[Senate Hearing 117-288]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-288
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
Part I
January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web:
http://www.govinfo.gov
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS,
FIRST SESSION--PART I
S. Hrg. 117-288
NOMINATIONS OF THE 117TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION_PART I
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Part I
January 19, 2021 thru July 20, 2021
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
47-861 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut MITT ROMNEY, Utah
TIM KAINE, Virginia ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
Jessica Lewis, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Responses to additional questions from the committee and any
other material submitted for the record are located at the end
of each hearing transcript.
PART I
January 19, 2021--Blinken, Hon. Antony J., of New York, nominated
to be U.S, Secretary of State--hearing transcript printed as a
separate document in two parts:
Part I: https://bit.ly/3yKm75m
Part II: https://bit.ly/3OIPCd6
January 27, 2021--Thomas-Greenfield, Hon. Linda, of Louisiana,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations--
hearing transcript printed as a separate document: https://
bit.ly/3AsQRsH
March 3, 2021.................................................... 1
Sherman, Hon. Wendy R., of Maryland, nominated to be Deputy
Secretary of State......................................... 9
McKeon, Hon. Brian, of the District of Columbia, nominated to
be Deputy Secretary of State (Management and Resources).... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 60
March 23, 2021................................................... 171
Power, Hon. Samantha, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development................................................ 176
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 207
April 15, 2021................................................... 263
Nuland, Hon. Victoria, of Virginia, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Political Affairs)..................... 269
Zeya, Uzra, of Virginia, nominated to be Under Secretary of
State (Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights)..... 272
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 292
April 28, 2021................................................... 353
Jenkins, Hon. Bonnie D., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Arms Control and International
Security).................................................. 357
Fernandez, Hon. Jose W., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment); Alternate Governor of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development; Alternate Governor of
the Inter-American Development Bank; and Alternate Governor
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.... 360
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 379
(iii)
May 19, 2021..................................................... 425
Nichols, Hon. Brian A., of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Western Hemisphere Affairs).. 431
Sison, Hon. Michele Jeanne, of Maryland, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Organization
Affairs)................................................... 434
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 462
June 9, 2021..................................................... 493
Andre, Hon. Larry Edward Jr., of Texas, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia.............. 498
Brewer, Hon. Maria E., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho....................... 500
Mushingi, Hon. Tulinabo S., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe................................................... 503
Aubin, Hon. Elizabeth Moore, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria.. 505
Young, Eugene S., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of Congo...................................... 508
Lamora, Christopher John, of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Cameroon..................... 510
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 520
June 15, 2021.................................................... 549
Robinson, Hon. Todd D., of New Jersey, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs)................................... 552
Holmgren, Brett M., of Minnesota, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Intelligence and Research)............. 555
Kritenbrink, Hon. Daniel J., of Virginia, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (East Asian and Pacific
Affairs)................................................... 558
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 583
July 13, 2021.................................................... 617
Smith, Gentry O., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Diplomatic Security)................... 622
Bitter, Hon. Rena, of the District of Colombia, nominated to
be Assistant Secretary of State (Consular Affairs)......... 625
Medina, Monica P., of Maryland, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs).................................... 628
Knapper, Marc Evans, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam............ 631
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 647
July 20, 2021.................................................... 669
Adams-Allen, Paloma, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (Management and Resources)....... 672
Donfried, Dr. Karen, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Assistant Secretary of State (European Affairs and
Eurasian Affairs).......................................... 675
Phee, Hon. Mary Catherine, of Illinois, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (African Affairs) and a member
of the Board of Directors of the African Development
Foundation................................................. 677
Witkowsky, Anne A., nominated to be Assistant Secretary of
State (Conflict and Stabilization Operations), and to be
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Development............. 680
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 695
----------
PART II
July 27, 2021.................................................... 739
Gifford, Hon. Rufus, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief
of Protocol and to have the rank of Ambassador during his
tenure of service.......................................... 745
Satterfield, Lee, of South Carolina, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Educational and Cultural
Affairs)................................................... 748
Coleman, Hon. Isobel, of New York, nominated to be Deputy
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (Policy and Programming)....................... 751
Lu, Hon. Christopher, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. for U.N. Management and Reform,
and to be the Alternative Representative to the Sessions of
the General Assembly of the U.N............................ 753
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 768
July 28, 2021.................................................... 789
Salazar, Hon. Kenneth Lee, of Colorado, nominated to be
Ambassador to the United Mexican States.................... 795
Lewis, Jessica, of Ohio, nominated to be Assistant Secretary
of State (Political-Military Affairs)...................... 798
Lu, Hon. Donald, of California, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (South Asian Affairs)................... 801
Escobari, Hon. Marcela, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (Latin America and the Caribbean) 803
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 823
August 5, 2021................................................... 859
Raynor, Hon. Michael, of Maryland, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Senegal, and to serve concurrently and
without additional compensation as Ambassador to the
Republic of Guinea-Bissau.................................. 863
Ostfield, Marc, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Paraguay................................ 866
Fitrill, Troy Damian, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Guinea.................................. 868
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 879
September 15, 2021 (a.m.)........................................ 889
Noyes, Hon. Julieta Valls, of Virginia, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (Population, Refugees, and
Migration)................................................. 896
Bauer, Hon. Denise Campbell, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the French Republic, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Principality of Monaco................... 899
Smith, Julianne, of Michigan, nominated to be U.S. Permanent
Representative to the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, with the rank and status of Ambassador....... 902
Leaf, Hon. Barbara A., of Virginia, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Near Eastern Affairs).................. 905
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 929
September 15, 2021 (p.m.)........................................ 997
Kang, Dr. C.S. Eliot, of New Jersey, nominated to be
Assistant Secretary of State (International Security and
Nonproliferation).......................................... 1000
Scheinman, Hon. Adam, of Virginia, nominated to be Special
Representative of the President for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, with the rank of Ambassador.............. 1002
Bernicat, Hon. Marcia Stephens Bloom, of New Jersey,
nominated to be Director General of the Foreign Service.... 1005
Crocker, Hon. Bathsheba Nell, of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Office of the
U.N. and other International Organizations in Geneva, with
the rank of Ambassador..................................... 1007
Carpenter, Dr. Michael, of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be U.S. Representative to the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1010
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1028
September 22, 2021............................................... 1067
Nides, Hon. Thomas R., of Minnesota, nominated to be
Ambassador to the State of Israel.......................... 1079
Cohen, David L., of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to Canada.................................................. 1082
Telles, Dr. Cynthia Ann, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Costa Rica................... 1084
Udall, Hon. Tom, of New Mexico, nominated to be Ambassador to
New Zealand and without additional compensation to be
Ambassador to the State of Samoa........................... 1115
Margon, Sarah, of New York, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.. 1118
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1130
September 28, 2021............................................... 1249
Markell, Hon. Jack A., of Delaware, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development, with the rank of Ambassador............... 1256
Gitenstein, Hon. Mark, of Washington, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the European Union, with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1259
Flake, Hon. Jeffrey Lane, of Arizona, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Turkey....................... 1262
McCain, Cindy Hensley, of Arizona, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Agencies for Food and
Agriculture with the rank of Ambassador during her tenure
of service................................................. 1265
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1285
September 29, 2021............................................... 1311
Sullenberger, Capt. C.B. III, of Texas, nominated to be U.S.
Representative on the Council of the International Civil
Aviation Organization with the rank of Ambassador during
his tenure of service...................................... 1318
Gawande, Dr. Atul A., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Assistant Administrator of the U.S. Agency for
International Development.................................. 1321
Cronin, Hon. Claire D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to Ireland...................................... 1323
Logsdon, Kent Doyle, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Moldova...................... 1336
Cromer, Sharon L., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of The Gambia................................. 1339
Palmer, Hon. Virginia E., of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Ghana........................ 1341
Van Vranken, Howard A., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Botswana..................... 1344
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1352
September 30, 2021............................................... 1411
Holgate, Hon. Laura S.H., of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency,
with the rank of Ambassador, and to be U.S. Representative
to the Vienna Office of the U.N. with the rank of
Ambassador................................................. 1415
McClelland, Caryn R., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam............................ 1418
Young, David John, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Republic of Malawi..................................... 1420
Pierangelo, Claire A., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador to the Union of the Comoros..................... 1423
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1431
----------
PART III
October 5, 2021 (a.m.)........................................... 1455
Stewart, Mallory A., of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be Assistant Secretary of State (Verification and
Compliance)................................................ 1458
Bondy, Steven C., of New Jersey, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Kingdom of Bahrain.................................. 1461
Carty, Lisa A., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council,
with the rank of Ambassador, and to be Alternate
Representative to the Sessions of the U.N. General Assembly
during her tenure of service............................... 1463
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1485
October 5, 2021 (p.m.)........................................... 1525
Hovenier, Jeffrey M., of Washington, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Kosovo....................... 1529
Murphy, Michael J., of New York, nominated to be Ambassador
to Bosnia and Herzegovina.................................. 1532
Pantaleon, Hon. Julissa Reynoso, of New York, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Spain, and to serve
concurrently and without additional compensation as
Ambassador the Principality of Andorra..................... 1535
Kennedy, Victoria Reggie, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Austria...................... 1538
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1558
October 20, 2021 (a.m.).......................................... 1583
Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the People's Republic of China............... 1587
Emanuel, Hon. Rahm, of Illinois, nominated to be Ambassador
to Japan................................................... 1626
Kaplan, Jonathan Eric, of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Singapore.................... 1630
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1651
October 20, 2021 (p.m.).......................................... 1735
Mahoney, Hon. Patricia, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Central African Republic................. 1739
Vrooman, Hon. Peter Hendrick, of New York, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Mozambique................... 1741
Haas Peter D., of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador to the
People's Republic of Bangladesh............................ 1744
Chung, Julie, of California, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka............. 1747
Shukan, Brian Wesley, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Republic of Benin................................... 1756
Fitzsimmons, Elizabeth Anne Noseworthy, of Delaware,
nominated to be Ambassador to the Togolese Republic........ 1759
Gilmour, Hon. David R., of the District of Columbia,
nominated to be Ambassador to the Republic of Equatorial
Guinea..................................................... 1762
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1771
October 26, 2021................................................. 1837
Stanley, Marc R., of Texas, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Argentine Republic......................................... 1840
Rashad, Hussain, of Virginia, nominated to be Ambassador-at-
Large for International Religious Freedom.................. 1846
Wong, Chantale Yokmin, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be U.S. director of the Asian Development Bank, with the
Rank of Ambassador......................................... 1849
Kugler, Dr. Adriana Debora, of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Executive Director of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development for a term of two years..... 1852
Toloui, Hon. Ramin, of Iowa, nominated to be Assistant
Secretary of State (Economic and Business Affairs)......... 1857
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1873
November 2, 2021................................................. 1941
Barrett, Hon. Thomas, of Wisconsin, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg................ 1947
Harpootlian, Jamie L., of South Carolina, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Slovenia..................... 1950
Miller, Scott, of Colorado, nominated to be Ambassador to the
Swiss Confederation, and to serve concurrently and without
additional compensation as Ambassador to the Principality
of Liechtenstein........................................... 1952
Ramanathan, Erik D., of Massachusetts, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Kingdom of Sweden........................ 1955
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 1968
December 1, 2021................................................. 1985
Nathan, Scott, of Massachusetts, nominated to be Chief
Executive Officer of the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation........................................ 1990
Bass, Hon. John R., of New York, nominated to be Under
Secretary of State (Management)............................ 1993
Brzezinski, Hon. Mark, of Virginia, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Poland....................... 1995
Adler, Michael M., of Florida, nominated to be Ambassador to
the Kingdom of Belgium..................................... 1998
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2024
December 14, 2021 (a.m.)......................................... 2067
Blome, Hon. Donald Armin, of Illinois, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan............. 2074
Garcetti, Hon. Eric M., of California, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of India........................ 2077
Gutmann, Dr. Amy, of Pennsylvania, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Federal Republic of Germany......................... 2080
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2094
December 14, 2021 (p.m.)......................................... 2151
Hill, Hon. Christopher R., of Rhode Island, nominated to be
Ambassador to the Republic of Serbia....................... 2156
Taylor, Michele, of Georgia, nominated to be U.S.
Representative to the U.N. Human Rights Council with the
rank of Ambassador during her tenure of service............ 2159
Albright, Alice, of the District of Columbia, nominated to be
Chief Executive Officer of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation................................................ 2162
Donnelly, Hon. Joseph, of Indiana, nominated to be Ambassador
to the Holy See............................................ 2164
Whyche-Shaw, Oren E., of Maryland, nominated to be U.S.
Director of the African Development Bank for a term of five
years...................................................... 2180
Ebong, Enoh T., of the District of Columbia, nominated to be
Director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.......... 2182
Nucete, Leopoldo Martinez, of Virginia, nominated to be U.S.
Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank
for a term of three years.................................. 2185
Jorge, Maria Fabiana, of the District of Columbia, nominated
to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-
American Development Bank.................................. 2188
Additional Material Submitted for the Record................. 2196
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 3, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present. Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Rubio, Romney, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz, Rounds, and
Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider nominees for two critical
positions, Wendy Sherman, to be Deputy Secretary of State and
Brian McKeon to be Deputy Secretary of State for Management and
Resources.
They are both foreign policy veterans with deep experience
in Congress and the executive branch. Ms. Sherman has held a
series of positions at the State Department and is well versed
in international affairs.
And I would be remiss if I did not mention Mr. McKeon's
long service as chief counsel and deputy staff director of this
committee under then-Chairman Biden. And we appreciate your
willingness to return to government service.
We thank your families as well because, inevitably they are
part of the sacrifice. And I understand before I begin my
opening comments that Senator Cardin would like to introduce
Ambassador Sherman.
So I will recognize him for that purpose.
Senator Cardin?
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much,
and Ranking Member Risch, thank you for the opportunity for me
to introduce a fellow Marylander, a person I deeply admire, a
seasoned diplomat, and, I think a person eminently qualified to
take on the responsibilities as Deputy Secretary of State, and
that is Wendy Sherman.
On a personal note, I have known Wendy Sherman and her
family for my entire adult life. Her family represents the
values of giving back to the community, and Wendy has chosen a
career in public service for all the right reasons. to make our
nation and world safer and to enhance opportunities for all.
So first, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank Wendy Sherman and
her family for their willingness to continue in public life. We
recognize the sacrifices and we thank you for being willing to
serve our country.
Ambassador Sherman is extraordinarily qualified to be the
Deputy Secretary of State. She started as a social worker and
rose to become the chief of staff for Senator Barbara Mikulski.
She knows how to work with senators.
She was the Secretary for Children and Youth in Maryland,
and also in Maryland the director of the Maryland Office of
Child Welfare. She has executive experience. She knows how to
manage and she knows how to lead.
She has incredible experience in the State Department as
the Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, a counselor
for State under Secretary Albright with the rank of ambassador,
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the first woman
to hold that position.
And if confirmed, she would be the first woman to hold the
Deputy Secretary of State position. She knows the strength of
diplomacy and how to use it to advance U.S. interests. I cannot
think of a person better suited for this position at this
moment.
We are at a critical junction. We have the opportunity to
rebuild America's diplomacy, to strengthen relations with
allies around the world, and to promote our reputation as a
global leader for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
In order to seize this opportunity, we need competent
compassionate leaders with deep expertise and integrity at the
helm of the U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Sherman is just
such a leader. She is, first and foremost, a dedicated public
servant.
Ambassador Sherman has spent her career advocating for
people and the public good. Ambassador Sherman is a tested
diplomat with particular experience in many of the most urgent
challenges that face our global community today. She has gone
toe to toe with our adversaries from North Koreans to Iranians,
and represented the United States with dignity, strength, and
poise.
Her achievements in community organizing and her experience
in both the public and private sector give her the knowledge
that she needs to carry out these responsibilities.
I want to just mention one example of why I think
Ambassador Sherman is the right person for this position, and
that is the Iran nuclear agreement. I was ranking member in
2015 when we took up the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and
let me just set the stage because I think many of us knew at
that time that there was the threatened veto by the Obama
administration.
There was a deep partisan division in the Senate as to how
we should review the act. And we worked together, Democrats and
Republicans, with the Obama administration. Ambassador Sherman
was extremely helpful in making this a reality.
And at the end of the day, that Review Act passed the
United States Senate by a 98 to 1 vote and Ambassador Sherman
was key in involving Congress as we reviewed that Act. She gave
each of us, Democrats and Republicans, a meaningful role in how
we could improve the Iran nuclear agreement. She was totally
engaged with complete transparency and trust.
Ambassador Sherman and I came out with different sides on
the final agreement. But I could not stress enough how
impressed I was of her commitment to include all of us in the
process. She gave us the opportunity to fully participate in
the best traditions of the executive and legislative branches
working together to strengthen U.S. foreign policy.
Ambassador Sherman is the type of leader we need at the
State Department, who knows how to work with Congress and will
always put the national security of America first.
I strongly endorse her nomination to be the next Deputy
Secretary of State. And, Mr. Chairman, if I might, I would ask
unanimous consent that a letter signed by a hundred former
ambassadors endorsing Ambassador Sherman's nomination to be
Deputy Secretary of State be made part of our record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
As an esteemed and respected senior member of the
committee, you are well served, Ambassador, by that glowing
introduction. So thank you, Senator Cardin.
Let me start off with a few remarks to set the scene and
then I will turn to the distinguished ranking member.
Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon, before diving into some
of the many regional and global issues we face, I want to
address the serious challenges facing the department and its
workforce. Our career Foreign and Civil Service are an
invaluable resource for this nation. Their dedication,
professionalism, and sacrifice deserve our gratitude and our
support.
But the last few years have been trying for the department.
There has been a stunning loss of expertise, steep declines in
morale, little accountability for those at the top, and the
department still has not achieved a workforce that reflects the
diversity of this great country.
It is clear that Secretary Blinken is setting a tone and,
critically, an example that will help restore trust and empower
career experts. In particular, I appreciate his commitment to
ensuring the department's leadership and workforce reflect the
diversity of our nation, including the recent announcement of a
chief diversity officer.
It will, of course, take more than just a good example and
hard work from the Secretary to rebuild the department and its
workforce. So I look forward to hearing from both of you how
you will contribute to that cause.
You also both know the importance of a strong relationship
between the department and Congress, and the value of engaging
and securing congressional support on major foreign policy
decisions.
In recent years, that relationship has suffered. I
appreciate the Secretary's acknowledgement of the problem and
commitment to productive engagement with this committee.
I expect to work with him and you to solidify this
relationship so it does not vacillate from one administration
to another.
While restoring and rebuilding the department, it is
essential we face a series of pressing challenges around the
world, and I will just highlight a few.
Iran. As I am sure you remember, I was not a proponent of
the JCPOA. But I also believe that the Trump administration's
decision to withdraw without a serious strategy involving our
allies would, ultimately, leave us less safe and Iran
emboldened.
Unfortunately, my belief has been realized by Iran's
continuing aggression across the Middle East, and the recent
IAEA report that Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is now more
than 14 times over the JCPOA limit.
Public reports suggest that they are three months away from
crossing the nuclear threshold. I support this administration's
plan to return to diplomacy. But returning to the JCPOA without
concrete actions to address Iran's other dangerous and
destabilizing activities will be insufficient.
I believe there is bipartisan support to find a
comprehensive diplomatic approach with Iran that includes
working closely with our European and regional partners, and I
urge you to do everything possible to find this sweet spot
because without bipartisan support, no deal will be durable.
Russia continues to challenge the U.S. and our allies
around the world. I welcome the President's commitment to lead
again on areas requiring cooperation like strategic stability
and arms control.
But the U.S. is also obligated to counter the Kremlin as it
uses its military to attack neighbors, its media to lie to the
world, its oligarchs to corrupt our economies, and its security
forces to repress peaceful democratic opposition.
Many on this committee are focused on the Nord Stream 2
pipeline. I have supported the legislation to stop the
pipeline. It is the congressional will as is evidenced by its
passage, and I urge the administration to act with urgency to
block this effort.
In our own hemisphere, democratic governance is under deep
strain. Cuba remains under the rule of an entrenched
dictatorship, Venezuela has been kidnapped by a brutal criminal
regime, and fraudulent deeply flawed presidential elections
have led to political crises in multiple countries.
Across the region, irregular migration has skyrocketed as
citizens face diminished prospects, crime, and lose hope in
their home countries. More than 5 million people have fled
Venezuela, and hundreds of thousands are abandoning El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Addressing these crises
require effective leadership.
I am very concerned about the viability of the peace
process in Afghanistan. The Taliban is, clearly, not abiding by
all of its commitments under the February 29th agreement,
calling into question the future of Afghan security and
governance. We need senior level focused attention from the
department.
On Africa, this was another casualty, in my view, of the
previous administration. We are losing the Sahel. The 2020
Global Terrorism Index found that seven of the 10 countries
with the largest increase in terrorism were in Sub-Saharan
Africa.
Fragile democratic transitions are in jeopardy in Ethiopia
and Sudan, while there is significant democratic backsliding in
Uganda, Tanzania, Mali, and the Ivory Coast. Here, too, we need
senior level attention and an effective strategy.
I will save China for questions, but it is, clearly, the
single most significant foreign policy challenge to the United
States. We must not only confront China, but we must compete
with it, and I look forward to hearing some of your views in
that regard.
Finally, I would be remiss not to note that there are
American citizens being held hostage or otherwise unlawfully or
wrongfully detained in many countries around the world. Iran is
among the worst offenders, including the wrongful detention of
Siamak Nimazi, and more recently, Emad Sharghi.
As the lead sponsor of the Robert Levinson Hostage Recovery
and Hostage Taking Accountability Act, which was signed into
law last year, I want and expect to work with you to make sure
the administration is doing everything possible to bring these
Americans home now and to implement the Levinson Act quickly
and effectively. There is nothing more critical to our foreign
policy than the safety of Americans abroad.
With that, I look forward to hearing your remarks and I
turn to the distinguished Ranking Member, Senator Risch, for
his comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I sincerely
appreciate that. And thank you to our two nominees. I want to
thank you both personally for spending the time you did meeting
with me.
Mr. McKeon, I really--on a personal note, I really
appreciate your personal history of my office, since your
attachment to that office goes back a long ways, and the way we
open the closets and find things in there, your history has
helped explain a lot of things as we occupy that office.
So thank you for that. I understand you worked there with
then Senator, now President Biden in that office and it was--
the history was interesting. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Ranking Member, can you expound upon what
you meant?
Senator Risch. I will not.
[Laughter.]
Senator Risch. But that is a question for you--Senator Lott
also had that office, and I have had many interesting
conversations with Senator Lott about the office and
attributing certain things to certain people is important to
me. So that is why I have appreciated Mr. McKeon's
enlightenment in that regard and it explains a lot of things.
Well, the two nominations that we have before us today are
really of considerable importance to our foreign policy and to
the effectiveness, certainly, of the State Department. The
Deputy Secretary of State will serve as chief advisor to
Secretary Blinken and serve as Secretary in his absence.
The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources
will serve as the lead officer for the management of personnel
and resources at the department. We all know on this committee
how important that is.
Neither job is a small task, but both serve critical
functions. While the deputy secretaries will face a broad array
of foreign policy issues during their tenure at the department,
there is a few pressing matters I would like to talk about and
I would like to focus on specifically today.
Obviously, I am not going to touch on them all. I think
Senator Menendez did an outstanding job of underscoring the
hotspots around the world and places that are of real concern
to us.
I also want to say that I fully agree with Senator Menendez
that China and the Indo-Pacific are critically important
regions in the world for United States interests and are going
to be the challenge of the 21st century.
The region is home to some of our strongest alliances and
partnerships, and it also is the primary arena of competition
with the People's Republic of China. The Chinese Communist
Party routinely engages in actions that deliberately undermine
U.S. interests and values, as well as the world order based on
free markets and the rule of law.
This includes anti-competitive economic statecraft,
aggressive military posture and coercion, and undermining the
tenets of free and open societies.
These are huge challenges for you and for all Americans.
The State Department's highest priority must be to
prioritize resource and respond to the challenges posed by the
Chinese Government.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is currently
negotiating a legislative package on China. There are a number
of bills kicking around already on the issue. Both sides of the
aisle are robustly engaged, and the American people deserve a
bill that is truly bipartisan and includes concrete and
effective proposals.
I look forward to continue working with Senator Menendez,
my other colleagues on the committee and off of the committee
as they are--the jurisdiction cuts across several committees on
the bill that would strengthen the U.S. position in this
competition, and I hope we can put forward a strong final
product.
China is not and cannot be a partisan issue. It is a common
issue for all Americans. A central theme for this
administration is rebuilding U.S. alliances in the Indo-
Pacific. The Biden team has, in fact, already inheriting strong
relationships, including with Japan, India, Australia, Taiwan,
and other nations.
In addition to the lofty discussions by the current
administration on that, I would really like to hear specific
steps that the administration is pursuing to support and
strengthen U.S. alliances.
One area that is particularly important to our alliances is
extended deterrence, which is fundamental and foundational to
the health and strength of U.S. alliances. The Biden
administration should commit to our declaratory policy and
nuclear posture will continue to reflect that reality. A
failure to modernize or an embrace of policies that dilute or
reduce our extended deterrence commitments will make the Indo-
Pacific more dangerous for us and for our allies.
Finally, on the Indo-Pacific, North Korea's nuclear and
ballistic missile programs continue to threaten both regional
stability and U.S. forces and allies in the region.
Ms. Sherman, I would appreciate your assessment of the
North Korea issue and your views on sanctions, the role of
high-level diplomacy, and other matters relevant to the Biden
administration's North Korea strategy, at least as much as we
can in an open setting like this. We did not get a chance to
talk about that much when we met. So I will be interested in
hearing that from you.
Another issue of acute concern for all of us is Iran. It is
really unfortunate that the Iran issue has divided us
frequently more than it has brought us together, and it is
absolutely critical to our relations in the region.
And my views on Iran are well known. I was robustly
engaged, as Mr. Chairman knows, when we talked about this years
ago, and several of my colleagues joined me in a letter to
President Biden last week outlining the Republican consensus on
an appropriate policy, moving forward.
I do not know if you have seen that or not, Ms. Sherman,
but it does detail mine and other members of this committee's
views on that. Those of us that signed it were Republican, but
that does not mean that those views are strictly Republican.
There are a number of us that have worked across the aisle on
this issue.
The Iranians are testing this administration. They tested
it again this morning, as most of you know, with an attack on
American facilities in the region, and the response at the
outset is going to be very important.
I have no doubt that all of you are at the present time
discussing that and, I would hope, creating a very worthwhile
appropriate response to the testing that is done. This testing,
I think, that the Iranians are doing is emblematic of the
mindset of these people. We are at a juncture here when people
are talking more and more about sitting down and trying to
resolve the issues and what do they do but ratchet up actual
kinetic attacks against Americans.
These people, as you told me, Ms. Sherman, are not to be
trusted and I agree with you on that, in that regard, and I
doubt there is many people sitting around the table here that
would think otherwise.
Rejoining the old nuclear accord is a nonstarter, as far as
I am concerned, and it does not meet U.S. national security
interest. The scope is too narrow and the sunsets have passed
or remain dangerously close.
Any new deal with Iran must address its regional terrorism,
ballistic missiles, and detention of U.S. persons, issues that
should be addressed now while the United States has leverage.
Additionally, there must be no sanctions relief or
unfreezing of assets as a precondition for negotiation.
Negotiations--I am troubled by what I hear are discussions
between the administration and South Korea, as far as
unfreezing some of those assets. That will not be helpful, I do
not believe.
To think you can enter into so-called follow-up agreements
on the issues that I just discussed--terrorism, ballistic
missiles, and detention of U.S. persons--anyone who would think
that you could enter into follow-up agreements with Iran after
a nuclear agreement I really believe is delusional.
We were--it has been proven in the past that that did not
work. It did not work then. It is not going to work now, and it
is all because of the Iranian mindset on these issues.
If you enter into a nuclear deal without dealing with these
other malign activities, that is a delusional activity, and I
believe, once again, we will walk away bamboozled by the
Iranians.
I assure you, Chinese, Russian, and diplomats--excuse me.
Finally, I want to--I want to address and I hope that the
Biden administration has demonstrated it has learned from the
mistakes of the past. I know we are going to struggle again
with if we get to an agreement point how that agreement is
ratified by America.
I know everyone here has seen what has happened in the
past. If, indeed, this is a partisan agreement, three years
from now we will see a cadre of Republicans trying to get the
nominee for the--to run as the party standard bearer, and once
again, you will go along the line and they are going to say,
what will you do with it, and they will say, well, I am going
to set it on fire. The next guy will say, well, I am going to
shred it. The next guy will say, well, I am going to put it on
the floor and stomp on it.
That is what happened last time and, of course, we wound up
where we wound up with that. This needs to be something that is
embraced by all of us, not one of the parties, and we will wind
up again where we are.
When I was--I cannot tell you how many times--I think all
of us had this experience--where our European partners and
others would come in and say, well, you know, America, you
breached your agreement that you entered into.
And I kept telling them, you did not have an agreement with
America. You had an agreement with Barack Obama and with John
Kerry. An agreement with America is a treaty that goes through
the United States Senate and is ratified by a vote by the
United States Senate.
Now, I understand that they have already--the
administration has already said that is a nonstarter. I am
unhappy to hear that. But, hopefully, at least we will have
very close to unanimous agreement on--agreement that--as we go
forward.
Well, finally, I want to briefly address the administrative
role of Deputy Secretary positions. If we did not appreciate
the importance of U.S. global health security before, we
certainly must now.
As the deputy is charged with coordinating policy and
resources, it will be incumbent upon you to ensure that the
department is organized and resourced to lead global health
diplomacy and coordinate the implementation of a coherent
global health security strategy overseas.
I cannot underscore enough how important this is on global
health.
It will also be imperative that you seek reforms to the
department where necessary. My staff and I have heard from
numerous current and former diplomats over the last few years
about how difficult it is to get outside of our embassies and
consulates abroad to meet with the locals.
The department's approach has been so cautious that it
often stops our diplomats from doing their jobs. I assure you,
the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats are not having
these issues, and in order to stay ahead of our adversaries and
advance our interests, the State Department needs to rebalance
its risk tolerance as far as ambassadors and other people being
able to get out from the embassies to do their jobs.
I also look forward to working with you as the department
establishes an Office of Sanctions Coordination pursuant to the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021. That should strengthen
the role of the department in development and implementation of
sanctions policy.
This has been a matter of tension between the first and
second branch for some time. Hopefully, the Act will smooth
that out.
I welcome your views on all these important issues. Again,
I thank you both for being here today and I look forward to
hearing your thoughts on these important matters.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will now proceed to the testimony of both of our
nominees for the committee's information. At some point,
Senator Cardin and I will rotate here because we have a vote in
the Senate Finance Committee for the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
So if we get up at one point, it is not because of what you
said but because we need to go cast a vote.
So we will turn to our nominees.
Ambassador Sherman, as to both of you, your full statement
will be entered for the record. We ask you to summarize it more
or less in about five minutes. And then we will get to a pre-
agreed with the ranking member round of seven-minute questions
for each member.
Ambassador Sherman?
STATEMENT OF HON. WENDY R. SHERMAN OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and thank you, Senator Cardin for your very kind and
generous introduction.
I am grateful to my husband, Bruce, who sits behind me, for
his love and support, and my daughter, Sarah, who inspires me
with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my grandsons, Ezra and Oscar,
seven and five, watching in Boston, and my sister, Andrea, her
husband, Kevin, their son, Eric, along with numerous friends
and colleagues have sustained me in their love and counsel.
I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in
nominating me to be Deputy Secretary of State.
If confirmed, I pledge to work every day to sustain that
trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate. President
Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts diplomacy
center stage where we lead not just by the example of our power
but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy
benefits and serves the American people.
This vision is one that is deeply personal to me. In 1945,
my parents were present at the founding of the United Nations.
My father, then an active duty Marine still recovering from
injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, thought it was important
that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to prevent
war and spare future generations from suffering their
generation endured.
This same sentiment led him to help found what later became
the American Veterans Committee. My parents instilled in me a
profound commitment to making a safer better world for the
American people. That commitment led me to social work and
community advocacy, and later to politics and public service as
a means of providing improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool
of first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected
and competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis
to nuclear proliferation, the challenges that threaten the
prosperity and security of the American people will only be
solved by working together in common purpose with our allies
and partners.
To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships,
strengthen our democratic institutions, increase economic
opportunity, and enhance respect for democratic principles,
including freedom of the press, religious liberty, human
rights, and the rule of law.
Engaging in the broadest way possible not only with
government officials but with the private sector and all of
civil society--youth, women and girls, journalists, and opinion
leaders--is critical to our success in this effort.
When I served as the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, I traveled to 54 countries to advance Americans'
interests and values. I went to Burma in support of further
democratic and economic reforms, and met with both Aung San Suu
Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing.
I traveled to Bangladesh after the horrific garment factory
accidents to press on worker safety and labor rights. In
Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment and welcomed
rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African
Leaders Initiative.
I traveled to almost every conflict zone and engaged
extensively with our transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and
international partners who work with us to resolve those
conflicts.
If confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and
relationships to bear on the challenges that face our country
today. Among all of these challenges posed by the ambitions of
China to rival the United States, the determination of Russia
to damage and disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other
threats posed by Iran and North Korea, to compete and win the
strategic competition with China we have to invest in America
and confront and challenge Beijing where we must, including on
human rights and democratic values.
We will act firmly in defense of our national interests in
response to actions by Russia that harm us or our allies.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, ask for one more moment. Thank you.
With respect to Iran, as the lead of the U.S. negotiating
team for the JCPOA, I remain clear eyed about the threat that
Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies.
I am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA. But I
would note that 2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor
2016 when it was implemented. The facts on the ground have
changed, the geopolitics of the region have changed, and the
way forward must similarly change.
Moving forward on the challenges that our country faces
will not be easy. But I firmly believe in the capacity of the
United States to meet those challenges through renewed global
leadership and the exceptionally talented staff of the State
Department.
During my prior service, I experienced the unparalleled
professionalism of the State Department civil servants, Foreign
Service officers, locally engaged staff, and contractors. I
also saw the personal sacrifices and contributions of their
families. I hope I will have the opportunity again to work with
these extraordinary women and men.
Of course, our diplomacy to be successful in any issue we
must engage with you, with Congress. I am honored to now be
participating in my fourth nomination hearing before this
committee. The first time was as the nominee to be the State
Department's Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs in
1993.
I have learned firsthand the need for close and
constructive coordination with Congress with consultation, not
just with notification. As a former congressional chief of
staff, I have a deep appreciation for the role of the Congress
and the executive branch.
Secretary Blinken has spoken to this committee of his and
the President's commitment to restoring Congress' traditional
role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look
forward to our discussion today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Wendy R. Sherman
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
And thank you Senator Cardin for your kind introduction.
I am grateful to my husband Bruce for his love and support and my
daughter Sarah, who inspires me with her work. Bruce, Sarah, my
grandsons Ezra and Oscar, and my sister Andrea, her husband Kevin,
their son Erik, along with numerous friends and colleagues, have
sustained me in their love and counsel.
I am also deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President
Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their trust in me in nominating me to
be Deputy Secretary of State. If confirmed, I pledge to work every day
to sustain that trust and the trust of this committee and the Senate.
President Biden has outlined a foreign policy vision that puts
diplomacy center stage, where we lead not just by the example of our
power but the power of our example, and where our foreign policy
benefits and serves the American people. This vision is one that is
deeply personal to me. In 1945, my parents were present at the founding
of the United Nations. My father, then an active-duty Marine still
recovering from injuries he suffered at Guadalcanal, felt it was
important that he and my mother attend the founding of a forum to
prevent war and spare future generations from the suffering their
generation endured. This same sentiment led him to help found what
later became the American Veterans Committee.
My parents instilled in me a profound commitment to making a safer,
better world for the American people. That commitment led me to social
work and community advocacy, and later, to politics and public service
as a means of improving the lives of my fellow citizens.
As the President has emphasized, diplomacy must be the tool of
first resort of American leadership in a more interconnected and
competitive world. From the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear
proliferation, the challenges that threaten the prosperity and security
of the American people will only be solved by working together and in
common purpose with our allies and partners.
To do so, we have to rebuild alliances and partnerships; strengthen
our democratic institutions; increase economic opportunity; and enhance
respect for democratic principles, including freedom of the press,
religious liberty, human rights, and the rule of law. Engaging in the
broadest way possible, not only with government officials, but with the
private sector and all of civil society--youth, women and girls,
journalists and opinion leaders--is critical to our success in these
efforts.
When I served as Under Secretary of State, I travelled to 54
countries to advance American interests and values. I went to Burma in
support of further democratic and economic reforms and met with both
Aung San Suu Kyi and Min Aung Hlaing. I traveled to Bangladesh after
the horrific garment factory accidents to press on worker safety and
labor rights. In Africa, I pushed on countering Chinese investment, and
welcomed rising leaders on the continent as part of the Young African
Leaders Initiative. I traveled to almost every major conflict zone, and
engaged extensively with our Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific allies and
international partners who work with us to resolve those conflicts. If
confirmed, I will bring a breadth of experience and relationships to
bear on the challenges that face our country today.
Among those challenges are those posed by the ambitions of China to
rival the United States, the determination of Russia to damage and
disrupt our democracy, and the nuclear and other threats posed by Iran
and North Korea. To compete and win the strategic competition with
China, we have to invest in America and confront and challenge Beijing
where we must, including on human rights and democratic values. We will
act firmly in defense of our national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. With respect to Iran, as the lead
of the U.S. negotiating team for the JCPOA, I remain clear-eyed about
the threat that Iran poses to our interests and those of our allies. I
am ready to address your questions about the JCPOA, but would note that
2021 is not 2015 when the deal was agreed, nor 2016 when it was
implemented. The facts on the ground have changed, the geopolitics of
the region have changed, and the way forward must similarly change.
Moving forward on the challenges our country faces will not be
easy, but I firmly believe in the capacity of the United States to meet
these challenges through renewed global leadership and the
exceptionally talented staff of the State Department. During my prior
service, I experienced the unparalleled professionalism of the State
Department's civil servants, foreign service officers, locally engaged
staff, and contractors. I also saw the personal sacrifices and
contributions their families make for our nation. I am grateful that,
if confirmed, I will again have the opportunity to benefit from the
expertise and dedication of all of the women and men who advance
American interests every day in all of the 180 countries with which we
have diplomatic relations.
Of course, for our diplomacy to be successful on any issue, we must
engage with Congress. I am honored to now be participating in my fourth
nomination hearing before this committee. The first time was as the
nominee to be the State Department's Assistant Secretary for
Legislative Affairs in 1993.
Since then, in three decades of work in foreign policy and national
security, I have learned first-hand the need for close and constructive
coordination with Congress. As a former Congressional Chief of Staff, I
gained a deep appreciation of the Senate's responsibility to provide
oversight of the Executive Branch. Secretary Blinken has spoken to this
committee of his and the President's commitment to restoring Congress's
traditional role as a partner in our foreign policy making, and if
confirmed, I pledge to play a leading role in that effort.
With that commitment, I welcome your questions and look forward to
our discussion today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Sherman.
Mr. McKeon?
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN MCKEON OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
NOMINATED TO BE THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of
the committee, it is an honor to appear before you as the
President's nominee to be the Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources.
I want to start by thanking President Biden, Secretary of
State Blinken, for selecting me for this position. It is
particularly gratifying to appear before this committee, which
was my professional home for 12 years when I worked for the
Democratic staff supporting then Senator Biden when he was
chairman or ranking member from 1997 to 2009.
I spent a lot of hours sitting in confirmation hearings up
in 419 and I never imagined I would be on the side of the dais
as the President's nominee.
I would not be here without the strong support of my
family, particularly my parents and my wife. My parents were
both children of the Depression. They are no longer with us,
but they taught us the value of hard work and perseverance.
My father, who was a lawyer by training but spent most of
his time in politics, sparked my interest in public service and
taught me that politics is a noble profession.
My wife, Liz, who worked in this chamber for 25 years for
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better
person, giving me unstinting love and support and advice and
helping me in tolerating all the long hours that go with
government service.
My over 20 years of service in this chamber and eight years
in the executive branch have given me a strong appreciation for
the many challenges confronting our country, long experience in
national security, and a deep knowledge of how the two
political branches operate.
I believe I have demonstrated an ability to manage large
organizations to get things done and to work across party
lines, including on this committee with the staffs of Senator
Helms and Senator Lugar.
I also have a great respect for the role of Congress and
foreign affairs. The debates in this chamber on the Gulf War,
the Iraq War, the Balkans conflicts, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance
were, for me, among the most memorable and important of my time
here, because in a democratic society matters of war and peace
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of
the American people through their representatives here in
Congress.
I know from this experience that not all wisdom resides in
the executive branch. I firmly believe that we share the same
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well
being of our country, although I know we will always--not
always agree.
As Secretary Blinken has made clear in his recent message
to the workforce, the department must consider Congress to be a
full partner in its work.
My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the department
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security
challenges of this century.
This starts with investing in our greatest asset, the over
75,000 public servants who work in Washington at over 270 posts
around the world and in dozens of facilities in the United
States.
Our diplomats are on the frontlines of America's security
and interests, and they deserve our support and efforts to
strengthen their ranks. We must ensure that we recruit,
develop, and retain a diverse and professional workforce that
is prepared and empowered to advance not only our traditional
diplomatic interests but also to address the pressing
challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased
economic competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and
not least the long-term strategic competition with China.
Let me say a few words about diversity, which will be a top
priority for all of our senior leadership. Stated simply, the
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless the
workforce is fully representative of America.
We must make real gains in advancing diversity, equity, and
inclusion through concrete actions to dismantle structural
barriers at the department. Meaningful change requires
sustained focus on three key areas. talent management,
transparency, and accountability.
Secretary Blinken has made clear he will have such a focus
and so will I, if confirmed. If confirmed, I also intend to
devote considerable attention to ensuring that we are aligning
our resources with our policy priorities, both investments in
State operations and in State and USAID foreign assistance
programs, and that we are good stewards of the taxpayer
dollars.
For the last several years, Congress has, on a bipartisan
basis, protected the international affairs budget from
requested cuts, which has, thankfully, provided a solid
foundation on which to build.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure
the department has the resources and authorities it needs to
meet the challenges we face.
I am committed to ensuring the effective management of
these resources. But we will need your help to make necessary
investments in our workforce and information technology, and
building and maintaining safe and secure embassies and in our
foreign assistance programs.
With that, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian P. McKeon
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee, it is
an honor to appear before you as the President's nominee to be Deputy
Secretary of State for Management and Resources.
I would like to start by thanking President Biden and Secretary of
State Blinken for selecting me for this position. It is particularly
gratifying to appear before this committee, which was my professional
home for 12 years, when I worked on the Democratic staff supporting
then-Senator Biden during his tenure as Chairman or Ranking Member from
1997 to 2009. I spent many hours sitting in confirmation hearings; I am
not sure that I ever imagined sitting on this side of the dais as the
President's nominee.
I would not be here without the strong support of my family,
particularly my parents and my wife. My parents, both children of the
Depression, taught me the value of hard work and perseverance. My
father, a lawyer by training whose main avocation was politics, sparked
my interest in public service, and taught me that politics is a noble
profession. My wife, who spent 25 years working in this chamber for
five different senators, has, simply put, made me a better person. She
provided unstinting love, support, and advice, and patiently endured
the long hours that I spent away from home over the years, for which I
am deeply grateful.
My over 20 years of service working in the Senate, and eight years
in the Executive branch, have given me a strong appreciation for the
many challenges that confront our country, long experience in
international affairs and national security policy, and a deep
knowledge of how the two political branches operate. I believe I have
demonstrated an ability to manage large organizations, to get things
done, and to work across party lines, including through close
collaboration with the staffs of Senators Helms and Lugar on this
committee.
I also greatly respect the role of Congress in foreign affairs. The
debates in this chamber on the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the Balkan
conflicts, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the expansion of the
North Atlantic Alliance were among the most memorable and important of
my time here--because in a democratic society, matters of war and peace
must be publicly debated and require the informed consent of the
American people, through their representatives in the Congress.
I know intuitively from this experience that not all wisdom resides
in the Executive Branch. I firmly believe that we share the same
commitment to protecting and advancing the security and well-being of
our country, and that we must work together. As Secretary Blinken made
clear in a recent message to the workforce, the Department of State
must consider the Congress a full partner in its work.
My first priority, if confirmed, is to help the Department of State
build back better to meet the diplomatic and security challenges of the
21st century. That starts with investing in its greatest asset--the
over 75,000 public servants who work in Washington, at over 270 posts
around the world, and in dozens of facilities around the United States.
Our diplomats are on the front lines of America's security and
interests. They deserve our support and efforts to strengthen their
ranks. We must ensure that we recruit, develop and retain a diverse and
professional workforce that is prepared and empowered to advance not
only our traditional diplomatic interests, but also to address the
pressing challenges of this era, such as climate change, global health
security, irregular migration, advanced technology, increased economic
competitiveness, threats to democratic governance, and, not least,
long-term strategic competition with China.
Let me say a few words in particular about diversity, which will be
a top priority for all of the senior leadership. Stated simply, the
Department of State cannot fully represent America unless its workforce
is fully representative of America. We must make real gains in
advancing diversity, equity, and inclusion through concrete actions to
dismantle structural barriers at the Department. Meaningful change will
require sustained focus on three key areas: talent management,
transparency, and accountability. Secretary Blinken has made clear he
will have such a focus, and so will I, if confirmed. As an initial
action, the Secretary has followed through on his commitment to this
committee by creating a Chief Diversity and Inclusion Office, reporting
directly to him.
If confirmed, I also intend to devote considerable attention to
ensuring that we are aligning our resources with our policy
priorities--both investments in our operations and in State and USAID
foreign assistance programs--and that we are good stewards of taxpayer
dollars.
For the last several years, the Congress has, on a bipartisan
basis, protected the international affairs budget from requested cuts,
which has thankfully provided a solid foundation on which to build as
we undertake the collective work to revitalize the Department of State.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to ensure the
Department has the resources and authorities it needs to meet the many
challenges we face. I am committed to ensuring the effective management
of the resources made available to us, but we will need your help to
make the necessary investments in our workforce, in information
technology, in building and maintaining safe and secure embassies, and
in our foreign assistance programs that seek to advance our national
interests.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today. I look forward
to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both.
We will start our round of seven minutes for members. I am
just going to ask you some generic questions on behalf of the
full committee, and I will reserve the balance of my time to
intercede as I believe is appropriate.
When I met with both of you, we discussed the department
will need to rebuild and repair its relationship with the
committee after the last few years.
Based on our discussion and the points that you have made
in your opening statement, I am confident you understand the
importance of a constructive relationship between the
department and Congress. So I have a few quick questions along
these lines and I would just appreciate a yes or no answer to
them.
Do you agree that the State Department is accountable to
Congress and the American people?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. I do.
The Chairman. Do you commit that the department will keep
this committee fully and currently informed on the department's
activities?
Ms. Sherman. I do.
Mr. McKeon. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you understand and agree that a
constructive relationship between the department and this
committee requires meaningful engagement and consultation with
the committee while policies are being developed, not after the
fact, and do you commit to ensuring that type of meaningful
engagement?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. Yes, I do.
The Chairman. And do you commit to working with this
committee to provide answers on outstanding requests that your
predecessors withheld from Congress through years of
stonewalling?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, to the extent that I know what they are,
Senator.
Mr. McKeon. Same answer, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
With that, I will turn to Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Ms. Sherman, let us get right to the heart of the thing to
begin with. Your comments about this not being 2015 are greatly
appreciated.
I think we all understand that. You say you are clear eyed
about the challenge in front of you and I--in your defense, I
will say that you are carrying water for different people this
time than you were last time. I and a lot of my colleagues here
were deeply, deeply disappointed, as you know, in your
performance in negotiating in getting to the JCPOA, and I got
to tell you, one of the most surreal experiences I have had in
the United States Senate is the hearing we had where I was
asking you about the annexes or whatever you call them, the
supplements to the JCPOA, and you would not tell me what was in
them.
And as you know, I serve on the Intelligence Committee so I
got the same national security clearance that you do and did at
the time. And yet, you wanted me to support the agreement but
would not tell me what was in part of the agreement.
And I could not do that and I will not do that, and I will
not do that in the future.
So what--you say you are clear eyed on this. We are all
clear eyed, we hope. But tell me, what are your thoughts about
putting in front of us another agreement that has got annexes
or agreements that we cannot see, and yet you want us to
support them? Are we headed down that road again?
Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, thank you very much for your
candor and for recalling a situation that was uncomfortable all
the way around.
Senator Risch. I bet it was.[Laughter.]
Ms. Sherman. What I want to say to you and to all the
members of the committee today is that President Biden has been
very clear about what he wants to achieve as has Secretary
Blinken with regards to Iran, and it is along the lines of both
the letter that you and Republicans sent as well as the
sentiments that have been expressed by the Democrats.
And that is that we have to ensure that Iran does not
obtain a nuclear weapon, that there be compliance-for-
compliance, as the President has said, and Iran is a long way
from compliance, as we all know.
The President and the Secretary have also said that we must
work with you and with our partners and allies to address all
the other issues of concern regarding Iran, and there are many.
their ballistic missile production, their state sponsorship of
terrorism, their really concerning behavior in the region,
their arms sales, their human rights abuses of their own
people, putting American citizens in Evin Prison. I can go on
and on about all of the range of concerns.
So, in my view, Senator, and I do not have access to
intelligence right now, which is considerably important in this
situation. I do not have access to all of the thinking of the
administration because I am not in it.
But if confirmed, I would want to learn all of that. So in
the Deputies Committee, I can bring my experience. But the
decisions that need to be taken will be along the lines of
those laid out by the President of the United States and the
Secretary of State, and indeed have to be decided on the merits
of where we are today, not nostalgia for what might have been.
I think this is a very tough problem set. I think it will
require serious discussions, as the chairman said, with the
United States Senate on both sides of the aisle to get your
views, to understand.
I do think we have the same objectives and I think the
issue is how to achieve them, how to sequence various steps to
get there, how to work with our allies and partners to make it
real.
So I think we have a tough road ahead. You will be very
important to that policymaking, as the chairman laid out and as
you and I discussed in your office, and I look forward to those
conversations and to working in this administration, if
confirmed, to deal with what is a very difficult challenge.
Senator Risch. Well, I agree it is a difficult challenge.
As you and I discussed when you were in my office, I consider
the malign activity of Iran just as important as the nuclear
aspects of it.
And as I told you, the nuclear aspects of it, for me,
become less important when I know that there is a country on
this planet which has a tolerance that is substantially lower
than ours for Iran developing a nuclear weapon.
Indeed, they consider it existential and they have said to
me over and over and over again they will never allow that to
happen. You guys can sign any agreements you want. You can do
whatever you want. But Iran is not going to have a nuclear
agreement, and these people mean it when they say it.
So, to me, it is all well and good to talk about enrichment
and all that sort of thing. But the other thing is the
terrorism, the ballistic missiles, the human rights, and on and
on and on, as you have said to me are equally important to the
nuclear aspects of this.
The enrichment thing really bothers me. We argued about
this last time, and I could not believe that the JCPOA allowed
enrichment. There is only one reason that Iran wants to do
enrichment and that is if it eventually wants to pursue a
nuclear weapon.
I do not believe them when they say, oh, well, this is for
peaceful nuclear energy. I know you do not believe them in that
regard. I do not think anybody believes them in that regard.
But they say those kinds of things frequently.
Is it still the position of the--of the administration that
they are going to go it alone and you are not going to submit
an agreement as a treaty under the Constitution of the United
States to the Congress?
Ms. Sherman. I do not know what the ultimate decision will
be, Senator, because I do not know where we will be. I think
that the Biden administration is absolutely committed to
following the law and doing what is appropriate and necessary
to whatever gets decided.
But since I do not know, none of us today know what the
ultimate outcome will be here, it is hard to make a commitment
in advance. And I am not in a position--I am not an
administration official. Hope to be, if confirmed by this
committee and by the United States Senate, to give you a
definitive answer.
Senator Risch. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKeon, thank you for your willingness to serve,
continue to serve, returning to the political life. We
appreciate it very much. I appreciate the opportunity that we
had to talk about the management at the State Department.
I want to give you an opportunity to talk about the
commitment, if confirmed, to deal with the diversity at the
State Department. This committee has for many years been
concerned about the opportunities within the State Department
for all people, diversity, so our State Department looks like
our nation and can represent a global community more
effectively.
I was pleased to hear that Secretary Blinken announced a
new Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer. I do not believe
that person has been named yet.
Could you just share with the committee your commitment and
strategies to improve diversity at the State Department if you
are confirmed?
Mr. McKeon. Yes. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin.
The President has made his commitment and he has made it
clear that he wants to have a government that looks like
America and that, of course, includes the Department of State.
The department does okay in recruiting underrepresented
communities. It is not doing well in retention and promotion,
and the data of officials at senior levels bear that out.
The GAO just did a report, I believe, for this committee in
the House committee that emphasizes that once again. As you
said, the Secretary has appointed or he has announced he will
have a Chief Diversity Office. There is, I believe, a person
who has tentatively been chosen and is probably embedding. So I
hope that announcement will be made soon.
We really need to make it a priority across the board in
everything that we are doing and emphasize to all of our
leaderships that this has to be a priority in the bureaus and
in overseas missions.
What we really need to focus on, among other things, on the
retention and promotion side is transparency, giving people
opportunities to advance in a fair and objective way and making
opportunities available for people to show that they have
leadership skills and the capabilities.
And we need to understand why are people leaving, why are
they not finding the Foreign Service to be a good professional
home.
So the department has done some work on that. There is a
lot more that needs to be done, and you can be sure that I am
going to spend a lot of time with the Chief Diversity Officer
drilling down on this and working to make material progress.
Senator Cardin. I can assure you that there is great
interest in this committee in this, your efforts, and I would
ask that, if confirmed, you share with us your strategies and
work with us, so we can have accountability at the end of the
day.
Mr. McKeon. Definitely will do that, Senator. As the
Secretary said in his confirmation hearing, we will be measured
in significant part on this issue if we have succeeded or
failed to make significant progress in the next few years.
Senator Cardin. Ambassador Sherman, I want to talk about
one of the issues that we have talked about before and that is
President Biden's commitment to embrace our values in our
foreign policy. We just saw with the report released in regards
to the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi some transparency,
which I think was very much appreciated.
But there is also frustration that because of the position
of the Crown Prince, there may not be full sanctions imposed
against him under--using Magnitsky sanctions or the like.
So I want to give you an opportunity to express how we will
advance U.S. values. There is legislation that Senator Wicker
and I have put in to make the Global Magnitsky statute a
permanent statute. It is, certainly, gaining global
credibility.
We have also, with Senator Young, introduced legislation
that would provide a clearer direction on dealing with anti-
corruption around the globe.
Can you just share with me your commitment to advance U.S.
values as we embrace countries that we have to have strategic
relations with? We recognize that. But it needs to be under the
umbrella of advancing U.S. values.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator Cardin, and thank
you for your leadership and working with Senator Young as well
on both the Global Magnitsky Act and trying to figure out how
to better deal with the challenge of corruption around the
world, which is, certainly, a very difficult and very critical
challenge in so many ways.
Where the horrifying murder of Jamal Khashoggi is
concerned, the administration, the Biden/Harris administration,
has made it very clear from the start, as has Secretary
Blinken, that the administration is recalibrating its
relationship with Saudi Arabia.
It has done that by making public the report that had been
kept nonpublic for so long about the murder and the
accountability for that murder. The President took a very
important step by saying that we would no longer sell offensive
weapons to Saudi Arabia because we want to see an end to the
Yemen war, which is, in fact, a very bipartisan view up here in
the Senate, that that conflict should end, that it is a
humanitarian disaster.
I think that we will, in other ways, and I think that when
the President spoke to the King of Saudi Arabia he was quite
clear that we will not be silent on human rights. We will speak
up and we have, in fact, sanctioned many people in Saudi Arabia
and we have said that many are barred from visas, though that
visa list is not made public, Senator, given the rules of
privacy around visas.
Senator Cardin. And I understand that, and the Magnitsky
statute is a statute that involves the Congress and the
executive branch together, and we will be making
recommendations to the administration. In many cases, this will
be nonpublic correspondence in order to investigate before
sanctions are considered or imposed.
Will you commit to consider the names that we present to
you for sanctions in a deliberative manner and work with us to
make sure that the intent of the Global Magnitsky statute is in
fact carried out?
Ms. Sherman. I certainly believe, Senator, that on all
issues we should make a commitment to be open to your ideas,
your thoughts, your counsel, your advice, and so yes.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Rubio?
Senator Rubio. Thank you. Thank you both for being here,
for your willingness to serve.
Ms. Sherman, let me just ask you quickly as we start out,
what is your understanding of former Secretary Kerry's role? Is
he going to be involved in Israeli-Palestinian issues? Is he
going to be involved in negotiating the Iran issue? Or is he
solely going to be focused on the climate issues?
Ms. Sherman. My understanding, Senator, is that former
Secretary Kerry is the President's Special Envoy on climate and
that is his sole responsibility and it is quite a large one.
Should take up most of his time.
Senator Rubio. Since January 2017, have you met with any
Iranian Government officials?
Ms. Sherman. I have met with Iranian officials. I cannot
remember the last time that it happened, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Who did you meet with?
Ms. Sherman. I have met with Foreign Minister Zarif. I have
met with my former counterparts, Abbas Araghchi and Majid
Ravanchi, who is now the ambassador to the United Nations.
And when I had such meetings, they were on the margins of
the Munich Security Conference, where, as you know, everyone
attends from all over the world.
Before and after these meetings, Senator, I was, I think,
most of the time if not every time in touch with then Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Hale to let him know that I was
having such a meeting and to let him know that I would
certainly stay in touch.
I would represent America's policies, whether I agreed with
them or not, and in those meetings my sole purpose was to urge
the Iranians not to take actions that were against the deal
that would escalate the security situation.
And most importantly, Senator, I am appealed to by almost
every family who has someone detained in Evin Prison, and so my
major purpose, quite frankly, in those meetings was to urge the
Iranians that I know to get Americans out of Evin Prison
because it is the most heartbreaking set of meetings anyone can
have is to sit with families and hear how horrifying the
situation is.
Senator Rubio. And I would agree with that, and I
appreciate your work on that and I appreciate your answer on
having been in touch with members of the previous
administration.
And let me--you did write an article in July of 2020 where
you wrote, among other things, an area I care about is, as a
result of Trump's failure people, you know, inside--the people
of Cuba and Venezuela face a bitter future.
So I wanted to explore, in particular, just a number of the
changes that were made under the Trump administration to see if
you think that those were bad ideas. One of them was a measure
that prohibited doing business with entities controlled, owned,
and operated by the Cuban military, and in particular, one of
them was the one that controls all the remittances. They take
10 percent right off the top.
So you can send remittances to Cuba. You just have to do it
through a bank. It just cannot be through the hands of this--
that takes--skims off 10 percent and you can do business with
individual private Cubans. You just cannot do business with
entities controlled by the Cuban military and the regime.
Was that a bad idea?
Ms. Sherman. I do not know the details well enough,
Senator, but I do agree that we should take measures that say
to the Cuban Government that we do not support their way
forward and that we support the freedom of the Cuban people.
Senator Rubio. Well, I only--the details are as follows.
The goal of this strategy was to say, if you want to do
business with an individual, a private Cuban, in fact, the
Trump administration made it easier to send remittances to
Cubans who are using that money to open up a private business,
to the extent that they are allowed to do it. You are allowed
to send remittances.
If they can do it through a bank you can, obviously, take
the cash in yourself as an individual. The one thing they said
is you cannot send it through this entity, which skims 10
percent off the top. And that is just the beginning of how they
take the money that you also have to spend it at their stores.
And you cannot do business, not even with the Ministry of
Tourism, per se, in some cases, but with the entities
controlled by the Cuban military.
The gist of it is if individual Cubans are allowed to
engage in commercial activity, the United States can do a lot
of things with them. But if it is going to be run through the
clearing house of an entity controlled by the military in Cuba,
they cannot. That is the prohibited entity.
So I am curious. I mean, that was the heart and soul of the
Trump policy. Yet, you say somehow it leads to a bleak future
for the Cuban people. And so I am curious of those things you
thought were bad ideas as I have described it to you.
Ms. Sherman. So, Senator, I believe that it is very
important that we support the Cuban people and that we take
actions that increase their chances for freedom, their chances
for private commercial activity, their ability to get
remittances, which increases their own economic power.
The ability that--the primary objectives, is my
understanding of the Biden/Harris administration, is to move
forward on the freedom and the need for democracy in Cuba, and
the greatest emissaries for that are the American people led by
Cuban Americans.
And, quite frankly, Senator, you and I have not had a
chance to talk. I know how much you know about Cuba. I know how
much you know about what we need to do to help support the
Cuban people, and I look forward to further discussions with
you about that.
So yes, if there are ways to support the Cuban people, I am
all for it.
Senator Rubio. Okay. And you also mentioned Venezuela in
that piece. The cornerstone of the Trump approach was the
recognition of Juan Guaido, the legitimately elected president
or the President of the legitimately elected National Assembly,
and imposing sanctions that he and almost the entire opposition
supported, which sanctioned how the regime stole money.
Was that a bad idea?
Ms. Sherman. I think it was a very good idea to support
Guaido as the legitimate leader of Venezuela. What I would have
hoped for, Senator, difficult to do, is that we would have done
more work to bring together our allies and partners in the
region and around the world, quite frankly, not just in Latin
America but around the world, to increase the pressure and to
support and recognize Guaido to try to end the horrible saga
for the Venezuelan people and --
Senator Rubio. Well, the overwhelming majority of countries
in the region did recognize Guaido and did come together via
the Lima Group.
Ms. Sherman. Yes, indeed, and beyond the Lima Group and
around the world. I just think there were more steps that we
could have taken. It is a very difficult situation and, again,
you and I have not had a chance to talk about this and I look
forward to your counsel. I know we share the same objective,
and that is for the people of Venezuela to have a life, and
right now they do not.
Senator Rubio. Well, I will just close by saying this.
Beyond the Lima Group, the only countries really left at that
point at that time were Nicaragua, Cuba, and Argentina under--
and Bolivia under Morales. Good luck with that.
Ms. Sherman. Beyond Latin America, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Well, that is--the EU just sanctioned
Venezuela as well, and many of those countries did. So thank
you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you both for being here
this morning, for your willingness to be considered for these
very important posts and for your ongoing willingness to serve
this country.
I think you are both the perfect choices for this difficult
time, based on your understanding of both the executive branch
and Congress, of the State Department, and your commitment to
restoring America's role in the world.
So I want to begin and, really, appreciate both of you
taking the opportunity to talk with me before we got to this
hearing, and one of the issues that I discussed with both of
you was how we are going to continue to treat those public
servants from the State Department and other parts of our
Government who have been affected by what is known as the
Havana Syndrome, the attacks against our diplomats in Cuba,
China, and other parts of the world.
And there are--as I see it, there are two parts to this
problem. One is to ensure that those people who have been
attacked are treated properly, are believed, and that they get
the medical attention and benefits that they deserve, and
Congress has worked on that. We passed legislation in the last
Defense Authorization Act to try and better level the playing
field for those people who were affected.
But the other piece of that is ensuring that we get to the
bottom of who is responsible, and I hope the State Department
will work with DOD, who, as I understand, has been designated
the lead agency to try and come to understand what is
happening.
So I would ask that, if confirmed, will you both commit to
addressing the recommendations of the National Academy of
Sciences report, and more generally, to providing more
transparency with Congress and the public on this issue?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Shaheen, as we discussed yesterday,
protecting the people we send overseas is our top priority. We
have to take care of them. We send them out on behalf of the
United States.
And so we are very grateful for the work that you have done
and the committee has done and the Congress has done to make
sure that benefits are being provided to those who have
suffered.
But we do, obviously, need to do work to find out what is
the cause of this. I do not really understand why, between the
FBI and the CIA and DOD and State Department, we have not been
able to figure it out. That is not a slight against anybody who
is doing the work. It is just--it is kind of confounding.
So, as you know, the Accountability Review Board on this
matter pointed out there was not leadership at the top of the
department paying attention to this issue.
So I intend to take on this issue in coordination with
Ambassador Sherman. But this will be a high priority to get
after this and we will be happy to continue to talk to you
about this.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Ambassador Sherman?
Ms. Sherman. I completely agree with what Mr. McKeon has
said, and I must say, Senator, it is very disturbing that we
have personnel who have gone through this and continue to
suffer from it.
It is critical that they get the medical attention that
they deserve and that we find out what happened so that it does
not happen again.
So thank you for your leadership on this, along with others
across the aisle. And I know that Secretary Blinken is
committed to getting to the bottom of this as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for that.
One of the challenges we continue to face is the ongoing
war in Afghanistan. One of the reports that did not get as much
attention as the Khashoggi report in recent weeks was the
Afghanistan Study Group that made a number of recommendations
that I think are particularly relevant as we see the recent
assassination campaign against civil society leaders in
Afghanistan and, particularly, against women.
But what that report recommended is that the administration
should slow the withdrawal of troops in Afghanistan, abandon
the May 1st exit deadline, reduce American forces further only
as security conditions improve.
And I wonder if you could respond to that, Ambassador
Sherman.
Ms. Sherman. Certainly. I have been briefed on the Iraq/
Iran study--sorry, the Afghanistan Study Group. It is hard to
keep all the study groups straight. And I think they just did
extraordinary work that I am sure the administration will take
into account as it is undertaking its own review.
There is no question that Secretary Blinken believes that
diplomacy has to be at the core of a just and sustainable
settlement in Afghanistan, that the role of our troops is
really to ensure that we do not have the recreation of al-Qaeda
in the future or even a new ISIS foothold as a safe haven.
And so there is very careful deliberation going on with our
Defense Department colleagues, it is my understanding, and
ultimately, a decision by the President as we approach May 1st
about how to proceed.
To your point about women, and I told you this story --I
will share it with the other senators--one of the most searing
meetings I have ever been in as a diplomat was with Secretary
Albright in a Peshawar refugee camp after the Taliban had
driven people out of Afghanistan.
And Secretary Albright and I were able to meet with the
women in that camp because we were women, and my daughter was a
teenager at the time and a teenager about her age told the
story of watching her sister being raped and thrown out the
window.
These were women who were doctors and teachers and
professionals and homemakers and moms who are just trying to
keep their family together, and I was horrified. And I know
there is a deep commitment to ensure that whatever ultimately
happens for the people of Afghanistan that women never find
themselves in such a position again.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you for that. I think there is
some anxiety around the administration's announcement of Zalmay
Khalilzad continuing as the Special Representative for the U.S.
in Afghanistan. He has been distinctly unresponsive to the need
to include women in any of the negotiations.
Now, that may have been a function of the previous
administration. But I can tell you, in my discussions with him
he did not hear me at all when I said this needs to be a
priority for the United States.
So I hope you will take that back to the State Department
and to the Biden administration and make it clear that in any
work that he is doing on our behalf that he is including women
at the table.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Sherman. Senator, if confirmed, there will be no doubt
that in everything I do at the State Department on behalf of
the people of this country, I will make sure women are
included.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Senator Cardin. [Presiding.] Senator Romney is recognized.
Senator Romney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sherman, as the Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs under President Obama, you, obviously, were
very much involved in the development of the JCPOA and
negotiating the JCPOA.
You know that people like myself and many in my party were
very, very concerned that that was not an agreement that was
effective in preventing Iran from, ultimately, having a nuclear
weapon.
As a matter of fact, my read of that agreement is that it
would delay Iran from being able to develop a nuclear weapon
but that, ultimately, they would be permitted to develop a
nuclear weapon and have the missiles necessary to deliver that
to targets of their interest.
Am I correct in that understanding that the agreement would
delay but not prohibit Iran from ever having a nuclear weapon?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, people read the agreement
differently. The objective of the agreement, and the--I believe
the outcome of that agreement was that Iran would never obtain
a nuclear weapon.
I do completely understand why many senators and many
people in Congress and many people in the world believe that if
Iran can continue to create fissile material, the stuff that
goes inside a nuclear weapon, that they would be concerned that
having that ability gives them the option should they choose to
go there.
So I see the problem quite clearly and what I have said
this morning, I think, is very important, which is that we are
now where we are, which is outside of the agreement.
The Iranians have increased their enrichment capacity. They
have increased their development of ballistic missiles. They
have increased their bad behavior. The Maximum Pressure
campaign may have put chips on the table, but it has not
stopped. In fact, they have gone further than they had at the
end of the Obama administration.
So we will all have to work together on what is the best
strategy, going forward. The President and the Secretary have
said that they want to reenter the deal if there is compliance-
for-compliance. The Iranians are far away from compliance so
there is a long way to go here.
Senator Romney. With time, I am anxious to get your
perspective as to how it is this agreement prohibits Iran from
ever having a nuclear weapon. My understanding is the agreement
allows them to enrich and to create fissile material down the
road, and that they, obviously, had the capacity at some point
to use that fissile material to develop a nuclear weapon under
that agreement.
It does strike me that the purpose of our strategy with
regards to Iran's nuclear program is twofold. Number one is to
try and to dissuade them from ever having a nuclear weapon and
that that is the ultimate objective, and number two, to exact a
very high price on Iran such that they, as well as other
nations thinking of going nuclear, would understand the
consequence of taking that step, that the price is going to be
very, very heavy, indeed.
I do not understand how reentering the JCPOA in any way
either, number one, dissuades Iran from ever having a nuclear
weapon, or makes the price sufficiently high to keep them from
pursuing that course.
So I guess I am anxious to get your perspective as to what
the purpose would be of reentering an agreement which does not
prohibit them from having a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Sherman. The Biden administration, is my understanding,
Senator, has said that they want to create a deal that is
longer and stronger, but is part of a comprehensive strategy
that deals with all of the elements of concern with Iran,
including delivery systems for a nuclear weapon, and to ensure
that any agreement ensures that Iran will not obtain a nuclear
weapon.
I would be glad to but I think it probably will get us into
the weeds to talk about why the JCPOA did create the assurance
that you are looking for. But it is really beside the point now
because we are at a very different place. The geopolitics are
very different in the region.
There were many things that I disagreed with the previous
administration on. But the normalization of relations of
countries with Israel, known as the Abraham Accords in the
previous administration, was a very good thing. It has changed
the geopolitics of the region, and that means that one has to
think about this in a different way because there are different
elements on the table.
So I think we have to start where we are now and figure out
the best way forward, and I would hope that if I am confirmed
that I have an opportunity to get your views on this.
And as was laid out at the beginning of this when the
chairman asked for commitments from Mr. McKeon and me, that
Congress and the Senate and this committee will be there at the
takeoff, not just at the landing.
Senator Romney. Do you have any optimism about the prospect
of Iran bowing, if you will, to our demands to pull back from
their enrichment program and otherwise return to the JCPOA as,
perhaps, adjusted in some ways, making it tougher?
With the attack last night by Iranian-backed militias in
Iraq, it would suggest that they are flexing their muscle, not
showing their weakness. Are we reading that wrong? Is there any
prospect for them agreeing to a course which is more consistent
with our objectives?
Ms. Sherman. I hope so, Senator, but I do not know. I am
not privy to intelligence. I am not privy to all of the
deliberations in the administration.
But, if confirmed, one has to dig into the details and into
the intelligence and into consultations with you, with our
allies, with our partners, with Israel, with the Gulf Arab
states, with countries around the world that might have
information that is useful to making those assessments.
So I cannot give you a definitive answer today. I certainly
hope so because the other routes the President, the Vice
President, and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, all of us, all of you, are committed to ensuring that
Iran does not present an existential threat to anyone not able
to deter our and our allies and partners' actions, and if they
had a nuclear weapon that would change that calculus in very
significant and very bad ways.
Senator Romney. Like you, Ambassador, I do not have access
to that intelligence. I am not a member of the Intelligence
Committee, as is Ranking Member Risch.
But I would hope you study very carefully the conditions
there in Iran, the health and well being of their leadership,
the state of their economy, the public attitudes there.
I think there is some prospect that the Maximum Pressure
campaign is actually delivering the kind of impetus that we
might be looking for, and that before we bend and provide to
Iran the hoped for reduction of our sanctions that we might
consider the option of continuing with the Maximum Pressure
campaign. I offer that only as a request on my part.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Romney.
Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and thank you, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon. Thank
you for your willingness to serve our nation again, and my
thanks to your families as well.
I am particularly pleased to have the two of you with such
experience, such skills, such background in the executive
branch and State and DOD and the White House, and here in the
Senate so that we can help work together to make sure that the
foreign policy priorities and agenda of the executive branch
are supported or at least well understood, in close
consultation with this committee, going forward.
And I look forward to being partners in demonstrating to
the American people how foreign policy and the foreign policy
of this administration actually improves their lives, advances
their security and prosperity, whether it is from keeping
COVID-19 variants from spreading through doing robust
vaccination around the world to mitigating threats from our
adversaries to addressing the existential threat of climate
change.
And I hope you will be partners in working through some of
our nation's most urgent national security challenges, from
building an enduring and bipartisan strategy for confronting
China, cooperating where necessary and possible but being
prepared for a robust and sustained competition with China,
addressing Iran's nuclear program and its other threats to the
region and to the world, recalibrating the U.S.-Saudi
relationship in light of the release of the ODNI report on the
Crown Prince's role in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and
reviewing authorizations of the use of military force to
strengthen and ensure congressional oversight on critical
issues of war and peace.
I look forward also in my new role as the chairman of the
State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee to
aligning resources with policy and commitments, and
prioritizing the protection of human rights, the defense of
democracy, the revitalization of the State Department and
promoting the diversity of the workforce.
It is my hope the President's budget request will increase
funding to what has been a stagnant foreign affairs budget to
restore our leadership by fulfilling climate pledges,
strengthening global health and security, and addressing our
arrears at the United Nations.
So, Ambassador Sherman, just a brief question. You will be
called on to travel the world to continue your service overseas
on behalf of the American people. I hope you will also spend
time traveling within our nation, speaking to the American
people.
Do you agree diplomats in Washington, leaders in the
administration, have to do a better job of explaining foreign
policy not just abroad but here at home?
Ms. Sherman. I quite agree with you, Senator.
When Secretary Blinken asked me and the President agreed
for me to be nominated as Deputy Secretary of State, one of the
things I said to the Secretary--he was not yet Secretary at
that point--but said to the Secretary that I thought it was
critical that not only he but myself, if confirmed, Mr. McKeon,
if he was confirmed, anyone who was a leader in the State
Department ought to be spending as much time in America talking
to the American people as we did abroad.
Jake Sullivan, who is the National Security Advisor, said
very early on that every day in consideration of national
security and foreign policy we need to ask, what does this mean
for the American people? What does this mean for working
people? What does this mean for the middle class in America?
People do not understand why we do what we do and how it
has anything to do with their day-to-day lives. So I thank you
for laying out this very critical issue. I think this is
something that Democrats and Republicans can agree on, which is
that the American people deserve to hear from us why we are
doing what we are doing and why it matters to them.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. And I think as we work to
combat the pandemic, we have right in front of us an example of
how the health of the world impacts the health of the American
people.
As we work to confront climate change, we have an
opportunity to look at how our competition with China, our
realignments around trade, may well end up also advancing our
goal of combating the existential threat of climate change.
I know you have both heard of the Global Fragility Act. We
discussed it in our constructive conversations before today. I
just want to urge that this bipartisan tool that is available
to address the real security challenges in the Sahel mentioned
by the chairman in his comments is taken full advantage.
It is something that a group of us worked hard to get
introduced and marked up and passed and signed into law, and it
gives an opportunity for the State Department, along with AID
and DOD, to really lead a strategy.
But it will only work if done in consultation with this
committee and with robust funding from Congress. So it is my
hope that you will let us know what you need to implement it
effectively and that you will utilize, in particular, the
multi-donor fund that it has authorized to leverage resources
from public and private sector partners elsewhere.
If confirmed, you will have critical influence over whether
we stand up for democracy and human rights at a time when
China's authoritarian model is posing an increasing challenge
to our principles.
How do we balance the need to impose consequences on
Beijing for its horrific actions in Xinjiang and its oppression
in Hong Kong while also, perhaps, cooperating in some areas
like nonproliferation or climate change?
And in my view, our response to China has to bring in
domestic policy, robust investments in manufacturing, IP
protection, and labor, but include engagement with our allies.
I would be interested, Ambassador Sherman and Mr. McKeon,
if you might, in the minute and a half I have left, just some
brief comment on how the Foreign Relations Committee can best
help in shaping a sustained bipartisan policy with regards to
China.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
I agree. I think this is an area where Democrats and
Republicans agree. China is a major challenge for the United
States, and I think there are three elements to it. We have to
compete with China, and President Biden, Vice President Harris,
the Secretary have said that begins with investment here at
home in infrastructure and 5G and quantum computing and
artificial intelligence and jobs for Americans that will take
them into the next decades ahead.
We have to compete and win. That includes ensuring that
China cannot hack our networks, cannot steal our trade secrets,
and cannot steal our corporate secrets.
We need to challenge and confront China where we must in
the South China Sea. Certainly, what they do on human rights.
Secretary Blinken said, in his view, that the treatment of the
Uighurs was genocide. I would agree with him on that and we
should not shy away from saying things as they truly are.
And third, there will be some small areas in which we will
have to cooperate, and as strange as it may sound, global
health may be one of them, starting with getting the real facts
about what happened in the pandemic.
And I will turn the last 15 seconds over to my colleague.
Mr. McKeon. As you know, Senator Coons, the President said
in the campaign and since that he wants to put democracy and
human rights back at the center of our foreign policy. So that
means it is integral and it will inform all the decisions we
make.
At a minimum, we are going to speak out about China's
outrageous behavior and treatment of its citizens in
international fora or as well as directly, and we need to look
at new tools to amplify what is happening there.
One of them is Radio Free Asia that is funded by the U.S.
Agency for Global Media. You may not know that Senator Biden
was the author of the legislation to create it and it is one of
the things I am proud of having worked on.
So we definitely would want to collaborate with you on the
best ways to come to grips with the China challenge because it
is going to be a generational one.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you both.
And, Mr. Chairman, if I might just, in conclusion, across
questioning and exchanges with a wide range of members of this
committee, it is clear that close consultation, briefings both
classified and open, and debate with this committee around the
path forward on Iran, around the path forward on authorizations
of the use of military force, are critical to our success and
our ability to craft something that will win bipartisan support
here.
And I look forward to working with you on Africa as well,
something the chairman mentioned, and I know we have great
promise for making progress in this administration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. [Presiding.] Thank you.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. One of the things I agreed with candidate
Barack Obama on was that he said in an interview with a Boston
paper we should not go to war without congressional
authorization unless under imminent attack.
I had the chance to ask him about this after the
administration chose to launch attacks on Libya and he said,
well, I said unless under imminent attack and Benghazi was
under imminent attack. And I said, really? You were talking
about imminent attack of a foreign city, not the United States?
I think nobody interprets the idea of a president going to war
unless under imminent attack to be anything other than a U.S.
city or a U.S. interest, at the very least.
So I was shocked by that. What was your position in the
Obama administration about the Obama administration's decision
to go to war in Libya, Ms. Sherman?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
These decisions, as you know, are incredibly difficult to
make, and when Libya began I was the Under Secretary for
Political Affairs. And I think that most people thought that we
were providing support to Europe for a humanitarian
intervention.
It turned out to be quite something different. I am glad
that today, some years later, we are now potentially facing
elections in Libya, that Libya is getting back, perhaps,
hopefully--fingers crossed--to a better place for Libyan
people.
I will be the first to say, and I think President Obama has
said so in his own memoir, that we did not have a full
understanding--we have learned from this--that Gaddafi had not
built any institutions. He had not created any government.
So when Gaddafi disappeared in Libya, there was nothing.
There was absolutely nothing except the potential for a civil
war and for an ongoing conflict. So I think we have to be very
careful.
Senator Paul. I appreciate the understanding. In
retrospect, it may not have been the best activity. But one of
the lessons we might learn, and we might learn from Iraq also,
is that regime change does not work, that Thomas Jefferson is
not waiting in the wings and American-style democracy is not
going to blossom, and when we get rid of a tyrant maybe you get
another tyrant.
But I guess the reason I question whether there was a
lesson learned is that immediately many people in the Obama
administration, the Hillary Clinton camp, et cetera, Samantha
Power, Susan Rice, and I am not sure you, were then advocates
of going into Syria in a big way.
In fact, your boss basically said, well, the problem was we
just did not go in big enough into Syria. What was your opinion
on Syria during the Obama administration on sending arms in and
getting involved in their civil war?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. I want to correct the
record a minute, as I was thinking about this. I was not
actually in the Government at the time of the Libya decision.
The reason it is so much in my mind is I was on the Defense
Policy Board at the time and we had a big discussion about
Libya. And the Policy Board believed we should not create a no-
fly zone in Libya. We should not help out. We had breakfast
with Secretary Gates on a Wednesday morning. He said, we are
absolutely not going to do this. And on Thursday, we did it. So
that is why it is very fresh in my mind. But I was not in
government at the time.
On Syria, I was very torn. I thought there was a disaster
happening in Syria and happening for the Syrian people.
President Obama was very cautious because he understood that
this was a slippery slope, that the American people were tired
of war in the Middle East. And so he moved very, very
carefully.
It is a struggle in those situations when you see terrible
suffering of people, so not an easy decision. I think he tried
to be very cautious.
Senator Paul. But, you know, I think we have to learn some
lessons sometime. I mean, many in the Democrat side of things
learned the lesson very quickly. Maybe just for partisan
reasons they did not like the Iraq war, and it was a disaster.
But, really, it was a disaster. I mean, it is still an ongoing
disaster. The whole tipping of the balance between Iran and the
rest of the Middle East was tipped by, you know, getting rid of
the regime in Iraq.
And so it is this idea that we are going to make the world
this great place for democracy, this Wilsonian idea of us,
naivete that, you know, we are going to get rid of a regime and
it is going to get better, even in Syria.
So we did not go all the way in, you know, with the full
might of the U.S. We went partway in. But you could argue that
had we not gotten involved and had we discouraged the other
Arab nations from getting involved that it would have still
been a disaster but maybe 10,000 people die instead of 500,000
people.
So I think the misguided notion that we helped anybody in
Syria, it would be easy to argue. The evidence shows that a
half a million people died and millions of people are
dislocated because we did the half-ass approach to it. We went
halfway in there.
And so then Blinken's response, in conclusion, is we should
have gone all the way in there. And from my perspective, is we
need to stay the hell out of these wars and toppling, you know,
one strong man, one tribal leader, we get another one or we get
worse.
And all along the Syrian civil war, the fiercest fighters,
we would pretend that there were lawyers and doctors fighting,
that there were these moderates over there fighting. Al Nusra
were the fighters. Al-Qaeda were the fighters. The fiercest
fighters were the jihadists.
And so I have never thought that the jihadists would be
better than Assad, and I am not a fan of Assad either. But we
have to learn some lessons, and I do not think we adequately
learn the lessons. We go from Iraq and the power vacuum of
Iraq. People say, oh, ISIS came about because we left too soon.
Well, maybe ISIS came about because we got rid of Hussein. I
mean, what is the original domino that leads to that? It is
destabilizing in having no government.
You may be optimistic about Libya. But I see it as one of
the biggest terrorist havens in the world. You got competing
governments. The last administration was never really clear who
they were supporting, whether it was this General Haftar or the
U.N. government.
And the thing is, is it is muddled, and we have all these
people we give arms to who are then giving arms to both--you
know, to opposite sides in this Libyan civil war.
Maybe we would have been better off not getting involved,
not bombing Gaddafi into oblivion, not thinking that he was
some great saint but knowing that there was at least some
stability there. And I wonder if chaos is worse, you know, a
worse scenario.
And all I would ask is that we have got to learn these
lessons. And I am not so positive--I do not think Blinken has.
He is already sending us back into Syria. What do you think of
sending more convoys into the conflict in Syria?
Ms. Sherman. Well, my understanding, Senator, is that is
not what Secretary Blinken is about. What he is about is
looking at what our interests are regarding ISIS and a de-ISIS
campaign, and to make sure that we have a very small footprint
and an appropriate one that is only in our interests.
But I do appreciate, Senator, the issues you raise. These
are very hard decisions. You are correct that we should learn
lessons of history and try not to repeat them, that regime
change is rarely, if ever, successful.
So on some of your points, I would agree with you. I think,
nonetheless, we do have American interests that compel us
sometimes to use very precious blood and treasure.
But no President, no Secretary of State, no Secretary of
Defense, makes these decisions without enormous consideration,
and I hope as this administration goes forward with more and
more consultation with Congress, as I think the chairman knows,
finally, long overdue, there are now Title 10 notifications--
pre-notifications to this committee, and I think that is a step
in the right direction.
Senator Paul. I hope you will be a constructive voice. All
I will say is that we are bombing now again in Syria without
congressional approval and we are sending more convoys in there
without congressional approval to a messy war.
It has been going on forever. There is nothing good that is
going to come out of our involvement. People say, well, U.S.
lives are at risk. Yeah, because we put them there. You know,
we put them in the middle of a civil war that is, largely,
over, but can continue if we keep putting troops there--to put
our troops as a tripwire to get involved in a further
escalation of this war.
So I hope there will be sane voices and I hope you will be
one of those. But I do not have a great deal of confidence that
we have actually gone away from John Bolton. I think we have
gone to a liberal form of John Bolton with your new boss and
that is something I am very concerned with.
The Chairman. Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to you both for your continued willingness to
serve your country. Senator Paul and I do not always agree on
the answers to these weighty questions but I do think he brings
a healthy caution regarding American hubris, particularly in
the Middle East and I appreciate his line of questioning.
I am hoping to squeeze in three questions here, two, for
you, Ambassador Sherman, one for you, Mr. McKeon.
I wanted to come back to the topic of Venezuela. I remember
shortly after Elliott Abrams was appointed to be President
Trump's envoy, he came into my office and he talked about the
big chance that the administration was taking, essentially,
sort of playing all of our cards right at the outset, including
the recognition of Juan Guaido, and he predicted that if Maduro
had not fallen, had not left power by May of 2019, then our
chance that we had taken would have been perceived as a
mistake.
Last week, the Europeans, essentially, de-recognized Juan
Guaido as the leader of Venezuela, essentially confirming that
two years later our policy has not worked.
Maduro is still in power. Russia, China, and Cuba are more
deeply involved in Venezuela and the United States, having
played all those cards early on, we look feckless, not just in
Venezuela but throughout the region.
And so does it make sense to continue a policy that by all
objective measures has not worked and, if not, what should a
new policy look like?
Ms. Sherman. If I knew the answer this morning to that
question, Senator, you should confirm me quickly without
hesitation.[Laughter.]
Ms. Sherman. I think this is a very thorny and very
difficult situation. I think that the United States and the
world community was right to recognize Juan Guaido. I do not
think that the previous administration took advantage of all of
the things that it might have to try to push that agenda
forward.
I do not think we have supported Colombia in the way that
we perhaps needed to for taking in all of the refugees out of
Venezuela. I think that we have given Maduro a platform to, in
fact, say that everybody is feckless and he gets to do whatever
he wants to do.
There are ways, perhaps, that we can communicate with the
Venezuelan people that we have not. But I do not--I will be the
first to say I do not this morning--I am filled with humility
in saying that I do not know that there is an easy answer to
this problem.
What I can say to you, Senator, is I think it is a very
critical one. It is absolutely wrapped up in China's investment
in Latin America, Russia's investment in Latin America, about
sort of the triad with Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and we
have to think through what a strategy going forward might be.
And, if confirmed, I look forward to speaking with you and
with everyone on this committee with your ideas and thoughts
about the best way we might crack this very difficult
challenge.
Senator Murphy. I hope it is also a prism through which the
administration can take a review of American sanctions policy.
I think there is an argument to be made that in this case the
sanctions may have, ultimately, accrued to the benefit of
Maduro to the detriment of Venezuelan citizens, and not gotten
us the political return that we had hoped and still hoped for.
On Iran--I know we keep on coming back to this, but I just
wanted to clarify an answer that you gave to Senator Romney in
your exchange with him. You listed out a number of malevolent
behaviors by the Iranians, the things that we hope that they
eventually come to the table on.
But I just wanted to confirm that it is still your
understanding that the administration's position is that we
should get back into the nuclear deal, get back on the same
page with the P5+1 and use that as a platform through which to
put pressure on the Iranians with respect to its ballistic
missile programs, its support for terrorist groups.
I think the Maximum Pressure campaign was built on a
fantasy, this idea that we could have a comprehensive
negotiation where the Iranians would come to the table on
everything all at once. In fact, during the last four years,
despite these intense sanctions the Iranians came to the table
on none of Secretary Pompeo's list of 12 demands.
So it is still our belief that we should get back into the
nuclear agreement and as quickly as possible, understanding
that that will take negotiation, and use that as a platform
with which to bring together the world community around other
behaviors that we object to by Tehran.
Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is my understanding that the Biden/
Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, want to get back into
the deal but to make it longer and stronger, and to use it as a
platform to have negotiations on the other issues of concern
that we have with Iran.
Senator Murphy. And it makes me a little nervous when we
sort of hear terms like longer and stronger. Again, I think
many of us supported that deal on its terms. We understand that
we always had to have a follow-on negotiation to make sure it
was lengthened.
But by expanding out the number of things that we want to
talk about at this negotiating table, I worry that, you know,
we may be setting ourselves up for failure. But I look forward
to continuing that discussion with you.
Thank you again for your service. I am really looking
forward to supporting your nomination and working with you.
Mr. McKeon, I wanted to expand the conversation that you
and I had privately and that is the question about the
effectiveness of our diplomacy abroad when we have such
difficulty getting outside the wire.
Diplomacy does not just happen in embassies. It needs to
happen in communities. And in the wake of Benghazi, we have
become much shyer, much more reluctant, much more cautious
about putting our diplomats out, especially in dangerous
places, and the work that Senator Coons has done on fragile
states, I think, is part of the answer here.
But, you know, we also have a review process for incidences
abroad that tends to, you know, make people very, very hesitant
to do anything that might put any diplomat at risk.
The risk tolerance in State is fundamentally different than
the risk tolerance we have in the Department of Defense, and I
think that is a mistake.
I think we should pursue some congressional reforms to the
Accountability Review Board process to make people less fearful
of punitive action and more willing to learn from mistakes.
What is your thoughts on how we can try to push diplomacy
back outside our embassy compound walls?
Mr. McKeon. Senator Murphy, thank you. It is a hard
challenge, and I appreciate you being willing to dive into it.
You know, there is no such thing as perfect security. The
diplomats that work for our country are in a dangerous
business, and evidence of that is on the walls of the C Street
lobby in the State Department, the names of those who have been
killed while serving the government overseas.
As you said, we have the statute that mandates
accountability review. Our board process was enacted in the mid
'80s. It does not apply in the same way to DOD or the
intelligence community. So I appreciate if you and other
members of committee are willing to take a look at that. We
should have a conversation about it.
The department began a review under the last Secretary,
being led by very senior diplomat, to look at this question
which they put it under the framework of risk mitigation.
Though I do not know the timing of his work, but that will also
inform our conversation.
Senator Murphy. Great. I look forward to working with you
on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty. Put your microphone on, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. There we go. I was saying thank you very
much for scheduling this important hearing for two very
important positions in the State Department.
Also, Ambassador Sherman, I appreciate your acknowledgement
of the success of the Abraham Accords. A tremendous amount of
work went into that. I know you had been critical of the
previous administration about this earlier.
But I appreciate your acknowledgement of the success
because, indeed, it has changed the dynamic in the region. And
I encourage the Biden administration to strongly consult with
our allies in the Middle East as you consider reentry into the
JCPOA.
I would like to turn now, Ambassador Sherman, to a
discussion on the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, if I
might. You mentioned earlier that the Biden administration will
follow the law. I would just like to follow up on Ranking
Member Risch's comments here, if I might, because I think it is
very important that we talk about the oversight dynamic here.
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 requires the
executive branch to submit to Congress any and all agreements
that are related to the nuclear program of Iran. Those need to
be submitted for congressional review.
Ambassador Sherman, can you imagine any scenario in which
the Biden administration would decide to participate again in
the JCPOA concerning Iran's nuclear program or modifies any
aspect of the current sanctions regime on Iran and you would
not submit this to Congress for review?
Ms. Sherman. It is always hard, Senator. I am not a lawyer.
But any lawyer would tell you and has told me never to make a
completely universal comment about such a question.
But what I will say to you is that this administration, the
Biden/Harris administration, Secretary Blinken, are committed
to following the law. And if, indeed, whatever is decided falls
within the terms of INARA, then we must, indeed, come to
Congress.
Senator Hagerty. I think this is the concern that Ranking
Member Risch and I have right now and that is looking at a very
specific legal interpretation of the document and not looking
at the purpose of the Act.
The purpose of the Act is to ensure congressional review,
not to find weasel words or ways to get out of complying with
it. So I encourage this administration and you, if you are
confirmed, to find a way to comply with the purpose of this
Act.
Ms. Sherman. I think that is a fair point that the intent
is to make sure that Congress has a say, and I think what is
and, as Senator Cardin pointed out earlier, I was very engaged
with both Senator Cardin and Senator Corker to ensure that
INARA, in fact, happened, and that there was a congressional
review process. I thought it was terribly important, and very
grateful to then Chairman Corker and Senator Cardin, who was
ranking at the time, for moving forward on a congressional
review process.
What I would hope this time is that we have happen what is
happening here, which is that you all are there at the takeoff
that you are reviewing the considerations of this
administration throughout the process, and that the review does
not just come at the end but the review happens throughout any
process that goes forward.
And if I am confirmed, you have my commitment, not just
regarding any agreement with Iran but with what we are doing in
foreign policy and national security, writ large.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ambassador.
Can we turn to the Central Bank of Iran now? That is
another source of concern. U.S. policy has sought to deny the
Iranian regime, including the Central Bank of Iran, the money,
especially the hard currency that it uses to fund terrorism and
many other malign activities that threaten the national
security of the United States, of Israel, and our partners in
the Gulf.
The Treasury Department has concluded that, since at least
2016, Iran's IRGC Quds Force, the terror outfit that exists
there, has received the vast majority of its foreign currency
from the Central Bank of Iran.
Ambassador Sherman, do you commit to maintaining sanctions
on the Central Bank of Iran and hold it accountable for its
activities to support terrorism, including any secondary
sanctions that are now in place?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, I do not know all the ins and outs of
the current sanctions that are in place because I have been out
of government now for some time.
But I, certainly, do not want to do anything that supports
the IRGC to continue its activities in the region that are
vastly destabilizing and put our allies and our partners and
ourselves at tremendous risk.
Senator Hagerty. I think these sanctions have taken a great
deal of time and effort. I was personally involved in some of
the aspects of this. And I would encourage you and I would
encourage the Biden administration not to grant sanctions
relief to the Central Bank of Iran without a thorough review
and make certain that these sanctions are--continue to stay in
place until they have stopped in all aspects supporting
terrorism.
A further question, Ambassador Sherman. The Iranian regime,
clearly, wants the United States to lift sanctions against the
Central Bank of Iran. Please, and I would love for your
commitment on this to not provide any form of sanctions relief,
including through the use of waivers or licenses to the Central
Bank of Iran unless we can verifiably ensure that they cease
all of their malign activities.
Ms. Sherman. I appreciate your view and I will, certainly,
want to talk with you further, if confirmed, and as I learn
more about the sanctions that are currently in place and how
they affect different activities by Iran. Thank you for that.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much.
Turn to North Korea for just a minute, you and I have
spoken about this before. As you know, when I was ambassador to
Japan, I was there when Kim Jong-un launched two
intercontinental ballistic missiles over Japan and, at a
different time, tested a hydrogen bomb.
I have no doubt that North Korea is going to remain one of
the most critical national security challenges that the United
States will have to face this decade. And as we learned during
the Trump administration, subordinates come and go in the
negotiations, sometimes permanently, perhaps.
Kim Jong-un takes the decisions on the nuclear program. It
is critical to strengthen the Maximum Pressure campaign to
sharpen the choices for the Kim regime.
Ambassador Sherman, do you support additional sanctions
against the Chinese companies that are doing business with
North Korea?
Ms. Sherman. Again, because I have been out of government,
I do not know all that is in place now. But, certainly, we do
want to ensure that North Korea understands that unless it
comes to the table to really make progress in denuclearization
that we will use every tool that we have to prevent them from
doing so and, certainly, want China not to be playing an
adverse role in that process.
Senator Hagerty. Yeah, they have been playing a tremendous
role, as you and I both know, and I hope we can continue to
work toward that goal.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you. I look forward to it, Senator, if
confirmed.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses. I want to follow up on Senator Hagerty's line of
questions with respect to congressional approval of forward
steps on Iran.
I have a very different opinion about the JCPOA than the
Republican members of this body, and Senator Risch and I have
done this often. But I have exactly the same opinion as all the
members of the body about congressional review, and I was the
original--sort of one of the original drafters of INARA.
Because the Obama administration--the plan was to do a deal
with Iran and do it pursuant to waiver authority under the
congressional sanctions and not bring it to Congress for eight
years.
Eventually, at year eight, they would have to come to
Congress to have a statutory lifting of the sanctions. That was
the original plan. And even though I thought the negotiation
was coming up with a deal that I thought was much better than
the status quo ante, and Senator Corker did not think so, we
both thought because congressional sanctions were being used as
leverage to get the deal that Congress had to be involved. And
whatever the forward steps on the deal might be, Congress needs
to be involved because you are using a congressional statute
that imposes sanctions as leverage in this topic. So I just
want to associate myself with the comments that he made.
Now I will go to associating myself with topics raised by
Senator Paul. You talked about your parents being there at the
founding of the U.N. because your dad was a Marine veteran who
had suffered war injuries at Guadalcanal, and he wanted to be
there at the founding of an organization that was designed to
prevent war.
Sadly, we, as humans, cannot prevent war. No organization
can. But we should try to prevent unnecessary war.
And it is interesting the way the Framers of the
Constitution and then even the architects of Senate procedures
have tried to help us figure out a way to prevent unnecessary
war.
So the United States, unlike virtually anywhere else in the
world, has a founding document, the Constitution, that says it
is not for the executive to decide to go to war. It is for the
legislative branch.
Nobody does that. I mean, war is for the king, the monarch,
the emperor, the dictator. But not here. The initiation of war
is supposed to be by Congress with the President then managing
the war because the last thing you need is 535 commanders in
chief.
And then within the rules of this body decisions about
going to war come out of the Foreign Relations Committee, not
out of the Armed Services. I am on the Armed Services
Committee.
Most people guess that that is where war resolutions start.
They do not, because as you said, prefer diplomacy first, and
if diplomacy fails, war can be a sad necessity. But prefer
diplomacy first. So it has to start in the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Let me ask you this, Ms. Sherman, and I have very high
regard for both of you and I will support both your
nominations. Iraq right now, are they an enemy or are they a
partner?
Ms. Sherman. I hope they are a partner, Senator.
Senator Kaine. Yeah, they are a partner. They are not an
enemy anymore. There are some challenges with our partner, with
Iraq, especially the activities of these Iranian-backed militia
groups, which the successive prime ministers have tried to
figure out how to control without completely satisfying us.
But they are not an enemy. We still have two war
authorizations against the nation of Iraq that have not been
repealed. Gulf War 1991, Iraq War Resolution 2002. Boy, how is
that to treat a partner and have a war authorization against
them?
Today, Senators Lee, Paul, Young, Grassley, Kaine, Durbin,
Coons, Duckworth, we are introducing a bill to repeal the two
Iraq AUMFs.
And I am not going to ask you for a commitment on that. You
are not part of the administration yet. But I would think
Congress should not just allow war authorizations to exist in
perpetuity.
But we often do. We pass them and then they are just out
there and they can be used in mischievous ways.
The President undertook on his own initiation without
congressional approval missile strikes against militia
positions in Syria that are connected to Iran last Thursday.
At the same time that this happened, the U.S. had an offer
on the table with Europeans for Iran to come back to a table
for a no-preconditions discussion about what do we do about the
JCPOA. Iran was considering that offer.
The administration, from my conversations, was actually
pretty optimistic that Iran was going to accept that offer.
Then missile strikes happened on Thursday, and then Iran turned
down the offer on Sunday.
The President asserted, as a rationale for the missile
strikes, that he had unilateral power under Article 2 to do
them. He did not refer to the AUMFs, which was good because
those would be fig leaves. He just said, I have Article 2
power.
But the challenge is if you allow presidents unilaterally
to do things, even things that are prudent, okay, president
takes a step with a missile strike. Iran then turns down an
opportunity to explore diplomacy.
I cannot imagine anybody at the Pentagon or at the State
Department was surprised with the militia airstrikes back at
the Air Force--at the Air Force Base where U.S.-led coalition
forces were yesterday.
When one side decides, I can do this unilaterally, then the
other side decides, I can do this unilaterally because you
started it. No, you started it. No, you started it. And then we
are in the midst, potentially, of a significant military
engagement of war without a discussion in Congress.
I do not care how prudent unilateral executive action is.
It can lead to counteraction and counteraction and reaction,
and then suddenly, we are in the middle of something that has
not been discussed in front of Congress, has not been discussed
in front of the American people.
And I just think, again, even the events of the last couple
of days since, Ms. Sherman, you and I talked on our Zoom call
have demonstrated that the Framers were not really wrong when
they said decisions about war and the initiation of war should
be sort of aired before the people's legislative body and have
an imprimatur. If we are going to do it, it should have an
imprimatur on it of more than just one person.
I have shared this view about the missile strikes last
Thursday and about the at least temporary collapse of this
diplomatic opportunity Sunday, and then the Iraqi strikes
against the base with the U.S.-led coalition.
This is the kind of thing that happens and there is no
guarantee it will not happen if you have more dialogue with
Congress and the public. But you reduce the risk. I think you
reduce the risk of unnecessary and uncontemplated escalation if
you have the kind of consultation that, I think, both Democrats
and Republicans on this committee would expect of you.
I know you believe that and I am confident you will push
for that to all your might, and that is one of the reasons that
I have the confidence that I will support you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. McKeon, I enjoyed visiting this week. When we spoke,
you outlined how examining the resourcing of America's
development enterprise and our foreign assistance would be one
of your top priorities, if confirmed.
This is an area of particular interest to me. It dates back
several years. In fact, I co-chaired a CSIS task force in 2017
with Senator Shaheen on reforming our foreign assistance
programming.
And one of the recommendations that we made in that
convening of former career Foreign Service officers and USAID
professionals and other experts was to take a hard look at the
overlapping responsibilities and, thus, the duplicative efforts
and budgets of the State Department, USAID, and various
development finance organizations and to empower USAID to have
a bigger voice in the conversation and more of a leading role
in American foreign policy.
So that starts with strategic direction from the top. From
the outside, what do you find, sir, most concerning about how
our foreign assistance is organized?
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator. I will have to dig out the
task force report from 2017 because I am not familiar with it.
As you know, the USAID administrator reports to and is
under the direct authority of the Secretary of State. But I
think, from experience in the last 20 years, that relationship
has probably had more--marked more by tension than
collaboration.
So I think one of the first priorities would be to try to
reset that working with Ambassador Power, if she is confirmed.
She is going to be a great spokesperson for the mission and is
not shy.
So I am sure that she will assert her views about the
relationship and the direction of our program. So I think first
priority is to get the relationship between State and AID in
the right place and make sure that the programs are aligned and
not duplicative.
Then, as you mentioned, the other agencies. The Secretary
of State chairs the board of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation and the Development Finance Corporation.
And so we, at the State Department, if I am confirmed and
the Secretary, we need to make sure we are using that role to
ensure that everyone is rowing in the same direction on our
programs and are aligned with the President's priorities and
strategies.
You have given us great tools with the--with these
agencies, the DFC being the newest one, but we need to put them
to greatest effect, and I would like to talk to you more about
it as I dig into it, if I get into the job.
Senator Young. While I move to our diverse array of various
agencies that are tasked with foreign assistance, it is one of
the things I discovered when I became a member of this
committee is just the constellation of different agencies.
And one avenue to explore is how we can task some of these
agencies with operating in countries with lower incomes or
worse health outcomes while directing others to specifically
address more developed economies and societies, rather than
throwing our resources from the various agencies at the same
countries.
For instance, how can the United States better utilize our
more independent development organizations like the Millennium
Challenge Corporation or the Development Finance Corporation
and make them more strategic in their investments?
I would like you to sort of speak to that generally, and
then answer this specifically. Can the Development Finance
Corporation be more focused on middle income countries that
face more pressure from Russian and Chinese influence?
Mr. McKeon. Senator I need to dig into the DFC statute. My
understanding from a briefing paper is they are supposed to
prioritize their investments in lower income countries. I think
there is some exception for middle or higher income countries
in some respects. But the primary focus is supposed to be on
the lower income countries. If I have that wrong, please tell
me.
Senator Young. Respectfully, I think that is just been the
construction of the statute. The statute actually does call for
development assistance to lower income countries, and then
there is--in the same charge, it indicates that the resources
may also be deployed strategically.
So it is like so many of our statutes. It is a vaguely
written statute, which I lament, but my own views, which you
might have sort of inferred by the question, is that we have an
opportunity here to perhaps use DFC in a more strategic fashion
vis-`-vis some of our strategic competitors, like Russia and
China.
So I would look forward to working with you or others
within the administration to--on that effort.
Ambassador Sherman, I do not want to neglect you, and I am
grateful for your long-standing service and for your appearance
here today.
President Biden has signaled that working with our partners
and allies is going to be a foundation of his foreign policy
and that he will seek to renew relations with our European
partners.
In fact, in his recent address before the Munich Security
Conference, he called the transatlantic relationship the
cornerstone of all we hope to accomplish in the 21st century.
I agree that we must be engaging with our democratic allies
in order to reach agreements on security and trade and
technology development and health resiliency and all manner of
other things.
But we also have to be willing to embrace our own ability
to shape these areas and not the other way around, right. So
there is a balance to be struck.
So if the leaders of Europe are unwilling to confront the
threats emanating from around the globe, most especially the
threats emanating from China and Russia, how would you
recommend the United States adjust its strategy to engage with
them?
In 10 seconds or less, please.
Ms. Sherman. I think it is absolutely critical that we
engage with the transatlantic relationship around China and
Russia. We are so much stronger together than we are apart, and
I think that it will take vigorous diplomacy, which Secretary
Blinken is going to lead, and, if confirmed, I hope to help him
do exactly what you are suggesting, that we help to drive that
agenda.
Europe is not always excited about us being back at the
table because they are wary, given some years of us being away.
But they also respect and understand the power of the United
States of America, and I think that it is time that we lead by
our example by what we are doing to compete and build our own
infrastructure to do that competition.
But doing it together will make us much more powerful in
challenging China, competing with China, and dealing with all
of the threats that are put forward by Russia.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
I understand we have Senator Markey virtually.
Senator Markey. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much,
and thank both of you for your long-term service to our country
and we hope that you will be given the opportunity to continue
because I think you would be enormous assets to ensuring that
we have a safer better world that we are living in for everyone
in our society.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, just want to go through a few bits
of facts from the past so that we can just establish it as part
of this hearing record.
Before you helped to get the world's major powers and Iran
to the negotiating table, Iran was about two months away from
producing enough highly-enriched uranium for its first nuclear
bomb.
Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, that was the assessment.
Senator Markey. And after all sides began implementing the
Iran nuclear deal, that breakout time extended to more than a
year. Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Markey. And Senator Risch asked you about
enrichment, so I would like to go back to that. As part of the
Iran nuclear deal, Iran reduced, reduced, its stock of low-
enriched uranium by 98 percent to 300 kilograms.
But as a result of the Trump administration's unilateral
exit from the Iran nuclear deal, that number increased to 12
times over that 300-kilogram limit.
Is that correct?
Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
Senator Markey. Okay. So, again, while many of my
colleagues have spent time criticizing the Iran deal, the
effect of that arrangement did dramatically reduce the ability
of Iran to have a quick breakout time towards producing a
nuclear weapon.
And I just want to make sure that all of that is out on the
table, and again, you played an instrumental role in ensuring
that that would be part of that agreement.
So compliance-for-compliance is what President Biden is now
saying his goal is. So can you just, again, expand a little bit
more on what the Biden administration's policy will be in terms
of compliance-for-compliance in ensuring that we do go back to
a position where Iran's breakout time is lessened dramatically?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
It is my understanding what the Biden/Harris administration
hopes to do is to get Iran to come back into full compliance
with the deal.
Then we would be in compliance with the deal and that we
would build from that to get a longer and stronger agreement,
given that the deal is now some years old and, as you have
pointed out, Iran has now increased its stockpile, increased
the depth of its enrichment, increased many of its capabilities
more--using more sophisticated centrifuges as a result of our
leaving the deal, and that we would not only get back to where
we were but we would build a better, stronger, longer platform.
And then we would address the other issues of concern.
And as you pointed out, Senator, that one-year breakout
time is critical because it allows us if for some reason Iran
is able to cheat, though there were the most extraordinary
verification and monitoring mechanisms, we would have time to
slap back on sanctions or even to take military action.
So we would maintain all of our options to ensure that Iran
not obtain a nuclear weapon.
Senator Markey. Yeah, and I agree with you. A one-year
breakout time gives us time to put additional pressure on, but
if it goes down to only two months or one month as a breakout
time, our capacity to respond is, obviously, diminished
dramatically.
So I think the approach which the Biden administration is
taking is the correct one.
If I could just move over to Burma, that recent coup
carried out by the Burmese military against the democratically-
elected civilian government has been condemned by the Biden
administration, and I welcome the steps which the
administration has already taken, including imposing targeted
sanctions against the military.
What role do you think China should play in partnering with
the United States and do we have a capacity to get China to
partner with us in order to put pressure on the military in
Burma to allow for the civilian democratically-elected
government to return to power?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you for that really important question,
Senator.
It is my understanding that Linda Thomas-Greenfield, our
ambassador now to the United Nations, is going to use our
platform since we are in the presidency in the month of March
to have a more serious discussion in the U.N. Security Council
about Burma and encouraging China to urge a return to a
democratically-elected government and to end the military coup,
which in its wake is just having a horrifying impact on the
rights and the freedoms of the Burmese people.
We have lots of issues with Burma even before this coup,
given the treatment of the Rohingya. But now it is of great
concern for all of the people of Burma and their freedom and
their way forward.
I applaud Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield for taking
this subject up as one of the first things that she does, and
Secretary Blinken has made it very clear this is a very high
priority for him and to not only look at those sanctions but
see that we get everyone engaged in ensuring that we return the
government.
Senator Markey. Okay, thank you. And I do believe we have
to put much more pressure on those military leaders and I hope
that that is part of the Biden plan. And no one has done more
thinking about the North Korean nuclear program than you have,
historically. You have just a rich history of the three
generations of the Kim family and their attitudes about this
issue.
Could you give us your sense of what the steps should be
that are taken by the Biden administration in conjunction with
the regional allies, especially in order to reduce this ever-
increasing nuclear threat from North Korea?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. It is my understanding
that a review is going on in the administration to decide on
how best to proceed with North Korea. Very tough challenge.
Quite agree with you it needs to be done with partners and
allies in the region, particularly Japan and South Korea. But
with everyone who has a stake in ensuring that Kim Jong-un does
not develop even more nuclear weapons, greater delivery
systems, and pose even a greater threat to the region and to
the world.
So I understand that review is ongoing and, if confirmed, I
would be glad to be talking with everyone here more about it to
get your views and ideas as well.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Markey. Do you--okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to the both of you. Congratulations on your
nominations.
In the last six weeks, the Biden administration has
embraced China, has bombed Syria, has empowered Russia and
Putin, has refused to stand with Israel on the Golan Heights,
and has lifted sanctions on Iranian-backed terrorists.
That is not an encouraging opening for the foreign policy
of this country for the next four years. I want to focus on a
couple of those areas.
Let us start with an area that should be a potential for
bipartisan cooperation. It is a topic that I discussed with
both of you at length in the past week, and that is Nord Stream
2.
Nord Stream 2, in the last year, was an incredible
bipartisan victory for the United States. The pipeline was over
90 percent completed from Russia to Germany. Congress acted not
once but twice, passing strong bipartisan sanctions.
Sanctions supported by Republicans and Democrats on this
committee passed it into law, and despite mountains of Russian
disinformation, the pipeline ceased minutes before those
sanctions were signed into law.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration has been sending
mixed signals and those signals have been heard by Putin. And
so Putin, after ceasing building the pipeline for a year, has
gone back to building the pipeline because Putin and Russia
believe the Biden administration will not hold them
accountable, will allow them to complete this pipeline, which
would put billions of dollars in Putin's pockets to be used
against America, against Europe.
The European Parliament, by the way, in December 2018 voted
433 to 105 to oppose Nord Stream 2, and in January 2021, after
Putin attempted to murder Navalny, they voted again to condemn
it, this time 581 to 50.
Let me start with both of you. Do both of you agree that
allowing Nord Stream 2 to be completed would be terrible policy
for the United States?
Ms. Sherman. Senator, the President of the United States,
the Secretary of State, have both said they oppose Nord Stream
2 and do not believe it should be completed.
Mr. McKeon. Senator that is my understanding as well. The
President has said it is a bad deal.
Senator Cruz. Well, if they oppose it, they are not very
effective at opposing it because when their administration came
into office, suddenly it commenced, and to be particular, last
month the State Department transmitted a mandatory and overdue
report to Congress about who is helping Putin build the
pipeline. The report included one ship and its owner, which the
Trump administration had already sanctioned.
So it simply reiterated what the Trump administration had
done. It did not include any entities that are plainly in
violation, not even the company that is actually constructing
the pipeline Congress has instructed the President to sanction.
Then, yesterday, the Biden administration imposed sanctions
for the poisoning of Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, but
those sanctions went out of their way not to touch the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline.
That was not an accident. Now that construction is resumed,
we have precious little time. I told both of you that if the
Biden administration does not change course, we are going to
wake up in six months or a year and this pipeline is going to
built because the Biden administration failed to act.
And so I want to ask you, Ms. Sherman, if confirmed, will
you move immediately to ensure that the Biden administration
meets its mandatory obligation imposed by Congress to name and
sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe laying,
pipe laying activities, certification, or insurance related to
Nord Stream 2?
Ms. Sherman. Well, Senator, even if confirmed, I will not
have the authority to make those decisions unilaterally. But I
can say to you that I will do everything I possibly can to
ensure that Nord Stream 2 does not go forward, and I know that
the administration will welcome advice and counsel from you and
from the Senate and we will move forward on everything that
they can do legally to stop the pipeline.
Senator Cruz. Well, I want to be very clear so that no one
in the administration is surprised. This was an incredible
victory for U.S. foreign policy and an incredible loss for
Putin and Russia.
The sanctions legislation was supported by virtually the
entirety the committee when we voted on it. The vote was 20 to
2, an overwhelming bipartisan majority.
The administration has all of the tools to stop the
pipeline, as evidenced by the fact that we stopped it for a
year that it worked, that we know it worked.
And it has only been in the last few weeks with the new
administration that Putin has felt he has the green light to go
ahead. I understand that the Germans want the pipeline built,
that the German Government does.
But going soft on Russia is a serious mistake, and once it
is built, it likely is impossible to unwind. So the window and
the urgency is now.
Ms. Sherman. Senator, we share the sense of urgency, and I
just want to say although I am not yet a part of the
administration and will not be unless confirmed by the Senate,
that I do not believe that the Biden/Harris administration has
been soft on Russia in any way, shape, or form.
I know we disagree when it comes to Nord Stream 2. But they
are very clear. As we heard, Ambassador Burns, who is, I hope,
about to be confirmed to be the director of the CIA, said and
who is our ambassador to Russia, that we all should be very
clear eyed about Russia being an adversary. Secretary Blinken
has spoken at length about ways in which Russia threaten our
country and I think there is a commitment to move in a tough
way.
Senator Cruz. Ambassador Sherman, with all due respect--
with all due respect, words are cheap. And so if the Biden
administration wishes to not be soft on Russia, rather than
saying we do not want to be soft on Russia they could actually
follow the mandatory law and stop the pipeline.
The test is going to be real simple. If Putin has billions
of dollars and Europe is energy dependent on Russia because the
Biden administration refused to comply with mandatory
bipartisan sanctions, that will be the test and not any
political rhetoric about we are tough on Putin.
If you are tough on Putin, do not give him billions of
dollars. The State Department needs to file a supplemental
interim report on Nord Stream 2 that sanctions every entity and
they are refusing to do so.
And if this pipeline gets completed, it will be the fault
of this administration. I do not want this to happen. I want
that to be a bipartisan victory and a victory for the United
States. You both have the opportunity to make sure that happens
and so I implore you to do that.
Thank you.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you. Just since the chairman reserved
his time I am going to take a moment of that time.
President Trump could have used sanctions for the course of
his four years in office on Nord Stream. He did not need
congressionally-approved sanctions to affect the pipeline.
Would that be from your experience a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. That is a fair statement, Senator.
The Chairman. And yet he did not do that. So I join my
colleague in my concern for Nord Stream. I mentioned it in my
opening remarks, and I urge the administration to do everything
they can to stop Nord Stream.
But it would be intellectually unfair to suggest that the
Biden administration is going to be the reason why Nord Stream
gets built when four years were lost with no sanctions
whatsoever.
I understand that Senator Schatz is up next virtually.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you for being willing to serve again.
My first question is for Ambassador Sherman. You know, as
people think of Asia, the mind races across the Pacific to
China and not the nations in between us and them, and so I want
to talk a little bit about Oceania.
It has got 12 million people, 14 island states, 17
territories, and 6 percent of the votes that we may need at the
United Nations. And so how do we step up engagement in Oceania?
Ms. Sherman. It is a great question, Senator, and you
probably understand this part of the world better than most of
us do, representing Hawaii, where it is very much a part of
your neighborhood in many ways.
I think that it is critical to engage with Oceania and with
the island states. They are often, as you point out, critical
votes at the United Nations and, certainly, in the General
Assembly.
And I know that in the Obama administration we, in fact,
created a special forum to have those conversations and to
ensure that we had diplomats who traveled to those island
nations. That often does not happen because they are far away.
Sometimes the travel is difficult. But it is quite critical.
So I thank you very much for raising it and, if confirmed,
I certainly will commit to you to pay attention to what is
often a swing vote.
Senator Schatz. Thank you. And I think one area for
potential cooperation, you know, we think of climate action as
an objective of American foreign policy.
But climate action is a shared response to the climate
crisis, especially in the disaster preparation, disaster
response space, and as we look at more long-term impacts of sea
level rise, especially in island nations and coastal nations,
there are opportunities to step up what USAID is doing and
other sort of, as you like to use the term, avenues of smart
power.
And so I am particularly excited about the opportunities
for us to deploy those resources throughout island nations for
selfish reasons but also for good humanitarian reasons.
Can you talk a little bit about what is going to be the
climate action strategy? I know we have got, you know, a lot of
horsepower behind this, including the President of the United
States, the former Secretary of State.
But how does that get operationalized in the international
context? And I am particularly interested not just in Paris but
how we use shared climate response as a tool of diplomacy.
Ms. Sherman. So let me make a couple of comments and then
Mr. McKeon may want to add to it as well in terms of how we are
organizing to tackle this very critical challenge.
The President of the United States, the Secretary, the vice
president have made clear that climate and our response to the
changing climate is a whole-of-government approach and it is
also a whole of State Department approach.
So as much as we have a special presidential envoy for
climate in former Secretary Kerry, every part of the
department, every bureau of the department, will have a focus
on climate as well because, as you well know, some of these
island nations are at risk of even disappearing, let alone the
changes in the ecosystem of the oceans, which affects fishermen
and the ability to have maritime and fishery economies. So it
is a critical issue that we will all have to pay attention to.
And your point, Senator, about disaster preparedness is
often a place where countries even with whom we do not agree on
everything can work together because it is such a necessity,
and the United States brings, really, unparalleled capabilities
in disaster preparedness and response.
Mr. McKeon, I do not know if you want to add to that.
Senator Schatz. Mr. McKeon, before you answer, I would like
you to perhaps provide some emphasis on those areas where we
can make some permanent structural change within the department
so that our climate strategy becomes so embedded into American
foreign policy objectives that it does not swing in one
direction or the other depending on the partisan affiliation of
the President herself or himself.
Mr. McKeon. Thank you, Senator.
As Ambassador Sherman said, we really have to integrate the
emphasis on climate action throughout the department. It is not
just going to be Secretary Kerry's team, but, of course, they
will be leading the diplomacy.
But it has to be front of mind for the work of everyone in
the department in all of the regional and functional bureaus to
think about how in pursuit of their programs and their planning
they are integrating a climate action dimension to it, not just
in our diplomacy but also in our assistance programs, as you
suggested.
So I think we owe you more thinking on this and I am not
sure what planning has gone on already because we are not in
the department.
But we will come back to you once we are--once we are in
the seat, if confirmed, to give you more detail about how we
are moving forward on this.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
My final question for Ambassador Sherman, global press
freedom is on the decline. Reporters Without Borders found that
the protection of rights for journalists has decreased 12
percent since it started reporting on such things in 2013.
What can we do to reverse this trend?
Ms. Sherman. Really important, Senator, and we have already
had some discussion here this morning about our response on the
horrifying death of Jamal Khashoggi. I think it is critical
that we engage with journalists around the world, that we talk
about press freedom wherever we go.
Yes, journalists are separate and apart, and they are part
of holding us accountable and administration accountable. But
they are also citizens. They are also standing for freedom.
And, in fact, one of the great parts of the United States
is when we find ourselves challenged, as we have in many ways
over the last years, it is often the press who hold all of us
accountable for what we are doing.
And so we have heard Secretary Blinken speak of the
importance of press freedom and making it essential to our
human rights agenda around the world and our agenda on
democracy.
Senator Schatz. Thank you to you both for testifying, for
being willing to serve again. And I just want to thank the
chair and the ranking member and all the staff for welcoming me
on to the committee.
The Chairman. It is very good to have you with us, Senator
Schatz.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, and I want to thank both of you for your prior public
service and your willingness to serve again.
Mr. McKeon, I want to associate myself with the remarks
from my fellow Maryland senator, Senator Cardin, about the
importance of your commitment to greater diversity in the
Foreign Service and the State Department.
Senator Sullivan and I are the co-chairs of the Foreign
Service Caucus and will soon be reintroducing legislation we
introduced last year, the Foreign Service Families Act.
It is to provide Foreign Service spouses and families
serving overseas with the same opportunities that we rightly
provide now to military spouses and families serving overseas.
I am just looking for your commitment that you will review
this legislation and provide us with your feedback as soon as
possible.
Mr. McKeon. Senator, you definitely--you have that
commitment. I have already looked at the bill and it looks, on
its face, very straightforward. I am sure colleagues in the
department will tell me we might need a tweak here or there to
make it more workable for--from the perspective of the
department. But we can work with you on that.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. One of the benefits
of going last here is you also get to associate yourself with
some of the prior comments, and I do want to associate myself
with the comments of Senator Young and Senator Coons, and I
know the chairman shares this, about better coordinating all
the tools available in our both diplomatic arsenal and our
development arsenal. USAID, the International Development
Finance Corporation. You and I spoke about that and I look
forward to working with you on that as well.
Ambassador Sherman, I teamed up with Senator Toomey to pass
two pieces of legislation. One is the BRINK Act, to apply
secondary sanctions against entities doing business with the
North Korean regime, and the Hong Kong Accountability Act to
apply sanctions to those Chinese officials who are tasked with
implementing the crackdown on democracy and human rights in
Hong Kong.
I would like your commitment to work with us to both fully
and effectively apply the sanctions under both those pieces of
legislation.
Ms. Sherman. It is an easy commitment to make, to make sure
that whatever sanctions we have we use them effectively and
efficiently.
Senator Van Hollen. So let me turn now to a little bit of
the Middle East, and JCPOA has been well covered here.
President Biden has made clear that he supports what had been
for a long time a bipartisan objective of U.S. foreign policy,
which is a secure State of Israel and a viable Palestinian
state--a two-state solution.
The Biden administration has also indicated that it would
oppose unilateral steps by either party that undermines the
prospects of a two-state solution, and we need to hold
everybody accountable there.
You would agree with, would you not, that expanding
settlements in East Jerusalem of the West Bank are unilateral
measures that do not serve the interests of protecting the
prospects of a two-state solution, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. It has been a long-standing position that
settlements, is my understanding, do not help to achieve a two-
state solution when they go beyond the current outlines of the
two states--the potential for two state.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate it. Well, one of them
under consideration is an area called E-1, which the Bush
administration made clear, Secretary Condoleezza Rice made
clear would be a very clear violation of our efforts to
preserve the opportunity for a two-state solution. So I hope
you will look into that right away.
While ISIS no longer controls any substantial territory,
you would agree that it remains a very potent threat to the
United States and our allies, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. I do agree it remains a threat.
Senator Van Hollen. And you would also agree, I believe,
that our Syrian Kurdish allies have been absolutely essential
partners in our fight against ISIS and have been a major part
of why we have been able to diminish ISIS' influence in the
region, would you not?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. So can you commit to working with us to
work with Turkey to stop trying to, essentially, kill and
destroy our Syrian Kurdish allies who have been such key
partners in that fight against ISIS?
Ms. Sherman. You know, Senator, I certainly understand
why--Turkey's concerns. But, nonetheless, I agree with you that
the Kurds have been immensely helpful partners to us and that
we need to work with Turkey to find a way forward for them to
understand that that partnership does not threaten them if we
all manage it in a sane kind of way.
Our relationship with Turkey is very complicated and one in
which I think, if confirmed, I would certainly pay some
considerable attention to.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that, and the chairman and
the ranking member and I have been very involved in the
legislation to impose the CAATSA sanctions on Turkey for their
purchase and deployment of the S-400. Turkey is talking about
another round of purchasing S-400 from Russia. So I hope you
will work with us and with Turkey to discourage them from
moving forward there.
On the JCPOA, I just want to underscore the fundamental
principle behind it, which is it is our policy to prevent Iran
from getting a nuclear weapon, right?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. And it is also our view, your view, my
view, that resolving that through diplomatic means is better
than going to war with Iran, right?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Van Hollen. And the United States has lots of
troops in Iraq right now, do we not?
Ms. Sherman. We do indeed.
Senator Van Hollen. And I actually agree with Senator
Paul's analysis of the consequence of the--our actions with
respect to Iraq, which is the biggest geopolitical winner was
Iran, which, of course, neighbors Iraq.
If we were to go to war with Iran, our troops in Iraq would
be put in grave danger, would they not?
Ms. Sherman. It is my belief that they would be, yes,
Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. I think it is pretty clear that they
would be right in the line of fire. So I encourage you to
continue your efforts with respect to JCPOA compliance-for-
compliance and I hope that we can get to that position as soon
as possible.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I would like to jump in. Ms. Sherman, I am grateful to see
you here and very excited to support your nomination on the
floor of the Senate.
You and I talked a lot about the Horn of Africa and some of
the challenges we see going on within Ethiopia that are really
painful and discouraging. Amnesty International said over the
weekend and CNN has reported that there have been massacres by
Eritrean forces, which have killed hundreds of civilians in the
Tigray region of Ethiopia.
It is really a point that I think we are at the level of a
major humanitarian crisis affecting millions of people, and
that there is the possibility of a famine, and I know you are
aware of it.
I really did appreciate Secretary Blinken's receptiveness
to appointing a special envoy to the Horn of Africa in a
statement last week, and I really do hope that we move forward
in that direction.
But the Government of Ethiopia continues to deny that there
is even ongoing fighting there, and this puts us in a difficult
situation. They are even putting out a lot of misinformation
that makes it hard to understand what is happening.
And so understanding that the U.S.-Ethiopia relationship is
important, as we know, could you just maybe give some more,
publicly in this hearing, some more thoughts on how you would
engage Prime Minister Abiy to cease hostilities and ensure that
humanitarian access is in the region and how we create better
governmental accountability?
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you
for your concern about the Horn of Africa and about what is
happening in Ethiopia, which is quite horrifying.
Secretary Blinken, is my understanding, spoke to the prime
minister yesterday and made it very clear that we expect him to
ensure humanitarian access.
He had said that he would, but the Secretary wanted to make
sure that he understood that there would be consequences if he
did not, that he has responsibility for ensuring peace in the
Tigray region of Ethiopia, that Eritrean troops should leave
and others who are not helpful actors should not be in the
region.
I think we will have to follow this up, working with our
diplomatic presence in Ethiopia, to ensure that that
humanitarian access continues, that this conflict ends, and the
Ethiopian prime minister understands that the United States is
not only watching but we will take action.
And I am very grateful as a citizen, as a person who cares
about the rights of people around the world, that Secretary
Blinken was so forthright yesterday with the prime minister.
Senator Booker. I am really grateful. Can we shift to Libya
and Somalia as well, another really difficult area of conflict?
[Senator Booker requested and was granted permission to
submit the material referenced above for inclusion in the
hearing record. That information is located at the end of this
transcript beginning on page 144.]
And we can see that this was an internationalized conflict
with more countries being involved. Libya, UAE, Russia, Turkey,
have all fueled this conflict that I believe is another strike
point on the continent.
In Somalia, you see these other groups that are pursuing,
really, their own interests that are really to the detriment of
Somalia's Government and federalized system.
And so could you maybe give some insights on what you will
do to address the issues of foreign interference in a situation
that is really fragile and could destabilize even more, and how
you will help the regional bureaus of the State Department
cross between their silos?
That is the challenge you have in the Near East and Africa
bureaus that I am a little concerned about, that structurally
we are not really organizationally prepared for the conflict
that we are seeing there.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you, Senator. On Libya, I actually have
a small sliver of hope, given the pending elections and the
peace process that has begun in Libya. It is very fragile, as
you say, led by the Europeans.
And yes, I agree with you there. Lots of it became a proxy
place for conflict, and that those who represent those proxies
should be out of Libya and let the Libyan people decide their
own future.
I was in Libya right at the point where Hadi was about to
run as the only presidential candidate. It was fragile then. It
remains fragile now, and--I am sorry, Hadi is Yemen. Long in
the process here. I apologize.
But I was in Libya at the point of the conflict and before
we had to shut down our embassy in Libya. So I hope that there
is a more--a chance for peace in Libya, led by Europe with our
support.
In terms of Somalia, which I also visited when I was Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, and I thought we were on the
road to a better future for the Somali people. It has, clearly,
gone backwards in just terrible ways.
And so I think we have to engage across bureaus, as you
suggest, to make sure that we bring all of our resources to
bear. I know that our ambassador to the U.N. will also play a
role both in the Libyan and the Somalia circumstances.
And I do not know whether my colleague has something he
wants to add on sort of how we are organized to become a better
matrix organization and less siloed.
Senator Booker. I appreciate you opening the door to Mr.
McKeon and maybe I will turn to him. I had this incredible
couple paragraphs written here, knowing you are a Notre Dame
graduate, to remind you of my exploits as a football player
against your school and defeating them soundly. But I am going
to----
Mr. McKeon. After we talked the other day, I watched the
video of you making that catch and avoiding tackle from the
all-star NFL star.
Senator Booker. I appreciate you saying that because my
chairman, I am not sure if he even knows that I played.
Mr. McKeon. I texted some friends, and they were just
wondering how you got away from Lou Holtz.
[Laughter.]
Mr. McKeon. So they would like to hear the story.
The Chairman. The chairman recognizes that the junior
senator from New Jersey excels in everything.[Laughter.]
Senator Booker. Thank you very much. I am actually going to
just ask you--I just want to maybe say it on the record. You
were so gracious. But I have a lot of concerns about diversity,
paid internships.
I am going to introduce a bill today about paid internships
in the State Department because that is just an issue to me
that has always troubled me, as I have traveled around the
world, seeing our State Department, these amazing heroic
frontline folks, but they do not really reflect the diversity
of our country.
And I just would love to just maybe get in the five, 10
seconds I have left maybe some thoughts from you on that
effort.
Mr. McKeon. Yes, thank you.
As I said to you the other day, the department has scraped
together a few million dollars to start paying interns. It is
not for the entire program. And it appears that I need to dig
into it some more.
We might need some legislative authority to facilitate this
in addition to the resources. So we will come back to you and
look forward to working with you on this legislation.
Senator Booker. I look forward to supporting you as well on
the Senate floor, and thank you both for your extraordinary
service to our nation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Booker.
So the Chair will reclaim his time, and we appreciate that
you have been through two and a half hours without relief. So
we will try not to make this too prolonged.
But, Ambassador, is it fair to say that the Trump
administration's maximum effort campaigns did cause economic
consequences to Iran?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, I would say that it did.
The Chairman. Yeah. But it is also fair to say that Iran is
now closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than it was before
and during the Maximum Pressure campaign?
Ms. Sherman. Yes, it is.
The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that we could not get
one vote for many of our major allies at the United Nations to
extend the arms embargo that ceased?
Ms. Sherman. That is my understanding, Senator. Yes.
The Chairman. Is it also fair to say that the Maximum
Pressure campaign has done nothing, ultimately, to get Iran to
stop its nefarious activities throughout the region?
Ms. Sherman. That is my assessment as well.
The Chairman. Or, for that fact, to diminish its support
for terrorism in the world?
Ms. Sherman. It appears so, yes, Senator.
The Chairman. So I say these only because I recognize that
the Maximum Pressure campaign cost Iran financially, but it did
not meet the goals that I think we, collectively, want. So let
me ask you this.
There is no question--well, let me ask you, do you believe
that a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat to the State
of Israel?
Ms. Sherman. I do.
The Chairman. And I share that view, and I also believe
that it is a threat to the United States of America, not just
about Israel or our allies in the region. So, therefore, I
believe that it is President Biden's view that Iran cannot be
allowed to obtain a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Sherman. That is correct.
The Chairman. Now, in that regard, how we achieve that goal
is really the question, and so I appreciate the phrase
``stronger and longer.'' Longer, I get what it means. Stronger,
I am hoping for definition.
Because the reality is if all--from my perspective, and I
have heard my colleagues on both sides here--from my
perspective, if all we do is return to the JCPOA, that
certainly is not stronger.
And if we extend it, it might be longer, but it is not
stronger because there are still sunset issues that are now
more prevalent today than they were in 2016 when the agreement
went into effect.
And so it also will not have dealt with the ballistic
missiles. It will not have dealt with the destabilization of
the region. It will not have dealt with its support for
terrorism or the violation of its own people's human rights.
And so, you know, the question in my mind is not so much
JCPOA. The question is, what is the JCPOA Plus or what do we
do, but how do we, in fact, ensure that we have more than
illusory promise in terms of what comes, the follow-on, and the
connection between any return to some form of the JCPOA with
some clearly determined process to deal with these other
issues.
Otherwise, my own view will be that we will have failed.
And so this--I drive this because while I also, in fairness,
for the record, you are not going to be the lead on the Iran
portfolio. That has already been designated to others.
But upon confirmation as a deputy you are going to be in
all the deputy meetings, and you also have expertise and
experience in this regard and you will be called upon to
express both the Secretary and the administration's view but
also on your expertise.
So could you give me a sense of what that would be in broad
strokes, understanding--and I appreciate your comments in
response to other questions about looking at the intelligence
when you have access to it again because I think a deep dive
into the intelligence will be very important to understand what
Iran has and has not complied with in its actions and its
intentions.
Ms. Sherman. Thank you very much, Senator.
I do not know all of the answers at this point because not
only have I not made a deep dive into the intelligence because
I am not in the administration, I do not know what
deliberations have gone on so far in the administration as they
try to think through the strategy that is best here.
You know, I have seen what others see from press reports
about our offer to open diplomacy, which I think should be the
first resort always. I have seen the strike in Syria in
retaliation for the threat against Americans.
I have seen the response, perhaps, or just a separate
action against Al Asad Airbase. I, you know, read in some of
the Iranian press what is going on politically in their
country. But I do not know all the pieces of the puzzle
anymore. You have to be really inside to get the fingertips for
what is going on.
But I do agree with you, Senator, that there has to be very
careful deliberations which will include, and I hope already
have begun to include, you and the members of this committee
and other senators who have interest in this arena to get your
advice and counsel, as I have said in this hearing, at the
takeoff, not just at the landing, to have true consultation,
not just notification, how we sequence sanctions, how we
sequence any lifting of sanctions, what we expect from the
Iranians, what those who are in the negotiation and in the
JCPOA yet believe we need to do going forward.
So there are a myriad of puzzle pieces here and, if
confirmed, I would look forward to extensive discussion with
you and with others who have interest in this to sort through
how the administration goes forward.
The Chairman. Let me ask you this. If we were still in the
agreement and Iran had done what it has done today, would that
not be subject to snap back?
Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
The Chairman. And I would consider that it would be a set
of actions that would require snap back, from my own
perspective.
Let me ask you this. Sanctions relief for whatever deal may
come forward, clearly, we have to be very careful. There are
sanctions which I helped fashion that are not about the nuclear
portfolio and issue, but about terrorism and other things.
Iran likes to try to claim that all sanctions that we levy
are just about their nuclear portfolio. We cannot tolerate that
or else we will have nothing in our arsenal of peaceful
diplomacy to deal with Iran's other nefarious activities.
Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. It is a fair statement that we have to keep
sanctions on that deal with human rights abuses, state
sponsorship of terrorism, arms sales, et cetera, what we have
done in terms of Hezbollah and Hamas.
So, yes, I think there are many things that need to stay in
place.
The Chairman. Let me turn to another subject for a moment.
First of all, my dear friend and colleague, Senator Rubio, on
Venezuela, you know, I agree with him and our cause in
Venezuela.
I think what you meant in response to his question, and
correct me if I am wrong, that one of the things you thought
should have been done is to take the international recognition
of Guaido and, ultimately, maximize that recognition beyond
simple recognition, but an effort to multilateralize sanctions
against the Maduro regime. Or am I wrong?
Ms. Sherman. No, very well said. Wish I had said it as
well.
The Chairman. Okay. So, but--and let me refer to Senator
Murphy, who said that the European Union no longer recognizes
Guaido.
The European Union never recognized Guaido. Individual
member states of the European Union recognized Guaido and some
of them have a concern because the basis of that recognition
was under the Venezuelan Constitution.
The President of the National Assembly, in the absence of
the President or a legitimate president, ultimately is
recognized as the interim president of Venezuela.
He is, according to the view of some, no longer the
President of the National Assembly because we had an
internationally-condemned false elections in Venezuela that
elected a new National Assembly.
But it is not because he lost his title. It is because they
had an election that has been internationally condemned. Is
that a fair statement?
Ms. Sherman. I believe so, yes, sir.
The Chairman. And so how we internationalize this is
incredibly important.
Let me turn to Cuba for a moment, which is, along with
Iran, one of my passions. You know, do you know that a Cuban
worker in Cuba cannot be employed directly by a foreign entity?
Ms. Sherman. I did not.
The Chairman. Hotels in Cuba, or a U.S. company that gets
created in Cuba, cannot directly hire a Cuban worker. They go
to the state employment agency controlled by the regime. The
regime sends the worker, for example, to the hotel. The regime
gets paid in dollars by the foreign company and then gives the
worker a fraction of their wages in return.
Do you know that Cuban doctors that are sent abroad,
ultimately, have their passports taken from them so that they
cannot leave the country they are sent to, and that payment for
their service by that country is sent to the regime and not
paid to a Cuban doctor?
Ms. Sherman. I had been aware about the passport issue and
I better understand now from you how the payment system works.
The Chairman. Do you understand that when we talk about we
want to help the Cuban people, of which I am all in favor, but
when we send a remittance to Cuba as a U.S. citizen for one of
our family members that the regime takes 10 percent of it right
off the bat, and you do realize that?
Ms. Sherman. I had heard of that.
The Chairman. And then after that, they turn the balance of
the remittance not in dollars, which have a far more vibrant
buying ability within the island, but they turn it into
worthless pesos.
So when we send money, we allow money to be sent under
these circumstances, what we are doing is empowering the
regime.
Do you realize that a U.S. company that wants to open up in
Cuba has to go through one of Castro's two relatives in order
to be able to open up and the state becomes a co-owner with
them?
Ms. Sherman. I had not realized that, sir.
The Chairman. That is exactly what happens, in tourism and
whatnot. You have Castro's son and son-in-law. Both heads of
the Cuban military are parts of the Cuban military and they
direct the two corporate entities that do all these.
So I share these with you because I find it interesting,
you know, lying on the beach in Veradaro and sipping a Cuba
Libre, which is an oxymoron, is not going to liberate the Cuban
people.
Have you heard of the San Isidro movement?
Ms. Sherman. Yes.
The Chairman. Okay. The San Isidro movement is a bunch of
artists and writers who just want freedom of their expression.
The Government cracked down on all of those, and so they
started a movement in what is a black majority part of Havana
to, ultimately, denounce their artistic and freedom of
expression movement.
The Government has viciously attacked them and arrested
them. These are the realities of Castro's Cuba, not the
romanticism that some people seem to have, and I personally
have a problem--I like to be consistent. In this town,
consistency is not a great virtue. But I like--I try to be
consistent.
My advocacy for human rights and democracy globally is not
subject to where it lies. So whether it be in Burma, whether it
be in Venezuela, whether it be on the Uyghurs and human rights
in China, whether it be about the Rohingya, my view is pretty
universal.
And the problem I have with some is that when it comes to
certain places in the world they are enormous advocates of
democracy and human rights; but when it comes to other places
in the world, they are willing to look totally the other way
and act in a different way than we would seek to act in other
places. And I think that is problematic.
I understand the world. There is not a single way we can--
do not get to treat everybody in a cookie cutter fashion.
By the same token, when we send different messages--that
here is where we will promote human rights and democracy, here
is where we will not, here is where we will sanction the
consequences of violations of human rights and here is where we
will not--then it becomes a really problematic area to stand up
for what I believe President Biden is about, which is about
standing up for democracy and human rights--based upon the time
I served with him on this committee.
So I hope we are thinking about that, whether it is about
Cuba or any other place. I want to help the Cuban people,
ultimately, live a better life. I would like them to be free. I
would like them to choose who governs them. I would like them
to be able to worship at the altar that they choose.
But that is not, for the most part, the reality of life in
Cuba. So we need to understand the realities, not the
romanticism, and when we seek to help; what we cannot do is,
ultimately, help a regime that oppresses them.
Finally, I hope you will pay some attention to, upon your
confirmation, to the eastern Mediterranean region. I passed
into law with Senator Rubio the Eastern Mediterranean Security
and Energy Partnership Act of 2019. It is incredibly important
that we look at Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and others in an
eastern Mediterranean strategy that is both about energy, but
at the--and that can diversify and, therefore, not have the
pipeline issue as important as issue as it is, but at the same
time deals with security.
Several of these countries host us in very significant
ways, are our security partners. With Turkey being under
Erdogan, the--not the reliable NATO ally that we have aspired
it to be, not to be the bridge between East and West, not to
be--you know, there are more lawyers and journalists jailed in
Turkey than in any other place in the world. That is an
extraordinary statement about a NATO ally.
And so what we do as it relates to Turkey but also in our
own interest. Even if Turkey was a perfect partner, which it is
not, the East Med is an incredibly important area and I want to
commend that to your attention as you look forward to take
duty.
And then, very finally, I hope the President will keep his
commitment to recognize the Armenian genocide. The United
States Senate by unanimous consent passed it last year. I was
proud to sponsor that. The House of Representatives has passed
it.
It is time for the President of the United States to do
what the rest of the Congress of the United States has
represented to the American people, which is to recognize the
genocide. Let us call history for what it is.
And in that regard, I also hope that we will look to help
the people of Armenia and help to facilitate the release of
POWs that the Azerbaijanis have. It is in violation of
international law what they are doing.
We need to speak out, which the previous administration did
not, and we need to work to try to get that region to look
forward to what the Minsk process was. There is some suggestion
that this is all over. No, it is not, and we need to get--
released the POWs and we have to help Armenia as it gets all of
these people, refugees, back into their country.
With that, before I close, I am introducing into the record
a letter written by 19 of Brian McKeon's former Republican
colleagues during his time on this committee expressing
enthusiastic support for his nomination and complete confidence
in his character and abilities.
I am quoting from the letter. They note their deep respect
for Brian as a leader who exhibits unfailing integrity,
fairness, professionalism, devotion to our national interest.
[The information referred to is located at the end of this
transcript.]
The Chairman. Due to COVID precautions, my staff will email
the letter directly to the clerk.
With that, and thanks to the committee for your attendance,
the record will remain open until the close of business
tomorrow, March the 4th.
I urge both of you, if there are questions for the record,
to respond to them in--as quickly as possible so that your
nominations can be considered at a business meeting of the
committee.
And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
----------
Letter in Support of Hon. Wendy R. Sheman's Nomination, Signed by
Former Ambassadors and National Security Officials
Letter in Support of Hon. Brian McKeon's Nomination, Signed by 19
Republican Former SFRC Staff Members
Responses to Additional Questions
Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. The FY 21 NDAA includes a requirement for the Secretary
of State to develop and implement a strategy for countering white
identity terrorism globally. The attack on Congress earlier this month
underscores the importance of this issue. Do I have your commitment
that you will submit this strategy on time if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to developing a Department of State
strategy for countering white identity terrorism globally, in line with
the NDAA requirement. Countering white identity terrorism and other
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremism (REMVE) is a top
priority for the Biden-Harris Administration. The State Department has
an important role to play on these issues, as we are seeing increasing
transnational links between white identity terrorists and other REMVE
actors. If confirmed, I will prioritize working closely with the
interagency and our partners around the world to address the threat of
white identity terrorism and other REMVE, as well as all forms of
terrorism and violent extremism--offline and online.
Question. How specifically will you ensure that the State
Department prioritizes this issue?
Answer. ``white identity'' terrorism, including terrorism
designations as appropriate, and foreign partner engagement. The United
States developed effective tools to counter the spread of ISIS and al-
Qa'ida that can be adapted to address this threat. Among these tools,
public diplomacy programs that promote people-to-people engagement help
increase awareness and build international consensus to counter white
identity terrorism.
Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship,
which will be critical in addressing 21st century challenges ranging
from climate change to China. In light of this, I introduced the
Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate Cooperation with India Act to
boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy. If confirmed, what
aspects of the Trump Administration's work on energy in India will you
continue and what will you change?
Answer. In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of
installing 450 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I
would support the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance
the flexibility and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage
India's clean energy transition over the next decade. In contrast to
the previous administration's approach, in order to support India
raising its climate ambition, if confirmed, I would prioritize lower
cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as coal-fired power,
including by promoting renewable energy, battery storage, and load
shifting.
Question. I also believe that the U.S.-India partnership is
strongest when based on shared democratic values, and I am concerned by
the recent trend away from those values in India. From the recent
crackdowns on farmers peacefully protesting the new farming laws and
corresponding intimidation of journalists and government critics, to
the rising anti-Muslim sentiment and related government actions like
the Citizenship Amendment Act, to the continued repression in Kashmir
nearly a year and a half after the abrogation of Article 370, there are
a significant number of human rights and democracy issues facing India.
Do I have your commitment that you will actively raise human rights and
democracy issues with the Indian Government, at your level and all
levels of the Department?
Answer. I share your belief that the U.S.-India relationship is
underpinned by a common commitment to democracy and democratic
institutions. The Biden-Harris administration will ensure human rights
and religious freedom remain core pillars of U.S. foreign policy, and
if confirmed, my engagement with the Indian Government will reflect our
values and commitment to human rights.
Question. What is your plan for ensuring that discussion of these
important issues does not get lost amidst other priorities in the
bilateral relationship?
Answer. The U.S.-India strategic partnership is one of our most
critical relationships in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will work
with counterparts in the U.S. and Indian Government to deepen our
comprehensive partnership based on mutual interests including regional
security and economic growth, promoting shared values of democracy and
human rights, and cooperation on shared challenges including climate
change, COVID-19 response efforts, and trafficking in persons. By
prioritizing our shared interests and values, we can advance broader
U.S. national security interests for regional peace and stability in
the Indo-Pacific.
Question. A democratic, stable and resilient Ukraine is in the
national security interest of the United States, and efforts towards
that end receive broad bipartisan support in the Senate. If confirmed,
how will your policy approach to Ukraine differ from the approach taken
during the Obama and Trump Administrations?
Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will continue to oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. Further, if confirmed I will work with
Congress to continue providing the security assistance, including
lethal defensive weapons, Ukraine requires to defend itself against
Russia's aggression. I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic
path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and economic
reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter
future for all Ukrainians.
Question. Do you support the provision of lethal security
assistance for Ukraine, beyond providing Javelin missiles?
Answer. If confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress
to continue providing the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself
against Russia's aggression, including lethal weapons, based on a U.S.
and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense requirements. This
includes the provision of defensive lethal assistance that has already
expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as armed Mark VI patrol boats
this year, for instance.
Question. How will you work to urge Ukrainian officials and its
private sector to deny Chinese efforts to take over significant
military production capabilities in the country?
Answer. The United States is prepared to work with our Ukrainian
partners to advance our shared interests and protect Ukraine's
sensitive industries. I was pleased to see Ukraine's decisive action to
sanction Chinese firm Skyrizon, which has attempted to take control of
Motor Sich, on January 29. This action protects U.S. and Ukrainian
national security. The administration has urged and will continue to
urge Ukraine to remain vigilant about People's Republic of China (PRC)
influence in its strategic industries and to pass legislation creating
a mechanism for reviewing investment. If confirmed, I would work
closely with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation to
support U.S. investors as alternatives to predatory PRC investors.
Question. Do you believe that our Indo-Pacific strategy ought to be
a function of our China policy, as was the case with the Trump
administration, or that our China policy ought to be a function of our
Indo-Pacific strategy? Put another way, can we get China ``right'' if
we don't get the region right, first?
Answer. Our global policy to compete with China and the U.S.
commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific are complementary
strategies. Our relationship with China will be competitive when it
should be, collaborative when it can be, and adversarial when it must
be. The common denominator is the need to engage China from a position
of strength. To do that, the United States needs to support a free and
open Indo-Pacific, where our engagement builds broad cooperation with
allies and partners in pursuit of common interests, including advancing
COVID-19 recovery and returning to sustained economic prosperity,
dealing with the climate crisis, upholding international law and
multilateral institutions, and reinforcing democracy, human rights, and
good governance. As the President has said, how the United States and
Asia work together to secure the peace, defend our shared values, and
advance our prosperity across the Indo-Pacific, including how we
address the China challenge, will be among the most consequential
efforts we undertake.
Question. With regards to China and the broader Indo-Pacific
region, aside from words of condemnation and economic sanctions: What
other tools does the Biden Administration have to counterbalance
China's growing influence around the world, including in contentious
regions such as the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and Tibet?
Answer. If confirmed, I will promote Department efforts to re-
engage with allies, partners, and international organizations to create
a level playing field for U.S. businesses across the globe, support
those who fight for democracy and human rights in China and across the
Indo-Pacific, maintain our technological edge, protect U.S.
intellectual property from theft, promote freedom of navigation and
overflight and other lawful uses of the sea, and continue to work with
Congress to spotlight and combat malign PRC actions and human rights
violations, including in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang.
Question. There is little question that the Trump administration's
failed North Korea policy has left us worse off than we were before.
North Korea's nuclear and missile programs are unconstrained, our
alliance with the Republic of Korea has been put under great stress,
and the sanctions regime is in tatters. President Trump's diplomatic
failure with North Korea is the latest in a long-line of failed efforts
to achieve a denuclearized North Korea. How will the Biden
administration approach North Korea?
Answer. North Korea's weapons of mass destruction program and
proliferation activities constitute a serious threat to international
peace and security and undermine global nonproliferation efforts. If
confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing
policy review, in consultation with our allies, of the state of play on
North Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the
complete denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the
near term on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.
Question. What is the pathway to denuclearization and a stable,
peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula?
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea must remain a top national
security priority for the United States. I support the Administration's
plan to evaluate and adopt, in consultation with our allies, a strategy
to keep the American people and our allies safe and that takes into
account pressure options and the potential for future diplomacy with
North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress
on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's WMD and
ballistic missile programs.
Question. What does success with North Korea look like?
Answer. Foremost, success entails achieving the complete
denuclearization of North Korea and a durable peace on the Korean
Peninsula, which would promote stability for our allies, the region,
and the world. Further, success would entail an end to malign North
Korea-linked actions globally, including cyber-enabled malicious
activities and arms trafficking, and involve greater respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms in North Korea. If confirmed, I plan to
join the Biden-Harris Administration's ongoing policy review, in
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North
Korea.
Question. The war in Yemen is about to enter its 6th year and, in
spite of the efforts of UN special envoy Martin Griffiths, little
progress has been made toward ending a conflict that has killed more
than 17,000 civilians and created the world's worst humanitarian
crisis. Iran continues to ship weapons, including ballistic missiles,
which have allowed the Houthis to menace Saudi Arabia and continue
their war against the internationally recognized Yemeni Government.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia continues to hit civilian targets in Yemen with
U.S.-made warplanes and munitions. I am pleased to see that the
Administration shares my concerns about the civilian casualties
resulting from Saudi Arabia's use of U.S. munitions, and is reviewing
arms sales to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, while ending U.S. support
for the Saudi-led war in Yemen. What evidence will the Administration
need to see regarding the improved use of offensive U.S. weapons
systems by those countries before it is comfortable with further sales?
Answer. As President Biden said, the Administration is committed to
reinvigorating diplomatic efforts, alongside the UN and others, to
achieve a ceasefire and end the war in Yemen. The Administration is
recalibrating our relationship with Saudi Arabia to reflect U.S.
values. The President announced the ending of U.S. support for
offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant arms sales, and
appointed Special Envoy Tim Lenderking to spearhead our diplomatic
efforts and support to the UN. The Administration paused two arms sales
with Saudi Arabia, and, if confirmed, I will support efforts to
evaluate other potential sales to help ensure they are consistent with
our values and that Congress will be consulted. The Administration will
work with our partners to help them reduce the risk of civilian harm.
Question. I am under no illusions about the Houthi's malevolent
role in the conflict, but Secretary Blinken's reversal of his
predecessor's poorly thought-out FTO designation of the Houthis has
prevented Yemen's humanitarian crises from exponentially worsening. At
the same time, I am also deeply concerned by the previous
administration's freeze on assistance to Northern Yemen. Will the Biden
Administration lift this freeze? What steps will the Administration
take, alongside the UN and other international donors, to ensure that
the Houthis are not able to divert or place unacceptable conditions on
international assistance?
Answer. USAID was forced to partially suspend some assistance to
NGOs in northern Yemen in March 2020 due to Houthi interference in
partners' operations. This decision is currently under review. As with
all humanitarian programs, the United States aims to ensure our
partners can deliver assistance in a timely manner without undue
interference. Without proper oversight of taxpayer money, we adjust or
terminate funding to specific programs as necessary. Over the last
year, the U.S. has worked closely with our partners, including the UN
and other donors, to advocate with the Houthis to cease interference in
aid operations, and there have been some positive changes. The
Administration continues to press all parties to allow for the
unhindered provision of aid.
Question. I am also concerned by the recent Houthi advance into
Marib province, which threatens to displace hundreds of thousands of
Yemenis, many for the second or third time. How will the Biden
Administration build leverage to push all warring parties to agree to a
nationwide ceasefire in Yemen and begin talks aimed at a sustainable
political solution to the conflict?
Answer. The President committed to ending all support for the
Saudi-led Coalition's offensive operations in Yemen, including relevant
arms sales. There is no military solution to the conflict and the
Department redoubled its diplomatic efforts to find a political end to
the war and address the dire humanitarian crisis. The Secretary named a
U.S. Special Envoy for Yemen in order to redouble U.S. efforts to find
a peaceful resolution as soon as possible. If confirmed, I will support
efforts towards a nationwide ceasefire that quickly moves to
negotiations and increases international pressure against the Houthis
to convince them to halt their assault on Marib.
Question. The Taliban's commitments on counterterrorism are an
indispensable part of the February 29th agreement. Its compliance with
those commitments, or lack thereof, must inform the decisions the U.S.
makes regarding our future in Afghanistan and will certainly be the
basis of future congressional support for assistance to Afghanistan. Do
you commit to make the Taliban's compliance with the February 29th
Agreement, especially with the counterterrorism provisions, the basis
of any decisions the U.S. makes regarding our future in Afghanistan?
Answer. I agree it is important to ensure Afghanistan never again
serves as a safe haven for terrorist groups that threaten the security
of the United States and our Allies. To this end, I support the
Administration's ongoing review of compliance by all parties with their
commitments in the February 29 U.S.-Taliban Agreement and the February
29 U.S.-Afghanistan Joint Declaration. This review includes assessing
whether the Taliban are fulfilling their commitments relating to
counterterrorism, reducing violence, and engaging in meaningful
negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Question. Our relationship with Mexico is one of the most
important in the world. However, I have serious concerns over the
growing challenges to the rule of law in Mexico by armed criminal
organizations-especially when certain groups increasingly appear to be
equipped with military-grade arms and vehicles. While the Mexican
Government rightfully raises concerns about international arms
trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico, that only tells half the story.
The arrest and botched release of former Mexican Defense Minister
Cienfuegos last year, as well as other high profile cases, suggest that
criminal organizations have coopted certain officials and institutions
at various levels of the Mexican Government. And, despite these
challenges, the Lopez Obrador Government has taken steps to complicate
bilateral law enforcement cooperation. What is your assessment of
challenges to the rule of law in Mexico and how will you work with
Mexican authorities on these issues?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that U.S. efforts to dismantle
transnational criminal organizations, reduce impunity and corruption,
and strengthen the rule of law in Mexico receive the full cooperation
of the Mexican Government. If confirmed, I look forward to
comprehensive conversations with the Mexican Government so that this
cooperation deepens and works for the benefit of both nations. In the
context of those conversations, I will not hesitate to raise any issues
with the Mexican Government that I believe to be obstacles to our
bilateral security cooperation.
Question. The U.S. has a long-running strategic interest in the
stability of the East Africa region, given its proximity to the Red
Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Western Indian Ocean. The last
administration never developed a holistic plan to consolidate
democratic gains, prevent democratic backsliding and pursue our
geostrategic interests. I am working on legislation to develop such an
approach, and I hope you will work closely with me on that effort.
Ethiopia is one country that will be impacted by my efforts. The
transition to democracy there is jeopardized by an ongoing conflict in
Tigray, communal violence in other parts of the country and closing
political space. Prominent political opposition figures are in jail,
along with thousands of opposition supporters, journalists, and others.
Under the current circumstances, do you believe Ethiopia can hold
credible elections in June? What action should the USG consider in
addressing the deep humanitarian, political, and security crisis that
is now impacting Ethiopia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the State
Department develops and implements a comprehensive strategy for the Red
Sea region. One critical element of this is a strategy to address the
ongoing issues in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the ongoing border
dispute with Sudan. A peaceful, stable, democratic Ethiopia at peace
with its neighbors is essential for the Horn of Africa and the wider
region. The Ethiopian Government has promised national elections in
June. Inclusive dialogue among all political actors is a prerequisite
to identifying and adopting necessary reforms. All detainees need to be
afforded due process. The violence in Tigray must end; humanitarian and
human rights workers must receive unhindered access; and independent
investigations into reported human rights abuses and violations must
proceed.
Question. Sudan, another country along the Red Sea Corridor, is
undergoing a fragile transition as well. What specific steps will you
take to ensure a successful transition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support Sudan's democratic transition
and Civilian-led Transitional Government, as well as efforts to promote
economic reform and development. Further, if confirmed, I intend to
ensure consistent engagement with Sudan's civilian leaders to encourage
progress in taking the difficult, but necessary, next steps, including
governance and security sector reforms, expanded protection of
civilians in Darfur, resolution of ongoing conflicts, and
accountability for past atrocities.
Question. As I told Undersecretary Hale over a year ago, we are
losing the Sahel. The 2020 Global Terrorism Index found that seven of
the ten countries with the largest increase in terrorism were in sub-
Saharan Africa; Burkina Faso topped the list. But this is not just a
security crisis; we need a comprehensive strategy that addresses
Diplomatic, Development, and Defense issues (3Ds). Will you make the
crisis in the Sahel a top priority for the State Department, and ensure
that the interagency pursues a ``3Ds'' strategy in the region?
Answer. I agree with your concern about rising violent extremism,
governance challenges, and humanitarian concerns in the Sahel. The path
to lasting stability lies in accountable governance, providing services
and economic opportunities, protecting the rule of law, and engaging
communities in decisions. The Biden-Harris Administration has committed
to undertake an interagency review of our diplomatic, security, and
other assistance programs. As part of the review, the Administration
will work to understand threats in the region and evaluate our overall
approach to address the drivers of insecurity. If confirmed, I will
work with the Department of Defense, USAID, and other agencies to
ensure that the U.S. Government has and implements a unified strategy
to support sustained security and stability in the Sahel.
Question. As Deputy Secretary, how will you ensure close
coordination between regional bureaus to develop strategies and
integrated approaches to geographic regions such as the Sahel and the
Red Sea?
Answer. The President's interim national security guidance
underscores that we must be prepared to manage crises and challenges
that do not respect borders. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Department's regional and functional bureaus to make sure they
understand the President and Secretary's policy imperatives in both the
Sahel and the Red Sea region and that they work collaboratively through
working groups, joint briefings, and persistent coordination to develop
strategies around which we can organize our diplomatic engagement and
foreign assistance. If confirmed, I will guide the Department to work
across bureaucratic and geographic seams to address regional challenges
by understanding, engaging, and cooperating with allies and partners;
building strong partnerships; and strengthening long-standing
connections.
Question. Multilateralism has long been a pillar of U.S. foreign
policy, and an avenue for advancing international human rights.
However, over the last four years, the U.S. Government went from being
a strong champion of human rights and of the rights of women, girls and
LGBTQ individuals, to being an obstacle to those goals at the United
Nations and other multilateral forums. It is vital that this
Administration send an early signal that it is fully committed to
reversing that, and to advancing human rights and gender equality
globally. How will you demonstrate, through early action at the State
Department, a renewed U.S. commitment and leadership to promote global
gender equality, women's and girls' rights, and the rights of LGBTQ
persons?
Answer. As President Biden has said, the promotion of democracy and
human rights is central to this Administration's foreign policy and if
confirmed, I will examine all options to address threats to gender
equality and the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons. I
fully support the objectives outlined in President Biden's memorandum
on advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world. The
work to promote gender equality and respect for the human rights of all
women, girls, and LGBTQI+ persons is amplified when the United States
works multilaterally and coordinates with international partners. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's efforts to increase U.S.
engagement on these issues bilaterally and across relevant UN fora and
regional organizations, as appropriate.
Question. How will you use your role to immediately halt and
reverse dangerous rollbacks on women's rights and LGBTQ rights in
intergovernmental processes and multilateral forums?
Answer. Advancing the human rights of women, girls, and LGBTQI+
persons is essential to ensure just and equitable societies where all
individuals can fully contribute. If confirmed, I pledge to work
closely with partner nations, civil society, and multilateral
institutions, as appropriate, to advance women's health and human
rights, including women's and girls' sexual and reproductive health and
reproductive rights. I will also fully support the objectives outlined
in President Biden's Presidential Memorandum on Advancing the Human
Rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world and will work with other
governments and multilateral institutions to ensure that U.S. diplomacy
and foreign assistance promote and protect these rights.
Question. On June 18, 2020, following a year-long investigation by
my staff, I published a comprehensive report on the Global Forced
Migration Crisis, which examined the urgent plight of millions of
people forced to flee their homes due to conflict and persecution. It
provided a blueprint for addressing this growing crisis. What actions
will you take, including with our partners, to address the global
forced migration crisis? How, specifically, will you work to address
the root causes of displacement, such as new and unresolved conflicts,
support populations on the move and those enduring lengthy
displacement, and seek to assist the low-income countries who host the
majority of refugees and displaced people?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure State and USAID are
strengthening protection and durable solutions for the millions of
forcibly displaced people across the globe by pursuing new strategies
for addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change;
rebuilding the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program; enhancing U.S.
engagement in international institutions; and standing up for
democratic values and human rights. The State Department will continue
to work with our partners and the Department of the Treasury to engage
multilateral development banks on support in protracted situations of
displacement. In addition, the Department aims its diplomacy at
continuing to strengthen the global humanitarian architecture,
including through donor engagement, and at promoting respect for
international humanitarian principles.
Question. Principled humanitarian action is under attack around the
world. Violent conflict has reached record highs, and nearly 235
million people worldwide need emergency humanitarian assistance-a 40
percent increase from last year. There has also been a steep escalation
in the deliberate, willful obstruction of humanitarian access to those
in need, the targeting of innocent civilians and humanitarian aid
workers, and an overall noncompliance with international law. What will
you do to minimize the abuse of humanitarian assistance, including the
blocking or diverting of humanitarian aid, and to minimize the
targeting of civilians and humanitarian aid workers?
Answer. I support the United States taking a strong leadership role
in support of principled humanitarian action. If confirmed, I intend to
engage publicly and privately where necessary to promote the protection
of civilians and humanitarian workers, and humanitarian access, working
closely with our global and multilateral partners. Further, I will
support the efforts of the State Department to prevent and immediately
address any diversion or abuse of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The
Administration's commitment to these principles has already been clear
in the Secretary's engagement on the protection of civilians and
unhindered humanitarian access.
Question. How can the United States best hold accountable the
perpetrators of such abuses, and promote accountability and compliance
with the law of armed conflict and human rights law?
Answer. I support using all tools available to promote
accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians, including
humanitarian aid workers, consistent with international law. If
confirmed, I would encourage all parties to armed conflict to comply
with international humanitarian law and ensure the protection of those
providing humanitarian aid. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that
the United States supports a variety of tools at our disposal,
including investigations and prosecutions at appropriate international
and national tribunals, targeted sanctions, and other mechanisms, to
promote accountability for those responsible for targeting civilians,
including humanitarian aid providers.
Question. We are in a 15-year democratic recession, and this past
year has been among the worst we've seen for global democracy. For the
first time since 2001, more people live under autocracies than
democracies. The COVID-19 crisis has created new opportunities for
authoritarians and those leaders who strive to consolidate power to
cement their hold on government structures and erode the fundamental
human rights of their countrymen. How will you address democratic
backsliding and emerging global electoral challenges? These include
foreign interference; the manipulation of new media platforms;
advancements in artificial intelligence and sophisticated cyber
threats; and corruption in electoral processes that undermines
governance?
Answer. I share concerns over the need to defend democracy and
counter growing authoritarianism globally, including authoritarian
responses to the global pandemic that suspend or severely curtail
democratic governance, rule of law, and human rights. President Biden
committed to host a global summit to bring together democracies around
a common agenda to defend and strengthen democratic institutions,
including commitments on combating corruption, pushing back on
authoritarianism, and advancing human rights, including online. If
confirmed, I will support the Administration's goals of promoting good
governance at home and abroad with all available diplomatic,
programmatic, and other foreign policy tools to counter democratic
backsliding and strengthen democratic resilience to malign influence.
Question. How will you invest in democracy programs, particularly
in the context of the secondary impacts of COVID-19 on elections and
democracies worldwide?
Answer. The United States has long been a leader in promoting
democracy and human rights, including advancing civil and political
rights abroad. Adhering to democratic principles is essential for an
effective global response to COVID-19, and it is imperative that
countries not use the pandemic as a means to suspend or severely
curtail democratic governance, rule of law, and respect for human
rights. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that democracy programs
support civil society groups and governments in strengthening
protections for human rights by fostering accountable, responsive and
inclusive democratic institutions and processes that directly address
the secondary impacts of COVID-19.
Question. The Department of Defense annually seeks to duplicate
various security assistance authorities heretofore reserved to the
Department of State, to the detriment of the Secretary of States
fundamental mission to oversee and direct U.S. foreign policy. If
confirmed, will you personally and aggressively defend the Department
of State's prerogatives in this area?
Answer. I am aware of the Defense Department efforts in this area
and recall selectively supporting some security assistance authorities
for Defense, where for example they provided clearly for the Secretary
of State to ``concur'' in Defense's use of such authorities; were time-
limited; did not duplicate State's authorities; and provided for joint
formulation. If confirmed, I will certainly study this matter
thoroughly, as I share your concerns. Among my key goals will be
personally to uphold and defend prerogatives of the Secretary and the
Department and to protect the fundamental and primary responsibility of
the Secretary to carry out for the President the fundamental mission of
overseeing and directing US foreign policy.
Question. Will you commit that you and your staff will work closely
with this committee to protect the Secretary of State and the
Department of State's primacy in this regard?
Answer. I look forward to working closely with you and the
committee to protect the primacy of the Secretary of State and the
Department in this regard. I also consider that protecting such primacy
means also protecting and enhancing the tools to engage
internationally, such as reserving to, or enhancing the broadest range
of agile foreign assistance authorities of the Secretary of State. If
confirmed, I also look forward to working with you to ensure that such
authorities are robust and flexible, particularly given the view by
some countries that Defense authorities may be less restrictive than
those of the State Department.
Question. Section 10 U.S.C 127(e) allows the Secretary of Defense
to provide undefined support to any foreign person that is in any
undefined way supporting U.S. Special Forces operations in a country,
so long as the Chief of Mission of such country concurs. There is no
requirement in the law that the Secretary of State, nor the Department
of State, be aware of such activities. Such ``support'' has included,
at least, the provision of lethal defense articles to unknown foreign
persons, who could be involved in criminal or even terrorism-supporting
activities. It is vital that the Secretary of State be aware of this
support. Secretary Blinken, when asked this question, confirmed that he
would look into the current practices and procedures in the Department
with respect to reporting and concurring with such transfers and, if
necessary, make amendments. Will you, if confirmed, ensure that this
issue is put to the Secretary for decision, or if delegated to you,
that you will direct all Chiefs of Mission not to agree to any such
request without first consulting with you or the Secretary of State?
Answer. The Departments of State and Defense are working closely to
address the changing global threat environment. If confirmed, I will
coordinate closely with the Secretary of State and critical Department
stakeholders to review the current Department practices and procedures
related to Section 10 USC 127e. In the event this issue is delegated to
me, I will take appropriate action to communicate Department procedures
to chiefs of mission and will initiate a discussion with Department of
Defense counterparts to clarify reporting and concurrence procedures
and make amendments as necessary.
Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their
ability?
Answer. The people who work for the U.S. Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect Americans
and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of career
talent over the last four years coincides with declines in overall
employee job satisfaction in annual workforce. That said, the nearly
77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient. If
confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining State Department
to advance our security and prosperity, including by developing a
diplomatic corps that fully represents America in all its talent and
diversity. That means recruiting, retaining, and providing career
development opportunities to officers with the skills to contend with
21st Century challenges and who represent the diversity of the country
we represent. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to ensure their
safety and well-being and demand accountability for fostering a more
diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.
Question. Last year, I published a report Diplomacy in Crisis,
which laid out the challenges facing the Department workforce. It cited
employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for example,
steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared reprisal or
retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does that
concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?
Answer. I agree that retaliation for participating in the EEO
process or anti-harassment program, for requesting a reasonable
accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is unlawful,
grounds for discipline, and counter to good management; employees do
best when they have the ability to speak up and help us improve. If
confirmed, I plan to amplify the Chief Diversity and Inclusion
Officer's, Bureau of Global Talent Management's, and the Office of
Civil Rights' efforts to promote a culture of speaking up, free from
fear of retaliation.
Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as
having substantial impact on their career. Do you commit to reviewing
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and
help more women serve in senior roles?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that women have equal
opportunities for career advancement and professional development.
Throughout my career, I have benefitted from strong mentors and leaders
who have helped me shape my career, and I have worked to mentor others.
If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to serve as models for
the Department on mentorship and promulgating the tenets of fairness
and transparency in building their teams. I will hold my senior
leadership responsible for creating environments where everyone's
contribution is valued. I will also prioritize reviewing
recommendations on initiatives to help address the gender gap in the
Department from our employee affinity groups and associations.
Question. As you know, Ahlam Tamimi is responsible for
masterminding a terrorist attack that killed 15 people, including two
Americans at a restaurant in Israel in 2001. She has been living in
Jordan since 2011 and the United States has continued to try to bring
her to justice. Do you commit to pursuing justice for Americans
murdered in this brazen attack?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
Question. Will the administration continue to pressure Jordan to
publicly condemn Tamimi and her actions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
Question. Will the administration press Jordan to seek
parliamentary ratification of the 1995 extradition treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore all options to bring Ahlam Al-
Tamimi to justice. The Department will continue to ask that the
Government of Jordan extradite Al-Tamimi, and will continue to raise
this issue at the highest levels. The Department will also engage
Jordanian officials at all levels on the extradition treaty, which is
in force.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In your view, are the Maduro regime's involvement in
transnational organized crime and its poor economic and political
policies in Venezuela to blame for region's most significant security
and humanitarian crisis? Can humanitarian conditions improve on the
regime's watch?
Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime's corruption and repression
are responsible for the economic collapse and the resulting
humanitarian crisis in Venezuela. Maduro and his enablers tolerate and
often cooperate and collude with criminal and terrorist networks, non-
state armed groups, and many malign actors that perpetrate human rights
abuses and human trafficking. Instead of applying Venezuela's resources
to respond to its humanitarian crisis, Maduro and those allied with him
pillage state coffers.
I understand the impact the current crisis in Venezuela is having
on the region, and the pain it is inflicting on Venezuelans and their
families. If confirmed, I am committed to addressing the humanitarian
situation affecting millions of Venezuelans both inside the country and
the millions who have fled to neighboring countries, pressing for a
peaceful, stable, democratic outcome in Venezuela through free and fair
elections and helping the Venezuelan people rebuild their lives and
their country.
Question. Please describe your views on what would constitute
adequate conditions under which free and fair presidential,
legislative, and local elections could be conducted in Venezuela.
Answer. There are several conditions that should be met before we
can consider any Venezuelan elections free and fair. The illegitimate
Maduro regime should free all political prisoners, return political
party organizations to their duly chosen leaders, and remove all undue
restrictions on individuals and political parties to allow their free
participation. All candidates, political parties, and the electorate
should have unrestricted access to independent news sources and other
sources of information. An independent National Electoral Council
should be appointed and allowed to organize the elections free from
undue influence. Finally, consistent with the bipartisan Venezuela
Emergency Relief, Democracy Assistance, and Development Act (VERDAD) of
2019, elections should be observed and certified as free and fair by an
independent electoral observation mission comprised of domestic and
international experts.
Question. Please describe the conditions under which you would
recommend the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba.
Answer. The United States continues to maintain diplomatic
relations with Cuba, which provides an opportunity to communicate
directly with the Cuban Government regarding matters of human rights.
The Biden-Harris administration's Cuba policy will be governed by two
principles. First, support for democracy and human rights will be at
the core of our efforts through empowering the Cuban people to
determine their own future. Second, Americans--especially Cuban-
Americans--are the best ambassadors for freedom and prosperity in Cuba.
We have serious differences with Cuba on a range of issues, including
Venezuela and human rights, but the administration will engage directly
on those differences and on other issues that are in the interest of
the United States.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to conduct meaningful
consultations with me, my office, and the rest of the committee before
and during any negotiations with Cuba?
Answer. Through three decades of work in foreign policy and
national security, I have learned firsthand the need for close and
constructive coordination with Congress. I recognize there are many
different views in Congress on what our approach to Cuba should be. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on a range of
policy topics, including Cuba.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that U.S.
public and private engagement in Cuba does not disproportionately
benefit the Cuban military, intelligence, or security services or
personnel at the expense of the Cuban people?
Answer. The administration committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-
Cuba policy, including our posture regarding economic sanctions on
Cuba, to ensure they advance the goals the administration is trying to
achieve in empowering the Cuban people to determine their future. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's review of the policy with an
eye toward assessing its impact on the political and economic well-
being of the Cuban people and look forward to consulting with Congress
on this issue.
Question. In December 2020, Mexico approved reforms to its national
security law, limiting the power of foreign law enforcement agents in
the country and restricting their ability to operate. If confirmed,
what steps will you take to ensure effective law enforcement
cooperation with Mexico?
Answer. It is critical that the United States and Mexico work
together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and their
operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the rule of
law in Mexico. If confirmed, I look forward to comprehensive
conversations with the Mexican Government, and I will not hesitate to
raise any concerns I believe to be obstacles to our bilateral law
enforcement cooperation.
Question. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the recommendations
of the Bureau of International Organizations as compared to the
regional bureaus?
Answer. I have long appreciated and valued the expertise available
from the Bureau of International Organizations. If confirmed, I will
ensure the bureau's perspective is solicited, whenever appropriate, and
in all circumstances welcome its recommendations. The bureau's voice
and role in U.S. foreign policy is crucial as the administration re-
engages with international organizations, restores its partnerships,
and returns to its traditional alliances.
Question. Will you support the creation of an Office of Integrity
in the United Nations System within the Bureau of International
Organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to
ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively to
push back against the rising influence of China and others in the UN
system and other international organizations and to select qualified
and independent candidates to lead and staff these bodies, including
highly specialized agencies.
Question. Nations have increasingly used hostage diplomacy in an
attempt to gain leverage through coercion. Multiple Americans are
victims of this trend, and Americans are currently wrongfully detained
in Russia, China, Iran, and Venezuela, among other countries. What role
do you believe the Deputy Secretary has in returning Americans and
preventing hostage diplomacy?
Answer. Bringing home U.S. hostages and wrongful detainees is a top
priority for the administration and the Department of State. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary and Special
Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs to make every effort to quickly
recover all U.S. nationals held hostage or wrongfully detained abroad.
Additionally, it will be of the utmost importance to closely coordinate
with, and lend support to, family members of hostages and wrongful
detainees.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State, in what
concrete ways will you work to bring home Americans wrongfully detained
abroad and support the work of the Special Presidential Envoy for
Hostage Affairs?
Answer. The safety and security of U.S. citizens is one of the
highest priorities of the Department of State. If confirmed, I will
ensure the Department continues to use all the diplomatic means at our
disposal to work for the release of those U.S. citizens wrongfully
detained or held hostage and provide support to their families.
Specifically, I will support the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage
Affairs and the interagency in implementing the Robert Levinson Hostage
Recovery and Hostage-taking Accountability Act. The Levinson Act is
critical for harnessing all of the U.S. Government's capabilities to
resolve these cases quickly and provide support to families.
Question. The Iranian regime received billions in sanctions relief
as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The
Obama administration argued that ``our best analysts expect the bulk of
this revenue to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits
the lives of the Iranian people.'' However, a vast body of follow-on
reporting indicates that a majority of sanctions relief was, instead,
funneled to the regime's defense budget and to its proxies in Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.
Do you believe that sanctions relief provided to Iran as a part of
the JCPOA improved the economy and the lives of the Iranian
people?
Answer. While the DIA testified in 2017 that the majority of
sanctions relief was used for domestic purposes, the Biden-Harris
administration is under no illusions about Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and about its government's willingness to
divert funding that should be used to better the lives of its citizens
to those purposes. It is also clear that the reimposition of sanctions
has not had the effect of drying up Iran's proliferation of missiles,
support for terrorism, and regional activities.
We need to address all of these activities using a variety of
tools--deterrence, sanctions on Iranian entities providing support to
violent groups and militias in the region, and, in the event we rejoin
the JCPOA, in any follow-on talks with Iran--in close consultation and
coordination with our allies and partners. If confirmed, I am committed
to consulting closely with Congress on the path forward.
Question. What tools and safeguards exist that would prevent Iran
from directing future sanctions relief to malign activities?
Answer. The U.S. Government maintains a range of tools to combat
terrorist financing, and we will continue to use these to counter
Iran's destabilizing activities and support for terrorism.
We will continue to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian
entities and individuals providing support to terrorist groups in the
region. The Biden-Harris administration will take action, in
coordination with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter
Iran's destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely
with Congress on the path forward.
Question. Do you commit not to pursue sanctions relief or
unfreezing of Iranian assets as a precondition for nuclear negotiations
with the Iranian regime?
Answer. We are ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a
mutual return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
as a starting point for follow-on negotiations. Our first order of
business is consulting with Congress and our allies on the path
forward.
Question. You have previously expressed skepticism over the
prospects of U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, indicating that if such a
development were to take place, the United States would need to be
willing to put ``more on the table.'' Please describe in detail the
prospects for U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, to include views of UNSCR
2231-mandated Transition Day in 2023 and Termination Day in 2025.
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to ensuring
that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many
other issues of concern related to Iran. The administration remains
ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to
compliance with JCPOA commitments as a first step, but the work will
not end there. The administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use
it as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's
nuclear program and to address other critical issues.
Question. Exactly what form should ``more on the table'' take in
your view? What do you see as being acceptable to both the United
States and Iran?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains ready to engage in
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with
JCPOA commitments. While it is too early to speculate on the specific
details, if confirmed, I commit to robust consultation with Congress
and our P5+1 partners on the best way forward.
Question. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17)
(``INARA'') requires the President to provide to Congress the text and
related materials of any agreement with Iran relating to the nuclear
program of Iran within five days of reaching the agreement.
Additionally, INARA stipulates that the administration certify that
such an agreement is not ``inimical to or constitute an unreasonable
risk to the common defense and security.''
Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any future
nuclear deal with Iran?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are
satisfied, including its transmission and certification requirements.
Question. Would the requirements of INARA cited above apply to any
process of rejoining or reaffirming U.S. participation in the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA. The JCPOA was submitted under INARA in 2015 and
underwent close Congressional and public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am
committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Would any agreement between the United States and Iran
regarding how the United States and Iran might return to compliance
with the JCPOA constitute an ``agreement with Iran relating to the
nuclear program of Iran''?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. What are the reporting requirements of INARA that you
believe that the administration is currently subject to?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult within the administration to
identify and confirm those requirements. I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting
requirements.
Question. In 2014, in your capacity as Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, you hosted a roundtable in which you suggested that
the JCPOA contained ``in one way or another, all the concerns that must
be addressed.'' While the 2015 agreement did secure time-limited curbs
on Tehran's nuclear program, it failed to address Iran's destabilizing
support for proxy militias and its ballistic missile development.
Further, it failed to secure the release of American hostages, like
Washington Post reporter Jason Rezain, who remained illegally detained
by the Iranian regime until January 2016.
Is it still your position that the 2015 nuclear agreement contained
a sufficient basis for the United States to address all of its
most pressing national security concerns?
Answer. The objective of the JCPOA was to ensure that Iran would
never obtain a nuclear weapon, which is just one of the myriad issues
of national security concern the United States and our allies and
partners face regarding Iran. The situation we face in 2021, however,
is different from the situation in 2015. The facts on the ground have
changed, and our path forward must take this into account. The Biden-
Harris administration is committed to addressing not only the concerns
about Iran's nuclear program, but also broader concerns, including
Iran's unjust detentions of U.S. citizens, its ballistic missile
program, and destabilizing regional activities.
Question. Would you recommend the United States pursue re-entry
into the 2015 nuclear agreement absent the release of American
hostages, including Morad Tahbaz, Baquer Namazi, and Siamak Namazi?
Answer. The safety of U.S. citizens overseas is a top priority for
the U.S. Government. The continued unjust detention of U.S. citizens in
Iran is atrocious. I have spoken with family members of U.S. citizens
detained in Evin Prison and their stories are horrific. As President
Biden has said, the administration will aggressively work for the
release and return of all our unjustly detained U.S. citizens.
Question. The Biden administration has indicated that it will
attempt to address Iran's regional terrorism and ballistic missile
activity in follow-on agreements after rejoining the JCPOA. Assuming
the United States grants nuclear-related sanctions relief as a part of
U.S. re-entry into the JCPOA, what leverage would the Biden
administration retain to ensure Iran engages in meaningful discussions
on its support of regional terrorism and ballistic missile program?
Please be specific.
Answer. As President Biden has said, we are ready to engage in
meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and then use that as a
platform to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear
program and address other issues of concern. The framework of U.S.
sanctions on Iran remains robust, and there are many layers of that
sanctions architecture that would remain in place, even in the event of
a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This certainly includes the primary U.S.
embargo on Iran, and many other U.S. sanctions on Iran. Working with
allies and partners, we also have other avenues to place pressure on
Iran.
Question. The Abraham Accords have the potentially to fundamentally
change the Middle East for the better. The previous administration had
an empowered agent in the White House, Jared Kushner, to pursue
normalization agreements. We understand that the Biden administration
will push this role back down to the State Department--currently at the
Deputy Assistant Secretary level. Given the importance of the Abraham
Accords, how do you plan to expand and strengthen the Accords without a
similar empowered staff?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, we will
also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date,
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Question. Will you assign responsibility for additional
normalization agreements to more senior staff?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the normalization
agreements with the relevant subject matter experts and determining the
best way forward, including with respect to staffing responsibilities.
Question. In your hearing testimony, you referenced a number of
meetings that you had with Iranian officials after you had concluded
your service at the Department of State in 2015. What meetings did you
have with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department in
2015? Were these meetings scheduled ahead of time? If so, by whom?
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on
the margins.
In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.
Question. Who were the participants in those meetings? When and
where did those meetings occur? In what capacity did you engage in
those meetings?
Answer. As noted in the previous answer, the meetings were
principally with Foreign Minister Zarif. At the Munich Security
Conference, I believe he was accompanied by DFM Abbas Araghchi. When I
saw FM Zarif in New York he was also accompanied by the DFM and by
Iran's Ambassador to the United Nations. When I saw DFM Araghchi in
Moscow, he was alone.
Question. Please describe in detail the purpose of the meetings,
the scope of the discussions that occurred in the meetings, the
positions you took in those discussions, and how those discussions
inform your views on Iran policy issues.
Answer. As I stated in my confirmation hearing, I kept Under
Secretary Hale apprised of the meetings and committed to sharing any
useful information with him. I attended meetings to urge Iran to not
escalate the situation, to stay compliant with the JCPOA, to cease its
regional violence, and to release U.S. citizens who had been unjustly
detained. As I noted, families have continued to call me and urge me to
do whatever I can to help gain release of their loved ones. My views on
Iran policy were offered in the confirmation hearing and were not
changed by the meetings.
Question. Did you inform any sitting U.S. official that you had
planned or were likely to have each of these meetings? If so, please
provide details for each meeting.
Answer. As noted, I kept Under Secretary David Hale apprised of the
meetings.
Question. After each of these meetings occurred, did you inform any
sitting U.S. official that the meetings had taken place and/or share
what was discussed? If so, please provide details for each meeting.
Answer. As noted, I offered to apprise Under Secretary Hale of any
useful information and did so as appropriate.
Question. Outside of these meetings, have you had any other
contacts with any Iranian officials since leaving the State Department
in 2015? Please provide details.
Answer. None that I recall.
Question. What are the tools and strategies the Department can best
employ to address cross-regional security, political, and economic
challenges in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa, Sahel, and Maghreb regions
of Africa?
Answer. It is essential that we bring an end to deadly conflicts
and prevent the onset of new ones; help African nations address climate
change; violent extremism; promote development, health security,
environmental sustainability, democratic progress, responsive and
responsible governance, and rule of law; assist countries facing
economic distress, including health and food insecurity; and support
economic and political independence in the face of undue foreign
influence. If confirmed, I will ensure we work across bureaucratic and
geographic seams to address these regional challenges by cooperating
with allies and partners, building strong partnerships, investing in
civil society, and strengthening long-standing political, economic, and
cultural connections.
Question. Do you believe Special Envoys are the most effective tool
in confronting such complex regional issues?
Answer. Special Envoys have been an important tool for responding
to complex security and political challenges, in certain cases where
sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement is needed. When well-
coordinated with regional and functional bureaus and embassies, envoys
can help to integrate and lead cross-regional policy efforts, such as
building international coalitions to counter transnational threats.
Envoys can play an important role in responding to conflicts of a
cross-border and cross-regional nature that require complex, negotiated
solutions with buy-in from multiple states and actors. If confirmed, I
intend to play an active role in the policy discussions surrounding the
potential deployment of future envoys.
Question. What other tools should the United States consider?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes that many of the
biggest threats we face are transnational in nature and must be
addressed collectively, including through international organizations.
Nowhere is this more true than in Africa--the African Union (AU) and
sub-regional institutions play an important role on governance,
economic, and security issues across the continent. If confirmed, I
will ensure increased U.S. engagement with the AU and other
subregional bodies. Additionally, I will work to pursue
mutually beneficial partnerships across Africa. Coordination and
collaboration are essential, and we must work to align our approaches
to holistically address security and governance challenges.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to building greater
interagency coordination and strategy regarding U.S. security policy
and programs in Africa, namely between the Department of State and the
Department of Defense, and specifically with the United States Africa
Command (AFRICOM)?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department
of Defense and AFRICOM to make sure we are united in our efforts to
implement the President and the Secretary's policy imperatives in sub-
Saharan Africa and that we work collaboratively to develop unified U.S.
Government policies around which we can organize our diplomatic,
security, and development engagement.
Question. The U.S.-Germany relationship has been increasingly
strained in recent years. Among our points of disagreement are the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, military spending, attitudes towards China, and
questions of the use of nuclear weapons. What steps will you hope to
take to improve the United States' relationship with Germany?
Answer. Reinvigorating and modernizing relations with U.S. Allies,
including Germany, is one of this administration's highest priorities.
The administration has already begun this process by conducting
extensive consultations with the German Government on a range of issues
of mutual concern. The administration also halted the withdrawal of
U.S. troops from Germany and lifted the cap on the number of U.S.
troops that can be stationed in Germany. If confirmed, I look forward
to further strengthening the U.S.-German relationship, consulting
closely on our common security priorities, especially at NATO, and
partnering based on our shared values on challenges, including climate
change, recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic, and addressing threats
posed by China, Russia, and Iran. We will not always agree, but we will
look to manage those differences constructively as Allies.
Question. Under German leadership, the European Union just
concluded an investment deal with China. How do you view the German
Government's attitudes towards China, doing business with China, and
their recently published Indo-Pacific Strategy?
Answer. The EU's investment deal with China is a demonstration of
the amount of work we have before us to reinvigorate our Transatlantic
alliance and develop a more unified response to the challenge posed by
China. If confirmed, I will engage actively with the EU, Germany, and
other European partners on shared concerns about China. My engagements
will include discussions on how to advance our shared economic
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, prevent
goods made with forced labor from entering global markets, create a
level playing field and promote private enterprise, and highlight
China's failure to uphold its international commitments.
The Biden-Harris administration will work jointly with Germany,
NATO, the EU, and other partners to address China's predatory economic
practices, the challenges China poses to our collective security, and
its human rights violations. Ultimately, the onus will be on China to
show that its new pledges on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and
subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not just cheap talk. The
United States welcomes Germany's support for a rules-based
international order, including in the Indo-Pacific, where Berlin
recently announced it will send a naval vessel to demonstrate Germany's
active engagement in the region.
Question. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder recently wrote
in Handelsblatt that ``a moralizing foreign policy'' towards China,
implying that, when it comes to China, human rights should be placed
after economic interests. Do you agree?
Answer. China has engaged in gross human rights violations that
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The
President has been clear that the administration will put our
democratic values back at the center of our foreign policy and stand up
for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. The United States will
work with Germany and other allies and partners to condemn human rights
violations by China in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and elsewhere. Promoting
respect for human rights will be a pillar of U.S. engagement with
Germany and other allies with respect to China both in bilateral and
multilateral settings.
Question. How do you and the Biden administration intend to work
with those European voices and actors that fall on either side of the
human rights-economics divide?
Answer. The President has made it clear that revitalizing our ties
with allies and partners, including in Europe, is an administration
priority. The administration is working to demonstrate that democracies
that protect human rights deliver for their people and that human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law are essential to meet the
challenges of our time. Vibrant democracies that protect human rights
are more stable, more open, better partners to us, and more dependable
markets for our goods and services. If confirmed, I will strengthen our
relations with our allies, work with likeminded partners, and pool our
collective strength to promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of
law.
Question. Do you believe that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline should be
completed?
Answer. The President has made clear his belief that the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline is a bad deal and that the administration will oppose
it, and I strongly agree with this position. Nord Stream 2 expands
Russian malign influence, threatens Europe's energy security, makes
Allies and partners more vulnerable, and divides Europe. This project
has the potential to destabilize Europe and embolden Russian aggression
toward the West. I understand that the Department and our embassies in
the region are carefully monitoring any activities taken to construct
the pipeline and will respond in accordance with our obligations under
PEESA and CAATSA. The administration continues to engage with Germany
to express the United States' continued opposition to the pipeline and
to highlight our concerns. If confirmed, I will continue to use all
available tools to counter Russian malign influence, to work with
Allies and partners in the region, and to support Transatlantic energy
security goals.
Question. Do you commit to following the law and fully implementing
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act and the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Clarification Act?
Answer. Yes. The State Department submits a report to Congress
every 90 days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report
due to Congress in mid-May. I understand the Department submitted the
first report required by PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed,
I will continue to use all available tools to counter Russian malign
influence and to work with Allies and partners in the region to support
Transatlantic energy security goals. The administration will continue
to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and
will designate additional entities as appropriate.
Question. Do you believe the United States should entertain
potential proposals from the German Government that might allow the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline be completed?
Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. The
administration views Nord Stream 2 as a geo-political project that is a
threat not only to Europe's energy security, but to strategic stability
on the continent. The United States will continue to work with allies
and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and the
Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security.
Question. Do you believe that it would be worthwhile to allow the
completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline in hopes of improving the
U.S.-German relationship?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has clearly stated that the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline should not be completed and has consistently
conveyed this to German officials. Germany is an important economic and
security ally and, if confirmed, reinvigorating and modernizing
relations with U.S. allies will be among my highest priorities. Close
friends and allies should be able to talk frankly to one another about
disagreements, as we do with German officials on Nord Stream 2. The
administration remains hopeful that through diplomatic engagement,
bolstered by the tools provided by Congress, Germany will address our
concerns raised by the pipeline related to energy security, Ukraine,
and malign Russian influence.
Question. Are such proposals currently being entertained?
Answer. The administration continues to engage Germany to make
clear our view that Nord Stream 2 is a bad deal and should not be
completed. The administration has not received any formal proposals
from the German Government related to Nord Stream 2.
Question. The Biden administration has stated its intent to achieve
``a carbon pollution-free power sector by 2035'' that puts the United
States ``on an irreversible path to a net-zero economy by 2050.'' To
this end, President Biden has ordered that federal agencies move to a
fully electric vehicle fleet for automotive transportation needs and
begin to use the federal procurement system for smaller equipment to
drive demand for low energy-use appliances. What specific steps will
you take to achieve these goals at the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to
comply with relevant authorities of Energy Policy Act of 2005 (PL 109-
58), in full consideration of the administration's net-zero goal and
Federal Acquisition Regulations.
Question. Will these environmental goals impede other Department
missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the Department's operations,
logistics and procurement experts to implement relevant policies,
strategies and plans in a manner consistent with federal laws and
regulations and as outlined in the President's Executive Order on
Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.
Question. Will the Department be expected to offset carbon
emissions from activities such as air travel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the Department supports
the administration's goals, which may include future carbon offsets.
Question. Do you agree that extended nuclear deterrence is
foundational to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and to the strength
of U.S. alliances?
Answer. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in advancing
U.S. national security objectives, including ensuring a free and open
Indo-Pacific. It does so by providing assurance to allies and partners,
which are our greatest strategic asset, and promoting nonproliferation.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress, allies, and
partners on this important issue.
Question. Do you believe that adoption of a sole purpose doctrine,
a no first use policy, or a posture that fails to modernize U.S.
nuclear forces would serve U.S. and allied interests in the Indo-
Pacific?
Answer. The United States will ensure our strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible. As directed by
the President, this administration will conduct reviews of various
nuclear policies. In that process, we will consult with our allies and
partners, including those in the Indo-Pacific, as well as with
Congress.
Question. The Trump administration advanced a ``free and open''
Indo-Pacific strategy, which yielded a lot of concrete cooperation,
especially with Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asia. If confirmed,
what are the key principles, initiatives, and other elements of the
previous administration's Indo-Pacific strategy that will you continue?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. As President Biden has said, working with allies and partners
to secure peace, defend our shared values, and advance our prosperity
across the Indo-Pacific will be among the most consequential efforts we
undertake. If confirmed, I will join the administration's review of our
Indo-Pacific policy, and I commit to working closely with Congress to
make sure we have the right components in place.
Question. What major policy changes would the administration make
in U.S. strategy towards the region?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with allies and partners to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific
region. The administration is conducting a review of our
IndoPacific policy and, if confirmed, I commit to working
closely with Congress to make sure we have the right components in
place.
Question. The Obama administration failed to secure congressional
support for the Iran nuclear deal. If confirmed, and if the Biden
administration pursues an agreement with North Korea regarding its
weapons programs, do you commit to regular briefings at both the member
and staff levels in advance of and following negotiations with North
Korea?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress on efforts to
limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile programs.
Question. If confirmed, and if the Biden administration pursues an
agreement with North Korea regarding its weapons programs, do you
personally commit to appear before this committee prior to the
completion of any such agreement for public hearings on the matter?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Congress on
efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs.
Question. Do you believe that an agreement with North Korea
regarding its weapons programs should be submitted to the Senate as a
treaty for the Senate's consent to ratification? If no, please explain
in detail.
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national
security priority for the United States. I understand the
administration, in consultation with our allies, will evaluate and
adopt a strategy to keep the American people and our allies safe and
that takes into account pressure options and the potential for future
diplomacy with North Korea. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting
with Congress on efforts to limit the dangers posed by North Korea's
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs, including
through any agreements that may be negotiated.
Question. The Indo-Pacific is the most important region for U.S.
security and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global
population and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the
world, but is also home to security challenges that threaten to
undermine U.S. national security interests, regional peace, and global
stability. The Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a
``free and open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with
regional countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region
to support this goal. Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision
for the ``free and open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last
several years?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If so, what should the State Department's role be in this
strategy? If not, why not?
Answer. While our Indo-Pacific policy is still under review, the
State Department will have a major role in supporting a free and open
Indo-Pacific, including by reinvigorating our alliances and
partnerships, helping the region recover from the global pandemic,
promoting democratic resilience, and confronting climate change. As the
President has said, we will work with partners in the Indo-Pacific and
across the world to protect the free exchange of ideas in open,
democratic societies and to ensure the benefits of growth are shared
broadly and equitably.
Question. Chinese influence in Europe continues to grow. It has
invested billions across Europe and has sought to acquire strategic
infrastructure and companies in Europe. European countries are starting
to take a much more robust approach to China across the board,
including on investment and human rights. What is your assessment of
China's objectives in Europe and with regard to the transatlantic
alliance?
Answer. The objective of the People's Republic of China's (PRC) is
to make Europe more reliant and compliant, by dividing and weakening
alliances forged through the European Union and NATO. They attempt this
through abusive, unfair, and illegal economic and trade practices,
including market-distorting subsidies, intellectual property theft,
forced technology transfers, and predatory investments. With economic
leverage comes political influence, security vulnerabilities, and the
ability to coerce countries. This weakens countries' willingness to
oppose the PRC's efforts to reshape the international order, creating a
threat to the transatlantic alliance itself.
Question. How should the United States respond to growing Chinese
influence in Europe?
Answer. Our engagement with Europe to counter the growing influence
of the People's Republic of China should begin with a common
understanding of the threats facing our mutual prosperity and national
security and must include collaboration with NATO. Working with our
Allies and partners, we will address vulnerabilities to Transatlantic
security, promote technology innovation, information sharing, and
energy security within the Alliance. We will support transparent
economic growth and fair labor practices. We are developing foreign
assistance programs to reach 24 countries that focus on transaction
advisory, cybersecurity, and strategic infrastructure protection.
Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China,
including a chapter on contending with China's anti-competitive
economic practices. I argued that the United States and Europe should
revitalize trade negotiations, continue important initiatives at the
World Trade Organizations such U.S.-EU-Japan efforts on subsidies, fix
current sticking points like ongoing disputes between Boeing and
Airbus, coordinate on export controls, and strengthen supply chain
resilience. How would you advance these goals?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding
and revitalizing relations with our European allies and working with
them as using the full array of tools to counter China's abusive
economic practices, both in bilateral and multilateral fora, including
the WTO. The administration will work with our allies and partners to
ensure the resilience of the United States, as well as global supply
chains, particularly under the February 24, 2021, Executive Order on
America's Supply Chains. As of March 5, the administration announced a
four-month suspension of tariffs on the UK and EU with the goal of a
permanent settlement, under the Section 301 Boeing-Airbus case. If
confirmed, I will continue these efforts to take on the challenge of
China's abusive and illegal economic practices.
Question. What additional areas would you prioritize?
Answer. In addition to those issues discussed in the previous
question, presenting positive alternatives to China, which showcase the
value of the U.S. model against the techno-authoritarian model
proliferated by Beijing, is critical. If confirmed, I will work with
our European allies and partners on a coordinated approach to China's
abusive economic practices, human rights violations, and other
challenges. The EU has made it clear it is willing to cooperate with
the Biden-Harris administration on China. The administration will work
in bilateral and multilateral fora, including the UN and others, to
ensure U.S. national security is protected with respect to investments
in critical infrastructure and sensitive technologies, and to push back
against PRC attempts to weaken standards, rules, and institutions that
support our economic prosperity.
Question. The incoming administration has stated that global health
cooperation with China will be a major priority. The United States
invested a lot of resources and personnel over many years to pursue
health cooperation with China. That included a close relationship
between the U.S. CDC and China's CDC, including co-location
arrangements where they worked side-by-side for many years. While co-
location arrangements ceased because of concerns about the physical
security of U.S. diplomats, cooperation still continued. However, in
the world's hour of need at the beginning of a serious pandemic
originating in China, the Chinese Government's response proved that
global health cooperation would always take a back seat to the standing
and reputation of the CCP. While some level of cooperation may be
necessary, how can we have confidence in these initiatives without
reciprocal good faith efforts by Chinese Government interlocutors?
Answer. It is important that we get to the bottom of the early days
of the pandemic in China so that we can take steps to prevent future
pandemics. The Biden-Harris administration will rebuild and expand the
systems to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats globally,
including in China. The administration will work to get our experts
back into China so that our scientists have the access and
relationships needed to prepare for and respond to the emergence and
spread of potential future outbreaks around the globe. If confirmed, I
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on
certain issues, including on global health, but will be guided by a
clear-eyed assessment of China's intentions.
Question. How will you overcome this fundamental challenge, and why
should the American people trust that use of taxpayer dollars and other
resources will bear fruit?
Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation
state to the United States and our interests. There are competitive,
cooperative, and adversarial aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. We
must advance our economic interests, counter China's aggressive and
coercive actions, sustain our key military advantages, defend
democratic values, and restore our vital security partnerships as we
also conduct results-oriented diplomacy with China on shared challenges
such as global health. The Biden-Harris administration will test
whether China is willing to play a constructive role on certain issues,
including on global health, but will be clear-eyed about China's
intentions.
Question. What areas of health cooperation will the incoming
administration prioritize with China?
Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as
ours. The Biden-Harris administration is willing to test whether China
is willing to play a constructive role in certain areas where we may
share interests but will be clear-eyed about China's intentions. We
will not trade off our core interests or values in discussions with
China or any other country.
Question. What will be the role of the State Department in this
regard?
Answer. The State Department can play a leading role in elevating
global health diplomacy to identify potential global health risks, to
work with the international community to detect and prevent epidemics
and pandemics before they occur, and to ensure effective international
responses when they do. This includes addressing the root causes of
these events and strengthening the prevention and response capabilities
of local health systems. If confirmed, I will strengthen the Department
of State's diplomatic engagement in support of the COVID-19 health and
humanitarian response, as well as global health security more broadly,
in close alignment with USAID, HHS, CDC, and other agencies involved in
this space.
Question. Would you advise the President to send high-level
visitors to Taiwan, boost defense ties, explore negotiations for a Free
Trade Agreement, strengthen the economic partnership set up by the
Trump administration, and advocate for Taiwan in international
organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I support sending senior-level visitors to
Taiwan to deepen and broaden our relationship. I support boosting
defense ties and strengthening the economic partnership with Taiwan, as
well as advocating for Taiwan's participation in international
organizations. I understand that USTR is the lead agency on trade, and
pending confirmation of the new USTR, I will work with the office of
the USTR on a review of trade policy toward Taiwan.
Question. The previous administration authorized many critical
capabilities via arms sales to Taiwan over the last several years,
including fighters to replace and augment those being worn out from
Chinese Air Force incursions, ground-launched anti-ship missiles,
mobile artillery rocket systems, and surveillance drones. Do you commit
to fulfilling these arms sales with speed and urgency so that the
capabilities get to Taiwan in a timely manner?
Answer. My support for Taiwan is rock solid. Taiwan is a leading
democracy, a major economy, and a critical security partner. I support
a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, consistent with the
wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts to make available defense articles and
services necessary to enable Taiwan to defend itself, consistent with
the law, U.S. export regulations, and nonproliferation policy.
Taiwan remains a priority for this administration. In my position
at the Department of State, working together with the Department of
Defense, I will implement that priority wherever feasible to assist
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
Question. Do you commit to ensuring that the Department of State
adheres to a regularized process with regard to Taiwan arms sales,
including avoiding the practice of bundling?
Answer. Yes, that would be my intent, if confirmed. Consistent with
the Taiwan Relations Act and our One China Policy, the United States
continues to make available to Taiwan the defense articles and services
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability. This longstanding policy contributes to the maintenance of
peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
If confirmed, I will continue to support U.S. policy to assist
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. Doing so
increases stability both across the Taiwan Strait and within the
region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. Throughout my life, my most important contribution has been
to help open doors for women and to advocate for their human rights,
and I have sought to stand for any group of marginalized people in the
United States and around the world. In politics, I ran Barbara
Mikulski's successful campaign for the Senate, helping her to become
the first Democratic woman elected to the Senate in her own right. I
was also Executive Director of EMILY's List, helping Democratic women
get elected to the U.S. House and Senate. As Undersecretary of State,
on virtually every overseas trip, I made it a point to meet with women
leaders, women business owners, and women crafts persons to give women
visibility and press coverage and regularly spoke out about ensuring
that half of the world should be included.
As I traveled as a diplomat, I met with LGBTQI+ youth in Nepal, the
first country to allow citizens to check `other' on their passport, and
I met with LGBTQI+ advocates in other countries as they sought their
rights. I met with the Rohingya in Bangladesh and had a frank
conversation in Burma with Aung San Suu Kyi. I have also worked to help
free those unlawfully detained and imprisoned, particularly in Iran,
and helped achieve some releases over the years.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Studies show how diverse teams outperform other teams based
on their ability to innovate and address new challenges creatively.
Diversity is America's competitive advantage on the global stage.
Addressing today's challenges across the globe will require the
Department to harness the wealth of diversity and experiences in our
workforce to address increasingly complex challenges impacting our
foreign policy as well as the lives of the American people. If
confirmed, I commit to fostering an inclusive workplace throughout the
Department so that every employee's contribution is valued. If
confirmed, I will hold our senior leadership accountable for the
conduct of their teams and for perpetuating an environment where each
individual is heard and seen.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that
is diverse and inclusive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that my team upholds the values
of diversity, inclusion, and mutual respect by setting that example
myself and cultivating an environment where every contribution is
valued and considered, regardless of differences in race, gender,
ethnicity, or other attributes. I will ensure my team takes the proper
training to cultivate an office environment that creates opportunity
for dialogue and for innovation across diverse backgrounds. If
confirmed, I will hold my leadership accountable and will work with the
Department's new Chief Diversity and Inclusion officer to ensure our
administrative and foreign policies support the values of diversity and
inclusion.
Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S.
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests
of any senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior
White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international
presence, but these mutual funds are exempt from conflict of interest
laws. I am committed to following all applicable ethics laws and
regulations and remaining vigilant with regard to my ethics
obligations. I will divest any investments the State Department Ethics
Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of interest.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter
and supporter of terrorism?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces,
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The
administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
personnel and our vital interests and will respond to any such threat
using all appropriate means.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should trust the
world's leading exporter of terrorism to honor any international
agreements?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA does not rely on trust;
it provides the most intrusive nuclear verification and monitoring
procedures ever negotiated. Diplomacy is a tool; it is not a reward or
concession. It is a means to advance U.S. interests. I remain clear-
eyed about the threat Iran poses to us and our allies.
Question. What policies will you be pressing for to address Iran's
non-nuclear threats?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and then use that as a platform to
build a longer and stronger deal and also address other areas of
concern. The administration also intends to pursue full implementation
of relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions involving Iran.
Question. Regarding ``compliance for compliance'' with the
Iranians, can you commit today that you will not be counseling the
administration to take the first step or dilute its existing leverage
vis-a-vis the Iranians amid this process? Could you please explain to
us how you define compliance by the Iranians with the JCPOA?
Answer. The administration is ready to engage in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) as a starting point for follow-on
negotiations. There are many steps in the process to getting there that
we will need to evaluate. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting
with Congress and our allies on the path forward.
Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?
Answer. The administration agrees that a bipartisan approach to
Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for the long
term, and if confirmed I will work to engage with Congress on this and
other issues. As the Biden-Harris administration develops its Iran
policy, it is committed to consulting closely and regularly with
Congress, as well as U.S. allies and regional partners, to listen to
their ideas and concerns.
Question. Do you believe that the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. The Iran Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with
section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and it is a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224. I
believe Iran remains a state sponsor of terrorism and that, as the IRGC
branch focused on extraterritorial activities, the IRGC-Quds Force has
been directly involved in planning, directing, and supporting terrorist
acts outside of Iran. Iran's support for terrorism threatens U.S.
forces, diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere.
The administration is committed to countering any Iranian threat to our
forces, personnel, and our vital interests, and will respond to any
such threat using all appropriate means.
Question. Are you committed to strict enforcement of sanctions
against the IRGC and its subsidiaries and affiliates?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to countering
Iran's destabilizing activities, including its ballistic missile
program and support for terrorist groups and violent proxies in the
region. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to maintain and
impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals supporting
terrorist activity or responsible for serious human rights abuses, and
will work with our allies promote accountability for those involved.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 3, 2021, you acknowledged that you met
with officials of the Iranian regime--a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism--during your time out of
government since 2017. You also stated that you coordinated directly
with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale
concerning your interactions with Iranian regime officials.
Did you also coordinate directly with any of the following senior
U.S. State Department officials who handled Iran in their
portfolio: Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
Affairs David Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian
Hook, Special Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy
Secretary of State Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State
Michael Pompeo?
If yes, please identify dates of consultation? If not, why not?
Answer. I did not engage with any of the named individuals beyond
Undersecretary for Political Affairs David Hale.
Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the
exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. Do you agree that a credible option to use military force
is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from obtaining
nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?
Answer. Should Iran threaten U.S. personnel, the United States will
respond in a way that is calculated, on our timetable, consistent with
all applicable domestic and international law, and using a mix of tools
seen and unseen.
Question. Do you believe there were gaps in the JCPOA that must be
addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear weapon?
Answer. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is obligated not to manufacture or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed that under no circumstances would it
ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons and committed to a
series of limits on its nuclear activities that would verifiably block
any path to producing nuclear material for weapons for their duration.
The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it is committed to
ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. You have previously stated that the JCPOA provided the
most comprehensive inspection regime ever negotiated. But in 2018,
Israel revealed Iran's nuclear archive--which was unknown to the IAEA.
Do you agree Iran lied to the IAEA about the possible military
dimension (PMD) of its nuclear program?
Answer. The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information
provided by Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has
previously reported that it found evidence of possible military
dimensions of Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of
activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device
were conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated
effort, and some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration
will not take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear
program, and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification
authorities to investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear
material or activities in Iran.
Question. Can you describe your understanding of the regime's
financial system with respect to terrorism finance, money laundering,
corruption, and other illicit activity? Did the JCPOA change this
behavior?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens our forces and partners in the region.
President Biden is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing
activities, including its ballistic missile program and support for
terrorist groups and violent proxies in the region. The United States
and our partners negotiated a deal that verifiably prevented Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon and subjected it to the most intrusive
inspection regime ever negotiated. It was working. The President has
made clear that the United States will be prepared to resume
participation in the deal if Iran resumes strict compliance, as a
starting point for follow-on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen
these nuclear constraints, and address other issues of concern,
including Iran's ballistic missile program and its destabilizing
regional activity.
Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden
administration?
Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to
implementing the requirements of INARA.
Question. Do you agree that because INARA requires any agreement
with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran to be submitted to
Congress for review ``regardless of the form it takes'', ``whether a
political commitment or otherwise'', and ``regardless of whether it is
legally binding or not'', that any informal agreement, including even
an unwritten oral understanding, reached about how the United States
and Iran will return to compliance with the JCPOA, or move in the
direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA, must be submitted
to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that prior to and during the period for
transmission of an agreement to Congress for review pursuant to INARA,
and during the period for congressional review provided in INARA, ``the
President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or
otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctions with respect to
Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such
sanctions pursuant to an agreement'' required to be transmitted to
Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that the sanctions that may not be waived,
suspended or otherwise obviated under the circumstances described in
the preceding question include sanctions that may have been waived,
suspended or otherwise obviated pursuant to the JCPOA following
congressional review of that agreement pursuant to INARA, but which
were subsequently re-imposed by the United States Government?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). I understand that the Biden-Harris administration
is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA and if
confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including with respect to limitations during any
congressional review period.
Question. Are you personally committed to upholding the spirit of
INARA's restrictions on sanctions relief for Iran referred to in the
preceding two questions by not seeking to extend sanctions relief to
Iran in circumvention of those restrictions?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during the
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is committed to implementing the requirements of INARA.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied.
Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress
will be able to review pursuant to INARA any agreement that is
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran,
irrespective of the level of formality or politically or legally
binding nature of such agreement, to include any agreement providing
for return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to ``keep
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership fully and
currently informed of any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating
to Iran's nuclear program, including any new or amended agreement''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under INARA.
Question. Are you personally committed to keeping the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership fully and currently informed of
any initiative or negotiations with Iran relating to Iran's nuclear
program, including any new or amended agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to submit
a report to Congress not less frequently than every 180 calendar days
``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of Iran with the [JCPOA]
during the period covered by the report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that INARA requires the President to make a
determination and certification to the appropriate congressional
committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar days
regarding Iran's compliance with the JCPOA?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA
will require the President to submit a report to Congress not less
frequently than every 180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and
the compliance of Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period
covered by the report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its semi-annual reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, INARA
will require the President to make a determination and certification to
the appropriate congressional committees and leadership not less than
every 90 calendar days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new
agreement?
Answer. I am aware of reporting and certification requirements of
the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring
the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including the requirement to
determine whether to make the certification called for in Section
135(d)(6).
Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration will be
required under INARA to resume submitting reports and certifications to
Congress that are mandated under INARA should the administration
announce that the United States has returned to the JCPOA, or is
returning to the JCPOA?
Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am
committed to fully consulting with Congress on any agreement relating
to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under INARA, and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its reporting
requirements.
Question. If you agree that the Biden administration will be
required under INARA to resume submitting such reports and
certifications to Congress should it announce that the United States
has returned to the JCPOA, or is returning to the JCPOA, on what date
will the first such report be due, and on what date will the first such
certification be due? If you are not able at this time to specify the
dates on which such reports and certifications will be due, please
specify the method or formula you will use to calculate the respective
due dates.
Answer. I am aware of the reporting and certification requirements
of the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The United States has
not announced it has returned to the JCPOA, and I am not able to
specify dates for potential future reporting requirements. If
confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with Congress on any
agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called for under
INARA, and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied,
including meeting its reporting requirements in a timely manner.
Question. Can you assure the committee that there are no
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your
responses to the foregoing questions?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to implementing the requirements of the Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?
Answer. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest
supporters over the last fifty years. The U.S.-Israel relationship is
deeply personal to him and he has met and worked closely with every
Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. The President believes the
ties between our two countries, rooted in strategic interests and
shared values, should transcend domestic politics. In this vein, his
administration will not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel
relationship, but also ensure that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's goals to work closely
with Israel, to include building on normalization agreements to
strengthen cooperation between Israel and its neighbors.
Question. Do you believe Israel is and should always remain a
Jewish State?
Answer. President Biden supports Israel's future as a Jewish and
democratic state. He continues to believe the two-state solution is the
best way to ensure that Israel remains both Jewish and democratic. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to
restore credible U.S. engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and look for opportunities for the type of diplomatic progress that can
protect Israel's long-term security.
Question. Do you agree with United States policy (and law) that
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel?
Answer. This administration recognizes that Jerusalem is central to
the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians. Jerusalem is
the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final status issue,
which will need to be resolved by the parties in the context of direct
negotiations. The administration will handle all issues related to
Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity that they deserve.
Question. Do you agree the United States Embassy in Israel should
remain in Jerusalem?
Answer. The U.S. position is that our embassy will remain in
Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The ultimate status
of Jerusalem is a final status issue, which will need to be resolved by
the parties in the context of direct negotiations.
Question. Do you support full funding for United States security
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year Memorandum of
Understanding?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is
ironclad. As you know, the President played an important role in
helping to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on
security assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the
terms of the MOU without reservation.
Question. The MOU is a comprehensive agreement that outlined the
terms and conditions of this assistance to Israel. If confirmed, will
you oppose efforts to impose additional conditions or restrictions on
this aid?
Answer. The administration will continue to uphold President
Biden's strong commitment to Israel and its security. If confirmed, I
will advance the administration's position that we oppose efforts to
place additional conditions on U.S. military assistance to Israel.
Question. Do you support the United States' commitment to Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge?
Answer. The United States is required by law to help preserve
Israel's Qualitative Military Edge in the Middle East. If confirmed, I
will champion President Biden's priorities related to Israel's
security, including our commitment to maintain Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge.
Question. If confirmed, will you make ensuring Israel's Qualitative
Military Edge is maintained a priority?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is
inviolable. If confirmed, I will support the administration's objective
to continue U.S. military assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's
Qualitative Military Edge, which is critical to ensuring Israel has the
means to defend itself.
Question. Do you agree that the only way to reach a lasting
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is through direct,
bilateral negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians rather than
one imposed by outside actors?
Answer. The United States is working toward a more peaceful,
secure, and prosperous future for the people of the Middle East. As
part of this, the United States seeks to advance the possibility of
achieving a negotiated two-state solution, in which Israel lives in
peace and security alongside a viable Palestinian state. If confirmed,
I will support direct negotiations between the two parties to advance
this goal. I will also support the administration's goals of working
closely with Israel, engaging the Palestinians, and consulting with
partners in the region who have a common interest in supporting efforts
to advance lasting peace.
Question. Israel constantly faces terrorist attacks and threats--
including rocket attacks by Hamas in Gaza and attacks from Iranian-
backed groups in Lebanon and Syria. Do you fully support Israel's right
to defend itself from terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive
action to disrupt weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?
Answer. President Biden's commitment to Israel's security is a key
foreign policy tenet. The administration will continue U.S. military
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself.
The administration will take action, in coordination with our allies
and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's destabilizing
activities. There should be no doubt that the President has Israel's
back. If confirmed, I will support the administration's goals regarding
Israel's security.
Question. If confirmed, will you make it a priority to counter the
global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign against Israel?
Will you work to expand Israel's inclusion in the international
community and ensure our ally is treated as a normal nation?
Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the
American people's First Amendment rights, it will not hesitate to voice
our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to delegitimize
Israel on the world stage. The administration will work tirelessly to
support Israel's further integration into the international community.
Question. The International Criminal Court over the last several
years has taken actions potentially leading to the prosecution of
American and Israeli nationals despite neither country being a member
to the court. If confirmed, will you oppose and work to prevent ICC
prosecutions of Americans or Israelis?
Answer. The United States shares the goals of the ICC in promoting
accountability, respect for human rights, and justice for victims of
atrocities. However, the United States has always objected to any
attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United States
is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will work to
protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I share the
administration's serious concerns about the ICC's attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel is not a State Party, and
Palestine is not a State.
Question. Hezbollah's arsenal, particularly its precision guided
munitions (PGM), represents a clear threat to U.S. and allied forces
across the Middle East. If confirmed, what specific actions will you
recommend the U.S. take to address the PGM threat from Hezbollah?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States uses
all the tools at its disposal to push back on Hezbollah's terrorist and
illicit activities. Hezbollah's actions threaten regional stability, as
well as Lebanon's security, stability, and sovereignty. Hezbollah's
actions demonstrate it is more interested in advancing its own
interests than those of the Lebanese people. If confirmed, I will also
consult closely with Israel on how to address threats to regional
security and stability.
Question. What actions will you take to press all our European
allies and the United Nations to designate Hezbollah in its entirety as
a terrorist entity?
Answer. Hezbollah has been designated by the State Department as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization since 1997 and a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist since 2001. The Department remains concerned about
Hezbollah's terrorist and illicit activities around the world and its
destabilizing actions in Lebanon. If confirmed, I will continue to
advance our long-standing diplomatic efforts to press countries and the
European Union to fully designate, ban, or restrict Hezbollah from
operating in their territory. Thirteen governments around the world,
including in Europe, took significant domestic action along these lines
against Hezbollah in recent years. The administration will encourage
others to follow suit.
Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that the U.S.
continues support for the Kurds of Syria during the Biden
administration?
Answer. I am committed to supporting our local partners, the Syrian
Democratic Forces. They cannot continue to root out ISIS terrorists or
guard the tens of thousands of ISIS detainees and families who are
still in their custody without U.S. support. If confirmed, I will also
support renewed U.S. efforts to stabilize areas of northeast Syria
liberated from ISIS, to include an ongoing Syrian Intra-Kurdish
Dialogue, which aims to de-escalate tensions with the Syrian opposition
and advance more inclusive governance in northeast Syria.
Question. In a July 2020 piece in Foreign Policy titled ``The Total
Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under Trump'', you criticized the
Trump administration for having ``made no effort to find areas of
cooperation with China, such as climate change.'' Should cooperation or
competition be the dominant U.S. policy approach to Beijing?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, ``our relationship with
China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can
be, and adversarial when it must be. The common denominator is the need
to engage China from a position of strength.'' China has been growing
more authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. Beijing is now
challenging our security, prosperity, and values in significant ways
that require a new U.S. approach. If confirmed, I will be committed to
meeting this challenge.
Question. If you seek to cooperate with the PRC, do you believe
that the Chinese Communist Party will cooperate in good-faith?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration approaches China through
the lens of strategic competition and recognizes there are adversarial
and cooperative aspects to the U.S.-China relationship. The
administration is willing to test whether China is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about
China's intentions. China's failure to act consistently with its
international obligations and commitments will significantly factor
into how the U.S. approaches China on issues where our interests may
align. If confirmed, I will keep these past shortcomings in mind in
future dealings with Beijing and will consult with Congress on any
potential areas of cooperation.
Question. Can you name bilateral agreements between the United
States and the PRC that Beijing has honored in full and without later
reneging? How do you plan to ensure that Beijing fulfills its part of
any agreement on climate change given its long record of broken
promises?
Answer. China poses the most significant challenge of any nation-
state to the interests of the American people. The Biden-Harris
administration is committed to working closely with our allies and
partners to press China to act more constructively. If confirmed, I
will be unflinching in our diplomacy with China on climate change.
Given Beijing's track record of failing to honor its international
obligations, the United States will keep eyes wide open and not limit
its options in addressing the China challenge just because Beijing
makes offers of cooperation. The administration will judge Beijing by
its actions, not its words.
Question. Does China have more or fewer coal-fired power plants
today than in 2016?
Answer. China has more coal-fired power plants now than it did in
2016. China currently has approximately 1,005 gigawatts (GW) of
installed coal power generation capacity, which is roughly half of the
world's total. According to the Center for Research on Energy and Clean
Air, China also accounts for 41 percent of planned coal-power
construction, approximately 200 GW over the next five to ten years.
Although China has made efforts to decommission old coal plants and
curtail future builds, it has continued to expand its coal-fired power
fleet and added a net 36.8 GW and 29.8 GW of coal-fired generation
capacity in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Media report that, in 2020,
alone China built more than three times the amount built elsewhere
around the world.
Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department, under your
leadership, push for international transparency and accountability to
ensure we learn what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent
the next pandemic?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration recognizes COVID-19 is a
global challenge that requires a global response and will engage
globally to respond to and recover from COVID-19, as well as to prepare
for the next threat. The administration will work with allies and
partners to strengthen and reform the WHO, push for a transparent
investigation into the emergence and spread of COVID-19 to better
prepare for future outbreaks, and support multilateral efforts to end
the COVID-19 pandemic. The commitment to combat COVID-19, promote
public health, and advance global health security, as embodied in
National Security Memorandum-1, will save lives, foster economic
recovery, and build better resilience against future biological
threats.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department
will follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure of new
information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology? Will you
commit to sharing with Congress--and with the public as appropriate--
further details on the disclosures including the names of the Wuhan
Institute of Virology researchers who were sick in the fall of 2019?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it supports
a robust and transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic. An impartial public health investigation into the origins and
early spread of any novel outbreak is vital to protecting against
future health security threats. The administration will review all
information available to us about the origins of SARS-COV-2. It is
imperative to have transparency on the early events of the pandemic and
determine how COVID-19 spread, so future emergence events with pandemic
potential can be averted. If confirmed, I commit to follow up--with
Congress and with the public--on disclosures of new information and
relevant diplomatic reporting.
Question. If confirmed, will you support the suspension of U.S.
funding to research institutions in China engaged in virological
studies, including the Wuhan Institute of Virology and all branches of
the PRC Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and discontinue all
joint research projects involving Chinese scientists and U.S.
scientists that receive funding from the U.S. taxpayers so long as none
of this impacts U.S. national security, until PRC authorities allow a
credible and unfettered international investigation into the origin of
SARS-COV-2?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the current
policy and funding priorities for any programs the Department may have
for joint research projects with China.
Question. On April 3, 2020, you signed a statement entitled
``Saving Lives in America, China, and Around the World,'' which read in
part: ``No effort against the coronavirus--whether to save American
lives at home or combat the disease abroad--will be successful without
some degree of cooperation between the United States and China. China's
factories can make the protective gear and medicines needed to fight
the virus; its medical personnel can share their valuable clinical
experience in treating it; and its scientists can work with ours to
develop the vaccine urgently needed to vanquish it.'' Do you still
believe today that the same regime that infected the world with this
deadly virus, and then lied to cover it up, can really be part of the
solution?
Answer. Promoting global health is in China's interests as well as
ours. It is not a favor to be bargained for, but a challenge best
addressed with China's cooperation. The Biden-Harris administration
will test whether China is willing to play a constructive role on
certain issues where we may share interests, such as global health, but
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions. The administration will
not trade off U.S. core interests or values in discussions with China
or any other country.
Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are
compatible with our own?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian,
and increasingly aggressive. Under the Biden-Harris administration, the
United States will advance an alternative world view that promotes
democratic governance and transparency.
Question. What are the ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party?
Are they purely domestic in scope? Regional? Global? If global, how do
they challenge U.S. interests?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to expand its
domestic, regional, and global influence and drive wedges between the
United States and our partners and allies. The PRC's coercive economic
activity and aggressive acquisition of critical technologies through
licit and illicit means--coupled with a corresponding expansion of its
military footprint and collection capabilities--seek to expand Chinese
influence around the globe. These actions pose a threat to U.S.
interests and undermine our own military, diplomatic, and economic
influence. If confirmed, I will work with the Department of Defense,
other national security agencies, and Congress to address this
challenge.
Question. In what areas do you think the United States should try
to frustrate the CCP's ambitions and undermine the party's ability to
achieve their international ambitions?
Answer. The United States is committed to working with our allies
and partners to counter China's malign actions around the world. The
U.S. should engage in international institutions and make the necessary
investments in our military to ensure we can deter any aggression.
Economically, we can and must out-compete China, including by
preventing U.S. intellectual property and technology from being used in
ways that could undermine our competitiveness and security. If
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to confront
the challenges posed by China from a position of strength.
Question. Do you believe that the Chinese Communist Party's united
front and intelligence activities inside the borders of the United
States, as well as inside the borders of our allies and partners,
challenge the integrity of our policymaking? Why?
Answer. It is important that we bring greater transparency to bear
on malign People's Republic of China influence activities in the United
States. China's use of information operations and other coercive and
corrupting efforts to undermine and interfere in democracies poses a
threat to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed,
I will push back on Beijing's attempts to write the rules of the
information age by working with allies and likeminded partners to
support an affirmative, democratic vision for the global information
space, while building resilience against these threats and exposing
China's malign activity. Further, if confirmed, I will also work to
educate important U.S. constituencies, including state and local
governments, on these threats.
Question. Do you agree that the goal of the Chinese Communist Party
is not merely to make China stronger and more developed, but rather for
China to ultimately supplant the United States as the world's dominant
economic, political, and military power?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intends for the People's
Republic of China, which is growing increasingly illiberal,
authoritarian, and aggressive, to become a dominant world power. Its
values are often at odds with our own. The administration is committed
to working with our partners and allies to address the challenges the
CCP poses to democratic values from a position of strength. The
Department will communicate this clearly and directly in our public
diplomacy efforts. The Department will confront the CCP's growing
authoritarianism and escalating efforts to divide and manipulate others
and write the rules of the information age. It will work with allies
and partners to define an affirmative, democratic vision for the world.
Question. Is Xi Jinping's ``Community of Common Destiny for
Humanity'' compatible with your views of the international order and
the ways in which countries conduct diplomacy? If not, why not?
Answer. China seeks to make America and its allies more dependent
on China and erode the international system that has provided peace and
stability since the end of World War II. Xi's ``Community of Common
Destiny for Humanity'' policy framework is no exception. If confirmed,
I will prioritize renewed engagement with our allies and partners. I
will rally their support to push back against China, including its
attempts to reshape the international order and assert a set of values
inconsistent with our own.
Question. How would you assess the United States' policy of
engagement with Beijing from 1979 to 2017? In retrospect, did that
policy effectively protect and advance of our most vital national
interests? Do you support a return to that policy?
Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political
liberalization, that has not happened. China has grown more
authoritarian at home and more assertive abroad. The CCP is illiberal,
authoritarian, and intends for China to become a dominant world power.
Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete with and challenge
the United States. This necessitates a new U.S. approach. If confirmed,
I will commit to addressing China from a position of strength in
coordination with allies and partners.
Question. Please explain how you believe the United States should
act to defend our national interests when challenged by the Chinese
authorities, even if our allies and partners are reluctant to join us.
Answer. The most effective way to defend our national interests
when challenged by Chinese authorities is to build positions of
strength with U.S. allies and partners. On its own, the United States
represents about a quarter of global GDP. When we join with fellow
democracies that share more than doubles. China cannot afford to ignore
more than half the global economy.
When it is in the United States' interest to act on our own, we
will do so. It is essential to confront directly China's economic
abuses, defend our values, and protect the long-term prosperity and
security of the United States.
Question. While multilateral efforts are preferable, do you support
unilateral action to counter China's malign activities if diplomatic
efforts to secure multilateral action should fail?
Answer. The challenges that China poses to our security,
prosperity, and values, and how we conduct this competition in
coordination with our allies and partners, will be crucial for defining
the 21st century. PRC actions hurt American workers, blunt our
technological edge, threaten our alliances, and undermine international
organizations. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to
counter Beijing's aggressive and coercive actions, sustain our military
and economic advantages, and defend our democratic values from a
position of strength. However, when it is in the United States'
interest to act on our own, we should do so.
Question. If confirmed, in future dialogue with Beijing, will you
press for meaningful progress as a precondition for further rounds of
dialogue? Do you commit to supporting the administration and Secretary
in raising issues that Beijing deems ``sensitive''--such as human
rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the Uyghurs--regardless of
whether doing so may affect the CCP's willingness to engage in further
dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stand up for our values when human
rights are being abused in Xinjiang and Tibet--or elsewhere in China--
or when autonomy is being assaulted in Hong Kong. The administration is
willing to test whether the Chinese Government is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues but will be clear-eyed about U.S.
interests. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) failure to uphold its
international commitments will significantly factor into how we develop
our approach to the PRC. If confirmed, I will keep these past
shortcomings in mind in future dealings with Beijing. The Biden-Harris
administration will put our democratic values at the center of our
foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights, and human
dignity.
Question. Do you support the Trump administration's designation of
the National Association for China's Peaceful Unification as a foreign
mission of the PRC? What steps will you take to ensure other such front
organizations are properly designated, and to inform relevant
stakeholders within the U.S.--including state and local governments,
universities, and business associations--of the nature and mission of
such front organizations?
Answer. China's use of coercive and corrupting tools of influence
to undermine and interfere in democracies is a concern for the United
States and our allies and partners around the world. The Biden-Harris
administration will take action to counter this malign Chinese
influence, including by increasing transparency and accountability. The
administration will work with our allies and likeminded partners to
build resilience against these threats, to expose China's malign
activity and, when appropriate, to impose costs. The administration
will also work with important U.S. constituencies, including state and
local governments and academic institutions, to address these threats.
Question. Do you support the Trump administration's reciprocity
requirements that PRC diplomats report certain categories of meetings
to the U.S. Government, including meetings with educational
institutions and Chinese community groups?
Answer. The United States seeks for our diplomats in China the same
open access PRC officials enjoy in the United States. For years,
Beijing has systematically obstructed access by U.S. officials. The
administration will use all the tools at our disposal to achieve
reciprocal access for our diplomats in China.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights
concerns are integrated in every senior bilateral engagement, and that
specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, both publicly
and privately, with the PRC?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put our democratic values at the
center of our foreign policy and stand up for democracy, human rights,
and human dignity. Effective diplomacy on human rights issues requires
not only general statements but also targeted engagement on specific
cases. If confirmed, I will integrate advocacy on specific cases into
our human rights diplomacy.
Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a
responsible global actor?
Answer. The People's Republic of China seeks international
acceptance of its authoritarian alternative to the rules-based
international system that has been the mainstay of global security and
prosperity over the course of decades. At the same time, Beijing denies
or obfuscates that it has an alarming record of violations and abuses
of international human rights. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to challenge authoritarian governance and stand up for the
human rights of all individuals, including by calling on PRC
authorities to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms consistent
with China's international obligations and commitments.
Question. In December 2018, Chinese authorities detained Pastor
Wang Yi of the Autumn Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, and one year
later, sentenced him to nine years in prison for refusing to accept the
CCP controls of his congregation described above. If confirmed, will
you agree to raise Pastor Wang's case with leaders in Beijing and
advocate for his immediate and unconditional release until they do so?
Answer. I share your concerns regarding the deterioration of
freedom of religion and belief in the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Religious leaders are at particular risk of PRC repression and are
pressured to join state-run religious organizations, as we have seen in
the cases of Buddhist lamas, Muslim imams, Protestant pastors, and
Catholic bishops and priests. Pastor Wang Yi is no exception and, if
confirmed, I will continue the Department's advocacy for his release.
Effective diplomatic engagement on human rights issues requires not
only general statements but also engagement on specific cases. If
confirmed, I will advocate on specific human rights cases.
Question. Former Secretary of State Pompeo rightly determined that
the People's Republic of China is committing genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other Muslim
minorities. Secretary Blinken agreed with this determination. Do you
concur with former Secretary Pompeo and Secretary Blinken?
Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has committed
crimes against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang. Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups have suffered unspeakable oppression at the hands of
China's authoritarian government. The PRC is engaged in atrocities that
shock the conscience and must be met with serious consequences. If
confirmed, I will speak out consistently with allies and partners to
condemn these atrocities, and I will consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for those responsible and to deter future
abuses.
Question. If confirmed, will you work toward getting like-minded
countries to join the United States in a genocide determination?
Answer. Secretary Blinken said in his judgment that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) has committed genocide against Uyghurs, and I
agree. The PRC also has committed crimes against humanity in Xinjiang
against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other
ethnic and religious minority groups, including imprisonment, torture,
enforced sterilization, and persecution. The associated abuses in
Xinjiang are particularly devastating to ethnic minority women and
girls. These atrocities shock the conscience and must be met with
serious consequences. If confirmed, I will speak out consistently and
jointly with allies and partners to condemn these atrocities and will
consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those
responsible and deter future abuses.
Question. Will you endorse the Rubio-McGovern Uyghur Forced Labor
Prevention Act to prevent Beijing from profiting from its abuse of
Uyghur and other persecuted groups' labor?
Answer. While I cannot comment on pending legislation, I can
confirm that the Biden-Harris administration stands against forced
labor and abuses targeting Uyghurs and other minority groups carried
out by the People's Republic of China (PRC). If confirmed, I will work
with international partners to promote accountability for the PRC's
atrocities in Xinjiang, press for the immediate and unconditional
release of all those arbitrarily detained, the abolition of the
internment camps and an end to forced labor, as well as the cessation
of all other human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China. In
addition, if confirmed, I will support efforts across the government to
limit the profits China gains from forced labor.
Question. Do you believe that the National Liberation Army (ELN) is
a terrorist organization?
Answer. The National Liberation Army (ELN) is designated as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Do you believe that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia is designated as
a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance with section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global
Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Cuba harbors terrorists groups like the ELN. Do you
support keeping Cuba on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to carefully
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The
administration will also carefully review policy related to Cuba and
will provide further information at the appropriate time. The
administration does not discuss deliberations or potential
deliberations regarding designations.
Question. The Cuban regime denies the Cuban people essential
liberties such as free association, expression, belief, and access to
information. How would you characterize the Cuban regime's human rights
record?
Answer. Cuba has a poor human rights record. The Cuban Government
has increased its practice of arbitrary arrest and harassment of human
rights defenders, journalists, and anyone who criticizes the
Government. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-Harris
administration's promise to ensure that democracy and human rights
remain at the core of our policy efforts toward Cuba. The
administration will engage directly with a large swath of Cuban civil
society, with the goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine
their own future. The administration will also engage directly the
Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for reform.
Question. The Cuban military plays a large role in controlling the
flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this control to support
the Cuban Communist Party and ensure regime survival. Do you support
restricting financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to
promote freedom in Cuba?
Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the
pandemic, economic upheaval caused by the country's recent monetary
measures, and decades of living under an oppressive government that has
failed to responsibly manage Cuba's economy. The administration has
committed to carefully reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including our
posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they advance
the administration's goal of empowering the Cuban people to determine
their future. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and
economic well-being of the Cuban people, and I look forward to
consulting with Congress on this issue.
Question. Do you agree that Americans should be compensated for
property that was confiscated by the Castro regime?
Answer. Many Americans waited decades for compensation due to the
Cuban Government's confiscation of their or their family's property.
The Department will explore the best ways to support claimants and
resolve outstanding claims. The administration committed to carefully
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the best way to advance U.S.
nationals' claims against the Cuban Government. The administration
recognizes the varied views in Congress, and if confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with Congress in developing a path forward.
Question. Do you agree with Secretary Pompeo's decision to no
longer exercise the suspension authority in the LIBERTAD Act, which
allows Americans to sue in U.S. courts, companies trafficking in their
stolen properties?
Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing
U.S.-Cuba policy, including U.S. posture regarding the suspension
authority in Title III of the LIBERTAD Act. I understand that the
administration is exploring ways to best support U.S. nationals'
claims. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on
this issue.
Question. Do you agree we should maintain strong sanctions against
Cuba and Venezuela as the Cuban regime provides intelligence and other
vital support to the Maduro regime in Caracas in exchange for
subsidized or free oil?
Answer. The United States should maintain strong sanctions
targeting the illegitimate Maduro regime and its enablers, including
those complicit in human rights abuses and corruptly siphoning wealth
and resources from the Venezuelan people. The administration is also
committed to taking all appropriate steps to prevent our sanctions from
impacting humanitarian access and delivery.
Question. Do you support Interim President Juan Guaido in the
pursuit of the restoration of democracy in Venezuela?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration continues to recognize Juan
Guaido as the interim President of Venezuela. If confirmed, I will
press for the restoration of democracy in Venezuela through holding of
free and fair elections.
Question. Do you support democracy assistance to the Cuban people
to promote democracy, civil society and human rights in Cuba pursuant
to U.S. law?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will follow through on the Biden-
Harris administration's promise to ensure that the advancement of
democracy and human rights remains at the core of our policy efforts
toward Cuba. The Biden-Harris administration will engage directly with
a large swath of Cuban civil society, with the goal of empowering the
Cuban people to determine their own future. The administration will
also engage with the Cuban Government to denounce abuses and push for
reform. I am committed to consulting closely with Congress about Cuba
policy, if confirmed.
Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance?
Answer. If confirmed, I will take the Helms Amendment and other
legislative restrictions, including other restrictions related to
abortion, very seriously and will work with partners to ensure
compliance.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. March 15 will mark the 10th anniversary of the brutal
crackdown by Syrian president Bashar al-Assad against peaceful
protestors, resulting in a violent and protracted civil war. I am
concerned that U.S. actions in Syria in the last four years have not
reflected a robust decision-making process focused on supporting our
allies and countering malign actors. Having visited our Kurdish
partners in 2018, I have seen first-hand the value of an engaged U.S.
policy on Syria. What actions are available for the United States to
take now to improve the outcome in Syria?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration's policy goals in Syria
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution under the
parameters of UNSCR 2254, ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS, and
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in
need. The administration will use a variety of tools, across a
coordinated whole-of-government approach, to push for a sustainable end
to the Syrian people's suffering. Any political settlement must address
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria. Additionally,
the humanitarian situation is dire. If confirmed, I will work within
the administration to do more to aid vulnerable Syrians displaced
within Syria, as well as refugees who fled abroad.
Question. How should the U.S. balance Turkey, the Kurds and Russia
in responding to the situation in Northeastern Syria?
Answer. Preventing an ISIS resurgence in Iraq and Syria demands
revitalized U.S. engagement. The administration is committed to
supporting our local partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The
United States has shared interests with Turkey in countering terrorism
and ending the conflict in Syria and understands Turkey's concerns
about U.S. cooperation with the People's Protection Units (YPG) as part
of the SDF in the Defeat-ISIS campaign, which we will continue to
address. The administration will continue to consult with Turkey on
Syria as it seeks areas for cooperation. The United States has always
been open to dialogue with Russia on Syria, as long as the dialogue
contributes to protecting civilians and to credibly moving forward on a
political resolution to the conflict.
Question. I was pleased to see the Biden administration
implementing a sanctions regime against those responsible for the
poisoning of Russian opposition leader Aleksei Navalny and the
continued construction on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. On Nord Stream 2,
what next steps should the administration take to stop the Nord Stream
2 pipeline?
Answer. The administration believes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is a
bad deal and a threat to European energy security, including Ukraine
and other vulnerable partners. The administration welcomes Congress's
interest and appreciates Congressional efforts to provide the tools
needed to combat Russian aggressive actions. In a February 19 report to
Congress, the Department identified Russia-based KVT-RUS as an entity
knowingly selling, leasing, or providing the vessel FORTUNA for the
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, as required by
PEESA, as amended. I understand that the Department will continue to
inform companies about the risks of doing business with Nord Stream 2
and use all available tools to examine entities potentially involved in
sanctionable activity, as outlined by CAATSA and PEESA, as amended. It
will also continue its diplomatic engagement with key European partners
and allies to outline our serious concerns regarding the project's
geopolitical implications for Europe's energy security.
Question. How do you view the timeline for the administration to
act to stop the pipeline? Is there a point after which our options to
stop the pipeline are limited?
Answer. The administration's efforts to date aimed at stopping the
pipeline, aided by the authorities granted by Congress, have
significantly slowed the pipeline's pace of construction. It is of the
utmost importance to maintain this high level of engagement and
diplomatic pressure to prevent the pipeline's completion. If confirmed,
I will ensure the Department of State maintains this high level of
engagement and diplomatic pressure.
Question. What should next steps for broad, coherent U.S. policy
response to Russian aggression look like? How are the Navalny sanctions
part of a wider strategy to respond to and deter Russia?
Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions
and will comply with the legal obligations to impose a second round of
sanctions under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare
Elimination Act of 1991. As the administration works to advance U.S.
interests, it will continue to hold Russia accountable for its
destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, including its
repeated use of chemical weapons in violation of the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and human rights violations.
Question. What additional legal tools does the administration need
to stop this pipeline?
Answer. I appreciate Congressional support to stop this pipeline.
The administration has a number of sanctions tools at its disposal to
stop Nord Stream 2, including the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Act (PEESA), as amended, Countering America's Adversaries Through
Sanctions Act (CAATSA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA). As you know, PEESA and CAATSA Section 232 provide more
specific tools targeting Russian energy export pipelines, which can be
supplemented by IEEPA if needed. If confirmed, I will continue to work
with the ample tools Congress has already provided. I will also work to
maintain the high level of engagement with companies and diplomatic
pressure to bring an end to the pipeline's construction.
Question. How can the administration better amplify the concerns of
our central and eastern European allies to persuade Danish and German
authorities to stop the pipeline?
Answer. The administration has made clear to Germany and other
European partners that Nord Stream 2 is not just a commercial deal. It
views this project as a threat not only to Europe's energy security but
also to strategic stability on the continent. The German and Danish
authorities are aware of the U.S. position from frequent and high-level
interaction and statements, and the administration will continue all
such efforts. The United States will also continue to work with our
allies and partners, including Germany, Denmark, Ukraine, Poland, and
the Baltic states, to ensure Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that does not undermine collective security.
Question. From the administration's point of view, what aspects of
the pipeline's construction are the most vulnerable to targeted
sanctions that could stop the project?
Answer. To date, targeted outreach to Western insurers and
certification, engineering, and construction firms, including companies
providing pipe-laying vessels, have significantly affected the rate of
the pipeline's construction with many entities winding down their
operations and untold more refusing to engage with Nord Stream 2 AG
given the risk of sanctions. The administration will continue to be
clear that companies risk sanctions if they involve themselves in Nord
Stream 2 construction and will continue to monitor companies involved
in potentially sanctionable activities.
Question. Georgia has been on a dangerous backslide away from
democracy for several years now. Recent developments, including the
arrest and detention of Russian opposition leader Nika Melia, threats
to further destabilize Georgia and the region. What policy responses
are available to the United States? How should the U.S. work with
European allies to develop an international consensus on Georgia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Georgian
people's choice to pursue closer ties with the EU and NATO and, as
Congress has done, voice strong U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized
borders. In its messaging of support for Georgia's future in the
context of recent developments, the Department has emphasized the
importance of Georgian leaders and politicians modeling the values and
norms of the Euro-Atlantic community they aspire to join. If confirmed,
I look forward to working with Congress and European allies to help
identify opportunities to support Georgia's democratic development,
including reforms to foster judicial independence and a level electoral
playing field, as well as anticorruption and pro-business reforms. U.S.
assistance directly supports these goals. I am committed to ensuring
U.S. assistance to Georgia advances U.S. policy objectives.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Rob Portman
Question. Last week I sent a letter cosigned by the other GOP
ranking members of national security committees to provide our vision
for a successful renegotiation with Iran over its nuclear program and
its regional aggression. As you are probably aware, I was a vocal
critic of the previous JCPOA and I believe that the Biden
administration has a rare opportunity to fix the fatal flaws of the
previous agreement.
Specifically, my colleagues and I would like to see that the
nuclear issue and Tehran's regional aggression be addressed together.
Iran remains the number one state sponsor of terror, and it would be a
critical mistake to separate the two issues. Additionally, there should
be no financial relief for Iran to meet their pre-conditions for
diplomatic talks. This is a mistake that is often repeated time and
again, not just in our negotiations with Iran, but with rogue regimes
worldwide.
If confirmed, do you commit to addressing Iran's nuclear program
and regional aggression together in any future diplomatic
negotiations, while opposing any such deal that includes one
without the other? Do you agree to not grant concessions as a
precondition to diplomatic talks?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration agrees that we need to
supplement the JCPOA if we want a deal that is sustainable. There are
several issues the deal did not address, including Iran's ballistic
missile development, proliferation, and destabilizing regional
activities. Iran also remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
threatening international security and U.S. forces, diplomatic
personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. The administration
is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a mutual return
to compliance with the JCPOA, and then use it as a platform to
negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal, and other critical issues.
Question. Do you agree to not grant concessions as a precondition
to diplomatic talks?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will not make decisions
based on artificial Iranian deadlines. The President made clear he is
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon, and the
administration believes diplomacy, in coordination with our allies and
regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal. The
administration is ready to engage in meaningful diplomacy to achieve a
mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA and then use it as a
platform to negotiate a longer, stronger nuclear deal and other areas
of concern. Iran continues to exceed JCPOA limits on many fronts, so we
are a long way from that point.
Question. Senator Cardin and I worked together to push back against
the politically motivated global boycott, divestment, and sanctions
movement unfairly targeting Israel. These efforts have achieved
widespread bipartisan support in the Senate, and we look forward to
working with your State Department to ensure that Israel is not
unfairly targeted through these efforts.
What is your view on the strategic US/Israel relationship and can
we count on your support to oppose global BDS movements against
Israel?
Answer. President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and I firmly oppose the
Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel. This
movement unfairly singles out Israel and too often veers into anti-
Semitism. While the Biden-Harris administration will respect the
American people's First Amendment rights, the administration will not
hesitate to voice our disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight
efforts to delegitimize Israel on the world stage.
Anti-Normalization laws in the Middle East
The Trump administration achieved major breakthroughs in Israel's
relations with the Middle East. Senator Booker and I plan to re-
introduce a bill called ``Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken
Against the Normalization of Relations with Israel Act'' to capitalize
on this moment. This bill requires the Department of State to report
instances of Arab Government efforts to undermine people-to-people
engagement with Israeli citizens and residents. I believe it is
imperative that the normalization of formal relations between Arab
Governments and Israel is extended down to these countries' citizens.
How crucial is it that instances of anti-normalization laws are
documented publicly, and what further actions can the
administration take to ensure that people are not punished for
engaging with Israeli citizens?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on these efforts to expand the circle
of peace between Israel and its neighbors, urging states and
multilateral organizations with anti-normalization legislation or
decrees to revoke them immediately so that negotiations can commence.
The administration will also closely monitor the status of the existing
agreements to encourage both sides to uphold their commitments to
establish full diplomatic relations.
Question. Here in the Senate we have worked hard to provide the
right framework for Ukrainian Security assistance-I am proud to have
been a principle author of the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative,
a program that has provided the Ukrainians billions in military aid and
training. Under the previous administration, we have provided increased
amounts of lethal assistance, and I was glad to see in the NDAA that
$125 million is set aside for lethal assistance-all of this aid is
appropriately tied to continued Ukrainian sector reforms, which I am
glad to see President Zelensky is committed to.
Can I get your commitment to continue the support of robust funding
for USAI while supporting corruption and continued reforms in
Ukraine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to provide robust
security assistance to Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and
to support continued reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee
the execution of $115 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $3
million in International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $6
million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
Programs (NADR) funds that Congress appropriated for Ukraine for FY
2021. Additionally, if confirmed, I will closely coordinate with the
Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that Congress
appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) in
FY 2021, including the process to certify that the Government of
Ukraine has taken substantial actions to make defense institutional
reforms before the final tranche of $150 million in USAI funding is
released.
Question. For two decades, the Chinese Government has
systematically recruited U.S. researchers and sent Chinese military
researchers to steal U.S. taxpayer-funded research and intellectual
property at U.S. universities and institutes. This has led to the U.S.
taxpayer unwittingly funding the rise of China's military and economy.
This has to stop.
Last Congress, the Homeland Security and Government Affairs
Committee passed Senator Carpers and I's Securing American Innovation
Act. This bipartisan legislation will increase visibility on who is
conducting our federally funded research, their potential conflicts of
interest, and potentially problematic ties with our adversaries. More
importantly, it will provide the State Department the authority to deny
visas to foreign researchers whose problematic affiliations and access
to export-controlled technologies through fundamental research raise
national security concerns. We took a balanced approach with this bill.
We need foreign researchers to work with our researchers here, but we
need to take common-sense steps to prevent bad actors from coming to
the United States.
Do you agree that these new visa authorities are necessary, and how
will they better protect taxpayer-funded research and
intellectual property from foreign adversaries?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department guards against
the transfer of sensitive technology to foreign adversaries. The
Department will implement existing visa ineligibility grounds targeting
this activity. Presidential Proclamation 10043, issued in May 2020,
suspends the entry of the People's Republic of China (PRC) nationals to
study or conduct research if the applicant is affiliated with an
identified PRC entity that implements or supports China's military-
civil fusion strategy. The United States continues to welcome
legitimate students and scholars from China and around the world and
promote the United States for international science and technology
talent critical to our research enterprise. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress on reviewing legislation to further
State's work and role in these efforts.
International Criminal Court Mandate
Question. As you are aware, last year the appeals chamber of the
ICC allowed a politically motivated investigation into alleged actions
of US and allied personnel in Afghanistan to move forward. This court
has no jurisdiction over the US as we are not a signatory to the Rome
Statute. I was glad to see that the Trump administration responded with
financial sanctions and the restriction of travel visas for foreign
individuals assisting the ICC in this manner.
However, just last month, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber granted
authorization for an investigation into alleged crimes in the West
Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem to move forward. Like the United States,
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute. This is not the first
time that the ICC has conducted a politically motivated investigation.
My good friend Senator Cardin and I led a bi-partisan letter on this
issue along with 67 other Senators asking the State Department to push
back on the ICC's decision to prosecute Israel for alleged war crimes
in the West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza. And this month, we plan to send
to the Biden administration a follow up to that letter asking for a
firmer stance on these politically motivated investigations. Like us,
Israel is not a signatory to the Rome Statute and in our view this is
harmful to the peace process and again, outside of the ICC's
jurisdiction.
Do you agree that the ICC's expansion of their mandate is
detrimental to prospects of a negotiated settlement between
Israel and the Palestinian authority and what additional
actions can be taken to push back against the expansion of the
ICC's legal mandate?
Answer. I share the administration's serious concerns about the
ICC's attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. Israel
is not a State Party, and Palestine is not a State. A peaceful, secure
and more prosperous future for the people of the Middle East depends on
building bridges and creating new avenues for dialogue and exchange,
not unilateral judicial actions that exacerbate tensions and undercut
efforts to advance a negotiated two-state solution.
Question. What steps would you take to protect U.S. service and
allied coalition members from the ICC's jurisdiction?
Answer. I share the concerns and the objection by the United States
to any attempt by the ICC to investigate U.S. personnel, as the United
States is not a State Party to the Rome Statute. If confirmed, I will
work to protect U.S. personnel from legal jeopardy before the ICC. I
also share the administration's serious concerns about the ICC's
attempts to exercise jurisdiction over Israeli personnel. We will
continue to uphold our strong commitment to Israel and its security,
including by opposing actions that seek to target Israel unfairly.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. For several months, tens of thousands of farmers have
been camping out on the outskirts of New Delhi, demanding the repeal of
three agricultural laws they say will drive down crop prices and
negatively affect their earnings. Multiple rounds of talks between farm
union leaders and the central government have taken place, but have not
yet resulted in a resolution. As part of its response, Prime Minister
Modi's Government has shut down internet service in several districts,
impeding access to information and compromising protesters' fundamental
right to freedom of expression. It has also arrested activists on
suspicion of sedition for allegedly advocating for support of the
farmer protests. Internet freedom in India continues to decline as the
central government utilizes internet shutdowns to clamp down on
dissent, including for these protests and in the Jammu and Kashmir
region. As Deputy Secretary of State, what steps will you take to
ensure digital access is not obstructed in India?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by the growing use of government-
imposed Internet shutdowns around the world, including in India, which
restrict the rights of individuals online. If confirmed, I will speak
out against this worrying global trend and use bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy, including through U.N. bodies and the Freedom
Online Coalition, to raise our concerns with governments that engage in
this practice, including India. I will emphasize the need to protect
freedom of expression, which includes the freedom to seek, receive, and
impart information, both online and offline.
Question. Many of those protesting come from the northern Indian
states of Punjab and Haryana, regions with a significant Sikh
population. The Indian Government has labeled some of the farmers and
their supporters as ``anti-national'' and questioned their allegiance
to India. What will you do to encourage the Indian Government to
respect the right to protest for all its citizens?
Answer. The freedoms of expression, association, religion or
belief, and peaceful assembly are universal human rights. If confirmed,
I will use the full array of diplomatic tools to encourage the Indian
Government to respect these human rights.
Question. In 2019, then-Secretary Pompeo announced that the United
States would ``no longer recognize Israeli settlements as per se
inconsistent with international law'' and rescinded a 1978 legal
opinion that then-Legal Adviser Herbert Hansell provided to Congress
reaching a contrary conclusion that said, ``civilian settlements in
those territories is inconsistent with international law.'' This legal
justification was never publicly released or provided to Congress. How
do you view this issue?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the two-state
solution is the best way to ensure Israel's future as a Jewish and
democratic state and to give the Palestinians the state to which they
are entitled. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus
on urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps,
such as annexation of territory, settlement activity, demolitions,
incitement to violence, and providing compensation for individuals
imprisoned for acts of terrorism, that exacerbate tensions and make it
more difficult to preserve the viability of a two-state solution.
Question. If confirmed as Deputy Secretary, would you work to
reverse that decision?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to urge both Israel and the Palestinians to refrain from unilateral
steps that exacerbate tensions and undercut efforts to advance a
negotiated two-state solution, such as annexation of territory,
settlement activity, demolitions, incitement to violence, and providing
compensation for individuals imprisoned for acts of terrorism.
Question. If confirmed, would you provide Congress with the Trump
administration's Hansell opinion to include its legal justification for
the decision, and any new decision the Department may reach under
Secretary Blinken?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's focus on
urging both Israel and the Palestinians to avoid unilateral steps that
exacerbate tensions and make it more difficult to preserve the
viability of a two-state solution. This will include engaging Congress
on significant policy matters related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace
process.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Todd Young
Question. Do you believe the EU's recent commercial agreement with
China is already putting the United States on its back foot when
seeking to bring a unified front?
Answer. It is a demonstration of the amount of work we have before
us to reinvigorate our transatlantic alliance and develop a more
unified response to the challenge posed by China. If confirmed, I will
engage actively with our EU and other European partners on shared
concerns about China. My engagements will include discussions on how to
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive
and coercive actions, prevent goods made with forced labor from
entering global markets, create a level playing field and promote
private enterprise, and highlight China's failure to uphold its
international commitments.
Ultimately, the onus will be on China to show that its new pledges
on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and subsidies in the new
agreement are not just cheap talk.
Question. Some U.S. partners with whom we will have to cooperate to
best tackle the foreign policy challenges of the coming decades are not
democracies or are illiberal ones. They occupy key positions in the
Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia, and we may find ourselves
relying on them more. How do you believe the United States should be
cooperating with the Governments of Vietnam, the Philippines, India, or
our Gulf partners, even as we have concerns about human rights,
democratic values, and good governance?
Answer. As you rightly point out, the United States cannot always
choose the partners it must work with in addressing the most pressing
foreign policy challenges we face. Further, there is not a one-size-
fits-all approach to foreign policy, and no country has a perfect human
rights record. I believe the United States should approach cooperation
on a case-by-case basis, working to advance U.S. interests while also
placing democracy and human rights at the center of U.S. foreign
policy. As President Biden said, ``Diplomacy is back at the center of
our foreign policy.'' The United States must repair our alliances and
engage with the world once again to meet accelerating global
challenges--from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear
proliferation--which will only be solved by nations working together.
We cannot do it alone. If confirmed, I will seek to work in partnership
with countries where we have a national security interest, while at the
same time addressing human rights concerns, promoting good governance,
and upholding our democratic values.
Question. The Biden administration has spoken of the need to work
closely with allies and partners to develop a coordinated response to
the China challenge. What specific differences in approach do you
expect to be most difficult to resolve?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the
center of U.S. foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that
underpin peace and security and compete with China from a position of
strength. The United States will consult with allies and partners on a
coordinated approach to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) coercive
economic practices, human rights abuses, malign influence operations,
and other key challenges. The administration will work with the EU, our
Indo-Pacific and NATO allies, the Quad, and others to restore our vital
security partnerships, secure the technologies of the future, re-engage
in the U.N. system, and address attempts by the PRC to undermine the
international rules-based system.
Question. The Biden administration has stated that it hopes to
cooperate with China on such pressing global issues as climate change,
proliferation, and global health. How would you respond to concerns
that the administration might downplay areas of friction with China in
order to make progress on these global priorities?
Answer. Combatting climate change; opposing the proliferation of
sensitive goods and technology related to WMD, missile systems, and
advanced conventional weapons; and promoting global health are in
China's interest as well as ours. They are not favors to be bargained
for. If confirmed, I will test whether China is willing to play a
constructive role on certain issues where we may share interests but
will be clear-eyed about Chinese intentions, while advancing the
interests of the American people. Our core interests and values will
not be traded off in discussions with China or any other country.
Further, the Department of State will seek Congressional input on
potential areas of cooperation.
Question. India is making great strides in developing renewable
energy sources, but continues to rely heavily on coal-fired power
generation. Will you seek to work with India on balancing its growing
power consumption with a mutual interest in addressing climate change
and reducing greenhouse gas emissions?
Answer. I fully support the administration's ongoing efforts, led
by Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry, to work with
India on more ambitious climate commitments. As Secretary Blinken noted
in his confirmation hearing, the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to ensuring developing countries can meet their energy needs
while also reducing their emissions and building resilience against the
destabilizing impacts of climate change--both of which have clear
benefits not only for the recipient countries, but also for the United
States and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Congress to promote affordable energy in the developing
world consistent with our nation's energy and climate goals.
In view of Prime Minister Modi's announced target of installing 450
GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, if confirmed, I would support
the work advancing cost-effective strategies to enhance the flexibility
and robustness of India's electricity grid to encourage India's clean
energy transition over the next decade. If confirmed, I would
prioritize lower-cost alternatives to carbon-intensive energy such as
coal-fired power, including by promoting renewable energy, battery
storage, and load shifting.
Question. How do you intend to engage Pakistan as a player in U.S.
strategy toward the Indo-Pacific region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will push for an open and honest bilateral
relationship with Pakistan that stands on its own merits based on our
mutual interests. Despite a challenging relationship, I believe that
continued cooperation with Pakistan is possible on shared priorities
like securing a responsible end to the conflict in Afghanistan,
advancing regional security and fighting terrorism, expanding bilateral
commerce, and addressing climate change. By fostering productive ties
with all countries in the Indo-Pacific region, we hope to advance our
shared prosperity, security, and values.
Question. Do you view increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan as
an obstacle to U.S. interests?
Answer. I have concerns about many of China's activities globally
and will raise and take action on those concerns whenever appropriate.
While in principle the United States welcomes investments in
infrastructure and economic development that are sustainable and meet
international standards, I am concerned PRC-sponsored projects often
lack transparency and impose unsustainable debts. If confirmed, I will
work to encourage Pakistan to pursue a sustainable development path
involving good governance, long-term capacity building, and market
principles. U.S. diplomacy and cooperation with Pakistan reflects a
vision for a region of independent and prosperous nations at peace with
each other and the rest of the world. If confirmed, I will continue to
support that objective.
Question. To what extent will you prioritize cooperating with
Islamabad in combatting Islamist militancy and stabilizing Afghanistan?
Answer. Cooperation with Islamabad in combatting terrorist groups
in the region is a key part of U.S. efforts to seek a stable, peaceful
Afghanistan through a just and durable political settlement, and
success in this effort would be crucial to improved U.S-Pakistan
bilateral relations. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the
Pakistani Government to play a constructive role in advancing the
Afghan peace process as a means to achieve a more stable and secure
South Asia. Further, if confirmed, I will continue to work closely with
Afghanistan's neighbors to press for a significant reduction in
violence to facilitate progress in peace negotiations.
Question. Do you support the Abraham Accords and the landmark
normalization agreements that occurred during the Trump administration?
Answer. Yes, I support the Abraham Accords and the Trump
administration's role in negotiating them. The normalization agreements
between Israel and its Arab neighbors are a positive step that reflect
recognition among Israel and the states that have signed the agreements
that they hold many interests in common and can most effectively
address them through cooperation. The agreements are the product of
years of quiet diplomacy between Israel and its neighbors supported by
U.S. administrations from both parties.
Question. Do you intend to help Israel consolidate existing
normalization arrangements and normalize its relations with other Arab
states, and if so, how?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. The administration
will also closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to
date, encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with
Israel to uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic
relations with Israel.
Question. How will the administration approach arms sales and
issues such as the Western Sahara impasse with Morocco in light of the
normalization agreements to date?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration welcomes normalization
agreements as an important contribution to regional peace and continues
to review policy in numerous areas, including Western Sahara. The
administration wants to see the appointment of a Personal Envoy of the
U.N. Secretary-General and a renewed U.N.-led political process.
Morocco is a major non-NATO ally, and our military-to-military
partnership is a regional model. The administration looks forward to
continued cooperation, including the upcoming Moroccan-hosted African
Lion exercise, the largest joint military training and interoperability
exercise in Africa. The State Department continues to ensure all arms
sales meet U.S. national security objectives and reflect our values.
Question. Congress has passed two rounds of mandatory sanctions
against Russia's Nord Stream 2 pipeline as part of the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). These laws necessitate the
imposition of sanctions against entities that engage in or support
deep-sea pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under the laws, on
February 19, 2021, the State Department submitted a report to Congress
only identifying Russia's Fortuna vessel and its owner as engaging in
sanctionable activities. However, media and other forms of public
reporting, including visual data from reputable ship-tracking portals,
indicate that numerous other vessels and companies are supporting the
Fortuna's pipe-laying for Nord Stream 2. As required under PEESA and
PEESCA, the State Department must immediately identify these entities
to Congress and subject them to mandatory U.S. sanctions. When will the
State Department submit an updated report to Congress that formally
identifies these entities?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on the provision of vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying
activities, and various entities providing and supporting those
vessels, for the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report
due to Congress in mid-May. If confirmed, I will continue to use all
available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to work with
Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic energy
security goals. I understand that the State Department is actively
examining entities involved in potentially sanctionable activity and
will designate additional persons and entities as appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. U.S. sanctions have taken a heavy toll on civilians in
countries worldwide, particularly amid the COVID-19 pandemic. As a
humanitarian matter and as a matter of global public health, would you
consider strengthening humanitarian exemptions through a worldwide
temporary general license to ensure that sanctioned countries are able
to obtain critical humanitarian resources, including the COVID-19
vaccine?
Answer. Many U.S. sanctions programs include provisions aimed at
facilitating delivery of medical and other humanitarian supplies. If
confirmed, I will continue the State Department's conversations with
our allies and multinational and non-governmental organizations on
these issues. I will also continue State's cooperation with the
Department of the Treasury to use available tools, including issuance
of clarifying guidance and expediting of license requests, to
facilitate global delivery of humanitarian assistance particularly
during the COVID-19 pandemic. I would support initiatives by Treasury
to explore additional options, which could include issuance of
additional licenses to facilitate medical- or vaccine-related
transactions.
Question. What specific recommended additional actions will the
Biden administration pursue to hold Mohammed bin Salman, and senior
Saudi officials, responsible for the murder of Mr. Khasshogi?
Answer. The administration has taken a number of concrete steps to
recalibrate the relationship with Saudi Arabia. It followed the law and
submitted an unclassified report to Congress on the horrific murder of
Jamal Khashoggi. Under the Global Magnitsky Act, it sanctioned a former
senior Saudi official and the group whose members were involved in the
killing. The Department has taken action pursuant to a new visa
restriction policy against 76 Saudi individuals believed to have been
engaged in threatening dissidents overseas, including but not limited
to the Khashoggi killing. The Department will report on any such
extraterritorial activities by any government in the annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices.
Question. We will not stop climate catastrophe here at home if we
are supporting industries abroad engaging in ecocide. How will the
Administration prioritize policies that dramatically reduce U.S.
financial and diplomatic exposure in polluting industries abroad?
Answer. Dealing with climate change means investing in resilience
and green energy here at home and leading a global effort to reduce
carbon pollution. In his recent foreign policy speech, Secretary
Blinken described these challenges as being simultaneously domestic and
foreign. The administration is taking a whole-of-government approach to
put climate change at the center of its domestic, national security and
foreign policy, and to working with other nations to advance
conservation promote green recovery; revitalize communities and cities;
and secure environmental justice.
Question. Does U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan
Reconciliation, Zalmay Khalilzad, have specific instructions to make
the return of Paul Overby--my constituent who went missing in
Afghanistan/Pakistan in 2014--part of ongoing U.S. peace negotiations
with the Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan?
Answer. I have been advised the Secretary specifically directed
Ambassador Khalilzad to continue his efforts to press for the return of
Paul Overby and of Mark Frerichs during engagements with the Taliban
and with key regional partners.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator John Barrasso
Question. On July 7, 2015, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Martin Dempsey testified before the Senate Armed Services
Committee about Iran. He clearly stated, ``Under no circumstances
should we relieve pressure on Iran relative to ballistic missile
capabilities and arms trafficking.''
Only seven days later, you and the Obama-Biden Administration
disregarded the views of the American commanders on the battlefield. As
the lead negotiator of the Iran nuclear deal, you agreed to lift the
arms embargo and restrictions on ballistic missile technologies.
In any future negotiations, would you continue to disregard the
advice our military commanders?
Answer. The President and his national security team will always
take the advice of military commanders seriously. Iran's development
and proliferation of ballistic missiles, as well as its delivery of
weapons to violent proxies across the region, pose a threat to
international security and remain significant challenges. These
challenges existed despite the U.N. Security Council resolutions that
aimed to address them.
The Biden-Harris administration will use a variety of
nonproliferation tools to work to prevent the further advancement of
Iran's missile program and its ability to proliferate technology to
others, and will continue to enforce the U.S. arms embargo on Iran. The
administration will also work with our partners to stop shipments of
equipment and technology, seek to disrupt Iran's delivery of weapons to
violent proxies, and use our engagement in multilateral fora to urge
countries to take steps to address these activities.
Question. On October 18, 2020, the international arms embargo on
Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, was officially
lifted.
Considering the fact that you helped draft the agreement
eliminating it in the first place, what specific steps, if any,
will you take to reinstate the Iran arms embargo?
Answer. The administration will continue to push for full
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions barring the
unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and to the Houthis in
Yemen, and also continue to use domestic authorities to dissuade
countries from providing arms to Iran.
Question. What is your strategy to stop the dramatic increase of
weapons flowing to terrorists and proxy groups in the region?
Answer. The administration will continue to use domestic
authorities to dissuade countries from providing arms to Iran and
continue to push for full implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions barring the unauthorized transfer of weapons to Lebanon and
to the Houthis in Yemen. The administration will also continue to use
domestic authorities, including sanctions, to counter Iran's support
for terrorism in the Middle East.
Question. The U.S. constitution provides the Senate the power to
approve or reject treaties. Under your leadership, the Obama--Biden
administration refused to submit the Iran nuclear deal to the Senate
for its advice and consent. As one of the lead negotiators of the Iran
nuclear deal, you played a major role in drafting the agreement in a
way to avoid the ratification process.
If confirmed, will you continue to disregard the will of the
American people by negotiating international agreements and
then refusing to submit them to the Senate?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
committee on matters related to treaties and other international
agreements. The Supreme Court has long held that not all international
agreements require approval as treaties pursuant to the procedures set
out in Article II of the Constitution, and the Congress has recognized
this through the enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes
procedures regarding legally binding international agreements other
than treaties. Regardless of the form which particular agreements may
take, however, I am committed to engaging with the Senate as a partner
in the State Department's efforts to advance our national interests
through international agreements.
Question. If the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is
altered at all to include new provisions, would you advocate for the
administration to submit the accord for congressional review under the
Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act or other laws?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. Authoritarian regimes continue to restrict religious
freedoms and the rights of individuals. The violence, oppression and
attacks on human dignity cannot be tolerated. It is critically
important for the United States to stand up for those who are being
persecuted whether it is Christians in Nigeria or Uyghurs in China.
What additional efforts will you pursue at the State Department to
promote international religious freedom?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to use the full range of diplomatic
tools--both positive and punitive--to encourage governments to live up
to their international obligations and commitments to respect religious
freedom. This includes reforming outdated laws, ending abusive or
discriminatory practices, releasing individuals imprisoned for their
beliefs, and achieving justice for victims and accountability for
perpetrators of religious freedom abuses. The State Department will
also continue to fulfill its statutory requirements to produce its
annual report and annually review and designate countries and entities
for engaging in or tolerating severe or particularly severe religious
freedom violations.
Question. Defending human rights and the dignity of every person is
a fundamental value for Americans. Yet, the United Nations Human Rights
Council has refused to make serious reform to its organization. Efforts
by previous administrations failed to achieve the reforms needed.
Secretary Blinken recently admitted the council ``is flawed and needs
reform.''
What are the flaws of the United Nations Human Rights Council?
Answer. The two principal flaws of the Human Rights Council are its
disproportionate focus on Israel and the continued election of
countries with problematic human rights records. The continued
existence of a separate agenda item on Israel, Agenda Item 7, unduly
focuses attention on Israel to the exclusion of the human rights
records of every other country. The Administration believes that the
Council should treat Israel the same as it does every other U.N. member
state. Similarly, the membership on the Council must reflect high
standards for upholding human rights. Those with the worst human rights
records should not be members of the Council.
Question. What specific reforms does the administration believe
need to be taken at the U.N. Human Rights Council and how do you plan
to get the organization to make those reforms?
Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. The
United States has seen that when we play an active and constructive
role, we can advocate more effectively on Israel's behalf and engage
with our allies and friends to keep some of the countries with the
worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage countries
with better records to run for seats. When we were previously on the
Council, the United States was also able to help reduce the number of
resolutions focused on Israel. If confirmed, I will ensure the United
States prioritizes these specific reforms.
Question. Does the administration plan to demand any commitments
from the United Nations Human Rights Council on making those reforms
prior to rejoining?
Answer. The United States is pursuing reforms while re-engaging and
seeking a seat on the Human Rights Council, as announced by Secretary
Blinken during his speech to the Human Rights Council on February 24,
2021. The United States is most effective at the Human Rights Council
(HRC) and in other U.N. bodies when we are at the table, in the room,
in good financial standing, and use the full weight of our diplomatic
might to lead and to pursue appropriate and needed reforms. If
confirmed, I will ensure the United States prioritizes needed reforms
as part of our re-engagement with the HRC.
Question. For years, the United Nations Human Rights Council has
included human rights abusers and refusing to stand up for human rights
taking place across the world. A recent example is the election of
China and Russia to the United Nations Human Rights Council in October
2020. The Chinese Communist Party engages in torture, detention, and
forced labor of religious and ethnic minorities. Russia tramples on
free speech and the free press every day. Shockingly, Russia was
elected to the council the same week that the EU sanctioned Russian
officials for attempts to assassinate a Russian opposition figure. The
United Nations should be condemning the actions of Russia and China not
electing those responsible to this body.
Would you advise the United States to vote in favor of Russia,
China, or other human rights violators for membership on the
United Nations Human Rights Council?
Answer. The continued election of countries with problematic human
rights records to the Human Rights Council remains one of the principal
flaws of the Council. If confirmed I will advise the United States to
vote for nations with strong human rights records for the Council.
Question. During the Trump Administration, there were several
historic developments between Israel and its regional Arab neighbors.
The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan joined Egypt and
Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. These
agreements have created the path to peace through recognition and
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel.
In January, Secretary Blinken stated, ``We very much support the
Abraham Accords, we think that Israel normalizing relations with its
neighbors and other countries in the region is a very positive
development, and so we applauded them. We hope that there may be an
opportunity to build on them in the coming months and years ahead.''
Do you believe the Abraham Accords are a positive step forward for
the region?
Answer. Yes, I firmly believe the normalization agreements are a
positive step forward for Israel and the region and are in the United
States' best interest.
Question. What specific steps will you take to build upon these
historic successes and create additional peace agreements between
Israel and Arab nations?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, I will
closely monitor the status of the normalization efforts to date,
encouraging the states that have signed such agreements with Israel to
uphold their commitments to establish full diplomatic relations with
Israel.
Question. Congress continues to be deeply concerned with the
Turkish Government's purchase of the S-400 surface to air missile
defense systems from Russia. This decision threatens a range of U.S.
interests, including the strength of the NATO Alliance.
Do you believe a weak U.S. response to Turkey's actions would
embolden other countries to consider buying advanced Russian
military systems?
Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. A top
priority will be urging Turkey not to retain the S-400 and to refrain
from additional Russian arms purchases. The CAATSA sanctions announced
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence.
Turkey's suspension from the F-35 partnership represents an additional
significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress
to review the impact of the sanctions imposed in response to the S-400
acquisition and to determine whether additional measures are required
or warranted.
Question. Are you committed to fully implementing the Countering
America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) with respect to
Turkey's S-400 acquisition and any related purchases by other foreign
nations?
Answer. Yes. The imposition of CAATSA Section 231 sanctions on
Turkish individuals and entities in December demonstrated the State
Department's continuing commitment to CAATSA. If confirmed, I will not
only continue that commitment as it relates to Turkey's S-400
acquisition but also with respect to any other country that may be
considering similar transactions. I would strongly urge anyone
considering potentially significant transactions with Russia's defense
or intelligence sectors, or persons operating for, or on behalf of
either sector, to avoid such transactions, which may expose them to
CAATSA sanctions.
Question. Are current U.S. and NATO efforts to deter Russian
aggression in Europe adequate?
Answer. NATO has undertaken significant adaptation over the past
decade in response to Russian aggression in the Euro-Atlantic area,
including the illegal invasions of Ukraine and Georgia. The Alliance
relies on both conventional and nuclear capabilities for deterrence and
is also addressing growing gray area challenges. Allies will need to
continue work toward meeting equitable burden sharing to maintain
effective deterrence. Only with greater investment in defense across
the Alliance can we ensure NATO is able to adapt quickly to a changing
security landscape with the necessary capabilities and military
readiness.
Question. What is your position on the administration maintaining
or expanding sanctions intended to get Russia to change its policies
with regard to Ukraine, cyberattacks, and other malign activities?
Answer. President Biden has made clear that the United States will
act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to actions
by Russia that harm us or our allies. On March 2, the administration
took action to impose costs on the Russian Federation for the
poisoning, arrest, and imprisonment of Aleksey Navalny. The United
States will continue to take action to counter Russia's malign actions
and will comply with our legal obligations under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. As the
administration works together with allies to advance our interests, it
will continue to hold Russia accountable, including by sanctions, for
its destabilizing activity, disregard for international law, human
rights violations, interference in our elections, unlawful cyber
activity, and aggression in Ukraine and Georgia.
Question. How will you approach relations with Saudi Arabia?
Answer. President Biden has committed to recalibrating the U.S.-
Saudi relationship to ensure it reflects U.S. interests and values. The
Administration has elevated support for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, which has already led to positive initial results, such as
the conditional release of detained U.S. citizens and activists. Like
Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I will press Saudi Arabia for the
removal of conditions on their release, including travel restrictions,
and the implementation of reforms to avoid future such cases.
Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia remains an important U.S. partner on regional
security and counterterrorism, and the U.S. will continue to support
Saudi Arabian efforts to defend its people and territory, which is home
to thousands of U.S. citizens.
Question. How important of a role does Saudi Arabia play in our
efforts regarding Iran, Yemen, Iraq, and the Israel-Palestinian issues?
Answer. Saudi Arabia is a critical partner for containing Iranian
aggressive actions. The Biden-Harris administration strongly supports
Saudi Arabia's outreach to the Government of Iraq, to include recently
reopening its main border crossing with Iraq for the first time since
1990 and ongoing discussions to provide electricity to Iraq, both of
which will help to reduce Iraq's dependence on Iran. In Yemen, the
Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis has contributed to Yemen's
dire humanitarian crisis; Special Envoy Tim Lenderking is working with
Saudi Arabia, regional partners, and the U.N. to resolve the conflict.
With respect to Israel, Saudi Arabia supports a two-state solution and
has allowed overflights of Israeli-registered aircraft through Saudi
airspace to the UAE and Bahrain.
Question. What role, if any, do you see for Saudi Arabia and other
regional U.S. partners in talks with Iran?
Answer. The administration is committed to consulting closely with
our regional partners regarding U.S. policy on Iran, and in broad
terms, it supports dialogue among the countries in the region on issues
of regional security and stability.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by
either such committee relating to any such activity or
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and
transparently? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable
activities because of their participation in the construction of the
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA.
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities -
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and
operation of NS2 - were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress
in mid-May. I understand the Department of State submitted its first
report on PEESA, as amended, in February. If confirmed, I will continue
to use all available tools to counter Russian malign influence and to
work with Allies and partners in the region to support Transatlantic
energy security goals. I understand that the Department of State
continues to examine entities involved in potentially sanctionable
activity and will designate additional persons as appropriate, and will
comply with statutory reporting requirements.
Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed - which
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning - officials from the
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress?
If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is committed to complying with the requirements of
INARA, and if confirmed, I am committed to doing so.
Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to US sanctions. Reports
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case,
and confirm doing so.
Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if
confirmed, to work with the committee to try to accommodate any
official committee request for such Department information.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders,
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed
terrorists? If not, why not?
Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts,
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions,
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities.
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior
and ultimately end the war.
Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.
Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen, and
therefore remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions.
Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations.
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly
modify - this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and
we will continue to use all tools available to counter Iran's support
for terrorism. The President has made clear that the United States will
be prepared to resume participation in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) if Iran restores strict compliance, as a starting point
for follow on negotiations to lengthen and strengthen constraints and
address other issues of concern, including Iran's regional activity.
Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not
lift, rescind or significantly modify - or to agree within the
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify - these
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the , in the absence of a
determination that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material
support to terrorist organizations.
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The
President is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing activities
using the array of tools at our disposal, including sanctions to deal
with Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?
Answer. The IAEA has a decades-long successful track record of
monitoring the non-diversion of declared nuclear material globally.
While the IAEA thoroughly investigates all available information,
including based on its own verification and monitoring activities, it
is not an intelligence organization. It can only act on information
that is either acquired by it in the performance of its verification
mandates or presented to it. President Biden has made clear he is
committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Question. Please describe what new measures would you insist are
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?
Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program,
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such
indication.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met
with officials of the Government of Iran during your time out of
government. You also stated that you coordinated directly with Under
Secretary for Political Affairs Ambassador David Hale concerning your
interactions with Iranian regime officials. Please list any additional
senior State Department officials responsible for Iran policy with whom
you consulted or coordinated your engagement with Iranian officials,
such as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David
Schenker, Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook, Special
Representative for Iran Elliott Abrams, Deputy Secretary of State
Stephen Biegun, or Secretary of State Michael Pompeo.
Answer. I coordinated with Undersecretary Hale and did not engage
with others listed in this question.
Question. Please identify the dates on which you coordinated or
consulted with these officials.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I met with Foreign Minister
Zarif twice on the margins of the Munich Security Conference, in 2018
and 2019. I also participated in two bipartisan group meetings in New
York on the margins of UNGA: in 2018 with President Rouhani, and in
2019 with FM Zarif. Those meetings were facilitated by the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace (2018) and the International Crisis
Group (2019). Finally, in October 2017 I participated in a panel with
Deputy FM Abbas Aragchi at a nonproliferation conference sponsored by
the Center for Energy and Security Studies in Moscow, and we spoke on
the margins.
In every meeting, I urged Iran to stay in full compliance with the
JCPOA, even after U.S. withdrawal, and pressed for Iran to end its
regional violence and to release American prisoners. I consistently
kept Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale apprised
of meetings and offered to convey any useful information back to him.
Question. Please describe any additional contact you had with
officials from the Government of Iran Besides in-person meetings, have
you otherwise been in contact with any Iranian regime officials,
including via e-mail, text exchange, or secure messaging platforms,
between January 20, 2017, and today? If yes, please identify dates of
contact and the text of the exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
referenced in the previous question, other than to arrange logistical
details for those in-person meetings. I do not have records of those
exchanges.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Wendy R. Sherman by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is the status of the Clean Network Initiative at the
U.S. Department of State? As of November 2020, over 50 countries, 180
telecommunications companies, and dozens of other leading tech
companies had joined the State Department's Clean Networks Initiative
and pledged to advance common principles with regard to securing 5G and
other digital technologies against untrusted foreign vendors and
suppliers. The Biden administration, however, appears to have removed
any references to the Clean Network Initiative from the State
Department's website.
Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration views 5G security as a high
priority and is working with allies and partners to ensure their 5G
networks are free of untrustworthy vendor equipment and to support a
vibrant and diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications
equipment and services. The United States will pursue a comprehensive
strategy that addresses the full range of these issues. As is routine
practice, the Department archives webpages during the transition of
administrations. Webpages from 2017 to 2021 remain available to the
public at https://2017-2021.state.gov/index.html.
Question. What is the status of the Blue Dot Network at the U.S.
Department of State? In November 2019, the United States joined
Australia and Japan in launching the Blue Dot Network concept that
seeks to bring together governments, the private sector, and civil
society under shared standards for international infrastructure
development. If the Blue Dot Network is fully realized to promote
quality infrastructure investment that is open, transparent, and
compliant with international standards--including by eventually
mobilizing the deep capital markets of the United States and other
marked-based democracies--it can help to counter to China's predatory
One Belt One Road (OBOR) infrastructure initiatives.
Answer. I understand that the Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the
development of quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by
certifying projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I
understand that the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation continue to work with our Australian
and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of the
initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying quality
infrastructure projects in the developing world.
Question. In any negotiations that may occur with the authoritarian
regime in North Korea, do you commit to pursuing an end-state that
achieves complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization? What
do you perceive as the risks of further nuclear proliferation in East
Asia if we fail to achieve that end-state?
Answer. North Korea's proliferation-related activities constitute a
serious threat to international peace and security and undermine global
nonproliferation efforts. If confirmed, I plan to join the Biden-Harris
administration's ongoing policy review, in consultation with our
allies, of the current state of play on North Korea. I support the U.S.
commitment over the long term to the complete denuclearization of North
Korea, while also focusing in the near term on limiting the threat to
the United States and our allies.
Question. Do you concur that any U.S. international agreement to
achieve the final, fully verified denuclearization of North Korea must
also eliminate the threat of North Korean regime's ballistic missile
program?
Answer. Denuclearization of North Korea remains a top national
security priority for the United States. North Korea's weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missile programs constitute a serious threat
to the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I plan
to join the administration in conducting a thorough policy review, in
consultation with our allies, of the current state of play on North
Korea. I support the U.S. commitment over the long term to the complete
denuclearization of North Korea, while also focusing in the near term
on limiting the threat to the United States and our allies.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit that the State Department
will consult closely and proactively with Members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and their personal staff before providing
humanitarian assistance in order to ensure that any such U.S.
assistance benefits directly the suffering North Korean people and is
not vulnerable to diversion by the Kim Jong Un regime?
Answer. As part of its North Korea policy review, the Biden-Harris
administration will carefully consider the country's egregious human
rights record and work closely with partners and allies to promote
respect for human rights in the closed country. The administration
remains deeply concerned by the humanitarian situation in North Korea
and is committed to ensuring any humanitarian assistance benefits the
most vulnerable populations, including pregnant women, children, and
the elderly in detention, in North Korea, and not the Kim Jong Un
regime. The administration will continue to press for monitoring and
access necessary to ensure the assistance reaches its intended
recipients. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on
this crucial issue.
Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new
Special Representative for North Korea? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to join the administration's ongoing
review, in consultation with our allies, of the current state of play
on North Korea. I am not aware of any new personnel announcements at
this time.
Question. Do you agree that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
of 2015 (INARA) is permanent law and is binding on the Biden
administration?
Answer. The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) is binding
law. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is committed to
implementing all of the requirements of INARA.
Question. Do you agree that any agreement-including any annexes or
any informal agreement, even an unwritten oral understanding-involving
the United States and Iran regarding how the two countries will return
to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or
will move in the direction of returning to compliance with the JCPOA
must be submitted to Congress for review pursuant to INARA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
submitted under INARA in 2015 and underwent close Congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the
requirements of INARA are satisfied, including with respect to the
transmission requirement.
Question. Are you personally committed to ensuring that Congress
will be able to review, pursuant to INARA, any agreement that is
hereafter reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran-
irrespective of the level of formality or of the politically or legally
binding nature of such agreement-including any agreement providing for
return to compliance with the JCPOA, as well as any agreement that
amends, augments, or supersedes the JCPOA?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) and to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied, including its
transmission requirement.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the
President to submit a report to Congress not less frequently than every
180 calendar days ``on Iran's nuclear program and the compliance of
Iran with [each such new agreement] during the period covered by the
report''?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including its reporting requirements.
Question. Do you agree that, should any new agreement or agreements
be reached with Iran relating to the nuclear program of Iran, including
a decision to participate again in the JCPOA, INARA will require the
President to make a determination and certification to the appropriate
congressional committees and leadership not less than every 90 calendar
days regarding Iran's compliance with each such new agreement?
Answer. I am aware of this provision of the Iran Nuclear Agreement
Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to fully consulting
with Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as
called for under INARA and to ensuring that the requirements of INARA
are satisfied, including the requirement to determine whether to make
the certification called for in Section 135(d)(6).
Question. Can you provide an assurance that there are no
circumstances under which the Biden administration will not abide by
the understandings about compliance with INARA spelled out in your
responses to the foregoing questions?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to implementing all of the requirements of Iran Nuclear
Agreement Review Act (INARA). If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. When you were negotiating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) during the Obama administration, were you aware at the
time that the Iranian regime was concealing a nuclear weapons archive?
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. The Government of
Israel revealed the existence of this undeclared, covert nuclear
weapons archive in April 2018.
Answer. No. However, the United States and others were well aware
of Iran's long history of concealment regarding elements of its nuclear
program, especially as related to its past military dimensions. That is
why we worked with our allies and partners to ensure that the JCPOA
provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated,
including to investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear material
or activities in Iran, as well as any information that came to light
after implementation of the JCPOA. President Biden has made clear he is
committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program,
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities
in Iran.
Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama
administration, were you aware that the Iranian regime was storing
undeclared nuclear material at a warehouse reportedly called
Turquzabad? I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no. In May
2020, the State Department noted that in late 2018 ``public allegations
surfaced that Iran had been hiding material and equipment at a site in
Tehran called Turquzabad, only three miles from where the infamous
`nuclear archive' had been stored.''
Answer. No. The Turquzabad site was first publicly disclosed by
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in late 2018. To date, the IAEA has
detected particles of chemically processed uranium at the undeclared
location but has not yet made any conclusion regarding the potential
storage of nuclear material there. The IAEA continues to investigate
the source of the detected particles. The JCPOA provides the most
intrusive verification procedures ever negotiated, including to
investigate any indications of undeclared nuclear materials or
activities in Iran, and the administration has made clear its strong
support for the IAEA's investigation of safeguards-relevant information
that has come to light after implementation of the JCPOA.
Question. When you were negotiating the JCPOA during the Obama
administration, were you aware of any other undeclared sites under the
control or influence of the Iranian regime where nuclear material may
be present?
Answer. Iran has a long history of denial and concealment regarding
its past nuclear weapons program. The JCPOA addressed potential
undeclared locations by providing for the most intrusive verification
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has
made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a
nuclear weapon.
The IAEA has made clear that it takes no information provided by
Iran on its nuclear program at face value. The IAEA has previously
reported that it found evidence of possible military dimensions of
Iran's program to be credible, and that a ``range of activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device were
conducted in Iran prior to the end of 2003 as a coordinated effort, and
some activities took place after 2003.'' The administration will not
take Iran at its word regarding assertions about its nuclear program,
and fully supports the IAEA as it uses its verification authorities to
investigate any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities
in Iran.
Question. Did your Iranian regime counterparts disclose to you the
existence of its nuclear weapons archive, the Turquzabad site, or any
other undeclared Iranian regime nuclear-related site during the
negotiations for the JCPOA?
Answer. Iran has never acknowledged its past nuclear weapons
program. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure Iran never again pursues
nuclear weapons and provides the most intrusive verification procedures
ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. President Biden has made clear
he is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. President Biden says he will rejoin the JCPOA if the Iran
regime first returns to ``full compliance'' with the JCPOA. Can the
Iranian regime be in full compliance with the JCPOA if it is concealing
undeclared nuclear material, sites, and/or activities?
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to strict limits on
its nuclear program as well as enhanced verification and monitoring
measures that go beyond its obligations under its safeguards agreement.
The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification procedures ever
negotiated, including to investigate any indications of undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in Iran. It is critical that Iran
comply with both its safeguards obligations and its JCPOA commitments.
President Biden has made clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran
never acquires a nuclear weapon.
Question. Is it your view that Iran must fully and verifiably
account for all of its undeclared activities, sites, and materials
before the United States would rejoin the JCPOA and lift any sanctions?
I request you to begin your answer with a yes or no.
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. The JCPOA provides the most intrusive verification
procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any indications of
undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The Biden-Harris
administration strongly supports the IAEA's ongoing investigation in
Iran into indications of possible undeclared nuclear material and,
along with the rest of the international community, awaits the IAEA's
conclusions in its ongoing safeguards investigations while expecting
full Iranian cooperation with inspectors. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon.
Question. During your nominations hearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on March 4, 2021, you acknowledged that you had met
with senior officials of the Iranian regime-a regime that is a U.S.-
designated State Sponsor of Terrorism-during your time out of
government. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via phone, e-mail,
text exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017,
and today? I request that you begin your response with a yes or no. If
yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. Besides in-person meetings, have you otherwise been in
contact with any Iranian regime officials, including via e-mail, text
exchange, or secure messaging platforms, between January 20, 2017, and
today? If yes, please identify dates of contact and the text of the
exchanges.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, since January 2017 I have
not had additional contact with Iranian officials beyond the meetings
discussed, other than to arrange logistical details for those in-person
meetings. I do not have records of those exchanges.
Question. In ``The Total Destruction of U.S. Foreign Policy Under
Trump'' (Foreign Policy, July 31, 2020), you wrote: ``As a result of
Trump's failures, the Middle East is further from peace..'' But soon
thereafter, in September 2020, Israel signed the Abraham Accords that
normalized bilateral relations with the United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain, respectively. In December 2020, Morocco signed the Abraham
Accords with Israel. And in January 2021, Sudan also signed the Abraham
Accords with Israel. What is your current assessment about the Trump
administration's efforts to promote peace and normalization agreements
between Israel and Arab nations? And what steps will you support to
further the Abraham Accords peace process in the Middle East?
Answer. The 2020 normalization agreements are an important
contribution to peace and security in the Middle East. The Biden-Harris
administration will seek to build on the agreements to expand the
circle of peace between Israel and its neighbors. If confirmed, the
administration will also closely monitor the status of the
normalization efforts to date, encouraging the states that have signed
such agreements with Israel to uphold their commitments to establish
full diplomatic relations with Israel.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that if the United
States decides to participate again in the JCPOA, you will seek to
prevent the Iranian regime or any other Iranian entity from being
allowed to export oil to Syria either in defiance of U.S. sanctions
under Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, Executive Order 13894,
Executive 13582, and other relevant authorities, or by receiving a
waiver or license to do so?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is under no illusions about
Iran's destabilizing activities in the region, nor has it forgotten
about the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime. The Biden-Harris
administration is committed to countering the threat posed by Iran,
using the various tools at its disposal, including sanctions, and
working in close coordination with our allies and partners. If
confirmed, I commit that I will seek to enforce fully U.S. sanctions
with respect to Syria.
Question. Will the Biden administration maintain existing sanctions
designations against the Assad regime and continue imposing new
sanctions designations against the Assad regime? The Caesar Syria
Civilian Protection Act has imposed significant economic pressure
against the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad. Before January 2021,
the U.S. Government imposed more than 100 sanctions designations
against the Assad regime and its supporters since June 2020. Under the
Biden administration, the U.S. Government has not yet imposed any new
sanctions designations against the Assad regime and its allies.
Answer. The Caesar Act is an important tool, which seeks to limit
the ability of Assad and others in the Syrian Government to profit from
the ongoing conflict and any post-conflict reconstruction. Sanctions
are also one way to press for accountability from the Assad regime for
its atrocities, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against
humanity. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure U.S.
sanctions do not unnecessarily impede humanitarian access in Syria and
that they remain targeted in a way that contributes to progress toward
our political objectives.
Question. Does the Biden administration intend to appoint a new
Special Envoy for Syria? If not, why not? Since closing the U.S.
Embassy in Damascus in February 2012, the U.S. Government has
maintained a Special Envoy for Syria to oversee diplomatic activities
concerning Syria. The Biden administration has not appointed a new
Special Envoy for Syria since the previous envoy left office in January
2021, leaving the position vacant.
Answer. I understand that the State Department does not have any
appointments or nominations to announce at this time, but I am assured
there is a very experienced team in place working on these issues. If
confirmed, I will continue to advance our policy goals in Syria, which
include achieving a comprehensive political resolution that addresses
the factors that drive violence and instability in Syria, under the
parameters of UNSCR 2254 and in close consultation with our allies,
partners, and the UN; ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS; and
promoting the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid to Syrians in
need.
Question. Energy revenues account for approximately 80 percent of
Russia's exports, and the conclusion of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2)
pipeline would provide a financial boon for Russia's Putin regime. At
the same time, Nord Stream 2 pipeline-if finished-would drastically
increase Russia's malign influence and coercive leverage over Europe
especially by exposing Central and Eastern European allies to potential
supply cutoffs and price manipulation by Russia. Does the State
Department continue to publicly maintain that Nord Stream 2 is a
Russian malign influence project? This has been the position of the
U.S. Government, including the Secretary of State and the State
Department, for the last few years.
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear that Nord
Stream 2 is a geo-political project that threatens Europe's energy
security. If confirmed, I support publicly addressing the ongoing
threats to energy, geopolitical security, and European solidarity posed
by Nord Stream2. Nord Stream 2 is a clear example of a tool that Russia
uses for coercive actions in the region and provides the means to use
gas, a critical natural resource, to advance its political goals and
spread its malign influence within Europe.
Question. Why has the State Department not yet imposed sanctions
against NS2 AG itself pursuant to mandatory sanctions against
Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA)? NS2 AG expressly describes
itself on its website as the ``project company established for
planning, construction and subsequent operation of the Nord Stream 2
Pipeline. The company is based in Zug, Switzerland and owned by Public
Joint Stock Company (PJSC) Gazprom.''
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use all available tools to
counter Russian malign influence, to work with Allies and partners in
the region, and to support Transatlantic energy security goals. I
understand the Department of State is continuing to examine entities
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate
additional persons as appropriate. The administration has made clear to
Germany and other European partners that it does not view Nord Stream 2
as just a commercial deal, but as a threat to Europe's energy security
to strategic stability on the continent.
Question. During the Trump administration, the United States worked
closely with the Government of Japan to facilitate an expedited process
for Foreign Military Sales. Based on that experience, has the State
Department created a best practices template or manual to facilitate
and expedite further Foreign Military Sales to allies and partners?
Please begin your answer with yes or no.
Answer. While the Department has not developed a specific manual or
template for expediting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to allies and
partners, the State Department adjudicates almost all FMS cases within
48 hours. The Department also continually works with interagency
colleagues and our foreign partners to facilitate and streamline the
FMS process. If confirmed, I will ensure the FMS process works as
smoothly as possible to advance the interests of the United States and
for the benefit of our allies and partners around the world.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. U.S. consulates are a key tool for engaging with local
populations, and I am concerned that the closures of the Vladivostok
and Yekaterinburg consulates will negatively impact our ability to
engage with the Russian people in those areas. What impact will the
closures of those two consulates have on our ability to engage with
Russians in those regions? If confirmed, how will you ensure that the
U.S. continues to engage directly with the Russian people in these
regions?
Answer. At this time, there has been no permanent change to the
consulates' posture. Engaging with Russians, especially those outside
Moscow, is critical to diplomacy. U.S. consulates provide a valuable
platform to convey the deep concerns President Biden has expressed
about the Russian Government's continued efforts to suppress freedom of
expression and peaceful assembly, and to share our values and insights
from the U.S. experience in democracy. During the pandemic, Mission
Russia has adopted a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid
engagements to maintain a connection with these audiences. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing, and finding ways to expand,
the Department's virtual engagement.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to advocate for the
release of locally employed consulate staff who remain unjustly
detained in the aftermath of the Turkish coup attempt?
Answer. The Department of State continues to press the Government
of Turkey on behalf of Mission Turkey's three wrongfully accused
locally employed (LE) staff, including by supporting their legal cases
and by calling for their releases and exonerations. Senior Department
and Mission Turkey officials have publicly and privately condemned the
unjust prosecution and conviction of these employees in discussions
with senior Turkish officials, and the Department continues to call for
the swift release of the employee who remains in detention. Department
personnel regularly consult with the LE staff and their families, who
remain appreciative of USG support, and respect their concerns that
public USG statements are more likely to damage than assist their
cases.
Question. More than four years after U.S. personnel overseas began
suffering from a set of mysterious but in many cases debilitating
symptoms, we have more questions than answers about who was behind
these attacks, what the ongoing threat may be to personnel, and, going
forward, what we need to do to protect diplomats and others serving
overseas. Do I have your commitment to engage fully on this issue, to
be transparent with this committee, and to work with relevant
interagency partners to provide Congress all relevant information about
these attacks?
Answer. Yes.
Question. The Department of State faced deep budget cut proposals
every year under the Trump administration. And, as they say, ``if you
show me your budget, I'll tell you your priorities.'' Congress pushed
back repeatedly against these proposed cuts. But they were proposals
that never should have been made to begin with. Do I have your
commitment that you will seek and fight for a full and robustly-funded
Function 150 International Affairs budget?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure
a function 150 budget that will allow us to ``make diplomacy the tool
of first resort for U.S. statecraft to achieve the administration's top
foreign policy priorities,'' as the Secretary said on March 3. If
confirmed, I will advocate for the necessary investments in our people
and programs to support and cooperate with our allies and partners
around the world to advance our interests and build back better,
including by furthering the democratic values of prosperity, freedom,
and peace.
Question. The Department of State has remained perilously behind
the curve when it comes to tech innovation and cyber security. The
recent SolarWinds hack is a stark reminder of the high risk of
vulnerabilities in government systems. What do you see as the immediate
priorities for State's cyber infrastructure? What steps will the
Department take in the future to prevent such intrusions and to
mitigate the damage where these intrusions do occur?
Answer. The SolarWinds supply chain compromise is a serious
cybersecurity issue for the federal government and private sector
companies. Cybersecurity remains of paramount importance and if
confirmed I intend to support the Department's efforts to protect and
maintain its cyber infrastructure. These efforts are focused on
dedicated investments in infrastructure, talent, and planning to ensure
the security and resilience of the Department's networks and digital
assets, thereby protecting its global workforce and the citizens we
serve. We must also ensure that the Department's internal governance
structure for cybersecurity is properly aligned to protect the
Department's networks.
Question. How is the Department cooperating and coordinating with
other relevant USG agencies and offices to address the intrusion and to
repair any damage?
Answer. While a full assessment of the incident is ongoing, I will,
if confirmed, support the Department's continued cooperation and
coordination with the joint Cyber Unified Coordination Group in
addressing the SolarWinds vulnerability. It is critical that the
federal government also work with private sector partners to address
the ever-expanding landscape of threats.
Question. In September 2020, State's Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) identified $200 million spent on Trans-Sahara
Counterterrorism Partnership programs as potentially wasteful spending
due to mismanagement and inadequate oversight from staff in the Africa
Bureau. The OIG found that, among other contributing factors, the
Africa Bureau continuously experiences staffing shortages, and that the
State Department has not appropriately prioritized the Africa Bureau's
needs. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources, what will you
do to ensure that the Africa Bureau has adequate resources and staff,
including a properly skilled, trained, and incentivized workforce
equipped to meet the bureau's needs and objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of African
Affairs to ensure it has the resources, including personnel, necessary
to meet the bureau's objectives. I recognize that the Bureau of African
Affairs is chronically understaffed both in terms of positions and
vacancies. If confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the
world to ensure that our embassies and bureaus are adequately staffed
to meet our duties and advance our interests. Staffing must be aligned
with our most pressing interests, including oversight of critical
programs like the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If
confirmed, I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to
ensure that our vacancies are filled, which would address elements of
the OIG report related to field-based oversight.
Question. I understand that our embassy in Niger lacked both a
political officer and an economic officer for months on end, at a time
when that country was preparing for historic elections, chairing the
Economic Community of West African States regional bloc, and engaging
in counterterrorism operations in the increasingly insecure Sahel.
Similarly, despite an armed uprising and a recent contentious election,
our embassy in the Central African Republic reportedly lacks a
political officer. As Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources,
what will you do to ensure that hard to fill posts, especially in
Africa, are appropriately staffed by qualified Foreign Service
Officers?
Answer. The Department offers a number of incentives for employees
to serve voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship
differential payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when
appropriate. Service need differential provides an additional 15
percent of salary for employees who agree to serve an extra year at
posts that are particularly difficult to staff. There are also
procedural incentives, such as the ability to take ``stretch''
assignments into higher-ranking positions that may offer more
challenging work and greater opportunities for promotion. If confirmed,
I will continue to review these incentives and calibrate them to
America's national interests overseas.
Question. There are long-standing concerns among career civil
service employees that the Department is ``designed'' for the career
foreign service, with few career advancement pathways for the career
civil service. The lack of such pathways can mean that the Department
loses talent to outside industries or to another office or bureau with
higher-graded positions available. How will you address these long-
standing concerns among career civil service employees, and create
intentional and transparent pathways to career advancement?
Answer. I am committed to listening to the workforce and ensuring
we retain high performers by investing in their professional
development and strengthening programs that mentor individuals for
success, provide actionable feedback on performance, chart career
progression, provide more interagency and other detail opportunities,
and create viable pathways for those in the Civil Service who aspire to
advance their careers. I support efforts to expand existing career
development and detail opportunities for Civil Service employees.
Question. Some of the most successful businesses in the world have
developed extensive employee training and career-long mentoring
programs. The Department has a renowned facility in the Foreign Service
Institute that plays a critical role in training both foreign and civil
service employees. Unfortunately, there are very few classes focused on
developing the management skills necessary to maximize the morale and
effectiveness of Department employees. Do you believe the Department
should develop a more robust management training initiative to ensure
that sound management skills are viewed as a necessary skill not just
for ``management-coned'' foreign service officers?
Answer. Yes, I believe that management skills should be widely
taught to all of our foreign affairs professionals, and that all
training should reinforce the leadership skills needed to build up
employees' morale and effectiveness. If confirmed, I will continue to
promote FSI's commitment to providing world class training to employees
across the Department. I will work to ensure FSI remains committed to
seeking additional ways to expand its reach in these crucial areas.
Question. Do you commit to reviewing existing management trainings
and reporting back to the committee with recommendations for
improvement?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to a full review of current
management skills training at FSI and will report back to the committee
with recommendations for improvement as necessary.
Question. A recent survey of executive-level staff at the State
Department conducted by Executive Women at State found concerning
trends that inhibit career advancement for women. More than half of the
respondents ranked 15 of the 22 barriers measured in the survey as
having a huge or significant impact on the advancement of women at the
Department; 75 percent of respondents described gender-related bias as
having substantial impact on their careers. Do you commit to reviewing
this report and its recommendations, and prioritizing a review of how
the Department can reduce barriers for women to increase retention and
help more women serve in senior roles?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review this report, and will work to
build upon the Department's ongoing initiatives and framework to
increase flexibilities and support for our workforce. The Department
instituted a number of policy changes designed to advance equal
opportunity for women in the workforce and address barrier concerns
raised by affinity groups and associations. In line with the
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' if confirmed, I
commit to the Department's undertaking of further analysis to explore
barriers to equal advancement for women and what remedies can be taken
to mitigate those barriers to support the retention and career
advancement of women at the State Department.
Question. It is no secret that the Department's morale has sunk to
historic lows over the past several years under President Trump and
Secretary Pompeo. Secretary Blinken has already made great strides in
addressing distrust and improving morale at the Department, but much
work remains to make sure that the Department's workforce is empowered
and trusted to carry out its critical diplomatic work. What steps will
you take to rebuild the morale of the people who serve at the
Department and to ensure the Department has a workforce that is
supported and empowered to carry out their mission to the best of their
abilities?
Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S.
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys. The
report issued by your committee last July, ``Diplomacy in Crisis,''
also chronicles the decline in morale at the Department, among other
things. That said, the nearly 77,000 State Department employees
worldwide remain resilient. If confirmed, I am committed to improving
the State Department to advance our security and prosperity, including
by investing in a diplomatic corps that fully represents the United
States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting,
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to officers
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who
represent the diversity of the country we represent. I will spare no
effort, if confirmed, to ensure their safety and well-being and demand
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan
workplace.
Question. Last year, I published a report, Diplomacy in Crisis,
which laid out the challenges facing the Department's workforce. It
cited employee survey data that showed some disturbing trends-for
example, steep increases in the number of staff who said they feared
reprisal or retribution if they were to report a violation of law. Does
that concern you, and how do you plan to reverse that culture?
Answer. I reviewed the committee's report prior to the confirmation
hearing. These findings do concern me. I agree that retaliation for
participating in the EEO process or anti-harassment program, requesting
a reasonable accommodation, or for opposing discriminatory practices is
unlawful, grounds for discipline, and counter to good management;
employees do best when they have the ability to speak up and help the
Department improve. The release of the forthcoming Diversity and
Inclusion Strategic Plan will help guide a collective action approach
to, among other things, fostering a culture that encourages people to
speak up. If confirmed, as a senior leader in the Department, this work
will be a priority.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular
presence and where diplomatic engagement proved critical to securing
access for global health experts on the one hand and the evacuation of
American citizens on the other. Who is responsible for the execution of
U.S. foreign policy at overseas posts, including diplomatic engagement
to advance U.S. global health security interests in countries of all
income categories: the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), or the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC)?
Answer. At every overseas mission, the chief of mission is
responsible for the execution of U.S. foreign policy. Multiple agencies
have personnel on the ground under chief of mission authority, and the
State Department works closely with all relevant agencies to deliver on
our robust U.S. Government foreign policy objectives.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to organize and resource
the Department to advance the global health security and diplomacy
objectives of the United States overseas?
Answer. The Department of State is firmly committed to using
diplomacy to advance global health security objectives. The Department
has already begun to mobilize an international response to COVID-19
with an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi, which will support
COVAX, along with a pledge to provide an additional $2 billion through
2022. The State Department's efforts to address the full range of
global health security threats are facilitated by the close
coordination of bureaus across the Department and the interagency. I
understand the State Department is reviewing options to structure its
response to meet critical policy objectives and, if confirmed I look
forward to being part of these efforts and working with Congress as
planning progresses.
Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized is vital to the effective
planning and execution of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) programs. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State
Department-led COP process is restored and that the implementing
agencies--USAID and CDC--adhere to such plans without unwarranted
delays or deviations?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is fully committed to and
supportive of PEPFAR. On March 5, 2021, the Department announced plans
for the COP/ROP 2021 planning process to resume on April 1, 2021, and
conclude no later than May 21, 2021. If confirmed, I will be firmly
committed to ensuring that collaborative, transparent, and data-driven
COP/ROP 2021 plans are completed in every PEPFAR-supported country and
region and that there is no disruption in HIV services at the start of
FY 2022. Following COP/ROP 2021 approvals, I understand that PEPFAR
will move expeditiously through the required processes of Congressional
notifications, approvals, and transfer of funds to implementing
agencies in advance of the beginning of FY 2022.
Question. During his confirmation process, this committee asked
Secretary Blinken: ``Under your leadership as Secretary of State, what
actions will you pursue to ensure that hard-to-fill posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently staffed?'' On January
19, he replied in writing: ``If confirmed, I will work with the White
House and relevant State Department bureaus and offices to ensure that
all posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and consistently
staffed with the appropriate personnel.'' Secretary Blinken's response
was insufficient because it merely re-phrased the question into an
answer and was non-specific on any action reflecting a change in
priority from previous administrations. What do you view as the most
pressing management and staffing challenges facing the Department's
Bureau of African Affairs?
Answer. Advancing the State Department's diplomatic agenda and
implementing innovative, effective foreign assistance programs depends
on its personnel. The Bureau of African Affairs has been chronically
understaffed both domestically and overseas, impeding the Department's
ability to achieve the administration's goals, as well as to seize
opportunities when they appear. Staffing must be aligned with our most
pressing interests, including oversight of critical programs like the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. If confirmed I will explore
enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including those in
Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our vacancies are
filled.
The Department offers a number of incentives for employees to serve
voluntarily in difficult locations. These include hardship differential
payments of 5 percent to 35 percent, and danger pay when appropriate.
Service need differential provides an additional 15 percent of salary
for employees who agree to serve an extra year at posts that are
particularly difficult to staff. There are also procedural incentives,
such as the ability to take ``stretch'' assignments into higher-ranking
positions that may offer more challenging work and greater
opportunities for promotion. If confirmed, I will continue to review
these incentives and calibrate them to America's national interests
overseas.
Question. What specific actions will you prioritize in your role to
ensure that the Africa Bureau's staffing efforts focus on building
regional expertise, diversity, and preparedness so the Department can
sufficiently and consistently staff hard-to-fill posts in Africa?
Answer. I recognize that the Bureau of African Affairs is
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If
confirmed, I will review the State Department's staffing levels around
the world to ensure that staffing is aligned with its most pressing
interests. I will explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship
posts, including those in Africa, and will look for other ways to
ensure that our vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive
workplace and, if confirmed, will support the Bureau of African
Affairs' efforts as they work to implement management reforms for
recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Question. Recently, legal restrictions--commonly referred to as
``section 889''--have gone into effect that severely limit the types of
telecommunications networks that U.S. Government departments and
agencies can use overseas. These restrictions were an attempt to combat
the Chinese Government's sale and use of Chinese companies'
technological networks and equipment in other countries to engage in
espionage. However, many countries' networks are so saturated by
prohibited telecommunications equipment that complying with section
889, absent a waiver, may limit the ability of our posts to operate
abroad. How do you assess the burden placed on the Department by these
restrictions?
Answer. Compliance with FY 2019 NDAA Section 889 places an extreme
burden on the Department's ability to conduct diplomacy in those
nations where access to trusted networks is limited or non-existent.
The current ODNI national security interest waivers mitigate the impact
of Section 889, enabling the State Department to continue to supply its
posts with critical services. There are parts of the world where it is
unlikely that any trusted vendor will be available. Current ODNI
waivers expire in 2022. Without waiver extensions, changes to the
compliance regimen, or unforeseen technical solutions, the Department
will be severely impacted in its ability to conduct diplomacy overseas.
Question. Do you believe that the Department should be able to
implement these restrictions fully without diminishing its ability to
operate abroad?
Answer. While I strongly support the intent of Section 889 of the
2019 NDAA, I understand that the current global market upon which the
Department relies cannot meet the provision's requirements without
waivers while continuing to accomplish the Department's mission. Absent
a waiver, critical mission area activities will cease or be seriously
hindered.
Question. Are there costs associated with these restrictions?
Answer. As a result of the ODNI approved waivers, I understand that
the initial cost of compliance has been manageable and mainly focused
on administrative workloads. As alternatives and compliant sources are
identified overseas, it is anticipated the cost of compliance will
increase when transitioning overseas acquisitions to compliant
services.
Question. Would the Department be able to operate without the
waivers currently granted by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) to the Department?
Answer. I understand that the Department of State would not be able
to operate without the waivers currently granted by the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI). ODNI granted nine waivers under section
889(d)(2) until September 30, 2022, to allow the Department to continue
contracting activities that would otherwise be prohibited under section
889(a)(l)(B). I understand that these waivers cover not only
contracting for telecommunications services, but also contracting for
security services and equipment and many other programs and services
vital to the Department and potentially impacted by the breadth of
section 889(a)(1)(B).
The Department will make use of these waivers until an offeror
attests itself eligible under section 889(a) or until alternative
sources eligible under section 889 can be identified and contractual
arrangements and necessary transitions implemented.
Question. Do you plan to request an extension of waivers?
Answer. Without change to the current compliance requirements, I
understand that the Department must pursue extensions of all waivers
granted by ODNI. I am committed to protecting U.S. telecommunications
and, if confirmed, will work across government agencies and in the
international community to adopt networks based on trusted supply
chains
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to find a long-term
solution that ensures secure, reliable communications while encouraging
foreign governments to move away from prohibited technological
networks?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support the intent of the FY 2019 NDAA
Section 889 and concur that steps must be taken to contract with safe,
reliable, and secure services. If confirmed, I will continue to engage
with the Department's interagency partners to develop a unified long-
term solution.
Question. One troubling trend my staff and I have identified during
our travels over the previous Congress is that many of our diplomats
are not getting out from behind embassy walls and meeting with the
local population or even other diplomats. Frequently, we are told that
the security requirements are too great to support regular traverses to
and from embassy compounds. This intolerance of reasonable, voluntary
risk sacrifices advancement of U.S. interests for airtight security and
keeps our diplomats from being able to do their jobs. Does the
inability of State Department diplomats to leave the embassies at which
they are currently stationed put the Department at a strategic
disadvantage?
Answer. Consistent in-person outreach remains essential to
advancing U.S. foreign policy goals. Doing this work requires a
diplomatic presence in some of the most difficult and dangerous
environments in the world. The Department of State continues to
prioritize people-to-people engagement and relationships while taking
into account a wide range of threats, including the unique local
circumstances at each post. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing
the Department's current overseas operating posture and consulting with
Congress and internal Department stakeholders such as the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security to determine if current laws and our policies to
mitigate operational risk should be modified.
Question. Do Chinese, Russian, and Iranian diplomats face similar
restrictions to those placed on U.S. diplomats?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to answer the question of
exactly what restrictions are now being placed on Chinese, Russian, and
Iranian diplomats.
Question. Do you support getting our diplomats back outside posts?
If yes, how so?
Answer. The Department of State strives to provide the most secure
environment possible for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy while
acknowledging that there is never a guarantee of complete safety. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) makes every effort to ensure that
the Department's personnel and contractors are aware of potential risks
and trained accordingly. State Department employees understand the
risks but face them every day to advance U.S. national security and
foreign policy interests on behalf of the American people. If
confirmed, I will work with the DS to maximize the ability of our
diplomats to work outside posts whenever possible through effective
risk mitigation and management decisions.
Question. Do you intend to emphasize to the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, regional security officers, and chiefs of mission your desire
to do so? If yes, what specific steps will you take?
Answer. Engaging diplomatically outside posts whenever possible is
paramount to the success of the Department. If confirmed, I intend to
work closely with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to ensure our
foreign affairs community can effectively achieve U.S. foreign policy
goals with an acceptable level of risk.
Question. Should security concerns always take precedence over the
ability of our diplomats to operate abroad?
Answer. Security conditions faced by our foreign affairs community
overseas evolve, but the need to operate globally and carry out the
State Department's diplomatic mission remains constant. If confirmed, I
commit to ensuring the Department routinely assesses the threat
environment in which its people live and work, mitigating risk with all
the tools at our disposal, and making informed risk management
decisions. My objective will always be to ensure personnel working in
the Department's diplomatic missions overseas are able to carry out
their duties in as safe and secure an environment as possible.
Question. How should diplomatic objectives be weighed in relation
to security concerns, particularly with regard to embassy security?
Answer. I understand that the Department uses a variety of
policies, training, and techniques to weigh diplomatic objectives in
relation to security concerns. The Department sets a high baseline of
security practices for all personnel and diplomatic facilities wherever
they are located. If confirmed, I intend to continuously review and
improve the Department's global security standards without sacrificing
our ability to effectively fulfill our diplomatic mission.
Question. Between late 2016 and May 2018, the State Department
found that certain U.S. Embassy community members suffered a series of
unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues. If
confirmed, will you commit to continuing the investigation into the
circumstances surrounding the sonic attacks?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to engaging in the
ongoing investigation into circumstances surrounding the unexplained
health incidents. The Department continues to work on determining what
happened to our staff and their families and to ensure their well-being
and health going forward. There is no higher priority than the safety
and security of our U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S. citizens.
Question. Will you seek to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
diplomatic personnel in Havana and other posts where personnel have
been injured?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure the
safety and security of U.S. personnel and their families under Chief of
Mission security responsibility. The Department is working to determine
what happened to its staff and their families and to ensure the well-
being and health of our officials going forward. That investigation is
ongoing and is a high priority.
Question. Dozens of these cases were reported by personnel
stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Havana, Cuba. To date, Cuba has
refused to cooperate with investigations into these reports. Is it in
the national interest of the United States to assign an ambassador to
Cuba before the Cuban Government fully and credibly cooperates with
these investigations and explains the targeted attacks on U.S.
diplomats in Havana?
Answer. The Department of State has no higher priority than the
safety and security of U.S. personnel, their families, and U.S.
citizens. The Department continues to review its staffing posture to
ensure that Embassy Havana can continue its core mission effectively
and safely. The Department continually reminds the Cuban Government of
its obligation under the Vienna Convention to take all appropriate
steps to protect our diplomats.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to support all State
Department employees and their families who were injured by these sonic
attacks, including those employees who have since left the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting all State
Department employees and their families who were injured by these
unexplained health incidents, regardless of employment status. To
ensure that affected personnel receive the appropriate care, the
Department established the Senior Care Coordinator position to serve as
an advocate for the affected personnel and provide administrative
support including assistance in applying for workers' compensation.
This position is an advocate for all affected personnel.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work constructively with
other government agencies to find the cause of the attacks and
determine the best ways to support those U.S. Government employees who
have been injured?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to strengthening
interagency cooperation on this issue. The Department has partnered
with multiple agencies to help identify the source and cause of these
injuries. Recently, the Department designated a senior-level official
as the Senior Advisor to the Health Incidents Response Task Force who
will advise senior Department leadership and coordinate the
Department's response to the health incidents with the interagency.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly share new
information on this issue with Congress, including updates on any live
investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to regularly share new
information on this issue as appropriate.
Question. Do you support Congress passing a State Department
authorization bill?
Answer. As you might imagine, given my years working with the
President, including in his capacity as chairman of this committee, I
have been very involved in and supportive of Congressional efforts to
pass a State Department Authorization Act. If confirmed, I am committed
to working with the committee on our shared interest in strengthening
the capabilities of the Department, including through legislation as
necessary.
Question. Do you believe it is important that the Department be
explicitly authorized outside of the appropriations process?
Answer. I do think it is important. Given my past work on the staff
of the committee, I appreciate the role of the Senate Foreign Relations
committee, in considering and developing authorization legislation
pertaining to Department operations. I recall, too, the challenges
encountered at times in efforts to secure such authorization. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with the committee on legislative
proposals, particularly those providing needed authorizations.
Question. Do you believe that the role the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is important in providing congressional oversight?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you commit to making Department personnel under your
purview available for timely briefings upon request?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Department
makes available personnel who are well-positioned to be responsive to
your requests in a timely manner.
Question. In light of the massive cyber hack of the U.S. federal
Government that was reported in December 2020, how important is
cybersecurity to the State Department and U.S. diplomacy?
Answer. Cybersecurity is of paramount importance to the Department
of State. The Department needs to ensure cybersecurity is an integral
part of its efforts, including as it adopts new technologies to meet
new global diplomacy demands. The continually evolving threat to the
cyber landscape requires a dedicated investment in infrastructure,
talent, and planning to ensure the security and resilience of our
networks and digital assets while protecting its global workforce and
the citizens we serve.
Question. What cybersecurity challenges does the Department
currently face?
Answer. As with any global organization, the Department of State is
an attractive target for malicious cyber activity. Therefore, the
Department is always engaged in identifying cybersecurity threats and
taking steps to counter any threats. Cyber threat actors will likely
prioritize exploitation of the Department's maximum telework and global
posture and attempt to target remote access solutions and devices to
collect internal Department information. Threat actors will attempt to
identify and exploit any new vulnerabilities in operations.
Additionally, cyber threat actors may be more likely to target supply
chain operations against the Department's software providers, inspired
by the recent SolarWinds event. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the
Department's cybersecurity efforts are geared toward addressing these
challenges.
Question. How do you intend to improve cybersecurity at the
Department?
Answer. The Department's approach to cybersecurity is rooted in a
deep understanding of the operational nexus between malicious cyber
activity and counterintelligence threats and the need to develop
proactive solutions for managing the Department's global cyber exposure
and ensuring a safe and reliable digital environment for performing the
diplomatic mission. To proactively defend against current, emerging,
and future cybersecurity threats, the Department should continue steps
to consolidate network monitoring and infrastructure IT operations and
maintenance as well as maximize network visibility, auditing, and
configuration management. The Department must ensure rigorous
vulnerability management and swift patch deployment, while leveraging a
matrix of cybersecurity, security technology, and investigative
capabilities to detect, analyze, and defend against all cyber threats.
Question. As with any workforce, high morale among the State
Department's employees is vital to attracting and retaining talent. Is
morale at the Department a problem?
Answer. The people who work for the Department of State are
committed public servants who uphold U.S. policies to protect U.S.
citizens and their interests abroad. The marginalization and loss of
career talent over the last four years has coincided with declines in
overall employee job satisfaction in annual workforce surveys, as well
a reduction in test takers for the Foreign Service exam. That said, the
nearly 77,000 State Department employees worldwide remain resilient and
work every day to advance the interests of the American people.
Question. If yes, how do you intend to improve and maintain morale
at the Department?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to improving and maintaining a
State Department workforce that advances our security and prosperity,
including by developing a diplomatic corps that fully represents the
United States in all its talent and diversity. That means recruiting,
retaining, and providing career development opportunities to personnel
with the skills to contend with 21st century challenges and who reflect
our country's diversity. I will spare no effort, if confirmed, to
ensure their safety and well-being and demand accountability for
fostering a more diverse, inclusive and non-partisan workplace.
Question. Are there specific areas of morale (or bureaus) that you
believe need immediate attention?
Answer. I am not currently in a position to speak to this question,
but if confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to investigate the
areas and bureaus that may need urgent attention. I commit to ensuring
the safety and well-being of the entire workforce and demand
accountability for fostering a more diverse, inclusive, and non-
partisan workplace.
Question. In 2017, Congress passed a lateral entry pilot program
for the Foreign Service which the Department has yet to implement. Do
you commit to begin implementation of the program in 2021 and to design
it as Congress intended?
Answer. I understand the Department developed and planned to roll
out a new Lateral Entry Pilot Program for Foreign Service generalists
in FY 2021. Implementation was delayed for Congressional consultation
and notification requirements in the Department's annual appropriations
act and by the Department's focus on responding to the global COVID-19
pandemic. If confirmed, I commit to resume implementation of the
program when appropriate.
Question. Currently, Foreign Service oral assessments are only held
in Washington, D.C., throughout the year and once a year in San
Francisco, California. On February 24, 2021, Secretary Blinken issued a
press statement saying that, in order to effectively represent the
American people to the world, ``we must recruit and retain a workforce
that truly reflects America.'' Is geographic diversity important is
building a Department that ``truly reflects America''?
Answer. The Department administers the Foreign Service Oral
Assessment outside of Washington, D.C. twice each year, in San
Francisco in February and in Chicago in May. In addition, the
Department maintains a national recruitment platform that includes
geographic diversity in its strategic recruiting objectives. In 2020,
the recruitment team conducted 1,500 events nationwide. Secretary
Blinken is committed to increasing diversity, including geographic
diversity, at all levels through recruitment and retention as a major
priority. If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary to build a
diverse workforce that is fully representative of our Nation.
Question. Do you think making it easier and more cost effective for
Americans outside of Washington, D.C., and northern California to take
the Foreign Service oral assessments would encourage a more
geographically diverse Foreign Service?
Answer. Secretary Blinken and I are committed to building a diverse
workforce representative of the American people--including
geographically--and the Department will continue to expand the
accessibility of the Foreign Service assessment process. If confirmed,
I will dedicate resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition
and support additional innovations to attract exceptional talent. The
Department typically offers the Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside
of Washington, D.C., twice each year in San Francisco (February) and
Chicago (May). In response to COVID-19 disruptions, the Department
successfully piloted a virtual oral assessment for Specialist
candidates in June 2020. If confirmed, I will direct my team to resume
in-person oral assessments outside Washington, D.C., as soon as
conditions allow.
Question. Do you commit to expanding the number of locations where
the Foreign Service oral assessments can be administered?
Answer. COVID-19 caused disruptions to the assessment process. To
overcome this, in June 2020 the Department successfully piloted a
virtual oral assessment for Foreign Service Specialist candidates.
Although the Generalist Foreign Service Oral Assessment could not be
adapted to a virtual format, the Department's prioritization of public
health measures at the assessment facility will permit in-person oral
assessments to resume in Washington, D.C., in late March. When health
and safety conditions permit, the Department will again offer the
Foreign Service Oral Assessment outside of Washington, D.C., twice each
year, in San Francisco and in Chicago. If confirmed, I will dedicate
resources to continue modernizing talent acquisition and support
additional innovations to attract exceptional talent.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to briefing this committee on
the administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to
the constitutional and legal authority to appoint such officials?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to briefing this committee on the
administration's use of special envoys, including with respect to the
relevant appointment authorities.
Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?
Answer. Yes, I am aware that this office has been re-established in
statute, and that the law requires the administration to appoint a head
of such office to have the rank of ambassador and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. I understand that the Department is actively
reviewing these new requirements. If confirmed, I believe there will be
the opportunity for me to engage in this process, as we will want to
ensure that any such official would have the expertise and stature,
including political support, to operate effectively within the U.S.
Government and internationally.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. While a Senate staffer working for then-Senator Biden--
first in his Senate office as a foreign policy legislative assistant,
and later as chief counsel on the staff of the Committee on Foreign
Relations--I developed and executed on legislative and oversight
efforts to protect and enhance the work of U.S. international
broadcasting, which provides objective news and information to
audiences around the world. In particular:
Early in the Clinton administration, Senator Biden blocked an
effort, proposed in the first budget submitted by President
Clinton, to close Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL).
Senator Biden believed, as I did, that it was premature to
close the radio services, given that democratic governments and
traditions in Europe and Eurasia after the collapse of the
Soviet bloc were not firmly established. In that period, we
also learned from testimony by leaders such as Poland's Lech
Walesa of the power of these services during the Cold War in
sustaining dissident movements. With the regression of
democracy in the region since then, it is clear that the
decision to preserve RFE/RL was well-founded.
Based on the success of RFE/RL, Senator Biden authored the
legislation that led to the creation of a similar `surrogate'
radio service to broadcast to China and other countries in East
Asia. ``Radio Free Asia (RFA)'' was established by legislation
enacted in 1994 and initiated broadcasts in 1996. Today, the
service has a well-established reputation for its coverage of
news in the countries to which it broadcasts and has earned
numerous journalism awards. For example, in 2019, a journalist
from RFA's Uyghur service received the Magnitsky Human Rights
Award for her reporting on the humanitarian and human rights
situation in China's Xinjiang region.
When legislation was proposed to consolidate U.S. foreign affairs
agencies in the 1990s, Senator Biden insisted that the Broadcasting
Board of Governors (BBG)--then a part of the U.S. Information Agency--
be maintained as an independent agency, and not merged into the
Department of State, based on our concern that doing so would
jeopardize the journalistic integrity of the broadcasting services
supported by the BBG.
As chief counsel to the Committee on Foreign Relations, in
coordination with a human rights organization, I initiated a standard
set of questions for the record that were posed to every ambassadorial
nominee about human rights issues in the country to which they had been
nominated. We also later undertook to request follow-up reports from
the ambassadors after they had been at post for a number of months. I
believe this process helped to sensitize nominees to the importance of
these issues and ensure that they were giving priority attention to
human rights issues as part of their work.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to
championing diversity and inclusion.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure each of the
supervisors at the Department of State is fostering an environment that
is diverse and inclusive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ask those who report to me to provide
updates on their initiatives and contributions to advance diversity and
inclusion at the State Department. I will encourage leaders to
prioritize innovation and creativity across teams, ensuring that all
voices are heard and that their contributions matter. If confirmed, I
will support, empower, and work with the new Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer and bureau representatives to implement Department-
wide diversity and inclusion policies, ensure transparency of these
initiatives, and hold senior leadership accountable for progress.
Question. Do you commit to bring to the committee's attention (and
the State Department Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S.
actions that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's
business or financial interests, or the business or financial interests
of any senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules, and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any
reason to suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any of the
President's business or financial interests, or the interests of senior
White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse does not have any financial interests in a
foreign country. My investment portfolio, as set forth in my SF-278
submitted to the committee, includes mutual funds and exchange traded
funds, including a foreign stock fund, which may hold interests in
companies with an international presence, but these funds are exempt
from the conflict of interest laws. I am committed to following all
applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining vigilant with
regard to my ethics obligations. I will divest any investments the
State Department Ethics Office deems necessary to avoid a conflict of
interest.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. There is the proliferation of special envoys, who are
often political appointees, and who tend to duplicate work that should
belong to the regional bureaus and other permanent offices of the
Department. This is not to say that special envoys cannot play a role
in certain circumstances, but many career diplomats seem to think there
have been too many in recent years. If confirmed, what will you do to
streamline the Department, reduce wasteful spending, and do away with
redundant positions?
Answer. I understand that the Secretary shares your concern about
the proliferation of redundant positions. I also am aware that some
special envoy positions are required by law. If confirmed, I will work
toward accomplishing the Secretary's goals of efficient and effective
management, including by examining the Department's use of special
envoys.
Question. It is critically important that we have a Foreign Service
that is designed to meet the needs of this century. The talent we have
recruited to the Foreign Service is impressive, but I think there are
ways to further strengthen how we identify new talent and train the
workforce that we have. To meet the challenges of this century, our
Foreign Service must be structured to counter the malign influence of
the Chinese Communist Party. The new regional China officer positions
created during the last administration were a good step in this
direction. If confirmed, what would you do to shift the focus of the
Foreign Service toward developing regional expertise and advanced
language skills, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region? If the
generalist model is to be retained, are you prepared to carve out a
separate track for political and economic officers who specialize in
one region and/or critical language?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to examining the best ways to
develop and advance the skills of Department employees so they are
prepared to meet global challenges, including the challenges posed by
China. In addition to operational and leadership effectiveness,
officers wishing to get into the Senior Foreign Service must
demonstrate language proficiency. The new Professional Development
Program also gives officers the flexibility to focus on and build
expertise in a specific region.
I understand in 2020 the State Department stood up a Mandarin
Language Task Force to answer the continuing critical need for regional
expertise and advanced Chinese language skills. The task force has
already delivered an Advanced Mandarin Training Program, with students
starting in-country, in-depth language training in Summer 2021.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to an evaluation of the
personnel numbers in each region and adjust accordingly?
Answer. People are the most important State Department asset and
properly aligning them to regions and posts is essential to achieving
our mission objectives. If confirmed, I will work to make sure that the
State Department has the appropriate people in the right place at the
right time to achieve its objectives.
Question. Another perennial problem is that too many Foreign
Service officers have traditionally regarded human rights and democracy
promotion as the responsibility of civil servants in the Department of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), or USAID, but not the Foreign
Service. If confirmed, what will you do to raise the importance of
human rights and democracy issues in the Foreign Service?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have made clear that
America's cherished democratic values are at the center of this
administration's foreign policy. If confirmed, I will ensure that this
is reflected in human resources decisions as well as policy actions. I
pledge to encourage Foreign Service Officers, most of whom passionately
and skillfully carry the mantle of human rights and democracy promotion
in the execution of their duties, to serve in DRL and to elevate their
attention to these issues, wherever they serve. If confirmed, I look
forward to working to better enable Foreign Service Officers to build a
career around these important issues and to elevate the roles that
human rights and labor officers play at our embassies.
Question. I hear from married couples in the Foreign Service that
getting assignments in the same country is often difficult. It is
important that we find creative ways to keep married couples together,
both for morale reasons and to make the best use of the talent we have.
If confirmed, what will you do to support Foreign Service families and
tandem couples?
Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find
appropriate positions at the same post, while also ensuring that we
meet service need, promote career development, and follow the law such
that no advantage or disadvantage accrues to any employee on marital
status grounds. If confirmed, I will look for ways to expand workplace
flexibilities for tenured employees to increase opportunities for
tandems to serve together, including identifying aligning tours of
duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees teleworking
overseas, and identifying more opportunities for in-country language
training.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. Sluggish State Department hiring procedures--including a
pre-pandemic average of six months to complete a security clearance--
contribute to recruitment challenges and poor morale, and create
significant staffing gaps. This is particularly true overseas, where
embassies rely on spouses, known as eligible family members (EFMs), to
fulfill critical professional and support roles. These positions can be
vacant as often as one-third to one-half of the time due to the lengthy
hiring and security process. If confirmed, what will you do to address
sluggish State Department hiring procedures, particularly for eligible
family members?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support ongoing efforts of
the Department's senior leadership to re-engineer the security
clearance process for all employees, including EFMs. The government-
wide Federal Investigative Standards, implemented in 2017, has
increased the work that goes into completing background investigations,
which impacts EFM onboarding. To streamline family member employment to
fill available positions overseas, I am committed to expanding
membership in the Foreign Service Family Reserve Corps (FSFRC), where
eligible EFMs are appointed to a position that allow them to maintain
their current security clearance during gaps in employment at posts.
The FSFRC is a helpful tool in reducing the time needed to hire and
onboard EFMs overseas.
Question. The pandemic has necessitated a swift move to remote
work, highlighting possibilities for expanding the use of telework even
after the current health emergency is under control. Would you support
increasing the number of foreign and civil service domestic positions
approved for telework overseas (i.e. DETO, domestically employed
teleworking overseas) and opening them to EFMs and tandem spouses?
Answer. During the pandemic, Foreign Service personnel and employed
family members teleworked from the United States to provide remote
assistance to our missions around the world. The Department implemented
new workplace flexibilities allowing domestic employees to telework
remotely from other U.S. locations to maintain an agile workforce. In
the past five years, the Department doubled the number of both Foreign
and Civil Service DETOs, which allowed qualifying employees to perform
their domestic work overseas for a defined period of time. Family
members who encumber Civil Service and Foreign Service positions may
enter DETO arrangements to perform work from the location of their
spouse's overseas assignment. If confirmed, I will strongly support the
Department's focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities,
including telework and remote work.
Question. Would you instruct offices to re-examine policies that
permit remote telework only after several months of in-office work,
thereby eliminating eligible overseas applicants from applying?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the Department's
focus on enhancing employee workplace flexibilities, including telework
and remote work. The pandemic has reinforced the need for such
flexibilities and demonstrated that virtual work can be successful.
I understand in August 2020, the Department established a remote
work policy, which permits employees in domestic positions to work
full-time from an alternate worksite in the United States with
supervisor and bureau approvals.
Question. Would you support expanding telework to allow for
appropriate overseas positions to be filled by EFMs and tandem spouses
who are stationed in the U.S. or at other posts?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support expanding employment
opportunities overseas for spouses to work in the country to which
their employee spouse is assigned and accredited. While the Department
does not have authority to employ family members domestically using its
overseas hiring authorities, family members with prior U.S. Government
service who are currently residing in the United States may be eligible
to apply non-competitively to Civil Service positions.
Question. Being assigned to the same post is a perpetual struggle
for tandem couples. While the State Department is prohibited from
discriminating based on marital status, 3 FAH-1 H-2425.8-7(A) states
that State ``will make a reasonable effort to assign both members of a
tandem to the same post in positions appropriate to their class levels
and qualifications.'' What actions will you take to ensure that this is
implemented given current challenges that tandems face in being
assigned to the same post?
Answer. I strongly support efforts to help tandem couples find
positions at the same post that are appropriate to their skill codes,
grade levels, and qualifications, while also ensuring that no advantage
or disadvantage accrues to any employee on the grounds of marital
status. I will look for ways to expand existing and new workplace
flexibilities for tenured FS employees to increase opportunities for
tandem spouses to serve together, including identifying aligning tours
of duty, expanding positions eligible for domestic employees
teleworking overseas (DETO), and identifying more opportunities for in-
country language training.
Question. Will you work to align bidding timelines across different
components of the State Department (e.g. Diplomatic Security and
generalist/specialist cycles) and different foreign affairs agencies?
Answer. The Department has worked to bring bidding cycles in line
over the past two years for all employees. The main cycle takes place
in the fall, for positions that will be open the following summer.
There are also bidding cycles for winter vacancies, for ``priority
staffing posts'' in 11 countries, and for chiefs of mission, deputy
chiefs of mission, and principal officers. I will continue to review
the bidding cycles and process to ensure they meet our staffing and
mission requirements. Other foreign affairs agencies manage their own
bidding cycles and process to meet their mission needs.
Question. Will you direct the Entry Level Division of the Career
Development and Assignments Office to make every reasonable effort to
direct assignments for incoming officers and specialists to posts where
their tandem spouse is already serving?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct the Career Development and
Assignments Office (CDA) to follow the law when directing assignments
for entry-level employees, so that no advantage or disadvantage accrues
to any employee on the grounds of marital status. Further, if
confirmed, I will direct CDA to make reasonable efforts to assign both
members of a tandem to the same post or region within the bounds of the
law. Entry-level employees have less flexibility due to tenure
requirements and therefore are always the ``lead bidder'' when bidding
with a mid- or senior-level spouse; more flexibilities exist for mid-
and senior-level employees to align tours with an entry-level spouse.
If both tandem spouses are entry-level, CDA will direct the entry-level
employees according to service needs and career development.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Rob Portman
GEC/Global Disinformation
Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over the last 4
years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through our
efforts and have made important strides in countering global
disinformation. I think this is one of the gravest threats we face
internationally. Disinformation operations are cheap, deniable, and
when combined with economic and political subversion can be a
devastating to democracies. Thanks to the work of the GEC we now have
an effective organization that can help our allies fight back.
However, there is more work to be done to ensure that the effort is
sustained and strengthened through the work of the GEC. In particular,
I would like to see:
A sustained funding level of at least $138 million annually. At its
current amount of $60 million, the Center continues to be under
resourced, and is unable to expand into areas such as Africa
where countries desperately need our assistance.
Extension of hiring authority. It is critical that the Center be
able to retain its talent within the Department as well as
recruit outside expertise.
A commitment to continue the work of the GEC. Foreign
disinformation is a threat to our democracy and a tool our
adversaries wield against us. It is critical that we have the
resources, means, and capability to combat this threat, and the
GEC located within the Department of State is the right
organization to do it.
Question. Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and
me to continue strengthening the capabilities and funding of the GEC so
that we can continue the fight against state sponsored disinformation
campaigns worldwide?
Answer. You have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you and
your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the GEC and our full
range of public diplomacy programs so that we are better able to
counter disinformation campaigns of authoritarian regimes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. Will you commit that the Department will make a robust
State Department and USAID budget request in Fiscal Year 2022 to
address the global pandemic and its secondary impacts?
Answer. If confirmed, and to the extent that decisions have not yet
been made on the FY 2022 budget request by the time I am appointed, I
am committed to making sure that the Department requests the necessary
resources in FY 2022 to address the global pandemic and secondary
impacts on Department operations and foreign assistance. I know
Congress has already generously provided the Department with funding
and expanded authorities in FY 2020 and 2021, which protected the
health and safety of the American people and others worldwide, allowed
for the timely and efficient repatriation of Americans stationed
overseas in the early stages of the pandemic, supported global health
security and pandemic preparedness, and sustained consular operations
worldwide into FY 2021. I also understand there are significant
resources for international pandemic response efforts in the American
Rescue Plan, which the Congress is currently considering.
Question. Will you commit to the goal of working in cooperation
with our international allies to ensure that every person, regardless
of wealth, will gain access to a life-saving vaccine?
Answer. If confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's
commitment to multilateralism to surge broad and equitable global
vaccine distribution. On December 22, 2020, Congress appropriated funds
to contribute to Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance to support the procurement
and distribution of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, including
through the COVAX Advance Market Commitment to facilitate vaccine
distribution in 92 low- and middle-income countries. Last month, the
Administration announced an initial $2 billion contribution to Gavi,
and that the additional $2 billion provided by Congress will be
released as the United States works with other donors to elevate their
pledge commitments. I will encourage countries to consider vulnerable,
marginalized, and at-risk populations in their national vaccination
plans.
Question. What role can ``vaccine diplomacy'' play towards
restoring the U.S. global image?
Answer. Most countries in the world are anxious to procure COVID-19
vaccines. In addition to meeting our primary responsibility and
commitment to ensuring that all U.S. citizens have access to vaccines,
therapeutics, and other resources, the United States will also lead in
ensuring sufficient vaccines are available around the world, with a
focus on protecting communities most at risk. The United States is
supporting COVAX, a multilateral initiative to ensure equitable
distribution of vaccines. The U.S. will work to expand global
vaccination, including through encouraging others to donate to COVAX,
and will work to support efforts to mitigate secondary impacts. If
confirmed, I will work to leverage our technical, financial,
diplomatic, and other assistance to support global vaccination efforts.
Question. What steps will you take to revitalize efforts to ensure
that USG diplomatic and administrative personnel who identify as LGBTQI
are able to receive visas for themselves and their families when
assigned to U.S. diplomatic and consular facilities and bases abroad?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that all of
the Department's employees and their families are treated fairly and
equitably. For employees assigned overseas, that commitment includes
seeking accreditation, with all appropriate privileges and immunities,
for our LGBTI employees and their families. The State Department has
formed a dedicated senior working group to seek ways to gain full
recognition for our LGBTI families in those countries that do not now
extend such recognition.
Question. Will you commit to regular and personal oversight of
these efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be wholly committed to regular and
personal oversight of these efforts.
Question. I was pleased to see the recent Presidential Memorandum
on Advancing the Human Rights of LGTBQI Persons Around the World. The
memorandum outlines a leadership role for the State Department to
ensure the federal government's swift and meaningful response to
incidents which threaten the human rights of LGBTQI persons abroad.
Please articulate how you will mobilize our diplomatic corps to support
LGBTQI equality worldwide.
Answer. In accordance with President Biden's Presidential
Memorandum on Advancing the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the
world, I am committed to working closely with our diplomatic corps in
using the broad range of diplomatic and programmatic tools and
resources to promote and protect the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons.
If confirmed, I pledge to support the Department's efforts to empower
civil society and local LGBTQI+ movements; combat criminalization of
individuals on the basis of LGBTQI+ status or conduct; protect
vulnerable LGBTQI+ refugees and asylum seekers; and allow swift U.S.
responses to human rights violations of LGBTQI+ persons.
Question. How can the Department better use the insights and
talents of its affinity groups to increase outreach to minority
communities with a view to increasing diverse employment and better
connecting U.S. foreign policy programs and goals to the needs of the
American people?
Answer. The State Department encourages all employees to help
recruit diverse talent by using their professional affiliations and
networks to amplify Department career opportunities. The Department's
17 Employee Affinity Groups (EAGs) members can explain to future
colleagues their unique roles and cooperation to create a culture of
inclusion across the Department. The Department's Volunteer Recruiter
Corps, launched in January 2021, will leverage employees' diverse
insights and experiences to recruit for a more inclusive workforce;
half of the 500 participants are EAG members. Outreach from members of
underrepresented groups in the diplomatic workforce will be key to
prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a
national security imperative.
Question. Specifically, will you consider encouraging domestic
travel of U.S. diplomats, increasing the number of Pickering and Rangel
Fellows, and increasing the number of Diplomats in Residence at U.S.
colleges and universities in underserved areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I will look forward to carefully reviewing
this proposal. I will also continue the Department's efforts to build a
more diverse workforce. Currently, 16 regional Diplomats in Residence
are based around the country, including seven at Historically Black
Colleges and Universities and Hispanic Serving Institutions. In 2020,
the Department's virtual recruitment and career fairs opened new
channels to reaching candidates. A new ``sourcing unit'' will identify
highly skilled potential candidates from all backgrounds.
The Department increased the Pickering and Rangel Fellowship
Programs by 50 percent in 2020 and will welcome a newly expanded cohort
of 90 fellows in March. Additionally, in 2020, the Department recruited
a record number of fellowship candidates. The Department is considering
new fellowships to meet specialist career track hiring needs and
diversity and inclusion initiatives, as we have done for Information
Specialists with the Foreign Affairs IT Fellowship. If confirmed, I
also look forward to continuing conversations with Congress to explore
an expanded paid internship program.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. Section 15(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 states that ``The Department of State shall keep the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives fully and currently
informed with respect to all activities and responsibilities within the
jurisdiction of these committees. Any Federal department, agency, or
independent establishment shall furnish any information requested by
either such committee relating to any such activity or
responsibility.'' Can you commit to complying with this provision of
law by ensuring that information requested by members of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee is provided expeditiously and
transparently? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working with Congress and this committee
in accordance with the law to provide all information needed to perform
traditional oversight functions as promptly as possible.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. Last month the State Department transmitted a mandatory
and overdue report to Congress listing entities engaged in sanctionable
activities because of their participation in the construction of the
Nord Stream 2 (NS2) pipeline, pursuant to the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended. PEESA mandates the imposition
of sanctions on entities listed in such reports. The report included
only two entities, the Fortuna and KVT-RUS, both of which the Trump
administration had already sanctioned. It did not include any entities
which are plainly, publicly required to be listed under PEESA.
Reportedly, State Department officials who spoke to Congressional
staffers were unable to provide a justification why several entities--
including the company responsible for the planning, construction, and
operation of NS2--were left off. This abdication is inexcusable. Can
you commit to immediately ensuring the Biden administration meets its
mandatory obligation to provide an interim report to Congress pursuant
to PEESA and sanction all of the entities that are engaged in pipe-
laying, pipe-laying activities, certification, and insurance
sanctionable under PEESA? If not, why not?
Answer. The State Department submits a report to Congress every 90
days on vessels engaged in pipe-laying and pipe-laying activities, and
various entities providing and supporting those vessels, for the Nord
Stream 2 pipeline, as required by the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA), as amended, with the next report due to Congress
in mid-May. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to counter
Russian malign influence and to work with Allies and partners in the
region to support Transatlantic energy security goals. The Department
of State will continue to examine entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as
appropriate.
Question. One of the most egregious dynamics in the initial
implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)
involved the way that the Obama administration circumvented
Congressional deliberation and approval by first attempting to lock in
the agreement as international law via United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR 2231). After that resolution was passed--which
occurred just as the Congressional review period mandated by the Iran
Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA) was beginning--officials from the
Government of Iran and the Obama administration suggested that Congress
would be abrogating the U.S.'s formal international obligations by
rejecting the agreement. Can you commit to ensuring that any future
nuclear agreement negotiated between State Department officials and
Iran, which involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional
sanctions, will only be negotiated in full consultation with Congress?
If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting fully with Congress on
any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called for under
INARA.
Question. Can you commit to ensuring that any future nuclear
agreement negotiated between State Department officials and Iran, which
involves the suspension or waiver of Congressional sanctions, will not
be implemented without Congressional approval? If not, why not?
Answer. I am aware that the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) contains certain limitations on sanctions relief during a
congressional review period. I understand that the Biden administration
is committed to complying with the requirements of INARA, and if
confirmed, I am committed to doing so.
Question. It was recently announced that Iran and South Korea
agreed to allow Tehran to access approximately $1 billion of its assets
that are frozen in South Korean banks due to U.S. sanctions. Reports
indicate that the South Koreans received approval from Biden
administration officials to do so. Please transmit to the committee any
waivers, decision memos, or other documents pertaining to this case,
and confirm doing so.
Answer. I do not have access to Department records nor the
authority on my own to give you Department records. I commit, if
confirmed, to work with the committee to appropriately comply with an
official committee request for such Department information.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. Officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. They have not
provided an explanation for the delisting of the three leaders, and in
fact they have publicly, repeatedly, and falsely denied or downplayed
the relief provided to these Iran-backed terrorists. For example, on
February 11 State Department spokesman Ned Price falsely told
journalists ``there is no change'' to the sanctions on these
individuals. He was asked about the issue again the next day, and said
``the Secretary had an intent to remove this broad designation of the
movement.'' The public statement issued by the State Department did not
mention the revocation of the SDGT designation on the Houthi leaders,
but noted that they ``remain sanctioned under E.O. 13611.'' Can you
commit to ensuring that State Department officials stop publicly
misleading journalists and the American public about sanctions relief
provided by the Department and the Biden administration to Iran-backed
terrorists? If not, why not?
Answer. I understand that the three Ansarallah leaders in question
were designated under the U.N. Security Council's Yemen sanctions
regime in 2015 and domestically under E.O. 13611, related to acts that
threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen. Therefore, they
remain on the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions. As a consequence of the revocation of
Ansarallah's Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group
designation under E.O. 13224, there was no longer a basis to retain the
SDGT designations of these individuals as leaders of Ansarallah, which
were derivative of the broader SDGT designation of the group. If
confirmed, I intend to continue our support of U.N.-led efforts,
including a robust implementation of the U.N. and E.O. 13611 sanctions,
to call attention to and condemn Ansarallah's destabilizing activities.
The State Department's emphasis will continue to be on using diplomacy
to build international pressure on Ansarallah to change its behavior
and ultimately end the war.
Question. Please describe why the State Department lifted the SDGT
designations on Abdul Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-
Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim.
Answer. I understand that simultaneous with the designation of
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, as a Specially Designated
Global Terrorist (SDGT) under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, these
individuals were designated as SDGTs on the basis that they were
leaders of an SDGT, namely Ansarallah. As a consequence of the
revocation of Ansarallah's SDGT designation, there was no longer a
basis to retain the designations of these individuals as leaders of an
SDGT. However, they remain designated under the U.N. Security Council's
Yemen sanctions regime and domestically under E.O. 13611 related to
acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen and,
therefore, remain on Treasury's Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List and are subject to asset freezing and any
attendant travel restrictions.
Question. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI), has been designated as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SGT) pursuant to Executive Order
(EO) 13224 for providing material support to terrorist organizations.
Can you commit to not lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to
agree within the interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly
modify--this terrorism designation of the CBI, in the absence of a
determination that the CBI has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to counter Iran's support for terrorism, including through the
appropriate use of sanctions and regular coordination with our partners
and allies. Iran is the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism,
which poses a threat to security and stability in the Middle East, and
the administration will continue to use all tools available to counter
Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is
designated as a terrorist organization both as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization and as an SDGT pursuant to EO 13224. Can you commit to not
lift, rescind or significantly modify--or to agree within the
interagency process to lift, rescind or significantly modify--these
terrorism designations on the IRGC, in the absence of a determination
that the Government of Iran has ceased providing material support to
terrorist organizations.
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism threatens our forces and
partners in the region and elsewhere. If confirmed, I intend to
continue working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities in the region, including its support for
terrorist groups and violent militias and its ballistic missile
program, and maintain international, collective pressure on Iran. The
administration is committed to countering Iran's destabilizing
activities using the array of tools at our disposal, including
sanctions to deal with Iran's support for terrorism.
Question. You and other officials responsible for the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have repeatedly described it as
the most rigorous inspection regime ever negotiated. Despite this
inspection regime, the IAEA was unable to locate the illicit Nuclear
Archive subsequently seized by Israel, which included designs and
materials relevant to the creation of nuclear weapons. They were also
unable to find locations which, having been revealed by Israeli
officials, subsequently proved to have evidence of nuclear work that
the IAEA says Iran has not accounted for. Please describe what you
perceive to have been the flaws in the JCPOA inspection regime do you
believe were responsible for these failures by the IAEA?
Answer. I did not work on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
while serving in the Obama-Biden administration, but I did support the
policy decision by President Obama to conclude it. The IAEA has a
decades-long successful track record of monitoring the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material globally. While the IAEA thoroughly
investigates all available information, including based on its own
verification and monitoring activities, it is not an intelligence
organization. It can only act on information that is either acquired by
it in the performance of its verification mandates or presented to it.
The administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any
indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material that could
contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
Question. Please describe what new measures you would insist are
included in any future nuclear agreement with Iran to ensure that the
IAEA has the ability to identify such materials and activities?
Answer. The IAEA has said it has the tools it needs to perform its
verification mandates in Iran so long as Iran fully implements its
JCPOA commitments. This includes implementation of the Additional
Protocol to Iran's NPT-required safeguards agreement that provides
enhanced information and access regarding Iran's nuclear program,
including with respect to undeclared locations about which the IAEA has
questions. The JCPOA provides the IAEA with the most intrusive
verification procedures ever negotiated, including to investigate any
indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities in Iran. The
administration has full confidence in the IAEA to pursue any such
indication.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Jeff Merkley
Question. In partnership with the State Department's New Chief
Diversity Officer, what tangible steps will your office take to improve
diversity across the State Department, including at the most senior
levels of the Foreign Service?
Answer. If confirmed, I will partner with the Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer to track the progress of the Department on
performance metrics on diversity and inclusion as outlined in the soon-
to-be released Diversity and Inclusion Strategic Plan. I will hold
officers who report to me accountable to promote a culture of
inclusion--where every individual voice is heard, respected, and
valued. The Department is taking a critical look at the current
selection processes employed by the deputy chief of mission and
principal officer selection panels. If confirmed, I will encourage
hiring managers to identify opportunities that will allow the
Department to reach a wider candidate pool to include more candidates
from underrepresented backgrounds. Additionally, the Department is
finalizing an Enterprise Data Strategy which will include an initial
emphasis on supporting Department diversity and inclusion efforts.
Question. Why have women and minorities historically left the
Foreign Service at significantly higher rates than white males, and
what can you do to address that troubling trend?
Answer. Understanding why women and minorities leave the Department
is a crucial step in increasing retention. If confirmed, I intend to
ask Department experts to examine whether there is a significantly
higher rate of attrition for certain populations. Consistent with the
recommendation of the January 2020 GAO report, ``Additional Steps Are
Needed to Identify Potential Barriers to Diversity,'' I commit to the
Department's undertaking of further analysis, including as part of its
forthcoming Enterprise Data Strategy, to explore what interventions the
Department can introduce to mitigate attrition, including of
underrepresented minorities and women, ensuring the Department remains
an employer of choice. If confirmed, I will focus on bringing
accountability and transparency to this issue.
Question. Significant delays in the hiring process have impacted
the State Department's ability to bring on board talented Foreign and
Civil Service Officers, as well as local staff and family members at
many embassies abroad. Do these delays affect the State Department's
ability to deliver on its goals, and how will you approach implementing
a more efficient hiring process?
Answer. I understand in FY 2020, the Department achieved a 20-
percent reduction in Foreign Service assessment timelines, despite
disruptions caused by COVID-19. A new virtual oral assessment and a
remote-proctored Foreign Service Officer test allowed at-home testing.
The Department's Bureau of Global Talent Management (GTM) created an
entirely virtual Foreign Service onboarding process that met FY 2020-
authorized Foreign Service hiring targets, including 414 Foreign
Service staff hired virtually. The Department exceeded the Foreign
Service Specialists target by 14 percent. The Department has
experienced high Civil Service (CS) vacancy rates due to the extended
hiring freeze; however, I understand the CS hiring backlog has been
significantly reduced. If confirmed, I will dedicate resources to
continue modernizing hiring strategies and support additional
innovations to attract exceptional talent.
Question. With last year's closure of the U.S. Consulate in
Chengdu, the United States appears to be at a disadvantage in our
diplomatic reach and representation in China. How will you approach re-
positioning our diplomatic footprint in China to ensure that we have
the broadest reach, including access to parts of the country in which
we do not currently have representation?
Answer. I understand that the suspensions of operations at U.S.
Consulate General Chengdu and U.S. Consulate General Wuhan
significantly increased the workload for Embassy Beijing without adding
additional staff, and that the Department is currently reviewing
Mission China's request for additional personnel. It is important that
the Department is adequately resourced and positioned to know what is
happening inside China. If confirmed, I will review the Department's
diplomatic presence there, including whether it should resume
operations at U.S. Consulate General Wuhan.
Question. For many years, the State Department has relied on
consular fees to fund most of its basic functions, a model that proved
untenable over this last year. How will you approach working with
Congress to find a more sustainable model for funding the Department?
Answer. The consular funding structure relies on visa fees and the
growth in visa demand to fund the Department's highest priority: the
protection of U.S. citizens and their interests. The Department retains
only 83 percent of all consular fees it collects. Retained fees are
exclusively from passport and visa applications. The Department remits
the remaining consular fees, primarily for overseas citizen services,
to the Treasury. For FY 2021, Congress expanded expenditure authorities
of certain retained fees which otherwise could not be used to support
U.S. citizen services. I understand that the Bureau of Consular Affairs
may continue to need appropriations without further changes to its
fiscal structure. If confirmed, I would work with Congress to find a
solution.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian McKeon by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. In your prepared statement, you highlighted the
importance of increasing diversity in the Department of State to ensure
that it is ``fully representative of America.'' If you are confirmed,
what metrics will you develop to measure that all aspects of diversity,
to include race, gender, ideology, regional, and socioeconomic
differences are represented in the Department of State's efforts to
increase diversity?
Answer. Diversity is the key to unlocking an organization's
potential as diverse teams consistently demonstrate high performance
due to their creativity and innovation. If confirmed, I commit to
upholding and fully implementing the Department's leadership and
management tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to
strengthen teams across the Department. I will hold senior leaders
accountable for promulgating fairness and transparency in their day-to-
day decisions and will seek progress reports, working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, on their continued commitment to
championing diversity and inclusion.
In addition, I will work to ensure that our recruiting efforts
target all regions of the country. The Department is also developing a
program to begin to pay some interns, which will help our recruitment
efforts with those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged.
Question. In the era of global connectivity and greater ease of
movement, what is the purpose of an Embassy in the 21st century?
Answer. Maintaining a U.S. embassy presence allows the Department
to cultivate personal relationships around the world to advance U.S.
foreign policy, economic, and national security interests and to
support U.S. citizens abroad, such as assisting and evacuating more
than 100,000 U.S. citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. While creative
and effective pivots to virtual traditional and public diplomacy have
allowed the Department's missions to promote U.S. priorities during
COVID-19, consistent in-person outreach remains the most effective way
to achieve an understanding of host countries that strengthen our
ability to assert U.S. influence. If confirmed, I am committed to
working with Congress to ensure Department resources and personnel are
aligned to respond to 21st century challenges.
Question. Do you support reorganizing or abolishing aspects of the
Department of State to prevent redundancy and overlapping areas of
responsibility?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing the Department's
organization and aligning available resources and staffing with
strategic priorities, as well as ensuring clear lines of accountability
and responsibility. I am committed to ensuring the effective and
efficient use of U.S. taxpayer dollars.
Question. In your view, how can we reform the allocation and
selection of career Ambassadors to ensure American interests are
adequately represented?
Answer. The Department of State endeavors to ensure that U.S.
interests are strongly represented by career ambassadors who embrace
the diversity of the United States. There is a rigorous selection
process in place which focuses on the candidate's suitability, talents,
skills, abilities, and experience, and the candidate is vetted by
senior Department officials before being submitted for consideration by
the White House. These positions are highly competitive, and the
Department thoroughly reviews all qualified candidates. If confirmed, I
will review the Department's ambassadorial selection process to ensure
we are choosing the best candidates for these positions.
Question. In your view, should any Ambassador be seated who has not
met and counseled with the President of the United States?
Answer. The ambassador is the direct representative of the
President of the United States. As such, it is beneficial for the
United States for the ambassador to meet and counsel with the
President. However, that is not always possible, given the number of
ambassadors and the President's schedule. As you know from your
experience as Ambassador to Japan, ambassadors do receive a personal
letter of instruction from the President that provides them guidance
directly from the President in preparation for their assignment.
Question. In order to expand the pool of qualified candidates for
senior positions in Embassy Tokyo, specifically the position of Deputy
Chief of Mission, the Department of State previously removed as a
requirement Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4. Is there
a requirement for Japanese language proficiency at the level of 4/4 to
be eligible to apply for the position of Deputy Chief of Mission in
Embassy Tokyo? Please begin your answer with yes or no.
Answer. No. A 4/4 level in Japanese is exceedingly rare and would
exceed the working-level requirement of 3/3 for most language-
designated positions. Although having Japanese language skills is
certainly desirable, there is no specific language requirement for the
selection of the Deputy Chief of Mission in Tokyo.
__________
Additional Material Submitted
by Senator Cory A. Booker
Report by Amnesty International on the November 19, 2020 Massacre at
Axum (Ethiopia)
Massacre in the Mountains
A CNN Report on the November 2020 Massacre in
the Tigray Region of Ethiopia
[Editor's Note: The CNN report contains video material that
cannot be adapted to the formats used by the Government
Publishing Office to publish committee hearings. The report can
be accessed with the following URL:]
https://www.cnn.com/2021/02/26/africa/ethiopia-tigray-dengelat-
massacre-intl/index.html
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NOMINATION
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TUESDAY, MARCH 23, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Portman, Paul, Young, Barrasso, Cruz,
Rounds, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee will
come to order. Today we are considering the nomination of
Ambassador Samantha Power to be administrator of the United
States Agency for International Development, known to all of us
as USAID.
Ambassador Power, congratulations on your nomination. Thank
you for your willingness to return to public service. It is a
pleasure to welcome you back before the committee.
When I chaired your 2013 hearing to be U.N. Ambassador, I
said you were, quote, ``impeccably qualified for the
position.'' Your experience, drive, and dedication to the
advancement of humanitarian principles also, I believe, make
you impeccably qualified to be the next USAID administrator.
Before I go any further, I understand that our
distinguished colleague from Massachusetts, a member of the
committee, wants to introduce you this morning. So we will turn
to him first.
Senator Markey?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, Ranking
Member Risch. It is my absolute honor and pleasure to introduce
our nominee today, Ambassador Samantha Power, nominated to be
the administrator of the United States Agency for International
Development, USAID, and more importantly, a cherished
Massachusetts resident.
I would also like to welcome Ambassador Power's husband,
Cass, and their two young children, Declan and Rian, who are
right behind us here today.
Samantha is a friend, a constituent, and, of course, a
fellow Irishman--Irishwoman in her case. As noted in a New
Yorker profile of her, Ambassador Power's last name, Power,
comes from the Irish ``de paor,'' meaning ``of the poor.''
Fittingly, she has dedicated her entire life in the service of
others, using her razor-sharp intelligence and fierce advocacy
as a journalist, activist, and diplomat to stand with the
world's voiceless masses, all while simultaneously advancing
United States interests by building bonds in every corner of
our world.
Ambassador Power has been known to be ferocious in the
pursuit of justice, human rights, and democracy, always taking
the time to hear other points of view with great humility.
While she disagrees with Henry Kissinger on everything from
politics to the no-brainer debate of Red Sox versus Yankees, he
has said that Samantha, quote, ``has----
The Chairman. Do not ruin the nominee's opportunity here,
Mr. Markey.
[Laughter.]
Senator Markey. Ambassador Henry Kissinger has said that
Samantha ``has an excellent analytical mind, and even on
matters where I might have come to different conclusions, I
respected her analysis,'' perhaps the highest praise ever given
by a Yankees fan to a member of Red Sox Nation.
As an immigrant from Ireland, Ambassador Power's personal
background gives her a unique and deep respect for this country
and all it stands for. Spending time between Pittsburgh,
Atlanta, Dublin, and Boston, she received her bachelor's degree
at Yale University and went on to obtain her law degree at
Harvard University.
She served in several key positions during the Obama
administration, including as the Special Assistant to the
President, the National Security Council, Senior Director for
Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights and, notably, as the
youngest ever United States ambassador to the United Nations.
Prior to entering government service, she began her career
as a war correspondent, reporting from the seas of Sarajevo.
She became a Pulitzer Prize-winning author and served as the
founding executive director of the Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy at Harvard University.
As she takes on the important work of the challenges
Ambassador Power will face are daunting: recovering from the
global pandemic, revamping the state of global democracy,
tackling the climate crisis, and extending life-saving
assistance to the nearly 1 billion people around the world who
go to bed hungry every night.
I know of no person more qualified to take on this task.
She embodies that bold red, white, and blue USAID logo which
states ``From the American People.''
In 2015, Ambassador Power invited me to be her guest to
attend His Holiness Pope Francis' address before the United
Nations General Assembly. For two Irish Catholics from
Massachusetts, it was the experience of a lifetime.
On that day, Pope Francis spoke of the need for compassion,
inclusivity, and action in tackling the world's shared
challenges.
Ambassador Power's career personifies each of these
qualities, and I know she will take her compassion, her
inclusivity, and her unwavering desire for action to achieve
great things for the people of the United States and the world
at USAID.
So welcome, Ambassador Power. We are pleased to have you
here. We cannot wait to see you get to work over at USAID and I
thank you for your service to our nation.
It is my privilege, Mr. Chairman, to introduce Ambassador
Power to the committee.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Markey. We know
that you both sit here and in other committees. So if you have
other work to do, we certainly invite you to join us if you
can. If not, we will see you back a little later.
That was a rousing introduction and with--but with one
flaw. I thought it was extraordinary. So as a Yankee fan, I
just--I just cannot be quiet.
So, anyhow, let me start off. Ambassador, in his inaugural
address, President Biden said that, quote, ``We will lead not
merely by the example of our power, but by the power of our
example.''
The work that dedicated professionals of USAID do
exemplifies that example, supporting people around the world to
advance democratic and citizen-responsive governance, to help
ensure fair treatment and access to opportunity for vulnerable
minorities, and provide life-saving relief on behalf of the
American people.
We know that these core values are the strength of our own
country and that promoting them abroad contributes to more
stability and stability worldwide.
As I emphasized to Secretary Blinken at his nomination
hearing, the U.S. must reassert itself as a global leader
capable of confronting complex challenges.
As we work to address COVID-19 inequality, migration,
climate change at home, if the U.S. is not contributing
leadership and resources to address these issues globally, then
our security at home is tenuous at best.
There are few people as familiar with many of today's
complex long-running conflicts as you are. As you well know, if
confirmed, you will be responsible for responding to new and
renewed conflicts from Venezuela to Ethiopia to Burma, human-
and resource-driven conflicts which have victimized hundreds of
thousands of civilians, forcing millions to flee their homes.
Political crises in Latin America have caused unprecedented
humanitarian disasters. I am encouraged by the Biden
administration's plans to renew our commitment to achieving a
diplomatic solution to the Venezuela crisis where USAID has
provided significant humanitarian and development assistance.
In the Northern Triangle countries, addressing rampant
crime, weak governance, corruption, and displacement must also
be a top U.S. priority, as stability there directly impacts the
security and prosperity of the United States.
Across Africa we have seen democratic backsliding in
various countries, along with persistent terrorist threats and
conflicts that have cost thousands of lives and displaced
hundreds of thousands more.
In particular, the conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray Province
has contributed to destabilizing the whole Horn of Africa while
increased terrorism has thrown the Sahel into chaos.
Meanwhile, climate change is increasing food insecurity and
natural resource scarcity, and threatening the very existence
of many small island nations, while COVID-19 pandemic continues
to ravage the world.
At the same time that you will be confronting these global
challenges, you will also need to rebuild and restore USAID as
an institution. Successful U.S. foreign policy rests on the
appropriate utilization of the three D's: defense, diplomacy,
and development.
Unfortunately, the previous administration had anywhere
from skepticism to disdain for the last of those two. While I
believe Ambassador Green who--for whom I have great respect,
believed and invested in the mission of the agency, the years
after his departure have taken a serious toll on the agency
morale, strained USAID's relationships with its implementing
partners, and weakened trust in America.
The agency needs internal attention, and I recommend that
if confirmed you listen to USAID's civil servants, Foreign
Service officers, and Foreign Service nationals to explain what
USAID needs.
As you may know, USAID underwent a major reorganization
spearheaded by Ambassador Green, and while I believe he
approached this effort with the best of intentions, the
ultimate execution was lacking.
I do believe the agency must be nimble enough to respond to
changing and pressing challenges, and I trust that you will
make the ongoing reorganization work better and consult with
this committee on how that might be achieved.
So, in conclusion, if confirmed, you will have your work
cut out for you. However, I have great confidence in your
experience and abilities, not to mention your passion for
making this world a better place.
But we would expect you to engage with this committee as a
partner and asset in accomplishing USAID's mission. This
committee has a long bipartisan history of support for USAID,
and I expect you to engage in frequent and open dialogue to
help sustain that support.
I look forward to hearing from you today. We welcome your
family, who is always part of the sacrifices that those of us
who are in public service make.
And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Risch.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Senator Menendez. I appreciate
that, and Ambassador Power, thank you for agreeing to take this
on and thank you to your family. As the chairman noted, there
is always sacrifices that are shared, sometimes not equally by
the family.
The role of the USAID administrator is an important one. We
all know that. In order to accomplish the goals of our--as a
nation, we need a development agency that reflects the
challenges of the 21st century and is staffed and resourced to
be strategic, efficient, effective, and accountable.
USAID must be led by someone who understands that aid is
most effective when it is targeted toward clearly-defined U.S.
national interests and those who are committed to advancing
good governance, economic growth, and self-reliance.
The challenges before us are immense. An estimated 80
million people globally have been displaced from their homes,
26 million of whom are now refugees. The conflict in Syria has
entered its tenth year and has left more than 12 million people
food insecure.
Ebola has reemerged in West Africa and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and the COVID-19 pandemic has shuttered
schools, destroyed livelihoods, and pushed millions of people
into poverty around the world.
USAID has a successful record of responding to emergencies,
and we will count on the next administrator to put dollars
provided for humanitarian assistance to good use.
The agency has also done tremendous work in combating food
insecurity, expanding access to water, and empowering women to
participate in their economies.
USAID needs to work on coordination with the CDC. This is
why the largest U.S. global health program, PEPFAR, is
coordinated by the Department of State.
As we continue to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, I look
forward to working with the department, USAID, the CDC, and my
colleagues here in Congress on a more comprehensive approach to
global health, security, and diplomacy.
Senator Menendez and I have been discussing that issue in
particular, and we have talked about a path forward to where we
can get a bipartisan piece of legislation that will be one of
the most important things we do as far as global health is
concerned and as far as the people of the world are concerned.
We must put in the work now so we can get ahead of the next
pandemic and keep Americans safe from infectious disease
threats before they cross our borders again. We should also
maximize the impact of U.S. contributions to COVAX and GAVI,
the Vaccine Alliance, and through the Global Fund's COVID-19
response mechanism.
Beyond pandemics, I am interested to learn more about how
you, if confirmed, will position USAID to counter China's
malign development model. That model is something that many of
us consider to be one of the greatest threats to U.S. national
security.
I would also like to better understand your view on
promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law, the
foundations of healthy and stable societies. The United States
cannot, should not, and should not even consider singlehandedly
trying to solve the world's problems. Difficult choices must be
made.
But while the administrator is not empowered to make those
choices independently, USAID does remain under the foreign
policy direction of the Secretary of State.
I am pleased to see that the next administrator will have a
seat at the principal's table on critical matters of
development and humanitarian response.
If confirmed, I am eager to work with you to ensure that
USAID remains strategic focused and accountable.
Thank you, Senator Menendez.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, Madam Ambassador, the floor is yours. Your full
statement will be included in the record. We ask you to
summarize it, and then we will have a conversation with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAMANTHA POWER, OF MASSACHUSETTS, NOMINATED
TO BE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Risch, members of the committee. It is a tremendous
honor to appear before you today. I am humbled by President
Biden's trust in me and by the opportunity to join such an
indispensable agency at such a critical time.
I would like to begin by thanking my mother, Veera Delaney,
a doctor whom I have watched care for her patients during the
darkest hours of this pandemic, my father, Eddie Bourke, whose
curiosity about the world helped spark my own, my husband and
best friend, Cass Sunstein, an American original, and my 11-
year-old son, Declan, and eight-year-old daughter, Rian, whose
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our
responsibility to our planet.
Public service does ask a lot of families and I am
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine.
I would also like to thank the members of this committee.
While bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan
support for the U.S. Agency for International Development has
saved and improved millions of lives while enhancing U.S.
security and U.S. prosperity.
I was fortunate to work with many of you when I last
served. If confirmed, I will be eager to build on these
relationships and forge new ones.
I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I
started my career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and
partners deliver food to the vulnerable while supporting
mothers as they tried to locate their missing sons and
husbands.
Since then, wherever I traveled, whether in East Timor just
after became the world's newest nation, Darfur in the middle of
this century's first genocide, or West Africa at the height of
the Ebola epidemic, USAID was there. America was there,
identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to meet them.
In my work, I have seen how the investments the United
States makes in other countries are investments in our own
security. I have seen the inextricable linkages between
political freedom and broad-based economic growth.
I have seen that the most effective development is driven
by those on the ground with local knowledge and expertise, and
I have seen the overwhelming power of individual dignity as a
driver of world events.
Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they
be able to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and
exercise their fundamental rights.
If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of
USAID and invest in the capabilities of the agency's dedicated
10,000 Foreign Service officers, civil servants, locally
employed staff, contractors, and other personnel.
This means seeking out and amplifying their insights,
learning about specific local needs, and adapting our programs.
It means addressing the issues related to diversity, equity,
inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce, and it
means emphasizing what President Biden himself and both of you,
I think, already have stressed.
Development is critical to America's ability to tackle the
toughest problems of our time, economic, humanitarian, and
geopolitical. In consultation with you and others in Congress,
I will aim to ensure that USAID enhances its long-standing
leadership in food security, education, women's empowerment,
and global health, while also addressing four interconnected
and gargantuan challenges confronting the world at this moment.
First, the COVID pandemic and the development progress that
has been imperiled in everything from food security to gender
equality to access to education to economic growth.
Climate change, and the surge in droughts, storms, food
shortages, and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies.
Third, with more conflicts occurring today than at any
point since the end of the Cold War, conflict and state
collapse.
And fourth, finally, with freedom declining around the
world for the fifteenth straight year in a row, democratic
backsliding.
In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure
the committee that I will work every day to expand burden
sharing in the international system. At the U.N., working with
my administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major
commitments from other countries to care for refugees, respond
to the Ebola epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the
sustainable development goals.
U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to mobilize
governments, international organizations, foundations, and
businesses to help countries achieve their own development
goals.
If I am confirmed to lead this great agency, I will work
tirelessly with members on both sides of the aisle to ensure
that taxpayer dollars are well spent. Guided by evidence, I
will work with you to adapt or replace programs that are not
delivering. I will be transparent and accessible as together we
chart a course that meets the needs of the current moment.
In 1979, as Senator Markey alluded to, my mother brought my
younger brother and me to America from Ireland, blessing me
with a life full of opportunity. As one who has been given so
much by the United States, I would take it as an incomparable
privilege to lead the world's premier development agency in
order to expand the opportunities available to others.
I thank you, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Power follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Samantha Power
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today. Thank you, Senator
Markey, for your kind introduction.
I am humbled by President Biden's trust in me, and by the
opportunity to join such an indispensable Agency at this critical time.
I would like to begin by thanking my mother Vera Delaney, a doctor
whom I have watched care for her patients during the darkest hours of
this pandemic; my father Eddie Bourke, whose curiosity about the world
helped spark my own; my husband Cass Sunstein, an American original;
and my 11-year-old son Declan and 8-year-old daughter Rian, whose
shared love of animals and nature remind me daily of our responsibility
to our planet. Public service asks a lot of families, and I'm
indescribably grateful for the support and generosity of mine.
I would also like to thank the members of this committee. While
bitter political winds blew, continued bipartisan support for the U.S.
Agency for International Development has saved and improved millions of
lives while enhancing U.S. security and prosperity. I was fortunate to
work with many of you when I last served. If confirmed, I will be eager
to build on these relationships and forge new ones.
I first saw USAID's impact in war-torn Bosnia, where I started my
career in 1993 as a reporter. I saw USAID staff and partners deliver
food to the vulnerable, while supporting mothers as they tried to
locate their missing sons and husbands. Since then, wherever I
travelled--whether to East Timor just after it became the world's
newest nation; Darfur, in the midst of this century's first genocide;
or west Africa, at the height of the Ebola epidemic--USAID was there--
America was there--identifying needs and moving heaven and earth to
meet them.
In my work--as a writer, professor, human rights advocate, national
security staffer, and diplomat--I've seen how the investments the
United States makes in other countries are investments in our own
security. I've seen the inextricable linkages between political freedom
and broad-based economic growth. I've seen that the most effective
development is driven by those on the ground with local knowledge and
expertise. And I've seen the power of individual dignity as a driver of
world events. Even as China increasingly uses its financial leverage to
sway other nations, citizens everywhere are insisting that they be able
to exercise agency, provide for themselves, and exercise their
fundamental rights.
If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the institution of USAID
and invest in the capabilities of the Agency's dedicated 10,000 foreign
service officers, civil servants, locally-employed staff, contractors,
and other personnel. This means seeking out and amplifying their
insights, learning about specific local needs, and adapting our
programs. It means urgently addressing the issues relating to
diversity, equity, inclusion, and advancement within USAID's workforce.
And it means emphasizing what President Biden himself has stressed:
Development is critical to
America's ability to tackle the toughest problems of our time--
economic, humanitarian and geopolitical.
In consultation with you and others in Congress, I will aim to
ensure that USAID enhances its longstanding leadership in food
security, education, women's empowerment, and global health, while also
addressing four interconnected and gargantuan challenges confronting
the world at this moment:
The COVID-19 pandemic. With decades of development gains shattered
by COVID, imperiling progress on everything from food security
to gender equality and access to education, USAID's support to
partners will be vital for recovery, including by building more
robust and durable health infrastructure for the future.
Climate Change. With the surge in droughts, storms, food shortages,
and climate-associated humanitarian emergencies, USAID can help
countries become more resilient, while supporting their efforts
to reduce carbon emissions.
Conflict and state collapse. With more conflicts occurring today
than at any point since the end of the Cold War, USAID
assistance will continue to mitigate suffering, while working
with U.S. diplomats and our international partners to address
the root causes of such crises.
Democratic backsliding. With freedom declining around the world for
the fifteenth year in a row, USAID's democracy, rights, anti-
corruption, and governance programming must nimbly support
democratic and civil society actors as they push back against
creeping authoritarianism and seek to build lasting democratic
institutions.
In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure the
committee that I will work every day to expand burden-sharing in the
international system. At the United Nations, working with my
administration colleagues, I was able to help secure major commitments
from other countries to care for refugees, respond to the Ebola
epidemic, strengthen peacekeeping, and adopt the Sustainable
Development Goals. U.S. investments are catalysts that can be used to
mobilize governments, international organizations, foundations, and
businesses to help countries achieve their own development goals.
If I am confirmed to lead this great Agency, I will work tirelessly
with Members on both sides of the aisle to ensure that taxpayer dollars
are well spent. Guided by evidence, I will work with you to adapt or
replace programs that are not delivering. I will be transparent and
accessible--as together we chart a course that meets the needs of the
current moment.
In 1979 my mother brought my younger brother and me to America from
Ireland, blessing me with a life full of opportunity. As one who has
been given so much by the United States, I would take it as an
incomparable privilege to lead the world's premier development Agency
in order to expand the opportunities available to others.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Power.
We will start five-minute rounds of--in order of those who
have appeared either in person or virtually, and I will start
with the chair.
USAID plays a central role in the U.S. government's
humanitarian response to conflict and forced migration. Last
year, I released a comprehensive report on forced displacement,
which found that the vast majority of the 80 million displaced
people worldwide are not displaced for months but for years or
decades at a time.
How will you lead efforts at USAID to ensure coherence
between the U.S. humanitarian and development programs and to
ensure that a maximum impact is achieved in assisting
protracted displacement?
Ambassador Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Well, first, let me say that those displacement numbers, as
you know, are the highest since World War II. Every year, we
see that number go up. When I was U.N. Ambassador, it was the
highest since World War II, and it gets worse and worse.
Climate-related events, of course, are a factor, and I
think you are likely to see a surge and displacement stemming
from the economic fallout from the COVID pandemic.
It is important to look behind the numbers at the causes of
displacement, which vary. I alluded in my testimony to the fact
that more conflicts are occurring now than at any point since
the end of the Cold War. As you noted just now, conflicts are
lasting longer.
So it used to be that one conflict would start but another
might have been brought to an end and that, therefore, again,
those numbers were not just continuing to grow.
But as a new conflict starts, other conflicts are just
lasting longer and longer, and so the protracted refugee
population is higher than it has been since World War II.
The investment that President Biden has committed to making
in diplomacy is a critical part of this. We have seen, for
example, in Libya, diplomacy produce, for the first time in
many years, a U.N.-brokered transition government.
We need diplomacy to pay dividends in Yemen, which is
facing the worst humanitarian crisis of any place on earth. And
when it comes to a place like the Northern Triangle, where you
have been so active, it is critical to look at the different
drivers of migration, which range from physical personal
insecurity and gang violence and corruption to the lack of
economic opportunity.
And USAID, again, I think has a really important role to
play in mitigating humanitarian suffering, but also looking
upstream at why people are leaving their homes in the first
place.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me ask you this. Under the
last restructuring of USAID, the Democracy Rights and
Governance Center was moved under the new development,
Democracy and Innovation Bureau.
My question is, I think this is a very significant part of
the mission of USAID. I noticed you mentioned it among your
four pillars.
How will you elevate and integrate democracy and human
rights in USAID's response both to the COVID pandemic, which
has provided cover for autocrats to attack civil society and
diminish human rights, but even more broadly?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Well, there is a
contest in this world occurring now between two models, the
democratic model and an authoritarian model. The trends were
not pretty before COVID struck and, as you note, they are
getting worse in terms of human rights recessions, even in
established democracies around the world.
I think that there would be no question to any of the
wonderful USAID staff as to the level of priority that I give
democracy and human rights. My whole career has been in that
field.
I was moved to go into foreign policy by the massacre in
Tiananmen Square that occurred in June of 1989 when I was still
a college kid.
And so on the specifics of whether the Democracy Rights and
Governance Center and that programming belongs within the DDI
Bureau where it is now, I would love to revert.
But on the substance, I would just like to note that,
again, this is incredibly important programming, partnering
with the Department of State and their Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor Bureau, looking at anti-corruption work specifically,
which is a real Achilles for authoritarian and illiberal
countries, I think one we have not taken full advantage of.
This will be a huge priority for me, Senator.
The Chairman. All right. And finally, you mentioned in your
comments, and I think it is one of the central issues that we
need to face as we deal with the challenges of migration and
the challenges that we have at the border, having AID address
violence, corruption, and other drivers of migration in the
Northern Triangle countries are incredibly important as part
of--Vice President Biden was--when he was vice president he had
a plan then.
Unfortunately, it was not continued. There is another
provision in--that he has put forth. How do you see the key
components of a joint USAID-State Department strategy as part
of that the Northern Triangle effort?
Ambassador Power. Well, just to note that I have been very
heartened in the briefings that I have been able to have from
outside by the reliance on data and evidence in tailoring those
programs.
USAID actually gets data from the International
Organization of Migration and CBP, the Customs Border
Protection, to find out why individuals are leaving their
homes, to dig into the specifics, to dig into the localities
from which they are fleeing.
And USAID--prior to the funding suspension under the Trump
administration, USAID actually has tailored programs around
those places where people are most likely to flee and tailor
programming around, again, the causes of migration.
So I think that is the right approach. It will take us some
time to ramp back up, unfortunately, because some of those
programs were suspended. But the infrastructure is in place and
I look forward to working with you again to dig into specifics.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you.
Ambassador Power, first of all, thank you for taking the
time yesterday and previously for you and I to talk about this
position and your confirmation, and one of the things we talked
about yesterday was National Security Memorandum No. 1 that
President Biden has executed in which the Secretary of State
will lead and, in coordination with the USAID administrator,
the development of the U.S. Government wide plan to combat
COVID-19 pandemic.
Can I get your thoughts on the record for that, please,
briefly?
Ambassador Power. Specifically on COVID-19 or on the
structural----
Senator Risch. Well, generally on the structure and then as
it relates to COVID-19.
Ambassador Power. Yeah. I mean, I think that as actually
COVID-19 illustrates probably better than any contemporary
threat, our fates, and the fates of the American people, are
connected to health infrastructure, economic prosperity, the
curbing of extremism and radicalization internationally.
And so programming that USAID does in that regard, in
cooperation with the State Department and other agencies, is
incredibly important for our security and what President Biden
has done in elevating USAID and giving it a seat on the
National Security Council and in the Principles Committee, I
think, has just effectively enshrined that reality, which is
that our development efforts and our diplomatic efforts have to
be resourced and prioritized alongside, of course, our
essential defense efforts.
So I think that is the logic. You know, from having spoken
with him about this decision, that is the logic of elevating
USAID. The expertise is there, the know-how is there, and I
think what is really important about doing this is it means
that that expertise and know-how will be reflected in the
interagency, not only at high levels but at every level.
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thanks for that answer.
Moving offshore, the memorandum also refers to a diplomatic
outreach plan for enhancing the United States response to the
COVID-19 pandemic by engaging partner nations.
Could you give me your thoughts on that, please?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
When I was U.N. Ambassador, I had the privilege of being
part of President Obama's effort to mobilize a large anti-Ebola
coalition to prevent, in that instance, an epidemic, a horrific
epidemic from becoming a global pandemic of the kind that we
are now living through.
I think the United States is at its most powerful,
effective, and efficient when it leverages the support that it
offers international institutions or the resources that it
dedicates to combating global challenges, when it leverages
that to get others to do more.
And that is what President Biden, I think, has already done
in the context of announcing the $2 billion that you allocated
late last year for GAVI, for the vaccine effort, that that $2
billion is going to be contributed.
But it is also going to be leveraged to get other countries
to do more before the next $2 billion is obligated, and I think
that is just one example. There has not--there has not been, I
should say, optimal coordination, I think, in the international
global vaccine area and that is something that I am very eager
to dig into, if I am confirmed.
Senator Risch. Thank you. I appreciate those thoughts.
The Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act, which I
introduced, creates a coordinator position at the State
Department that is consistent with the type of framework I
believe that President Biden intends in his memorandum.
Are you familiar with that, by any chance, and go ahead.
Your thoughts?
Ambassador Power. The prior version of the bill I was
familiar with. I have not seen--I think the bill that you
either are on the verge of introducing or have just introduced.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. And as I indicated,
Senator Menendez and I have been talking about the global
health issue and an effort by this committee in that regard,
and I intend to work with Senator Menendez on the creation of
the framework because, obviously, the success is going to
depend on that framework and I hope to engage you and your
agency as we move forward on that.
And with that, my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Cardin, who is with us virtually?
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, Ambassador
Power, thank you very much for your willingness to continue to
serve our nation.
I want to follow up on comments that you made earlier this
year, which was something I was pleased to see where you
indicated that anti-corruption would be a centerpiece of
President Biden's foreign policy agenda.
And you have already answered some of that with Senator
Menendez in regards to how you are using the DRG Center. You
specifically mentioned in those comments the use of the tools
that are at your disposal, including Magnitsky sanctions.
Can I take it that you will work with us as we look at
permanently authorizing the Global Magnitsky statute today? It
is by executive order and by statute that expires. We take
pretty much what was in the executive order, Senator Wicker and
I, and codified that as permanent authorization.
Do we have your support on that legislation?
Ambassador Power. Unequivocally, and let me just thank you
for the Magnitsky Act where your leadership was so pivotal. As
you know, it has now been replicated to a large extent in
Europe and in Canada.
I think one of our tasks is to ensure that other countries
adopt similar measures so that we can multilateralize these
corruption and human rights sanctions.
Senator Cardin. And Senator Young and I have introduced
legislation to try to build on it to give capacity for our
missions to evaluate how well the countries in which they
operate are are dealing with corruption.
So it is a way of using a standard similar to what we do in
trafficking in persons to monitor progress made in fighting
corruption. You mentioned in your article anti-bribery statutes
and dealing with those--the laundering, anti-laundering
statutes, et cetera.
Will you work with us as we look to enact this law to give
you additional tools to help fight corruption?
Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator. Always looking for
additional tools. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
So let me talk a little bit about Central America. You
already talked a little bit about that with Senator Menendez,
and I know that President Biden is looking at providing help to
the Central American countries in order to do what is right in
our hemisphere from the humanitarian point of view as well as
the practical aspects of migration.
But there is systemic corruption in these countries that if
we do not deal with it we are going to be giving money that
will not get to its intended purpose.
So how do you intend to make sure that our assistance to
the Central American countries are used for the people to deal
with the problems of Central America and not just fuel
corruption?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
You put your finger on a real inhibitor of progress--above
all progress for the people of that region. Let me say that,
from what I understand of USAID programming up to this point,
there is, of course, a recognition of the barrier that
corruption has constituted to economic progress, to progress in
combating threats to physical security, and thus, much of the
programming is routed, for example, through local officials who
have been identified as reformers or--and/or civil society
partners.
And, indeed, many of those partners, as you know, are doing
work to hold the central authorities accountable for
transgressions and for different forms of corruption.
It has been disappointing to see some of the strides that
were made, for example, in Guatemala and Honduras through CSIG.
CSIG was actually the most popular and I know you were critical
in pushing for its mandates to be renewed successively in
Guatemala. It was the most popular institution in Guatemala
before it was shut down, and so that is disappointing because
it had a really important role to play. Then Vice President
Biden was also critical in ensuring that it was preserved
there.
But I think, thinking through at the central level, how--
what more we can do for civil society actors that are holding
government accountable to try to change the equation so that
those governments that are trending in worrying directions
reverse that tide.
Senator Cardin. I know that we can help you in this regard.
I strongly support our involvement in Central America. But when
we put conditionality on aid, it gives the administration, I
think, the additional strength in dealing with the governments
to indicate there has got to be progress made in dealing with
the governance issues.
So I hope you take that as friendly help when we look at
conditionality to make sure that we do achieve progress in
dealing with systemic problems in these countries.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back my time.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Portman, who is with us virtually, I understand?
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador Power, and also thank you to your husband, Cass
Sunstein, for his willingness to come back into public service.
We appreciate your willingness to step up again.
I enjoyed our conversation, and let me follow up a little
bit on what Senator Cardin just talked to you about.
As you know, I suppose, we have spent $3.6 billion of
taxpayer money in the Northern Triangle countries--El Salvador,
Honduras, Guatemala--in the past five years. The results are
not impressive, understanding that recently some of the natural
disasters in that area, particularly the hurricanes, added to
this.
But I will tell you, I just got the numbers this morning
from last week. Five hundred and fifty kids per day came into
the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle countries,
which is five or six times more than in January when there was
less than a hundred.
In terms of families--and by the way, there were 300 in
February so we are going up and up and up--in terms of
families, 1,500 per day last week, as compared to a thousand in
February, on average, less than a hundred in January, again, a
15 times increase.
So the push factors are not being addressed effectively.
People are coming. The pull factors are that the changes were
made in policies to allow people to come and they are
responding and the traffickers are responding.
So I guess what I would ask you is how you would do it
differently. Senator Cardin rightly asked you about corruption,
and I believe insisting on transparency and rule of law and
tying our aid is important.
By the way, of that $3.6 billion, as you know, much was
sent through the Millennium Challenge Corporation, MCC, which
has precisely those criteria and others to ensure the money is
well spent.
But I guess I would ask you also about tying it to
immigration and specifically requiring those countries to work
with us to have people apply for asylum from their country of
origin or if they feel it is unsafe to do it in a safe third
country, which is one of the programs that was discontinued by
the current administration.
In other words, someone could apply in Guatemala for asylum
if they are from Honduras, which would be the first country
that they would come into, a safe third country.
Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us
spending what President Biden has now suggested, which is
another $4 billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been set
in the last five years?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first, just to embrace the premise of your question
that we have a responsibility to be effective vigilant stewards
of taxpayer resources, this is an immensely challenging set of
problems, and as you called them push factors out of the region
to deal with there are no silver bullets. Needless to say, if
there were someone would have found one along the way.
But I guess I would just offer a few thoughts. I mean,
first of all, there is actually compelling data, and I look
forward to digging into the numbers further if I am--if I am
confirmed, but that shows that, for example, in the districts
where USAID had programming aimed at curbing violence--for
example, in El Salvador between 2015 and 2017, there was a 61
percent drop in homicide rates.
There are comparable numbers in terms of the statistics in
districts that USAID programming was set up in Honduras, with a
slightly smaller drop but, nonetheless, a very substantial drop
in homicide rates.
I think that is encouraging. I think, you know, suspending
the programs, unfortunately, gave us less influence in using
our programming to work with those reformist officials who were
willing, again, to crackdown on violence within their
neighborhoods.
Senator Portman. Ambassador, let me interrupt you just for
a second----
Ambassador Power. Of course.
Senator Portman [continuing]. Because I want to cover
another topic as well. But just on this topic, having just been
at the border the last few days, I did talk to a lot of
unaccompanied kids and also to families and single men coming
over from Central America and, as you know, the constant
refrain is, ``I can make 10 or sometimes 20 times as much in
America. I want to take care of my family.''
So I agree that dealing with the violence is important and
I applaud those changes. And, in fact, not only has violence
been dealt with in those countries so that the numbers are a
little better, generally, but also the economic situation is a
little better, although the hurricanes and the COVID-19 numbers
are probably not going to be as good.
But it is--it is an economic issue, primarily. In other
words, people will still be looking to come to the United
States. And my question to you was, should we condition
billions of dollars in taxpayer money not just on the important
things that Senator Cardin talked about but also on working
with us on this issue of immigration and, specifically, on
asylum claims? Do you agree with that?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think that one of your premises,
if I understood it, of putting individuals in a position where
they could apply for refugee status or asylum in the region
rather than entrusting, for example, their children to
coyotes----
Senator Portman. Right. And taking a dangerous course,
which is----
Ambassador Power. I do not think any parents, you know,
relishes the entrusting of one's child, again, to a smuggler.
So one of the things that we looked at in the Obama
administration, as you know, was setting up these UNHCR offices
in the region. I think that is something that President Biden
is looking at again, and that is very important.
But you put your finger, again, on one of the major causes
of migration, which is the lack of economic opportunity, and
that is something that USAID has a lot of experience investing
in.
You are right, we have not produced the same kinds of
results, as I have pointed to, when it comes to physical
security and crime. But I think, you know, now with tailored
programming, not being everywhere but being specifically in
those communities where we know that there is the highest
concentration of migrants, we can, working with you and being
held accountable, hopefully, begin to make a dent.
Senator Portman. Well, Ambassador, I hope you--I hope you
work with--my time is getting toward the end here. But my
question is specifically dealing with the economy----
The Chairman. The senator's time has past expired so----
Senator Portman [continuing]. And the violence issues, but
also if you could work with us on this issue of immigration and
asylum so people can apply from their home country or a safe
third country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Coons, who just returned from the Tigray region in
Ethiopia on a mission and we appreciate his work, and you are
recognized.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, and Ambassador Power.
Welcome, and thank you for your willingness to serve our
nation again, and to Cass and to Declan and to Rian, thank you
for supporting your wife and mother in her tremendous service
to our nation.
You are taking on this role, hopefully, once confirmed at a
critically important time. We all saw how, in the last year of
the previous administration, the absence of a Senate-confirmed
administrator.
The absence of clear and forceful leadership led to real
drift and some challenges operationally and organizationally.
There are humanitarian crises all over the world, as many
of us will comment today, from Venezuela to Yemen to Burma to
Ethiopia to many other nations, and clear and capable
leadership at USAID is critical.
I have profound respect and appreciation for the work of
the USAID, the folks who are deployed around the world. I just
had the opportunity to meet with a number of the humanitarian
partners and leaders that USAID is relying on in Ethiopia, as I
have elsewhere.
I also think it is critical we continue to explain to the
average American how the work of USAID overseas helps keep us
safer, healthier, and more prosperous.
And, tragically, COVID-19 is an opportunity for us to
remind folks exactly how vaccinating the rest of the world is
critical to preventing new variants from breaking out and from
harming all of us.
So I look forward to working with you in my role as the
chairman of the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations
Subcommittee and to having a meaningful dialogue.
Let me dive in first, if I could, to what I just saw. If
confirmed, can we count on USAID to work with this committee
and with all of us in Congress to ensure that we are addressing
the humanitarian crisis throughout Ethiopia and, in particular,
in the Tigray region?
Ambassador Power. Absolutely. Thank you for taking the trip
that you took. USAID, as you know, just made an announcement of
an additional $52 million dollars in humanitarian support. I
think that makes the contribution so far $150 million plus
since the crisis began.
But the humanitarian--mitigating the humanitarian
suffering, of course, is not all we need to be doing. We need
to get at the root causes of that suffering and secure access
so that that food can be delivered.
So thank you for what you have done to try to make that
happen.
Senator Coons. And I am optimistic we will make progress
now on humanitarian access.
I also met with the head of the Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission, Daniel Bekele, and discussed with him and with
other international leaders about carrying out a thorough and
independent investigation of human rights abuses.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, has also talked recently about doing a joint
investigation.
From your career working in human rights issues, what kind
of investigation do you think would be most effective and have
the greatest impact in getting to the root of human rights
violations that have occurred?
Ambassador Power. Well, the biggest challenge,
traditionally, for international human rights investigations,
especially independent ones, is securing access, and so the key
is not only getting the approval from the Center and from the
prime minister for something like that, but making sure that
that agreement trickles down and that there is a willingness on
the part of the authorities who have granted access to ensure
that, you know, the checkpoints do not go up then as soon as
the investigators deploy.
There are many, many countries where atrocity allegations
have occurred, have developed. Unfortunately, creative
traditions of erecting roadblocks, you know, where it matters--
in other words, harassing, intimidating witnesses and so forth,
denying visas to particular communities, blaming so-called
uncontrolled militia, you know, without, at the Center, really
taking steps to make sure that those militia allow
investigators to do their work.
Senator Coons. Well, I look forward to partnering with you
and relying on your advice in exactly how to make sure that
this commitment that has recently been announced by the prime
minister to investigate and this partnership that I think is
quite possible is successful.
And there is a number of things I look forward to working
with you on: the implementation of the Global Fragility Act, a
bill that I helped lead that has been signed into law that is a
new tool to ensure that development and diplomacy take the lead
in support of defense work in securing countries from the Sahel
to the Northern Triangle, the Nita Lowey Middle East
Partnership for Peace Act and ensuring that we are investing in
both people-to-people programs and joint economic ventures to
facilitate the conditions for a possible two-state solution,
and then ways in which we can keep the Development Finance
Corporation a development finance corporation and to best use
the MCC.
My last question will be for you about the critical role
that delivering safe and effective vaccines to the developing
world can play in continuing our role as one of the world's
leading supporters of effective public health programs.
There has been a significant increase in the appropriated
funds available through COVAX. We have rejoined WHO.
What do you think we most need to do to ensure the prompt
and equitable distribution of effective vaccines globally?
Ambassador Power. Well, let me just cite, Senator, the
International Chamber of Commerce report--I think we discussed
it on the phone a month or two ago--but that shows that until
and unless there is economic recovery by virtue of vaccinations
and curbing of the pandemic in the developing world, it is
going to cost the global economy $9 trillion, including
developed countries $4.5 trillion. Between that and the issue
of variants, where as long as the pandemic is raging somewhere
there is a chance of some mutation and variants moving
aggressively, it is so in our interest to make that happen.
COVAX, if fully funded, will vaccinate 20 percent of
people, they hope, by the end of this year--20 percent of the
people in developing countries.
That is not sufficient, and so looking to see how COVAX is
being supplemented by bilateral donations, surplus donations,
and other contributions, I think, is really important.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Paul?
Senator Paul. Good morning. Welcome.
Ambassador Power. Good morning.
Senator Paul. Many on the left are horrified at being
associated with the neocon foreign policy. But it is no small
irony that the end results of responsibility to protect are, in
reality, little different than the interventionist policies of
John Bolton and Bill Kristol.
Like the neocons, the liberal advocates of responsibility
to protect have advocated for military intervention in Libya,
Syria, and Yemen.
Sure, the reasoning might be more humanitarian than
geopolitical, but the advocacy for military intervention ends
up looking pretty much the same.
I remember liking what candidate Obama said about military
intervention, that without congressional approval it was only
justified when there was an imminent threat.
After President Obama began bombing Libya, I asked him at
lunch one day, what about your pledge to ask and seek
congressional permission unless it was an imminent threat.
He responded that there was an imminent threat to Benghazi.
I looked at him incredulously and responded, ``Really? An
imminent threat to a foreign city is your justification for an
unauthorized war?''
The responsibility to protect ideology did not learn much
from the Libyan debacle and immediately pushed the Obama
administration to jump into Syria. Many on the left, like
Secretary Blinken, do not admit that there was too much
intervention. They actually believe in Syria that they failed
because there was too little military intervention.
Several hundred thousand people have died in Syria and more
than a million refugees have been displaced. If you are talking
about humanitarianism, famine, the wars, really, other than
natural causes war is the number-one cause of famine around the
world.
An argument can be made, though, that Assad would probably
massacred far fewer people had the West and the Gulf States
stayed out of the civil war.
Are you willing to admit that the Libyan and Syrian
military interventions that you advocated for were a mistake,
and that going forward, you will be more conscious of the
unintended humanitarian disasters that seem to occur again and
again with our military interventions in Africa and throughout
the Middle East?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Well, first, if I may, just talk about USAID and its role,
which I think can be very important in Libya today.
I think before you arrived I mentioned that there is--a
power-sharing government has finally been set up in Libya.
USAID right now, because of the security conditions, operates
its programs, largely, from the----
Senator Paul. You would acknowledge Libya is worse now than
it was before we started bombing them?
Ambassador Power [continuing]. I think it is really
important with Libya having the opportunity to have elections
at the end of this year for us to do what we can to support
those elections. I think it is in the face of mass atrocities
there are a whole set of nonmilitary tools that are--I would
hope that you would support deploying.
We had some successes with them, for example, in helping
bring about the South Sudanese Referendum, which was a risk of
grave atrocities occurring back in the first term of the Obama
administration, an attempt to steal an election in Cote
d'Ivoire where diplomatic pressure averted mass atrocities, and
even sending technical advisors, military advisors, to Central
Africa to combat the Lord's Resistance Army, which kidnapped
children and----
Senator Paul. Do you think we were successful in Libya,
that Libya is a better place because of our military
intervention, or Syria?
Ambassador Power. The decision that President Obama made
when confronted with the risk to the people of Benghazi and
other civilian centers was an incredibly difficult one, and
again, in sitting in the Situation Room, I think it is hard now
to remember--you know, with the United Nations, NATO, the Arab
League, this body, the Senate, unanimously calling for a no-fly
zone, President Obama made the judgment that the risks of
allowing Benghazi to fall and the slaughter that would ensue
were not----
Senator Paul [continuing]. I know it is a tough decision,
but in retrospect, was Libya a good idea to militarily
intervene in Libya? A good idea to militarily intervene in
Syria, in retrospect?
Ambassador Power. I think the challenge is that we do not
have the counterfactual and, certainly, the fallout in the--in
the wake of the intervention, the centrifugal forces have been
incredibly difficult to manage and, above all, hard on the
Libyan people.
Senator Paul. But we have to learn lessons sometime. I
mean, we went into Libya. We went into Iraq. We destabilized
Iraq. We are still dealing with that. We went into Libya,
destabilized Libya. We are still dealing with that. Syria, the
same thing, and Yemen as well.
So, I mean, there should be an accumulation of knowledge
and a learning curve here that our interventions make things
worse, not better.
Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
I, certainly, agree that nonmilitary tools in the toolbox
are--carry with them far fewer risks. I opposed the war in
Iraq. I agree with you on Yemen.
All I am trying to describe is that when these situations
arise, it is a question almost of lesser evils, that the
choices are very challenging.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations,
Ambassador Power, for your nomination.
You have been a human rights activist. You have played a
number of roles with the Obama administration, including U.N.
ambassador, and now you are poised to take the helm of a
critical engine of humanitarian assistance around the globe.
So I am going to ask you questions that kind of combine all
the roles, both about what you might do at USAID but also how
you see some of the challenges that affect the committee.
You began your prepared remarks with four gargantuan
challenges, and one was democracy backsliding, and I want to
talk to you about that. We are seeing it everywhere.
We are seeing it in every continent. We are seeing, as you
indicate, declines in freedom and democracy indices, whether
you are looking at, you know, Freedom House annual reports or
the Economist Democracy Index annual reports.
President Biden has indicated that sometime either later
this year or earlier next year he wants to convene a summit of
democracies, which I think is a great idea.
How would you foresee USAID being part of what the U.S.
might do in convening such a summit? Just share your thoughts
on that.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
If I might, just because the democracy and human rights
numbers are so unfortunate and depressing, just to offer
something on the other side of the ledger.
Prior to the pandemic, there were more political protests
that occurred in more places than at any point in modern
recorded history.
So on the one hand, you have states increasingly repressing
their people and growing more sophisticated in shutting down
the internet and in stifling space for civil society.
On the other hand, many, many people are not getting that
memo and are insisting on taking their protests and their
concerns to the streets and holding governments accountable.
So I think there is a lot to work with out there of
concerns about violations of dignity and rights and a desire
for the United States to play a leadership role in promoting
human rights, of course, with humility.
With regard to the summit, I am not privy to the
deliberations and sort of what the planning and thinking is
either on timing or on the details of substance.
But I think there are a lot of opportunities to collaborate
and for USAID to play an important role, for example, in
combating misinformation and sharing best practices for doing
so in protecting election infrastructure, not only from
misinformation but from hacking and other forms of intrusion,
the anti-corruption programs that have been effective in
holding governments accountable and bringing civil society into
conversations that are too often top down.
I think there are a lot of lessons that can be imparted in
that regard. And often, Senator, I think it is--it is countries
that themselves are at different stages of democratic
progression that have the most valuable lessons to impart to
those countries that are just becoming democratic.
For example, the country of Sudan, which is experiencing a
political transition, is a long way from being a full and--a
full Jeffersonian democracy, that----
Senator Kaine. Sudan is a good example of something. I
agree with you.
You would agree with me that in something like a summit of
democracies it would be very important not to just focus on,
like, a NATO like U.S. and Europe or an OECD, just kind of the
big developed nations, but we should include large and small
democracies, mature and nascent from every continent on the
planet.
I mean, should not that be the goal of such a summit?
Ambassador Power. Again, I do not know how the current
administration is thinking about the summit. I can tell you,
Senator, from having helped design invitation lists as a U.N.
ambassador that questions of who is in and who is out are
actually quite challenging.
Senator Kaine. And but I am not asking about particular
nations. I am just saying it would have less utility if it is
just seen as kind of a U.S. and Europe thing or a big nation
thing, right?
If we are going to have a summit of democracies, there are
democracies on every continent. They are big and small and
nascent and mature. And if we are going to try to uphold the
model and share best practices, we should not have kind of a
U.S. or U.S. and Europe-centric view. We should try to include
democracies from everywhere.
Ambassador Power. I think the more demographically and
culturally and regionally representative we can be in general
in talking about democracy and human rights the better.
The progress I was able to make as U.N. ambassador on LGBTQ
rights would not have happened without the leadership of Latin
American countries, who were at the forefront there.
So I agree with the premise of your question. I am just not
familiar with what the plans are for the summit.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. I do not have any other
questions, Mr. Chair. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young?
Senator Young. Welcome, Ambassador, and congratulations on
your nomination.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Senator Young. As you know, the People's Republic of China
is using development dollars to advance its foreign policy
goals through programs like the Belt and Road Initiative.
Some have proposed expanding DFC's work to enable it to
more effectively combat China's investments by targeting
middle-income countries or perhaps utilizing DSC to support the
export of U.S.-made emerging technologies.
Whether through USAID or DFC, it is absolutely essential
that our development dollars, I think, be used to advance our
geostrategic priorities.
So, Ambassador, how would you like to see our development
agencies improved so that we are able to more effectively
compete with China?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The way in which, and I alluded to this in my opening
statement, but that China is using its economic leverage and
heft not only to, in often a predatory way, but not only to
change governing practices within countries but in my old place
of work the United Nations to actually leverage those financial
commitments to change the rules of the road altogether and to
water down international human rights commitments and so forth,
for fear that those laws and norms will be used against China.
It warrants urgent, immediate, and well-resourced attention.
I think you asked about improvement and I am, again,
incredibly impressed with what USAID staff have done and was
very impressed with the leadership of Mark Green in this area.
I think you and Senator Coons and others have worked on
making the DFC a much more powerful tool in the American
toolbox. I think increasing coordination between the Millennium
Challenge Corporation, the DFC, USAID, and the range of other
development actors is one answer.
I think recognizing our comparative advantages--you know,
we actually believe in local self-reliance. That is what we are
working toward. We want countries not to be dependent on
international assistance.
So the investments we make are in their ability to have
agency and to dictate their own affairs. This is very----
Senator Young. Sure.
Ambassador Power [continuing]. Different, I think, than the
China model. Go ahead, sir.
Senator Young. No. So you mentioned local self-reliance. I
am going to get into that momentarily since you brought that
up.
Might you support expanding DFC's mission to target areas
in the developed world where China is attempting to make
inroads?
Ambassador Power. I would want to look into that and hear
from you and others, just, again, having not worked yet within
the administration or dug into DFC-related questions, if I
could.
But I think, certainly, the question for American foreign
policy, broadly, is not only, you know, how do we deal with
China in sub-Saharan Africa and the inroads they are making
there, but across the developed world as well.
Senator Young. You mentioned self-reliance, that emphasis
on making countries self-reliant, I think, is itself an
advantage, right, because all people--so I think not just most
people but all people want to be more self-reliant, less
reliant upon foreign nations and others. It is sort of wired
into our DNA.
How would you say America's national security interests are
helped by making countries more self-reliant? Is that
consistent with your thinking?
Ambassador Power. Absolutely consistent with my thinking,
and I think you put your finger on it. It is you cannot travel
the world and talk to individuals, whether they are those who
are receiving U.N. food assistance or those receiving technical
assistance in a government ministry, without being struck by
how eager they are to not be dependent on international
assistance, and I think that is something USAID staff have
taken to heart. So----
Senator Young. Is there--is there a way that we might, or
how should we measure self-reliance?
Ambassador Power. Well, I think domestic resource
mobilization is something that USAID has invested a lot in, so
making sure that countries are able to collect their own tax,
infrastructure, strengthening the rule of law, so that there is
an ability, you know, not only for NGOs to hold governmental
actors accountable for potential corruption or malfeasance but
also the courts, and making sure there is an independent
judiciary. So work in those domains, I think, is one----
Senator Young. Then, lastly, in summary fashion, I will
just ask you, how would you use your seat on the Development
Finance Corporation's executive board to ensure that DFC and
USAID's complementary missions are furthering achieving self-
reliance in our targeted countries?
Ambassador Power. I really look forward to that individual
being named, nominated, confirmed, and sitting down with them.
I think a critical answer to your question about China but also
our larger question about just enhancing development for the
sake of U.S. security and prosperity lies in that partnership.
And the resources that DFC bring to bear but also,
specifically, they bring to bear what countries most want,
which is private sector investment and, really, to move away
from assistance to a more equal relationship of that nature.
Senator Young. Thank you, Ambassador. I will be submitting
some questions for the record about Burma.
Ambassador Power. Okay. Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand that Senator Schatz
is with us virtually.
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Ambassador, for being willing to serve. Again, thank you to
your family.
USAID is already leading in climate in our foreign
assistance. We see that in the work of the bureaus, the various
offices, and the regional missions.
But I do think there is more that we can do to make sure
that there is leadership at the top to help to steer the
agencies' climate work so there is an advocate for consistent
and reliable funding, and someone to establish a clear set of
priorities for USAID's mission.
Can you talk about where we might make some permanent
structural changes at USAID so that our emphasis on climate is
embedded into our budget, our priorities, and our objectives,
going forward, and so that it does not swing back and forth
depending on who is the president of the United States?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
your leadership on climate.
I am struck by how much work is already being done, and you
are alluding to this at USAID as it relates to disaster risk
reduction, helping those countries that want to transition to
clean energy or to lower their carbon emissions, above all,
dealing with something that I know you have worked on in the
Pacific Island context, which is mitigation and adaptation
for--especially with Pacific Island countries, those countries
that are only a few feet above sea level and really suffering
devastating effects of climate events and just the rising sea
levels.
But you asked a question more about the sort of
bureaucratic instantiation of these efforts. I think, for
starters, I will want to get smarter at a granular level about
what USAID is already doing and was doing under the prior
administration.
I think, as well, thinking through what it means to
acknowledge that climate touches just about every aspect of
USAID programming, from food security to displacement and
humanitarian emergency to we had an exchange earlier about
conflict and the causes of conflict and how we can address root
causes.
So given that, what is the appropriate bureaucratic sort of
structure for that disaster risk reduction, adaptation,
mitigation, emissions reduction expertise? You know, what is
the best way to channel all the expertise that exists within
the building so that it is reflective of the fact that this
expertise needs to permeate so many domains?
And so I do not have an answer for you today, Senator. If
you have ideas, I would love to hear them. But I think it is
incredibly important to make sure that the structure is fit for
purpose at this moment.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
I want to stay in Oceania and talk a little bit about not
disaster response but disaster preparation. You know, the
United States government is very effective in disaster
response.
I think of the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake and tsunami. I
think of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami that impacted coastal
Thailand, among other places, and, of course, we were there for
the rescue.
But for such a small amount of money, we were able to
prevent some of these disasters. Obviously, the natural
disasters are unpreventable, but for the simple price of about
$500,000, we were able to deploy some sea level gauges so that
people would get early warning about tsunamis and save life.
And I just wonder how you are looking at not just disaster
response and mitigation in terms of hard infrastructure, but
especially early warning systems and those relatively easy to
deploy and inexpensive to purchase the kinds of assistance that
really help island nations, and whether USAID would be amenable
to really taking a look throughout Oceania about that.
Ambassador Power. I cannot wait to dig into that set of
questions, if I am confirmed. I do--I did read a little bit
about it, just as I was been preparing these last weeks for
this hearing.
And, as you said, just with such modest financial
investments, I read about these beetles that were working with
NOAA to provide countries that, in low connectivity areas,
allow people to communicate warnings of extreme weather events
to come.
I think that is just a great example of the kinds of uses
of technology, the uses of satellites, the uses of surveillance
that we can bring to bear to mitigate harms.
So eager, all ears, and look forward to hearing more about
what USAID staff, which have been so creative in this domain,
have already done.
Senator Schatz. Sea level gauges, DART buoys, drones for
reconnaissance and disaster response--all of these are really
inexpensive, even in the context of USAID but, certainly, in
the context of our overall foreign aid and defense budget.
So I look forward to working with you on all these things.
Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
Senator Hagerty. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, I would like to commend your two children for
attending today. I know that it takes a lot for a family to be
as supportive as they have been of their parents, and I hope
they obtain a great civics lesson today and I commend them for
joining you and for being so supportive of your service.
To the extent that the United States spends development
funds overseas, I know we all want to make certain that those
funds are spent in a manner that is efficient and as effective
as possible at serving our interest.
So I would like to turn our attention to women's
empowerment. As you know, to the extent that women flourish in
a nation their economies flourish, their democracies flourish,
and we tend to see more stability.
The previous administration put together a tremendous
program, the Women's Global Development and Prosperity
Initiative, and Congress has allocated some $200 million this
fiscal year.
It enjoys great bipartisan support from this committee. And
I think it has tremendous potential.
Ambassador, I would like to ask you, first, if you are
aware of this program, and then further, how would you go about
the implementation and making sure that we see this program
through as it is intended?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator, just to
wholeheartedly agree with your various premises about the link
between women's empowerment and education and increased GDPs.
Peace processes last longer if women are included in at the
table.
As to the program that you are referencing, I have,
certainly, read about it. I would like, if I could, to dig into
it, again, if I am fortunate enough to be confirmed, and look
at also how it fits alongside other USAID investments, for
example, in girls' education, in other efforts to catalyze
entrepreneurship for women and girls.
But, again, I share your premises and happy to consult with
you on that, going forward.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate that, and I would
underscore that this is a terrific program and I think it has
tremendous potential. So I hope that it will take a premier
role as you evaluate what you may do, if confirmed, in the
implementation of programs that will help advance our interest
overseas.
Along those same lines, I would like to shift gears and
talk a bit about nations that are vulnerable to Chinese
influence and, specifically, the implementation of Chinese
technology into their networks and their infrastructure.
Are there things that you might be able to accomplish, that
USAID could accomplish, that would help make these nations less
vulnerable to Chinese penetration, to help them stand up
against the--this sort of incentivization that the Chinese
often will give to get other types of benefits? Can you address
that concern, please?
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Well, I think some of the answer is diplomatic. You know,
the last administration, I think, exerted a lot of diplomatic
pressure on countries and some of it was proved, I think,
ultimately effective. For example, the United Kingdom reversing
its prior decision on Huawei and 5G.
So I look forward to working with Secretary Blinken in that
regard. But also, I had a couple exchanges earlier, sir, about
the comparative advantages of USAID assistance and U.S.
development assistance, more broadly, and I do think the fact
that we stand for digital and secure--secure and open digital
infrastructure is a comparative advantage.
It is something that aligns with the aspirations of
hundreds of millions of people around the world, and so part of
the investments that USAID makes in civil society and in
nongovernmental actors, part of our work with the DFC, knowing
how much countries value private sector investment from the
United States.
I think linking these conversations and recognizing that
for American companies, for example, the investment climate is
more hospitable in the event of an open and secure digital
infrastructure. I think that can be part of our leverage
alongside questions of how USAID spends--expends its resources.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I appreciate your time and effort
looking at how we might better leverage our position to ensure
that the networks around the globe remain free and clear.
Thank you very much for your time.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand Senator Van Hollen is with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member, for this hearing. And, Madam Ambassador, it is
great to see you. Thank you for your past service to our
country and for your willingness to serve again in this
capacity, if confirmed, and it is great to see your family.
Senator Murphy and I have proposed a new foreign policy
budget to really meet the needs of this century in the year
2021, recognizing that many of the threats that we face are
transnational, global, from climate change to pandemics to
cybersecurity, and we look forward to working with you to
explore that budget.
It includes a significant increase in the budget for AID,
among other things, and part of the idea is also to combat what
Senator Hagerty was just discussing, which is China's very
active and aggressive effort to export its model of
authoritarianism to the developing world through a number of
instruments, including debt trap diplomacy, the Belt and Road
Initiative.
Their focus has been on sort of major infrastructure
projects and, you know, decades ago, AID was also very focused
on building larger infrastructure projects.
If you could just comment on how you see the role of AID in
the developing world in the context of China's ongoing efforts,
but with the toolbox that you have. I mean, should we consider
changing the mix in our toolbox as we go forward and how do you
see that challenge?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
Understandably, this has come up a good bit today, just as
it comes up every day in the world, and I should say thank you
to you and Senator Murphy for looking into this question of how
development diplomacy, our foreign affairs budget, should be
tailored for this moment.
So I look forward to seeing what comes of that exercise. I
have seen the preliminary numbers, but look forward to more.
You know, I think that the phrase I keep coming back to is
comparative advantage, and you alluded to debt trap diplomacy.
I think, you know, on the one hand, this has been a year of
tremendous Chinese expansionism and aggressiveness when it
comes to developing countries and when it comes to its near
abroad as well. We have seen that in Hong Kong. We have seen it
in the South China Sea. We have seen it on the Indian border.
But it has not gone that well for China. Their--you
actually see, you know, very poor polling when it comes to
China's standing in the world. Even with the donations of
protective gear in light of the COVID pandemic, you do not see
increases in soft power.
Quite the contrary, in light of COVID and the status of the
global economy and how much different countries have suffered
from that, and I think it is in part because people recognize
that this coercive and predatory approach, which is so
transactional and, seemingly, not really rooted in encouraging
countries to achieve their own destinies, their own development
objectives.
I think it is not going over that well, and that creates an
opening for the United States. I think our comparative
advantages are our support for accountable governance, which
aligns with what citizens want worldwide, our ability to not
only bring in the DFC but, in parallel, private sector
investments, which countries hunger for, the fact that we are
carrying out programming that is supportive of various
countries' environmental objectives, so many of these countries
cherish the natural resources that they have been given.
And so I think our approach, which is helping them sustain
those resources rather than pillaging them, is something that
also gives us a comparative advantage.
So I can go on and, again, I think it is country specific
in terms of how the programming should be tailored. But,
fundamentally, it is about supporting those countries achieve
their objectives and their goals of becoming self-reliant and
not being dependent on assistance.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. I also want to
follow up briefly on the line of questioning from Senator Coons
regarding our role in working with others in the world to
defeat the coronavirus.
As you indicated, the COVAX facility, we hope, will
vaccinate about 20 percent of the developing world. But it is
in their interest and in our interest, obviously, to stop the
spread of variants as quickly as possible, variants that could,
potentially, you know, become more immune to vaccines. And then
there is the economic fallout, both in those countries and the
global economy.
What do you see as AID's role specifically in trying to
expand the vaccination effort and the use of excess U.S.
vaccine supplies?
Ambassador Power. Well, because it will be some time before
everyone is vaccinated in the world and in the developing
world, it is really important not to lose sight of the
diagnostic and the treatment support that we can offer, the
support as well as we go in rebuilding health infrastructure
that has been completely overwhelmed by the human costs of this
pandemic.
I also think, you know, there is no question that the
humanitarian toll when it comes to severe malnutrition is going
to be substantial, and USAID, of course, brings great assets
when it comes to meeting humanitarian emergencies and
supporting organizations like the World Food Programme and
others in meeting food needs and humanitarian needs.
So I think there is--to look at the pandemic both as the
vaccination challenge, which we have talked about earlier, as a
treatment challenge, but then not to lose sight of the fact
that measles and TB and polio treatments and vaccines, all of
those have lagged behind, and nor to lose sight of the need to
ensure that this is the last pandemic that does this kind of
damage and to be building again in the infrastructure that
these countries need to be able to fend for themselves in the
future.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good to
see you, Ambassador. Thank you for your willingness to serve
again.
Let me just quickly associate myself with a few comments
and lines of questioning from other members on the committee.
First, let me join with Senator Young in recommending that
you play a forceful role at the DFC with respect to increasing
their capability to be able to finance projects abroad. We
have, obviously, targeted DFC's financing towards the
developing world for good reason.
But China plays a different game. We carved out a billion
dollars through legislation written by myself and Senator
Johnson about a year ago to allow for energy projects to be
financed in nondeveloping countries.
I think we are going to have to continue to expand the
aperture when it comes to the type of countries and type of
economies the DFC is able to do business in in order to compete
with China.
Let me just associate myself with Senator van Hollen's
comments. You and I have talked ad nauseam about the need to
dramatically increase our nonmilitary toolkit, and now you will
be in a perfect position to advocate for those resources.
My hope is that the administration, when it submits its
budget, you know, will make a substantial down payment on those
smart power tools. Just no way to compete with China or prevent
the next pandemic or fight climate change if you are still
funding, you know, more employees at military grocery stores
than diplomats representing America abroad.
My lines of questioning are on the ability of USAID to be
able to be nimble enough to meet the changing nature of very
complex challenges.
The first is on the topic of how we get our USAID team
outside the wire. We have significantly downsized--as an
example, we have significantly downsized our embassy in
Baghdad. I think right now we have four USAID officers
overseeing a billion dollars of funding there.
But it is not unfamiliar what is happening there. All over
the world we are having a harder time getting our diplomats and
our economic development officers outside of embassies.
Second, we also have a lack of flexibility in the way that
USAID can deploy funds. Congress tends to compartmentalize and
earmark dollars so that when a challenge pops up it is
difficult for the USAID administrator to put the dollars into
the place that really needs it.
So I wondered if you would talk for a second about the need
to be able to move USAID personnel around to places that need
to see American presence but also the need for Congress to work
with you to try to give some more flexibility to the accounts
that you are going to oversee.
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator. Both such important
questions.
So when it comes to the circumstance for USAID personnel
and U.S. diplomatic personnel, as you know, it is very
challenging, with more conflicts happening than any point since
the end of the Cold War.
With extremists, you know, who do harbor depending on,
again, where we are talking about can harbor ill intent towards
U.S. personnel, you know, we need to take security precautions
and keep our personnel safe.
At the same time, you will never meet people more eager to
be out in the communities where the beneficiaries of U.S.
programming are than USAID's personnel. I mean, that is what
drew these extraordinary men and women to this agency in the
first place.
You know, many of them are former Peace Corps volunteers or
people who have taught English when they were, you know,
practically in high school, you know, living in these
communities.
So I think--I look forward to working with Secretary
Blinken and our security professionals to being sure that we
have the balance right there.
And then when it comes to flexibility in deploying funds, I
do think this relates to the conversation that we have been
having about China. You know, we--and actually, the Ranking
Member Risch and I spoke about this a little bit in his office
yesterday--we want our assistance to be fit for purpose.
We want our rules and regulations to be fit for purpose. We
need to be accountable to the American people, given the
generosity and the spirit behind the investments that are being
made through USAID.
I, certainly, if confirmed, want to be responsive to the
objectives that people have up here, and that is why you see a
lot of those earmarks is that people have strong commitments
and want to see particular programming.
And from what I can tell, you know, that is the kind of
programming that I would wish to see as well. But we really do
need to make sure that we are able to move quickly.
I know Administrator Green made some inroads on this issue.
But I do think there is more to be done to make sure that we
are--we are able to be a 21st century agency meeting the
challenges of the moment.
Senator Murphy. Agree. Circumstances change, and these days
they change very quickly, and so I think there is probably a
way for us to maintain accountability for funds, maintain
programmatic earmarking but, perhaps, allow for a little bit
more flexibility with regard to country and geography.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador, welcome.
Ambassador Power. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. So, Ambassador, you and I have had a good
working relationship. We had a very good conversation in my
office. We have worked together, in particular, concerning
humanitarian crises and dissidents.
I appreciated your willingness when serving as U.N.
ambassador to speak out for Meriam Ibrahim, who was wrongfully
imprisoned in Sudan and sentenced to torture and death for the
crime of being a Christian, and you showed courage speaking out
for her.
As you know, I was very frustrated President Obama would
not speak out for her, but I was grateful that you did. But I
also had very significant disagreements with you during your
time as U.N. ambassador and nowhere were those disagreements
stronger then concerning Israel and concerning Iran.
Concerning Israel, I think, perhaps, the most shameful
moment of the Obama administration was after the election in
November of 2016 and was the Security Council's passage of
Resolution 2334, which I do not think it is coincidental that
the Security Council passed it after the presidential election
and not before.
And that resolution was passed with, at best, the
acquiescence of the United States and of you as U.N. Ambassador
and, at worst, the active encouragement of the Obama
administration and you, as U.N. Ambassador.
I believe Resolution 2334 is a pile of lies, that it is a
resolution that is motivated by anti-Semitism, by hatred for
Israel. Resolution 2334 declares much of modern-day Israel is
illegitimate and illegally occupied territory.
It declares the Jewish Quarter in Jerusalem as illegitimate
and illegally-occupied territory. It declares the Wailing Wall
as illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory.
The much-circulated picture of President Obama in a
yarmulke paying respects at the Wailing Wall, to see the Obama
administration put through a resolution designed to attack
Israel, was quite dismaying.
So I guess my first question is, do you agree with
Resolution 2334?
Ambassador Power. Thank you, Senator.
I had--there were two sort of guiding principles that I
relied upon as U.N. ambassador as it relates to Israel. The
first was to combat bias and anti-Semitism and the unfair way
that Israel has been treated at the U.N. and is treated at the
U.N., and the second, following President Obama's direction, of
course, was to preserve space for a two-state solution.
I want to make sure I have the chance to just describe a
little bit what I did, and I am disappointed we did not get to
talk about this in your office, what I did in the first
category because I think your question does not reflect the
reality of my four years at U.N.----
Senator Cruz. With respect, Ambassador Power, the time is
limited----
Ambassador Power. Right.
Senator Cruz [continuing]. And so if you could just answer
the question I asked. Do you agree with Resolution 2334?
I recognize you may well have done other things that were
positive concerning Israel. I am focused on this action at the
United Nations.
Ambassador Power. I just would like to get on the record
that under my leadership we secured Yom Kippur as a U.N.
holiday. We convened the first ever General Assembly condemning
anti-Semitism in the same chamber as the Zionism is racism
resolution was passed decades before.
And we integrated Israel in a way that had never been done
before: chairing committees, being able to actually be part of
groups from which they had been traditionally excluded.
I do not think there is a record that looks as substantial
when it comes to integrating Israel.
On the resolution itself, it is a resolution in keeping
with President Obama's desire to encourage the parties to avoid
unilateral steps, including terrorism, incitement to violence,
and the building of settlements.
Those dimensions of the resolution--I think, if you read my
explanation of vote at the time, the problem with the
resolution and the reason President Obama decided to abstain
was, by and large, the venue because the U.N. has been so
biased, because they are 18 General Assembly----
Senator Cruz. So let us get to a little bit more
granularity.
Ambassador Power. Yeah.
Senator Cruz. Do you believe the Jewish Quarter in
Jerusalem is illegitimate and illegally-occupied territory?
Ambassador Power. I do not.
Senator Cruz. So do you disagree with the substance of
Resolution 2334? Because that is what it says?
Ambassador Power. Senator, President Obama's desire was to
encourage the parties to avoid unilateral steps. That is the
essence of that resolution and I think the reason that he made
the judgment to instruct me to abstain.
Senator Cruz. So encouraging the party to--parties to avoid
unilateral steps. Resolution 2334 was a unilateral step. Israel
had no say in it. It was a step taken by the enemies of Israel
to condemn Israel.
Ambassador Power. Again, the desire that animated me in my
time at the U.N. was to fight bias and to preserve space for a
two-state solution.
Senator Cruz. Okay. A final question. Can you please
describe the role played by Iran and by the Houthis, in
particular, in deepening the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and
assess whether the Biden administration's moves to relieve
terrorism sanctions on the Houthis has played a role in that
humanitarian crisis?
Ambassador Power. The Houthis, when I was at the United
Nations, the Houthi overran a sovereign government, used
military force for territorial acquisition, have used food as a
weapon of war.
I mean, again, I am on record condemning Houthi actions and
specifically, again, the use of humanitarian aid. I think the
challenge is the vast majority of Yemenis live under Houthi
control at the moment unless and until there is a political
settlement.
And so it is really important, given that that is the
world's largest humanitarian catastrophe right now, that we
find a way to get food to those vulnerable people.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cruz. But the Biden administration's lifting the
terrorism sanction----
The Chairman. The senator's time has expired, and----
Senator Cruz. I was just asking her to answer the question.
The Chairman. I know. I have let more time than other
colleagues.
Senator Cruz. Okay. I would still like her to ask the
question.
The Chairman. I am sure you can submit it for the record
and you will get a response.
Senator Cruz. Okay. So you do not----
The Chairman. No, I want to observe the time I have for
everybody else.
Senator Cruz. She could still----
The Chairman. Senator Booker?
Senator Booker. I am really grateful. We are all juggling
hearings today and I appreciate the yielding of my friend from
Texas and the considerations of our chairperson on a tight day.
I am very happy to see Ambassador Power. I have known her
for years. She is a woman of extraordinary integrity,
commitment, and has lived a life of service to our nation on
many fronts that no matter what your political bias is it is
laudatory the kind of dedication she has had to the best
interest of America and issues of human rights and human
decency.
I want to ask Ambassador Power, really quickly, about the--
around the issue of preventing future pandemics. Last week, it
was reported that wildlife farms that were encouraged by the
communist Chinese government to breed exotic animals were most
likely the source of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The senior senator from Texas and I--Senator Cornyn--
introduced a bill called the Preventing Future Pandemics Act,
which authorizes funding to USAID to work on reducing demand
for consumption of wildlife from wildlife markets.
Will you work with us to reduce the global demand for
wildlife that could lead to another zoonotic disease outbreak
and will you work with us to invest in food systems and
alternative sources of food protein to move food-insecure
communities away from the consumption of wildlife?
Ambassador Power. Yes, Senator, and I appreciate the
integrated approach that that you bring to this issue, the idea
that environmental, agricultural, health--that these sectors
can be separated, I think, is--has been proven anachronistic
and, if confirmed, part of my challenge at USAID is to bring
about that integration and make sure that our experts are
working together across what have been silos in the not so
recent past.
Senator Booker. Thank you.
Ambassador, I know, from a friendship with you spanning
from years, that you are--you have an incredible and courageous
empathy for humanitarian crises around this planet and I know
how seriously you take that.
We are in the midst right now in 2021 with a record 235
million people who are in need of humanitarian assistance and
protection. That is an increase of 40 percent since 2020.
I am really honored to be working with Senator Young. He
and I co-chair a task force at CSIS to look at the humanitarian
access, which has been increasingly constrained as violent
conflict has escalated.
The NGO partners we worked with identified both
international--in other words, the willful obstruction by
governments, as we are seeing, frankly, in Ethiopia, and
bureaucratic obstruction of humanitarian access.
And the humanitarian groups really argued to Senator Young
and I that in the complicated environments like Yemen and
Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, northeast Nigeria, and elsewhere,
compliance with some USAID policies related to potential
materiel support to terrorist groups has made it nearly
impossible to operate.
And so in my final question to you and respectful of the
time of other senators, I just want to know, can you outline
the steps that you are going to take to work internally at
USAID and with colleagues at the State Department to try to
streamline and improve the regulatory process itself so that
humanitarian NGOs are really on a sound legal footing when
carrying out humanitarian assistance that is funded by the
United States?
And will you work with us to find ways to ease some of the
regulatory burdens on frontline humanitarian NGOs to make sure
they are on legal--sound legal footing in carrying out
humanitarian assistance funded by the U.S.?
Ambassador Power. Thank you. Thank you so much. My
gratitude to our partners working in those difficult
environments and my gratitude to USAID staff who do the same at
great risk.
I think part of the reason that you are seeing humanitarian
access denied is a sense of impunity on the part of various
actors, and it does create immense challenges for our partners
on the ground.
With regard to vetting and the challenges of complying with
regulations and certification, I think, Senator, that is
something absolutely I would love to sit down with you and talk
through.
I think we have to make sure that our--we are doing
everything in our power to ensure that our assistance reaches
our intended beneficiaries, given the kinds of actors that
inhabit these conflict areas.
At the same time, if there are efficiencies to be achieved,
of course, we would strive to achieve them. So absolutely happy
to sit down with you and talk that through, consistent, again,
with following the law and the requirements that this body has
put forward.
Senator Booker. I look forward to that partnership. I
yield. But I would like to just say I am so grateful to the
state of New Jersey for giving me the privilege of being a
United States senator.
I will count it as one of the great honors of my experience
as a senator to vote for your confirmation on the Senate floor.
You are an extraordinary human being that will do not just
the United States proud but the world proud with what I believe
will be extraordinary efforts to make this planet more just for
humanity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso?
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations. Good to see you. The kids have grown up
since you were last here. Cass is behind you, and as you say,
he is----
Ambassador Power. He has not grown up.
Senator Barrasso. No. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Barrasso. I would like to--if I could--before I
start on some other questions, just if you could please answer
Senator Cruz's question about if, when the Biden administration
lifted the terrorism sanctions on the Houthis if that made the
humanitarian crisis worse.
Ambassador Power. In lifting the designation--that is an
empirical question. I do not have an answer to the question and
I had not heard the full question before. So I do not know the
answer to that question.
Senator Barrasso. I want to move to energy development in
Africa. You know, worldwide 840 million people are living
without electricity. Five hundred and seventy-three million
live in--of these live in sub-Saharan Africa.
Power Africa was launched to increase the number of people
with access to power. Energy development can lift people out of
poverty, improve their education, health, well-being. On my
multiple trips to Africa, what I see is humanitarian problems
when they do not have electricity, when they do not have power,
whether it is to charge a phone or to deliver a baby and use
the suction apparatus at the time of the birth of the baby
with--it can make the difference between life and death.
So developing countries desperately need access to a steady
supply of affordable reliable electricity to support their
economic growth as well. So, you know, people back home in
Wyoming know firsthand the benefits of developing abundant
energy resources.
The solution to ending energy poverty does not lie in
limiting options but, I believe, using all available options. I
mean, you read about the most threatening environmental hazard
to people it is--it is cook smoke. It is indoor smoke because
they are using dung and wood to cook indoors.
I think we have to be diligent in promoting all-of-the-
above energy strategy that helps alleviate energy poverty.
So will you commit to helping developing countries use all
energy resources, including coal and oil and natural gas, so
they can get electricity?
Ambassador Power. Senator, I know that many of our
partners, you know, are seeking to transition, in part because
of pollution. I think Power Africa, and grateful from afar for
the last four years for your leadership on Power Africa.
I think it has been a tremendous boon to many communities,
both in poverty alleviation and in providing energy.
I gather that more than 18 million new power connections
for homes and businesses have been established through Power
Africa and that means first-time energy access for more than 88
million people in sub-Saharan Africa.
You know, on the specifics of what the energy sources are,
if I could--if I could get back to you I would be grateful.
Again, I know that there has been a shift over time, including
in the last administration, toward renewable sources. But I
also know that the all-of-the-above approach has been one that
has been the standard since the inception.
Senator Barrasso. Well, there have been issues about what
loans would be made to which countries, and China is rushing in
with--if the United States does not want to be active in
providing opportunities for affordable energy, China is happy
to become a partner with many countries that, I think, are ones
that we would rather those be working with us, and sometimes
the purity of the climate alarmists, as I call them, is harmful
to the economic needs and the health needs of people in these
areas, parts of the world.
Moving ahead, due to coronavirus, countries all around the
globe are struggling to support the health and safety of their
citizens. We see that--you have seen it firsthand.
There are limited resources to address incredible and
growing needs that we just heard about from Senator Booker.
Given the increasing needs for humanitarian assistance, global
health, and food insecurity, I am concerned that precious
resources are going to be redirected away from that in terms of
focusing on international climate change. Will climate change
be your top priority as the administrator of USAID?
Ambassador Power. Well, as you know, climate-related events
and the changing climate and the warmer climate is affecting
USAID returns on investments. You know, more droughts have made
an impact on our agricultural and food security programming.
So I think what we would be looking to do is within current
programming, for example, on food security, to think about
climate resilience.
You know, when it comes to humanitarian emergency funding,
you know, since there are more natural disasters happening
statistically, as a general rule, each year, thinking about how
to do disaster risk reduction, so there is less damage.
And so we, thus, you know, need to provide less
humanitarian emergency funding because buildings were built
more securely in the first instance. So I think it is less a
zero sum trade off and more about integration.
Senator Barrasso. Mr. Chairman, my time is expired. Thank
you.
The Chairman. Ambassador, I am going to just draw your
attention to a few things. I am going to submit those questions
for the record. I would like a substantive response to them
instead of going through it here. But I want to draw your
attention to just a couple things.
We have challenges in the hemisphere, like Venezuela and
Colombia, and I would like to hear your assessment on how AID
can provide development assistance to countries like Colombia
that are hosting refugees and doing a good neighbor and a
hemispheric good neighbor.
But I think we need to help countries like that that are in
the midst of doing that.
Second, I would like to draw your attention to the
challenges that the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh
continues to face in the light of last fall's attack by
Azerbaijan.
In the short term, USAID can help address food, water,
health care, and COVID assistance need, particularly for
displaced Armenians. But I am concerned the U.S. has not done
enough to date.
So I would like to look forward to hearing from you on
that. I would like to hear from you how the administration
seeks to address the interconnected security governance and
climate-related crises that are feeding the humanitarian
emergency in the Sahel.
And then lastly, I would like to draw your attention to the
U.S.-India relationship. We introduced the prioritizing clean
energy and climate cooperation with India to boost U.S.-India
cooperation. I would like to hear the role you envision USAID
playing in boosting U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy.
And last, last year's appropriation omnibus authorized the
USAID administrator to establish the United States-India
Gandhi-King Development Foundation, which would attract public
and private capital to fund grants to address development
priorities in India. I would like to hear your views on that
foundation.
So we will submit those for the record. If you give us a
substantive response, I would appreciate it.
I want to salute Declan and Rian, who have done such an
extraordinary job of listening to all these in-depth questions
and had patience through this whole period of time.
As the hearing comes to a close today, I want to thank
Ambassador Power for her time and her thoughtful testimony. It
is my intention, working with the ranking member, to hold the
markup for Ambassador Power as soon as possible after the
recess.
The record will remain open until Thursday, March 25th. I
would urge you to answer any questions that are submitted for
the record so that you can be in a position to be considered at
a business markup.
With thanks to the committee, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Robert Menendez
Refugees from Venezuela
Question. I support a strong U.S. response to the Venezuela
humanitarian crisis given the regional implications, particularly for
neighboring Colombia, which has received the vast majority of
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.
While the State Department leads on the refugee and migrant
response (with the exception of food aid), what is your
assessment of how USAID can provide development assistance in
countries hosting large numbers of refugees?
Answer. Thank you for your support. USAID works closely with the
State Department to coordinate response efforts across Latin America
and the Caribbean, as these countries have received an unprecedented
number of migrants and refugees from Venezuela. Since 2018, USAID has
provided more than $298 million in humanitarian assistance supporting
Venezuelan migrants, refugees, and host communities in Colombia with
food assistance, direct cash assistance, and health support. USAID is
also supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia
resulting from the Venezuelan migration crisis. In Colombia, I gather
that USAID has dedicated more than $77 million in development funding
to provide long-term assistance for Venezuelan migrant receptor
communities with the aim of expanding health, education, and justice
services. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to all
Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it possible
for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important step for
Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many Venezuelans it
hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you on how
USAID can support this effort.
Central America Regional Security Initiative
Question. The Trump administration sought to include funding for
reintegration services for migrants returning to Central America as
part of all of its programming for the region. As a result, existing
programmatic initiatives such as the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI) were significantly distorted to address
reintegration initiatives for deportees from the United States-
something never previously conceived to be a part of the CARSI
framework.
As USAID Administrator, will you work to ensure that well-
established initiatives are used for their intended goals, and
that security initiatives such as CARSI are never utilized for
deportee reintegration services?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will work to
ensure that well-established initiatives, including CARSI, are used for
their intended goals.
Internal Displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras
Question. Humanitarian organizations report that internal
displacement in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased over the
past year as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the region has seen
an uptick in gang and criminal violence, especially in El Salvador and
Honduras. Women, children, and LGBTQI+ individuals are at heightened
risk of violence, intimidation, and forced displacement.
Given recent commitments by governments in the region to address
forced displacement, including the early 2020 passage of an
IDP-focused law in El Salvador, what more can USAID do on the
humanitarian and development fronts to respond to internal
displacement in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
Answer. I agree this is a crucial issue. With growing needs from
COVID-19, food insecurity, and the continued impact of recent
hurricanes, USAID is looking to further expand humanitarian assistance
in the region, for example increasing support for child protection.
Following the hurricanes, USAID has been instrumental in providing
emergency assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) ensuring
they have safe shelter, food, clean water, health and protection
services, in addition to helping them recover their livelihoods. The
Agency utilizes several sets of data to understand internal
displacement flows and dynamics and inform assistance, such as its
InfoSegura regional project on security information management,
implemented with the United Nations Development Program, and the
International Organization for Migration's displacement and shelter
mapping. This data collection and analysis informs evidence-based
policies on human mobility in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. To
increase protection for IDPs, USAID's Regional Human Rights Project
supports strengthening early warning systems that track IDP dynamics,
preventing and alerting their potential human rights violations,
including referral programs for possible victims. Such efforts with the
Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, are now being expanded at the
regional level through joint work with the human rights ombudsman from
Honduras and El Salvador. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID
remains focused on internal displacement data to inform programming in
Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador.
Gender-Based Violence
Question. Will you ensure that USAID targets gender-based violence
(GBV) survivors, women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for
humanitarian programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed as USAID Administrator, I will ensure
that USAID continues to support gender-based violence (GBV) survivors,
women at risk of GBV, and LGBTQI+ individuals for humanitarian
programming in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. I understand that
in the Northern Triangle, USAID supports civil society and independent
watchdog institutions to deter human rights abuses, respond to human
rights violations, and support vulnerable populations. This includes
forcibly displaced persons, women, children, and youth affected by
violence and insecurity, indigenous and Afro-descendent communities,
and LGBTQI+ individuals.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to
face serious challenges in light of last fall's attack by Azerbaijan.
In the short term, USAID can help address food, water, healthcare, and
COVID assistance needs, particularly for displaced Armenians.
If confirmed, what will be your plan of action for providing needed
assistance to ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, including
those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and long term?
Answer. This has been a horrific chapter in the lives of the
civilians impacted by the recent conflict. President Biden has made
clear his intention to look at enhancing humanitarian assistance in the
region due to the displacement caused by the conflict. I believe USAID
has an important role to play in supporting peacebuilding and
humanitarian efforts, and supporting citizen-responsive governance and
durable economic growth. If confirmed, I will continue to pursue all
appropriate avenues for helping the people who are suffering in the
aftermath of this war. Since September 2020, USAID has provided more
than $4.5 million in total assistance to effectively respond to the
complex humanitarian crisis resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict and associated COVID-19 resurgence. USAID provided food,
shelter, emergency health assistance, and social services to
communities displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia.
Question. What do you view as the biggest challenge to providing
assistance at this time, and how will you address that challenge?
Answer. Both the Armenian government and humanitarian actors
estimate that 35,000-45,000 spontaneous arrivals will permanently
remain in Armenia, which is a major challenge moving forward. While the
displacement situation is dynamic and continues to evolve, USAID
continues to work closely with the Department of State to assess urgent
post-conflict humanitarian needs and possible future U.S. Government
engagement on an ongoing basis.
The Sahel
Question. The Sahel region of West Africa is facing a significant
humanitarian crisis due to armed conflict, poor governance, and the
impacts of climate change. Last year, the efforts of U.N. and
humanitarian agencies in the region were severely underfunded.
How will you, if confirmed, plan to address the interconnected
security, governance, and climate-related crises that are
feeding the humanitarian emergency in the Sahel?
Answer. I am concerned about rising violent extremism, growing
humanitarian needs, and increasing governance challenges in the Sahel.
If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to align with regional,
national, and local efforts to expand economic growth, improve human
capital, counter violent extremism, strengthen governance.., and build
resilience to climate risks. Gains in these areas will help communities
be less vulnerable to shocks and violent extremism. Complementing these
efforts, USAID carries out and coordinates resilience programs with a
longer term aim to reduce chronic vulnerability that underlie the
crisis and the need for recurrent humanitarian assistance. These
investments aim to lift people out of poverty and improve on successful
interventions to facilitate increased resilience to climate change and
self-reliance in the Sahel. In addition, the administration will take
advantage of the authorities provided in the Global Fragility Act to
move this work forward. If confirmed, I hope to build on USAID programs
already in place to counter violent extremism in the Sahel. I will also
continue to work with my counterparts to find effective programming to
address and combat violent extremism throughout the African continent.
Support for Cuban Civil Society
Question. For more than two decades, USAID has co-led U.S.
government initiatives to promote democracy in civil society, and to
provide support for courageous human rights defenders, as well as civil
society leaders and journalists who work independently of the Cuban
regime.
As USAID Administrator, what steps will you take to continue this
important work and ensure U.S. support for human rights
defenders, independent civil society leaders, and independent
journalists in Cuba?
Answer. Cuba is one of the most repressive countries in the world.
The country is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human
rights, controls information among its populace, inhibits meaningful
civil society activity-including free press-and criminalizes political
dissent. The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential
to Cuban democracy. I gather USAID has a portfolio in place to continue
supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will
push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency
will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political
prisoners and persecuted activists. USAID-supported NGOs continue to
defend the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for
their political beliefs. If confirmed, I will ensure these critical
programs continue. Also, as one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to
the UN, I raised the case of Oswaldo Pay directly with the Cuban
Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent investigation of
the circumstances in which Pay had been killed, and I continued to
advocate publicly in support of Pay 's family. During my time at the
UN, I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of Cubans
like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer, and Antonio
Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against Cuba's
persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
Haiti
Question. Haiti's humanitarian situation is rapidly deteriorating,
with the U.N. reporting extremely high levels of food insecurity, a 377
percent increase in gender-based violence over the past year, and lack
of access to education.
What more can USAID do to support protection-related needs, such as
child protection and prevention, and respond to gender-based
violence?
Answer. COVID-19 has had devastating direct and indirect impacts on
women and children in Haiti. Supporting key initiatives that protect
and empower vulnerable people is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I
will ensure that we continue to build on USAID investments in Haiti
that support protection-related needs. For example, USAID has provided
approximately $2.3 million in fiscal year 2020 funding to the United
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and four non-
governmental organizations to provide protection services such as
psychosocial support to Haitian children, families, and frontline
health care workers affected by COVID-19. In addition to prioritizing
protection activities, USAID also requires partners to adhere to COVID-
specific gender and protection mainstreaming requirements to ensure all
programming is safe and accessible to the most vulnerable. USAID has
also provided $500,000 to support activities in child-friendly spaces
for vulnerable children and adolescents. USAID partners have also
organized awareness campaigns that bring attention to gender-based
violence services; trained journalists on how to ethically report on
gender-based violence; and developed referral networks to connect
survivors to safe spaces, legal aid, and other lifesaving services.
U.S.-India Cooperation
Question. I am a strong supporter of the U.S.-India relationship,
and I was proud to introduce the Prioritizing Clean Energy and Climate
Cooperation with India Act to boost U.S.-India cooperation on clean
energy.
What role do you envision USAID playing in boosting U.S.-India
cooperation on clean energy?
Answer. The U.S.-India development relationship spans more than 70
years. India is a partner in advancing our shared objectives to support
inclusive economic growth, reduced carbon emissions, open and inclusive
digital ecosystems, and the global health security agenda across South
and Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India is a priority country for
our climate diplomacy strategy, both because of its current emissions
trajectory, which is concerning, but also because we see India as an
important partner on future clean energy research, development, and
deployment. If confirmed, I envision that USAID will work with its
clean energy transition as part of our shared objective of meeting the
climate challenge.
U.S-India Cooperation and Congress
Question. How can Congress and USAID work together to strengthen
that cooperation?
Answer. While India is the third largest emitter of greenhouse
gases globally, the Government of India has demonstrated in recent
years a commitment to reducing emissions and combating climate change,
including by setting ambitious targets for power sector-led emissions
reductions. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress in
support of India's climate priorities through programs and partnerships
that prioritize climate change mitigation, clean energy development,
sustainable landscapes, and disaster risk reduction.
United States-India Gandhi-King Development Foundation
Question. Last year's appropriations omnibus authorized the USAID
Administrator to establish the United States-India Gandhi-King
Development Foundation, which would attract public and private capital
to fund grants to address development priorities in India. What are
your views on this Foundation? If confirmed, what will be your first
actions regarding the Foundation?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the Gandhi-King
Scholarly Exchange Initiative Act, which calls for professional
exchanges and the establishment of the U.S.-India Gandhi-King
Development Foundation in coordination with the Government of India.
The Foundation presents a unique partnership opportunity for the United
States to work with the Government of India in leveraging India's
domestic public and private resources to combat its most pressing
development challenges. I look forward to advancing this partnership
and honoring the legacies of both Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr and
Mahatma Gandhi. If confirmed, I will support the establishment of the
Foundation which will include coordinating with the relevant Government
of India ministries and stakeholders and creating a roadmap for next
steps in establishing the Foundation.
Labor Rights in Bangladesh
Question. In March 2020, I released a SFRC report highlighting the
growing threats to labor rights and trade unions in Bangladesh. The
U.S. must respond to this threat by increasing our support for unions,
not abandoning them. Under the previous Administration, USAID moved
away from using its Bangladesh labor rights appropriation to support
the development of unions, even though unions have been clear that they
want, and can use, such support.
If confirmed, will you commit to directly and robustly supporting
the development of trade unions in Bangladesh, including with
the funding from the annual appropriation for labor rights in
Bangladesh?
Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue.
Labor rights are actively threatened and diminished in Bangladesh, as
was made clear in your 2020 Report commemorating the seventh
anniversary of the Tazreen Fashions and Rana Plaza tragedies. I
understand that USAID has a robust labor program in Bangladesh, and if
confirmed, I commit to continuing this important work. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with you to help ensure the findings of your
report are central not just to USAID's labor programming in Bangladesh,
but also the Agency's entire global labor program.
Tigray
Question. The ongoing conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region has
triggered a large-scale displacement crisis, regional instability, and
a humanitarian emergency with constrained outside access.
Under what conditions should the U.S. restore full foreign
assistance funding to Ethiopia? Should the U.S. increase
assistance for critical development programs that address the
drivers of the conflict and strengthen political reforms?
Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides.
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. I understand that the
Administration is reviewing our diplomatic, security, and other
assistance to the region. If confirmed, I look forward to engaging in
this conversation and commit to keeping you informed.
Question. Do you believe that, under current circumstances,
Ethiopia can hold credible elections in June? What steps will you take,
if confirmed, to address closing political and media space, and
intercommunal violence in Ethiopia?
Answer. For the June elections to constitute a step forward in
Ethiopia's political development, they will need to be seen as credible
by a majority of Ethiopians, result in more inclusive political
representation, and lay the foundation for broader political dialogue
across Ethiopia. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
interagency partners to determine how USAID can best strengthen
democratic processes in Ethiopia, especially at a time of such grave
crisis.
COVID-19
Question. Diseases do not recognize borders, so challenges like the
COVID-19 pandemic necessitate a global response that the U.S. must help
lead.
How will USAID ensure its COVID-19 aid response is conflict
sensitive and takes a peacebuilding and trauma-informed
approach to reduce the risks of further violence and advance
effective recovery?
Answer. Around two-thirds of the countries where USAID works are
beset by or at risk of violent conflict, and COVID-19 is putting
further stress on fragile systems in these nations. Dozens of countries
have curtailed free expression, assembly, and media; more than 70
countries postponed elections; and a number have experienced civil
unrest. Disinformation is rampant. Loss of jobs and lack of adequate
education and basic services create contexts ripe for conflict. I
understand that USAID applies principles of conflict-sensitivity
throughout all programs, including its COVID-19 response. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID continues to support conflict-sensitive
approaches across all USAID programming.
Question. What steps will you take to address secondary impacts on
health, education, poverty, and human rights in countries where USAID
has programs and activities?
Answer. No matter where in the world we live, we all share the goal
of ending this terrible pandemic, restoring normalcy in our daily
lives, and beginning to rebuild from the devastation caused by COVID-
19. We will not be safe here at home from COVID-19 and its variants
unless the rest of the world makes significant progress on getting the
pandemic under control. If confirmed, I will prioritize preventing
COVID-19 transmission through public health and vaccine interventions;
alleviating worsening humanitarian crises and food insecurity; and
addressing the long term second order impacts on the global economy,
democracy and human rights, education, and livelihoods. USAID will work
with partner country governments, civil society organizations, and
other partners to address the second order impacts through a conflict-
sensitive, rights-based approach to health, education, poverty
reduction, and governance.
Question. Will you revise the USAID-State COVID-19 strategy to
ensure a peacebuilding and conflict prevention perspective is
integrated?
Answer. As directed by President Biden's first National Security
Memorandum, USAID is working with interagency counterparts to develop a
whole-of-government response plan for combating the global pandemic.
That document will provide a framework for State and USAID's
forthcoming work on COVID-19 and will prioritize addressing second-
order effects of the pandemic. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's
programs incorporate and address the evolving context of the COVID-19
pandemic, including issues related to peacebuilding and conflict
prevention.
Question. In what ways can USAID respond to governments using
COVID-19 to justify closing civic space, curbing fundamental freedoms,
committing human rights abuses and expanding authoritarianism?
Answer. COVID-19 is not just a public health crisis but also a
crisis for democratic governance, fundamental freedoms, and civic
space. According to Freedom House, the condition of democracy and human
rights worsened in 80 countries during the pandemic, with a range of
countries using the crisis to tighten their grip on power, crackdown on
political targets, and restrict the rights of vulnerable populations.
The Administration will restore democracy and human rights to the
center of U.S. foreign policy, strengthening the protection of human
rights worldwide and re-establishing government-wide attention to
atrocity prevention and the protection of civilians in war. USAID will
ensure that programming to address COVID-19 is implemented in a
conflict-sensitive, rights-based approach. If confirmed, my seat at the
NSC will allow me to ensure that these issues are engaged at the
highest levels of decision-making within the USG.
Environmental and Social Safeguards
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure adequate
environmental and social safeguards are in place for all of USAID's
programming?
How will you support USAID's development of this mechanism to
ensure that it effectively addresses impacts that could
undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives?
Answer. USAID has guiding regulations for examining the
environmental impact of all projects, as well as a commitment to
protect and advance vulnerable populations; to seek to do no harm; and
to promote human rights. I understand USAID is designing an Agency-wide
accountability mechanism that will further enable beneficiaries and the
project affected community to express environmental, social and
economic concerns and grievances. If confirmed, I commit that the
project design and implementation for all USAID programs, projects, and
activities will include strong safeguarding for beneficiaries,
especially the project affected community, including Indignenous
Peoples and vulnerable populations.
USAID Resources
Question. Many USAID officials have argued they need greater
flexibility in managing appropriated funds in order to adjust to
rapidly changing global circumstances and achieve the greatest impact,
while respecting Congressional priorities and maintaining high levels
of accountability.
How would you approach the question of increasing flexibility for
USAID?
Are there resource management tools you need immediately as you
address the challenges presented by the pandemic, and
adjustments needed in the near term as we move to post-Covid-19
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to discuss
ways to improve USAID's ability to align its resources with its
strategic objectives and priorities, including increasing our ability
to adapt and pivot to emergent needs and opportunities as they arise,
while of course making sure to provide Congress with complete and
useful information on the use of appropriated resources in a timely
manner.
Accountability
Question. Accountability of resources and programs through
transparency, monitoring, evaluation, and learning is an important aid
reform pillar that strengthens the ultimate impact of programs, and
ensures sustainability of investments.
Is it your intention to prioritize accountability across the
agency, especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and
learning to improve programs and strengthen their impact?
Answer. Yes, it is my intention to prioritize accountability across
the Agency, and especially the role of monitoring, evaluation, and
learning. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the
American people. Measuring and analyzing results-and learning and
adapting when programs fall short-are essential aspects of day-to-day
management of USAID's operations. USAID is recognized as a leader among
federal agencies in using evidence from monitoring and evaluation for
accountability and for learning. Of course, there is always room for
improvement and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing
USAID even further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather
information to adapt programs and achieve results.
Question. What is your vision for ensuring important aid
effectiveness tools will receive priority under your leadership?
Answer. The key principles of development cooperation effectiveness
include transparency, accountability, a focus on results, and inclusive
partnerships. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to ensure
that USAID deepens its commitments to these principles in all aspects
of its programs. I will also ensure that USAID remains a leader in the
international aid community in championing these principles and
promoting learning and exchange among donor and partner countries. For
example, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID will continue to
support international accountability through USAID's leadership on
remote monitoring and real-time evaluations, among other newer
mechanisms. These innovative approaches have allowed USAID to maintain
oversight of programs following the onset of the pandemic despite
constraints placed on travel.
American Recovery Plan Funding
Question. The American Recovery Plan provides $41 million for
COVID-related operational expenses at USAID; $905 million for global
health response activities; and an estimated $900 million for
international economic stabilization efforts. The United States has
both a national security and economic interest in mitigating the COVID-
19 pandemic's potentially crippling and destabilizing effects on
regional and local foreign economies.
With regards to the economic stabilization allocation: where do you
see the economic risks created by the pandemic as being most
acute?
Answer. The pandemic has had devastating impacts on households in
the U.S. and around the world, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities
and inequalities, especially in humanitarian settings. The
reverberating socioeconomic impacts of this global crisis are, and will
continue to be, widespread-and have already led to major backsliding in
development and governance. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID remains
committed to addressing urgent humanitarian needs, providing immediate
economic relief by forging sustainable pathways out of poverty, and
working with partner-country governments, civil society, and other
actors to stabilize economies.
Question. Will you commit to fulsome engagement with this committee
on the Agency's use of these funds?
Answer. Yes, I commit to fulsome engagement with this committee on
the Agency's use of the American Rescue Plan funds.
Question. The GAO recently published a report finding that the
previous administration gave USAID plenty of marching orders, but
consistently neglected to involve USAID in strategy development and
decision-making around USAID's CARES Act allocation.
Will you commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in COVID
decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's
American Recovery Plan funds?
Answer. Yes, I commit to asserting USAID's appropriate role in
COVID decision-making processes, and in budgeting the Agency's American
Recovery Plan funds.
USAID Vaccine Allotment
Question. It was widely reported that the previous administration
failed to acquire an allotment of the COVID vaccine for USAID employees
from Health and Human Services.
Will you commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID
personnel, and use the Recovery Plan's operational resources to
ensure a healthy and safe work environment at USAID?
Answer. The safety of USAID's workforce is my highest priority. I
commit to prioritizing the health and safety of USAID personnel and to
using the American Rescue Plan's (ARP) operational resources to secure
a healthy and safe work environment at USAID. The Agency has recently
partnered with the Department of State to vaccinate its overseas and
domestic personnel with critical in-person continuity of mission
functions. The Department of State is covering USAID personnel overseas
while, domestically, USAID received a direct vaccine allocation from
HHS. The Agency will continue to make every effort to keep USAID staff
safe in its domestic facilities. The Agency will use ARP funds to
augment its staff to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic and to improve
the Agency's operational readiness.
USAID's Global Labor Program
Question. I need your commitment to restore and expand USAID's
Global Labor Program. It is the agency's only multi-country program to
empower marginalized workers to advocate for their rights and
livelihood. Workers around the world are struggling amidst the COVID-19
pandemic, with women workers suffering disproportionately.
Do you believe USAID currently has the staff capacity and expertise
to develop the worker rights programs and approaches that
marginalized workers so desperately need right now?
Answer. Empowering workers is relevant both globally and in the
United States, and I appreciate your longstanding leadership on this
critical issue. Work is central to people's daily lives, and labor
issues and the ways in which workers express their rights affect many
of USAID's development objectives. We already know, for example, that
women are over-represented in a number of the industries (like retail
and hospitality) most impacted by the pandemic around the world.
USAID's Global Labor Program (GLP) was created to increase the capacity
of worker organizations, and I look forward to working with our
partners to ensure our strategy adequately promotes labor rights and
access to justice in a fair and equitable manner. If confirmed, I will
ensure that the high capacity and expertise of USAID staff to address
these issues remains an Agency priority.
Climate
Question. President Biden is hosting a Climate Leaders' Summit on
April 22, 2021. How will USAID participate in this summit? Do you
anticipate building global support and financing for climate adaptation
at the Summit?
Answer. I understand that USAID is actively participating in
preparations for the Summit, and that the Agency welcomes the
opportunity provided by the event to highlight their work with
developing countries on climate change mitigation, adaptation, and
finance. A key theme of the Summit will be mobilizing public and
private sector finance to drive the net-zero transition and to help
vulnerable countries cope with climate impacts. USAID has extensive
experience improving policies, strengthening institutions, and
mobilizing finance for climate adaptation and mitigation that also
advances countries' development priorities. If confirmed, I will
continue to elevate these issues within the interagency and with our
developing country partners, and look forward to engaging in the
Summit.
Question. Climate adaptation is currently vastly underfunded, and
USAID's work in this area needs improvement in terms of execution,
transparency and reporting.
What are your initial ideas for how USAID can improve its support
for the needs of those communities hardest hit by climate
change to adapt in place?
Answer. I agree with your concern that adaptation programs are
vastly underfunded. USAID works with vulnerable countries to implement
their adaptation priorities and is committed to further mainstreaming
climate considerations into its work to intensify efforts to increase
climate security and resilience. USAID helps partners access and use
climate and weather data and tools, and develop strategies to build
resilience to climate risks, whether from sudden events such as floods
and storms or from slower-moving events such as droughts and sea-level
rise. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that our efforts on
climate are informed by on-the-ground knowledge and in consultation
with stakeholders.
Question. Many developing countries have made greenhouse gas
emission reduction commitments to the Paris Agreement that are
contingent upon support and assistance from multilateral finance
institutions and/or bilateral assistance from developing countries.
Is it important for U.S. support and assistance to developing
countries to be consistent with host country climate change
mitigation commitments?
Answer. Yes, and with the U.S. having rejoined the Paris Agreement,
USAID will play an important role in working with developing countries
to set and achieve more ambitious targets under their Nationally
Determined Contributions to the Agreement. Developing countries produce
about two-thirds of annual global greenhouse gas emissions and are
integral partners in limiting climate change. USAID will provide
assistance to partner countries to achieve their climate mitigation
commitments and low-emissions economic development goals through
concrete actions like transitioning to renewable energy and improving
conservation and management of carbon-rich forests and landscapes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders deployed authoritarian
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and constitutional
frameworks, including in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
Meanwhile, across multiple administrations, including the Obama
administration in which you previously served, U.S. democracy and
governance programs are chronically underfunded and notoriously slow to
respond to emerging opportunities.
If confirmed, how will you prioritize reinforcing democratic
institutions and norms in Africa through USAID programs while
balancing competing priorities in the areas of economic growth,
stabilization, global health, humanitarian assistance, and
human rights?
Answer. In sub-Saharan Africa, Freedom House reports that 21
nations experienced democratic declines and only seven showed positive
trends in 2020--the largest gap in 15 years. If confirmed, I will seek
to increase, in scale and effectiveness, USAID's investments in
democracy and governance throughout the region, including through
support for anti-corruption efforts and justice reforms. In many
backsliding countries, concerns about corruption and accountability are
central to citizens' concerns about government performance. If
confirmed, I will also work to make sure that USAID is doing much more
to integrate efforts to address corruption and improve democratic
accountability into economic growth, stabilization, global health,
humanitarian assistance, and human rights programming. By embedding
strong participation, inclusion, transparency, accountability, and
oversight measures in health, education, and economic programming,
USAID can better safeguard its investments in sustained and resilient
recovery efforts from the pandemic, and lay a foundation for shoring up
democratic institutions in the long term. This is an immensely
challenging area, especially given China's growing support for various
governments' undemocratic tactics and its provision of rights-
infringing technologies in many of these countries. Given the critical
importance of reversing democratic backsliding and supporting
democratic reformers, I look forward to consulting closely on the path
ahead.
Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was,
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly
mobilizing the necessary resources (enabling policies, funding, and
staff) has been a challenge. If confirmed, how would you prepare USAID
to respond to rapid democratic changes and seize unexpected
opportunities?
Answer. USAID's democracy, human rights, and governance efforts are
intended to promote democracy and civil society participation as well
as prevent and respond to closing democratic spaces. These efforts
include both rapid response mechanisms through our Office of Transition
Initiatives programs as well as long-term investments designed to
demonstrate solidarity with pro-democratic forces, protect nascent
advances, and prevent backsliding. USAID can play an important role
during unexpected opportunities by helping civil society adapt to
changing circumstances and providing assistance to strengthen existing
checks and balances. To further support transitions and rapidly
mobilize in the context of unexpected opportunities or crises, USAID
seeks to promote flexibility within activity design, award language,
and implementation. This can ensure that programming, implementers, and
local actors are able to best respond to windows of opportunity and/or
democratic backsliding. As the current crisis in Ethiopia demonstrates,
democratic progress and overall stability are fragile, and if confirmed
I will be focused on ensuring that USAID programming is appropriate
for, and reflective of, actual circumstances on the ground. As a long-
time Sudan watcher, I am grateful to Congress for stepping up in
support of Sudan's nascent democratic transition and eager to assess
current programming and what more might be done to help deepen the
reform process.
Question. There are long-standing concerns about the fungibility of
U.S. foreign assistance for African countries ruled by authoritarian
regimes (e.g., Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, etc.), particularly
for health and food security programs, which account for the
overwhelming majority of U.S. assistance on the continent. While this
aid advances U.S. humanitarian interests, it can also offset essential
budget lines, displace national investment, and enable authoritarian
regimes to prioritize military spending, pilfer state resources, and
support corrupt patronage networks.
Do you think it is time for the United States to undertake a
comprehensive re-evaluation of the policies, forms, and methods
of delivering U.S. foreign assistance in Africa?
Answer. The tendencies that you describe are certainly ones I have
observed in Africa and other regions. USAID works in very complex
environments and I gather that the Agency's investments in Africa,
particularly in health and food security, are structured to be
sensitive to local contexts, in order to save lives and improve
livelihoods for those most in need. When providing assistance in the
region, USAID works with both U.N. organizations and international and
local non-governmental organizations to ensure that support and
services go to those most in need. USAID also utilizes a variety of
tools to monitor the delivery of assistance to ensure compliance with
all applicable laws and regulations. If confirmed, I look forward to
delving into these issues more deeply and consulting with you further
to ensure that USAID's assistance does not inadvertently benefit
authoritarian governments.
Question. How will USAID effectively deliver aid such that it
reaches the intended beneficiaries without enabling the preservation of
repressive regimes?
Answer. This is a very important issue. USAID adheres to strict
guidelines for monitoring assistance provided in restrictive
environments and, depending on the extent of the restrictions, has
developed remote methods for program monitoring, including contracting
with third party monitors who are able to access regions where USAID
staff are not able to travel. One of the cornerstones of U.S. soft
power is our willingness to provide life-saving humanitarian assistance
wherever it is most needed. In response to famine or natural disasters
in authoritarian countries, USAID works with non-governmental partners
to ensure that aid reaches those most in need without providing
material support to unfriendly or authoritarian regimes. When it comes
to longer-term development programs in those countries, USAID works
with civil society and other non-governmental organizations to support
development and democracy and governance programs. If confirmed, I look
forward to consulting with you further to ensure that USAID's
assistance does not enable the preservation of repressive regimes.
Question. Africa is experiencing a massive demographic shift. Over
the next two decades, demographers project that Africa will account for
nearly half of global population growth and, by mid-century, will be
home to a quarter of the world's population. Sixty percent of Africa's
population is currently under 25, with an overall median age of 20, and
expected to continue to get younger. USAID will remain at the forefront
of United States efforts to work with young Africans.
Programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) and the
initiative's Mandela Washington Fellowship are important, but
what can USAID do to expand its reach, more effectively engage
Africa's massive youth population, and build long-term
partnerships with the next generation of decision-makers,
business partners, and allies?
Answer. This emphasis on youth is key. Continent-wide initiatives
such as the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), Prosper Africa,
Power Africa, as well as mission-based programs, contribute to USAID's
global reputation as a leader in youth programming. For example,
through YALI, USAID has equipped more than 20,000 young leaders from 49
sub-Saharan African countries with the skills to catalyze economic,
political and social change in their home countries based on American
values of transparency, civic engagement, and accountability. I gather
that USAID missions also integrate youth across all key sectors and
support strategic partnerships with other donors and private sector
partners, a practice I will ensure continues if confirmed. If
confirmed, I look forward to further consultations with you on ways to
expand USAID's engagement with young people on the continent, helping
support the next generation of political leaders, engaged citizens, and
business owners.
Question. Launched by the Trump administration, Prosper Africa is a
U.S. Government initiative supported by 17 agencies and departments,
including USAID, to increase two-way trade and investment between the
United States and Africa. In 2019, Africa accounted for just 1.4
percent of U.S. global trade and received 0.7 percent of U.S. foreign
direct investment. Such shares have declined relative to their
historical highs a decade or so ago. One area of Prosper Africa that
requires greater emphasis, and where USAID can play a critical role, is
in improving the enabling environment for economic growth.
Strengthening the rule of law, combating corruption, and promoting
inclusive economic growth and human rights under a rules-based system
would create better conditions for U.S. investment while also
counterbalancing efforts by the Chinese Communist Party to undermine
free-market competition in African markets to their advantage.
How can the U.S. Government, and USAID in particular, most
effectively incentivize reforms that will improve the enabling
environment for investment and trade in Africa? Does the
existing Prosper Africa provide an effective framework, or does
it need to be modified? If so, how?
Answer. Improving the enabling environment for private sector
investment is essential, and I agree with you that USAID staff and
programs can play an important role in engaging local actors to take
steps to improve the regulatory and investment climate. USAID has
developed innovative new programs in support of Prosper Africa,
including a new continent-wide program to be launched this year to
boost trade, increase investment, and support business-friendly policy
reforms. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other Departments
and Agencies to advance this important goal, including through any
necessary adjustments to Prosper Africa. I will support efforts that
build the capacity of African businesses and catalyze U.S. private
sector investment in Africa's growth, and engaging young entrepreneurs,
especially women, as partners. Programs that strengthen the rule of
law, protect individual rights, and tackle corruption are vital for
creating the conditions for economic growth and for attracting U.S.
investment and trade in Africa.
Question. How should U.S.-African trade and investment initiatives
factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter China, particularly in
Africa?
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States is
providing a meaningful alternative to China's state-led approach by
advancing a model of sustainable economic growth based on transparency,
responsible lending practices, strong environmental standards, and
investment in relationships with local communities. Through Prosper
Africa, the United States aims to mobilize billions of dollars of U.S.
private sector capital and to ensure that American companies can
compete on an even playing field by sharing timely information on new
opportunities, providing comprehensive packages of financing and other
assistance, and supporting trade and investment policies that promote
transparency and competition. We must also strengthen American soft
power by effectively communicating this support, engaging with youth,
and promoting entrepreneurship and American business practices. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting further with you and to working
with other Departments and Agencies as well as the business community
to help ensure that the U.S. is pursuing trade and investment
initiatives strategically and from a position of strength.
Belarus
Question. Since the August 9, 2020, presidential election,
Belarusians have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to
contest the official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander
Lukashenka another term. The Government has responded to these peaceful
protests with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances,
arrests, torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists.
Since the protests began, the United States, though USAID and the
State Department, has increased its support for civil society
in Belarus. Do you believe that the U.S. response to events in
Belarus has been adequate? What more could, or should, the
United States and its European allies do to assist those
Belarusians working for democracy, free media, and a free
society?
Answer. I have used my platform as a private citizen to be an
outspoken supporter of the courageous Belarusians who have been
peacefully protesting for over seven months. If confirmed, I will build
on the U.S. Government's support for their democratic aspirations.
President Biden strongly condemned the Lukashenka regime for its
violent repression of the protesters and called for a peaceful transfer
of power, the release of all political prisoners, and new elections. As
the administration consults with allies and partners to determine
appropriate next steps to support the Belarusian people and their right
to choose their own leaders via free and fair elections, if confirmed,
I look forward to working with my interagency counterparts--guided by
the Belarus Democracy Act of 2020--in developing a whole of U.S.
Government approach to end this egregious assault on Belarusian
citizens and initiate a constructive dialogue with those calling for
change. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I made it a priority to call
attention to the work of activists, dissidents, and reformers around
the world, and to mobilize multilateral pressure on their behalf. In
addition to demonstrating solidarity and raising international
awareness, support from government officials can sometimes provide
those on the front-lines in places like Belarus with a greater degree
of protection from potential retribution. As such, if confirmed, I will
continue to find ways to lift up the voices of those Belarusians
working for democracy while encouraging my counterparts around the
world to do the same.
Georgia
Question. Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good
progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic
reforms, and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the
EU and NATO. USAID has been a major funder of reform and development
programs in Georgia. However, over the past few years, the country has
suffered democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the
judiciary, media, and the ruling political party.
Do you believe that the political and governance situation in
Georgia has reached the point at which we should reevaluate our
relationship with the country, including by conditioning
certain aid to Georgia? What levers can the United States,
through USAID, use to push Georgians, including and especially
the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary
and complete its electoral reforms?
Answer. I agree that for Georgia to unlock further progress in its
economic and democratic development, the people of Georgia must have
confidence that their elected leaders are committed to a citizen-
centered democracy based on the rule of law. USAID's work with
Georgia's political parties, local nonpartisan monitoring groups, and
the Central Electoral Commission support this goal. USAID's current
programs are also actively working to strengthen Georgia's justice
system and electoral process. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with Congress to assess the shape and scope of these programs in light
of the democratic downturn, so as to ensure that they are targeted
appropriately, considering as well whether resources should be
channeled in different ways.
Ukraine
Question. Ukraine continues to fight two wars: first with the
Kremlin and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and
independence; and second with its own demons, particularly the
entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic
transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.
Should the United States continue to condition certain types of
assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms?
Should existing conditions for aid be expanded? What further
incentives does the United States, along with our European
partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its land
reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-
enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive
judiciary?
Answer. When I travelled to Ukraine in 2015 as U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N., I spoke out against the very issue you identify: deep,
systemic corruption that permeated virtually every facet of Ukrainian
life. I continue to share your concerns about the daunting obstacle
that corruption poses for the Ukrainian people. Troubling recent
rulings by Ukraine's own Constitutional Court that weaken important
anti-corruption institutions, such as the National Anti-Corruption
Bureau and the High Anti Corruption Court, demonstrate clearly how much
work remains to be done. At the same time, some inroads have been made.
When the protests against President Yanukovych began in November 2013,
Ukraine ranked 144th out of 175 countries on Transparency
International's corruption index. Today, it ranks 117. While there is
obviously significant additional work yet to be done, these small but
important advances show how critical USAID and USG assistance is to
anti-corruption efforts, from work aimed at strengthening oversight and
accountability mechanisms to partnerships with civil society
organizations. The Biden administration has been clear about its intent
to support Ukraine's self-chosen European path, including by pushing
for more progress on fighting corruption and implementing reforms that
will strengthen Ukraine's institutions. USAID implements numerous anti-
corruption programs in Ukraine that directly address land reform,
judicial reform, decentralization, and privatization. Combating
corruption is a central tenet and cross-cutting pillar of USAID's
development strategy in Ukraine, and if confirmed, I will seek to
ensure that measurable progress continues to be achieved on this
pressing concern.
Central Asia
Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have often
been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy. However, the region sits
between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S.
involvement and activity in those countries. USAID has recently
expanded its presence in the region in response.
Over the past few years, the coordination between the United States
and EU on development programs in Central Asia has markedly
strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia
engagement strategies. Will you commit to continuing to
coordinate USAID's Central Asia engagement with the EU and to
ensuring that Central Asia remains a priority for engagement by
USAID?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that Central Asia remains
a priority for USAID. The Biden administration fully supports the C5+1
initiative and seeks to help this region be more independent and
resilient. We will continue our close coordination with the EU on
development programs. A crucial strategic interest for the United
States is the stability of the region, which borders China, Russia and
Afghanistan and is increasingly marked by conflict and
authoritarianism. USAID has cultivated relationships in Central Asia,
establishing two new Missions in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in June
2020. If confirmed, I will build upon this momentum in collaboration
with Congress and the European Commission's Directorate-General for
International Partnerships, which has established technical expert
working groups focused on coordinating trade, energy, water and
environmental efforts in Central Asia.
Question. The Indo-Pacific is a critical region for U.S. security
and economic growth. It represents nearly half of the global population
and is home to some of the most dynamic economies in the world, but is
also home to security challenges that threaten to undermine U.S.
national security interests, regional peace, and global stability. The
Trump administration articulated a strategy to advance a ``free and
open Indo-Pacific,'' and has expanded partnerships with regional
countries and implemented multiple initiatives in the region to support
this goal. USAID played a significant role in this strategy.
Do you agree with the core tenants of a vision for the ``free and
open Indo-Pacific'' strategy advanced over the last several
years? If so, what should USAID's role be in this strategy? If
not, why not?
Answer. Yes, I agree. The Biden administration has made it clear
that a Free and Open Indo-Pacific will be a foreign policy and national
security priority, consistent with the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act
of 2018. If confirmed, I will ensure USAID continues to fulfill its
important role supporting democracy, human rights, inclusive economic
growth, open and inclusive digital ecosystems, and the global health
security agenda in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, I believe that USAID
should continue its vital leadership in efforts to support countries'
COVID-19 responses and their natural resource management.
Question. If confirmed, what are the key principles, initiatives,
and other elements of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy
do you believe should be retained and continued? How would you build on
these initiatives? What other policies, initiatives, and priorities
would you pursue to advance U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region?
What specific policy and funding priorities would USAID require to
advance a successful Indo-Pacific strategy?
Answer. The Biden administration will continue to advance the
principles of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I will
continue to prioritize strengthening democratic systems, fostering
economic growth, and improving the management of natural resources as
part of USAID's approach to the Indo-Pacific region. I look forward to
building upon USAID's successful investments in democratic governance,
transparency and anti-corruption measures, the digital economy,
infrastructure, and energy across the Indo-Pacific. At the same time,
USAID will need to review and adapt these initiatives to address the
significant impacts of COVID-19 on the region, take advantage of new
opportunities to increase climate security and resilience, and build
upon renewed multilateral partnerships. I appreciate the continued
support and advice of Congress on how to best advance U.S. interests in
the Indo-Pacific region, and if confirmed, I look forward to working
with you to identify policy and funding priorities.
Question. Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands are both
critically important regions to the United States.
If confirmed, what will be your top priorities with respect to
USAID's work in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue deepening USAID's
collaboration with like-minded partners in this critical region. I also
support USAID's increased activities and staff presence in the Pacific
Islands region to support our allies and counter Chinese influence.
We are committed to working with our Pacific Islands partners to
help them address the effects of climate change, which poses an
existential threat, and to mitigate the impacts of frequent natural
disasters.
If confirmed, I am committed to advancing shared objectives toward
strengthening democratic systems, fostering economic growth, and
improving the management of natural resources throughout the region.
Question. In the area of human capital development, the Trump
administration emphasized preserving and expanding assistance programs
that provide concrete technical assistance and capacity-building for
emerging and established leaders in partner governments, the private
sector, and civil society. How would you work to bolster human capital
development programs in the Indo-Pacific through USAID, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to support USAID's
investments in technical assistance and capacity-building to bolster
emerging leaders from partner governments, the private sector and civil
society in the Indo-Pacific region. USAID will continue to prioritize
investments to increase workforce participation opportunities (with a
focus on women and girls), develop skills for a digital economy among
youth, and improve education outcomes by modernizing curricula in
partnership with host country governments, educational institutions,
and the private sector. I will also direct USAID to work toward
rebuilding human capacity in critical government institutions and
health systems badly strained by their efforts to combat the COVID-19
pandemic.
China
Question. My view is that China's ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative
(OBOR) is a means by which to increase the economic influence of state-
owned Chinese firms in global markets, engender undue PRC political
leverage with governments around the world, create a China-centric
technology regime, secure dependence on supply chains centered on
Chinese companies, export corrupt business practices, and provide
greater access to strategic nodes for the People's Liberation Army.
Do you agree that these are the goals of OBOR? If confirmed, what
actions would you take and what partnerships would you seek to
execute concrete USAID projects to compete with or reduce the
influence of OBOR?
Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt;
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain
projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-reaching
strategy that addresses the challenges of OBOR, and I believe that
frustrations around the world with China's development practices
provide an opportunity for the U.S.
The administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision
to Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance,
transparency, and local ownership in our global development work. If
confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative
advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by
engaging directly with our partner countries and ensuring that good
governance, sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are
built into projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to
ensure that development investments are both beneficial and
sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies and partners,
including at the DFC and in the private sector, to better leverage our
collective resources and influence, and I will be an advocate for the
highest human rights, governance, environmental, social, and labor
standards in order to promote investments that are sustainable for the
long term.
Question. In a speech you gave on China last year at Harvard, you
highlighted that the Chinese Government and Chinese companies are
supplying other countries with digital technologies, such as facial
recognition and artificial intelligence, and those countries are in
many cases using those technologies for repressive purposes. China is
also supplying next generation telecommunications equipment and other
technologies through its Digital Silk Road.
In your view, what is the role of USAID in helping developing
countries harness emerging technologies to advance economic
prosperity and freedom?
Answer. Emerging technologies can play a significant role in
advancing economic prosperity and freedom, and USAID has an important
role to play in this area. I understand that USAID launched its Digital
Strategy in 2020 to ensure the Agency effectively integrates digital
technologies across all its work and strengthens the openness,
inclusiveness, and security of country-level digital ecosystems in
partner countries. The Agency is supporting the digital security of
civil society and media organizations, including cyber risk assessments
and providing AI tools to track disinformation flows. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with Congress to further strengthen USAID's
work in this area.
Question. What tools does USAID possess in this regard, and how
would you prioritize putting them to good use, if confirmed?
Answer. I understand that the Agency is supporting e-commerce and
the opportunities that digital platforms offer traditional businesses
in developing countries to access new markets and to better integrate
into the global trading system. Additionally, it is working with CBP to
apply emerging technologies such as non-invasive inspection systems to
assure the safety, security and traceability of goods moving across
borders. If confirmed, I will work with the interagency to promote the
adoption of policies and technologies in our partner countries to
advance U.S. national security objectives while creating innovation and
investment opportunities for American businesses.
Question. Last year, I published a report on how the United States
and Europe can cooperate on shared challenges related to China, which
included chapters encouraging U.S.-Europe cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific and Africa.
What areas relevant to USAID's mission are ripe for greater U.S.-
Europe cooperation in these two regions? What are some factors
that could enable such cooperation, and what are the limiting
factors? What is your perspective on the analysis and
recommendations in the report I published?
Answer. I agree that U.S.-EU cooperation is critical to combatting
China's influence in the Indo-Pacific and Africa and appreciated your
report's analysis and recommendations to focus on areas such as
democracy promotion, private sector growth, and the environment. USAID
engages frequently with EU officials to seek to align policy and to
increase burden sharing on key issues such as the COVID-19 global
response, democracy and governance, economic growth, energy, food
security and resilience, global health, and humanitarian assistance.
The EU's new seven-year budget articulates commitments to climate
change, human development, gender and digital development. These areas,
along with immediate and second-order impacts of the pandemic, are
opportunities for greater cooperation. In Brussels, Secretary Blinken
and EU leaders recently discussed challenges that China presents to the
rules-based order and agreed to resume U.S.-EU dialogue to coordinate
approaches.
Burma
Question. Please describe your planned approach to USAID engagement
in Burma, in light of the military coup and the Biden administration's
executive order that will retain support for humanitarian assistance
and civil society.
What areas of engagement and assistance will you prioritize, if
confirmed?
Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military
coup in Burma and the junta's violent actions against peaceful
demonstrators. I support USAID's immediate action following the coup to
redirect $42.4 million away from work that would have benefited the
Government of Burma and toward strengthening civil society and other
non-governmental actors.
If confirmed, I will work with the administration and Congress to
continue to put pressure on the military regime, call out human rights
abuses and ensure that USAID programs do not benefit the military
regime and are focused on improving health outcomes and combating
COVID-19, strengthening the ability of civil society to guard
democratic space, fostering food security, supporting independent
media, and promoting peace and reconciliation in Burma's conflict--
affected regions. I would also prioritize continuing to provide
critical humanitarian assistance to the Rohingya and other vulnerable
populations including in Chin, Kachin, Rakhine, and Shan states.
Supporting Middle East and North Africa Policy
Question. When looking broadly across the Middle East and North
Africa, one is struck with the enormity of the humanitarian need.
However, given the relative size of budgets, how do you recommend
the United States best align USAID programs with larger
diplomatic objectives that further U.S. national interests?
Answer. I agree with your assessment regarding the importance of
aligning USAID's humanitarian and development work with diplomatic
objectives, and ensuring that all advance U.S. national interests.
USAID and State align department, regional, and country-specific
strategies and in MENA, in particular, there is close collaboration to
ensure mutually-reinforcing efforts. USAID's primary role in
particularly volatile countries in the region is to meet the basic
needs of suffering populations and support stabilization efforts that
are necessary preconditions for enduring diplomatic solutions. If
confirmed, I commit to working further with the Congress and closely
with Secretary Blinken to ensure that USAID programs are as closely
aligned as possible with our national interests across the region.
Question. Looking across the region, what do you see as the most
significant drivers of instability that run counter to U.S. interests
and are most deserving of USAID's limited resources?
Answer. Destabilizing factors--including Iranian aggression, malign
Russian influence, terrorist networks, and authoritarian resurgence and
repressive governments that don't provide outlets for dissent and
pervasive corruption--run counter to U.S. interests in the region.
Nations in the Middle East and North Africa are also struggling to
address the impacts of the COVID pandemic. Fragile economies, medical
facilities, schools and essential services that were already struggling
to meet the needs of their local populations as well as people
displaced by active conflicts in Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Iraq, have
been further strained by the pandemic. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that USAID's resources are addressing life-saving and
stabilization needs and addressing the root causes of conflicts, such
as polarization, state fragility, corruption, social and economic
exclusion, gender inequality, and anemic economic growth.
Iran
Question. In 2008, you advocated for a new Iran policy based on
``broadening cultural contacts with the Iranian people, bypassing the
regime through Voice of America and the Internet.''
What role should USAID play in efforts to foster greater U.S.
engagement with the Iranian people? What form do you envision
this would take?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights,
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and
freedom of expression. Iranian authorities have responded to a series
of popular and widespread demonstrations with brutal repression, the
arrests of thousands of protesters, and the use of lethal force.
According to Amnesty International, over 300 people were killed during
the most recent spate of major protests in late 2019.
If confirmed, I will work within the administration to draw
attention to the Iranian regime's human rights abuses and express
support for the people of Iran. I look forward to engaging with
Congress to further consider this issue.
Question. Can you commit to limiting any USAID program to Iran to
the development and humanitarian assistance space?
Answer. Yes.
Iraq
Question. In the past, you've suggested the United States should
seek to mitigate, rather than eliminate, Iranian influence in Iraq. In
2008, you wrote ``no aspect of the Iraq quagmire can be resolved
without Iranian involvement.''
Do you still believe this to be the case? If so, how do you plan to
balance concerns about Iranian's malign influence, including
its support for militia groups, with U.S. efforts to support a
stable, sovereign Iraq? What is your vision for the role U.S.
assistance can play in supporting an independent Iraqi
governance model?
Answer. Iran's support for terrorism and human rights abuses
threatens U.S. forces and civilians as well as U.S. partners in Iraq
and the region, and can hinder our ability to implement foreign
assistance progamming. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID's
programs in Iraq further the goal of a stable and sovereign Iraq, while
also considering the safety and security of our staff balanced with
proper oversight of USAID programs. I also will review USAID's approach
to ensure that development and humanitarian assistance needs of all
Iraqis continue to be met in a principled and equitable manner as USAID
continues to support the recovery and rehabilitation needs of victims
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), including Yezidis.
Lebanon
Question. Despite the August 4, 2020, explosions in Beirut and
unrest that followed, Lebanon's political elites have continued to
cling to power. Past policy has been to withhold broader financial
assistance absent reforms targeting corruption and transparency.
How does USAID plan to advance crucial economic reforms in Lebanon,
and what conditions would Lebanon need to meet in order to
qualify for U.S. financial support?
Answer. I share your concerns--the Lebanese people deserve
accountability and a government that prioritizes their safety and
prosperity. However, the crisis in Lebanon goes beyond the explosion at
the port and other immediate concerns like COVID-19. Lebanon's crisis
is the result of decades of bad governance, economic mismanagement, and
corruption. Unfortunately, the Lebanese people have paid the highest
price for their leaders' negligence. USAID's development programs are
intended to provide support directly to the Lebanese people with
essential services and humanitarian assistance and to counter potential
Hezbollah influence in local communities. USAID can support the
Lebanese people through programs that help businesses retain staff and
assets to build a foundation for economic recovery; empower municipal
governments and civil society to deliver vital services; and keep
students in school. These programs lessen the likelihood that Lebanese
citizens will suffer the worst effects of the economic crisis.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with you and the committee
to ensure USAID's assistance is appropriately targeted to support the
people in Lebanon in the face of these challenges.
Question. Can you commit to working to ensure the $11 billion in
CEDRE, IMF, and World Bank funding earmarked for Lebanon remains
contingent on key reforms, including reforms to the electricity/natural
gas sector, increased transparency, and an audit of the central bank?
Answer. If confirmed, I will expect my team to continue to engage
with the Department of State, the World Bank, other IFIs, and our
allies in support of meaningful economic and political reforms
necessary to halt further deterioration and put the country back on a
path toward prosperity. Lebanon's elected officials must respond to the
demands of their people and move forward on reform.
Yemen
Question. The previous administration suspended U.S. humanitarian
aid to Houthi controlled areas of Yemen in response to restrictions
imposed on the delivery of aid.
What is your position on the suspension? Can you commit to
maintaining broad restrictions on aid flows into Houthi
controlled areas until all 12 conditions are meaningfully and
comprehensively addressed?
Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special
award conditions. I further understand that USAID is carefully
monitoring this issue, which includes participation in the Yemen
Technical Monitoring Group (TMG), consisting of USAID, U.N. agencies,
NGOs, and like-minded donors, which meets monthly to review Houthi
progress towards the Benchmarks for Monitoring and Decision-Making on
Donor Criteria/Conditions for Funding. If confirmed, I will support
these efforts and monitor conditions on the ground closely.
Question. How do you plan on working with U.S. funded NGOs to
ensure the appropriate carve-outs are in place to ensure certain, life-
saving operations can continue despite the broader suspension in U.S.
assistance?
Answer. I understand that on March 11, 2021, USAID determined that
international non-governmental organization (INGO) partners could
resume humanitarian operations in northern Yemen, subject to special
award conditions. During the suspension of humanitarian operations,
USAID continued to support NGOs implementing some critical life-saving
assistance, such as treatment for severe malnutrition. USAID partners
remained operational in southern Yemen.
Syria
Question. More than 11 million people are in need of humanitarian
aid in Syria. Traditionally, the U.S. and its partners have relied
heavily on four humanitarian access points along the Syrian border to
transport this life-saving assistance. Of these four cross-border
access points, only the Bab al-Hawa crossing remains open, thanks to
Russian and Chinese vetoes at the U.N. Security Council.
How do you plan on continuing to maintain U.S. aid flows regardless
of any future action taken at the U.N. Security council related
to Bab al-Hawa?
Answer. In 2014, I helped lead the U.N. Security Council in
authorizing the delivery of vital assistance across the four
humanitarian access points that you reference. I share your anger at
Russia and China's vetoes at the U.N. Security Council to reduce the
number of available access points, which even in 2014 were not even
close to sufficient in terms of meeting the actual needs of Syrian
civilians. Overall, since the beginning of the conflict, Russia and
China have together vetoed 16 Security Council resolutions related to
Syria. In the face of these unconscionable decisions, the U.S. must
continue to aid vulnerable Syrians within Syria and across the region.
The United States remains the largest humanitarian donor in Syria,
providing over $12.2 billion in humanitarian assistance since the
conflict began. Despite enormous challenges, humanitarian organizations
are reaching vulnerable Syrians in both government- and opposition-
controlled areas, utilizing both cross-border and cross-line access.
That said, there are no viable alternatives that would yield the same
range and magnitude of capability, or efficiency, as the U.N.'s cross-
border assistance to northern Syria. I understand that the Biden
administration strongly supports renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border
crossing and reinstatement of other crossings into northern Syria in
the U.N. Security Council, and if confirmed, I will work tirelessly in
support of these efforts.
Question. What are your thoughts on cross-border humanitarian
assistance in the absence of a U.N. resolution?
Answer. There is no solution at the scale needed if U.N. cross-
border access is not reauthorized. Humanitarian assistance must be able
to be as flexible as possible, including both cross-line and cross-
border. The humanitarian needs inside Syria will only increase in the
face of closing borders and shrinking operating spaces. As referenced
earlier, I understand that the Biden administration strongly supports
renewal of the Bab al-Hawa border crossing and reinstatement of other
crossings into northern Syria in the U.N. Security Council, and if
confirmed, I commit to tirelessly supporting these efforts. I also
believe that we must partner with a range of countries, NGOs, and
influential figures to raise awareness about the catastrophic impact on
Syrian civilians that will result from losing the final crossing,
highlighting the reputational costs for Russia if it uses its veto to
completely cut off civilians in northern Syria from this life-saving
assistance. Additionally, if confirmed, I will support the Department
of State's efforts to advance a negotiated political settlement so that
Syria can move beyond its continual cycle of violence and suffering
towards reconciliation and rebuilding.
Central America
Question. In September 2019, then-(Acting) Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Michael Kozak described to this
committee how, despite years of programmatic successes, the U.S.-
Central America Strategy had failed to muster the political will
necessary for aid-recipient countries to effectively combat the endemic
corruption, economic protectionism, and rampant criminality that have
generated wave after wave of illegal migration from the region.
If confirmed, what actions would you take to build and maintain
political will among the political leadership in the countries
of Northern Central America to tackle the push factors of
illegal migration?
Answer. The President has articulated a comprehensive $4 billion,
four-year plan that will provide financial and other forms of
assistance and incentives to confront corruption, enhance security, and
foster prosperity across the region. As Vice President, he also exerted
consistent diplomatic pressure in support of anti-corruption efforts in
the region. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on
the most effective ways to implement President Biden's plan, and
increasing the diplomatic pressure on elected officials not doing
enough to confront corruption and lawlessness. I understand that USAID
is working in partnership with other U. S. Government Agencies to
address the root causes of irregular migration from the Northern
Triangle and foster an environment where families can envision their
futures in their home countries and communities. USAID focuses on
combating crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth, addressing
corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational
criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater
economic opportunity, social services, and protection. With the
appropriate time, sustained commitment, and appropriate partners, I
believe USAID programs can help address the push factors that lead
Central Americans to reluctantly leave their homes. To give just one
example: in neighborhoods where USAID worked in El Salvador to
implement security programs, homicides declined by an average of 45
percent from 2015 to 2017. If we want to duplicate, improve upon, and
eventually scale initiatives of this kind, strengthening our
partnerships with civil society leaders--including advocates for
transparent and accountable government and human rights--will be
important. Similarly, USAID will work with those private sector leaders
committed to transparency and the rule of law.
Question. The 2014 Strategy for Engagement in Central America aimed
to deter illegal migration from the region by promoting economic
prosperity, security, and good governance in recipient countries.
Pursuant to that strategy, Congress has placed multiple conditions on
aid to these countries.
To what extent have legislative conditions contributed to policy
changes in the recipient nations? How do you plan to
incentivize needed reforms if the recipient countries fail to
meet conditions set by Congress, and those failures prompt
restrictions on assistance?
Answer. Congress is a key partner in setting America's foreign
policy agenda and with regard to the implementation of foreign
assistance. I cannot state definitively how the aforementioned
conditions specifically impacted decision-making in recipient
countries, but based on my own experiences as a diplomat, I agree that
it is important that the administration work with Congress to utilize
all available congressional tools with flexibility to implement our
policies and respond to changing contexts.
Question. President Biden has proposed a four-year $4 billion
strategy for Central America.
Can you describe the types of investments and specific reforms you
would seek from individual governments under this strategy to
reduce illegal migration from the region, including the
concrete and verifiable benchmarks by which you will measure
success? How will this strategy help the governments of Central
America become more self-sufficient so that U.S. foreign
assistance is no longer needed to achieve these objectives?
Answer. I believe that the ultimate solution for sustainably
reducing irregular migration from Central America is to work not only
with governments to encourage critical reforms, but also broadly with
civil society, the private sector, and international partners to
catalyze structural changes that address corruption, security, and
prosperity in the region. Creating economic opportunity, rebuilding the
social fabric in communities that have been torn apart by violence,
establishing inclusive, fair, and just rule of law, and ensuring there
is the capacity to deliver citizen-responsive governance and services
will position Central America's Northern Triangle countries to address
the drivers of irregular migration for the long term.
Nicaragua
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections.
If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing actions and programs
designed to improve the capacity of the democratic forces in
Nicaragua to be a credible challenge to Ortega ahead of the
November 2021 general elections?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring USAID supports viable,
democratic processes and institutions in Nicaragua. USAID is focused on
the November 2021 national elections in Nicaragua and on restoring
democratic processes and respect for human rights through expanding
opportunities for coalition building and supporting electoral integrity
and an active civil society.
Cuba
Question. According to the State Department, in 2019, the
Government of Cuba maintained an estimated 50,000 medical personnel in
more than 60 countries under conditions that represent forced labor.
The United States, the United Nations, independent media outlets, and
non-governmental organizations have all documented and called out the
Cuban regime's exploitative and coercive practices toward its doctors
participating in its overseas medical programs.
Do you consider the Cuban regime's overseas medical missions to be
exploitative human trafficking efforts? How can USAID Missions
in countries that accept Cuban medical missions help
communicate the realities of the forced labor practices
employed by the Cuban regime?
Answer. Support for democracy and human rights is at the core of
this administration's Cuba policy. We must be vocal in our support for
the journalists, human rights defenders, and democracy activists
seeking to challenge the repressiveness of Cuban authorities, who
maintain an extraordinarily tight grip on all aspects of life on the
island and are ruthless in seeking to stifle dissent. I understand that
USAID has programs in place currently to support the human rights of
Cuban workers, including medical personnel. If confirmed, I will work
with my colleagues at the Department of State to review the Cuban
Government's practices with regard to its overseas medical programs and
look forward to consulting with you on this issue.
Question. The State Department's 2019 Human Rights Report for Cuba
painted a dismal picture of human rights abuses by the Cuban regime, to
include accounts of disappearances; torture and other cruel, inhumane,
or degrading treatment or punishment; harsh prison and detention center
conditions; arbitrary arrests and detentions; denial of fair public
trial; and political prisoners and detainees. The regime also has
cracked down on freedom of expression, limited internet freedom, and
restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Will you commit to calling out human rights violations by the Cuban
Government?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that support for human
rights remains at the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of
the most repressive countries in the world, and is ruled by a
dictatorship that flagrantly abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its
populace from accessing even basic independent information, inhibits
meaningful civil society activity--including free press--and
criminalizes political dissent. As one of my first acts as U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case of Oswaldo Paya directly with
the Cuban Foreign Minister, pressing him to allow an independent
investigation of the circumstances in which Paya had been killed, and I
continued to advocate publicly in support of Paya's family. During my
time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out Cuba for its abhorrent
treatment of Cubans like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio
Ferrer, and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out
against Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
Question. How will you work to support democratic activists and
human rights defenders in Cuba?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's work to support
democratic activists and human rights defenders in Cuba. The role of a
vibrant civil society continues to be essential to Cuban democracy. I
gather that USAID has a portfolio in place to continue supporting a
diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba who will push for
democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The Agency will also
continue providing basic needs assistance to political prisoners and
persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue defending the human
rights of those who are abused and even jailed for their political
beliefs.
Question. Do you commit to maintain a robust USAID democracy
program focused on advancing respect for basic human rights in Cuba?
Answer. Yes, I am committed to supporting robust USAID democracy
programming in Cuba.
Haiti
Question. Haiti is facing a complex and worsening constitutional
crisis.
What role can USAID play in promoting effective dialogue among the
different political forces? If confirmed, what efforts would
you make to support strengthening Haiti's technical capacity to
hold elections?
Answer. The Haitian people deserve democracy and prosperity. Haiti
has been without a functioning government for too long, and in the
meantime, conditions continue to deteriorate. The political parties
need to come together to end the misery, corruption and insecurity
wreaking havoc for the Haitian people. While Haiti is facing a complex
emergency that USAID assistance alone cannot resolve, USAID does have
an important role to play in helping to promote democracy, human
rights, and governance. With respect to the upcoming legislative
elections, I understand that USAID's current activities aim to promote
credible elections, increase political party competition, and expand
civic participation in electoral processes to help end the ongoing
political crisis of rule by decree. If confirmed, I will advocate for a
strong whole-of-government and multi-donor approach for targeted
democracy, human rights, and governance work to promote democratic
political reform, peace and stability.
South America
Question. Over the last three decades, Colombia has emerged as a
source of economic prosperity and stability in the region and a key
strategic ally and partner of the United States. Yet, policy decisions
made during the negotiations of the 2016 deal with the FARC terrorist
organization created new challenges for Colombia and in our relations.
Coca production in Colombia has steadily increased since 2013, reaching
212,000 hectares in 2019. In March 2020, the United States and Colombia
announced a joint action plan to reduce coca cultivation and cocaine
production by 50 percent by the end of 2023. The plan would make full
use of all available tools, including rural development, interdiction,
as well as manual and aerial eradication.
Would you agree that achieving this goal by 2023 would deliver
significant health and security benefits for Americans here at
home? If confirmed, what tools and policies would you implement
to ensure that our two nations meet this goal?
Answer. I share your concern about the flow of drugs from Latin
America and the Caribbean to the United States. USAID plays an
important role on this issue through its alternative development
programs in Colombia, which are intended to offer licit alternatives--
such as coffee, cacao, dairy, and others--to replace coca production.
Alternative development is a necessary but insufficient tool to
significantly reduce coca cultivation, which also requires robust
involvement by the private sector, civil society, and international
organizations, along with a commitment by Colombian leaders to
equitable economic development in communities that have long been
underserved by government programs. Colombia's historic 2016 peace
accord with the FARC was an important first step in ending one of the
longest-running armed conflicts in the world, which had led to the
deaths of hundreds of thousands of people and displaced millions of
Colombians. Implementing the various components of the accords is a
complex undertaking, and a challenge that continues to this day. I
gather that USAID's assistance focuses squarely on these efforts at
implementation, which must move forward in order to enhance security,
governance and development in former FARC-controlled and ungoverned
territories where some 95 percent of coca is cultivated and cocaine is
produced.
Venezuela
Question. Approximately 7.2 million people will require
humanitarian assistance due to the Venezuela regional crisis in 2021, a
10 percent increase from the year before.
How will you organize the resources of USAID to respond to the
increased need of millions of Venezuelans?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize humanitarian funding for
the Venezuela regional crisis. The situation within Venezuela is grave
and deteriorating: a recent U.N. fact-finding mission has uncovered
``widespread and systematic'' abuses by the Maduro Government against
the Venezuelan people, including extrajudicial executions, enforced
disappearances, arbitrary detentions, and torture. Concurrently, more
than five million Venezuelans are now refugees, putting immense
pressure on neighboring countries. USAID has provided more than $1
billion in humanitarian assistance since 2017 for Venezuelan migrants
and refugees, and host communities in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru, as well as more than $104 million since 2018 to reach people
inside Venezuela with life-saving humanitarian assistance, making the
U.S. the largest donor to the crisis regionally. USAID also supports
long-term development and integration activities in Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru for Venezuelan migrants and refugees. Still, there is
more that can be done, particularly in terms of stronger coordination
and cooperation with like-minded countries.
If confirmed, I will ensure USAID's critical humanitarian and
development assistance continues. Furthermore, despite the Maduro
regime's efforts to stifle any activities that threaten its hold on
power or accountability for its numerous crimes, if I am confirmed,
USAID will continue to provide support for civil society organizations
and democratically-minded actors working under incredibly dangerous
conditions to bring about a democratic transition.
Self-Reliance
Question. Former USAID Administrator Mark Green spearheaded the
agency's ``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative in an effort to
provide strategic focus to U.S. foreign assistance, including by taking
a data-based approach toward building partner country capacity to
achieve and sustain development results. In contrast with China's
development model, which creates dependence, Administrator Green argued
that America should seek to foster self-reliance and responsibility
among its friends.
While distinct from diplomatic and humanitarian assistance, do you
agree that the purpose of development assistance is to end the
need for its existence? If so, how will you ensure that USAID
and the implementing partners it supports effectively work
themselves out of a job?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the principle of self-reliance and that
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. I
also believe it is what the vast majority of beneficiaries of USAID
programs want most for themselves and their communities. My vision for
USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It also
applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance within
core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing democracy,
human rights, increasing climate security and resilience, and global
health in a collaborative manner with civil society partners and
governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound, evidence-based
development and humanitarian programming that continues to improve aid
effectiveness, self-reliance and sustainability.
Question. Do you intend to work with USAID to continue the
``Journey to Self-Reliance'' initiative, whether in name or in spirit?
If not, why not?
Answer. I deeply respect and appreciate former Administrator Mark
Green's leadership on this issue and intend to build on this
initiative. I understand that the Journey to Self-Reliance emphasizes
developing critical local capacities and supporting meaningful country
commitments, fit to the diverse contexts in which USAID works. I agree
the concept is sound and builds on the work of the Agency to support
sustainable development that has spanned multiple administrations.
Global Health Security
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic originated and accelerated in
higher-income countries, where USAID does not maintain a regular
presence and where intense, high-level diplomatic engagement proved
critical to securing global health data, navigating supply chain
disruptions, and facilitating the safe evacuation of American citizens.
Do you agree with the framework outlined by President Biden in NSM-
1, in which the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
USAID Administrator, leads (1) the development of the U.S.
Government-wide plan to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and (2) a
diplomatic outreach plan for enhancing the United States'
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on engaging
partner nations?
Do you agree that this framework outlined by President Biden could
be used in other contexts to support global health efforts of
the U.S. Government, to include efforts to advance the Global
Health Security Agenda and enhance pandemic preparedness and
response overseas?
Answer. Yes, I support the framework outlined by the President in
NSM-1. I gather that there has been effective collaboration in the
interagency on the Global Health Security Agenda and if confirmed, I
look forward to reviewing it further and seeking ways to enhance our
impact.
Question. My bill, the Global Health Diplomacy and Security Act,
creates a coordinator position at the State Department that is
consistent with this type of framework outlined by President Biden. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with me on this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and the
committee on all efforts to advance global health security so as to
ensure that, after such devastation, the world is far better prepared
to confront global health threats.
COVID-19
Question. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (P.L. 117-2),
included $10 billion in international affairs funding for the COVID-19
pandemic response, to include: (1) $3.75 billion to prevent backsliding
in HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis programs, of which $3.5 billion
was directed toward the multilateral Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria's COVID-19 Response Mechanism; and (2) nearly
$5 billion in bilateral funds, of which an unspecified portion would be
directed toward the United Nations and other multilateral entities.
This is on top of the $4 billion that already had been appropriated to
support U.S. contributions to COVAX/Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance.
What are the comparative advantages of bilateral funding versus
multilateral funding in the U.S. response to COVID-19 overseas?
Are there benefits to bilateral funding that you, if confirmed,
will advocate for and prioritize?
Answer. I believe that the U.S. Government (USG) is most effective
when both bilateral and multilateral funding is available and flows to
responsible and accountable partners. Multilateral funding allows the
USG to leverage the financial commitments, technical expertise, and
diplomatic engagement of many partners, often achieving economies of
scale and burden-sharing with other donors. Bilateral funding enables
USAID to align that work and those commitments to action on the ground
through the expertise and coordination of USAID field teams and ongoing
local assistance efforts, and address priorities that may not be
effectively or efficiently covered through multilateral channels.
If confirmed, will you continue the policy of providing funding for
multilateral entities, to include COVAX/Gavi and the Global Fund, in
tranches, such that U.S. contributions are made available based upon
need, performance, and other donor support?
I understand that USAID funding to Gavi/COVAX will be provided in
tranches. This will allow USAID to ensure Gavi/COVAX has the funding it
needs to scale global vaccine access, while closely monitoring COVAX's
performance and also incentivizing other donors to provide additional
resources. I understand that to date, USAID has obligated $2 billion
out of a total $4 billion to Gavi/COVAX. If confirmed, I will ensure
that USAID, in consultation with Gavi, is carefully considering the
timing of contributions to ensure COVAX is sufficiently resourced to
meet critical public health needs, given evolving supply dynamics and
resource constraints.
PEPFAR
Question. Lack of strategic direction, embittered competition, and
poor communication between the two principal implementers of U.S.
global health assistance--USAID and the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC)--have long plagued U.S. global health programs. This
is why, when authorizing the greatest commitment by any country to
combat a single disease in history, Congress placed the responsibility
for coordinating the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
(PEPFAR) within the Department of State. The PEPFAR program is now
recognized as the most successful U.S. foreign assistance program since
the Marshall Plan and has saved millions of lives, strengthened health
systems and supply chains, and advanced key U.S. diplomatic, economic,
and security goals.
Recognizing the success of the PEPFAR model--but also understanding
that PEPFAR would eventually need to be transitioned--the Obama
administration in 2009 sought to launch a 6-year, $63 billion Global
Health Initiative (GHI). Managed by the Coordinator of U.S. Government
Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS and Special Representative for Global
Health Diplomacy at the Department of State, the GHI proposed to take
an evidence-based approach toward strengthening health systems and
enhancing global health security. Though the GHI never found its
footing, the compelling need to close gaps in global health security
while also mitigating the need for disease-specific initiatives
justifies taking another look.
Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the coordinating
role played by the Department of State and the implementing
roles played by USAID and CDC, has been successful? As more and
more countries approach epidemic control, do you believe this
model could be adapted to advance broader global health
security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama administration
envisioned under the GHI?
Answer. I agree that PEPFAR has been enormously successful, and
should be considered one of the most significant and impactful public
health initiatives ever undertaken. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
many of my African colleagues spoke to me in strikingly personal terms
about what PEPFAR meant to their countries, offering sincere and
profound thanks to the American people for continuing to support this
initiative. I am also aware that there are other highly successful U.S.
Government public health initiatives, including the President's Malaria
Initiative, the West Africa and Eastern Congo Ebola responses, and
USAID's Neglected Tropical Disease program that should be reviewed for
lessons learned. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the
administration and Congress to review all of these successful programs,
draw lessons learned and determine how to best posture the U.S.
Government and USAID to advance global health security, global health
diplomacy, and pandemic response objectives.
Question. The Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator was recently
directed to suspend its Country Operating Plan (COP) process, which had
already reached an advanced stage, in order to alleviate burdens on
implementing partners during the COVID-19 outbreak. While sympathetic
to the needs of implementing partners, the COP process, and the data-
driven approach it has institutionalized, is vital to the effective
planning and execution of PEPFAR programs. If confirmed, will you
ensure USAID fully and faithfully engages in the COP process and
adheres to such plans without unwarranted delays or deviations?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully and
faithfully engages in the COP process and adheres to such plans without
unwarranted delays or deviations.
Question. The World Health Organization (WHO): You had a front row
seat to the ineptitude of the WHO during the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak
in West Africa. It was so bad, in fact, that you helped lead the effort
on the U.N. Security Council to declare the outbreak ``a threat to
international peace and security'' and to establish the U.N.'s first-
ever ``health-keeping'' mission.
Much like the Ebola outbreak that preceded it, the WHO was either
unwilling or unable to mount an effective emergency response to the
COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China. Not only did it fail to press the
Chinese Government for access and information in the critical first
days of the outbreak, but the WHO provided political cover for China's
reckless response, publicly validated disinformation, and condemned
travel controls designed to mitigate the global spread.
Do you agree that the WHO is badly in need of reform? If so, what
specific reforms are necessary to restore its credibility among
the American people and the world?
Answer. Yes, the WHO needs reform and strengthening. While the WHO
continues to play an important role in the global response to COVID-19,
the pandemic exposed weaknesses in the readiness posture of both the
WHO and member states to respond to a crisis on this scale. President
Biden is firmly committed to reforming and strengthening the WHO, and
some of his first executive actions have focused on strengthening
global preparedness against future pandemic threats. The administration
believes that the best way to do this is by remaining an actively
engaged member of the organization and working with all member states
to support, strengthen, and build accountability at the WHO. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Departments of State and Health
and Human Services to ensure USAID informs and supports efforts that
strengthen the World Health Organization.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that by joining COVAX, the
vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT)
Accelerator, the United States will not subsidize the distribution of
non-transparently developed, reportedly substandard Chinese and Russian
COVID-19 vaccines?
Answer. USAID funding to COVAX will only support procurement and
delivery of vaccines that meet rigorous quality standards, are safe and
efficacious, and have been approved or authorized by a stringent
regulatory authority, such as the U.S. FDA or the World Health
Organization. To date, vaccines developed by China and Russia have not
met these standards.
Food Aid and Food Security
Question. The United States is the single most generous provider of
humanitarian assistance in the world, both financial and in-kind, thus
saving hundreds of millions of lives and promoting the growth of
healthier, more stable societies. Yet today, an estimated 690 million
people are food insecure, of which 270 million are facing starvation.
As needs outpace the ability of donors to respond, it is imperative
that the Department and USAID be enabled to stretch U.S. humanitarian
resources farther, including by modernizing U.S. international food
aid.
Historically, the flagship U.S. food aid program--Food for Peace--
required that 100 percent of the food provided under the Act be
purchased in the United States, of which 50 percent must be shipped on
U.S. flagged vessels. According to the GAO, the shipping requirement,
in particular, has added significant time and cost to emergency food
aid, even while failing to fulfil its statutory purpose. Three
consecutive administrations have thus proposed changes--ranging from
setting aside 20 percent of the budget for local and regional
procurement to eliminating Food for Peace entirely. The Global Food
Security Act (as re-authorized through FY2023) and the 2018 Farm Bill
did include modest reforms, but more needs to be done.
Do you agree that the Department of Defense is capable of managing
its own sealift capacity and that U.S. agricultural cargo
preference requirements have outlived their statutory purpose,
add unnecessary time and expense to life-saving U.S. food aid,
and should no longer be applied to international food aid?
If confirmed, will you carry forward the food aid reform efforts of
your predecessors, including under the Obama administration?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity and build the
resilience of vulnerable communities as effectively and efficiently as
possible. Each of the food assistance modalities--U.S. in-kind food,
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming--
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need,
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of
our programs is of utmost importance.
Humanitarian Assistance
Question. How will USAID, in coordination with the new Office of
Sanctions Coordination, work with the Treasury Department to ensure our
sanctions programs are designed to shape behavior without exacerbating
humanitarian crises around the world?
Answer. I understand that USAID coordinates regularly with the
interagency to review sanctions programs, including how sanctions are
impacting the COVID-19 response and humanitarian programs. If
confirmed, I will support USAID's work with the Department of Treasury,
the Department of State and the rest of the interagency to develop
effective sanctions regimes with requisite flexibilities to ensure that
life-saving humanitarian assistance can reach those in need.
Question. Should U.S. humanitarian assistance be branded? If not,
why not? If confirmed, will you uphold President Trump's Executive
Order on branding U.S. foreign assistance and the USAID Branding
Modernization Act (P.L. 116-334), including by branding all U.S.
foreign assistance administered by USAID?
Answer. I am committed to branding and agree that branding sends a
strong public diplomacy message, conveying that our assistance is due
to the generosity of the American people. It is also a critical element
of a counter China strategy.
Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to USAID
awards and partners must continue to follow the branding requirements
outlined in their assistance agreements.
Women, Peace, and Security
Question. Under President Trump's Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
initiative signed into law in 2019, the United States is working to
advance three objectives by 2023, such that: 1) women are more prepared
and increasingly able to participate in efforts that promote stable and
lasting peace; 2) women and girls are safer, better protected, and have
equal access to government and private-assistance programs, including
from the United States, international partners, and host nations; and
3) the United States and partner governments have improved
institutionalization and capacity to ensure WPS efforts are sustainable
and long-lasting.
What actions will you, if confirmed, take to ensure these goals are
met? Will you enhance lines of effort and agency actions?
Answer. I agree that women's meaningful engagement leads to better,
more durable outcomes for peace and security. Studies show that when
women participate in peace processes the resulting agreement is 35
percent more likely to last at least 15 years. More broadly speaking,
one of the best predictors of a state's peacefulness is the way women
are treated within that state. USAID assistance supports the objectives
in the WPS Act to bolster women's ability to participate in peace and
political processes, protect against gender-based violence, and hold
accountable those that commit acts of gender-based violence. USAID's
activities also help break down barriers to women's participation in
conflict mitigation and peacebuilding. If confirmed, I will work with
my colleagues to further implement our commitments under the WPS Act
and ensure that these efforts continue to be a priority for the Agency.
Human Trafficking
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated cases of human
trafficking and online sexual exploitation and abuse worldwide.
What will you prioritize, if confirmed, to counter this growing
problem during COVID-19 and to prevent a resurgence of these
behaviors after the pandemic is over?
Answer. I share your concerns and believe that human trafficking is
a grave human rights abuse. Sadly, the COVID-19 crisis has amplified a
number of factors that increase the risk of human trafficking and
online sexual exploitation and abuse. In particular, as out-of-school
or quarantined children spend more time online, the potential for
online harm of children also increases. If confirmed, I am committed to
USAID's work to counter human trafficking, which includes activities to
raise awareness about the risk of online sexual exploitation and abuse,
and provide children, families, and communities with the knowledge and
tools they need to reduce exposure to harmful online content.
Question. How will you, if confirmed, enhance USAID's role in the
President's Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking
(PITF) and the Senior Policy Operating Group to Combat Trafficking in
Persons (SPOG)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will bring USAID's expertise to bear in the
PITF and SPOG, specifically by strengthening the interagency approach
to promote evidence-based prevention practices; identify, protect, and
respond to victims' needs; increase prosecutions and convictions; and
build partnerships, including with the corporate sector. I will
advocate for survivors and those who experienced trauma from human
trafficking. A survivor-centered approach is essential to preserve the
dignity, safety, and well-being of at-risk and vulnerable populations.
I am committed to working within the interagency to increase
collaboration with international organizations, civil society groups,
and the corporate sector.
United Nations Funding
Question. USAID provides significant amounts of funding to the
United Nations system, including through voluntary contributions to the
World Food Program, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and others.
If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure that funding that goes
through the U.N. system has proper oversight and is not lost to
waste, fraud, abuse, or diversion to repressive governments,
armed groups, terrorist organizations, or criminal enterprise?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration will continue to hold
United Nations (UN) organizations accountable to their mission and U.N.
member states. This means doing everything possible to ensure that U.N.
organizations are using resources efficiently and effectively--
eliminating waste, demanding zero tolerance for corruption and sexual
exploitation, and strengthening whistleblower protections and
transparency and accountability. Since most USAID funding to U.N.
partners is project-based, the Agency also ensures that USAID's U.N.
partners understand and comply with USAID requirements on monitoring
and reporting. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Department of
State and Mission to the U.N., to continue to advance these priorities.
DDI
Question. With the re-organization of USAID, there is a new Bureau
of Development, Democracy and Innovation.
Can you speak in detail about USAID's democracy promotion efforts?
Answer. China and Russia are using their resources, influence, and
technology to support autocrats and undermine and interfere with
democratic institutions. To meet this moment, the Biden-Harris
administration will restore democracy and human rights to the center of
U.S. foreign policy. USAID will pursue an affirmative strategy that
counters new and emerging threats to democracy and advances human
rights. This has been a top priority of mine throughout my career, and
if confirmed, I will elevate democracy programming and seek to deepen
current investments in anti-corruption programming, democracy, human
rights, and governance, including by supporting civil society and
promoting independent media and protection for journalists.
Question. How do these efforts complement the work being done by
the Department of State's Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Bureau?
Answer. USAID works closely with the Department of State and the
National Endowment for Democracy in democracy promotion efforts. Each
entity has distinct comparative advantages--in the case of USAID, that
includes USAID's ability to leverage relationships and know-how through
its missions to tailor its work to local conditions--which gives the
United States a multi-faceted and more effective approach in
increasingly complex environments. I understand the USAID's Bureau for
Democracy, Development, and Innovation and the State Department's
Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) engage in regular
information-sharing and coordination efforts to avoid duplication and
make the most strategic use of assistance funds. This coordination
takes place both in Washington and at our missions overseas. If
confirmed, I will work closely with my counterparts to ensure that
coordination continues to take place and every effort is made to
maximize the impact of our assistance.
Atrocity Prevention
Question. What role does USAID play in U.S. atrocity prevention
efforts?
Answer. Since the 2011 Presidential Study Directive on Mass
Atrocities, USAID has played a leadership role in helping improve U.S.
Government capabilities related to atrocity prevention. USAID addresses
mass atrocities in four main ways: identifying and communicating risk
factors and warning signs that could lead to mass atrocities;
mitigating risks and bolstering resilience to shocks that could lead to
mass atrocities; responding to escalating atrocity situations with
humanitarian assistance and prevention programs; and supporting
recovery from mass violence and gross violations of human rights
through programs focused on promoting justice and accountability,
rebuilding social cohesion, supporting political transition, and
supporting the protection of human rights.
This work is incredibly important because preventing mass
atrocities is a core national security interest of the United States.
While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to
the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human
Rights, I worked with President Obama to create the aforementioned
Directive and the Atrocities Prevention Board, the first White House-
led structure tasked with reacting to early warnings of atrocities.
Climate
Question. If confirmed, how will you and USAID interact with the
office of Special Presidential Envoy Kerry, including with respect to
implementation of U.S. foreign assistance connected to any climate
arrangements or agreements negotiated by the office of Special
Presidential Envoy Kerry?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with
Special Presidential Climate Envoy Kerry, as USAID plays an essential
role in working with our partner countries to translate bold climate
ambition into action. Indeed, Secretary Kerry and I have a strong
working relationship, forged during my time as U.S. Ambassador to the
U.N. while he was serving as Secretary of State. I understand that the
administration's top priorities are to: immediately raise and implement
partner countries' climate commitments, meet the U.S. climate finance
pledge, accelerate efforts to increase the resilience of climate
vulnerable countries. USAID will work with countries and regions with
globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes to reduce
deforestation and improve conservation, as unsustainable land use
accounts for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, as well as
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems
that serve as global carbon sinks. USAID will also work with countries
and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich landscapes
to reduce deforestation and improve conservation.
Infrastructure
Question. USAID plays an important role in the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network and the Transaction Advisory Fund,
set up under the Trump administration.
Please describe your specific views on these two programs. Will
USAID under the Biden administration retain this initiative?
Answer. China's significant infrastructure investments around the
world are often fiscally unsustainable, include corrupt practices and
processes, do not comply with international environmental and labor
standards, lack public oversight and transparency, and have limited
community involvement. I believe that USAID, through initiatives like
ITAN, should continue advising countries on how to ensure a fair and
level playing field. Once a country commits to undertaking a
competitive procurement process, USAID should continue using mechanisms
such as the Transaction Advisory Fund to advise it on how to ensure
projects are legally, financially, and technically viable and
incorporate appropriate environmental and social safeguards.
Reproductive Health
Question. President Biden has rescinded the Mexico City policy
(which conditioned U.S. assistance to foreign NGOs upon a commitment
that they will not perform or promote abortion with funding from any
source) and has said the United States will rejoin the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), notwithstanding concerns about its support for
China's population control program. Abortion pro-choice advocates are
also seeking to overturn the Helms amendment (prohibiting the use of
U.S. foreign aid for the performance or promotion of abortion as a
method of family planning) and the Siljander amendment (prohibiting use
of U.S. foreign aid to lobby for or against the legalization of
abortion).
In your opinion, does the term ``reproductive health'' include
abortion?
Answer. Abortion is not included in USAID's definition of
reproductive health.
Question. Do you commit to uphold U.S. laws that prohibit funding
for abortion overseas?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to uphold U.S. laws, including
the Helms and Siljander amendments.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Human Rights
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. Promoting human rights and democracy has been central to my
work as a writer, advocate, and diplomat. In 2002, after years of
extensive reporting and research, I published ``A Problem From Hell'':
America and the Age of Genocide, which documented inaction in the face
of genocides over the course of the 20th century. The book was
integrated into high school and university curriculums, and some of its
lessons were embraced by student activists, faith groups, and others
seeking to promote human rights. In addition, many readers have
informed me that the book's central message encouraged them to take
action in the face of genocide in Darfur.
While serving on the National Security Council as Special Assistant
to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human
Rights, I worked with President Obama to develop new processes aimed at
ensuring that atrocity warnings rapidly reached senior policy makers,
and to make creative use of the policy toolbox when signs of potential
atrocities arose--efforts that helped ensure that, in the face of mass
atrocities, the American response did not come down to a choice between
doing nothing or using U.S. military force. This work produced
significant outcomes, such as the highly-effective deployment of U.S.
military advisers to support African Governments combating the Lord's
Resistance Army, proactive peacekeeping in the Ivory Coast to prevent
spiraling mass atrocities following a stolen election, and relentless
high-level diplomacy in support of Sudan's independence referendum,
which paved the way for the birth of an independent South Sudan. Also,
during my time as Senior Director, I worked with my NSC colleague Gayle
Smith to spearhead the creation of the Open Government Partnership
(OGP), a multilateral initiative that secures governmental commitments
to promote transparency, fight corruption, empower citizens, and
strengthen governance. Since its founding in 2011, the OGP has grown to
include 78 country members and a growing number of local members--
representing more than two billion people--that work alongside
thousands of civil society organizations.
As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., my top priorities included working
to prevent and end conflicts, addressing the humanitarian needs of
vulnerable communities, and advancing the human rights and dignity of
all individuals. I spearheaded the effort to convene two successive
summits that mobilized unprecedented commitments to U.N. Peacekeeping
of over 50,000 new troops and police from more than 60 countries. In
response to the global refugee crisis, I led efforts to convene a
summit in which participating nations agreed to increase their total
annual contributions to U.N. appeals and international humanitarian
groups by approximately $4.5 billion and to double the number of formal
refugee resettlement slots made available to the U.N.'s refugee agency,
while a range of private sector companies made $650 million worth of
pledges in support of refugees. Finally, I used intensive public and
private diplomacy to secure the release of political prisoners and
enhance the rights of LGBTQ individuals. Among various efforts to
advocate on behalf of those unjustly imprisoned, in the #FreeThe20
campaign, I publicized the cases of 20 female political prisoners
around the world--16 of whom were ultimately freed. As part of my work
to advance LGBTQ rights, I helped create for the first time a mandate
for an Independent Expert to monitor and report on the violence and
discrimination faced by LGBTQ persons around the world, convened the
first-ever U.N. Security Council meeting on threats to LGBTQ persons ,
and was able to push the Security Council to condemn (for the first
time in its 70-year history) violence against individuals due to their
sexual orientation.
Diversity and Inclusion
Question. In response to a request that I led, GAO reported in June
2020 that USAID still has much work to do in order to create and
sustain a truly diverse workforce. What plans do you have for improving
diversity and inclusion at USAID?
Answer. Diversity, equity, and inclusion must be a guiding
principle--in our people, funding and programs, and policies. If
confirmed, as I noted in my testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion
foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how
we support our workforce. The report you requested, for example,
presented data demonstrating that ``promotion outcomes at USAID were
generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for whites in
early to mid career.'' I will engage the staff to understand the
challenges facing them, solicit advice on how we can create a workforce
that is more diverse and inclusive, and treat these issues with the
urgency they demand. Ensuring that USAID remains the world's leading
development agency requires that diversity, equity, and inclusion be
guiding principles when it comes to our people, our funding and
programs, and our policies.
Question. Do you commit to regularly and transparently monitoring
the Agency's progress towards its diversity goals?
Answer. Yes.
Basic Education
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that USAID's
efforts to support remote learning and re-enrollment efforts in the
context of COVID-19 will support marginalized learners, including
girls, refugees, and children with disabilities?
Answer. COVID-19 interrupted the education of more than 1.6 billion
learners. The risk of not returning to the classroom is especially high
for those who experience multiple vulnerabilities based on economic
status, gender, disability, refugee and displacement status. Since the
beginning of the pandemic, USAID has adapted its education programming
to respond to the shifting needs of students and educators in more than
50 countries. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID continues to
support partner countries to sustain investments in inclusive distance
learning so that education systems are more resilient and equitable. I
will also ensure that USAID continues to leverage its partnerships and
global leadership to ensure continued learning opportunities,
especially for the most marginalized. I will also ensure that USAID
continues to leverage its partnerships and global leadership with
groups like the Global Partnership for Education, Education Cannot
Wait, the LEGO Foundation, the Inter-agency Network for Education in
Emergencies, the Partnership to End Violence, and UNICEF, among others,
to ensure continued learning opportunities, especially for the most
marginalized, including girls, refugees, and children with
disabilities.
Question. What more can USAID be doing to help build back school
systems around the world so that they are capable of serving all
students, both during and after the pandemic, and are more resilient in
the face of future challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue to build
more resilient and equitable education systems and societies,
especially for the most marginalized and those in vulnerable
situations, by building emergency preparedness and response capacity,
institutionalizing remedial and accelerated education, and engaging
youth and higher education institutions as leaders. USAID has
opportunities to leverage its experience and expertise in accessible
and safe distance learning, non-formal and accelerated education,
inclusive education, youth workforce development, and private sector
engagement to scale. Institutionalizing these approaches within
education systems to meet the diverse needs of all children and youth
while also building resilience within education systems will help
minimize disruptions to learning in the event of future emergencies.
Conflicts of Interest
Question. Do you commit to bring to the attention of the committee
(and the USAID Inspector General) any change in policy or U.S. actions
that you suspect may be influenced by any of the President's business
or financial interests, or the business or financial interests of any
senior White House staff?
I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Do you commit to inform the committee if you have any reason to
suspect that a foreign government, head of state, or foreign-
controlled entity is taking any action in order to benefit any
of the President's business or financial interests, or the
interests of senior White House staff?
Answer. I commit to comply with all relevant federal ethics laws,
regulations, and rules and to raise concerns that I may have through
appropriate channels.
Question. Do you or do any members of your immediate family have
any financial interests in any foreign country?
Answer. My spouse's and my investment portfolio includes mutual
funds that may hold interests in companies with an international
presence, or directly in U.S. companies that have an international
presence, but none of these holdings represent conflicts of interest
with the position for which I have been nominated. I am committed to
following all applicable ethics laws and regulations and remaining
vigilant with regard to my ethics obligations. I have already committed
to divest investments the USAID Designated Agency Ethics Official
(DAEO) has identified as possible conflicts of interest. Additionally,
the separate U.S. literary agents that represent my spouse and me, have
international offices that negotiate publication or republication of
our writings in various foreign countries. The DAEO has reviewed these
business arrangements and has determined that they do not represent
conflicts of interest, but has advised me that we will need to monitor
and report any overseas re-publications that occur during my tenure in
Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting the Interim
President of Venezuela Juan Guiad" and prioritize working with
implementing partners in support of President Guaido's humanitarian
efforts in Venezuela?
Answer. The United States recognizes Juan Guaido as the interim
president and the democratically-elected National Assembly as the only
legitimate democratic institutions in Venezuela. If confirmed, I commit
to working with the interim government and to support the people of
Venezuela.
Question. Will you commit to working with non-governmental
organizations and civil society groups to restore democracy and a
pathway to free, fair, and transparent elections in Venezuela and to
keep my office informed of that progress?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with non-
governmental organizations and civil society groups to restore
democracy and a pathway to democratic elections in Venezuela. I look
forward to consulting with you about how we might strengthen those
efforts, given the devastating costs of Maduro's repression.
Question. Do you commit to supporting the Interim President of
Venezuela, Juan Guaido, and the National Assembly?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support to support Interim President
Juan Guaido, the democratically elected National Assembly, and the
people of Venezuela to determine their own future through free and fair
elections.
Question. If confirmed, what would your priorities be for Central
America?
Answer. If confirmed, my priorities in Central America will include
expeditiously strengthening programs that seek to improve conditions in
the region and tackle the major drivers of migration. While the
specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be generalized across
countries or even communities, they are generally tied to insecurity,
lack of economic opportunity, and the effects of poor governance and
corruption, and I will work with other U.S. Government agencies to
build the political will of partner nations to address these drivers.
COVID-19 has exacerbated these conditions, as have major natural
disasters (including hurricanes) recently hitting the region.
As you know, in recent years, USAID programs have been designed to
combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth; addressed
corruption and impunity; disrupted the activities of transnational
criminal organizations; civil society; and provided vulnerable citizens
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection. As
USAID restarts and ramps up those programs and as USAID missions in the
region seek new or expanded partnerships, the agency will draw on
evidence of what works in order to help foster an environment where
families can envision their futures in their home countries and
communities. If confirmed, I will continue USAID's current approach of
tailoring and adapting programs to the unique needs of each country and
community. I will also continue the Agency's practice of using
migration data to focus resources geographically in response to
specific, local drivers of migration. USAID will work with a wide range
of stakeholders from civil society and the private sector to increase
the impact of our efforts. And I look forward to further consultations
with Congress on how to further improve the effectiveness of these
programs.
Question. Regional coordination is essential to the effectiveness
of the U.S. Strategy for Central America. Will you commit to working
closely with our partners in this region?
Answer. Yes, I will commit to working closely with our partners in
the region. I understand that USAID works closely with multiple
stakeholders in the region both in the public and private sectors as
well as with civil society organizations and international non-
governmental organizations.
Question. How will USAID, under your leadership, work to address
the drivers of violence, corruption, and migration in the Northern
Triangle?
Answer. The specific drivers of irregular migration cannot be
generalized across communities or even countries. Accordingly, USAID
tailors and adapts programs that address the root causes of irregular
migration to the unique needs of each country and community; the
extensive use of data is critical and is an integral part of these
efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able to
concentrate resources geographically in response to local drivers of
migration.
I understand that USAID is addressing the security, governance, and
economic drivers of irregular migration to the United States from
Central America in partnership with other U.S. Government agencies,
including the development of a forthcoming strategy on addressing the
root causes of irregular migration as mandated in Executive Order
14010. Critical to the success of our efforts is generating political
will on the part of governments in the region to address the reasons
people choose to migrate. USAID combats crime and violence through its
programming by reaching at-risk youth, addressing corruption and
impunity, disrupting the activities of transnational criminal
organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens with greater economic
opportunity, social services, and protection. Through this work, USAID
seeks to foster an environment where families can envision their
futures in their home countries and communities. If confirmed, I will
work to build and expand on this foundation. I look forward to
deepening consultations with Congress on how to further improve the
effectiveness of these programs.
Question. Last year, in the FY 21 SFOPS conference report, $25
million was allocated for programs in Guatemala, Honduras, and El
Salvador to implement the national sexual gender-based violence (SGBV)
prevention strategies in fiscal year 2021. The bill required, within
120 days, and in consultation with the USAID Administrator, a report on
the implementation of the national SGBV prevention strategies in such
countries. Also included in the FY21 appropriations bill, were
recommendations for the State Department to create programs in the
Northern Triangle for programming and enhancing the capacity of police,
judicial systems, and child protection systems to identify, investigate
and prosecute cases of sexual violence. If confirmed, will you commit
to briefing my staff on how USAID intends to implement this funding?
Answer. I share your desire to prevent sexual and gender-based
violence in Central America, which has some of the highest rates of GBV
in the world. If confirmed, I commit to briefing you on how USAID
intends to implement the funding appropriated in FY 21 and how the
Agency currently works across the region supporting initiatives to
reduce impunity for gender-based violence (GBV) cases. GBV was
prioritized by President Biden in Executive Order 14010 which mandated
a new strategy on the root causes of irregular migration from the
Northern Triangle.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba
democracy programs as well as civil society and human rights defenders
in Cuba?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, support for human rights will remain at
the core of USAID's efforts in Cuba. Cuba is one of the most repressive
countries in the world, and is ruled by a dictatorship that flagrantly
abuses human rights, seeks to prevent its people from accessing even
basic independent information, inhibits meaningful civil society
activity--including free press--and criminalizes political dissent. As
one of my first acts as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I raised the case
of Oswaldo Pay directly with the Cuban Foreign Minister pressing him
to allow an independent investigation of the circumstances in which
Paya had been killed, and I continued to advocate publicly in support
of Pay 's family. During my time at the U.N., I repeatedly called out
Cuba for its abhorrent treatment of civil society and human rights
defenders like Jose Daniel Ferrer, Jose Antonio Torres, Julio Ferrer,
and Antonio Rodiles. If confirmed, I will continue to speak out against
Cuba's persecution of its citizens and human rights violations.
The role of a vibrant civil society continues to be essential to
Cuban democracy. I understand USAID has a portfolio in place to
continue supporting a diverse sector of independent activists in Cuba
who will push for democratic freedoms, including religious freedom. The
Agency will also continue providing basic needs assistance to political
prisoners and persecuted activists. NGOs are poised to continue
defending the human rights of those who are abused and even jailed for
their political beliefs.
Question. Colombia has been directly impacted by the man-made
crisis created by Nicol s Maduro and his brutal regime in Venezuela.
Currently, Colombia hosts about 1.7 million Venezuelans, according to
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees. How should we support Colombia
in responding to the impacts it faces due to the Venezuelan crisis?
Answer. USAID is addressing immediate humanitarian needs and
supporting the long-term development challenges in Colombia resulting
from the Venezuelan crisis. I understand that the USAID Mission in
Colombia is providing more than $77 million for Venezuelans in health,
education, governance, citizen security, human rights, and economic
integration. Since 2018, USAID has also provided more than $298 million
in humanitarian assistance supporting Venezuelan migrants, refugees,
and host communities with food assistance, direct cash assistance, and
health support. Colombia recently granted ten years of legal status to
all Venezuelan refugees who have fled to the country, making it
possible for Venezuelans to live and work openly. This is an important
step for Colombia to harness the economic potential of the many
Venezuelans it hosts and, if confirmed, I look forward to consulting
with you on how USAID can support this effort.
Question. In 2017, Colombia signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with NATO and became the first NATO partner country in Latin America.
Today, Colombia and the U.S. are a success story that have forged a
bond through shared commitments in support of stability, the defense of
human rights, respect for democracy and the rule of law, and the
protection of citizens' safety and security throughout the Western
Hemisphere. Do you view our partnership with Colombia as one of the
strongest in the Western Hemisphere?
Answer. The United States and Colombia enjoy a decades' long
strategic partnership that is among the strongest in the region. If
confirmed, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and democratic
freedoms will be at the center of our relationship with Colombia.
Question. Do you believe that Colombia's shared goals with the
United States should be an example for younger democracies in the
Western Hemisphere? How do we take that model and focus our efforts on
other nations in the region?
Answer. I agree that the U.S.-Colombia partnership has proven
successful, and USAID's work with Colombia over the past decades on
peace and stability has achieved a number of successes. The peace
accords signed with the FARC in 2016 present a tremendous opportunity
for Colombia to end a conflict that had raged for more than 50 years,
and to end a continuous cycle of violence by transforming the long-
neglected parts of the country prioritized in the accords.
If confirmed, I will work with Colombia, and with Congress, to
collectively find ways to make USAID's assistance even more supportive
of Colombia's own efforts toward an enduring and inclusive peace. While
taking into account the context of each country's unique set of
circumstances, I agree that Colombia's advances provide important
lessons that may be applicable elsewhere within the region. At the same
time, as with other countries in the region, I will also speak up in
support of human rights: since 2016, more than 400 Colombian human
rights defenders have been killed, underscoring the importance of
USAID's continued assistance in helping the country achieve the
commitments and overall transformation envisioned by the peace accords.
Question. USAID foreign assistance programs must continue to
strengthen democratic institutions and bolster transparency and
accountability to underpin democratic resilience, but they also need to
provide targeted support to local stakeholders to understand CCP
influence and counter those malign efforts. Such funding should be
integrated into existing democracy programs at the country level, with
support from international actors who understand these issues, to
incorporate them into existing programs at the country level. If
confirmed, how will you ensure USAID supports these efforts?
Answer. U.S. competition with the People's Republic of China (PRC)
is a defining challenge of the 21st century. The administration's
approach is to provide an alternative vision to Beijing's--a vision
that promotes democratic governance, transparency, and local ownership
in our global development work. USAID will draw on America's
comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach from the
PRC's, by ensuring that good governance, sustainability and social and
economic safeguards are built into projects we support. USAID will
strengthen local capacity to ensure that development investments are
both beneficial and sustainable. If confirmed, I will work with allies
and partners to better leverage our collective resources and influence,
and I will be an advocate for human rights, governance, environmental,
social, and labor standards in order to promote investments that are
sustainable for the long term.
Question. How can USAID support administering some of the
Countering Chinese Influence Fund?
Answer. I would like to thank you and your colleagues for the
Countering Chinese Influence Fund (CCIF) resources that were made
available in the FY21 appropriations act. I understand that USAID is
working with the Department of State on programming these funds, as
well as others, to counter China's foreign policy strategy and
influence in critical countries and regions. The approach is to offer
alternatives to China's predatory development model and instead improve
inclusive, democratic governance; advance rules-based economic
competition and fair trade practices; strengthen our security
partnerships to counter transnational crime and terrorism; combat
digital authoritarianism and malicious cyber activities; and promote
energy security and independence. If confirmed, I look forward to
consulting with you on this and to further assessing how USAID can best
support these efforts.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to pushing for greater
humanitarian assistance and access for the Syrian people, while making
sure that such aid does not fall into the hands of a corrupt and
bloodthirsty Assad regime?
Answer. Yes. USAID remains committed to ensuring that all
assistance reaches those in need and does not benefit the Assad regime.
Across Syria, USAID takes all possible steps to minimize the risk of
diversion, whether to the Assad regime or to terrorist groups, by
working through experienced and trusted U.N. partners, other
international organizations, and non-governmental partners in Syria,
including through the use of third-party monitoring. USAID has zero
tolerance for fraud, waste, or abuse of American taxpayer resources and
requires partners to have robust safeguards and risk mitigation systems
in place to ensure that humanitarian assistance is reaching only those
for whom it is intended.
Question. Do you agree that long-term stabilization in Syria will
not be achieved as long as Bashar al-Assad remains in power?
Answer. Bashar al-Assad has perpetrated the most chilling, barbaric
crimes imaginable against the Syrian people for the past decade.
Despite political isolation, economic pressure, and weak control over
much of Syrian territory, Assad clings to power with no indication that
he is willing to bring an end to the war and the suffering of the
Syrian people, and indeed with Assad's increasingly ruinous economic
mismanagement exacerbating the horrific costs of conflict, repression,
and mass atrocities for the Syrian people. Members of Congress spoke
out clearly on this issue when they voted for the Caesar Civilian
Protection Act in the last Congress imposing military, political, and
accountability benchmarks for the Assad regime before it can receive
sanctions relief. Countless brave Syrians have risked their lives to
preserve evidence of Assad's war crimes, and Assad and his
collaborators must be held accountable for their atrocities.
Question. As an expert on genocide, do you agree that the Chinese
Communist Party is committing genocide and crimes against humanity
against Uyghurs and other its Muslim minorities in Xinjiang?
Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have
studied the facts that China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.
I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue, including the
passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds perpetrators
accountable for human rights violations and abuses against Uyghurs and
other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my platform to draw
attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that USAID actively
engages with you, the committee and the interagency to determine any
further steps that can be taken.
Question. You have written extensively about the failure of past
administrations to prevent and respond to genocide. You are now in a
unique position to put your aspirations into action. We have seen what
has happened to Iraq's Yazidi and Christian community at the hands of
ISIS. We know about the atrocities and likely genocide committed
against the Rohingya by Burmese military forces. Now, we are reading
weekly reports about the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang against Uyghurs
and other Muslim minorities by the Chinese Communist Party.
Can you assure this committee that you will not only support, but
also strengthen, USAID's commitment to victims of religious
persecution?
Answer. Yes. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of atrocities, especially
for religious minorities. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform
to elevate the voices of religious minorities. I called for the release
of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to
denounce her Christian faith, and for Sudan to repeal the laws that put
her in jail in the first place. I was the first person to bring a young
Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad to the U.N. Security Council, after her
family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS and she had been
forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a history of helping the world's
most vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of
their faith. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring with you, the
Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and Neighborhood
Partnerships office , and diverse faith communities, to mobilize
resources and, as appropriate, to tailor our programs to support
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.
Question. If so, how do you plan to use your position to do so?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to stand up for victims of
religious persecution, and I will review USAID's approach to ensure
that our programs are most effectively supporting them, making
adjustments as appropriate.
Question. The past several months have been historic for Israel's
relationships with regional Arab neighbors. The UAE, Bahrain, Morocco,
and Sudan joined Egypt and Jordan in establishing diplomatic relations
with Israel--paving the path to peace through recognition and
engagement rather than isolation and boycotts of Israel. What role do
you see for USAID in supporting these new relationships? Do you see
opportunities for increased trilateral cooperation in the region?
Answer. USAID has the opportunity to support these relationships
through identifying opportunities for increased trilateral and
multilateral cooperation, such as by leveraging the inherently
collaborative power of science, technology and innovation in order to
address common challenges. USAID supports cooperation between Israel
and countries in the Middle East region through the Middle East
Regional Cooperation (MERC) program, which has long supported programs
between partners throughout the region. If confirmed, I look forward to
building upon such efforts to further peace and normalization across
the Middle East.
Question. During your tenure as U.N. Ambassador, the United States
abstained at the United Nations Security Council on a one-sided
resolution that sought to impose solutions to final status issues on
the parties. Seventy-nine senators subsequently backed a resolution
objecting to the abstention. In hindsight, do you believe that vote
advanced American interests or moved the peace process forward?
Answer. During my time as Ambassador to the U.N., I worked
tirelessly to combat bias against Israel and end Israel's unfair
isolation at the United Nations. The U.S. Mission to the United Nations
helped secure several notable firsts for Israel under my leadership,
including bringing about recognition of Yom Kippur as a U.N. holiday;
convening an unprecedented session on antisemitism in the U.N. General
Assembly; spearheading Israel's full and equal participation across
numerous U.N. bodies; and lobbying to ensure Israel's historic
selection as chair of a powerful U.N. committee (the Sixth Committee,
the main U.N. forum for addressing questions of international law).
This context is important in addressing the Obama administration's
vote on UNSCR 2334. President Obama instructed me to abstain on UNSCR
2334 in order to try to preserve prospects for a two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He saw the vote as consistent with
bipartisan policy, dating back almost 50 years at the time, of
supporting two states and opposing unilateral measures by either side
that could impede prospects for two states. The resolution included a
condemnation of all acts of violence against civilians, including acts
of terrorism and incitement, and it expressed concern about Israeli
settlement activities, reaffirming the long-standing U.S. position on
settlements.
During my explanation of the U.S. vote, I denounced persistent
anti-Israel bias at the U.N. and described our numerous efforts
(including those mentioned above) ``to fight for Israel's right simply
to be treated just like any other country.'' I also explained President
Obama's posture on the resolution: ``It is because this forum too often
continues to be biased against Israel; because there are important
issues that are not sufficiently addressed in this resolution; and
because the United States does not agree with every word in this text,
that the United States did not vote in favor of the resolution. But it
is because this resolution reflects the facts on the ground--and is
consistent with U.S. policy across Republican and Democratic
administration throughout the history of the State of Israel--that the
United States did not veto it.''
(The full explanation of vote, from December 23, 2016, is available
here: https://web.archive.org/web/20161231232014/https://
usun.state.gov/remarks/7621)
If confirmed, I will work to advance President Biden's strong
support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in accordance with
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.
Question. The Helms amendment states, ``No foreign assistance funds
may be used to pay for the performance of abortion as a method of
family planning or to motivate or coerce any person to practice
abortions.'' If confirmed, can you guarantee there will be a strict
adherence to the Helms amendment in the administration of U.S. foreign
assistance?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that USAID fully abides by
all U.S. laws, including the Helms Amendment.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
Question. After enduring a decade of conflict, humanitarian needs
in Syria are projected to onlyincrease. President Biden pledged to
recommit the U.S. to lead on humanitarian issues including to pursue
political solutions, protect vulnerable Syrians and facilitate the work
of NGOs.
What specific actions will USAID take under your direction to
reassert U.S. humanitarian leadership and efforts in Syria?
What tools are available to the U.S. to ensure continued
humanitarian access into and within Syria?
Answer. As U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., I worked tirelessly to hold
the Assad regime and its backers accountable for their war crimes, and
to provide humanitarian assistance to the Syrian people. Among these
efforts, in 2014 I helped lead the U.N. Security Council to authorize
U.N. agencies to deliver relief into Syria without explicit approval
from the Syrian Government, allowing millions of people to receive
assistance that the Assad regime had been blocking. Today, USAID's
humanitarian assistance is reaching an estimated 4.8 million people per
month inside Syria and 1.1 million Syrian refugees in the region. The
United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance inside
Syria and across the region, contributing close to $13 billion since
the start of the conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to be a
forceful advocate for delivering critically-needed humanitarian aid to
the Syrian people, and ensure that the United States continues to play
a leading role in protecting vulnerable civilians by advocating for
unhindered humanitarian access, coordinating with other donors, and
encouraging other donors to increase their support to the response. I
will also work with Secretary of State Blinken and Ambassador Linda
Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the U.S. Government continues to
advocate in the U.N. Security Council and on the international stage to
improve the lives of the Syrian people, including through the
reauthorization of the aforementioned U.N. cross-border assistance and
to advance a long-overdue negotiated political settlement to end the
Syrian conflict.
Question. How can USAID play a role in bringing about a political
solution in Syria? What tools are available to the U.S. through USAID
to better support our allies in Northeastern Syria?
Answer. While assistance will not solve the conflict in Syria, it
is a vital component of the effort to create conditions for peace by
saving lives, providing some measure of stability to vulnerable
populations, and uniting partners and allies in support of the Syrian
people. If confirmed, in addition to ensuring that as many Syrians as
possible are able to receive critically-needed assistance, I will
support administration-wide efforts to advance a negotiated political
settlement, which is the only way to end this conflict. I will also
explore USAID support for civil society actors who are documenting war
crimes and pursuing accountability, a critical complement to pursuit of
a stable peace. The Biden administration redoubled the U.S. commitment
to our allies in northeast Syria by lifting the previous
administration's freeze on stabilization funds. If confirmed, I will
ensure not only that these critical programs continue, but that they
complement the larger administration-wide efforts to advance a
negotiated political settlement.
Question. It is imperative for U.S. foreign assistance to aim to
break down gender-related barriers to educational attainment in
countries where there is persistent gender disparity. This is
particularly important in secondary school when girls are the most
likely to drop out. In many contexts, poverty and entrenched social and
cultural norms can limit girls' access to quality learning
opportunities.
How can USAID better provide holistic support to ensure adolescents
stay enrolled in and complete secondary school?
Answer. USAID promotes a ``whole-of-girl'' approach, reducing
gender-based violence and increasing the capability of all learners, of
all gender identities, to realize their rights, determine their life
outcomes, and make independent decisions. If confirmed, I commit that
USAID will continue to break down gender-related barriers to education
so that all learners, especially girls and the most marginalized, have
access to safe, quality education from early childhood through
adulthood, especially during adolescence, a crucial time in girls'
lives. Part of this approach is recognizing that menstrual health and
hygiene is an integral part of dignity and empowerment for adolescent
girls, including their ability to attend and stay in school. USAID will
also continue to prioritize the needs of the most marginalized and
those in vulnerable situations, and address inequalities that have been
exacerbated by COVID-19. Ensuring that we continue to make progress in
this area is critically important not just for empowering young women,
but for achieving lasting advances on behalf of society as a whole and
creating conditions for a more equitable response to the fallout from
the pandemic. For example, addressing gender inequality in education
contributes to closing gender gaps in employment and wages, which have
in turn been shown to reduce income inequality and lead to overall
increases in GDP.
Question. USAID's global health programs are critical to providing
sexual and reproductive health care for women and girls. However,
research has shown that a 10 percent decline in the use of
contraceptives--such as due to the COVID-19 pandemic--could result in
more than 48 million women with an unmet need for modern contraception
and more than 15 million additional unintended pregnancies. If
confirmed, I hope you will not only support international family
planning as a priority for USAID, but also the partners on the ground
who implement these programs.
How will you work to expand and improve USAID's family planning and
reproductive health programs?
Answer. I believe that reproductive health care is essential to
women's health and well-being and also positively impacts infant and
child health. Now more than ever, as countries battle COVID-19 and the
secondary effects from the pandemic, we must strengthen our efforts to
reach those most vulnerable, including women who benefit from voluntary
family planning and reproductive health (FP/RH) programs. The
administration is committed to ensuring that foreign assistance
programs prioritize women's health needs globally, including robust
support for voluntary family planning and maternal health programs, and
for preventing gender-based violence.
Question. What needs to be done to increase access to sexual and
reproductive health care amidst the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has adversely affected all global
health efforts, including routine vaccination programs for children,
voluntary family planning and reproductive health programs , women and
children's access to basic health care, and the distribution of
treatments to control neglected tropical diseases, as well as
tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. If confirmed, I will work with
USAID global health experts to ensure funding is prioritized to
activities, including voluntary family planning and reproductive health
activities, that will support regaining the progress lost during the
pandemic.
Question. Is there a way for the U.S. to better engage with
partners and allies on the provision of family planning services? What
would that look like?
Answer. USAID is the largest bilateral donor for voluntary family
planning and reproductive health assistance globally. Other donors,
partner governments, and civil society actors have historically looked
to USAID for leadership because of its strong reputation for technical
excellence. The administration is committed to restoring U.S global
health leadership, including as it relates to voluntary family planning
and reproductive health, which will require effective partnerships to
improve coordination and investments and strengthen linkages across
diverse global health programs. If confirmed, I will look for ways that
USAID can advance voluntary family planning and reproductive health
programming with our partners and allies around the globe.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Rob Portman
Extremism and the Global Fragility Act
Question. Despite the best efforts of both parties and their
respective administrations, the threat from Salafi-Jihadi extremism
persists to this day. The Global Fragility Act passed by Congress last
year changed our approach to conflict-prone states that can be vectors
of violent extremism, uncontrolled migration, and extreme poverty by
dedicating $1.5 billion toward this space and establishing a new Bureau
for Development, Democracy and Innovation at USAID.
How will you effectively use this legislation to direct our
approaches toward countering fragile states?
Answer. this is a key priority. We need a comprehensive approach
and more tools to prevent conflict and increase stability. If
confirmed, I will consult with Congress on the implementation of the
U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (the ``GFA
strategy''). It is my understanding that the list of priority countries
is currently being considered by the interagency, with USAID
participation. After country selection, we will need to bring a range
of U.S. policy tools to bear in implementing the GFA strategy and
associated country and regional plans. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with you and Congress frequently to support the
implementation of the Act with State and DOD.
Latin America
Question. I would like to talk about the importance of Latin
America and the role of the United States in the economic and
democratic development of this region.
Last week I led a bipartisan CODEL to El Paso to see firsthand the
crisis on the border. We are seeing people fleeing extreme poverty from
the Northern Triangle countries-- Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.
I am very supportive of building a robust border protection system to
physically protect our border, but I also understand the necessity to
help these fragile countries address the root causes of illegal
immigration such as extreme poverty and breakdown in security.
The latest numbers are deeply concerning. 550 kids per day are
coming into the United States, mostly from the Northern Triangle
countries, which is five or six times more than in January, when there
were less than 100 in terms of families. In terms of families, 1,500
per day last week, as compared to 1,000 in February--on average, less
than 100 in January. This is a 15 times increase when compared to
previous data.
Do you believe that that is an appropriate condition to us spending
what President Biden has now suggested, which is another $4
billion on top of the $3.6 billion that has been sent in the
last five years?
Answer. As you note, President Biden proposed a multi-year, $4
billion comprehensive regional strategy to address the root causes of
irregular migration. I agree that any funding needs to be accountable
and channeled to evidence-based programming. Since the specific drivers
of irregular migration cannot be generalized across communities or even
countries, USAID tailors and adapts programs that address the root
causes of irregular migration to the unique needs of each country and
community; the extensive use of data is critical and is an integral
part of these efforts. By tracking migration trends, the Agency is able
to focus resources geographically in response to local drivers of
migration.
I gather that USAID is addressing the distinct and overlapping
security, governance, and economic drivers of irregular migration to
the United States from Central America in partnership with other U.S.
Government agencies, including, as mandated in Executive Order 14010,
by working with the State Department to develop a forthcoming strategy
on addressing the root causes of irregular migration from the region.
USAID seeks to combat crime and violence by reaching at-risk youth,
addressing corruption and impunity, disrupting the activities of
transnational criminal organizations, and providing vulnerable citizens
with greater economic opportunity, social services, and protection.
Through this work, USAID helps to foster an environment where families
can envision their futures in their home countries and communities. If
confirmed, I will work to build and expand on this foundation and look
forward to consulting with you about how best to ensure these programs
are tailored to optimize results.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress on asylum seekers to
have them apply from their home country or a safe third country?
Answer. Under President Obama, in my capacity as White House
Coordinator for Iraqi Refugees while serving at the NSC, I saw the
importance of the in-country processing efforts in Iraq that had
initially been established in 2008, and as U.N. Ambassador, I supported
President Obama's establishment of the Central American Minors (CAM)
Refugee program, which President Biden has announced will continue
under his administration. As you know, USAID is not involved in asylum
policy or enforcement of border security, so if confirmed, I would
defer to the Departments of Homeland Security and the State Department.
Question. Do you commit to placing an emphasis on combating
corruption, especially through the Millennium Challenge Corporation
through programming in the northern triangle countries?
Answer. Yes. Corruption can itself be a driver of migration and of
course makes it more difficult to address a wide range of development
challenges--from global health and food security, to economic
development and fair trade, to maintaining strong alliances. If
confirmed, I plan to renew USAID's focus on governance and anti-
corruption programs in the Northern Triangle and, in my role on the
Board of Directors at the MCC, I commit to placing an emphasis on
combating corruption.
Question. Do you commit to emphasizing an adherence to transparency
and rule of law in Latin America and beyond?
Answer. Yes, I commit to the importance of transparency and the
rule of law in Latin America and beyond.
Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA)
Question. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA), which is a
program I created during my time serving in the House, remains a top
priority for me. This is a ``debt-for-nature'' swap program that offers
eligible developing countries options to relieve or restructure
concessional debt owed to the U.S. in exchange for supporting
conservation activities for tropical forests and coral reefs. Through
the TFCA program, approximately $233 million in appropriated funds from
the U.S. Government have generated nearly $340 million through interest
and leveraging from NGOs and private entities.
To date, 20 agreements have been carried out with 14 different
countries to save more than 67 million acres of tropical forest.
Tropical forests are valuable tools for carbon storage. These TFCA
agreements have led to the sequestration of more than 56 million metric
tons of carbon dioxide--that's the equivalent of taking 11.8 million
cars off the road--and without losing a single American job. In fact,
this program has helped developing countries by improving their balance
sheet through debt-for-nature swaps.
TFCA was provided $15 million in appropriations for both fiscal
years 2020 and 2021. USAID, in coordination with the Treasury
Department and the State Department, is one of the key agencies
responsible for carrying out TFCA agreements.
If you are confirmed to be Administrator of USAID, will you commit
to prioritizing additional TFCA deals using the funding that
Congress has provided?
Answer. Thank you for your leadership on this important issue,
which I was grateful to have the chance to discuss with you. I
certainly agree that this is win-win programming. I gather that USAID
works closely with the State Department and Treasury in an effort to
program TFCA agreements, including those addressing coral reef
conservation. I understand that TFCA programs have generated
substantial additional resources through capital gains from fund
investments, cost-sharing by grant recipients, and co-financing with
other donors. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing additional deals
with TFCA funding.
Africa and Great Power Competition
Question. China has focused heavily on Africa as a part of their
Belt and Road Initiative. While China has provided much needed
infrastructure spending and benefits to some countries on the
continent, I am concerned about shifts in Chinese investment away from
development initiatives toward projects that are more aligned with
military purposes. At the same time, many countries have traded
infrastructure and development for natural resource rights and
burdensome debt obligations.
How will you effectively lead USAID to counter China's influence in
Africa? How can we do a better job of highlighting the benefits
of working with America rather than the CCP?
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States, and engaging with our African
partners to pursue shared strategic interests in advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth must be a cornerstone
of our global strategy to counter China. In this regard, U.S.-African
trade and investment initiatives have a critical role to play in
meeting this challenge head-on. In Africa, the United States offers a
meaningful alternative to China's predatory economic approach, and we
must continue to work to ensure that American companies can compete on
an even playing field at the same time we promote local
entrepreneurship and fair practices. Despite the massive amounts of
money that Beijing has invested in Africa, people in many African
nations are voicing growing concerns over China's lack of transparency,
lending practices, poor environmental record, and failure to invest in
relationships with local communities. In these and other areas, the
United States has multiple comparative advantages that we must work
across agencies to demonstrate. If confirmed, I look forward to
consulting further with you and to working with other Departments and
Agencies as well as the business community to help ensure that the U.S.
is pursuing trade and investment initiatives from a position of
strength. I also look forward to digging into the communications
dimension of this challenge, because we need to be strategic about how
we amplify the tenets of the U.S. approach and how we highlight for our
local partners the ways in which U.S. investments are responsive to
local needs and priorities.
Question. China has also exported a number facial recognition and
security software programs for law enforcement, the same systems that
are being used to enable the genocide in Xingjian against the Uyghurs,
to effectively ``coup-proof'' authoritarian regimes on the African
continent.
Do you see this as a threat for democracy promotion in Africa, and
how can we help you to be successful in pushing back against
this threat?
Answer. Yes. China's use of facial recognition and security
software programs for law enforcement are a threat to democracy and
freedom of expression in Africa. Freedom has been declining globally
for 15 consecutive years, and China and Russia are using their
resources, influence, and technology to buttress autocrats and
undermine and interfere with democratic institutions. In Africa, USAID
supports efforts to uphold civil society efforts to advocate for
fundamental rights, such as freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and to hold credible, free, and fair elections. I
appreciate your offer of support. If confirmed, I will continue to
prioritize this critical work and look forward to working with you and
your colleagues to devise new strategies for countering this growing
threat.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Tim Kaine
Virginia Tech Innovation Lab
Question. The Feed the Future Integrated Pest Management Innovation
Lab (IPMIL), funded by USAID and managed by Virginia Tech, has been in
operation since 1993. In that time, the program has generated nearly $2
billion in economic benefits for developing countries, funded 500+
graduate students, and collaborated with more than 100 institutions.
Unfortunately, in a deviation from its historic review process for
innovation labs, USAID has not renewed IPMIL for a full five-year
contract since 2014; rather, it is now operating on its second one-year
no-cost extension that is set to expire in November 2021. USAID's
Bureau for Resilience and Food Security has also established a new
Future Innovation Lab for Current and Emerging Threats to Crops (CETC),
for which the agency is now soliciting proposals.
Given the potential overlap between IPMIL and the CETC, I recently
led a letter with Senate and House colleagues to Acting Administrator
Steele in support of IPMIL, including seeking clarity on the status of
the program at Virginia Tech moving forward. Should you be confirmed, I
look forward to USAID's attention to the matter
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into this matter and
getting back to you.
USAID Collaboration with Research Universities
Question. USAID has a strong tradition of working with universities
to utilize their expertise to help address some of the most challenging
global development challenges. Feed the Future Innovation Labs are one
part of that partnership and are critical in advancing the solutions
needed to help reduce global hunger, poverty, and undernutrition. If
confirmed, are there new programs and collaborations you envision with
strong research universities like those in Virginia? Will you consider
expanding innovation labs to help reach more countries?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I would explore opportunities to deepen
USAID's collaboration with research universities. USAID greatly values
its partnership with the U.S. university community and the unparalleled
research capacity that these institutions bring to the U.S.
Government's global hunger and food security initiative, Feed the
Future. The U.S. university-led Feed the Future Innovation Labs are
central to leveraging American science and innovation to solve problems
facing food-insecure regions, and they are doing so in ways that build
local and national capacity in partner countries. I gather that the
cutting-edge portfolio of Innovation Labs evolves as new challenges
emerge and new research pathways open up for making progress in food
security, strengthening climate resilience and accelerating improved
nutrition, and if confirmed, I look forward to engaging in that process
and discussing any new opportunities with you.
New Partnership Initiative (NPI)
Question. The New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) was established to
diversify USAID's partner base by creating avenues for new and
underutilized partners to work with USAID. Through NPI, the Agency
promotes local leadership, seeks bold and innovative approaches to
fostering self-reliance, and identifies new sources of funding to
sustain partnership and scale impact. It is one of the only tools the
agency has to effectively work with new partners.
How will you work to ensure that mechanisms like the New
Partnerships Initiative are maintained as effective tools in
partnering with new, innovative, and locally established
organizations?
Answer. I recognize the longstanding challenge of enlisting new and
non-traditional partners. It is my understanding that approximately 80
percent of USAID funding went to just 75 organizations in 2017, and by
2019 only 69 organizations were receiving the same share. The number of
new partners has declined every year since 2011. Reducing the barriers
to engaging with and accessing resources from USAID is important, and I
strongly believe in diversifying the Agency's partnership base. Doing
so will help to broaden the USAID's perspectives and approaches in
order to address development and humanitarian challenges. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID continues to build on and expand efforts to be
more inclusive in partnering with a broader set of organizations to
achieve our objectives, while ensuring that the Agency meets relevant
requirements.
Community Health Workers
Question. Community health workers, the vast majority of whom are
women, have been a critical part of the response to COVID-19 and other
endemic diseases around the world. According to a recent report
commissioned by Malaria No More and the United Nations Foundation,
investments in community-based health programs help prevent 75 million
malaria cases annually, reducing the burden on the health systems of
low-income countries. Unfortunately, in many countries community health
workers are not well supported or compensated.
How can USAID support community health workers so that they have
the resources they need?
Answer. Community health workers (CHWs) have long been central to
responding to basic health needs, confronting global health threats
(including Ebola, Zika, malaria, and now of course COVID-19), and
providing life-saving assistance in humanitarian emergencies. CHWs are
an essential part of the global health workforce and often the only
source of care for their communities. The COVID-19 pandemic has only
exacerbated the need for CHWs, placing additional demands on these
critical frontline workers and requiring communities to redirect
resources to support COVID-19 response, when other health threats
remain. USAID recommends that host country governments include CHWs in
health systems as a professional cadre that are a critical part of a
sustainable health workforce. If confirmed, I commit to continuing to
advance programs that support and equip CHWs with the resources they
need.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator John Barrasso
Question. The coronavirus worsened the existing global food crisis.
An estimated 130 million more people were on the brink of starvation
last year due to factors caused by the coronavirus pandemic. Many of
these individuals are in countries already experiencing instability
from locust infestations, military conflict, and extreme poverty.
In what ways would you alter the previous planning and strategies
for U.S. food security efforts in light of the coronavirus
impacts?
Answer. The pandemic has exacerbated food insecurity and
malnutrition worldwide, with the most vulnerable bearing the brunt of
its impact. The World Bank estimates that in 2020 as many as 124
million people fell into poverty and hunger as a result, and expects
this number to increase significantly this year to as much as 163
million people. The nutrition impacts are equally devastating, putting
millions more children at risk. In the face of COVID-19, the U.S.
Government's Feed the Future initiative to end global hunger, is
adapting its vital programming to mitigate and deal with the impacts on
food systems and nutrition. Specifically, I understand that Feed the
Future is leveraging its existing global portfolio to respond to the
crisis in the following ways: (1) engaging governments on trade and
inclusive economic growth policies; (2) bolstering small and medium
sized enterprises throughout the food system and unlocking private
sector funds to accelerate economic recovery, growth and employment;
(3) transitioning households and communities off of assistance through
economic inclusion models; and (4) supporting governments to create and
strengthen their existing social protection systems, including shock-
responsive safety nets and risk financing. It will be critical to
further leverage Feed the Future as countries rebuild economically in
the long wake of the pandemic, and I understand that USAID is currently
looking at ways to do this.
Question. For more than 50 years, USAID's global health programs
have focused on saving lives and protecting vulnerable populations from
disease. The United States works extensively with countries across the
globe to strengthen public health systems. There are a finite amount of
resources available to address the current global pandemic. Yet, the
needs continue to expand.
What is your strategy to ensure USAID is assisting those countries
most in need due to the coronavirus pandemic?
Question. What indicators or criteria will you rely upon to make
decisions on how to best utilize U.S. resources to combat the
coronavirus?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID's COVID-19 work is
needs-based and evidence-driven. If confirmed, I will work with the
team at USAID to ensure that we prioritize resources based on rigorous
needs-analysis and clear performance metrics. It is my understanding
that USAID is developing a COVID-19 response plan, in coordination with
interagency partners, to meet critical and immediate health and
humanitarian needs such as vaccine readiness and acute food insecurity,
but also to address the wide range of second-order impacts of the
pandemic. If confirmed, I will support the development of this response
plan and ensure USAID invests new COVID-19 resources in a way that best
responds to the pandemic. I will also work with experts within USAID
and across the inter-agency to apply epidemiologic indicators and other
criteria to guide resource allocations, recognizing the complex and
dynamic nature of the first- and second-order impacts of the pandemic.
And across the board, I will prioritize transparency and accountability
in decision-making, and use data and analysis to guide the use of
funds.
Question. In 1985, USAID created the Famine Early Warning Systems
Network to provide objective, evidence based analysis to plan for and
respond to acute food insecurity.
Is this something that USAID can use as a model to work on an early
warning system for global health pandemics?
Answer. Yes, I believe that the Famine Early Warning Systems
Network is a useful model to inform our efforts to improve early
warning systems for infectious disease epidemics and pandemics, in
terms of establishing a data-driven approach to predict outbreaks. The
challenge will be to establish objective, evidence-based epidemiologic
criteria for tiered risk classification systems, and to link relevant
data to recognize threats early and take actions to prevent new
outbreaks from becoming epidemics or pandemics. If confirmed, I pledge
to work with other U.S. government departments and agencies, and the
international community, to improve early warning systems for
infectious disease epidemics and pandemics.
Question. What role should USAID play in the U.S.'s global health
security strategy to make us better prepared to combat any future
global health pandemic?
Answer. Ensuring global health security for the United States will
require that all countries be capable of preventing, detecting, and
responding effectively to health security risks and public health
emergencies. USAID will work in partnership with other international
organizations and public and private stakeholders to help implement the
U.S.'s global health security strategy. If confirmed, I will ensure
that USAID continues to work in close collaboration with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of State, and
other interagency partners, to strengthen global health security across
the globe to ensure we are positioned to prevent or respond to future
pandemics.
Question. In July 2019, USAID's Inspector General testified before
Congress on the management challenges impacting USAID. One major
management challenge identified was assessing and responding to the
risk in providing humanitarian and stabilization assistance.
Inspector General Ann Barr's testimony stated, ``Insufficient risk
assessments not only leave USAID programs and services vulnerable to
exploitation, but they also put USAID in the position of attempting to
mitigate threats it does not understand. The adverse effects of poor
planning, monitoring and evaluation were demonstrated in the fraud
schemes that our agents uncovered in Iraq and Syria and across Africa,
some of which involved diversions of USAID-funded commodities to
terrorists.''
How will you address the issues of insufficient risk assessments,
monitoring and evaluations at USAID?
Answer. It is important for USAID to act in the interest of the
American people, and to provide foreign assistance and build
partnerships where there is the greatest need, which is often in
difficult situations. Risks that are inherent to operating in conflict
settings and challenging environments can be mitigated, but never
eliminated. Monitoring risk, and measuring and analyzing results-and
adapting when programs fall short-is part of the day-to-day management
of USAID's operations. Of course, there is always room for improvement
and innovation. If confirmed, I look forward to pushing USAID even
further on finding innovative ways to quickly gather information to
adapt programs and better achieve results, while also ensuring proper
vetting and accountability to U.S. taxpayers.
Question. What steps will you take to strengthen current procedures
aimed at preventing diversions of U.S. taxpayer resources going to
terrorists?
Answer. USAID conducts extensive screening to mitigate risk and
safeguard U.S. foreign assistance from diversion to organizations or
individuals posing a threat to national security. USAID has a robust
system for partner vetting to mitigate the risk of funds supporting
terrorist groups. I understand that since it began tracking these
figures in 2015, USAID estimates that it has prevented more than $800
million from supporting or benefitting people and entities that do not
meet USAID vetting requirements. Further, USAID applicants are required
to sign certifications and assurances stating that they have not
knowingly provided material support or resources to terrorist groups or
individuals/entities affiliated with terrorist groups. This risk
mitigation has allowed USAID to continue to work in the highest-risk
environments, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with the
committee on this important priority.
Question. Will you commit to doing a full audit of USAID funds and
programs to ensure U.S. resources are not going to support terrorist
groups and entities on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block
Persons list?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall
into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I
understand that USAID has numerous safeguards, financial accountability
mechanisms and an independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I
am committed to supporting if I am confirmed.
Question. During a Senate investigation into the World Vision's
interactions with the Islamic Relief Agency (ISRA), redacted emails
were uncovered implying that when you were the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations you were involved in efforts to delist the ISRA from the
Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list.
Specifically, your office appears to have requested OFAC review the
designation without a formal request from ISRA. The U.S. Treasury
sanctioned ISRA for its support of terrorism including direct financial
support to Usama bin Landen, Al Qaida, the Taliban, and Hamas.
Why were you and your office involved with seeking a review of the
ISRA's placement on the SDN list?
What efforts did you and your office take to discourage the
delisting of ISRA from the SDN list?
Please describe all the efforts you and your office took while
serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations to advocate
for or provide assistance in the delisting process for entities
on the Specially Designated Nationals and Block Persons list.
As Administrator of USAID, when would you consider it appropriate
to assist entities in requesting a review of their placement on
the SDN list outside the general Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) parameters?
Will you commit to providing this committee and the rest of
Congress timely and substantive responses to oversight
inquiries?
Answer. As U.N. Ambassador, I was not involved in any effort to
delist ISRA; nor did I do anything to ``assist'' this or any other
entity on the SDN list. Indeed, the opposite is true. Under my
leadership, as is documented in public records, the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations (U.S.-U.N.) worked tirelessly to rebut ISRA's false
claims that it had been wrongly designated on the Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons list by the U.S. Government. During my
tenure, U.S.-U.N. repeatedly raised questions about ISRA's status and
funding in order to force the United Nations Committee on Non-
Governmental Organizations to postpone the consideration of ISRA for
accreditation.
In support of these efforts to prevent the accreditation of ISRA by
the United Nations Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, U.S.-
U.N. maintained the standard practice of regularly coordinating with
the U.S. State and Treasury Departments to ensure U.S. diplomats at the
U.N. had the most up-to-date information available.
Please find records of some of U.S.-U.N.'s actions at the January
2014, January 2015, and May 2015 sessions of the United Nations
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations:
https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ecosoc6593.doc.htm;
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6662.doc.htm;
https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/ecosoc6694.doc.htm;
As Ambassador, in addition to repudiating ISRA's efforts to
rehabilitate itself, I often used my platform to draw attention to the
crimes and dangerous activities of organizations on the Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list. If confirmed, I can
assure you that I share the goal of ensuring that the U.S. Agency for
International Development takes all appropriate measures to prevent
misuse of its funding-whether for terrorism, corruption, or any other
types of abuse. I further confirm my commitment to cooperate and
provide Congress with timely and substantive responses to inquiries, if
confirmed.
Question. With a national debt over $28 trillion, it is more
important than ever for the government to be good steward of taxpayer
funds. USAID must design and implement programs in the most effective
and efficient manner. Every agency needs to be carefully evaluated and
streamlined to eliminate duplicative and wasteful spending.
What reforms will you take to improve the effectiveness of U.S.
international development assistance?
Answer. I agree with the principle of aid effectiveness and that
USAID's programs should encourage self-reliance and sustainability. My
vision for USAID's role includes traditional development priorities. It
also applies a broader lens that recognizes U.S. foreign assistance
within core U.S. national security priorities, including advancing
democracy and human rights, mitigating the effects of conflict, and
promoting global health in a collaborative manner with civil society
partners and governments. If confirmed, I commit to advancing sound,
evidence-based development and humanitarian programming that continues
to improve aid effectiveness, self-reliance, and sustainability.
Question. What actions will you take, if any, to prevent fraud,
waste and abuse at USAID?
Answer. All USAID employees have a statutory duty and
responsibility to promote accountability in the Agency's programs and
activities. Every USAID employee is responsible for assisting the
Office of Inspector General, by promptly reporting instances of waste,
fraud, or abuse. Furthermore, I understand that USAID has a number of
policies and requirements in place to prevent fraud throughout the
solicitation, award, and management of our grants and contracts. I
understand that when instances of fraud, waste, and abuse do occur, the
Agency considers a variety of award remedies, such as disallowed costs,
special award conditions, and/or award suspension or termination. In
addition, implementing partners and individuals who have committed
fraud, waste, abuse, or other serious misconduct are subject to a
number of accountability actions, including exclusion from receiving
future U.S. Government funds through USAID's suspension and debarment
program.
Question. What opportunities exist for streamlining, efficiencies
and savings at USAID?
Answer. I agree that streamlining, efficiencies, and savings of
taxpayer dollars is a priority. If confirmed, I look forward to looking
for opportunities and continuing this conversation with you.
Question. A January Wall Street Journal article reported that you
requested the ``unmasking'' of nearly 300 people in the last year of
working for the Obama Administration as U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. When U.S. intelligence agencies intercept the communications
of private U.S. citizens, those individuals are ``masked'' to ensure
their privacy is protected.
How many U.S. citizens did you unmask during the time you worked as
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?
What criteria did you use in determining whether it was appropriate
to request the unmasking of a U.S. citizen?
Given the large number of reported requests for unmasking made in
your name, do you plan to refine your criteria going forward to
ensure Americans privacy is appropriately protected?
How will you protect the privacy of U.S. citizens as USAID
Administrator?
Answer. Safeguarding classified information and protecting the
privacy of US persons are serious responsibilities for anyone serving
in a national security role within the US government. I have protected
classified information and guarded the privacy of US persons throughout
my career as a public servant, and I will continue to do so if I am
confirmed as USAID Administrator.
While serving as U.N. Ambassador and as a cabinet member advising
the President on the full range of national security threats, I was a
recipient of information prepared by intelligence professionals, which
I used to do my job of protecting and defending the United States and
advancing US national security interests. I did not discuss the
contents of classified material with unauthorized personnel. On
occasion, in order to understand the intelligence briefed to me, I
asked questions about the individuals or entities referenced in
intelligence. Any requests I made for identifying information were made
solely for the purpose of understanding the intelligence in order to do
my job. While I do not recall the specific number of such requests I
made as U.N. Ambassador, the number attributed to me in press reports,
including in the Wall Street Journal Editorial board opinion piece
referenced here, is false. It is my understanding that the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence is responsible for matters
related to how intelligence professionals manage and record matters
related to intelligence.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Samantha Powell by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. In the waning days of the Trump administration, USAID
unveiled its 2020 Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy.
Unfortunately, the policy was drafted behind closed doors and erased
key LGTBQI+ rights, and denied comprehensive sexual and reproductive
rights to all people. Will you commit to reviewing the 2020 Gender
Equality and Women's Empowerment Policy, and updating it to make sure
it is rights-affirming and inclusive of all marginalized identities,
including LGBTQI+ individuals?
Answer. I understand that a review of the USAID Gender policy
commenced March 2021. If confirmed, I will consult with you and other
Members of the committee on the review. President Biden has been clear
that he supports protections for LGTBQI+ people, as do I. If confirmed,
I will ensure that USAID programs and policies contribute to these
efforts, by advocating for LGTBQI+ rights and programs around the
world.
Question. What is your vision for elevating USAID's leadership
within the executive branch to tackle the existential threat of climate
change?
Answer. If confirmed, I would commit to working closely with
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry and the National
Security Council's climate and energy directorate. The Biden
administration's top priorities are developing an ambitious U.S. target
and working with countries around the world to raise their ambition
alongside the United States. President Biden is inviting leaders from
major economies to a Leaders' Summit on Climate to discuss climate
impacts and-more importantly-what more can be done on a number of
fronts moving forward climate action to keep a 1.5 degree Celsius
warming trajectory in sight. Given that unsustainable land use accounts
for one-quarter of global greenhouse emissions, USAID will work with
countries and regions with globally important forests and carbon-rich
landscapes to reduce deforestation and improve conservation, as well as
reduce emissions from land use change in critical tropical ecosystems
that serve as global carbon sinks.
Question. We must support the developing world in the transition
towards renewable energy, while also better forecasting climate-driven
disasters to minimize human impacts before they occur. Will you commit
to increasing climate change mitigation and adaptation programming as a
part of a proactive and robust USAID climate strategy?
Answer. Yes, I commit to increasing USAID's efforts to support
reduced carbon emissions combating climate change, including climate
change mitigation and adaptation programming. Addressing climate change
will be a top priority for me, as it is for President Biden. If
confirmed, I will expand the scale and urgency of USAID's programming,
building on USAID's strong foundation of local partnerships to address
climate change. I will ensure that USAID continues to be a leader in
supporting countries to reduce carbon emissions and that USAID provides
further support for early warning systems which help communities
prepare for and mitigate the impacts of climatic events.
Question. The coup in Burma has temporarily severed the democratic
hopes for the Burmese people. The situation continues to devolve as the
threat of civil war rises. As USAID Administrator, will you work to
quickly increase and pivot U.S. assistance to strengthen civil society,
protect the fundamental civil and political rights of the Burmese
people, and lead the humanitarian community in contingency planning for
increased humanitarian assistance levels?
Answer. I condemn, in the strongest possible terms, the military
coup in Burma and the junta's ongoing violent crackdown against
peaceful demonstrators. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
and empowering the brave local and civil society actors who are
advocating for civil and political rights under extraordinarily
difficult and dangerous circumstances. I support the action taken by
USAID immediately after the coup to redirect $42.4 million from work
that would have benefitted the Government to civil society and programs
that directly benefit the people of Burma. Those programs focus on a
range of objectives, such as improving health outcomes, strengthening
the ability of civil society to guard democratic space, fostering food
security, supporting independent media, and promoting peace and
reconciliation in Burma's conflict-affected regions. If confirmed,
USAID will also continue to provide critical life-saving humanitarian
assistance to Rohingya and other vulnerable populations including in
Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Shan states.
Question. Recent reports and statements from Secretary Blinken
indicate an ethnic cleansing likely occurred in western Tigray.
Humanitarian and media access continues to be constrained in rural
areas. Concerns are mounting regarding the instability in the run up to
the June elections. How will you work with the interagency to increase
access and transparency, pursue accountability for victims, and provide
oversight and capacity building assistance in a surge to promote a free
and fair election?
Answer. The loss of life and mass displacement resulting from the
conflict in Ethiopia's Tigray region is profoundly disturbing. The
violence against civilians must end, and unimpeded humanitarian access
to the region must be granted without further delay. Ultimately, what
is required is a constructive political dialogue between the parties
and accountability for the atrocities committed by all sides.
Ethiopia's successful transition to a more democratic, inclusive, and
prosperous society is critical to U.S. interests. The administration,
with support from members of Congress and U.N. representatives, has
undertaken numerous diplomatic efforts to end the violence and provide
humanitarian access. As a result of these efforts, Prime Minister Abiy
recommitted to unhindered humanitarian access to Tigray. I understand
that USAID staff in Addis and in Washington continue to push for real
progress on these important issues. To your question on accountability
for victims, while Prime Minister Abiy has recently acknowledged human
rights abuses and violations and committed to ensuring that those
responsible are held accountable, it will be essential to hold him to
these commitments. If confirmed, I will both ensure that USAID
continues to work with the interagency on these critical issues and
work with the Secretary to ensure we can find a way to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Ethiopian people and support, as
appropriate, the pursuit of accountability.
Question. During the campaign, then-candidate Biden indicated that
his top foreign policy priority would be ``rallying the free world to
push back against rising authoritarianism'' and that ``human rights
will be at the core of U.S. foreign policy.'' Will you commit to re-
vamping the role of human rights programming as a central pillar of
USAID's development mandate?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will seek to deepen Agency investments
in democracy, human rights and governance. With freedom in its
fifteenth straight year of decline, there is more that the United
States and USAID need to do on all fronts to counter authoritarian
trends, support civil society, promote independent media, and protect
human rights defenders.
Question. The U.N. has called gender-based violence (GBV) against
women and girls a ``shadow pandemic'' during the COVID-19 crisis. Will
you commit to utilizing newly appropriated COVID-19 funds in working to
curb GBV and other secondary impacts of the pandemic?
Answer. Yes. Preventing and responding to gender-based violence
(GBV) is a critical component in the global response to COVID-19 and it
is a priority for USAID. If confirmed, I will prioritize USAID's
support for the prevention of and response to GBV that has emerged as a
result of COVID-19. Various types of GBV become particularly pervasive
during emergencies. As such, addressing GBV in emergencies is central
to USAID's efforts, including our COVID-19 response. If confirmed, I
will ensure that USAID programming continues to address GBV and that
our programming prioritizes women and girls' health, psychological
well-being, and safety. I understand that USAID is currently developing
a COVID-19 Response Plan, a strategy that will seek to address second-
order impacts of the pandemic, including increased rates of GBV, and
improve protection and target the needs of the most vulnerable and
marginalized families and individuals.
Question. For the past 15 years USAID has promoted a ``One Health''
approach, bringing togetherdisciplines such as medicine, veterinary
medicine, public health, and ecosystem health to more effectively
address emerging pandemic challenges. Tufts University is leading a new
effort consistent with the ``One Health'' approach to analyze,
communicate, and mitigate risks of zoonotic viral spillover in priority
countries. Will you commit tostrengthening this type of USAID
programming that ensures lasting reduction of the riskof viral zoonotic
spillover and disease so we can avoid repeating the experience of
COVID-19?
Answer. COVID-19 is a grave reminder that biological threats-
whether naturally emerging, accidental, or deliberate-pose a
significant and potentially existential threat to humanity. USAID's
partnership with countries throughout the world makes the Agency well-
placed to prevent avoidable outbreaks, detect threats early, and
respond rapidly when outbreaks occur. Preventing the next pandemic
requires an approach that recognizes that the future well-being of
humans, animals, and the environment are inextricably linked. History
has shown us that we need to significantly increase resources for both
risk reduction and the discovery of unknown viruses. To do this, we
should focus on the discovery of new viruses and address current
zoonotic diseases (e.g., Ebola viruses, coron aviruses) that pose the
greatest risk of spilling from wildlife to humans. If confirmed, I
commit to continuing this critical programming.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Ted Cruz
U.S. Foreign Assistance
Question. On December 10, 2020, President Trump issued Executive
Order (EO) 13964, ``Rebranding United States Foreign Assistance To
Advance American Influence'' which required U.S. Government Departments
and Agencies to use a single logo for all U.S. foreign assistance.
Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure consistency
and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of
American soft power in general?
Answer. I am committed to branding and believe that branding sends
a strong public diplomacy message, contributing to American soft power
by conveying that our assistance is due to the generosity of the
American people. Branding is also a critical element of a counter China
strategy. Current branding regulations and policy continue to apply to
USAID awards, and partners must continue to follow the branding
requirements outlined in their assistance agreements.
China
Question. Please assess the degree to which such moves to ensure
consistency and clarity in our aid contribute to the development of
American soft power opposite Chinese development efforts?
Answer. China's approach to ``development'' through One Belt, One
Road (OBOR) raises deep concerns for me and many people in USAID's
partner countries. Projects connected to OBOR have come under
significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption; unsustainable debt;
environmental degradation; construction contracts and jobs being
awarded to Chinese firms over local enterprises; lack of transparency
and local consultations; and even worries about the potential erosion
of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached to certain
projects. USAID needs a far-reaching strategy that addresses the
challenges of OBOR, and I believe that frustrations around the world
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S.
In addition to branding, the U.S. has a range of tools we can bring
to bear including development aid, finance, and our innovative
corporate sector. If confirmed, I will work aggressively to draw on
America's comparative advantages in distinguishing the U.S. approach
from the PRC's, by engaging directly with our partner countries and
ensuring that good governance, sustainability, and social and economic
safeguards are built into projects we support. If confirmed, I will
look forward to working with my colleagues across many agencies to help
ensure the U.S. is responding to Chinese development efforts from a
position of strength.
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing genocide
against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
2021, Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to
commit genocide and crimes against humanity.'' USAID had and has a
significant role to play in countering the CCP's genocide, and the
agency had initiated a number of programs and outreach in that space.
Those programs included efforts to preserve the cultural heritage of
the Uyghurs, which is being directly targeted by the CCP.
Do you agree with the assessment that the Chinese Government is
engaged in a genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities
in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. Yes. I agree with President Biden and experts who have
studied the evidence that.China is committing genocide in Xinjiang.
Question. What role do you see for USAID in countering that ongoing
genocide, and more broadly the human rights atrocities being committed
by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I welcome Congress's bipartisan action on this issue,
including the passage of the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act that holds
perpetrators accountable for human rights violations and abuses against
Uyghurs and other minorities in China. If confirmed, I will use my
platform to draw attention to the horrors in Xinjiang and ensure that
USAID actively engages with you, the committee, and the interagency to
determine any further steps that can be taken.
Question. What is the status of programs aimed at preserving the
cultural heritage of the Uyghurs within USAID?
Answer. I gather that USAID is developing programs to preserve the
cultural heritage and promote the human rights of Uyghurs and other
ethnic and religious minorities in the Asia region. If confirmed, I
will be eager to discuss these programs with you.
International Religious Freedom
Question. The Obama administration repeatedly failed to speak out
on critical issues of religious liberty, including the plight of
imprisoned Christians in Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba,
and Mexico. The result was a vacuum of American leadership. USAID has a
critical role to play in highlighting and countering such persecution,
as well as the plight of dissidents more broadly. Advancing
international religious freedom (IRF) is a major foreign policy
priority of the United States with bipartisan support, and I strongly
believe that the agency must maintain and deepen decisions and
commitments made by the Trump administration in that context.
The Trump administration allocated resources to IRF-related
projects in Iraq, Nigeria, and elsewhere. If confirmed, do you
intend to maintain these projects?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support international religious
freedom programs at USAID. I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and a profound awareness of the risks of persecution faced by
religious minorities. While serving at the NSC in the Obama
administration, I advocated on behalf of Coptic Christians in Egypt who
were experiencing violent attacks, and I met with Iraqi Christians
while visiting Iraq to show support for their community. As Ambassador
to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the voices of religious
minorities. I called for the release of Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese
woman sentenced to death for refusing to denounce her Christian faith,
and called on Sudan to repeal the laws that put her in jail in the
first place. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her first
major public platform, inviting her to speak before the U.N. Security
Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out by ISIS
and she had been forced into sexual slavery. In addition, I worked with
the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition of ISIS's
violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and Shiite
Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized in
March of 2016. USAID has a history of helping the world's most
vulnerable people, and it will continue to play a critical role in
supporting communities persecuted or discriminated against because of
their faith. If confirmed, I will review USAID's approach to ensure
that our programs are most effectively supporting victims of religious
persecution. Additionally, if confirmed, I look forward to exploring
with you, the Agency's regional bureaus and Center for Faith-Based and
Neighborhood Partnerships office, and diverse faith communities, how to
mobilize resources and, as appropriate, tailor our programs to support
individuals being subjected to religious persecution.
Question. Until recently the agency held monthly sessions for
USAID's cross-Agency Sector Council on Strategic Religious Engagement
and International Religious Freedom. Have such sessions of the
Strategic Religious Engagement and International Religious Freedom been
frozen, and if so why?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to looking into USAID's cross-Agency
Sector Council on Strategic and Religious Engagement and International
Religious Freedom and whether it is still holding sessions. I look
forward to discussing with you.
Question. The Trump administration invested significantly in
programs promoting IRF through USAID's Democracy, Human Rights and
Governance (DRG) Center. What is the status of those programs?
Answer. USAID continues to implement programming, including through
the DRG Center, that supports religious minorities. USAID is deeply
committed to supporting the world's most vulnerable people, including
members of religious minorities. USAID will continue to play a critical
role in supporting communities around the world that are persecuted
and/or discriminated against because of their faith.
Question. The Trump administration was considering support for a
Yezidi Genocide Museum in Kocho. What is the status of that program? If
it has been suspended or canceled, why?
Answer. I am not familiar with these deliberations or this program.
If confirmed, I commit to learning more about it and consulting with
you on this issue.
Question. The persecution of Christians in Nigeria has over the
last decade emerged as a systematic problem that the U.S. and the
global community have struggled to counter. Policy responses have been
broadly inadequate, and have been hampered by disputes over the factors
explaining the violence, including the degree to which the crisis is a
function of farmer-herder clashes or religious extremism. In December
2020, the Department of State designated Nigeria as a country of
particular concern (CPC) in response to pervasive and egregious
violations of religious freedom, and USAID in particular engaged
Nigerian bishops as part of countering the persecution of Christians by
Boko Haram.
What is your assessment of the degree to which the persecution of
Christians in Nigeria is a function of farmer-herder clashes
vs. explanations that the persecution is driven by religious
violence?
Answer. Nigeria's deep structural problems have manifested in
various violent conflicts which have escalated across the country. As I
witnessed in my trip in 2016 to the Boko Haram-affected regions of
Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad, while these conflicts may have been
originally rooted in resource competition, which includes farmer-herder
clashes, they have evolved over time to include targeted attacks based
on religion or ethnic identity. The violence is exacerbated by the
proliferation of illicit weapons and a weak state security
architecture.
Question. Have USAID officials, including and especially those
tasked with advancing IRF, engaged Nigeria's community of bishops since
February 1, 2021?
Answer. I gather that USAID works closely with the State Department
at U.S. Embassy Abuja to advance religious freedom. For example, in
March 2021, USAID supported the U.S. Ambassador's participation in a
major gathering of Nigerian Christian leaders hosted by Cardinal John
Onaiyekan. This meeting followed a July 2020 roundtable hosted by USAID
with senior Christian clerics, including bishops. USAID regularly
engages with religious leaders and faith-based organizations across
multiple sectors of programming to respond to the impacts of Boko Haram
in Northeast Nigeria. In mid-March 2021, USAID met with leaders from
the Christian Association of Nigeria, the Heads of Church
Denominations, and the Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace Center.
Question. The Trump administration made a particular point of
engaging churches and other faith organizations globally, and of
increasing the amount of direct aid that is disbursed through local
churches rather than international aid agencies. The move was driven by
several considerations, including concerns about corruption that is
endemic to many such agencies, e.g. on March 19, 2021, the Department
of Justice announced that the International Rescue Committee had agreed
to pay $6.9 million to settle allegations that it performed procurement
fraud by engaging in collusive behavior and misconduct on programs
funded by USAID. Critics of the policy have suggested that it entangles
USAID in faith-based organizations in violation of USAID principles
related to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles.
If confirmed, will you continue the Trump administration's policy
of increasing the amount of direct aid disbursed through local
churches? If not, why not?
Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive
development. As I understand it, USAID has a robust history of engaging
faith organizations to advance Agency goals and priorities. The Code of
Federal Regulations (22 CFR 205.1) clarifies that faith organizations
may compete for federal assistance funding on the same basis as other
organizations, and that all funding decisions are made on the basis of
merit, not religious or secular affiliation. If confirmed, I will
support USAID's strong engagement with faith-based organizations,
whenever and wherever appropriate, by ensuring field staff are equipped
with the requisite skills and resources to advance development and
humanitarian assistance goals.
Question. Do you believe that channeling aid through faith based
organizations is in tension with USAID principles related to unbiased
partnering or humanitarian principles? If so, please explain why.
Answer. Faith-based organizations are often the most trusted and
deeply embedded groups in local communities. These organizations often
serve remote, difficult to access communities and provide important
social services, strengthen civic space, and ensure inclusive
development and principled humanitarian assistance.
Question. Do you believe that channeling aid specifically through
Nigerian Christian groups is in tension with USAID principles related
to unbiased partnering and humanitarian principles? If so, please
explain why.
Answer. Faith-based and community organizations are eligible to
participate in USAID programs on the same basis as any other
organization without regard to their religious character or
affiliation. USAID humanitarian assistance is delivered solely on the
basis of need regardless of political, religious, or other affiliation,
in accordance with U.S. law and policy, and does not discriminate
against nor favor one group over another. Delivering humanitarian
assistance to the most vulnerable people, including ethnic and
religious minorities, is central to our work in Nigeria and a core
value of USAID's humanitarian efforts worldwide. USAID takes
significant steps to ensure our assistance reaches those who need it
most and does not jeopardize their safety.
Israel
Question. In recent years Congress has passed a range of
legislation limiting assistance to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and
for activities that benefit the PA, e.g. the Taylor Force Act (TFA)
(Title X of P.L. 115-141), which limits funding for activities that
``directly benefit'' the PA. TFA included certification language
regarding a range of concerns related to PA policies and governance,
including ``payments for acts of terrorism against Israeli citizens and
United States citizens.'' Part of the policy rationale for TFA's
restrictions is that money is fungible: any aid that directly benefits
the PA indirectly supports the PA's payments for acts of terrorism.
Officials in the Biden administration have recently suggested that
regardless of restrictions imposed by Congress the administration
intends to pursue projects and increase assistance that ``benefit[].
ordinary Palestinians,'' implicitly in contrast to programs that would
directly benefit the PA and therefore be noncompliant with TFA. Please
describe your understanding of restrictions imposed by Congress on aid
to the PA, especially your understanding of the distinction between aid
that ``directly benefits'' the PA and other forms of aid.
Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will
not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that
directly benefit the PA?
Can you commit that, if confirmed, you will ensure that USAID will
not engage in projects or provide assistance for projects that
are the same as, materially similar to, or successor projects
to USAID projects and assistance that were suspended pursuant
to TFA?
Answer. President Biden publicly supported passage of the Taylor
Force Act, and he has never hesitated to condemn terrorism or
incitement by Palestinian actors. He has made clear that this will
continue during his administration. I appreciate Congressional concerns
regarding U.S. aid that may benefit the PA and I can assure you that,
if confirmed, USAID will continue to ensure that any provision of aid
strictly adheres to relevant U.S. laws governing the provision of
assistance in the West Bank and Gaza, including the Taylor Force Act.
To comply with various legislative restrictions, including the Prisoner
Payment Restriction (Section 7041(k)(3) of the FY 2020 SFOAA) and
Taylor Force Act ( P.L. 115-141), USAID conducts case specific analysis
to ensure that USAID assistance is neither ``for'' nor ``directly
benefiting'' the PA, consistent with the requirements and exceptions
set forth in relevant statutes.''
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter.
The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out and
render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by recognizing
Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing Jerusalem
as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by seeking to
end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and for the
purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli communities, and by
taking several other steps.
Can you commit to ensuring that USAID's approach to Israel,
including cooperative projects, will not distinguish or
discriminate between Israeli communities in places Israel
controlled before and after 1967? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance the administration's
strong support for the U.S.-Israel relationship, as well as to enhance
prospects for two states by working to responsibly restart humanitarian
and development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza in compliance with
all legal requirements, including the Taylor Force Act.
Question. Do you believe that a) Israel has sovereignty over the
Golan Heights?; b) Israel has sovereignty over Jerusalem, including the
Old City of Jerusalem? c) Israel is in illegal occupation of any part
of Jerusalem?; d) Israel is in illegal occupation of the Old City of
Jerusalem?
Answer. The administration's position is that our embassy will
remain in Jerusalem, which we recognize as Israel's capital. The
administration has made clear that the ultimate status of Jerusalem is
a final status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in
the context of direct negotiations. I agree that the current Syrian
regime and its Iranian allies poses a significant security risk to
Israel and that the Golan Heights is critically important to Israel's
security.
Yemen
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5 the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of aid was central to the public explanation of
the decision: officials at the State Department have justified the
delisting of what they described as the ``broad'' designation of
Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large parts of Yemen's
population live under areas controlled by the group. Since then the
Houthis have escalated their violence across the region, bombarding
civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was already one of the worst
humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in large part because the
Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid, steal aid, and attack
civilians.
Please describe the role played by Iran and the Houthis in
deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen.
Answer. Iran's support for the Houthis-and the Houthis use of food
as a weapon of war-during the long-running conflict in Yemen has
contributed to the gravest humanitarian crisis in the world. Moreover,
I agree that Iran's malign influence in the region, including in Yemen,
Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, has clear destabilizing effects. Iran's
support for terrorism and human rights abuses threatens U.S. forces and
partners in the region in places like Iraq and Lebanon and hinders our
ability to provide humanitarian assistance in places like Yemen and
Syria. The U.S. Government continues to call on all parties to
implement a comprehensive, nationwide ceasefire in Yemen. The crisis in
Yemen will only be resolved when all parties to the conflict agree to a
durable and peaceful resolution to the conflict.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to
Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. The Houthis are far from benign actors, and their actions
contribute to prolonging the suffering of the Yemini people. However,
the administration takes seriously the warnings from the U.N. and
international humanitarian organizations that these designations could
lead to a wide-scale famine. At the same time, the administration has
been clear that it will not hesitate to apply pressure to push the
Houthis to curb their abuses against the Yemeni people and to negotiate
an end to the war. With the lifting of the terrorist sanctions, the
U.S. can continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemen, and
critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can flow freely.
USAID has announced $336 million in FY 2021 humanitarian funding that
implementing partners can now use to provide lifesaving assistance to
more than 13 million Yemenis. As this assistance moves forward, USAID
will continuously monitor the Houthis' interference and our partners'
access to populations in need to determine if our assistance is able to
reach those for whom it is intended.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to deliver aid to
Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As referenced in the prior question, Houthi operations in
Yemen exacerbate the already-catastrophic humanitarian situation in
Yemen, and the Houthi leadership should be held accountable for their
actions. However, while seeking to counter Houthi conduct, we must also
consider the highly credible voices urging the United States not to
make the country's humanitarian crisis worse or make it even harder to
end Yemen's civil war. The Biden administration's action has enabled
the U.S. to continue to provide humanitarian assistance to Yemenis,
including to those affected by the recent escalation of conflict in
Marib, and critical commercial trade, such as food and fuel, can
resume.
Classified Information
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that
information provided to Congress by USAID is in a format that
facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying with
Executive Order 13526, USAID's classification guide, and the executive
branch rules on the handling and storage of classified information.
U.S. Foreign Policy
Question. U.S. foreign policy is a responsibility which cannot be
delegated to foreign powers or international institutions. On the
contrary, the weight of U.S. foreign policy comes in three parts from
Congress: treaty ratification or rejection, domestic law that forms the
basis for enforcing foreign policy positions, and the power over the
purse.
Do you agree that U.S. foreign policy is non-delegable to foreign
powers, including international institutions, and that any
enforcement of commitments made by the United States
bilaterally or multilaterally must be authorized by Congress in
the form of treaty ratification or domestic law?
Answer. I agree that the U.S. Government is solely responsible for
conducting foreign policy on behalf of the American people, and that
this responsibility cannot be delegated outside the Government.
Collaboration with other nations and private actors, including using
platforms like international institutions, can be used to effectively
implement U.S. foreign policy.
Question. In a 2003 piece for the New Republic you wrote, ``And the
American approach must cease its reliance on gratuitous unilateralism.
We make rules and create international institutions precisely in order
to bind states when their short-term interests would otherwise lead
them toward defection. The United States is willing to bind itself to
the World Trade Organization, because it knows it benefits more than
any other country from free trade, but not to the ICC, because there is
no good selfish reason to expose American citizens to external
scrutiny. But the truth is that only U.S. resources and leadership can
turn such institutions into forces for the international stability that
is indispensable to U.S. security. Besides, giving up a pinch of
sovereignty will not deprive the United States of the tremendous
military and economic leverage it has at its disposal as a last
resort.''
Is it your view that the United States federal Government, through
the resources of its taxpayers spent at international
institutions, is responsible morally and legally for
``international stability?''
Answer. The United States is not the world's policeman. It is a
critically important global leader and catalyst, and it has often used
its resources and foreign policy tools to promote stability,
development, democracy, and human rights, as well as to alleviate
suffering in humanitarian contexts. As the COVID-19 pandemic
demonstrates, the welfare of Americans is often connected to the fate
of people living elsewhere. As a result, to take but one example,
investments in global health security are investments in the security,
prosperity, and overall well-being of the American people. In addition,
when the United States works with partners and allies and succeeds in
exerting its influence at the United Nations and other global forums,
we can be more effective in countering malign actors such as China,
Russia and Iran-who would like nothing more than to undermine the
democratic values, human rights norms, and rules of the international
system that benefit the American people and contribute to global
stability.
Question. Additionally, is it your view that in joining
multilateral institutions and international agreements outside the
treaty ratification process and changes in domestic law by Congress,
the United States only ``gives up a pinch of sovereignty?'' If yes, do
you believe it is appropriate for the president to unilaterally cede
sovereignty to a foreign power or international governing body?
Answer. The President should always act to advance what is best for
the American people. I believe that foreign policy should be conducted
in accordance with U.S. law. I also believe that Congress has an
important voice and should be consulted in foreign policy deliberations
including with respect to international agreements and engagement with
multilateral institutions.
Question. You note in the same piece that the United States
constitutes,''the very runaway state international law needs to
contain.'' Please elaborate on this view, and please specifically
address how this view reconciles with the oath you will take if
confirmed to'' support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic.''
Answer. This quote from eighteen years ago does not represent my
view of the United States. I should not have used that language,
especially because the article itself is an extended and passionate
call for America's moral leadership in the world.
In 2009, before I became NSC Senior Director for Multilateral
Affairs and Human Rights, I took the oath to ``support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and
domestic.'' It was one of the greatest honors of my life. I did so
again in 2013 when I became U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. As a public
servant, I have been a tireless advocate for American values around the
world and a relentless defender of the United States at the U.N. and
elsewhere, standing up to malign actors such as China, Russia,
Venezuela, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and others who seek to undermine
U.S. interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with you to
determine how to be maximally effective in promoting and protecting the
interests of the American people, drawing on the important tools that
USAID can bring to bear to promote freedom and prosperity.
Question. Religious liberty is a foundational American value
enshrined in our First Amendment. USAID policy should respect and
affirm life and religious liberty at all stages of the program cycle.
This includes adherence to, at minimum, the Silijander and Helms
amendments.
If confirmed, do you commit to following these provisions of law in
crafting and implementing USAID policies, procedures, and
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will follow the law and ensure compliance
with all applicable laws and regulations, including the Helms and
Siljander amendments.
Food for Peace
Question. Food aid delivered to people in need abroad under the
Food for Peace program currently falls subject to a requirement that 50
percent of the commodities are transported on U.S. built, flagged, and
crewed vessels. Unfortunately, this requirement results in higher
shipping costs, limited availability of vessels or vessels not
appropriately outfitted for carrying food aid, and less food arriving
to people in need due to food spoilage. A 2018 GAO report estimates
that ``for each $40-million increase in shipping costs, food aid
reaches one-million fewer recipients each year.''
Is it your view that cargo preference requirements prevent vital
aid from reaching intended recipients in a timely manner?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress to
make USAID's programming to combat rising food insecurity as effective
and efficient as possible, and to build the resilience of vulnerable
communities. Each of the food assistance modalities-U.S. in-kind food,
locally and regionally procured food, and cash-based programming-
complements the others in addressing food insecurity efficiently and
effectively. At this time of unprecedented global humanitarian need,
USAID's ability to reach hungry people and improve the efficiency of
our programs is of the utmost importance.
Question. Is it your view that USAID should be spending more of
their resources allotted for Food for Peace on the aid products and
commodities as opposed to transportation costs?
Answer. As USAID responds to an increasing number of complex and
protracted humanitarian crises, the costs of providing emergency food
assistance have unfortunately grown to reflect increased security and
logistical needs. In FY 2020, USAID shipped more than 1.4 million
metric tons of U.S.-grown agricultural commodities using Food for Peace
Title II resources. Volatility in shipping costs is just one complex
element USAID faces in the management of the Food for Peace Title II
account as it responds to increasing food insecurity worldwide.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Samantha Power by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID contribute to
efforts by the United States and our partner nations to counter the
People's Republic of China's predatory and malign Belt and Road
Initiative, including by bringing together governments, the private
sector, and civil society to promote global infrastructure development.
China's Belt and Road Initiative uses predatory financing, debt-trap
diplomacy, bribery, corruption, and other means to promote
infrastructure projects in developing nations, with the goals of
creating new markets for China's ``national champion'' companies,
capturing the loyalty of foreign government and business elites, and
drawing developing nations-especially those in strategic locations or
with strategically important resources-into Beijing's geopolitical
orbit.
Answer. Competition with China is one of the defining challenges of
the 21st century for the United States. By advancing security,
protecting global health, fighting climate change, strengthening
democracy, and spurring equitable economic growth, USAID can play an
integral role in helping the U.S. meet the challenges you have
identified that are posed by the Belt and Road Initiative. The
administration's approach is to provide an alternative vision to
Beijing's--a vision that promotes democratic governance, transparency,
and local ownership in our global development work. If confirmed, I
will work aggressively to draw on America's comparative advantages in
distinguishing the U.S. approach from the PRC's, by engaging directly
with our partner countries and ensuring that good governance,
sustainability, and social and economic safeguards are built into
projects we support. USAID can strengthen local capacity to ensure that
development investments are both beneficial and sustainable. If
confirmed, I will work with allies and partners, including at the DFC
and in the private sector, to better leverage our collective resources
and influence, and I will be an advocate for the highest human rights,
governance, environmental, social, and labor standards in order to
promote investments that are sustainable for the long term.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID not only promote
effective U.S. development assistance and humanitarian assistance, but
also advance America's long-term competition with the Chinese Communist
Party's broader malign influence and predatory efforts around the
world?
Answer. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) approach to
development through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) raises deep
concerns for me and many of USAID's partners. Projects connected to BRI
have come under significant scrutiny on issues such as corruption;
unsustainable debt; environmental degradation; preferencing of Chinese
firms over local enterprises for construction contracts and jobs; lack
of transparency and local consultations; and even worries about the
potential erosion of sovereignty due to the unfavorable terms attached
to certain projects. I share your conviction that USAID needs a far-
reaching strategy that addresses the challenges posed by the BRI. There
is no question that the frustrations many around the world have voiced
with China's development practices provide an opportunity for the U.S.
U.S. support for transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance
gives us another advantage, especially in communities that have
experienced repression and corruption. If confirmed, I will continue to
promote human rights, democracy and transparency and I will ensure that
USAID works with partners to better leverage our collective resources
and influence for sustainable and beneficial development pursued in a
spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support and strengthen
USAID's commitment to combat religious persecution, which is all the
more important after the State Department's recent determination of the
Chinse Communist Party's genocide and crimes against humanity with
respect to Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang? You have
written extensively about the failure of past U.S. presidential
administration to prevent and respond to genocide.
Answer. As you note, I have a longstanding commitment to human
rights, and have seen firsthand how religious minorities are at risk of
being targeted with atrocities. I also agree with you, President Biden,
and experts who have studied the facts that China is committing
genocide in Xinjiang.
While serving in the Obama administration, I advocated on behalf of
Coptic Christians in Egypt who were experiencing violent attacks and
met with Iraqi Christians while visiting Iraq to show support for their
community. As Ambassador to the U.N., I used my platform to elevate the
voices of religious minorities, such as by pushing for the release of
Meriam Ibrahim, a Sudanese woman sentenced to death for refusing to
denounce her Christian faith. I also called for Sudan to repeal the
laws that put her in jail in the first place. In addition, I worked
with the State Department's Ambassador-at-Large for International
Religious Freedom and others in the administration to seek recognition
for ISIS's violence against the Yazidi people, Iraqi Christians, and
Shiite Muslims as a genocide, which Secretary of State Kerry recognized
in March of 2016. I gave a young Yazidi woman named Nadia Murad her
first major public forum, inviting her to speak before the U.N.
Security Council, after her family had been almost completely wiped out
by ISIS and she had been forced into sexual slavery. USAID has a
history of helping the world's most vulnerable people, and, if
confirmed, I will invest in efforts to support communities persecuted
or discriminated against because of their faith, and I will make it a
priority to prevent and address ongoing violence and atrocities
perpetrated against religious and ethnic minorities including Rohingya;
Yezidis and Christians in Iraq, Syria and other parts of the Middle
East; and Tigrayans.
Question. Do you believe that the People's Republic of China should
be classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade
Organization? China-as the world's second largest economy-is still
classified as a ``developing country'' at the World Trade Organization.
Answer. No, I do not believe China should be classified as a
``developing country.'' Indeed, by any number of measures, China today
is a global economic powerhouse. China is already the world's largest
trading nation, having surpassed the United States in 2013, and its
investments in research and development are second only to those of the
United States-having increased by more than 15 percent a year on
average over the past two decades. And in 2020, half of the top ten
largest public companies in the world were Chinese companies. If
confirmed, I will work with Congress and the administration to counter
China's tactics whether in global forums or at the country and regional
level, including in Africa, Asia and the Western Hemisphere.
Question. What is your assessment of USAID's ``Clear Choice''
strategy under the last presidential administration? If you are
confirmed, do you commit to continuing and improving USAID's ``Clear
Choice'' strategy? As DevEx-a media platform that tracks the
international development efforts-reported in December 2020, your
predecessor, USAID Administrator Mark Green ``spearheaded a broad
agency strategy called `Clear Choice,' intended to denote that
countries have a `clear choice' between the U.S. and China when they
consider investment partnerships for infrastructure and other
development initiatives.'' The ``Clear Choice'' strategy sought to
better organize USAID's regional and functional efforts on development
and humanitarian assistance while also meeting the China Challenge and
countering China's malign influence, and better informing and
coordinating with interagency partners in the U.S. Government.
Answer. I applaud former Administrator Mark Green's efforts to
proactively counter malign Chinese influence in international
development. If confirmed, I will review and build on these efforts,
and I will work with allies and partners to better leverage our
collective resources and influence.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to modernize the
concept of foreign assistance to include also the development and
adoption of next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology in
partner nations that receive U.S. foreign assistance?
Answer. Digital tools hold immense potential to help people live
freer and more prosperous lives. They also present significant risks to
citizen privacy and data, freedom of the press, and individual
expression. I gather that USAID's work in this area builds upon the
Agency's twenty-five year legacy of bringing internet access points,
strengthening national broadband strategies and universal service
funds, and advancing multi-stakeholder models of internet governance to
USAID partner countries around the world. Today, such efforts are more
important than ever as the foundations of next-generation
telecommunications technologies like 5G are developed and adopted by
our partner countries to enable their citizens to participate in the
digital economy and ultimately become more self-reliant. If confirmed,
I will continue USAID's commitment to open, inclusive, secure and
competitive communications infrastructure and mobile technology, as
outlined in USAID's Digital Strategy.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will USAID use foreign
assistance to help ensure that partner nations-especially those that
receive U.S. foreign assistance-reject or move away from next-
generation telecommunications and mobile technology from Huawei or
other untrusted China-based vendors?
Answer. USAID is already addressing the challenges presented by
untrusted vendors of mobile and next-generation telecommunications
equipment. I understand that USAID provides developing countries with
technical assistance to encourage reforms to related regulations and
policies, including those that support secure networks, vendor
diversity, and cybersecurity best practices. USAID programs also
include work with civil society to bolster messaging for autonomy,
security, and privacy in their telecoms sectors, and with the private
sector to increase investment in and deployment of secure
communications technologies. If confirmed, I will continue this
commitment to next-generation telecommunications and mobile technology
built upon trustworthy vendors.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to supporting the
Abraham Funds or similar development initiatives with other countries
in the Middle East in order to advance U.S. national security
interests, support the Abraham Accords, and promote further peace and
regional economic cooperation between Israel and Arab nations?
Answer. President Biden rightly welcomed the Abraham Accords as an
important contribution to peace in a divided region. If confirmed, I
will join others in the Biden-Harris administration in efforts to build
on these agreements to further strengthen cooperation between Israel
and its neighbors and to encourage other Arab and Muslim countries to
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will seek to take
steps that advance the cause of peace, as well as Israel's integration
in the region and the world-something that I was able to make great
headway on at the United Nations, securing Israel's integration into
important U.N. bodies from which it had been excluded, recognition of
Yom Kippur as an official U.N. holiday, and the convening of the first-
ever U.N. General Assembly session on antisemitism.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 15, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:12 a.m., in
Room SD-106, Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Merkley, Booker, Schatz, Van Hollen,
Risch, Johnson, Romney, Paul, Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Let me turn to--again to the second part of
our business meeting or hearing. Before I do, I want to say
that I understand the administration will be coming up next
week to brief senators on the decision to withdraw from
Afghanistan. This committee will also receive a classified
briefing next Monday.
The administration, in my view, was dealt a terrible hand
by the last administration on Afghanistan, manifested in a
withdrawal agreement, then negotiated away all of our leverage
with the Taliban. President Biden was left only with bad
options. Most Senators would agree that the war in Afghanistan
has gone on too long and that we want to see our troops home.
But as I have said before, how we draw down matters, as does
the political arrangement left in our wake. I have many
questions. How can the U.S. maintain the capability to conduct
counterterrorism operations in the region without a military
presence in Afghanistan? What will this decision portend for
the women of Afghanistan? Without a U.S. military presence, how
long does our intelligence community think the Afghan
Government can survive in the face of punishing Taliban
attacks? So I look forward to these conversations next week.
Let me turn to our------
Senator Risch. May I respond?
The Chairman. Absolutely. The ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, I concur in the questions that you have. I do not concur
in the initial statement about the prior administration. There
is no good answer to this. There are just questions. I think
that at this point we should look forward rather than
backwards, and I think we should get answers to those questions
and decide what--how we can assist in the path forward because
that is the most important role we will play here. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to our two nominees,
Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya. Congratulations on your
nominations, and our thanks to both of you for your willingness
to return to the State Department and distinguished careers in
the Foreign Service. At this pivotal moment for our foreign
policy for democracy and for the State Department, I am
heartened that President Biden nominated both of you. You are
experienced and accomplished diplomats, and you have both
demonstrated the strength and commitment necessary to defend
our values.
The positions you have been nominated for--Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs, Undersecretary of State for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights--are among the
most important in the Department. Ms. Zeya, I understand that
the distinguished Senator from Virginia is going to introduce
you this morning, so I will turn to him at this time. Senator
Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to members of the
committee, it is a real honor for me to introduce a wonderful
public servant, Uzra Zeya, the nominee for the post described
by the chair. Virginia is one of the most connected States in
the country to our military mission, but I am also proud that
it is one of the most connected States to our diplomatic and
development missions, with many diplomats and State Department
staffers calling Virginia home.
Ms. Zeya is a 20-year Virginia resident. She is a
distinguished diplomat and nonprofit leader who has dedicated
virtually her entire adult life to public service, the
advancement of human rights, and U.S. national security. The
duty to serve runs in her family. She is here with her husband,
Tom, a United States Marine. Together, they have more than 60
years of public service to the American public, which is just
wonderful, and I love that we have got a diplomat and a
military union in the household. That is a wonderful balance.
Ms. Zeya served five presidents, three Republicans and two
Democrats, with distinction for 28 years as a Foreign Service
officer on four continents. She is fluent in Arabic, French,
and Spanish. She was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights, Democracy, and Labor. In that post, she led U.S.
human rights dialogue with China, Egypt, and Bahrain, among
others. She vigorously defended religious freedom around the
globe and expanded public/private partnerships to advance LGBT
equality and counter gender-based violence.
She was charge d'affaires in Paris, and she led the U.S.
response to, sadly, three major terror attacks in that city,
took U.S.-French cooperation on counterterrorism and Russia to
unprecedented levels, and elevated U.S. engagement against
antisemitism and online hate. In India, she crafted a strategic
partnership framework over a decade ago that still enjoys broad
bipartisan support and today serves as the cornerstone of the
U.S. Indo-Pacific engagement. She helped overcome India's
longstanding aversion to external democracy promotion, and
launched new bilateral initiatives to support gender equality
in Afghanistan, and to support free and fair elections abroad.
As a young human rights officer in Syria, she documented the
brutality of the Assad regime and led U.S. outreach to Syria's
minority, religious, and ethnic communities under siege. Since
leaving the State Department, Ms. Zeya served for 2 years as
CEO and president of the leading nonpartisan Peacebuilders
Network where she worked to strengthen the evidence base for
successful political transitions and support greater
accountability for taxpayer-funded foreign assistance. She also
drafted the Council on Foreign Relations report on revitalizing
the State Department.
Ms. Zeya is a trailblazer. She is the proud daughter of
Indian-American immigrants. She would be the first Asian-
American woman to serve as an undersecretary of state, and I
believe she is very, very well prepared to take on this post,
and we are proud to support this exemplary Virginian. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kaine, for the robust
endorsement of Ms. Zeya. Let me conclude. The State Department
faces unprecedented challenges from restoring America's place
in the world to managing the health and economic crisis created
by COVID-19, and China and Russia is at the top of the list of
foreign policy crises confronting America today. As you know
well, Ambassador Nuland, the United States needs to act now to
stop a resurgent Russia with Putin once again threatening
Ukraine, continuing his attacks on our democracy, and
threatening his grip on the Russian people and those who dare
to oppose him. I want to applaud the administration for the
actions that were announced today. They are robust. It is a
type of action I would have wanted to see, and I look forward
to their continuing engagement.
On China, we must both confront Chinese attempts to
undermine democracy and human rights and compete with them
economically. That is why I am pleased that Senator Risch and I
have authored a bipartisan bill which will make the United
States competitive with China, and provide us with a clear and
coherent national security strategy on China. And while I look
forward to a more in-depth discussion on Russia and China
during our time for questions, I want to quickly highlight
three additional policy areas: Iran, Turkey, and the Western
Hemisphere.
Although I did not support the JCPOA, I felt strongly that
the Trump administration's decision to withdraw without a
coordinated diplomatic strategy would embolden Iran and leave
us less safe, and Iran's behaviors only validated my
predictions. I recently led a bipartisan letter supporting a
diplomatic path forward, but let me be clear. That path must go
beyond the scope of the JCPOA. I expect that this
administration will pursue what the President and Secretary
themselves have endorsed, a stronger and longer agreement, and
I will expect you to provide the committee with details of any
agreement and on exactly what ``longer and stronger'' means.
Iran, not surprisingly, is seeking to control the timetable for
these discussions by taking provocative actions against vessels
in the Arabian Gulf and U.S. military facilities in Iraq.
In Turkey, President Erdogan got a free pass from the
previous administration, and we are seeing the effects: the
purchase of a Russian missile, systematic military aggression
in Nagorno-Karabakh and Syria, bellicose actions against Greece
and Cyprus. Long considered a NATO ally, Turkey seems to want
to break with us instead of being our partner now. Now, I do
not agree with Erdogan's choice, but we have to begin to
reorient ourselves in the Eastern Mediterranean towards
democracies that share our values and our security interests.
The administration has an important opportunity here, and I
hope they seize it.
Finally, in our own hemisphere, we must strengthen our
alliances and address forced migration. I am particularly
concerned about the challenges Columbia, our top strategic
partner in Latin America, currently faces, including the
monumental task of implementing the 2016 Peace Accord, the
violence related to drug trafficking, and the destabilizing
influence of the Madura regime's crimes against humanity in
Venezuela.
And, Ms. Zeya, I cannot close the day without raising a
crisis that goes to the core of American values and American
leadership: the state of democracy around the world. We are in
the midst of a 15-year democratic recession. From Nicaragua to
Hungary, democracy is marching backwards. Even worse,
authoritarians are using the COVID-19 pandemic as an excuse to
steamroll free and fair elections, independent media, and other
hallmarks of democracy, and they have assumed that their
violations will be met with little resistance. It is time for
the United States to step up and speak out on democracy, and I
expect that both of you will help lead the charge to restore
democracy throughout the world.
At a time of unprecedented challenges around the world,
America needs outstanding leadership at the State Department. I
have no doubt that you are both up to that task, but I expect
to hear from both of you today about how you plan to restore
America's place in the world, repair democracy, and confront
the immense challenges facing us.
With that, I turn to the ranking member for his opening
comments.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. We all
know that undersecretaries of state serve an important role at
the Department. They are responsible for day-to-day management
of and policy coordination for their respective bureaus, and we
want to thank both of you for your willingness to serve in
those capacities.
In the case of Ambassador Nuland's nomination to be
undersecretary for political affairs, this role oversees all
regional, bilateral, and multilateral policy issues for the
Department. This is no small task obviously. While this
position has a broad scope, there are a few specific areas of
concern I would like to address today, the first of which, of
course, is China. Next week, this committee will mark up the
Strategic Competition Act. This legislation, introduced by
Senator Menendez and myself, counters the Chinese Communist
Party's malign influence globally, including by expanding the
scope of the Committee on Foreign Investment and the United
States' review of foreign money flowing into U.S. higher
education institutions; advances concrete cooperation with
allies and partners in technology, infrastructure, development,
and defense; shines a light on China's predatory economic
practices; pushes back on the Chinese Communist Party's
influence at the U.N.; highlights China's growing nuclear
missile capacities; and calls on President Biden to assure our
extended deterrence to allies and engage China in arms control
talks.
These are just a few of the issues we face when it comes to
strategic competition with China. The Biden administration's
highest priority and ours here in Congress must be to
prioritize resources and respond to the challenges posed by the
Chinese Communist Party, as well as opportunities presented by
expanded and concrete cooperation with allies and partners,
especially in the Indo-Pacific region and in Europe.
I want to take this opportunity once again to thank the
chairman and the majority party for the negotiations we have
had on the China bill. I think this has been a very positive
step forward, and it is certainly bipartisan. And obviously, as
with all these kinds of things, there are parts of it that I am
not in love with, but, on the other hand, it is always a give
and take proposition to get where we want to go. I specifically
want to thank the staffs of both of the majority and the
minority for the give and take that they have entered into and
the many hours they have spent negotiating the details of the
many pages. I hope we can move this forward. I am a little bit
concerned about the overall idea of taking this and wrapping it
with six other committees who have ideas along this line. I
think these are always difficult enough, but the more of those
you wrap together, the more difficult it will be. So whatever
happens, I hope we are able to move this bill forward in a
bipartisan fashion.
Next, I would like to address the administration's ongoing
desire to re-enter the failed JCPOA. Many of us on both sides
in the Senate are closely following negotiations with the P5+1
in Vienna. I concur with the chairman that this is difficult.
This is not an easy proposition. And at the outset, many of us
are deeply concerned with the administration's promises to
lengthen and strengthen. Unfortunately, it sounds like a bumper
sticker, and, like the chairman, I am interested in hearing
what the details are. Unfortunately, to me, it is starting to
look a lot more like a straight re-entry into the 2015 deal,
which is not acceptable to me and I think not acceptable to
most members of this committee on both sides of the aisle.
Discussions with the parties have led me to conclude that, and
I hope I am wrong on this.
Negotiators have established working groups to address
nuclear compliance and sanctions relief, but they have not
established a working group on Iran's regional terrorism,
something that a lot of us have repeatedly said must be
addressed in any deal with Iran. Our national security
interests on Iran must last longer than a single
administration. If the administration chooses to continue on a
path of straight re-entry into the nuclear deal, it will be
short-lived. Either the next Republican administration will
tear down the deal, or the nation most directly affected, who
is remarkably always excluded from the deal, will take
unilateral action, which will not end well. To avoid this
outcome, the administration must seek bipartisan congressional
support for any agreement with Iran. I am feeling that the
administration is walking down a well-worn, partisan path that
will repeat the mistakes of the original administration that
entered into the deal. I hope I am wrong on all of this and all
of us here who have a lot of experience in this will be
listened to as we move forward.
In Europe, Russia remains a pressing concern. Although
Russia is amassing tens of thousands of troops on Ukraine's
border as we speak, they have still been allowed to continue
construction of the malign Nord Stream 2 pipeline. And,
Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your candid discussion with me
in that regard. Actually, in front of this committee, Secretary
Blinken testified that he sees the pipeline as a bad deal and
has told us that he would like to see it stopped. Yet despite
having the power to stop it, we have not seen real action, and
I am very disappointed in this. He was personally handed, by
myself and other members of this committee, a vetted list of
people who need to be sanctioned.
I am not happy with what has happened. They keep telling us
that, well, they need to vet this and prepare a case so that
when they put the sanctions on, they can be prepared to do it
at Court. I have told them, no, you do not. You have probable
cause on every one of those people that we have put in front of
you, and you need to sanction them. Now, when you go to Court,
you need lawyers that have a case well prepared, but there is
probable cause on every one of these to be sanctioned that will
shut down the pipeline.
The committee drafted and pushed through legislation on a
bipartisan basis to prevent the completion. We continue to be
concerned by the administration's refusal to fully implement
the law and sanction all parties--all parties--involved in the
construction of the pipeline. It is past time that the
administration take meaningful action on this issue.
I would remind everyone, on day one of this administration,
they stopped the XL pipeline, on day one. They have in hand
direction from this Congress on a bipartisan basis to do the
same thing on a Russian pipeline. If we are going to put
American workers out of work, we ought to put the Russian
workers out of work on the Nord Stream pipeline. Many on this
committee bemoan the previous administration's posture on
Russia. What is clear is that the Trump administration was
tougher on them than the present Biden administration has been
so far.
Next, we have Ms. Zeya's nomination to be undersecretary of
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. This
position is tasked with a broad functional portfolio, which
encompasses human rights, counterterrorism, refugees,
migration, and trafficking in persons. We must continue to lead
on the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights around the world, not just because those
democratic values form the core of our values as a Nation, but
also because they lead to stronger partnerships with other
nations. I know virtually every member of this committee agrees
with me on that proposition.
With regard to the rule of law, I share the
administration's concern about the International Criminal
Court's decision to investigate U.S. personnel in Afghanistan
and Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories. It is
completely unacceptable that the ICC has decided to pursue
cases clearly outside of their jurisdiction. The Department
must continue its efforts to protect our personnel from these
politically-motivated efforts.
Again, I thank you both for being here today and your
willingness to serve, and your family's willingness to
undertake the sacrifices necessary to do so. With that, thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch. We will now turn to
our two nominees. We ask you to summarize your statements in
about 5 minutes or so, so we can have a conversation with you.
Your full statements will be included in the record. We welcome
your family members who may be with you either virtually or
presently. We understand that it is a family affair. There are
sacrifices that are made by all in this process, and we
appreciate the willingness of your family members as well as
yourselves to make the sacrifice. With that, let me turn to
Ambassador Nuland.
STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE
AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (POLITICAL AFFAIRS)
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, and the members of this committee for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I also want to thank my
husband, Bob Kagan, and my kids, Lanie and David, for their
love and their wise counsel. Bob and David are with me today.
Lanie is studying for her law exams.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and
Secretary Blinken to serve as undersecretary of state for
political affairs. If confirmed, I will rejoin the profession
and the Department that I love, determined every day to
strengthen America's capacity to protect our freedom, our
security, and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary
Blinken in his vision to re-energize American diplomacy, to
strengthen our alliances and partnerships, and to build the
closest possible collaboration with this committee and with
both houses of Congress.
Over 32 years in the Foreign Service, I have served five
presidents and nine secretaries of state from both Republican
and Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that
America is at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys
broad bipartisan support both in Washington and at kitchen
tables across America, and the move that you have made together
on a bipartisan China bill is really important in that regard.
The Chairman. Could I just ask you to turn--move your
microphone closer to you? It is a little difficult.
Ambassador Nuland. Is that better?
The Chairman. Yes, thank you.
Ambassador Nuland. Okay. My foreign service career was full
of adventures, and challenges, and historic moments, from my
first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985, to watching the Soviet
flag come down and the Russian flag go up over Red Square in
1991, to being at NATO when it invoked Article 5, an attack on
one is an attack on all, 20 years ago in solidarity after the
Twin Towers fell. And, of course, I had the opportunity to work
closely with many of you in this room, both when I was
ambassadored in NATO in the Bush administration, and as
assistant secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the
Obama administration. I take pride that, together, we built
strong bipartisan approaches to policy, and many members of
this committee and the Senate contributed with their own travel
and diplomacy.
Today, our Nation faces a confluence of challenges as
daunting as at any time in my professional life. China, under
Xi Jinping, does not simply want to compete with us, it wants
to dominate the international system and change its rules to
benefit autocrats and undercut freedom around the world.
Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters and weapons on almost
every continent and accelerated its disinformation, election
interference, and snuff campaigns against its opponents. Iran
is again enriching uranium at 20 percent, while continuing to
destabilize its neighborhood from Syria, to Yemen, to Lebanon,
to Iraq. ISIS and Al-Qaeda are weakened, but they are not
defeated, and too many of the world's citizens are suffering
under corrupt and/or illegitimate leaders with blood on their
hands. Add to this the urgent global challenges we share:
restoring global health and security, tackling climate change,
and building our democracies and economies back better with
more equity and more justice.
If confirmed as undersecretary of state for political
affairs, my job will be threefold; first, to take on any
negotiations or diplomatic assignments and management issues
that the Secretary deems necessary; second, to oversee the work
of the regional bureaus and the Bureau of International
Organizations, ensuring that this orchestra of talent plays in
harmony; and third, to maintain the closest coordination with
fellow political directors around the world, especially in
allied and partner capitals, to build communities of common
action.
If confirmed, I will also be the senior lifer in the State
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to
respect and empower our great workforce and to have their
backs. That was also a powerful motivator for me to return to
service to help revitalize and modernize American diplomacy. We
must give our foreign, and civil service, and local employees
more professional opportunities, support, training, career
flexibility, and better technology, while strengthening
diversity at all levels of the Department.
I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America
is safer and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has
said, the alternatives are far worse, a chaotic vacuum or a
global takeover by the enemies of freedom. I also share
President Biden's conviction that we are at a global inflection
point. Democracy will and must prevail, but democracy does not
happen by accident. We have to defend it, we have to fight for
it, strengthen it, and renew it. If confirmed, it will be the
honor of a lifetime to play my part in that effort.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Nuland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Victoria Nuland
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I also want to thank my husband, Bob Kagan and my kids, Leni and
David, for their love, their wise counsel and the sacrifices they made
as a foreign service family.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden and Secretary
Blinken to serve as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. If
confirmed, I will rejoin the profession and the Department that I love,
determined every day to strengthen America's capacity to protect our
freedom, our security and our prosperity. And I will support Secretary
Blinken in his vision to reenergize American diplomacy; strengthen our
alliances and partnerships; and build the closest possible
collaboration with this committee and both houses of Congress.
Over thirty-two years in the Foreign Service, I served five
Presidents and nine Secretaries of State from both Republican and
Democratic administrations. That experience taught me that America is
at its strongest when our foreign policy enjoys broad bipartisan
support both in Washington and at kitchen tables across America.
President Biden and his team have pledged to lead a foreign policy that
represents and benefits the American people. This will require more
listening, more consultation with each of you, and with American
business, workers, and committed citizens across our country. If
confirmed, I look forward to doing as much hard work at home as abroad.
My foreign service career was full of adventures, challenges and
historic moments:
From my first tour in Guangzhou, China in 1985 when our
relationship seemed to have so much promise;
To watching the Soviet flag come down and the Russian flag go up
over Red Square in 1991;
To working on tough arms control problems and conflicts from Rwanda
to Haiti to Bosnia and Kosovo;
Too serving as Deputy Chief of Mission at NATO when our great
Alliance invoked Article 5--an attack on one is an attack on
all--in solidarity with the United States the day after the
twin towers fell.
And, of course, I had the opportunity to work closely with many of
you when I was Ambassador to NATO in the Bush administration and
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs in the Obama
administration. Together, we built strong bipartisan approaches to
policy, and many members of the Senate contributed with their own
travel and diplomacy.
Today, our nation faces a confluence of challenges as daunting as
at any time in my professional life. China, under Xi Jinping, does not
simply want to compete with us; it wants to dominate the international
system and change its rules to benefit autocrats and undercut democracy
and freedom around the world. Putin's Russia has deployed its fighters
and weapons on almost every continent and accelerated its
disinformation, election interference, and snuff campaigns against
opponents. Iran is enriching uranium at 20 percent again, while
continuing to destabilize its neighborhood from Syria to Yemen to
Lebanon and Iraq. ISIS and AQ are weakened but not defeated. And too
many of the world's citizens are suffering under corrupt and/or
illegitimate leaders with blood on their hands. Add to this the urgent
global challenges we share: restoring global health security, tackling
climate change, and building our democracies and economies back better,
with more equity and justice.
If confirmed as Under Secretary of State, my job will be three-
fold:
First, to take on any negotiations, diplomatic assignments or
management issues that the Secretary deems necessary;
Second, to oversee the work of the regional bureaus and Bureau of
International Organization Affairs, ensuring this orchestra of
talent plays in harmony, not at cross purposes;
And third, to maintain close coordination with fellow Political
Directors around the world, especially in allied and partner
capitals, to build communities of common action to meet today's
challenges.
If confirmed, I will also be the senior ``lifer'' in the State
Department. The President and Secretary Blinken have pledged to respect
and empower our great workforce, and to have their backs. That is a
powerful motivator for me to return to service--to help revitalize and
modernize American diplomacy. We must give our Foreign and Civil
Service personnel and local employees more professional opportunities,
support, training, career flexibility, and better technology while
strengthening diversity at all levels of the Department. For years, the
State Department scored the highest among government agencies for
workforce satisfaction. I believe it can and will again.
I am also animated every day by a firm belief that America is safer
and stronger when we lead. As Secretary Blinken has said, the
alternatives are far worse: a chaotic vacuum or a global take-over by
the enemies of freedom. I share President Biden's conviction that we
are at a global ``inflection point''--``democracy will and must prevail
. but democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight
for it, strengthen it, renew it.''
If confirmed, it will be the honor of a lifetime to play my part in
that effort. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Zeya?
STATEMENT OF UZRA ZEYA, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE AN UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE (CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS)
Ms. Zeya. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking
Member Risch, Senator Kaine for your kind words, and
distinguished committee members. It is also the honor of my
lifetime to be President Biden's nominee as undersecretary of
state for civilian security, democracy, and human rights. I am
deeply grateful to the President and Secretary Blinken for the
confidence they have placed in me.
I also want to thank those who made my journey here
possible: my husband, Tom, for always having my back and his
decades of service to our Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian.
I also want to thank our two children, Kiera and Lexi, who
could not be here today, but whose idealism never ceases to
inspire me. Ours is a family rooted in public service and the
advancement of freedom. For my father-in-law, a World War II
veteran who fought tyranny on the shores of Okinawa; to my
grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's quest for
independence; to my mother, whose own education was cut short
by marriage at the age of 16, and invested all her brilliance
in raising four independent-minded, opinionated daughters to
seize opportunities never afforded to her. I thank my parents,
brother, and sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually
today.
In today's disrupted world, the work of the State
Department's ``J'' family of bureaus and offices has never been
more important. Authoritarianism, violent antisemitism,
islamophobia, and xenophobia are on the rise as the world
enters the 15th year of a democratic recession. The Chinese
Government is perpetrating genocide and crimes against humanity
in Xinjiang, strangling autonomy in Hong Kong, and repressing
Tibetans, Christians, and other religious and ethnic
minorities. Global human displacement is at record levels while
the scourge of human trafficking is ever present and while
terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to South Asia.
Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead,
I would like to emphasize three core areas where, if confirmed,
I would gladly partner with all of you to address. First, the
United States needs to take on the China challenge from a
position of strength, rooted in human rights and our democratic
values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I know
the severe repression that has only grown more acute under the
CCP. I have met with courageous Chinese human rights activists
and their families, gave voice to their concerns at the United
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of
conscience who put their quest for liberty above their personal
welfare. I am proud to have been banned on Weibo for denouncing
systematic Chinese human rights abuses in Beijing in 2013. We
also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which
have killed far too many Americans.
Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home in
tandem with allies and partners. We are stronger when we work
together to address not only China's human rights abuses and
Russia's efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyberthreats,
and violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage
decades of experience from Europe to South Asia, shoring up
alliances in service of shared democratic values, and champion
administration initiatives, such as the Quad Summit and the
planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly committed to using
tools developed by Congress, such as the Global Magnitsky Human
Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights Policy
Act to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and
kleptocrats, and to encourage parallel action by allies and
partners.
Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective
foreign policies and programs that deliver for the American
people. If confirmed, I would build on my experiences inside
and outside government to ensure that our assistance and
policies have measurable impact and help support reliable
rights respecting burden-sharing partners for the United
States. To this end, I will support meaningful implementation
of key bipartisan legislation, such as the Global Fragility
Act, the Child Soldiers Protection Act, and the Women, Peace,
and Security Act. And with the devastating impact of COVID-19,
we need to ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy
work in tandem towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and
durable solutions.
And finally, with research showing that diverse
organizations produce greater impact and innovation, I will
gladly champion Secretary Blinken's effort to build a more
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect
to the ``J'' family workforce.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here and potentially
return to public service. If confirmed, I will work intensively
with all of the members of this committee on policies that seek
to deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the
American people. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Zeya follows:]
Prepared Statement of Uzra Zeya
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished Committee Members. It is the honor of my lifetime to be
President Biden's nominee for Under Secretary of State for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. I am deeply grateful to the
President and Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in
me.
I also want to thank those who made my journey here possible: my
husband, Tom, for being here today and his decades of service to our
Nation as a U.S. Marine and civilian. I also want to thank our two
children, Kira and Lexi, who could not be here today but whose idealism
never ceases to inspire me.
Ours is a family rooted in public service and the advancement of
freedom--from my father-in-law, a World War II veteran who battled
tyranny at Okinawa; to my grandfather, a freedom fighter in India's
quest for independence; to my mother, whose education was cut short by
marriage at the age of 16, so she invested her brilliance in raising
four independent-minded and opinionated daughters to seize
opportunities never afforded her. I thank my parents, brother, and
sisters for their solidarity in joining virtually today.
In today's disrupted world, the work of the State Department's ``J
family'' of bureaus and offices to advance civilian security,
democracy, and human rights has never been more important.
Authoritarianism, violent anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia
are on the rise worldwide, with a global democratic recession entering
its fifteenth year. The Chinese Government is perpetrating genocide and
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang while strangling autonomy in Hong
Kong and continuing to suppress Tibetans, Christians, and other
religious and ethnic minorities. Global human displacement is at the
highest levels ever recorded and the scourge of human slavery is ever
present, while terrorists expand their lethal reach from Africa to
South Asia.
Recognizing the enormity and complexity of the task ahead, I'd like
to emphasize three core areas where--if confirmed--I would partner with
members of this committee to address:
First, the United States needs to take on the China challenge--what
Secretary Blinken has called our greatest geostrategic test--from a
position of strength, anchored in America's support for human rights
and democratic values. Having led U.S.-China human rights dialogues, I
know the severe repression of human rights in China that has grown even
more acute. I met with courageous Chinese human rights activists and
their family members, gave voice to their concerns at the United
Nations, and demanded the release of Chinese prisoners of conscience
who put their quest for liberty above their personal welfare. I am
proud to have been banned on Weibo--a state-controlled social media
platform--for denouncing systematic Chinese human rights abuses in
2013. We also must continue to press China on synthetic opioids, which
have killed too many Americans.
Second, we must defend and renew democracy at home and abroad, in
tandem with allies, the ``force multipliers'' for our national
security. We are stronger when we work together with democratic allies
and partners to address not only China's human rights abuses and
Russia's malign efforts to undermine Western democracies, but also
rising corruption, disinformation, hate crimes, cyber threats, and
violent extremist movements. If confirmed, I will leverage decades of
experience, from Europe to South Asia, shoring up alliances and
partnerships in service of shared, democratic values, and champion
Biden-Harris administration efforts to empower democratic partnerships,
such as the Quad Summit and the planned Democracy Summit. I am strongly
committed to using tools developed by Congress, such as the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act and the Uyghur Human Rights
Policy Act, to target human rights violators, human traffickers, and
kleptocrats--and to encourage parallel actions by allies and partners.
Third, we need more integrated, inclusive, and effective foreign
policies and programs that deliver for the American people. If
confirmed, I would build upon my experiences inside and outside
government, most recently as CEO of a non- partisan global
peacebuilders' network. We must be careful stewards of taxpayer dollars
while ensuring our policies and assistance have a measurable impact and
help support reliable, rights-respecting, burden-sharing partners for
the United States. In consultation with Congress, we must also exercise
greater leadership to implement bipartisan legislation such as the
Global Fragility Act, the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, and the Women,
Peace, and Security Act. And with the impact of COVID-19, we need to
ensure that humanitarian assistance and diplomacy work in tandem
towards promoting prevention, self-reliance, and durable solutions.
Finally, research shows diverse organizations produce more
impactful and innovative results. If confirmed, I will champion a more
diverse and inclusive State Department, especially with respect to the
talented, 1,000-plus J family workforce.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. If confirmed, I
will work with members of this committee on policies that seek to
deliver greater peace, security, and prosperity for the American
people. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much to both of you, and we
will start a round of 5 minutes questioning.
Ambassador Nuland, I appreciate your leadership over the
years in countering Kremlin malign influence. I do not think
they were very happy to hear of your nomination, which is a
good thing, but a lot has changed since you were in government.
Thanks to Congress, we have the CAATSA law, which forced the
last administration to take some sanctions measures. However,
the last administration also ignored key mandatory provisions
in CAATSA and did little to galvanize our friends in Europe to
counter Russian aggression in all of its forms. So what
specific new measures would you recommend the Biden
administration take to build cohesion among our European allies
to show a united front against Kremlin aggression?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for
your leadership on this issue. I am going to guess you are
right about Kremlin's attitude to today's proceedings. I think
we made a very important step today with the strong package of
sanctions and measures that the President announced, including,
very importantly, constraining Russia's access to our financial
markets, to hold them to account for the SolarWinds attack, and
other things. I think you have also seen that the
administration has already been working hard to align with
allies and partners when it moves on Russia. For example, the
sanctions that were imposed after Navalny's arrest in February
were matched in Europe and in other parts of the world.
I agree with you completely that the U.S. can confront
Russia alone, but that is not the smart policy, and we are far
stronger when we do it together. I was very pleased to see
Chancellor Merkel, for example, issue a parallel, very strong
warning to President Putin with regard to his aggression in and
around Ukraine and the buildup of forces. That is the kind of
thing we need to do, and we need to continue to build sanctions
packages together so that the costs are borne born equally, and
we highlight what Russia is doing collectively.
The Chairman. Can we count on you to robustly implement the
CAATSA law?
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely, as well as Global Magnitsky,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Let me turn to China, which we
collectively agree is probably biggest strategic challenge
whether it is the broader Indo-Pacific region, getting that
right, which I think is the way in which we ultimately face the
China challenge correctly, or the previous administration,
which I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of
our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South
China Sea. How do you intend to be part of implementing a new
approach that we know that such claims are not self-enforcing?
It is critical that we make a legal position of reality, not
just rhetoric in the South China Sea, among other things. How
do you see your role in that regard?
Ambassador Nuland. Well, Mr. Chairman, I agree with you,
and, as I said in the opening, China is not just competing with
us. It wants to change the rules of the global system. This is
the challenge of our time, and having strong bipartisan
consensus, not just in this committee, but across the Congress
and across the country, makes us stronger. So does investing in
our strength at home. But as you have said, and as we talked
about with regard to Russia, doing this in tandem and
addressing all of China's issues in tandem with our allies and
partners is absolutely essential.
So we have to build a coalition of allies and partners to
combat unfair trade practices, to the aggressive security
policies of China in the South China Sea and in the Taiwan
Straits, the cybersecurity, disinformation, all of these
things, and protect against a PRC takeover of international
organizations. I am particularly gratified to see more
countries joining us, as you said, in the South China Sea with
freedom of navigation patrols, et cetera, and we need to take
this new quad and build on it, and get Europe and other parts
of the world more involved.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Nuland. If confirmed, obviously every bureau
that I will oversee will have to play a very strong role in our
China policy, and I would be responsible for weaving that into
everything that we do.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Ms. Zeya, let me ask you
one last question. The previous administration, in my view,
deprioritized human rights and weakened U.S. credibility on
this important value. From abdicating our role in the Human
Rights Council to failing to call out dictators' human rights
abuses, the previous administration disregarded one of the most
critical pillars, I view, of U.S. foreign policy. Can you speak
to the importance of U.S. leadership on human rights in terms
of our values and interests, and will you make it a priority to
ensure that we are working to hold both our allies and our
adversaries to the same standards on human rights?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership on
bipartisan human rights issues as seen in the Strategic
Competition Act, and I think it is a very pertinent question. I
would commend the administration's approach to reasserting U.S.
leadership on human rights by reclaiming an American seat at
the table. I think the U.S. decision to rejoin the recent Human
Rights Council session and to seek reelection to the Human
Rights Council reflects its commitment to make the aspiration
of centering human rights and democratic values in our foreign
policy a reality.
I would say that they are doing this eyes wide open,
recognizing many of the endemic flaws within the Human Rights
Council itself, starting with the fact that you have almost a
who is who of the world's worst human rights violators as
members of that grouping. But I think even within the session
that just took place where the U.S. was an observer, we are
seeing the positive impact of American engagement and
leadership.
And, you know, one of the very important issues that I
would continue to focus on is working to eliminate pervasive
anti-Israel bias in the U.N. At the just concluded Human Rights
Council session, they were able to reduce the number of agenda
items for Article 7. You know, the only country in the world is
Israel in having a specific agenda inclusion in that fashion.
And also work with like-minded partners on issues like Sri
Lanka, Belarus, Iran, on so many of the core concerns of this
committee, and I would work to expand and sustain that
leadership.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, Ms. Nuland, I want to talk about the JCPOA for a moment.
Look, all of us have been through this exasperating exercise
now for many, many, many years. Can you give me your thoughts
on how we can get together on this, the administration and
Congress? I mean, words alone cannot explain to you how
frustrated we were in dealing with the negotiators the last
time as they dealt with Iran. Totally ignored everything we
asked them to do, and then came back and wanted us to agree to
what they had agreed to. How are we going to work through this?
Help me out here.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Risch, I agree with you 100
percent that whatever agreements we reach with Iran need to be
supported in a bipartisan fashion, not only on this committee,
but across the Congress and across America, and, you know, that
will ensure that they are binding across administrations and
for the long term. So we have to do our job and consult at
every phase, and hear your ideas and incorporate them, and use
your expertise and the expertise that we have on this committee
and throughout the Congress.
We also have to get on with the job because as we sit here,
Iran is now enriching again at 20 percent. It is deploying IR2
centrifuges again. Its breakout time has shortened. So, you
know, first job, get them back in the box, and then together
define what ``longer and stronger'' means, and work together as
we go through these negotiations.
You know, I think you know from our time together working
on Ukraine, we built that policy together, and it was enduring
because of that. And if confirmed, I would pledge to be here as
often as we need to be to ensure that we all support what is
going--what is happening.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. One of the things
that strikes me, and I have just become so disgusted with this
over the years. I have listened very carefully to the nation
that is most directly affected by what happens with Iran's
nuclear ambitions, and they are very clear that it does not
matter what kind of an agreement you make, they are going to
take care of themselves. And so, look, however we go forward in
this, they have got to be brought into the fold here to come
along because they do not believe they are bound by this. They
believe that their existence depends on Iran not having a
nuclear weapon, and they are going to see that they do not,
regardless of what the agreement says. So this is an issue that
really has to be addressed.
And the question I keep asking the administration is, what
happens when you get the call, because that is going to be the
question. What do we do when we get the call? And so I think
that is something that is obviously appropriate for a closed
session, but somebody has got to answer that question.
In any event, let's talk for just a minute. Well, my time
is running out. Let me, again, express my frustration on the
U.N. Human Rights Council. I understand all the criticism that
was given to the last administration for getting up and walking
out of the Council. Frankly, I was not as shocked as a lot of
people were. I do not know how you sit at a table with--Ms.
Zeya, as you indicated, you are sitting around a table with the
who is who of human rights violators on the planet, and how do
you talk to these people? How do you say to them, you guys got
to behave yourself even a little bit more, and they are telling
us mind your own business, you know, we will handle our things
internally. How do you handle that?
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I share your concern and even
frustration over that issue, but I think it is a question of
tactics where U.S. disengagement from the multilateral system
leaves a vacuum that others are very gladly there to fill,
starting with China, but also Russia and other countries allied
to basically entirely distort the framework of universal human
rights, arguments of sovereignty, to reject any notion of
international scrutiny or accountability for human rights
violations.
So I think the United States needs to be there, but I think
the critical element as well, as I cited, is really leveraging
our alliances and partnerships, something that China and Russia
do not have and does not compare, as a force multiplier to
basically integrate universal human rights and our democratic
values to make bodies like the Human Rights Council much more
effective, and upholding the mission that they were set out to
pursue.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. That is really good
description of what they do and their malign activities, but I
think the general statement that we want to make things better,
as you talked about it, getting them to move forward on this, I
wish you well. I really, really do. But, boy, I will tell you,
watching what they have done and how they defend it, I am sure
not optimistic in that regard. But I wish you well, and we will
support you every way we can. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
thank both Ambassador Nuland and Ms. Zeya for your public
service, your incredible record to our country, and your
willingness to continue. And I also want to express my thanks
to your family for putting up with public service. It is not
always easy, so thank you both.
You both have mentioned that our foreign policy mission
must be defined by our values, and I agree completely with
that. I have listened to President Biden express that on
several occasions as well as Secretary of State Blinken. Both
of you mentioned Global Magnitsky, and I am pleased that you
underscored the importance of that particular statute that was
passed by Congress and incorporated in an executive order by
the President. You might be aware that there is a limitation on
that, a sunset clause, and there is legislation to remove that
sunset clause. And I take it we will have your support for
making clear that that statute needs to be made permanent by
Congress.
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I got both of your answers.
Thanks. Appreciate that. And, Ambassador Nuland, I want to just
underscore your point about President Biden's action taken
against Russia. It was not only a decisive action, as it was.
It was very clear on its findings, which was refreshing to see
the President of United States be very clear about Russia's
accountability under Mr. Putin in regards to incursions on
borders of other countries, in regards to the treatment of Mr.
Navalny, in regards to interference in our cybersecurity, all
those. It was a very clear finding, so that was refreshing to
see. So knowing your record, it looks like the President is
following in your footsteps about being very direct about
issues, and we appreciate that very much.
I also want to underscore the point that both of you made,
that we have to engage our allies. If we are going to be
effective in our foreign policy objectives, it is not only
having bipartisan support here in Congress. It is having the
support of like-minded countries, and that requires effort, and
we have done that in regards to the sanctions under Global
Magnitsky. We have gotten more and more countries to go along
with us, but I think we need to do more of those, that type of
outreach.
Ms. Zeya, I want to just mention one area that is under
your portfolio, and that is trafficking in persons. We have a
pretty clear statute on trafficking in persons. It is pretty
objective findings as to what tier a country would find itself.
But we have had problems under previous administrations where
political considerations interfered with the objective findings
of countries because of other bilateral considerations. Do we
have your commitment that you will maintain the integrity of
the TIP reports so that it is based solely on the facts and not
interfered with by other politics?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. And I use that as an example
because there is legislation that I hope will move in this
Congress that will use that model for dealing with anti-
corruption activities in countries. All countries have problems
with trafficking. All countries have problems with corruption.
Many of the issues that you have talked to, the root problem is
corruption. Mr. Putin does what he does because he gets a lot
of money. Oligarchs support his operations, his corruption, and
we need to increase the capacity in our country missions to
evaluate the corruption situations as we did with trafficking,
and then evaluate and use that for foreign policy
considerations, and that legislation does exactly that. So can
I have both of your commitments to work with us on passing
legislation that would use the trafficking model to deal with
corruption so that we have capacity in each of our mission
countries to deal with corruption in those countries?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, Senator. I confirm to consult with you and
would certainly support the elevation of U.S. anti-corruption
efforts, and view corruption as both a violation of human
rights, a means to sustain autocracy, as well as an inherent
danger to democracies.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator, same from me. Corruption is a
country killer. It is also a tool of malign outside actors. I
think we have got to do a better job of pulling together the
tools of government to help countries attack corruption, so
combining the efforts of the State Department, intelligence
services, Treasury, Justice into a fusion, and we can do that
off the embassy platforms, but we also have to train and
educate and support our officers out in the field better. And
if confirmed, I look forward to working with you on these
issues.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. My last point--it is not a
question--is that, dealing with diversity in the State
Department is a very high priority, and I know both of you have
mentioned that. Recognize that you have support in the Senate
to advance diversity within the Department of State. We have--
it is a challenge because we are looking for senior positions
as well as entry positions, and I hope that you will work with
us on a strategy as to how we can improve the record of
diversity within the State Department.
Ms. Zeya. Yes, I will.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin, and I think you
have spoken to the ranking member as well. We look forward in
the near future to have your legislation on corruption, which I
understand is bipartisan, for a markup soon.
I am going to see if we have some of our colleagues
virtually. Senator Paul?
[No response.]
The Chairman. All right. Senator Cruz?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Okay. Then as we wait for them to get
connected, let me turn to Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to both of you on your nominations. And thank
you both for your willingness to come back into the State
Department and continue your public service, which has been
admirable on both counts.
Ambassador Nuland, I have expressed disappointment in the
President's decision to set the September deadline in
Afghanistan to remove all of our troops. Given that we have a
very limited time there, is there anything that we should be
looking for in terms of benchmarks that we should try and reach
before that September deadline?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for
your long commitment to Afghanistan, and particularly to the
women of Afghanistan. As you mentioned, when we prepare for the
U.S. redeployment of forces, that puts an emphasis even more
strongly on the diplomatic aspects of our work and on the
embassy as the platform for that. So we have really got to bear
down on this peace process and on bolstering civilian, and
economic, and humanitarian assistance programs, and
particularly those that protect the gains that have been made,
and the gains of women and human rights, Afghan people. We have
got to, as the President has pledged to do, expand and expedite
special immigrant visas for those Afghans who helped us. We
have got to ensure that, as we find a new place to stage our
counterterrorism efforts, that we are successful in the
diplomacy to establish that, but also in their ability to
deploy as needed. I think we also have to look at our embassy
platform, particularly when we do not have military security
around it.
So I would expect we are going to be coming back to this
committee and to the Congress as a whole for more support, and
particularly also to get you involved in the diplomacy. I know
that has been something you have been willing to do in the
past, so watch this space. Thanks.
Senator Shaheen. And can you expand a little bit on post-
withdrawal strategy with respect to how we can continue to
support the gains that women and girls have made in
Afghanistan?
Ambassador Nuland. Well, Senator, I want to be careful here
because I obviously------
Senator Shaheen. Assuming you have been confirmed.
Ambassador Nuland. Yes. Yeah. I was not part of the
deliberations, but, as you know, we have very robust support
programs, assistance programs, and civilian training programs
for women and girls both in Afghanistan and outside. I think we
need to ensure that our allies and partners are also
contributing to that effort. And we have to hold the Afghan
Government and the Taliban to account for their commitments in
this regard, and it needs to be a fundamental measure of
whether Afghanistan is making progress or retaining the gains
or sliding backwards.
Senator Shaheen. Ms. Zeya, I appreciate your mentioning the
Women Peace and Security Act in your opening remarks. I think
it is a very important tool that we have, and I was
disappointed that it was not used by the previous
administration in Afghanistan as they were negotiating with the
Taliban. But can you talk about how you will work with the
Office of Global Women's Issues, if you are confirmed, to
ensure that the ``J'' family is aligned with the gender
concerns of GWI and the GPC?
Ms. Zeya. Absolutely, Senator, and I want to thank you for
your leadership on building bipartisan consensus for, you know,
greater women's empowerment and ultimately achieving women,
peace, and security goals. And I think the Afghanistan example
is critical, as you discussed with Ambassador Nuland. I would
say, from my own perspective, I think it is very important with
this decision for the U.S. to continue to strongly support
increased women's participation in the peace process. As you
are well aware, women's participation in peace processes, most
of which fail, you know, by record of history, makes them 35
percent more likely to last 15 years or more. This is critical,
I think, at the inflection point we find ourselves.
It is also critical to take an integrated approach in the
State Department. I think since the GWI Office was created,
and, you know, it has been a bipartisan effort with important
progress made, it is really critical to recognize this is not
the work of one office. So if confirmed, I would certainly seek
to further integrate gender equality across the full spectrum
of ``J'' family activity, obviously on democracy and human
rights, but also on issues like counterterrorism, counter-
narcotics, and, quite obviously, trafficking in persons. So
this work is too important, it is too enormous for anyone
office to accomplish alone, and I certainly would seek to
leverage the talent and expertise in the ``J'' family to make
WPS goals a reality. And I think we have a critical task ahead
of us in Afghanistan to make that possible.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you both very much. If you are
confirmed, and I assume you will be, I look forward to working
with you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. Thank you for
your leadership on global women's issues. With that, I
understand now that Senator Hagerty is with us virtually?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much. I have a question for
Ms. Zeya, please. Ms. Zeya, this is a matter of deep concern to
me. It is a serious problem in my home State of Tennessee.
December 1st, 2018, President Xi promised then-President Trump
to halt the export of fentanyl and all of the ingredients used
to make fentanyl. Since that promise was made, we have had over
100,000 American lives lost to synthetic opioids, directly
traceable to CCP-produced fentanyl. If I think about it,
America has done a great job, in the current administration and
the administration that preceded it, in dealing with the COVID-
19 situation, but there is no vaccine for the addiction to
fentanyl that we are experiencing at the hands of communist
China. Can you tell me what your plan is to address this and to
hold President Xi to his promise made in December of 2018?
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising a critically-
important issue, and I just want to express my own concern for
the welfare of your constituents, and this was one of the
reasons I raised this point in my opening remarks. And as you
recounted, I think there was progress made under the previous
administration where China agreed to implement controls and
schedule fentanyl analogs, but sadly, what happened is we saw
transnational criminal organizations adapt and basically shift
to using precursor chemicals from China, negating the gains
from the previous effort, which was the result of considerable
U.S. diplomacy and negotiation. So I absolutely believe that
the Chinese Government can and must do more to hold its
citizens and companies accountable that are supplying these
precursors to transnational criminal organizations in Mexico
and elsewhere.
I think the United States needs to take a whole-of-
government approach where the State Department, our embassy in
Beijing, plays a very important role, but we also need to work
with the Department of Homeland Security, DEA, and DOJ, to take
on the Chinese Government's willful ignorance on this issue and
to really prioritize saving the lives. As you mentioned, the
record numbers of American losses due to opioid-related
overdoses is unacceptable, and this is something I would intend
to prioritize if confirmed.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate your prioritization of that,
and I would also underscore the fact that our border has become
far more porous at Mexico, and that is where this fentanyl is
coming in and being produced in mass quantities. I was just
back in my home State of Tennessee talking with sheriffs, with
mayors, and what they have told me is something I think is
probably being experienced across America. There has been a
huge uptick in the number of overdoses since the borders
collapsed after the 20th of January. So this situation has
become even more critical at this point, and very much
appreciate your attention to it.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for sharing that information,
and I will certainly work to prioritize that in the work of the
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, and I know
this remains a significant priority in terms of our counter-
narcotics engagement with Mexico.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Next is Senator Kaine, and there
is a vote that is ongoing. It is the intention of the chair to
work through the vote, so I would urge members to possibly vote
and return. The order I have in order of appearance is--and,
course, we will flip back and forth to the extent that there
are members on the other side who are available. It is Senator
Kaine, Senator Merkley. I do not know if they will be here, but
Senator Schatz, Senator Van Hollen, Senator Coons, Senator
Booker, and Senator Murphy. That is the order I have. With
that, Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Great to see both of you, and
congratulations on your nominations. Ambassador Nuland,
briefly, I am about to reintroduce a bill that this committee
acted on last year but that never saw action on the floor that
would clarify that no President can withdraw unilaterally from
NATO without congressional action. NATO is a Senate-affirmed
treaty. I view this as a statement of congressional
prerogative, but also just simply an effort to demonstrate to
our NATO allies that congressional support for the alliance's
near 75 years is still very, very strong. You have a lot of
experience with our NATO allies. Would they see that statement
of strong intent from Congress in a positive light?
Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator Kaine. When you
introduced it last year, you could hear the huzzahs on the
other side of the Atlantic. I think there was quite a lot of
concern. And, you know, I also think that it is really
interesting that over the last 3 years, public opinion polling
on the United States with regard to NATO has gone up to record
levels over the last 20 years. You know, Americans want to work
with allies and partners, so I think you are reflecting the
bipartisan commitment to our great alliance as well across the
country. So I commend you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you. And when that bill was acted on
by the committee last year, just to specify, it was a very
bipartisan vote. It was bipartisan in introduction. The version
that we will introduce, again, is very bipartisan. Ms. Zeya,
thank you for the conversation that we had the other day. One
of the issues I would like to ask you about is the issue of the
refugee cap. The past administration dramatically scaled back
U.S. acceptance of refugees, and the Biden administration sort
of in its campaign and earlier today said we wanted to kind of
return more to the norm where the U.S. was accepting refugees
who go through a careful vetting process because our Nation has
been such a haven for those seeking refuge from circumstances
that are just nearly unspeakable. Tell me, is it your
understanding that it is still the administration's intent to
revert back to a norm on refugee admission? Some of us are a
little bit discouraged at the timing and pacing of that, but
please let us know what the administration's plans are, to your
knowledge.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator. I can assure you that I
strongly support President Biden's public commitment to raise
the ceiling for refugee admissions to 125,000 for fiscal year
2022. Now, as a nominee I am not privy to policy discussions
that are under way, but I know that the President is committed
to regrowing this program and doing it in the most effective,
orderly, and humane way possible. So if confirmed, I will do
everything in my power to make this a reality.
Senator Kaine. My surmise is that when the past
administration cut the program down so dramatically in terms of
the admissions, they may have also reassigned staff who were
working on vetting and other issues. And so I do not think we
want to just go back to the number without having the staff to
make sure the program is run well, so I think we would all
understand if it takes a while to get back to the norm. But
should you be confirmed, we would really love your reporting to
us about the progress toward that, recognizing it is not just a
State Department issue, but multiple agencies work on this, and
we would love to be in dialogue with you about that going
forward.
Human rights questions, I cannot think of anybody whose
background is better suited than yours to dealing with these
tough human rights issues. And one of the things that, you
know, I have often found on this committee in dealing with
human rights issues is, it is one thing to raise them against
adversaries, you know, what is happening with the Uyghurs in
China, what is happening with Hong Kong pro-democracy
activists, and we need to be muscular in raising this with
adversaries, but it is one of the most difficult sets of human
rights issues when you are dealing with allies. And, you know,
whether it is a--we have had an alliance with Saudi Arabia, we
have an alliance with Egypt, but we run into significant human
rights challenges with them.
And when you raise human rights issues with an ally, one of
the stock responses we used to hear from the past
administration, but not just them, from others, is, well, if
you push us too hard on human rights, of course, we will just
buy our arms or do our, you know, diplomatic activities with
Russia or others. Just talk about how we balance aggressive
promotion of our human rights values with this sort of oft-
repeated threat that, well, if you push us, we will deal with
countries that are not interested in human rights.
Ms. Zeya. Thank you, Senator, for raising, you know, what
is a challenging and a critically-important issue, this issue
of consistency with respect to centering human rights and
democratic values in our foreign policy. And in this case, the
way I see it, the administration is absolutely committed to
democratic renewal at home and abroad. And what this means is
it is important, as we seek to shore up our alliances and
partnerships, for us to hold one another accountable. And
ultimately, I think we have seen how a selective U.S. approach
to human rights, one that only targets U.S. competitors or
adversaries, ultimately undermines U.S. credibility and
leadership. So I can pledge to you, if confirmed, I would work
very closely with Ambassador Nuland, with counterparts in
regional bureaus, our 270 missions in the field, to strike the
right balance and to make sure that we are truly centering
human rights and democratic values in our foreign policy.
I think that the initiative of the Democracy Summit, which
the President is committed to, is a very important one where we
can help carry a concrete agenda forward on issues like
corruption, countering rising authoritarianism, and really
defending human rights at home and abroad.
Senator Kaine. Thank you much. I am over my time. Thank
you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to echo Senator
Kaine's concern about the presidential declaration on refugees.
There is a difference between refugee resettlement and the
question of those who seek asylum at our border. They are
fundamentally different, and they should not be conflated, and
I do hope and I believe the President is committed to that, but
the sooner he signs the declaration, the greater the
crystallization of that commitment will be realized. So thank
you.
I am not sure if there are any members presently waiting
virtually. If you are, please speak up at this time.
[No response.]
The Chairman. I am not hearing any. I do understand that
Senator Coons is coming back and there is another member on his
way. So let me take advantage of the time to ask one or two
questions that I had intended to wait to the end.
Ambassador, Azerbaijan's attack on the Armenian people last
fall with Turkey's full support was, in my view, an unspeakable
tragedy. The absence of top-level United States diplomacy
throughout the war was inexcusable, and we have to prevent it
from repeating in the future. I also believe the U.S. must
press Azerbaijan to release the prisoner of war numbers that it
has, which it is refusing to release them, in violation of
international law, and to ensure that the Armenians displaced
from their homes in Nagorno-Karabakh get the assistance they
need. So if you are confirmed, will you commit to advocating
for robust humanitarian assistance, including de-mining funds,
to help the Armenians in the South Caucasus who have been
displaced from their homes or otherwise affected by
Azerbaijan's attack? And secondly, what can we do to revitalize
the OSCE Minsk Group and create a more sustainable peace
process?
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. Mr. Chairman, I think you
know that I have worked on Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-
Karabakh issues for some 25 years, and the way things went down
last year was absolutely tragic for so many in the region. So
as you say, we have to get prisoners released. We have to get
humanitarian support back in. We have to ensure the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of Armenia and that it can make its
own decisions, and we have to talk to our ally, Turkey.
You know, the Secretary has spoken about needing to be
clear eyed regarding trends in Turkey. I think we have got a
lot of work to do there in our bilateral relationship to make
clear our concerns about not only what Turkey is doing outside
its country, but also what it is doing inside its country. So I
think we have got to get back into the business of strong
support for the Caucasus countries, being active
diplomatically, getting high-level leadership there, showing
support, et cetera, and using all of our economic and
humanitarian tools.
The Chairman. And I hope we will be a strong advocate for
getting POWs back. I mean, it is just in violation of
international law.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely.
The Chairman. With that, let me turn to Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to both the
nominees. Congratulations on your nominations. I have enjoyed
conversations with both of you in my office.
Ms. Nuland, I want to turn to a topic that is not going to
surprise you, and it is a topic we have discussed at great
length, and that is Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I have deep
concerns that the Biden administration is on the verge of
squandering what was an enormous bipartisan victory won by this
committee, by Congress, and the previous administration last
year. Nord Stream 2 was 90 percent complete when Congress
passed bipartisan sanctions that I authored, along with Senator
Shaheen, that stopped the pipeline in its tracks, immediately
stopped the pipeline for a year.
Russia has begun again building the pipeline. It did so in
the weeks following Joe Biden's election, and it did so because
Russia believes the Biden administration is not going to follow
the law, that they are not going to enforce the bipartisan
sanctions that have passed now both houses of Congress with the
chairman's support, with the support of virtually every member
of this committee, passed twice now, sanctions targeting Nord
Stream 2. And yet there are voices within the Biden
administration that I think are arguing not to enforce the law
and enforce the sanctions.
Ms. Nuland, in your judgment, can you assess the damage to
American national security and to the energy security of our
European allies if the Nord Stream 2 pipeline is completed?
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Cruz, thank you for your
leadership on this issue. We did have a robust conversation
about this, and we also worked on the energy security together
when I was in the European assistant secretary job. Look, this
is not just a bad deal for Germany and Europe. It violates
their own climate policy, their energy policy to go greener. It
deepens their dependence on Russia just at a time when Moscow
is rearming around and inside Ukraine and when they are letting
Navalny wither in prison. So I want to thank you for the tools
you, and this committee, and this Congress have given us. I
think we need to use all the tools at our disposal to stop this
pipeline before it is finished. We need to press the German
Government to do the same.
As I said earlier, I was very pleased to see a strong
statement from Chancellor Merkel warning President Putin about
his arming in Ukraine. Nothing would send a stronger signal to
him than the cancellation of this pipeline, and I think we have
got to make that point. And if confirmed, it will be a top
early priority of mine.
Senator Cruz. So if you are confirmed, what steps would you
anticipate taking to stop the completion of Nord Stream 2?
Ambassador Nuland. I understand there are sanctions
packages in development, some of them based on information that
has been provided and circulated from the Congress. I think we
have to accelerate the sanctions packages. I also think we have
to be much clearer and stronger with our German allies that
this is a matter of bipartisan concern across the United
States, and it is taking Germany in the wrong direction in
terms of its relationship with Russia. And all of us together
now need to stand up to an increasingly aggressive Putin. So
lots to do.
Senator Cruz. So I very much agree with you. I also think
time is of the essence. The Russians are trying to jam through
and finish this pipeline before the administration takes
action. As you know, I have tried to work with the
administration, using both carrot and stick, to prompt the
administration to comply with the law and use the tools that
are available. I appreciated Secretary of State Blinken putting
out a strong statement on Nord Stream 2. And, as you know,
because you were in the room when we negotiated that agreement
in my office, that in exchange for that statement, I lifted two
holds that I had placed on nominees from this administration. I
very much hope to lift other holds as well, but the agreement
that we worked out was designed to be incremental and staged,
and in order for the next set of holds to be lifted, we need to
see sanctions on the entities responsible for Nord Stream 2.
And the Biden State Department has indicated that those
would be forthcoming, but they have not been, and I will say
there are reports of ongoing resistance within the
administration to doing so. If that resistance manifests in
delays that will turn into an unequivocal win for Putin, a loss
for Europe, and a loss for America. And so let me urge the
administration to honor the commitments that it has made,
follow the law, and issue the sanctions that are mandatory
under law. We can stop this pipeline. We have stopped this
pipeline, and it is only the signals of weakness and a
willingness to disregard the law that have enticed Russia into
returning once again to building the pipeline. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is
online with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, and let
me thank both of our witnesses here today. Ambassador Nuland,
let me start with you. I was pleased to see President Biden
impose sanctions yesterday and today on Russia given Putin's
continuing aggression, given their cyberattacks on the United
States, including on our democracy and in working to interfere
in our elections. And, of course, we see increased aggressive
activity in eastern Ukraine from Putin.
Meanwhile, the chairman mentioned in his opening statement
a number of actions being taken by one of our allies, Turkey.
Under President Erdogan, Turkey has purchased the advanced air
defense system, the S400, from Russia. Turkey has violated the
airspace of another NATO ally, Greece, and invaded the
territorial waters of Cyprus. Under Erdogan, they have attacked
our Syrian Kurdish allies who were critical to our fight
against ISIS, additional measures taken in Armenia, so this
does not sound like a faithful NATO ally to me. Can you talk
about how you and the administration propose to deal with the
challenges we are facing now under President Erdogan's Turkey?
Ambassador Nuland. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I agree
with you that this is a very challenging allied relationship
that is going to require a whole lot more work. As I said to
the chairman, I agree with the Secretary. We have got to be
clear eyed and firm about it. It makes zero sense to me that a
NATO ally is buying new Russian weapons systems. It is also a
matter of bipartisan concern across the United States. We need
to continue to press Turkey on this issue, as well as all of
the other issues that we have together, and we have got to--you
know, including democracy and human rights inside the country,
freedom of the press. We have got to get on the same page
together with regard to Syria and Libya, and, as we talked
about earlier, Nagorno-Karabakh.
And, more broadly, I think we have got to start a
conversation in NATO about backsliding on our values among
allies. The United State is far from perfect itself as we all
know, but it is very important that we all recommit at that
table to the things that make us strongest, and, particularly,
in the context of a rise of autocracy and illiberalism across
the world. NATO allies have to stand for freedom, democracy,
and governments that serve their people. So if confirmed, I
look forward to rolling up sleeves, getting back to Ankara, and
having these conversations.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I was also pleased to
see the Biden administration, first of all, reaffirm our
ironclad commitment to the security of Israel and, you know,
deepen those ties even further. And also I was pleased to see
them reaffirm what had been longtime bipartisan support for a
two-state solution between Israel and the Palestinians. There
are a lot of people who think it is too late for a two-state
solution given the changes on the ground in the territories and
other factors. Do you believe it is too late, and, if not, what
needs to be done to ensure that we preserve the option of a
viable two-state solution?
Ambassador Nuland. Thanks, Senator. It remains profoundly
in U.S. national interests to support a two-state solution. As
you know, Senator, it is going to require willing and ready
partners on both sides in the Israeli context where, again, in
a government formation period in the Palestinian Authority,
there needs to be will as well. And in the meantime, we need to
ensure that both Israel and the PA refrain from any unilateral
steps that could exacerbate tensions and make it harder to get
to a two-state solution.
I think the United States has got to remain a steady
partner and continue to say to both Israel and the Palestinian
Authority that this is the best path for peace, so. I think
that is where we have got to go. And I think it is important
that the National Security Council is running almost weekly
sessions with Israeli counterparts, particularly in this period
of transition in Israel, to keep us connected not only on these
issues, but on Iran and other vital issues in the region.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, I know
I have run out of time. I will submit my questions for our
other witness, and congratulations to both of you on your
nominations.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen. Chairman
Menendez has gone to the floor to vote. As you both, as
seasoned public servants, know, the schedule of the Senate is
not entirely predictable, so for those watching and may be
surprised that I just popped in--Senator Coons--I am sitting in
for a few moments for the chairman as he goes to vote.
Thank you so much, Ambassador Nuland, Ms. Zeya, for your
willingness to serve our Nation again and for the support and
love that your family and your circle of supporters have
offered throughout your decades of service. I look forward to
working with both of you to address the many foreign policy
challenges facing our country, how to build a bipartisan China
strategy, something I am really encouraged about progress being
made here by Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Risch and
their staff. There is bipartisan legislation being introduced
that will be marked up next week. I am very excited about that
and look forward to joining as a sponsor and supporting their
work on that; the work to address Iran's nuclear program and
other threats regionally from the Islamic Republic, efforts to
support stability in the Middle East while avoiding additional
long-term entanglements, efforts to push back on and contain
the malign influence of the Russian Government. There are so
many challenges, I could take all of 5 minutes in summarizing
them, and I hope we will get to work closely together on
prioritizing human rights, defending democracy, revitalizing
the State Department, confronting shortcomings in workforce
diversity, and others.
Let me just ask both of you, if I could, about the Global
Fragility Act. Ms. Zeya you were kind enough to reference it in
your opening remarks. This is a tool provided by Congress on a
bipartisan basis, I helped co-author, to address the root
causes of extremism and violence in fragile countries. Will you
commit to reviewing it, and to promptly selecting the priority
countries for the Global Fragility Act, and submitting a
revised strategy that takes into account the post-COVID
context?
Ms. Zeya. Yes, absolutely, Senator.
Ambassador Nuland. I think one of the fun things here, if
we are both confirmed, is that we would work on these issues
together because it will obviously cross the remits of both of
our jobs, so looking forward to it.
Senator Coons. It is my hope and expectation we will use
this tool to balance assistance around security, democracy,
human rights, and to make sure that between diplomacy
development and defense, we have got the order right.
The Moscow Bureau of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is
under intense pressure, really under siege by the Kremlin, just
one of many recent examples of an authoritarian crackdown on
press freedoms around the world. How would you support, if
confirmed our RFE/RL's efforts to ensure that Russian citizens
have access to unbiased news about their own country, and what
actions would you take to support free press around the world?
If I might, Ms. Zeya.
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I think it is critical for, you know,
for the United States to take a whole-of-government approach on
these issues. So certainly, if confirmed, I would work closely
with the undersecretary for public diplomacy as well as USAGM
on this critical closing space for civil society and free
expression in Russia that is critical to holding the Putin
Government accountable for their widespread violations of human
rights. So I would look to work with partners in government as
well as the mission in the field to elevate this issue and act
accordingly.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Ambassador Nuland on press
freedom broadly?
Ambassador Nuland. Yeah, just to pile on, Senator, and
thank you for raising RFE/RL. I agree with you that they are at
a critical moment here. Really interestingly, I think one of
the reasons the Kremlin is cracking down is because
listenership and viewership at RFE/RL has gone up exponentially
over the last recent years, and not just in Russia, but also in
Belarus and other parts of the world where press is
constrained. So one of the things that Moscow understands is
reciprocity. If confirmed, I would be interested in looking at
whether we are being reciprocally constraining with regard to
RT Sputnik and other Russian Government organs. Press freedom
is an absolutely essential human right and part of good
governance around the world.
I would just lay down a marker here that I am also
concerned about press freedom in the NATO space. We have a
number of allies backsliding here, and it is very important
that we keep that front of agenda. And we also have a number of
American companies that, you know, broadcast freely in these
countries, and their ability to do that is being constrained by
government. So a lot of work to do.
Senator Coons. I introduced a bipartisan Libya
Stabilization Act in the last Congress and recently
reintroduced it. This would support a diplomatic resolution to
the ongoing grinding conflict in Libya, a country where there
are 280,000 IDPs and 570,000 refugees. What additional action
should we be taking to ensure that elections actually take
place in December of this year and to enable the Government to
be successful, and would movement by this committee on a bill
like the Libya Stabilization Act be constructive? Ambassador
Nuland, if you might.
Ambassador Nuland. Absolutely. We have a sliver of light
now in Libya with these elections, agreed, and we have got to
ensure that they are free, fair, that they are internationally
observed. This is a place where, again, working with allies and
partners, Europeans obviously, but countries in the--in the
region to support Libya as it goes forward with all of this, we
may need more resources to do that. I, you know, if confirmed,
look forward to opening up the hood and seeing what we are
already doing and working with allies and partners to ensure
that the Libyan people feel that support and get this chance
that they have suffered so much for.
Senator Coons. Any additional comments before I turn to my
colleague, Senator Murphy?
Ms. Zeya. Senator, I would just add on Libya, endorsing
Ambassador Nuland's comments, I think we should also leverage
all tools available, including U.N. and U.S. Government
sanctions, to bring an end to foreign military intervention,
hold violators of human rights accountable, and ultimately
support the goal of a sovereign, stable unified Libya.
Senator Coons. Wonderful. Thank you both. Let me now turn
to my colleague, Senator Murphy of Connecticut.
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Senator Coons. Welcome
to you both. Thank you for your willingness to serve once
again. Ms. Zeya, I look forward to building a working
relationship with you. To Ambassador Nuland, I am glad to have
you back as a partner. I will tell you, your candor and your
reputation for candor, we appreciate it here on the Foreign
Relations Committee. We often get a lot of spin from
administration officials on both sides of the aisle, but I
think you are well respected here on both sides of the aisle
because of your ability and willingness to talk to us about
facts on the ground as they are, not as we wish. So great to
see you again.
Speaking of facts on the ground, I wanted to bring us back
to the negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, and just note
a statement from the Saudi foreign ministry dated yesterday or
today in which an official there said we can begin with a
nuclear deal and move on to another format that we will discuss
all these other issues in a positive manner. Some folks took
note of that statement, but it, frankly, likely acknowledges
two realities: one, that our partners in the Gulf would like to
be at the table when we discuss broader regional security
concerns, in particular, Iran's support for terrorist
organizations or their ballistic missile program, but also,
that it is much more likely to have that conversation
constructively if we get back into the JCPOA and get back on
the same page with the P5+1.
And so I wanted to ask you whether you think that the
likelihood of getting a comprehensive agreement, where we
litigate all of our disputes with Iran, is more likely today
than it was in 2013, 2014, and 2015, when we were negotiating
the JCPOA.
Ambassador Nuland. Senator Murphy, it is great to see you.
Although I am a citizen in Senator Kaine's region at the
moment, I grew up in Connecticut, so Connecticut strong. Look,
on Iran, I think we have got to pursue all of these problems in
tandem. Whether that is a question of a comprehensive
agreement, I think there are many players in many different
pieces of this. What is most urgent today is that Iran is
breaking out again of its nuclear box. It is enriching at 20
percent. It is using these advanced centrifuges. We have got to
get them back in the box on the nuclear front. But at the same
time, we can and should be countering their malign regional
influence by being stronger diplomatically in Syria.
I have concerns that the diplomatic table, the future of
Syria's political structure, et cetera, is being run by Russia
and Iran, and the United States needs to be more active there.
We need to support Lebanon more strongly against malign Iranian
influence, and I was glad to see the undersecretary for
political affairs, David Hale, smake a trip to Lebanon. You
have worked a lot on the Yemen issue.
So I believe we can be working on Iran's malign influence
at the same time that we are having these conversations about
the nuclear problem, and, frankly, the players are different in
some of those things. And we have also got a build the basis
for people to understand better than they do now what Iran is
doing on the missile front. So walk and chew gum would be my
answer to your question.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, so I agree that our goal should be to
walk and chew gum at the same time. Do you think we have to be
driven by realities on the ground? And I, for instance, do not
believe that we are going to be able to make progress in Yemen
while we are still outside of the JCPOA. I think while we are
still engaged in maximum pressure, the Iranians are likely to
use every opportunity they can find to provoke. And so I do
think that there is some argument to sequence here, and I will
continue to make that argument on this committee.
In the remaining time I have left, I just wanted to turn to
the subject that you and I have spent a lot of time working on
together, and that is Ukraine. Obviously, you know, we have
taken strong steps today to send a strong message to the
Russians about the message we need to send regarding the array
of Russian forces on the border. But it has always been, I
think, our belief that while Russia wants to use that front in
order to put pressure on the Ukrainian Government, their
longer-term plan is not likely a full military takeover of
Ukraine, but to try to politically and economically weaken that
country to the point where they ultimately just make the
decision to install pro-Russian or a Russia-friendly government
again.
And so I would just ask this question. It is still
incredibly important for us to view this as a multi-systemic
effort that, while we have to have a military answer and
support Ukraine in a military way, we also have to be equally
focused on supporting their economy, supporting their political
reform agenda, because that is maybe the most likely mechanism
for Russia to eventually get a state of affairs that aligns
with their interests.
Ambassador Nuland. I absolutely agree completely, and, you
know, your leadership on Ukraine was essential the last time I
was in government, and the fact that you continue to support
Ukraine is important. The number one thing Ukraine needs to be
a strong, stable, sovereign state is to tackle endemic
corruption. The United States has put a huge amount of effort
into that, but corruption is also a tool that the Kremlin uses
to corrode Ukraine from the inside and by governments, et
cetera. So it is in all of our interests to continue to work on
those issues.
And the Zelensky Government has taken some important steps
in recent weeks, but there is a lot more to be done. And we
also need to get--support them and getting back into alignment
with the IMF and all of those things that you have worked on.
And the strong support from the Congress for Ukraine has been
important, but they need to take the steps to walk the walk.
Senator Murphy. Thank you. Thank you to you both. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. My understanding is there are no
members seeking recognition on either side of the aisle, and
with that, thanks to both nominees for their time today.
The record will remain open until the close of business on
Friday, April the 16th. I would urge the nominees to answer
questions expeditiously in order for their nominations to be
able to move forward to a business meeting.
The Chairman. And with that, the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Too often, regional bureaus have sidelined DRL and other
essential functional bureaus. If confirmed, how will you ensure better
consultation and coordination between DRL, other functional bureaus,
and the regional bureaus you will lead as P?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to the regional bureaus
under my supervision, as well as to the functional bureaus, that the
President's vision of placing human rights and democracy at the heart
of the foreign policy of the United States necessitates full inclusion
of DRL in the Department's policy-making processes. I intend, if
confirmed, to work with the Under Secretary for Civilian Security and
Human Rights, and with DRL's leadership, to ensure full policy
coordination among regional bureaus and across the Department.
Question. What actions will you take, including with our partners,
to address the global forced migration crisis? How specifically will
you work to address the root causes of displacement such as new and
unresolved conflicts; support populations on the move and those
enduring lengthy displacement; and seek innovative solutions to assist
low-income countries who host the majority of refugees and displaced
people around the world?
Answer. If confirmed, I will pursue comprehensive strategies for
addressing the root causes of migration, including climate change, help
rebuild the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, and stand up for
democratic values and human rights. I will also encourage stronger
partnerships between humanitarian and development actors, including
multilateral development banks, in situations of protracted
displacement and fragility, conflict, and violence.
Question. Do you think we are doing enough to counter threats to
democracy right now? What more should the United States be doing, and
how will you elevate the importance of democracy promotion efforts and
a democracy-centered foreign policy within the State Department and
abroad given the President and Secretary of State's public commitment
to these goals?
Answer. As President Biden said, ``The United States will stand up
for democracy wherever it is under attack.'' We know well from our own
experience that sustaining democracy requires hard work, careful
stewardship, and constant vigilance. If confirmed, I intend to support
the Biden Harris administration's commitment to putting the promotion
and protection of democracy at the center of U.S. foreign policy. This
means working to bolster to democratic resilience at home and abroad,
and holding ourselves, our allies, and our partners accountable to
promote, respect, and defend human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Question. What shifts must be made in our foreign policy to ensure
we are working to hold our allies and adversaries to the same standard
on human rights? How will you prioritize this parity in expectations on
upholding human rights?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the tradition of seeking to
report the facts on human rights fully and objectively on every country
in the Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, using
the standards found in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. I
also intend to raise human rights issues with allies and adversaries
alike, regardless of the other interests we may have in our
relationships with other countries.
Question. How will you engage with international counterparts to
pursue effective accountability measures to address violations and
abuses of human rights around the world? What role do you believe
multilateral bodies like the United Nations have in this endeavor?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that the United
Nations promotes respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and
holds those countries with the worst human rights records to account.
The United States supports U.N. investigatory mechanisms designed to
enhance accountability for human rights violations and to end impunity.
If confirmed, I will consider all possible tools and actions to promote
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and
abuses.
Question. We must be clear-eyed about the nature of President
Erdogan's Turkey. Turkey is among the top jailers of journalists and
lawyers in the world, which is unbelievable for a member of an alliance
founded on democratic values. In addition to its many domestic abuses,
Turkey's aggression throughout the region and its refusal to give up
the S-400 underscore the fact that Turkey is not a reliable NATO ally.
How the U.S. decides to define its relationship with Turkey is
critically important to security in the region and our ability to
support democratic values abroad. Is there any circumstance under which
the U.S. should reconstitute the F35 program with Turkey if it does not
get rid of its S-400 system?
Answer. President Biden has promised to call out Turkish behavior
that is inconsistent with its commitments as a NATO Ally. Turkey's
acquisition of the Russian-made S-400 was incompatible with NATO
principles, Turkey's commitments to NATO, and its participation in the
F-35 program, and thus resulted in Turkey's suspension and pending
removal from the global F-35 Joint Strike Fighter partnership. If
confirmed, I will continue to press Turkey to abandon the S-400 system,
and I would not support reconstitution of the F-35 program so long as
Turkey retains the Russian system.
Question. What is your position on the Cyprus question, in advance
of 5+1 talks next month?
Answer. I continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive
settlement to reunify the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation,
something which would benefit all Cypriots as well as the wider region.
The United States has welcomed and should stand ready to assist the
U.N. Secretary-General's initiative to convene an informal 5+UN meeting
in Geneva. Consistent with the October 2020 U.N. Security Council
Presidential Statement, I am deeply concerned by the Turkish Cypriots'
unilateral decision, with the support of Turkey, to reopen Varosha. If
confirmed, I will urge a reversal of this decision.
Question. Do you commit to the full implementation the Eastern
Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress and
colleagues in the interagency to support robust ties between the United
States and Greece, Israel, and Cyprus, as envisioned in the
legislation. The U.S.-Greece security relationship remains vital to our
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and has grown significantly as
bilateral ties have improved, beginning in the Obama-Biden
administration. If confirmed, I will work to continue to deepen ties
between the United States and Greece and the United States and Cyprus.
Question. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify, this
committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Turkey?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing close
consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations committee regarding
U.S. policy toward Turkey.
Question. Last year's NDAA included provisions which would require
the Department to be more forthcoming with Congress on the peace
process. The Department was required to provide a certification in
January to confirm that the Senate has been provided with all relevant
documents associated with the February 29th agreement. We have yet to
receive this certification. Will you commit to providing this
information to Congress upon your confirmation?
Answer. Yes, I understand that the Department is preparing to
provide a response regarding section 1217(b) of the William M. (Mac)
Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021
(P.L. 116-283) to Congress. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring
that the Department provides this response and other required
notifications, reports, and certifications promptly.
Question. The law also requires regular consultation with Congress
on the peace process. Do you commit to consult with, not simply notify,
this committee as it relates to U.S. policy on Afghanistan?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to consult fully with theon
U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.
Question. The continued spread of COVID-19 in Latin America and the
Caribbean is deeply concerning. Despite initial vaccination campaigns
in the region, cases are on the rise and many health systems are
overwhelmed. The current situation in Brazil is alarming and
unrestrained spread only raises risks for new variants. What steps will
you take to ensure vaccine access for nations in the Western
Hemisphere, as well as other developing nations? What other vaccine-
related initiatives will you prioritize?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. commitment to leading
the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including through
supporting global vaccine distribution via COVAX. Latin America and the
Caribbean are suffering a disproportionate share of global COVID-19
cases and deaths, posing a threat to the United States given our strong
economic ties. However, the President's first priority must be to take
care of the American people, and given the unpredictability of this
virus, we must be prepared for a variety of scenarios. As the United
States moves toward having enough vaccine here at home, I will support
efforts to pursue options for sharing doses abroad, if confirmed. I
will also support efforts to work with partners to expand the global
manufacturing of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines, and their needed
supplies, to increase worldwide capacity and availability.
Question. As Colombia works to implement its 2016 peace accord, it
is facing an uptick in violence against civil society leaders by
irregular armed actors and drug traffickers, including criminal groups
that receive safe haven inside Venezuela. Additionally, there are
concerns about the role of Russia in the region, including its presence
in Venezuela and its disinformation efforts targeting Colombia. What
steps will you take to strengthen U.S.-Colombia relations and ensure
that the United States helps our Colombian partners consolidate the
gains of peace?
Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our
democratic values. If confirmed, I will support the efforts the
Colombian Government and people as they continue to work towards a just
and lasting peace and a prosperous future. Through diplomatic
engagement and foreign assistance, the United States must work with
Colombia to promote sustainable peace and reconciliation by expanding
security, state presence, access to justice, and licit economic
opportunities throughout the country. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to work together with the Colombia Government to combat
narcotics trafficking and transnational crime, coordinate a regional
response to the political and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, and
promote and protect human rights.
Question. President Biden has outlined his strategy for a COVID-19
response, and has committed to making vaccines more widely available
here in the United States. Part of what we need to do to safeguard
American lives is ensure that other countries-especially poor
countries-can do the same. As I've said before, COVID-19 didn't start
here, but it came here. Americans are not safe until the world is safe.
What do you see as the most important actions the United States can
take to lead international efforts to end the COVID-19 pandemic for
once and for all?
Answer. To keep U.S. citizens safe, build back the economy, and
curb the emergence of variants, the United States is committed to
leading the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, and strengthening
global health security and pandemic preparedness to prevent future
biological threats. I will support those efforts if confirmed. Under
President Biden's direction, the United State has already taken
significant steps, including: re-engaging with the WHO; committing to
provide the most funding--$4 billion to COVAX--of any country to
accelerate the pace and ambition of global vaccination efforts; and
collaborating with our Quad partners (Japan, India, and Australia) to
expand the manufacture and supply of safe and effective COVID-19
vaccines.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your role in achieving that
goal?
Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have committed to a
whole-of-government response to COVID-19 and building longer term
global health security. If confirmed, I will work with all the regional
bureaus under my supervision, our functional bureaus, the U.S.
interagency and the international community--including the private
sector, civil society, and other partners--to help bring the COVID 19
pandemic to an end and build back better preparedness to prevent,
detect, and respond to public health threats both at home and abroad,
including through initiatives such as the Global Health Security Agenda
(GHSA).
Question. The situation in Ethiopia is alarming. Not only is there
conflict in Tigray, ongoing tensions in other parts of the country have
the potential to cause sustained violent conflict and political space
continues to close. The administration has taken a robust multilateral
approach to resolving the Tigray crisis, working through the U.N. and
with our African partners to achieve results, which I applaud. It also
sent a strong, positive signal of its engagement by dispatching Senator
Chris Coons to Addis Ababa. However there is much more to be done to
put Ethiopia's democratic transition back on track. 3. Can Ethiopia
hold credible elections in June under the current circumstances?
Answer. I share Secretary Blinken's concern that a number of
factors could undermine inclusive, free, fair, and credible national
and regional elections, including: continued violence, harassment and
detention of opposition figures, human rights abuses and violations,
growing insecurity, more than 2 million internally displaced,
interference with media freedom, and regional and local government
interference in political processes. If confirmed, I will pursue
sustained engagement to press the Government of Ethiopia to move
towards inclusive political dialogue, to ensure a free political
environment, and to address ongoing inter-ethnic tensions across the
country to help mitigate these risks.
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to encourage the Abiy
administration to take meaningful action to open political space, and
engage with all political stakeholders?
Answer. The United States strongly supports democratization in
Ethiopia. Political space for all Ethiopians is critical for advancing
this process and building strong, inclusive institutions. If confirmed,
I will work with the newly appointed Special Envoy for the Horn of
Africa and the Bureau of African Affairs to press the Ethiopian
Government to ensure freedoms of assembly and expression, political
participation, access to information, including through the internet,
and political resolution of inter-ethnic conflict across the country.
If confirmed, I will continue to underscore to the Government of
Ethiopia the need for broad and inclusive dialogue and for opposition
parties and civil society to be able to participate freely in the
political process and organize and work without the fear of harassment
or intimidation.
Question. What will you do to help resolve the Tigray crisis should
Russia and China continue to block U.N. Security Council efforts to
address this urgent matter, or the African Union fail to take a more
prominent leadership role?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to work closely with U.S. Ambassador
to the U.N. Linda Thomas Greenfield and the newly appointed Special
Envoy for the Horn of Africa to use every opportunity to address the
crisis across U.N. agencies. The U.N. plays a vital role in delivering
humanitarian assistance and in protecting refugees in Ethiopia. As
conflict in Ethiopia poses a threat to the broader region, if
confirmed, I will work with the African members of the Security Council
in New York and the African Union to push for an end to fighting and
press for a political settlement, protection of civilians, withdrawal
of Eritrean forces, immediate unhindered humanitarian access,
restoration of all communications to the region, independent
investigations into reported human rights violations, abuses, and
atrocities, and accountability for those responsible. I will also work
closely with the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa to build a broad
coalition of likeminded countries willing to work together to achieve
these objectives and to take the necessary steps to hold all parties
accountable to their commitments and their international obligations.
Question. The administration's recent suspension of drone strikes
outside select war zones has significant implications for the situation
in Somalia, where AMISOM and Somali operations against Al Shabaab have
long depended on the support of US drones. The current election crisis
in the country, which has been made significantly worse by parliament's
ill-conceived attempt to extend the term of President Farmajo, and an
earlier withdrawal of US troops under the Trump administration, are
additional complicating factors. What is your view on how best to
achieve a breakthrough both in the struggle against Al Shabaab, and on
the broader democratization and stabilization of Somalia?
Answer. A holistic approach is needed to ensure sustainable gains
in countering terrorist violence, achieving stability, and building
adequate governance. Such an approach will require not only continued
international support to counter al-Shabaab but also robust support to
build the capacity of Somali security institutions, promote sustainable
development, and improve governance. Engagement with all Somali
stakeholders and international partners, including the U.N. and AU, on
a pathway forward for Somalia is required. With respect to the current
political crisis, it is vital for the peace, stability, prosperity, and
governance of Somalia that the Federal Government and Federal Member
States reach a consensus on a way forward for the electoral process
without delay.
Question. Recent flawed elections in Uganda require a robust USG
response that advances of democracy, governance, and human rights in
this important African country. I was pleased to see the
administration's recent announcement of visa restrictions on Ugandan
persons engaged in undermining democracy. But Uganda's status as a
security partner in East Africa has complicated the willingness of past
administration's to apply meaningful pressure on Kampala for its
shortcomings in this area. How can the USG better prioritize democracy
and governance in its relationship with Uganda, and ensure that our
regional security interests do not crowd out or trump these essential
priorities?
Answer. Uganda's positive contributions to regional stability,
particularly as the largest troop contributing country to AMISOM and as
Africa's largest host of refugees do not give the Government of Uganda
a free pass regarding the importance of respecting human rights,
democracy, and good governance. If confirmed, I intend to support the
Department's efforts to ensure that U.S. policy appropriately reflects
the centrality of strong democratic institutions and respect for human
rights in our partnership with Uganda.
Question. The Central African Republic (CAR) faces ongoing violence
and a humanitarian crisis in the wake of elections that suffered from
low participation, and were fraught with irregularities. The U.S.
supported an increase to the United Nations peacekeeping force but
stability remains elusive, complicated by CAR government-aligned
Russian and Rwandan military involvement and an anti-government
coalition of militia groups representing roughly two-thirds of the
country that are committed to the overthrow of President Touadera. What
steps should the U.S. take to reduce tensions, encourage inclusive
political dialogue, build a participatory democracy, and help put the
country on a path toward sustainable peace?
Answer. The United States has been a steadfast supporter of the
democratic will of all Central Africans and their efforts to build
resilient, responsive, and representative democracy. This is the best
way to move the country towards peace and away from its repeated
crises. If confirmed, I will support efforts to continue working with
our partners to encourage an inclusive dialogue between all legitimate
actors in the country with the support of neighbors, regional
organizations, and the United Nations. If confirmed, I will work with
partners and allies to ensure countries providing assistance, military
or otherwise, do so in a transparent and coordinated way, and
consistent with the U.N. arms embargo.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator James E. Risch
Question. There are several vacant ambassadorial posts in Sub-
Saharan Africa without a named nominee to be considered by the Foreign
Relations Committee, including such high-priority posts as Sudan,
Kenya, and South Africa. Many other posts will become vacant in the
coming year with little evidence that candidates are in the pipeline
for consideration. As Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs,
if confirmed, are you committed to working with the White House to
ensure that Ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by
qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the White
House to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are
filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.
Question. Under your leadership as Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure
that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and
consistently staffed?
Answer. I recognize that State's Bureau of African Affairs (AF) is
chronically understaffed, both in terms of positions and vacancies. If
confirmed, I will review our staffing levels around the world to ensure
that staffing is aligned with our most pressing interests. I will
explore enhancing incentives to serve at hardship posts, including
those in Africa, and will look for other ways to ensure that our
vacancies are filled. I am committed to an inclusive workplace and will
support AF's efforts as they work to implement management reforms for
recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Question. With 49 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, there are myriad
opportunities and challenges to the security, economic, health and
humanitarian interests of the United States. The U.S. Government is
presently engaged on a variety of fronts. The White House and Secretary
Blinken have repeatedly stated that ``Africa is a priority for the
Biden administration''. In the early days of your tenure as Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, if confirmed, how will you
make clear inside the Department, across the administration and
externally, that Africa is a priority for the Biden administration?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to support the Secretary's efforts
to engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. If confirmed, I
intend to participate in the interagency policy process as the Biden-
Harris administration develops a whole-of-government Africa strategy
and consider additional banner initiatives to signal the critical
importance of this region. I believe active, consistent engagement of
senior officials in Africa will be critical to advance U.S. interests
on the continent and a signal of our commitment.
Question. How will you ensure the United States respects and values
our African partners, while also representing our values and interests,
particularly as it relates to respect for the rule of law, protecting
human rights, and advancing democracy?
Answer. I believe we must continue to build partnerships in Africa,
investing in civil society and strengthening democratic institutions.
If confirmed, I look forward to implementing the Secretary's plan to
engage African countries early and often as partners in pursuing our
shared interests and values--from security, global health, climate
change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. Senior-level
engagement on a consistent basis will be a signal of our commitment.
Question. Sub-Saharan Africa is experiencing a massive ``youth
bulge.'' While programs like the Young African Leaders Initiative and
its Mandela Washington Fellowship are vital, what can the United States
do to expand its reach and effectively engage with Africa's enormous
youth population?
Answer. Empowering youth is at the heart of the longstanding U.S.-
Africa partnership. If confirmed, I will direct Department of State
resources to expand youth engagement initiatives. In addition to the
Mandela Washington Fellowship, I intend to leverage YALI's USAID-run
Regional Leadership Centers, the online YALI Network, and other public
diplomacy and Department programs, including U.S. youth exchange
programs like the Pan-Africa Youth Leadership Program, to help identify
and dedicate resources for youth and alumni engagement to empower youth
leaders in their communities, particularly around issues of
entrepreneurship, civic engagement, democracy, governance, and respect
for human rights.
Question. What are your views on the role trade and investment
could and should play in building stronger ties between the United
States and the African continent? How should U.S.-African trade and
investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter
China, particularly in Africa?
Answer. Strengthening and expanding U.S.-Africa trade and
investment is critical to our primary objective of building stronger
ties between the United States and the African continent. Stronger
trade and investment ties with the United States also offers Africa an
alternative to the PRC. If confirmed, I will engage in our commercial
and economic diplomacy and use the tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and
Treasury. I will also work with the U.S. private sector, African
governments, and international financial institutions to increase trade
and investment in Africa and promote U.S. business.
Question. One vital area of Prosper Africa that requires greater
emphasis is improving the enabling environment within African partner
countries to better attract U.S. business investment. Improvements in
anti-corruption initiatives, human rights, the rule of law, and overall
good governance would create better conditions for U.S. investment
conditions. Such enhancements would also counterbalance efforts by
Chinese firms and the Chinese Communist Party to undermine free-market
competition in African markets to their advantage. How can the U.S.
Government most effectively support efforts to improve the enabling
environment for competitive foreign investment by U.S. firms in Africa?
What types of partnerships work best, and how can the United States
best incentivize reforms and other actions necessary to foster economic
opportunity and expand two-way trade and investment with the African
continent?
Answer. A conducive business climate is essential to building
sustainable economies. If confirmed, I will deploy the full set of
diplomatic and development tools to promote enabling environments in
our African partners that foster robust economic growth and respect for
human rights and democracy. For example, the Prosper Africa Initiative
will help clear impediments to economic growth in Africa, create new
export and investment opportunities for U.S. companies, and increase
prosperity at home. If confirmed, I will work to provide a meaningful
alternative to the People's Republic of China's (PRC) economic
approach, and I will help build countries' resilience in order to
respond to PRC economic coercion.
Question. What should be guiding principles for increasing two-way
trade and investment between the United States and Africa in light of
the presence of China, Russia and other malign actors that often
operate within several of these countries by their own rules?
Answer. The President is particularly focused on rebuilding the
middle class at home by creating new and better jobs, raising wages,
and strengthening communities. Increasing two-way trade and investment
is critical to building stronger ties between the United States and
Africa, and it will benefit the American middle class. The competition
with China, Russia, and other malign actors is one of the central
challenges that will define the 21st century. If confirmed, I will
advance the Department's efforts to ensure that American companies can
compete on an even playing field in Africa, which will allow them to
provide an attractive alternative based on entrepreneurship and free-
market principles, and which will be of benefit to African economies.
Question. How can the Department better leverage the Bureau of
African Affairs and encourage better coordination with the Bureau of
Near East Affairs on Red Sea Corridor issues?
Answer. A comprehensive and coordinated interagency approach to the
Greater Horn of Africa and the Red Sea corridor better serves U.S.
national security interests. To this end, Secretary Blinken has
appointed a special envoy for the Horn of Africa. If confirmed, I will
ensure close coordination between the Bureau of African Affairs and the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, the new special envoy for the Horn of
Africa, and the special envoy for South Sudan and Sudan on Red Sea
Corridor issues, and ask senior leadership to identify and implement
mechanisms for further coordination.
Question. President Biden has proposed a $4 billion plan for
Central America. Please describe specifically how this plan will build
off of the successes and failures of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement
for Central America, and the importance of garnering sustained
political will from the individual governments.
Answer. As I understand it, the Root Causes Strategy seeks to build
on the lessons learned from the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central
Americas. Place-based strategies, including targeted security and
economic programs, helped Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador reduce
violence and increase job growth prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The
Root Causes Strategy seeks to use similar tools and reforms to increase
transparency, combat corruption, and create conditions conducive to
economic growth a top priority, and to use data to support decisions
and technology to increase efficacy. If confirmed, I would work to
support a strategy to engage the governments, civil society, and
private sectors of countries throughout the region as partners in this
endeavor to address the factors that cause people to leave their homes.
If confirmed, I will work with these countries, including by bolstering
civil society, to build the necessary political will to undertake tough
reforms. I am under no illusions that will be easy. It will require a
consistent, committed effort from the United States and our partners.
Question. There have been more than a dozen failed attempts at
negotiating with Maduro in Venezuela. They have occurred in an
environment of engagement favored by the Obama administration, and
under the pressure of punitive measures implemented by the Trump
administration. Describe the conditions that would need to be met for
the administration to engage in negotiations with the Maduro regime in
Venezuela.
Answer. Only good faith negotiations among Venezuelans can
establish the conditions required for free and fair elections. That is
the best framework for a political resolution to the political,
economic, migratory, and health crises afflicting Venezuela. This was
the clearly stated sense of Congress when it passed the bipartisan
VERDAD Act in 2019, co-sponsored by nearly twenty Democrats and
Republicans, and it remains true today. As the Act states, ``direct,
credible negotiations led by the Interim President of Venezuela and
members of Venezuela's democratically elected National
Assembly.represent the best opportunity to reach a solution to the
Venezuelan crisis.'' The Venezuelan democratic opposition to Nicol s
Maduro has assembled a broad alliance for free and fair elections and
has made clear its willingness to establish the conditions for such
elections through negotiations, while also relying on coordinated
domestic and international pressure to bring Maduro to the negotiating
table. If confirmed, I will work with Venezuelan and international
partners to press Maduro to commit to participate in credible
negotiations with the Venezuelan opposition. If confirmed, I will also
work with international partners to press for respect for human rights,
restoration of democratic norms, and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Venezuela.
Question. What is your assessment of what it would take to achieve
those conditions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support diplomatic engagement in
order to advance a negotiated, peaceful solution to Venezuela's
political, economic, and humanitarian crises, an approach consistent
with the VERDAD Act of 2019. Venezuelans themselves must meet this
challenge. Past negotiations have fallen short because Nicol s Maduro
and his supporter used negotiations as a tactic to distract the
international community and to centralize power. Negotiations can
promote a peaceful transition toward free and fair elections if the
international community is united in pressuring Maduro to engage in
good faith and Venezuela's democratic forces remain united. Credible
negotiations must incorporate the views and reflect the interests of
Venezuelan civil society. They need to produce elections that comply
with international standards of freedom, fairness, and transparency and
allow Venezuelans to restore their democracy and the rule of law. To
create the conditions for such a process, Maduro must free political
prisoners and allow for the delivery of humanitarian aid. At the same
time, the President has made clear that the United States will continue
to pursue regime supporters involved in criminal activity and
violations of human rights.
If confirmed, I would work with partners inside Venezuela and
internationally to pressure Maduro and those who support him to commit
to a serious process.
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O/20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you
commit to prioritizing and maintaining policies and programs to create
acceptable conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining
policies and programs to create acceptable conditions for free and fair
elections in Nicaragua. I will support the continued use of the
economic and diplomatic tools at our disposal, including targeted
sanctions, bilateral and multilateral engagement, and support for
democratic processes, to advance free and fair elections. It is not too
late for the Ortega regime to make the meaningful reforms by the May
OAS deadline, and the United States continues to urge them to do so.
Question. Please describe the long-term implications for Nicaragua
and the region if Ortega fraudulently extends his time in office.
Answer. If confirmed, I will press for meaningful electoral reforms
by the May OAS deadline toward free and fair elections in November. I
understand that the Department is working multilaterally, in
coordination with the European Union, Canada, and the UK, as well as
our partners in the OAS, to use the tools at our disposal to create the
conditions for free and fair elections in November. If Ortega chooses a
non-democratic path, and if confirmed, I will join the Department's
efforts to work with those partners to hold accountable those
responsible and encourage a return to democracy.
Question. Despite reassurances from Secretary Blinken acknowledging
the importance of the Abraham Accords, there are concerns that
encouraging additional normalization agreements between Muslim majority
countries and Israel isn't a priority for the Biden administration.
Specifically, Senator Risch is concerned with the staffing, resourcing,
and messaging the Biden administration has dedicated to this issue thus
far. On the staffing front, the previous administration had an
empowered agent in the White House to pursue normalization agreements.
This has been pushed back down to the State Department, where it
currently falls under the purview of the Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) for Israel Palestinian Affairs (IPA). On messaging, we've seen
more out of the Department on restarting assistance to the Palestinians
than on additional normalization agreements. The Biden admin's interim
strategic guidance makes no mention of normalization in its section on
the Middle East. Can you share your thoughts on the Abraham Accords and
where it, as well as other prospective normalization agreements, rank
among your policy priorities?
Answer. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have welcomed the
recent normalization agreements between Israel and countries in the
Arab and Muslim world. The Department is leading the U.S. Government's
efforts, working with the National Security Council and the U.S.
Government interagency to deepen existing agreements and urge other
countries to normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, fostering
peace in the Middle East will remain a top priority and I will look for
opportunities to build on the Abraham Accords and expand cooperation
among countries in the region.
Question. Apart from the Abraham Accords, Senator Risch's top
priority in the Middle East is Iran policy. He led a letter to
President Biden, along with other national security Ranking Members
that outlined his position. We've engaged in extensive Iran discussions
with Sec Blinken, Wendy Sherman, and have just started consultations
with Rob Malley. How would you define this administration's strategic
aims with Iran? Where does regional activity fall in our strategic
aims? How does engagement with allies and partners fit in to this wider
strategy with respect to Iran?
Answer. The President is committed to ensuring Iran never acquires
a nuclear weapon and believes diplomacy, in coordination with our
allies and regional partners, is the best path to achieve that goal.
The administration has fundamental problems with Iran's actions across
a series of issues, including its support for terrorism, its ballistic
missile program, its destabilizing actions throughout the region, and
its abhorrent practice of using wrongfully detained U.S. citizens and
foreign nationals as political tools. If confirmed, I will support the
Biden-Harris administration's continuing commitment to addressing these
challenges using the various tools at its disposal, including
sanctions, and working in close coordination with our allies and
partners.
Question. The administration has said that regional terrorism and
ballistic missiles will be addressed in follow-on agreements. Do you
think this is possible? Assuming we grant financial relief as a part of
a nuclear negotiation, what leverage would the US have in terms of
securing follow-on agreements?
Answer. President Biden has committed to try to achieve a mutual
return to compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA), and then use that as a platform to lengthen and strengthen the
constraints on Iran's nuclear program, regional support for terrorism,
and other issues of concern. If confirmed, I will work to achieve this
vision. If confirmed, I would ensure the framework of U.S. sanctions on
Iran remains robust. Many layers of that sanctions architecture would
remain in place, even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. This
includes the primary U.S. embargo on Iran and many other U.S. sanctions
on Iran. If confirmed, I would work with allies and partners, and use
other avenues to place pressure on Iran to address these critical
issues.
Question. President Obama argued in favor of granting sanctions
relief, stressing ``.our best analysts expect the bulk of this revenue
to go into spending that improves the economy and benefits the lives of
the Iranian people'' and that ``Even a repressive regime like Iran's
cannot completely ignore those expectations.'' Yet, we now know that a
majority of the sanctions relief went to Iran's defense industry and
proxies. We actually saw an increase in Iran's malign regional
activities since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was
signed in 2015. Do you still believe Iran prioritized the needs of its
people over its defense industry and proxies?
Answer. I do not believe that Iran has prioritized the needs of its
people, as evidenced by its abysmal human rights record. The U.S.
Government maintains a range of tools to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region and support for proxy organizations. If
confirmed, I will support continuing U.S. efforts to maintain and,
where available, impose sanctions on Iranian entities and individuals
providing support to designated terrorist groups in the region. I will
also support action by the Biden-Harris administration, in coordination
with our allies and partners, to both deter and counter Iran's
destabilizing activities and to vigorously pursue talks on these
critical issues. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely
with Congress on the path forward.
Question. Russia and China are increasingly encroaching in the
Middle East in ways that are contrary to US interests--we see joint
R&D, basing, and a growing cooperation with US partners and allies in
the region. Russia's continues to use its support for Bashar al Assad
in Syria as a platform to further its influence in the region, while
China is trying to make deeper inroads into the Gulf and Israel and
thereby advance its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Biden
administration has advertised its commitment to de-prioritizing the
Middle East North Africa region, in favor of a greater presence in the
Indo-Pacific and Europe. Yet Great power competition has historically
taken place outside the Indo-Pacific and Europe regions, favoring
combat in weak and failed states. The moves made by the Biden
administration is occurring against backdrop of recalibrating
relationship with Saudi Arabia, de-emphasis on Abraham Accords, and
renewed focus on Palestinian issues. How do we compete with Russia and
China in the Middle East? How do we remain the partner of choice and
strike right balance between human rights and the national interest?
Answer. There is no question that the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) and Russia's coercive behavior threatens our collective security,
and that these countries are actively working to undercut the rules of
the international system and the values we and our allies share. If
confirmed, I will press our Middle East partners to be clear-eyed about
the risk of doing business with Russia and the PRC, highlighting that
partnerships with the United States bring tangible benefits to the
people of the region, while protecting human rights. The U,S. also
should support investment and economic growth in the region in a
transparent manner that respects workers, strengthens labor rights, and
serves as a counter to authoritarian business models.
Question. Lebanon is moving quickly towards financial collapse.
Despite the August 4 port explosion, political elites lack the will to
execute necessary reforms and unlock IMF, World Bank funds that will
save the country from collapse. According to many, Lebanese political
players are interpreting US outreach to Iran as a precursor to
sanctions relief and an excuse not to implement reforms. Can you
outline your thoughts on appropriate Lebanon policy? What role do
sanctions play in that policy?
Answer. Lebanon needs to execute significant reforms in cooperation
with the IMF to address its economic challenges. Lebanon can never be
truly stable and will never prosper if corruption remains rampant, and
Hezbollah continues to operate with impunity. If confirmed, I would
seek to use all available tools to push Lebanese officials to implement
the reforms necessary to root out corruption and terrorism and unlock
critical support from international financial institutions.
Question. Secretary Blinken has been vocal on the importance of
renewing and maintains cross-border humanitarian assistance, which we
agree with, but when discussing Syria policy or strategy, we return to
the same mantra of UNSCR 2254, progress on which remains stalled. What
changes would you propose for Syria policy? How can the administration
accelerate progress under UNSCR 2254?
Answer. If confirmed, I will join the Biden-Harris administration
in continuing to engage diplomatically to press for an end to the
Syrian people's suffering and to encourage all possible efforts to
advance the legitimate political track in keeping with UNSCR 2254, and
will advocate for accountability for the most serious crimes committed
against the Syrian people, including war crimes and crimes against
humanity. The United States seeks a nationwide ceasefire, unhindered
aid access through all possible routes, the release of those
arbitrarily detained, and free and fair elections under U.N. auspices.
If confirmed, I will support the use of a variety of tools to ensure
the Assad regime and its supporters do not profit from the conflict or
any post-conflict reconstruction, and will consult closely with our
partners and allies on the best way forward in Syria.
Question. What role does the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act
play in US policy? Do you feel it can be used as an effective tool to
containing Russian influence in Syria, and preventing US partners and
allies from normalizing relations with Bashar al Assad?
Answer. The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act is an important
tool to limit the ability of Assad and his enablers to profit from the
ongoing conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. If confirmed, I will
use it and all available tools to stop those responsible for grave
human rights abuses against the Syrian people, and will coordinate with
our allies and partners on policies toward Syria, including in
preventing normalizing relations with Assad, in order to push for
meaningful progress on our shared political objectives.
Question. In light of the rocket attack on Erbil by an Iranian
proxy group in February, and the continuing presence of ISIS forces in
remote areas of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, what steps is the Biden
administration prepared to take to reaffirm America's commitment to the
territorial integrity and safety of the Kurdistan Regional Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the United States' top
priorities of ensuring the enduring defeat of ISIS and increasing the
capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), including Peshmerga
forces. I understand that the administration is in constant contact
with Kurdistan Regional Government leaders to address security
concerns, and the United States provides assistance to support the
continued development and professionalization of the ISF, increasing
their ability to respond to threats and conduct counter-terrorism
operations, as well as defend Iraq--its people and borders--while
upholding the rule of law. If confirmed, I will support U.S. continued
efforts with Iraq on our shared vision of a secure, stable, democratic,
and prosperous Iraq that can stand on its own and defend its autonomy
against malign regional influence.
Question. In light of the threats posed to the Kurdish people of
Syria by ISIS, the Assad Government, Assad's backers in Moscow and
Tehran, and the Government of Turkey, what are the Biden
administration's policies on the U.S.-Syrian Kurd security and
diplomatic relationship, and the appropriate Kurdish role in Syria's
political roadmap under UNSCR 2254?
Answer. Stability in Syria and the greater region can only be
achieved through a political process that represents the will of all
Syrians. The Syrian Democratic Forces remain a capable and committed
military partner in the fight against ISIS. The United States also
supports the ongoing Intra Kurdish Dialogue and looks forward to its
continued progress. The dialogue complements renewed U.S. efforts to
stabilize areas of northeast Syria liberated from ISIS and to promote
greater transparency and inclusivity in local governance, and if
confirmed I will work to support it.
Question. In your opinion, does the Treaty for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons threaten the integrity of U.S. alliances, especially
regarding extended deterrence commitments?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration does not believe that
progress toward nuclear disarmament can be decoupled from the
prevailing security threats in today's world. If confirmed, I will
support the administration's view that the Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is incompatible with U.S. extended deterrence
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and
security, and may reinforce divisions that hinder the international
community's ability to work together to address pressing proliferation
and security challenges. U.S. allies covered by extended nuclear
deterrence--which includes all NATO Allies, plus Australia, Japan, and
the Republic of Korea--share the administration's view that the TPNW is
incompatible with our extended nuclear deterrence arrangements.
Question. In December 2020, NATO re-affirmed the Allie's
longstanding position that, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO
will remain a nuclear alliance.'' In your view, do you believe that
this principle requires the United States to deploy nuclear weapons in
NATO countries?
Answer. The United States is fully committed to its Article 5
obligations. If confirmed, I will strongly support U.S. continued
coordination with Allies in support of NATO's deterrence and defense
posture, including U.S. nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe.
Question. How can we get NATO allies to invest more in their own
defense?
Answer. This is an issue I have spared no effort on since my days
as NATO Ambassador, and if confirmed, one I will continue to pursue
vigorously. At the 2014 Wales Summit, Allies agreed to increase their
defense spending for the mutual benefit of the Alliance. If confirmed,
I will work to ensure Allies continue to share the responsibility of
our collective security against new and existing threats and appeal to
them to do more. If confirmed, I will also ensure that the burden-
sharing conversation at NATO also focuses on capabilities, readiness,
and force generation. I look forward to consulting with NATO Allies, as
well as with Congress, on the best strategy to ensure NATO has the
capabilities, readiness, and forces it requires to maintain a credible
defense and deterrence posture, as well as fulfill NATO missions and
operations.
Question. Why does Japan spend only about 1 percent of its GDP on
defense? Given increasing threats from China, is this acceptable and
sustainable? If confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding
defense spending with the Japanese Government?
Answer. Japan has become one of our strongest allies in maintaining
peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region and around the world. The
Government of Japan has increased its defense budget every year since
2012. The U.S. Japan Alliance advances our shared vision for a free and
open Indo-Pacific and beyond. If confirmed, I will work with Japan to
bolster its national defense capabilities to further strengthen the
alliance and regional security.
Question. Taiwan is set to increase its defense spending to about
2.4 percent of GDP for this year. However, some senior U.S. defense
officials have indicated that is still an insufficient amount for
Taiwan to be able to ensure resilient defense in the face of an
increasing Chinese threat. Do you agree with those concerns? If
confirmed, how would you approach discussions regarding defense
spending with the Taiwanese Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining the U.S. rock-solid
commitment to Taiwan. The United States will continue to make available
to Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan
to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy. At the same time,
Taiwan needs to maintain robust defense budgets. The United States sold
nearly $30 billion worth of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales
alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding
security cooperation seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize cost-
effective, mobile, resilient, and asymmetric capabilities, including an
effective civil defense force for defense in depth.
Question. How can we resolve the current impasse with Turkey over
the S-400?
Answer. One of President Biden's top priorities with respect to
Turkey is urging it not to retain the S-400 and to refrain from
additional Russian arms purchases. If confirmed, I will support efforts
to persuade Turkey to forego the S-400. The CAATSA sanctions announced
in December 2020 impose real costs on Turkey for acquiring the S-400
and advance our global efforts to deter and disrupt purchases of
Russian weaponry, which bring Russia revenue, access, and influence.
Turkey's suspension and pending removal from the F-35 partnership
represents an additional significant cost. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with Congress to review the impact of the sanctions imposed
in response to the S-400 acquisition and to determine whether
additional measures are required or warranted.
Question. What is your understanding of how China has expanded and
modernized its nuclear forces?
Answer. I understand that during this decade, the People's Republic
of China (PRC) is likely to more than double the size of its nuclear
stockpile. This rapid expansion includes new delivery systems as
Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which will include a long-
range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs, multiple-warhead silo-
based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic missile submarines. The
PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-glide vehicles, air-
launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear weapons that will
fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making additional advances
towards developing a launch-on-warning posture.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. Yes. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) ongoing rapid
expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages a more dangerous future, with
a considerably larger number of sophisticated nuclear delivery systems
able to reach the United States and our allies and partners than in the
past. This larger nuclear arsenal will buttress a broader PRC military
build-up and its increasingly assertive and threatening behavior to
U.S. allies and partners.
Question. How can we bring China to the negotiating table for arms
control?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to pursue arms
control to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
(PRC) growing nuclear arsenal. To date, the PRC has failed to
meaningfully engage on these issues. If confirmed, I will support
efforts to work with U.S. allies and partners to press Beijing to
engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control to reduce
global nuclear risks.
Question. Do you believe that China's professed no first use policy
is credible?
Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing
would act outside of its professed no first use policy. Some People's
Liberation Army (PLA) officers have written publicly of the need to
spell out conditions under which China might need to use nuclear
weapons first. There has been no indication that national leaders are
willing to attach such nuances and caveats publicly. However, ongoing
PRC advances in their nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise
questions regarding PRC intent and undermine their claims to seek a
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no-first use policy.
Question. Until now, analysts have estimated that the growth of the
Chinese arsenal would be constrained by the lack of fissile material.
However, recent reports indicate that Chinese plans to reprocess
plutonium will greatly increase its stocks of weapons-grade material.
Do you see this as threatening to the U.S. and its allies? Why do you
believe China is pursuing these activities?
Answer. Yes, this would be threatening to the United States and its
allies. China's ongoing rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal presages
a more dangerous future, with a considerably larger number of
sophisticated nuclear delivery systems able to reach the United States
and our allies and partners than in the past. Precisely because Beijing
is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear weapon states,
accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and intentions are
difficult. I would defer to the intelligence community for specific
assessments. In general, the United States has a longstanding position
that seeks to limit the further development of sensitive fuel cycle
technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing, beyond those
facilities already in existence.
Question. What is your understanding of how Russia has expanded and
modernized its nuclear forces?
Answer. Russia's strategic forces are undergoing a comprehensive
modernization in their force structure, operations, and planning. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's intention
to engage Russia in comprehensive negotiations that address the full
range of systems that threaten international security, including
Russian novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Question. In your view, do these capabilities pose an increasing
threat to the United States and its allies?
Answer. The United States monitors Russian nuclear policy,
strategy, doctrine, and current and projected nuclear forces. If
confirmed, I would work to sustain a safe, secure, and effective
strategic deterrent and ensure that our extended deterrence commitment
to our allies remains strong and credible. If confirmed I would also
support efforts to use the time provided by the five-year extension of
the New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with
Congress and U.S. allies and partners, arms control measures that
address all Russian nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems
and nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Question. After the United State ratified the New START Treaty,
Russia refused to engage in follow-on negotiations regarding its non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and other arms control issues. The United
States recently agreed to a five-year extension to the New START
Treaty. Given Russia's refusal to negotiate in the latter years of the
Obama administration, do you expect Russia to behave differently this
time, and to be willing to engage in arms control negotiations in the
next few years? Why or why not?
Answer. President Biden and President Putin have agreed to explore
strategic stability discussions on a range of arms control and emerging
security issues. The administration is in the process of establishing
the terms of these discussions and, if confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress and allies on the path forward. While Russian
intentions regarding possible negotiations remain unclear, the United
States must enter any talks on future arms control from a position of
strength.
Question. How should we account for Russian non-strategic nuclear
weapons and exotic delivery systems in future arms control agreements?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support an approach in which the
United States uses the time provided by a five-year extension of the
New START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress
and U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and nonstrategic
nuclear weapons.
Question. Would Russia view a U.S. no first use or sole purpose
policy as credible? Would such a policy affect the confidence of U.S.
allies in extended deterrence?
Answer. President Biden is committed to maintaining a strong,
credible deterrent to defend the United States and our allies, while
also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. The Biden-
Harris administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that
will certainly include declaratory policy and, if confirmed, I will
ensure we consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or
actions in this area.
Question. The Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions
Act (CAATSA) and other U.S. legislation and policy tools have failed to
deter Russia from attacking our democratic systems, especially through
means of cyberattacks. How can we deter Russia from conducting
cyberattacks?
Answer. Russia is a full-scope cyber actor that will remain a major
threat to U.S. Government, military, diplomatic, commercial, and
critical infrastructure networks. If confirmed, I will support efforts
to combat Russian cyber threats through a whole-of-government approach
that leverages the full range of U.S. Government capabilities--
diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, intelligence, and military. If
confirmed, I will work with the Department to communicate to the
Russian Government when its behavior is unacceptable, coordinate with
interagency partners to impose costs in response to destabilizing
activity, and build international coalitions to actively deter malign
Russian activities--including those carried out through cyberspace.
Question. If confirmed, how will you balance the International
Organizations bureau within the Political Affairs family regarding
decision-making?
Answer. The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO) is
the State Department's gateway to advancing U.S. foreign policy
priorities across the multilateral system. The IO Bureau was an
invaluable partner when I served as Assistant Secretary for European
and Eurasian Affairs, and if confirmed, I will rely heavily on the IO
Bureau's U.N. system and international organizations expertise to
advance U.S. interests and address global challenges. IO is also
central to our efforts to protect international organizations from
Chinese domination and efforts to flood the staff with their nationals.
Question. There is growing concern about the aggressive efforts of
the Chinese Communist Party to stack U.N. agencies with Chinese
nationals and secure leadership positions in order to exert undue
influence in International Organizations. Do you share this concern?
Answer. I do. The PRC engages in conduct to reshape the
international system to accommodate and more closely align with its
ideology. Its actions undermine the foundations of the international
system that has provided peace and stability since the end of World War
II. At the U.N., the PRC drives an authoritarian agenda that stands in
opposition to the values of the United States and the U.N. itself,
including on human rights, labor rights, transparency, and poor
economic practices. If confirmed, I will work to stop the PRC's efforts
to harm international organizations and their transparency, efficiency,
and influence.
Question. Do you believe the United States should craft a
comprehensive strategy to ensure the open and transparent processes for
the selection and promotion of Directors, Secretary Generals, and
Director Generals of all international organizations, including the
U.N. and its specialized bodies?
Answer. I believe in the independence and integrity of the U.N. and
other international organizations, including specialized agencies, and
agree with the importance of having qualified, independent candidates
in key positions. If confirmed, I will prioritize robust strategies
that include working with our allies and partners to select or elect
qualified, independent candidates that support democratic values
through a transparent and fair process.
Question. What do you believe is the most appropriate level of
funding to the United Nations? Should the U.S. leverage our
contributions to promote necessary reform within U.N. specialized
bodies and committees?
Answer. The most appropriate funding level for the U.N. is the one
that enables the U.N. to fulfill its mission effectively and
efficiently, as determined by the U.N. General Assembly in accordance
with its established procedures. If confirmed, I will work with the
U.S. Mission to the United Nations and the other IO missions to U.N.
organizations to promote reforms that ensure that the U.N. and U.N.
specialized agencies are transparent, accountable, and well-managed.
Question. The United States has accrued peacekeeping arrears due to
incongruence between U.S. law and U.N. assessment levels. How will you
advocate for the lowering of U.S. peacekeeping assessments to 25
percent during the scales of assessment negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. Mission to the
United Nations and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs on
a strategy to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N.
General Assembly to lower the U.S. peacekeeping assessment rate,
thereby reducing or eliminating future peacekeeping arrears.
Question. Do you support paying the backlog of U.S. arrears,
including the pre-Helms-Biden agreement arrears, or will you honor the
bipartisan agreement negotiated in the current President's name?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult closely with Congress on the
issue of whether to pay the ``contested'' arrears that are subject to
the Helms-Biden agreement. As indicated in the President's FY 2022
budget request, the Department is seeking funds and authority from
Congress to enable payment of peacekeeping arrears that accrued over
the past four years. These arrears are not subject to the Helms-Biden
agreement.
Question. Given the potential conflict with U.S. policy that U.N.
membership would cause, what actions would the Biden administration
take if the Palestinian Authority submitted a new application for
membership to the U.N. or attempt to accede to any new U.N. body?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties, a process I would support, if confirmed.
Question. Do you support establishing an office of U.N. Integrity
within the Political Affairs family to counter malign influence within
the U.N. system and to promote free and fair elections within the U.N.
system?
Answer. The IO bureau has taken steps in recent years to strengthen
its capacities to counter malign influence and I would support building
on those efforts, if confirmed. I look forward to working with Congress
to ensure the State Department is organized and resourced effectively
to strengthen the U.N. system and ensure the transparency,
effectiveness, and integrity of multilateral institutions. If
confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to elect qualified and
independent candidates to lead the U.N. and other international
organizations bodies, including highly specialized agencies.
Question. In 2014, your phone call with then-Ambassador to Ukraine
Geoff Pyatt was leaked, and, among other things, it revealed less than
flattering opinions about the European Union. At the time, how did you
address this comment with your European Union colleagues?
Answer. I made immediate contact with senior partners in the EU and
key Allied capitals to make clear that this phone call was leaked by
the Russians to try to drive wedges between us, and that my comments in
no way reflected my larger view of the EU, but reflected only a short
term, tactical frustration that the EU had chosen not to send an envoy
to help negotiate a transitional Ukrainian Government. In fact, I was
seeking more EU collaboration on Ukraine. I also apologized for the
crude language I used. I went on from that incident to have very
productive and collaborative relations with EU diplomats and Allied
partners for the next three years on Ukraine, energy security, Russia
relations, the Balkans, Cyprus settlement talks and a host of other
issues.
Question. Do you believe this statement will present issues in your
job as Under Secretary and impede your ability to work well with the
political directors of European Foreign Ministries? How will you
fulfill President Biden's intent to strengthen our relationship with
our allies, including the European Union as a bloc?
Answer. As noted, I went on from that incident to have very
productive and collaborative relations with the EU and Allied partners
on a wide variety of issues. If confirmed, I look forward to building
on that experience to support the President and Secretary's efforts to
repair, revitalize, and raise the level of ambition in the U.S.
relationship with the European Union. U.S.-EU cooperation will be
critical to our ability to control the pandemic, fight climate change,
address the challenge posed by China, secure a digital future that
favors free societies, and manage other global issues. If confirmed, I
will work closely with my EU and other European counterparts to deepen
cooperation on these issues on the basis of our shared values.
Question. Which nations do you believe the U.S. should work most
closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and actions
around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned with U.S.
goals and values vis-a-vis China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will put alliances and partnerships at the
center of our foreign policy to advance shared norms and values that
underpin peace and security and compete with the People's Republic of
China (PRC) from a position of strength. This includes working closely
with our Indo-Pacific and NATO and EU Allies, within groupings like the
Quad and the G7, and with other likeminded partners to preserve our
democracies, protect the integrity of the U.N. system, strengthen our
vital security partnerships, and secure the technologies of the future.
Question. What are your views on the recently agreed EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the U.S. be engaging with
the European Parliament to stop its ratification?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including
those related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on
China to show that its pledges on forced labor, state-owned
enterprises, and subsidies in its new agreement with the EU are not
just cheap talk, and the Chinese Government will need to follow
through. If confirmed, I will seek to engage with European
counterparts, including members of the European Parliament, on how to
advance our shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive
and coercive actions, as well as on China's failures to uphold its past
international commitments.
Question. Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe
telecoms companies out of their networks. What do you view as the next
priority areas for cooperation between the U.S. and EU?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support continued collaboration with
European Allies and partners to build a vibrant and diverse supply
chain of trustworthy telecommunications equipment and services. This
includes support for open, interoperable approaches like Open RAN
(radio access network) technologies that promise to increase vendor
diversity and market competition and have the potential to lower costs
and improve security. The United States encourages others to join us in
our support of trustworthy vendor diversity, open networks, and
transparent standards. National measures must be crafted to fully
exclude untrustworthy and high-risk suppliers, regardless of national
origin, from providing equipment and software in 5G networks.
Question. To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging
Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the U.S. should try to drive
wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do you
agree with that analysis?
Answer. I believe the alignment between Russia and China on many
issues amplifies the challenges that both countries pose to the United
States. China and Russia cooperate in certain areas, touting their
relationship as a ``comprehensive strategic partnership,'' but remain
competitors in others. Beijing and Moscow share the same goal of
undermining U.S. leadership and reshaping the international rules-based
order, particularly in the defense, democracy, and human rights realms.
They complement these efforts with their military capabilities,
technological innovation, and disinformation campaigns. If confirmed, I
will ensure the United States is vigilant in imposing costs on coercive
and reckless behavior that undermines the rules-based order.
Question. In an article last year in Foreign Affairs, you said the
U.S. should ``resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from
the outside world and speak directly to the Russian people.'' As
Putin's tightens the screws on his people, not least through the
``foreign agents'' law, independent media is being suppressed, and RFE/
RL is on the brink of withdrawing from the country altogether. How do
you propose we resist Putin's attempts to cut off his population from
the outside world? What actions do you believe the U.S. should take?
Answer. The United States is committed to maintaining ties with the
Russian people despite the Russian Government's efforts to increase
government control over its population using new and existing
legislation and regulations adopted under the guise of regulating
``foreign influence.'' If confirmed, I will ensure the United States
continues to promote the courageous work of Russia's independent media,
civil society organizations, and democratic elements of the society and
call out the Russian Government for abusing the fundamental freedoms of
the Russian people and will join with partners and allies to amplify
that message. If confirmed, I will work to enhance people-to-people
ties, seek ways to ensure continued communication with the Russian
people, and draw attention to Russia's increasing repression.
Question. In the same article, you wrote ``U.S. and allied
sanctions, although initially painful, have grown leaky or impotent
with overuse and no longer impress the Kremlin'' and the ``U.S. and
European leaders should be clearer about their conditions for rolling
back or removing sanctions.'' What do you believe the role of sanctions
should be in the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy?
Answer. Sanctions remain an important tool in our broader arsenal
of instruments for countering Russian malign behavior and signaling to
Russian leaders that their actions will have costs, as most recently
demonstrated by the President's April 15 executive order. If confirmed,
I will work with allies and partners to enhance coordination and
amplify the effect of U.S. sanctions actions, as well as the imposition
of new sanctions if warranted.
Question. With respect to Russia, how do you believe the sanctions
imposed on that country since 2014 have affected the Russia's economy
and foreign policy decision making?
Answer. U.S. and allied sanctions impose costs on Russia for its
destabilizing activities. Russia might well have sought to take even
more territory in Ukraine and elsewhere had tough sectoral sanctions
not been imposed. Economically, sanctions have sharply curtailed new
foreign investment in Russia. Moscow now has few opportunities to
achieve sustained growth absent significant structural reforms to
improve competitiveness and the business environment, which the Kremlin
shows little willingness to undertake. The economic role of the state
has steadily expanded, growing from roughly 35 percent of GDP in 2000
to 60-70 percent today. This is detrimental to Russia's long-term
interests and growth.
Question. Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can
the U.S. (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of being
clearer about the policy aims of sanctions and any conditions needed
for rolling back or removing sanctions with respect to Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to consulting with Allies and
Partners, as well as with Congress, to examine all options for how to
calibrate sanctions actions to best meet U.S. and allied policy aims.
Question. Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on
Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures
besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect
to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia?
Answer. I do, if they are properly targeted and maintained. I see
value to using other tools as well including multilateral visa bans and
international pressure campaigns. If confirmed, I will support the
Biden-Harris administration's commitment to using all available tools,
including but not limited to sanctions, to stop Russian malign
influence, and will also continue to seek ways to engage the Russian
people.
Question. What outreach to every day Russians do you intend to do
as Under Secretary for Political Affairs?
Answer. As the Russian Government increases its suppression of
freedom of expression and peaceful assembly in Russia, it is even more
critical for us to engage with everyday Russians through public
statements, broadcast and digital media, and the remaining educational
and people-to-people programs that the Kremlin still allows. And even
as we focus on responding to the Russian Government's aggression, as
the President has stated, ``the Russian people, like the American
people, are invested in a peaceful and secure future for our world.''
We need to nurture these inclinations, and Mission Russia has been able
to adopt a wide range of new virtual tools and hybrid engagements for
this purpose. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing and finding
new ways to expand our outreach to the Russian people.
Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian
Affairs between 2013 and 2017, you were responsible for U.S. policy on
Turkey during the 2016 coup attempt and as Turkey descended into the
authoritarianism under President Erdogan we see today. What did you and
the State Department do in those years to try to prevent Turkey from
purchasing the S-400 missile defense system from Russia?
Answer. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, I oversaw the successful effort in coordination with our NATO
Allies to convince the Government of Turkey to overturn its 2013
decision to move forward with a Chinese air defense system. I
consistently and repeatedly pushed for Turkey to choose a NATO-
interoperable air defense system, emphasizing that PATRIOT would be the
best choice for Turkey. I also worked within the U.S. interagency to
address Turkey's concerns about the PATRIOT. More broadly, I
successfully pushed other NATO Allies to reduce their dependence on
legacy Russian military equipment and procure NATO interoperable
military equipment.
Question. Is there anything you think the U.S. should have done
differently in the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt?
Answer. Following the devastating July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey
in which more than 250 people lost their lives, the United States
promptly condemned the coup and extended its heartfelt sympathy to the
Turkish people. Since then, we have supported Turkey's efforts to bring
perpetrators of the attempted coup to justice in evidence-based
prosecutions. However, I am concerned by the significant expansion of
scope of the prosecution for attempted coup-related activities to
include opposition politicians, the media, and others whose views
differ from the Government's.
Question. How should the U.S., the European Union, and NATO deal
with an increasingly authoritarian Turkey whose decisions are
problematic for its people, its allies, and its larger neighborhood?
Answer. I share the concerns about the Turkish Government's curbs
on freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly that erode
the foundations of a democratic society. It is in our shared interest
to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. If confirmed, I
commit to press Turkey to do more to bolster the rule of law, protect
human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold the rules-based
international order, and stand united with the Transatlantic community
in addressing global challenges from Iran, Russia, and China.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. should try to drive a wedge
between Russia and Turkey?
Answer. Russia attempts to interfere in domestic processes and
drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including
Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, weapons sales, corrupt
business deals, and disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are
transactional and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For
example, Russia and Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional
conflicts (e.g., Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily
dependent upon Russian energy supplies and Russian tourists,
construction sector projects, and Russian agricultural purchases are
important for the Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work to prevent
Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally.
Question. Recently, Senator Menendez and I re-introduced the
Ukraine Security Partnership Act, which aims to support Ukraine in its
fight against Russian-backed separatists in the east and push the
country to continue necessary reforms of its military and defense
sectors. In the bill, we propose placing of conditions on Foreign
Military Financing and International Military Education and Training
(IMET). With your experience working on Ukraine policy, what is your
view on Ukraine's historical response to conditionality? Do you believe
that increasing conditionality on a portion of military support for the
country would provide incentive for further reforms?
Answer. Reform conditionality on security assistance to Ukraine has
been an important driver of positive change in the armed forces,
including in ensuring U.S. support is properly used. If confirmed, I
will work with Congress to provide robust security assistance to
Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons, and to support continued
reforms in Ukraine. The Department will oversee the execution of $115
million in FMF, $3 million in IMET, and $6 million in Nonproliferation,
Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funds that
Congress appropriated for FY 2021. If confirmed, I will also coordinate
with the Department of Defense in the execution of $275 million that
Congress appropriated for the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative
(USAI) in FY 2021, including certifying that Ukraine has taken
substantial actions to make defense reforms before the final tranche of
$150 million in USAI funding is released. I will continue to urge the
implementation of defense reforms, for which Ukraine has made moderate
strides. If confirmed, I also look forward to consulting with Congress
as we engage the Ukrainian Government on these issues to ensure we have
the right mix of incentives for Ukraine to continue its reforms.
Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. The
U.S. gives a huge amount of money to support Ukraine's transition, yet
much of the country remains under the influence of oligarchs. What do
you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down
its previously positive path?
Answer. Ukraine needs to make more progress in combatting
corruption, institutionalizing rule of law, deepening economic reforms,
and strengthening democratic institutions. If confirmed, I will work
with Ukraine to hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of
reforms or try to undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial
integrity.
Question. As Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, you had responsibility for Europe during years of upheaval in
the region: the 2014 Ukraine Revolution of Dignity, the 2014 the 2015
European migration crisis, the Russian meddling in the 2016
presidential election, and the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, to name a
few. Looking back from today, what would you do differently? What
should the U.S. have done differently?
Answer. I am proud that the U.S. provided crucial political,
economic, and security support to Ukraine during my tenure as Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, in close
collaboration with the EU, NATO, and our democratic allies around the
world. I regret that the U.S. was not a direct participant in the
Normandy negotiations to implement the Minsk agreements because we
might have been able to push the process faster and more effectively.
As I testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in
2017 and 2018, I also believe we should have done more in 2016 to
expose and deter Russian election interference in the U.S.
Question. What do you believe you and the U.S. got it right?
Answer. The U.S. provided crucial political, security, and economic
support to Ukraine, coordinated closely with Allies and conditioned our
assistance on meaningful reform. We assembled a global coalition to
censure and sanction Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. We also
strengthened deterrence along NATO's Eastern border with Russia,
reversed the flow of gas in Europe to help Ukraine when Russia tried to
cut it off, collaborated with the EU to bring new non-Russian energy
sources to Europe, and provided intensive support to the U.N.-
facilitated Cyprus peace talks. We also worked intensively in the
Balkans to support good governance and reform, and called out those
NATO Allies that were backsliding on their democratic commitments.
Question. There were reports that you supported arming Ukraine with
lethal weaponry during your time as Assistant Secretary, a position at
odds with key officials in the Obama administration. Do you remain
willing to disagree, when appropriate, with the administration to
ensure the best policies are put into place?
Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed, as I always have
been, to providing my best counsel in the formulation of administration
policy, even if that input is at odds with others. Once the President
and Secretary have decided on a policy, I will faithfully implement it
to the best of my ability. If confirmed, I would look forward to
working with Congress to continue providing the assistance that Ukraine
requires to defend itself against Russia's aggression, including lethal
weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraine's defense
requirements. This includes the provision of defensive lethal
assistance that has already expanded beyond Javelin missiles, such as
armed Mark VI patrol boats this year, for instance.
Question. In the number three spot in the State Department, how do
you propose the U.S. reinvigorates the Minsk process and the Normandy
Format to pressure Putin to withdraw from Eastern Ukraine? Though not a
member of the Normandy Format, what can the U.S. do to support Ukraine
and end the war that is in its 7th year?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
will remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our
allies and partners, will seek opportunities to leverage U.S.
engagement on Ukraine-Russia conflict diplomacy.
Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting Europe's
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a mandatory or
discretionary authority?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the
statute and is considering designations.
Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the
completion of Nord Stream 2, or is it inevitable?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working with allies and
partners to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to ensure that
Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that enhances, rather
than undermines, its collective security. The administration has made
clear that Nord Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Russian malign influence
project that is a threat to Europe's energy security. If confirmed, I
will ensure the Department continues work to bring an end to the
project.
Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power)
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations
with Congress?
Answer. In the spirit of our Transatlantic partnership, the
administration is prepared to listen to the concerns of our Allies.
That said, to the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If
confirmed, I will consult early and often with Congress on all
sanctions matters. The Department looks forward to continuing to
consult with Congress on this matter and others, and if confirmed I
would look forward to doing the same.
Question. Do you believe that the State Department should implement
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended,
consistent with congressional intent to stop the completion of the
pipeline? Do you commit to ensuring that the State Department adopts an
interpretation of PEESA, as amended, consistent with Congress' intent
that the sanctions target a broad range of pipe-laying activities,
support services, insurance and certification activities, and other
conduct that supports or facilitates the construction of the pipeline?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
The administration is thankful for the tools that Congress has provided
to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that
enhances rather than undermines its collective security. Furthermore,
the Department continues to work to bring an end to the pipeline, which
it views as a threat to European energy security and as a tool of
Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to
continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to determine the
applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. The five post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, or C5, have been
an afterthought in much of U.S. foreign policy. However, the region
sits between Russia and China and has often proven eager for U.S.
involvement and investment. Former Secretary Pompeo visited Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan in 2020, and USAID has recently expanded its presence in
the region. Over the past few years, the coordination between the
United States and EU on development programs in Central Asia has
markedly strengthened and both partners have published Central Asia
engagement strategies. Will you commit to ensuring that Central Asia is
a priority region for engagement by the State Department and to
continuing to coordinate the U.S.'s Central Asia engagement with the
EU?
Answer. Changes in Central Asia in the last several years have
created both new opportunities and new challenges. If confirmed, I will
work with the SCA bureau to continue to advance the U.S. Central Asia
Strategy by providing strong support for the independence and
territorial integrity of the Central Asia countries, encouraging
regional cooperation and connectivity, working to reduce terrorist
threats, and promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain
U.S. diplomatic support and engagement in the region, including the
continued routine contact between EU and U.S. officials overseeing
engagement with Central Asia.
Question. In your opinion, what are the immediate priority areas in
which the U.S. should engage these nations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the U.S. Central Asia
Strategy, which lays out six priority policy objectives, including
support for the independence and territorial integrity of the Central
Asia countries, reduction of terrorism, support for stability in
Afghanistan, encouraging regional cooperation and connectivity,
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and
furthering regional development. If confirmed, I would look forward to
working with Congress to sustain U.S. diplomatic support for these
priorities and engagement in the region
Question. 1Do you believe that the U.S. should continue to look at
the Central Asian nations through an Afghanistan-centric, ``War on
Terror'' lens?
Answer. While promoting regional security will remain critical, the
U.S. Central Asia Strategy lays out several priorities beyond
preventing terrorism. If confirmed, I will support these priorities,
including support for the independence and territorial integrity of the
Central Asia countries, regional cooperation and connectivity,
promoting rule of law reform and respect for human rights, and
fostering economic opportunities for U.S. businesses in the region. If
confirmed, I would look forward to working with Congress to sustain
U.S. diplomatic support for these priorities and engagement in the
region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. The Saudi regime's human rights abuses are well-
documented, and while Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman has tried to
present himself as a ``modernizer,'' his social reforms have been
accompanied by vast crackdowns on independent voices. He has imprisoned
women's rights activists, journalists, and academics, and of course
most infamously, our own intelligence services have assessed him to be
behind the brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi
in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. The administration is to be
applauded for taking the important steps of releasing the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) report confirming MBS's
complicity in the Khashoggi murder, adopting the ``Khashoggi Ban,'' and
applying sanctions to 76 Saudis behind Khashoggi's murder. But MBS was
not among those, and continues to face no direct consequences for his
role. If confirmed, what steps would you take to hold Crown Prince
Mohammed bin Salman accountable?
Answer. I agree that the Saudi Government must be held accountable
for the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, and I support the steps the
Biden-Harris administration has taken to elevate the role of human
rights within the relationship, address past behavior, and deter future
abuses. As you note, the administration followed the law and submitted
an unclassified report to Congress on the murder of Jamal Khashoggi;
imposed Global Magnitsky sanctions on a former senior Saudi official
and the group whose members were involved in the killing, which
includes members of the Presidential Guard close to the Crown Prince;
and took action pursuant to a new visa restriction policy against 76
Saudi individuals believed to have been engaged in threatening
dissidents overseas, including but not limited to the Khashoggi
killing. The Department has committed to report on any such
extraterritorial activities by any government in its annual Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices. If confirmed, I will push to ensure
that human rights concerns remain a central element of our bilateral
conversations, and that we obey all aspects of U.S. law in this regard.
Question. Since the fraudulent election last August, freedom of
expression has been under attack in Belarus. The U.S. has sanctioned
some entities and individuals over their roles in the election and the
subsequent crackdowns on protesters; yet, the question remains what
more the U.S. Government should do to signal its support for the
Belarusian people. If confirmed, what measures would you support to
hold the Lukashenko regime accountable and support the people of
Belarus in their fight for a democratic future?
Answer. I condemn the Lukashenko regime for its violent and
repressive tactics against the Belarusian people peacefully protesting
for the right to choose their own leaders. If confirmed, I will call
for the release of all political prisoners, new elections, and a
national dialogue inclusive of the opposition and civil society. I will
support coordinated actions with our allies on sanctions and visa bans
against individuals and entities involved in human rights abuses and
other efforts to undermine democracy. I am committed to finding ways to
bolster assistance to support brave Belarusians advocating for
democratic change and standing up for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.
Question. I applaud the Biden administration's new sanctions
designations against the Russian Federation for its malign activities
on American soil that undermine U.S. national security. I urge the
administration to now follow through with congressionally mandated
sanctions against Putin's Nord Stream 2 pipeline. This pipeline, if
completed, would further undermine U.S. national security by increasing
the Kremlin's influence in Europe, exacerbating divisions within
Europe, and stripping Ukraine of its only source of leverage over
greater Russian military activity at a time when Putin is substantially
increasing his military capabilities along Ukraine's Eastern border.
The Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA) impose mandatory
sanctions on all entities involved in pipe-laying activities for Nord
Stream 2. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring the imposition of
sanctions as required under PEESA and PEESCA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate using to all available tools
to stop the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. I understand that
the Department is actively examining entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity and will designate additional persons as
appropriate. If confirmed, I will use all tools, to include these
authorities as appropriate, to counter Russian malign influence and to
work with allies and partners to support Transatlantic energy security
goals.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. How would you characterize the nature of the Chinese
Communist Party? Do you believe their worldview and value system are
compatible with our own?
Answer. The Chinese Communist Party is illiberal, authoritarian,
and increasingly aggressive. I believe the Chinese leadership seeks not
just to compete with the U.S. but to change the global rules of road to
favor autocracy. As such, we are in a fundamental struggle with China,
and it will be the challenge of our generation to defend and advance
democracy, liberalism, universal human rights, and freedom in the face
of Chinese ambitions.
Question. Is there any doubt in your mind that the goal of the
Chinese Communist Party is to become the world's predominant political,
military, and economic power, and for the United States to decline in
relation to it?
Answer. I have no doubt that is China and the CCP's goal.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Government's past approach
towards the PRC was effective at meeting this challenge?
Answer. The strategic environment has changed significantly in
recent years, as has China itself. While there was once a broad
consensus that economic liberalization in China would lead to political
liberalization, the opposite has happened. China has grown more
authoritarian at home and more aggressive abroad. The Chinese Communist
Party is illiberal, authoritarian, and intends for China to become a
dominant world power. Beijing is working across the spectrum to compete
with and challenge the United States. This necessitates a new, tougher
U.S. approach, working with allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP can be trusted to uphold its
commitments? How do you think the United States' approach to diplomacy
with China should change because of its long record of broken promises
to the international community?
Answer. Beijing has a long track record of failing to honor its
international obligations, including in Hong Kong and around the world.
As such, the United States must judge Beijing by its actions, not its
words, and work with allies and partners to impose costs on China when
it violates international norms and agreements.
Question. In 2018, during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing,
you said that Beijing is adapting and improving on Russia's methodology
and is now running disinformation campaigns and influence operations in
Taiwan, Australia and other neighboring countries. Do you believe China
is doing the same in the U.S.?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Given this broad consensus around Confucius Institutes
and their role in supporting CCP propaganda, how do you believe the
United States should counter Chinese influence operations through
programs such as their Confucius Institutes?
Answer. A clear understanding of the organizations and entities
that China uses to attempt to influence U.S. policy is important. If
confirmed, I commit to review these policies to ensure organizations
are properly designated and inform relevant stakeholders within the
United States, including state and local governments, universities, and
business associations, as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how will the State Department under your
leadership push for transparency and accountability to ensure we learn
what caused the COVID-19 pandemic and how to prevent the next pandemic?
Do you commit to follow up on the Department's January 2021 disclosure
of new information on activities at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,
and share with Congress-and with the public as appropriate-further
details on those disclosures, including the names of the researchers
who fell sick in the fall of 2019 and the nature of the research they
were conducting at the time?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to pursuing transparency and
accountability as we seek to determine the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic, assess the shortcomings of the global response, and support
necessary reforms to prevent future pandemics. I will continue to urge
the WHO to ensure the second phase of the study in China is timely,
transparent, expert-led, and free from interference. We do not know and
cannot know the full origins of the virus and its spread until we have
full transparency from the PRC.
Question. Do you concur with Secretary Pompeo's and Secretary
Blinken's determination that genocide and crimes against humanity are
currently being committed by the CCP against Uyghurs and other Turkic
and Muslim communities in Xinjiang? If so, what are the appropriate
tools for holding the CCP and its officials accountable for its
atrocities?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These atrocities shock the conscience and
must be met with serious consequences. If confirmed, I will support
using all appropriate tools, including those provided for in the Uyghur
Human Rights Policy Act, to pressure the PRC to end these atrocities
and to promote justice and accountability for the victims.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights
concerns are integrated into every senior bilateral engagement with the
PRC, and that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels,
both publicly and privately?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that human rights concerns are
at the forefront of our China policy, and I will commit to integrate
our human rights concerns into senior bilateral engagements with PRC
counterparts. I recognize that advocacy on behalf of individuals who
have been abused by PRC authorities should be a critical component of
the U.S. Government's approach, and I will engage both publicly and
privately to urge the PRC authorities to release unjustly detained
individuals unconditionally, consistent with their international human
rights commitments.
Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious
human rights abuses and its failure on so many other fronts to be a
responsible global actor?
Answer. Yes. I am clear-eyed about China's failure to uphold key
past commitments, including on human rights, and ongoing abuses. I will
keep these failures in mind as I deal with my PRC counterparts. If
confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and partners to address
these challenges from a position of strength, re-engage in
international institutions, and push back against attempts to rewrite
the rules and procedures of the international system.
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the State Department
maintains a high degree of pressure on Beijing for its violations of
Hong Kong's long-cherished autonomy, and prioritizes this key issue
above all other competing interests in Hong Kong?
Answer. Yes. The United States must clearly address Beijing's
assault on freedom, democracy, and autonomy in Hong Kong, in violation
of its international obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I will
work with partners and allies to strengthen a coordinated approach to
the crackdown.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthening the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship, including support for the Taiwan Travel Act and
supporting and encouraging senior U.S officials to travel to Taiwan,
and senior Taiwanese officials to travel to D.C. to meet their
respective counterparts?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to maintaining and strengthening our
rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. We must deepen our ties with Taiwan--a
leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, as
guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and
the Six Assurances provided to Taipei. Consistent with the ``one
China'' policy, I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
looking for opportunities for visits between Washington and Taipei that
advance our unofficial relationship and enable substantive exchanges on
issues of mutual concern.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to a regular and robust
arms sales process with Taiwan that does not fluctuate in accordance
with U.S.-China relations?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure that the United States
continues to maintain its commitment under the 1979 Taiwan Relations
Act to maintain Taiwan's defensive capabilities.
Question. Japan's Deputy Foreign Minister recently called Taiwan
the ``red line'' of the Indo-Pacific region and expressed Japan's hope
that President Biden would come to Taiwan's defense if the PRC attacks
it. How would you work together with your counterpart in Tokyo to
enhance Taiwan's defense and prevent PRC aggression against it?
Answer. The United States and Japan share concerns over Chinese
activities that are inconsistent with the international rules-based
order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion, and
we oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the East
China Sea. Given Taiwan's strategic location in the East China Sea, its
security is closely linked to Japan's. If confirmed, I will work with
Japan to promote peace and stability in the region, including in the
Taiwan Strait, and help create an environment in which Taiwan and the
PRC can reach a peaceful resolution of their differences, consistent
with the wishes of the people of Taiwan.
Question. Do you believe we should have a bilateral Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with Taiwan? If confirmed, will you work with Secretary
Blinken to urge USTR to prioritize the launch of trade talks with
Taiwan?
Answer. I support strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan economic and trade
relationship as part of a broader effort to strengthen the U.S.
geostrategic position, diversify global supply chains, and benefit U.S.
industry.
Question. Mongolia sits between two authoritarian states, the PRC
and Russia, both of which have taken aggressive action against
neighboring countries. Mongolia also plays an important role in Tibetan
Buddhism. If confirmed, will you commit to strengthen U.S. relations
with Mongolia and shore up its sovereignty if it comes under pressure
from its revisionist neighbors? If President Biden follows through with
his campaign promise to assembly a summit of democracies, will you
ensure that Mongolia is invited to participate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with my counterparts in
Ulaanbaatar and will also push back against the attacks of the Chinese
Government on Mongolian language and culture, as well as Tibetan
Buddhism. I understand planning for the Summit for Democracy remains in
the early stages, and the invitation list is yet to be determined. I
understand participating countries will be expected to deliver on both
domestic and international commitments that advance democracy, fight
corruption, and protect human rights.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to ensure the
U.S. promotes free speech in Russia, including by protecting the
remaining outlets that count as free and independent press in Russia?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by Russia's intensifying crackdown on
freedom of expression, including for members of the media. A prime
example of the Russian Government's campaign against independent media
is the use of its ``foreign agent'' law to harass and inhibit the work
of USAGM-funded entities in Russia. Another example is the Russian
Government's targeting for repression of those who are seeking
transparency and accountability from their government. Russia's recent
legislative changes further restrict the freedom of expression for
members of the media, the political opposition, and civil society. If
confirmed, I will press the Russian Government to end its repression of
independent media, raise the plight of embattled journalists and
outlets in multilateral fora, call out the climate of impunity for
violent attacks against journalists, and defend freedom of expression
in Russia.
Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions,
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the
Kremlin's most malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These
sanctions are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy
Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Clarification Act (PEESCA). Will you commit, if confirmed, to using
your position to ensure full implementation of the law including
sanctions to prevent the completion of Nord Stream 2? Do you believe
this is in the interest of the security of the United States and our
allies and partners?
Answer. If confirmed, I will use all available tools to stop the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline from being completed. I understand that the
Department continues to examine entities involved in potentially
sanctionable activity, is considering designations, and has made it
clear that companies risk sanctions if they are involved in the
project.
Question. Do you agree that Iran is the world's leading exporter
and supporter of terrorism?
Answer. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Its
support for terrorism threatens international security, our forces,
diplomatic personnel, and partners in the region and elsewhere. If
confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris administration's continuing
commitment to counter any Iranian threat to U.S. personnel and
interests, and will respond to any such threat using all appropriate
means.
Question. The Biden administration is making clear its intention to
return to the fundamentally flawed JCPOA. Do you support the lifting of
sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions, against Iran in an
effort to return to the JCPOA?
Answer. The framework of U.S. sanctions remains robust, and there
are many aspects of our sanctions architecture that would remain in
place even in the event of a U.S. return to the JCPOA. I understand
that the Biden-Harris administration intends to continue to use its
considerable leverage--including sanctions that would remain in place,
the threat of sanctions re-imposition, and other joint action with our
allies and partners--to protect U.S. interests. In the meantime, I
understand the administration's intention is to maintain and
potentially impose new sanctions on Iranian entities providing
financial and material support to designated terrorist groups in the
region. If confirmed, I am committed to consulting closely with
Congress on the path forward.
Question. Secretary Blinken in his confirmation hearing was asked
if it was in America's national security interests to lift terrorism
sanctions against Iran, including sanctions on the IRGC, Central Bank
of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Company. He answered that it was
not in America's interest to lift these sanctions and that he backed
``the toughest possible sanctions to deal with Iranian support for
terrorism.'' Do you agree with Secretary Blinken?
Answer. Yes, I agree with Secretary Blinken. The U.S. Government
maintains a range of tools to combat Iran's support for terrorism, and
if confirmed, I support continuing to use these tools to counter Iran's
destabilizing activities.
Question. Do you acknowledge that there are gaps in the JCPOA that
must be addressed to truly stop Iran from ever acquiring a nuclear
weapon?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will support the Biden-Harris
administration's unshakable commitment to preventing Iran from
acquiring a nuclear weapon. The administration's intention is to build
on the JCPOA with respect to its constraints on and transparency into
Iran's nuclear program and to address other issues of concern.
Question. Do you believe that for any Iran policy to be
sustainable, it needs to have bipartisan support?
Answer. Yes. A bipartisan approach to Iran is the strongest way to
safeguard U.S. interests for the long term.
Question. Do you believe that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) is a terrorist organization?
Answer. Yes. Iran is the foremost state sponsor of terrorism and
facilitates a wide range of terrorist activity. Iran's support for
terrorism threatens U.S. forces, diplomatic personnel, and our partners
in the region and elsewhere. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in accordance
with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and as a
Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive Order 13224.
Question. Do you believe that a credible option to use military
force is an important component of U.S. policy to prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons and to deter Iran's regional ambitions?
Answer. Yes.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Rob Portman
Question. As you know, I am the Co-Chair of the Ukraine Caucus
along with Senator Dick Durbin. I am very concerned with the recent
buildup of Russian forces on the eastern border of Ukraine and on the
Crimean Peninsula as well as the recent rise in attacks on the Line of
Contact that has resulted in the death of over 20 brave Ukrainian
soldiers. Russia's diplomatic, information, military, and economic
aggression throughout Eastern Europe is a stark reminder of the danger
revisionist powers pose to the free world. Recent escalations and
displays of military strength in the Arctic, the basing of Russian
troops in Belarus, and the constant drumbeat of misinformation threaten
America's national security. Russia's actions constitute a very
different vision, where international relations are singularly focused
on Russian interests, where its neighbors play a subservient role to
Putin's wishes and desires. These actions by Russia are regressive and
incompatible with the aspirations of freedom loving people everywhere.
Senator Durbin and I recently led a letter with our fellow members of
the Caucus to President Biden expressing our appreciation for his
support to Ukraine and encouraging him to provide critical material
support in the near and long term to help Ukraine protect from this
unwarranted, unprovoked aggression. Over the past 7 years, we have made
great strides in our support of Ukraine. I personally feel this is
important because not only does this serve as a direct check against
the Russians, but also sends a strong signal to our European allies
that we will stand and support those nations that seek freedom and
democracy. We have done a great deal in Congress, to include:
Over $1.6 billion in military aid through the Ukraine Security
Assistance Initiative Fund and over $3 billion in aid overall.
Provided Island Class patrol boats and anti-ship missiles to defend
their coast
Lethal and non-lethal assistance to include medical support for
wounded Ukrainian soldiers.
In this recent NDAA, one of my initiatives was included to have a
Department of State and Defense report to identify capability
gaps in the Ukrainian military and develop a strategy to
address the shortfalls.
Can I get your commitment to work with me and my Senate Colleagues
to find ways to continue our support for Ukraine and other eastern
European countries as they work to become democratic countries aligned
with our Western ideals?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law and
economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's democratic institutions and
lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians. I will bring the same
commitment to reform to relations with other eastern European
countries, such as Moldova.
Question. Last year, Ukraine received Enhanced Opportunity Partner
status from NATO. Ukraine has also been working hard to make much
needed military organization and security sector reforms to meet NATO
standards. From your perspective, do you see pathway to NATO membership
for Ukraine, and how would that impact the security environment in
Eastern Europe?
Answer. NATO's Open Door Policy has long served to promote
democratic values and common security across Europe, and that door
should remain open to Ukraine. In the 2008 Bucharest Summit
Declaration, Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become NATO
members, and in 2019 Ukraine was granted Enhanced Opportunities Partner
status. Ukraine is now working to implement its Annual National Program
(ANP), which is NATO's primary tool for guiding aspirants' reforms
towards Euro-Atlantic standards. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's
chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of
law, economic, and security sector reforms.
Question. Since 2014 Congress has made very strong statements in
regards to sanctioning Russia for their invasion of Crimea and backing
separatists in the Donbas. While I am supportive of diplomatic efforts
to solve the Donbas issue through the Minsk Process, I do not want to
do so at the cost of Ukrainian sovereignty or acknowledging the Russian
annexation of Crimea as legitimate-which of course, it is not. What are
your thoughts on how to best support the peace process and what do you
see as a viable way ahead to solve this very complex issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to vigorously oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic
efforts to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia
should remain in place until Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and
aggression in eastern Ukraine. I will continue to support the Minsk
agreements as the framework for a diplomatic resolution to the Russia-
instigated conflict in eastern Ukraine and, in coordination with our
Allies and partners, seek opportunities to use U.S. leverage to see
Minsk implemented.
Question. Regarding Crimea, do you share my views on the
illegitimacy of the Russian claims on what is Ukrainian land? Do you
anticipate keeping the sanctions in place?
Answer. Let me be perfectly clear: Crimea is Ukraine. If confirmed,
I will continue to oppose vigorously Russia's occupation and attempted
annexation of Crimea and support diplomatic efforts to end the conflict
in eastern Ukraine. Sanctions on Russia must remain in place until
Russia ends its occupation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine.
Successive administrations have been clear that the United States will
never recognize Russia's attempted annexation. Russia must end its
occupation of Crimea and return the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine.
Question. Combatting corruption has been a central tenant of the
Ukrainian Government after the Revolution of Dignity. In opinion polls
of the Ukrainian public, respondents consistently rank corruption as
top concern along with Russia. However, after the March 2020 government
reshuffling, the future of anti-corruption measures have been
uncertain. How can the United States utilize the tools of the State
Department and interagency to assist Ukraine in tackling corruption?
Answer. I am committed to strengthening our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will pursue tight interagency
coordination to support Ukraine's chosen Euro-Atlantic path, including
by pushing for progress on rule of law, corruption and economic reforms
that strengthen Ukraine's institutions and lead to a brighter future
for all Ukrainians. If confirmed, I will continue working with Ukraine
to hold accountable those who stand in the way of reforms or try to
undermine the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Advancing reforms, particularly anticorruption efforts, is just as
important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.
Question. Senator Chris Murphy and I have worked very closely over
the last 4 years to strengthen the Global Engagement Center and through
our efforts have gotten increased funding and personnel for the Center.
Senator Murphy and I recently sent a letter to Secretary Blinken asking
that he increase the funding for the GEC to at least $138 million. The
GEC budget was flatlined last year at $60 million and I am concerned
that the Department will not request robust funding this year. I hope
that when you are confirmed you will see the value of the GEC and fund
it properly to accomplish its critical mission of pushing back against
Russian and Chinese disinformation. We have done too much work on a
bipartisan basis to allow the GEC to not reach its full potential.
Secretary Blinken kept the former director Lea Gabrielle on for a
month, and I really appreciated that. Now there has been a gap in
leadership at the GEC and I hope that when confirmed you will work the
Secretary to bring on a new director quickly. I feel that the
disinformation efforts led by China, Russia, and Iran are a very
dangerous threat to the freedom and democracy of our allies and we
should do all we can to support and help them.
Can I get your commitment to work with Senator Murphy and me to
continue strengthening the capabilities of the GEC as well as
increased funding?
Answer. Yes, you have my commitment, if confirmed, to work with you
and your colleagues, as well as the Under Secretary for Public
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, to continue strengthening the Global
Engagement Center (GEC) and our full range of public diplomacy
programs. The GEC's efforts are an important part of the work we must
undertake with allies and partners to counter disinformation, define an
affirmative and democratic global information space, and ultimately
sustain an information environment in which audiences around the world
can freely access, contribute to, make informed judgments about, and
trust transparent and truthful communication.
Question. Recently, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that the
Office of the Prosecutor could proceed with an illegitimate
investigation into alleged crimes occurring in the West Bank, Gaza, and
East Jerusalem. As you are aware, both the United States nor Israel are
signatories to the Rome Statute, and the ICC is ignoring its mandate
that stipulates it only initiate a case where there is the absence of a
robust legal and justice system. Neither the United States nor Israel
fit this criteria, yet the ICC has decided to proceed with this
politically motivated investigation anyway. Senator Cardin and I wrote
a letter to Secretary Blinken signed by over 30 Senators commending him
on coming out against this statement by the ICC and encouraging him to
do everything he can to push back against this effort. We have also
authored language together that was included in the Trade Promotion
Authority (TPA) law of 2015, which leverages ongoing trade negotiations
to discourage prospective U.S. trade partners from engaging in economic
discrimination against Israel. Governments that call upon their own
companies to participate in a political boycott of Israel run afoul of
clear guidelines in the law.
On the ICC issue and BDS in general--will you work with me and
Congress to push back against efforts to marginalize and
discriminate against Israel?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to push back
against efforts to marginalize and discriminate against Israel,
including the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanction (BDS) campaign, which
unfairly singles out Israel. While the Biden-Harris administration will
respect First Amendment rights, I understand that it will not hesitate
to voice disapproval of the BDS campaign or to fight efforts to
delegitimize Israel on the world stage. If confirmed, I will also
support the administration's continued objection to the International
Criminal Court's efforts to assert jurisdiction over Israeli personnel.
Question. For the last six years, I was the Chairman of the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. During that time, I worked in
a bipartisan way to uncover the ways China exerts its influence here in
the United States. We held several hearings issued bipartisan reports
that documented how China stifles speech and academic freedom on
college campus through its Confucius Institutes, and how it uses talent
recruitment programs (like the Thousand Talents Plan) to steal our
taxpayer funded research and Intellectual Property. Based on those
findings, we proposed legislative fixes to these issues and I look
forward to working with you on them. Last Congress, I introduced the
Safeguarding American Innovation Act alongside Senator Carper and group
of 19 bipartisan senators (including Chairman Risch) to combat the
theft of American taxpayer funded research and intellectual property.
Recently, both FBI Director Wray and Attorney General Barr have spoken
about this threat, with the FBI opening a new China-related
investigation every 10 hours with around 2,500 open counterintelligence
investigations across the country. This legislation is designed to get
the federal government's house in order to respond to the threat of
China's talent recruitment programs. It also ensures that individuals
are held accountable for failing to disclose their foreign ties on
federal grant applications. Reforms the State Department's vetting
process for issuing visas to foreign researchers, and requires more
safeguards on sensitive research from our research institutions. One
particular section of the legislation would grant the State Department
a new authority to deny visas to individuals we know are coming to the
United States to steal our research and IP through loopholes in our
export control laws. This an authority that career attorneys at the
Department have requested across multiple administrations. And we
worked closely with those same career attorneys at the State Department
to craft the language in our legislation, including with safeguards to
ensure that the new authority is not abused.
Do you agree that government sponsored theft of US intellectual
property and technology by the CCP is a serious problem that
needs to be addressed?
Answer. Yes. Theft of U.S. intellectual property (IP) from sources
within China, including state sponsored entities, spans the entire
spectrum of IP, and costs U.S. companies hundreds of millions of
dollars a year. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners
and allies to ensure we are taking the most effective steps to combat
all forms of IP theft from the PRC.
Question. I understand that as of last week the administration has
entered indirect negotiations with Iran to discuss a return to the 2015
JCPOA. Last month I signed a letter with the other GOP ranking members
of national security committees outlining our shared vision for a
return to new negotiations. While I understand the need to prioritize
the nuclear aspect of the Iranian threat to the region, Iran's support
for terror proxies must be addressed in these negotiations. Their
support for Hezbollah, Shia-backed militias in Iraq, and the Houthi
rebels in Yemen are destabilizing the region with innocent civilians
paying the highest price. As we witnessed with the previous JCPOA, the
money earned through sanctions relief went not to the Iranian people
but directly to support terrorism beyond Iran's borders.
What is your assessment of the threat posed by Iranian backed proxy
networks, and how will you balance that assessment with the
need to contain Iran's nuclear program and their conventional
ballistic missile program?
Answer. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic missiles,
as well as its support for violent proxies and groups across the
region, pose a threat to international security, and remain significant
challenges. If confirmed, I commit to work on all aspects of the Iran
threat, including its nuclear program, its missile program, and its
support for extremist groups across the region.
Question. The Abraham Accords were an historic achievement that
will lead to a new era of peace and prosperity between Israel and its
neighbors. Last month, I introduced legislation with Senator's Booker,
Cardin, Young, Risch, and Kaine that would strengthen and expand these
normalization agreements. This legislation requires the Department of
State to develop a comprehensive strategy to expand these agreements,
as well as require the State to report on Arab countries anti-
normalization laws which punish community and people to people
engagement with Israelis
Do I have your commitment to expand and strengthen the Abraham
Accords while using all tools at your disposal to push back on
the barriers that still prevent the normalization of Israel in
the region?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to urge other countries to
normalize relations with Israel and support other opportunities to
expand cooperation among countries in the region.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Todd Young
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take or oversee to
enhance the level of our diplomacy in Afghanistan and to help ensure
that basic human rights--such as the ability of girls to go to school--
are preserved?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the U.S. stays actively
engaged in supporting the peace process, economic development, and
promoting human rights, women's rights, and girls' education in
Afghanistan, consistent with U.S. policy and values. The results of
U.S. investment in the social and economic development of Afghanistan
over the past 20 years have been significant, particularly with regards
to access to education. In 2001, fewer than 900,000 children--almost
all boys--were in school. Today, more than 9.2 million children--40
percent of them girls--are in school. Through robust diplomacy and
coordinated assistance, I will work to see these gains further advanced
and strengthened.
Question. Pakistan, India, and Iran have different views on what
the future of Afghanistan should look like. How should the U.S. engage
with those in the region on the path forward for Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to put the full weight of our
government behind diplomatic efforts to reach a peace agreement between
the Afghan Government and the Taliban. All of Afghanistan's neighbors
share an interest in a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that can serve
as an effective partner in combating terrorism, criminal networks, and
narcotics trafficking. I would welcome diplomatic efforts by all
countries to encourage the negotiating parties to accelerate the peace
process though meaningful negotiations. I would also welcome the U.N.
playing a constructive role as a convener and facilitator of
discussions. Additionally, I recognize that peace, regional
connectivity, and economic growth and development are mutually
supportive and indispensable to each other. If confirmed, I will
encourage regional and international partners to commit to greater
cooperation with Afghanistan in support of regional security and
economic growth.
Question. India has moved closer to the United States and the Quad
in recent years and away from their traditional ``non-alignment
posture.'' They have adopted something they've termed ``strategic
autonomy.'' This is clearly a nuanced shift but a shift nonetheless. As
the only Quad member that shares a land border with China, and as a
place where fighting between China and India has occurred, they are
undoubtedly an important partner. How will you help the U.S. to pursue
closer relations with India?
Answer. The United States and India share a comprehensive global
strategic partnership. The recent Quad leaders' summit marked a new
milestone for our collaboration to address a range of security,
economic and governance challenges across the Indo-Pacific. Our two
nations also enjoy a robust defense and security partnership as
evidenced by Defense Secretary Austin's recent visit. If confirmed, I
will strive to work with my Indian counterparts to further strengthen
our partnership, including our defense and economic cooperation, COVID-
19 response, and climate change.
Question. On February 11th Secretary Blinken revoked the Foreign
Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global Terrorist
designations of the Houthis, while retaining the designations of five
Houthi individuals as Specially Designated Nationals. I supported this
call because of what that designation would have meant for the
humanitarian situation on the ground as it would have likely led to a
famine and further devastated those on the ground. However, despite
these steps, fighting in Yemen has intensified, and Houthi forces have
been emboldened and have advanced on the city of Marib, the last
northern city controlled by the internationally-recognized Republic of
Yemen Government. I am glad to have a trusted hand with Tim Lenderking
serving as Special Envoy but the situation seems increasingly grim.
Should the United States do more to counter Iranian weapons smuggling
to the Houthis and protect Saudi territory from Houthi missile strikes?
If so, how?
Answer. I understand that the Department has been working closely
with interagency partners to disrupt the Iranian threat network and the
smuggling that occurs over land and via sea routes. It is also
essential that the U.S. continues to support the Republic of Yemen
Government (ROYG) Coast Guard and Border Guard with non-lethal training
so they can police their own borders. The Export Control and Related
Border Security program builds the capacity of the ROYG to interdict
the illicit transfers of arms and mitigate Iran's malign influence. If
confirmed, I would support continued work with Saudi Arabia to bolster
its defenses against various Houthi capabilities. These efforts will
prevent the Houthis from gaining access to further advanced
capabilities, and also encourage all parties to reach a ceasefire
agreement and subsequently end the war.
Question. What potential incentives can the international community
provide the warring parties to reach an immediate cease-fire?
Answer. A ceasefire is just one step in an overall peace process.
For a ceasefire to be durable, the warring parties must believe it is
in their interest. Toward that end, internationally facilitated
incentives should include: a roadmap to an inclusive resolution of the
conflict that addresses political grievances, accountability for human
rights violations, future reconstruction assistance, and the removal of
economic restrictions in support of engagement in negotiations. I
understand that Special Envoy Lenderking continues to work in support
of U.N. Special Envoy Griffiths' efforts and with the Republic of Yemen
Government and Saudi Arabia, with the support of the Sultanate of Oman,
and with our European partners, to align these incentives and bring
about an end to the conflict. However, I also understand that the
Houthis appear intent on continuing their offensive on the city Marib
and have been resistant to negotiating the terms of a durable
ceasefire. We need more pressure from the international community, to
include the U.N., our European partners, and Oman, to encourage the
Houthis to engage constructively with the U.N. and other parties if we
hope to end the conflict. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting
those efforts.
Question. How can the United States influence local actors to
create an agreed-upon political framework that maintains national unity
while addressing regional concerns?
Answer. The United States must remain committed to a unified,
stable Yemen that contributes to wider regional security and economic
cooperation. As the conflict continues, the country becomes
increasingly fragmented, and local stakeholders will expect to maintain
their new-found autonomy in a post-conflict setting. The buy-in of
these local stakeholders will be critical for any future political
settlement, and ultimately the long-term stability of Yemen. The future
of the Yemeni state is for Yemenis to determine. I understand that
Special Envoy Lenderking is working in lockstep with U.N. Special Envoy
Griffiths to achieve a ceasefire so we can transition to an intra-
Yemeni political process that is representative and can be sustained
over the long-term.
Question. There have been reports regarding the appointment of a
special envoy for Nord Stream 2. Presumably, such a position would
coordinate with U.S. partners and allies the imposition of additional,
mandatory sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, as required under
the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and the Protecting
Europe's Energy Security Clarification Act (PEESCA). It would not be,
in my view, to negotiate a deal that allows the Russian pipeline to be
completed. If confirmed, would you support the appointment of a special
envoy to ensure full implementation of U.S. sanctions laws and make
sure Nord Stream 2 is never finished?
Answer. Should the U.S. decide to appoint a Special Envoy for Nord
Stream 2, I believe that person's task should be to coordinate and
advance increased U.S. pressure consistent with U.S. law to stop the
pipeline before it is finished, and to work with European allies toward
the same goal.
Question. The Biden administration's new Russia sanctions,
announced on April 15, did not include any sanctions against the
Kremlin's malign geopolitical project, Nord Stream 2. These sanctions
are statutorily required under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security
Act (PEESA) and the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Clarification
Act (PEESCA). In your view, why did the Biden administration fail to
sanction Nord Stream 2?
Answer. Without being inside the Biden-Harris administration, I
can't speak to why certain decisions were or were not made. I
understand that the Department continues to actively examine entities
involved in potentially sanctionable activity and will designate
additional persons as appropriate. If confirmed, I commit to use all
available tools to try to stop the pipeline before it is completed.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the administration
to implement U.S. sanctions laws on the Kremlin's Nord Stream 2
pipeline?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to use all available tools,
including bipartisan legislation passed in the NDAA, to try to stop the
pipeline before it is completed, and to engage with key European
partners and allies to seek their support in that goal.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. What role do you see for the State Department in
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim,
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools,
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability
for those responsible and justice for victims.
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?
Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights,
Israel's security must remain paramount. As long as Bashar al-Assad is
in control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part
with the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.
Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
any part of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and at the same time,
it is central to the national visions of both Israelis and
Palestinians. I support the USG's longstanding position that Jerusalem
is a final status issue to be resolved through direct negotiations
between Israel and the Palestinians. As such, all issues related to
Jerusalem must be handled with care and sensitivity.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad''
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group.
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid,
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in
Yemen.
Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training,
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping through the Bab Al
Mandeb. Further, the Houthis use this support to threaten Yemeni
civilians, especially at this time in the city of Marib. The Houthis
also impede humanitarian access in the areas they control. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with our interagency partners to
counter Iran's destabilizing activities, and with our partners on the
ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision of
critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
The Biden-Harris administration heeded concerns from the United
Nations, humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among
others, that the designations could have had a devastating impact on
Yemenis' access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could
increase the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the
designations and the revocations limited the impact the designations
could have had on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports,
including food and other essential supplies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food,
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non
food items, such as blankets and water containers.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.
Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will be vocal about
Iran's human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary or
unlawful detention of numerous individuals, some of whom have faced
torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
and execution after unfair trials. If confirmed, I intend to work with
my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to promote
accountability for those responsible for human rights violations and
abuses.
Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related
concessions.
Answer. I believe we can and must work to ensure Iran never obtains
a nuclear weapon, at the same time we continue to pressure Iran
regarding its gross human rights violations and abuses, and use all
tools at our disposal to promote accountability for those responsible.
Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians their human rights,
including through severe restrictions on the rights to peaceful
assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or belief, and
freedom of expression. I support continuing to maintain and impose
sanctions on Iranian entities perpetrating human rights violations and
abuse.
Question. Russia and Germany appear to have assessed that the Biden
administration will not respond forcefully to their effort to complete
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Can you please describe your assessment of
the damage to American national security and to the energy security of
our European allies, if Nord Stream 2 was completed?
Answer. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline deepens Europe's energy
dependence on Russia, threatening European energy security and the
security of Ukraine and Central and Eastern European NATO and EU
countries, while dividing the continent. It enriches the Kremlin and
President Putin's allies at a time when Russia is amassing forces in
and around Ukraine and continuing its cyber and disinformation
campaigns in the U.S. and globally, among other malign activities.
Question. Could you please describe what steps you would take, if
you're confirmed, to ensure that Nord Stream 2 is stopped?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with allies and
partners, using all the tools at our disposal, including legislation
you have authored, to prevent the completion of the pipeline and to
ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply that
enhances rather than undermines its collective security.
Question. There have been public reports that the State Department
is considering the appointment of an envoy to specifically oversee the
State Department's efforts around Nord Stream 2. Additional reports
suggest that foreign diplomats have expressed hope that the envoy will
work for a deal with the Russians or Germans to allow the pipeline to
be completed, or at least serve as a short-term substitute for
sanctions. The State Department should absolutely spare no effort or
resource in blocking Nord Stream 2, and an envoy position would help
mobilize action in that regard--but the envoy must be someone who
ensures and oversees the immediate application of congressionally
mandated sanctions and makes sure Nord Stream 2 is never completed.
Appointing an envoy who negotiated terms for completing Nord Stream 2
would be an absolutely unacceptable outcome. This envoy must not be a
substitute for sanctions: it must be someone who immediately delivers
them. Do you intend to seek the appointment of an envoy who would work
on Nord Stream 2 specifically?
Answer. I understand the Biden-Harris administration is considering
appointing an envoy to work on Nord Stream 2 and other issues.
Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could help give focus
and energy to the interagency effort to stop the pipeline, and to
diplomacy with key countries.
Question. What responsibilities would such an envoy have?
Answer. I have not been privy to any formal position description if
it exists. If named, the envoy, I presume, would work inside the U.S.
Government to accelerate and sharpen policy and sanctions options and
diplomatically to stop the pipeline, using all available tools,
including the legislation you authored.
Question. What role do you envision such an envoy playing?
Answer. Particularly until a new Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs is confirmed, I believe an envoy could
help give focus and energy to the interagency effort to stop the
pipeline, and to diplomacy with key countries.
Question. The administration regards rejoining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or signing a successor agreement a
top priority. The JCPOA was classified by the Obama administration as
merely ``political commitments'' rather than an executive agreement or
a treaty. In your hearing you noted the importance of securing
``bipartisan support [for rejoining the JCPOA or singing a successor
agreement] so an agreement is binding.'' Is it your understanding that
any form of international agreement between the United States and
foreign nations does not hold any legally binding commitment unless
Congress ratifies the agreement as a treaty and passes legislation
implementing those commitments?
Answer. I share President Biden's conviction that a bipartisan
approach to Iran is the strongest way to safeguard U.S. interests for
the long term. The JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in
2015. Numerous other important international arrangements have been
done in this way. With respect to international agreements, the Supreme
Court has long held that not all such agreements require approval as
treaties pursuant to the procedures set out in Article II of the
Constitution, and the Congress has recognized this through the
enactment of the Case-Zablocki Act, which establishes procedures
regarding oversight of legally binding international agreements other
than treaties.
Question. Can you commit that, if the administration plans to
rejoin the JCPOA or signs any successor agreement, such agreement will
be submitted by the administration to Congress for ratification as a
treaty?
Answer. I understand that President Biden has pledged to work
closely with Congress, and this includes briefing on any plans
regarding his administration's future course of action on Iran. The
JCPOA was negotiated as a non-binding arrangement in 2015. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department carefully considers the facts
and circumstances of any U.S. return to the JCPOA to determine the
implications under INARA and would also assess the appropriate form of
any future agreement. The Biden-Harris administration has committed to
ensuring that the requirements of INARA are satisfied.
Question. The administration continues to emphasize working and
coordinating with ``allies and partners,'' especially in the context of
multilateral forums and in addressing major security challenges of our
time such as the rise of authoritarian China and the threat of a
nuclear Iran. In your view, do the alliances and partnerships of the
United States with other nations always produce a net-positive benefit
to U.S. foreign policy and homeland defense priorities?
Answer. I believe that alliances and partnerships serve as a force-
multiplier for the United States in advancing its foreign policy and
homeland defense priorities. While we must always maintain our
prerogative to operate unilaterally if it is in our national interest,
working with allies and partners to address shared challenges often
achieves the best outcomes for the United States. Some of the most
significant threats we face today--from the COVID-19 pandemic to
climate change--cannot be solved by one country alone. Our ability to
shape the behaviors of China, Iran, or others with whom we have serious
concerns will only be strengthened with likeminded partners by our
side.
Question. In situations where our allies and partners take a
differing or less stringent approach to a major foreign policy or
homeland defense priority, in your view is it appropriate for the
United States to exercise unilateral leadership? In your response,
please address the example of differing postures toward China between
the United States and the European Union.
Answer. The United States should work with its Allies and partners
whenever it can but should always reserve the right to act unilaterally
if and when necessary. While European views on China have evolved, the
U.S. remains more cautious about the challenges and threats China poses
to our security, economic interests and global norms and standards. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to discuss China with Europeans
both at NATO and in the U.S.-EU China Dialogue to align positions more
closely.
Question. Do you believe burden sharing in both monetary costs and
international commitments between the U.S. and our allies and partners
must be addressed before re-engaging or forming new multilateral
treaties or forums?
Answer. I believe in appropriate burden-sharing with allies and
partners in all shared endeavors and international commitments. The
U.S. should have full knowledge of the monetary and other consequences
before entering into any international commitments, whether through a
treaty or other means. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to
ensure that the implications of any such commitments are well
understood by both branches of the Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Victoria Nuland by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. Do you agree with the State Department's determination
that CCP-controlled China is committing genocide and crimes against
humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang? Secretary of State
Antony Blinken has sustained former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's
determination that CCP-controlled China is engaging in genocide and
crimes against humanity with respect to Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada have stated the
evidence--including from satellite imagery, and eyewitness testimony,
as well as the Chinese Government's own documents--is overwhelming.
China's extensive program of repression includes severe restrictions on
religious freedoms, the used of forced labor, mass detention in
internment camps, forced sterilization, and the destruction of Uyghur
heritage.
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. In your view, should U.S.-based corporations remain
silent on the issue of genocide and crimes against humanity in CCP-
controlled China?
Answer. No. Uyghurs have suffered unspeakable oppression at the
hands of China's authoritarian government. The People's Republic of
China is engaged in gross human rights violations that shock the
conscience and must be met with serious consequences. The United States
must speak out consistently and jointly with allies and partners,
impose costs and sanctions on those responsible, and help those
persecuted find safe haven in the United States and other countries. I
have been heartened by bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and,
if confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on this crucial
issue.
Question. If you are confirmed, how will you support the State
Department's efforts to compel U.S.-based corporations that conduct
substantial business in China to pitch in to immediately stop genocide
and crimes against humanity in CCP-controlled China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts by the U.S.
Department of State, along with the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to caution businesses about the risks of supply chain links to
entities that engage in human rights abuses, including forced labor, in
the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang) and elsewhere in
China. I will also support sanctions imposed on people and
organizations complicit in genocide and crimes against humanity against
Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, in Xinjiang. I am heartened by
bipartisan Congressional action on Xinjiang and, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress on this crucial issue.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. How will the State Department invest more resources into
protecting fundamental human rights? How will the State Department help
protect civic space around the world to ensure local human rights
activists, peacebuilders, and humanitarians, particularly women and
youth, have the space and resources to prevent violence and promote
sustainable peace?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to consult closely with Department,
interagency, and Congressional colleagues to ensure we have systems in
place that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I
will also work with bureaus and offices that administer democracy
programs to capitalize on emerging opportunities, including by pivoting
quickly to support programs tailored for these situations. In all
cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower democratic reformers
and activists on the ground. In addition, I intend to work bilaterally
and multilaterally with U.S. allies and partners to increase mutually
reinforcing efforts and burden-sharing in these areas.
Question. How will you increase support for members of civil
society that champion the full inclusion of disabled persons and
expansion of disability rights?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support timely appointment of a Senior
Advisor or Special Envoy for International Disability Rights and
prioritize disability-inclusive programming that recognizes persons
with disabilities among the beneficiaries, supports projects to address
gaps in their inclusion, and bolsters the work done by civil society to
advance the rights of disabled persons. I also will support the full
inclusion of persons with disabilities through Department of State
training, data collection, programming, and communication about
disability rights. An empowered and knowledgeable workforce can best
support members of civil society championing the full inclusion of
disabled persons and expansion of disability rights.
Question. How will the Biden administration right-size and
rebalance what many experts believe are over-militarized interventions
to address violent extremism? What steps can you take in this role to
restore a more balanced approach to prevention and countering violent
extremism?
Answer. Military forces and kinetic tools have played an important
role in U.S. and international counterterrorism efforts, but it is
clear that balanced, sustainable, whole-of-government and whole-of-
society approaches are needed to sustainably defeat terrorism and
prevent terrorist radicalization and recruitment. If confirmed, I will
promote civilian-led counterterrorism approaches that address
underlying grievances that fuel violent extremism and reduce the need
for military interventions. I will also work to ensure that U.S.
countering violent extremism (CVE) programs--especially prevention
work--are prioritized and adequately resourced, and that all U.S.
counterterrorism efforts advance the rule of law and respect for human
rights.
Question. The J Under Secretary and the bureaus he or she oversees
can find themselves disadvantaged when working with the regional
bureaus during the policy-making process. Do you agree that this is a
challenge and, if so, how would you empower the bureaus under you?
Answer. I agree that siloing between regional and functional
bureaus is a long-standing challenge for State Department policymaking.
If confirmed, I would leverage my 27-plus years of service in four
regional and three functional bureaus to elevate and achieve better
integration of J family issues in the full spectrum of U.S.
policymaking, including through improved coordination within the State
Department, the interagency, and with the 270-plus U.S. diplomatic
missions worldwide. I would elevate the voice and expertise of J family
bureaus and office by taking a burden-sharing approach with regional
and other functional bureaus on addressing challenges that know no
borders--from corruption and narcotics to rising autocracy and
extremism worldwide.
Question. What steps would you take to attract more individuals -
particularly from the Foreign Service - to work in the J family
bureaus?
Answer. If confirmed, I will create an inclusive environment that
is welcoming to all employees--both foreign and civil service--and of
all races, ethnicities, and backgrounds, because diverse teams make
strong teams. I will work collaboratively with the new Chief Diversity
and Inclusion Officer and the Bureau of Global Talent Management to
ensure that J family bureaus and offices are appropriately staffed and
attractive to all applicants. I also will focus on retention and
advancing a more meaningful professional development and advancement
path for all J family team members. This includes increasing training
opportunities for all and advocacy for J family Foreign Service
Officers in the DCM and Chief of Mission selection processes.
Question. Given President Biden and Secretary Blinken's strong
emphasis on re-centering human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign
policy, do you believe any changes should be made to the Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor bureau to ensure that it can effectively play a
much larger role in U.S. foreign policy than it has in the past?
Answer. Democracy and human rights are under increasing threat
globally from democratic backsliding and growing authoritarianism.
Responding effectively to these challenges requires more than any one
bureau or agency acting alone; it requires a whole-of-government
approach. If confirmed, I intend to empower the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor while also working with partners across the
Department, other U.S. agencies, and Congress to bolster democratic
resilience and promote, protect, and defend human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
Question. How do you think the U.S. arms transfer process should
change to better incorporate human rights and civilian harm concerns,
and what changes would you advocate for as Under Secretary?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have said human rights
must be at the center of our foreign policy, including arms transfers
and other security assistance. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
human rights remains key to reviews of potential Foreign Military Sales
and State Department-licensed Direct Commercial Sales. If confirmed, I
will encourage the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's
continued participation in arms transfer deliberations. I understand
the administration has been clear that the United States will insist on
adherence to agreements on the use of U.S.-origin defense equipment,
compliance with international law, including the law of armed conflict,
and respect for human rights, and it will consider appropriate
consequences when violations occur.
Question. Do you agree that the U.S. Government should refrain from
exporting arms to fragile states or countries at risk of atrocities?
Answer. I understand that, consistent with the Conventional Arms
Transfer (CAT) Policy, all arms transfers are subject to comprehensive
case-by-case considerations of U.S. interests - including any risk the
transfer may contribute to human rights abuses, including acts of
gender-based violence, violence against children, violations of
international law, including the law of armed conflict, terrorism, mass
atrocities, or transnational organized crime. If confirmed, I will work
to ensure human rights remains a key focus of CAT policy documents and
discussions, and I will promote measures for the mitigation of harm to
civilians.
Question. What specific actions will the State Department take
under your direction to reassert U.S. peacebuilding and humanitarian
leadership and intervention in Syria?
Answer. I fully expect the United States will continue to be a
leader in the Syria humanitarian response. On March 29, Secretary
Blinken called on the UN Security Council to reauthorize all three
international border crossings for humanitarian assistance. If
confirmed, I will support efforts to increase multilateral diplomatic
engagement at the Security Council and will be in close consultations
with our allies, in addition to Russia and China, at the UN to find a
formula that keeps humanitarian aid flowing. I understand the
administration supports the UN-facilitated, Syrian-led process laid out
within the parameters of UNSCR 2254. If confirmed, I will use a variety
of tools to push for a sustainable end to the conflict to end the
Syrian people's suffering and to bring stability, accountability, and
security to the Syrian people.
Question. How specifically will the United States ensure continued
principled humanitarian access into and within Syria?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with partners across the U.S.
Government to use a range of tools, including diplomacy, advocacy,
multilateral and bilateral engagement with other donors, information-
sharing, and financial support, to promote the delivery of humanitarian
assistance to those most in need across Syria, whether in areas
controlled by the Syrian Government or elsewhere. If confirmed, I
intend to do everything I can to realize Secretary Blinken's call to
the UN Security Council on March 29 to reauthorize all three border
crossings for humanitarian assistance and to urge the international
community to allow humanitarian agencies to use the safest, quickest
pathway to reach civilians in need.
Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all
but one of the special coordinators for Tibetan issues have been an
individual who served as Undersecretary for Civilian Security,
Democracy and Human Rights. If you are designated as the US Special
Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, will you commit to promoting
substantive dialogue without pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and
the Chinese Government that leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet,
as mandated by the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work intensively with U.S. allies and partners
to press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or
his representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful
autonomy for Tibetans.
Question. The Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to
face significant challenges following last fall's attack by Azerbaijan.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has provided
some funding to address this humanitarian situation, but I believe a
lot more needs to be done. If confirmed, what will be your plan of
action for providing needed assistance to Armenians from Nagorno-
Karabakh, including those displaced to Armenia, in both the short and
long term?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure continued support to address
the humanitarian situation of persons displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. I understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration closely monitors and assesses the situation on the ground
with the support of relevant embassies and humanitarian organizations.
I understand the administration is deeply committed to working on
lasting solutions for all those displaced by the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, including persons now in Armenia. If confirmed, I will
support the administration's efforts to seek short-term and long-term
solutions to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict.
Question. What do you view as PRM's role in responding to the
situation versus the role of other U.S. Government agencies and
offices, such as USAID?
Answer. Pursuant to the legislative authorities of each, I
understand the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) has
lead responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance, protection,
and solutions for refugees, asylum seekers, migrants in situations of
vulnerability, and stateless persons, while USAID's Bureau of
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) leads in response to natural and man-made
disasters, for internally displaced persons, and providing emergency
food assistance to refugees. If confirmed, I intend to ensure
complementary efforts that utilize the strengths of the humanitarian
expertise of both PRM at State and USAID/BHA.
Question. The United States continues to suffer the devastating
impact of our nation's opioid epidemic, with over 90,000 deaths in
2020, a large portion of which are caused by fentanyl overdoses. China
continues to be the largest source of illicit fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors. How will you prioritize combatting the illicit fentanyl
trade and what diplomatic tools will you use to ensure that countries
around the world, including China, take steps to place greater controls
on fentanyl and fentanyl precursors?
Answer. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) manufacture the
vast majority of the illicit fentanyl driving the opioid crisis using
People's Republic of China (PRC)-sourced chemicals, and traffic the
fentanyl into the United States via the southwest border. If confirmed,
I intend to continue and strengthen the Department's diplomatic efforts
to press the PRC to better regulate its chemical industry to prevent
chemical diversion, including through targeted engagement on this issue
in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. I also intend to continue
efforts to work with Mexico to bring justice to TCOs that contribute to
the deaths of thousands of Americans Mexicans each year.
Question. Last year, a United Nations fact-finding mission cited
evidence of a systematic campaign of extrajudicial killings, forced
disappearances, and torture in Venezuela since 2014. According to the
report, the Maduro regime's human rights abuses and torture constitute
crimes against humanity. How will you use the tools available to you,
including oversight for the various bureaus that have equities in this
issue, to ensure accountability for and prevent further crimes against
humanity in Venezuela?
Answer. Human rights conditions in Venezuela are horrendous. I
understand the United States is committed to supporting justice and
accountability measures and programs with our allies and partners that
strengthen democratic institutions, transparency, rule of law,
inclusion, economic empowerment, and access to information. The United
States has employed sanctions and imposed visa restrictions on
Venezuelan officials and their family members believed to be
responsible for undermining democratic governance, perpetrating human
rights abuses, or engaging in corrupt practices. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts to hold the Maduro regime accountable.
Question. How will you support efforts to mobilize international
attention to this issue?
Answer. The Department should continue to regularly engage the
international community to raise awareness of human rights violations
and abuses in Venezuela and to urge allies and partners to condemn the
Maduro regime's human rights record, hold human rights abusers
accountable, and call for the peaceful return to democracy and the rule
of law. The Department should continue to encourage international
bodies, in accordance with their respective mandates, to investigate
crimes committed by the regime and its enablers. If confirmed, I will
promote increased efforts to mobilize the international community to
hold the Maduro regime accountable.
Question. The European movement to ban ritual slaughter by
mandating stunning prior to slaughter threatens the existence of
religiously observant national Jewish and Muslim communities in Europe.
Bans such as those passed in Belgium in 2018 and 2019 make no exception
for religious purposes. Most recently, in December 2020, the European
Court of Justice dismissed appeals by Jewish and Muslim groups, setting
a precedent that may open the door to more such laws. This ruling and
the laws it upholds are an infringement on religious freedom and
endanger communities sustained by adherence to halal and kosher legal
traditions. How will you work to encourage individual European
countries to refrain from such legislation and support religious
pluralism in Europe?
Answer. Religious freedom extends to the observance and practice of
religion or beliefs, including dietary regulations. Slaughter in
accordance with religious beliefs is a fundamental practice for members
of certain religious groups, including Jews and Muslims. If confirmed,
I intend to work with the Governments of Belgium, other European
countries, and elsewhere, as well as Jewish, Muslim, and other groups,
to ensure laws, such as those intended to protect animal welfare, do
not have an undue negative impact on religious freedom.
Question. Atrocities are being perpetrated by armed actors
throughout Ethiopia's Tigray region, including extra-judicial
executions, sexual violence, forced displacement, and starvation
crimes. Other Ethiopian communities outside of Tigray have also been
the target of serious human rights abuses in recent months and years.
The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights are set to begin a joint investigation;
however it is unclear what level of access and cooperation the
organizations will be given to conduct their inquiry. How can the U.S.
best ensure that there is accountability for atrocities and other grave
human rights abuses across Ethiopia?
Answer. I understand the United States will support the work of a
joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as a first
step in the accountability process. I understand the Special Envoy for
the Horn of Africa will monitor this process closely and work with
international partners to press to ensure that the Ethiopian Government
provides the promised access necessary for these investigations to
proceed and respects their independence. If confirmed, I will work with
international partners and organizations, including the UN and AU, to
press for credible, independent, and transparent investigations into
human rights violations and abuses. These investigations are critical
for long-term transitional justice efforts, including criminal
accountability, which are also necessary for reconciliation.
Question. Samia Suluhu Hassan has recently assumed the Tanzanian
presidency and there is considerable hope she will turn the page on the
repressive policies of her predecessor, John Magufuli. However, it
remains to be seen whether the new President will pursue a concrete
package of much needed political reforms. How can the U.S. best
encourage the new administration to urgently improve Tanzania's
political climate?
Answer. Although I am encouraged by President Hassan's first steps,
including reinstating licenses for previously suspended media outlets,
the new Tanzanian leadership is still in its early days and much
remains to be seen. I understand the U.S. ambassador to Tanzania has
already met with representatives of the new administration and has
raised ongoing U.S. human rights concerns. If confirmed, I will support
further engagement with the new Tanzanian Government at the highest
levels, to both communicate our expectation of improvement on democracy
and human rights markers and to explore how the United States can best
support strengthening democratic institutions and preventing further
democratic backsliding.
Question. Sudan has made significant progress over the last year in
moving its political transition forward. Yet deep challenges remain,
including persistent violence in Darfur and the still shaky political
arrangements between the civilian and military components of the
transitional government. What action should the U.S. take to better
support a civilian-led, democratic transition in Sudan?
Answer. Sudan's civilian-led transitional government has made
important progress in implementing economic and political reforms,
improving human rights protections, and creating a pathway for ending
conflict in Darfur and other areas in Sudan. However, more needs to be
done to facilitate a transition to democracy as established under
Sudan's Constitutional Declaration, to implement the Juba Peace
Agreement, to establish peace accords with other armed groups, and to
address the root causes of conflict. If confirmed, I will work with the
Africa bureau, the Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan, and J
family bureaus and offices to develop comprehensive strategies to
address these issues and support a peaceful democratic transition.
Question. The United States has recently taken actions to address
the insurgency in northern Mozambique including terrorist designations
of ISIS-Mozambique and its leader, the deployment of a Special Forces
training mission, and publicly-acknowledged consideration of an
antiterrorism assistance program for the Mozambican police. These
actions seem to suggest a security-focused approach to
counterterrorism, but I believe that a successful counterterrorism
strategy must appropriately balance diplomacy, development, and
defense. If confirmed, will you pursue a ``3 D's'' approach to
counterterrorism in Mozambique?
Answer. Yes. A successful response to the threat from ISIS-
Mozambique must include more than a focus on security. If confirmed, I
will support a strategy that focuses equally on development, diplomacy,
and security, along with strategic communications, in coordination with
regional partners and D-ISIS coalition members.
Question. The interim government in Mali has announced that a
referendum on a new constitution will take place on October 31 of this
year, followed by general elections in February of 2022. What role
should the U.S. play in helping ensure a restoration of democracy in
Mali?
Answer. I believe the United States should continue its support for
regional efforts, including those by the Economic Community for West
African States (ECOWAS), to broker a restoration of democracy in Mali.
The ECOWAS-led effort to push for a civilian-led transition led to the
establishment of a transitional government, the recent announcement of
the constitutional referendum, and the scheduled series of elections.
If confirmed, I will continue the United States' role of coordinating
assistance and support with our African and other international
partners to continue these positive developments.
Question. What actions will you take if confirmed to support a
civilian-led transition in Mali?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the ECOWAS-brokered transition
effort, including by encouraging the transitional government to
maintain its course toward a return to constitutional rule. I
understand that due to the manner in which the security services
overthrew the last democratically elected government, the United States
restricts most bilateral assistance that benefits the Government of
Mali except for certain specified categories including humanitarian
needs and election support. I understand assistance can resume only
once a democratically elected government is in place and, if confirmed,
I will coordinate actions by other donor and partner states in support
of timely democratic elections.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator James E. Risch
Question. How will you work to ensure efficient communication and
facilitation among bureaus within the J family, the department, and in
the interagency?
Answer. Today's challenges are too complex for any one agency,
bureau, or individual to undertake alone. Similar to the U.S.
Government's efforts on the global stage, the Department's efforts are
strengthened when done in partnership with others. If confirmed, I will
work tirelessly to facilitate cooperation and ensure efficient
communication, not only among the J family of bureaus and offices but
across the Department, the interagency, and our branches of government.
These efforts will build on my 27-plus years of public service and
longstanding efforts to strengthen the Department by empowering staff,
incentivizing innovation, and promoting a workforce that is diverse in
both its personnel and perspectives.
Question. If confirmed, you will be in a position historically
dual-hatted as the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues. How will you
engage with the Tibetan community? Will you commit to hosting the
Tibetan administration representative at the State Department?
Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, and consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, I
will maintain close contact with Tibetan religious, cultural, and
political leaders, including by seeking to travel regularly to Tibetan
areas of the People's Republic of China and to Tibetan refugee
settlements in India and Nepal. This engagement will include hosting
the Representative to North America of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and
the Central Tibetan Administration at the Department of State.
Question. The Atrocity Prevention Task Force is a key tool to
understanding and targeting crises around the globe before they become
atrocities. This task force lacks structure and a clear mandate. How
will you bolster the efforts already in place to ensure this task force
can fully mobilize?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a whole-of-government approach
to prevent, mitigate, and respond to atrocities in line with the Elie
Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018. I understand
there is collaboration across the J family and interagency to support a
White House review of the structure, process, and interagency
coordination of the Atrocity Early Warning Task Force. I understand
that effort includes examining how best to integrate atrocity
prevention across related administration priorities, including the
Global Fragility Act and the Women, Peace, and Security Act. If
confirmed, I will support these efforts and work closely with
interagency partners, Congress, and civil society to improve U.S.
atrocity prevention.
Question. The administration has announced a resumption of funding
to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA) without securing any reforms. What reforms will
you seek to ensure that UNRWA's textbooks and materials will not be
anti-Semitic? How many UNRWA beneficiaries have citizenship in another
country where they reside?
Answer. I understand the Department has urged reforms in UNRWA and
received commitments from the Agency prior to announcing the funding
resumption. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure
UNRWA upholds the highest level of neutrality and a commitment to
tolerance in educational materials; if confirmed, I will prioritize
further progress in this area.
A significant majority of the 2.2 million registered Palestinian
refugees in Jordan hold citizenship. Not all Palestinian refugees seek
access to UNRWA services.
Question. How will you ensure there is not overlap between the work
of the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
and USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Development and Innovations?
Answer. President Biden has made clear in his Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance that revitalizing democracy is a priority
for U.S. foreign policy. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) and USAID's Bureau of
Democracy, Development and Innovations (DDI) to ensure their close
coordination continues in support of this objective. The bureaus have
complementary approaches to strengthen democratic institutions,
including empowering and protecting local voices and strengthening
government bodies. Using a complementary, holistic framework consistent
with best practices reinforces prospects for success.
Question. Over the last 15 years, we have seen democratic
backsliding around the world from countries in every hemisphere. Where
is the democracy promotion tool-kit failing? How can we improve our
democracy promotion efforts?
Answer. I share your concerns about the 15-year global trend of
democratic backsliding. The United States must continue to respond and
adapt to growing authoritarianism and new challenges such as the rise
of surveillance tools and the use of COVID by some governments to
justify repression. If confirmed, I will utilize all of the diplomatic
and programmatic tools available to address these trends, in close
partnership with other U.S. agencies, Congress, and like-minded
international partners. If confirmed, I also intend to ensure that U.S.
efforts to promote democracy are driven by data to improve
effectiveness, measurability and impact.
Question. Secretary Blinken has announced that the U.S. will be
seeking a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council for next year without
securing reforms to the deeply flawed body. He has also indicated that
the reforms the U.S. would seek are the same as the previous
administration 1) Agenda Item 7 (Israel Bias) and 2) membership reform.
What steps will you take to ensure that true reform is achieved? And if
true reform is not achieved, what will the United States do?
Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's disproportionate
focus on Israel and to its membership. When the United States plays an
active and constructive role on the Council, it can better advocate to
protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council. This year, there has
been a reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel under
Agenda Item 7. I believe the United States can also better engage, in
consultation with its partners, to keep some of the countries with the
worst human rights records off the Council and encourage countries with
better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will ensure the United
States continues to prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-
engagement with the Council.
Question. Earlier this month, the State Department released its
annual Human Rights Report, press reporting indicates that the
Department decided to delete paragraphs which listed out abuses,
including murder of Iranian citizens. If confirmed, would you work to
ensure that instances like this do not occur in the Human Rights
report? Do you believe this occurred because of administration's plan
to re-open negotiations with Iran?
Answer. The most recent State Department Country Report on Human
Rights Practices for Iran lays out in detail-based on credible sources-
Iran's abysmal human rights record. It includes numerous reports of
unlawful or arbitrary killings; forced disappearance and torture by
government agents; life-threatening prison conditions; hundreds of
political prisoners and detainees; serious problems with independence
of the judiciary, particularly the revolutionary courts; and severe
restrictions on free expression, the press, and the internet. If
confirmed, I will not pull any punches in calling out Iran's human
rights violations and abuses and will consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for those responsible for these actions.
Question. The administration has announced that it will host a
Summit of Democracies. Can you please provide more details on this
proposed summit? What will be the definition of democracy will be used?
Answer. I understand the administration is currently formulating
its vision for the Summit of Democracy, which is intended to advance
concrete commitments on pressing challenges to established and emerging
democracies, including corruption, rising autocracy, and defending
human rights at home and abroad. If confirmed, I promise to consult
with the committee as details become available, including on
definitional issues. I also commit to work with the committee to make
the Summit as results-oriented as possible.
Question. We have multiple allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific
region with poor human rights records, but who we also cooperate with
on economic and security issues that are important to the United
States. Some of the allies, like the Philippines, are crucial to
overarching U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. In your view, what are
the most effective ways to address human rights issues with countries
that fall into this category?
Answer. I understand the United States promotes a free, open, and
rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Upholding U.S. values, including
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a
key pillar of U.S. foreign policy and an enormous contributor to
security, prosperity, and stability as well as U.S. influence across
the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I will utilize the full range of
diplomatic tools to strengthen bilateral and multilateral
relationships, to promote our values, to candidly address human
security challenges with allies and partners, to support accountable
government institutions, to strengthen local civil society capacity to
hold their governments accountable, and to counter malign authoritarian
influence.
Question. Nicaragua is scheduled to hold general elections in
November. In October 2020, the Organization of American States adopted
a resolution [AG/RES.2962 (L-O-20)] calling for the restoration of
democratic institutions and respect for human rights in Nicaragua
through free and fair elections. The Ortega regime responded by
approving three statutes with the apparent aim of quashing dissent in
Nicaragua ahead of the November 2021 elections. If confirmed, do you
commit to prioritizing programs and policies that support the efforts
of democratic actors in Nicaragua to be a credible challenger to Ortega
ahead of the November 2021 elections.
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing and maintaining U.S.
efforts to create conditions for free and fair elections in Nicaragua.
The United States should continue to use the economic and diplomatic
tools at its disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and
multilateral engagement, to support the democratic opposition and
advance free and fair elections. It is not too late for the Ortega
regime to make the meaningful reforms required before the May
Organization of American States deadline.
Question. How can the United States best reconcile its defense
commitments to allies and partners, including through arms sales, with
its need to adhere to U.S. values?
Answer. As President Biden has said, America's values--defending
freedom, championing opportunity, upholding universal rights,
respecting the rule of law, and treating every person with dignity--are
the grounding wire of our foreign policy and our abiding advantage
globally. U.S. diplomacy must be rooted in those values, and our
defense commitments, including arms sales, are no exception. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure we are mindful of both our values and
our interests as we engage allies and partners, and that our partners
respect their commitments to the United States in turn.
Question. The Trump administration began initiatives to mitigate
civilian casualties caused by the actions of U.S.-supported partner
forces. How can we best build off of these efforts?
Answer. Human rights and civilian harm concerns should continue to
be a critical consideration for every U.S. arms transfer review. The
President and Secretary Blinken have said that human rights must be at
the center of our foreign policy, and that includes policy regarding
arms transfers and other security assistance.
If confirmed, I will build upon U.S. efforts to assist partners to
mitigate risks of civilian casualties and ensure our partner forces are
taking steps to comply with international law, including the law of
armed conflict, and protect human rights. If confirmed, as programs are
re-examined, I intend to make sure they promote these policies with our
security partners.
Question. Across Sub-Saharan Africa, democratic gains are under
threat as long-serving rulers manipulate constitutional and electoral
processes to remain in power while stifling dissent and limiting
opposition parties and candidates' activities. In 2020 alone, several
African ruling parties and incumbent leaders applied authoritarian
tactics that manipulated democratic processes and frameworks, including
in Cameroon, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. If confirmed as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights,
will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa be a
priority? What is your perspective on balancing competing U.S.
priorities in the areas of security, democracy, and human rights in
Sub-Saharan Africa, especially when some of our top security partners--
including Uganda, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Mali--periodically or
consistently engage in undemocratic practices? In your view, which
should take priority in Africa?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize encouraging governments
across Africa to support democratic processes, strengthen democratic
institutions, and respect the rights to freedom of expression,
association, and peaceful assembly. I will also work to ensure that
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a pillar of U.S.
foreign policy and that the United States takes a holistic approach to
security challenges, ensuring that U.S. security and governance
approaches are mutually reinforcing.
Question. In the last two years, Sudan and Ethiopia have embarked
upon unexpected democratic transitions. While the United States was,
and continues to be, eager to support these transitions, rapidly
mobilizing adequate resources has been a challenge in both cases. If
confirmed, how would you support the Department to respond to rapid
democratic transitions and opportunities that emerge unexpected?
Answer. Democratic breakthroughs present an excellent opportunity
for the U.S. Government to help consolidate democratic progress. Doing
so often requires marshaling resources quickly to put in place
effective programming. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with
Department and USAID counterparts to ensure we have systems in place
that provide flexibility to reallocate resources as needed. I will also
work with embassies in the field and bureaus and offices that
administer democracy programs to capitalize on these opportunities,
including by pivoting quickly to support programs tailored for these
situations. In all cases, I will work to ensure U.S. efforts empower
democratic reformers and activists on the ground.
Question. In Africa, USAID maintains a large democracy and
governance portfolio. In recent years, it has been the policy of the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) to limit programming
to countries in Africa without an active USAID presence. Do you agree
with this approach? What benefits could be seen from complimentary
efforts by USAID, DRL and other State Department bureaus?
Answer. I understand the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor (DRL) is currently active in over 90 countries in the world,
including many where there is a USAID presence. I believe that DRL's
focus on empowering local activists and grassroots organizations to
hold their government accountable complements USAID's work to build
more effective government institutions. If confirmed, I will support
DRL's efforts to coordinate closely with U.S. embassies, USAID, and
other programming entities to maximize their collective impact.
Question. Since Georgian Dream's 2012 electoral win, democracy and
governance in the Caucasian country has steadily declined. The
political situation came to a head after the October 2020 parliamentary
election culminated in an opposition boycott of parliament and a
breakdown of negotiations between the major parties. What more can be
done to steer Georgians of all political parties back on a democratic
trajectory? Does U.S. assistance to Georgia need to be conditioned on
political progress? What would incentivize the major political parties
to come to the negotiating table and compromise? Do you believe the
U.S. should consider targeted sanctions on individuals or entities that
are exacerbating or prolonging the crisis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will call on both sides to deescalate the
situation, engage in constructive dialogue, and make compromises to
allow Georgia to move forward. I believe U.S. assistance is integral to
advancing democratic reforms, boosting economic growth, and helping
Georgia resist Russian aggression. I understand the United States also
assists Georgian civil society and independent media to raise public
awareness and advocate for positive change. Any proposed conditionality
should be approached with this in mind. I believe it is important that
Georgia continues to make progress on institutionalizing democratic
values. If progress continues to wane in these areas, and if confirmed,
I would consider the deployment of additional tools to address these
issues and would seek consultation with Congress.
Question. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was
overwhelmingly elected in 2019 on an anti-corruption platform. After a
few promising reforms, Zelenskyy and his government have stalled and
even backslidden on democratic and market-based economic reforms. What
do you see as the current priorities for reform in Ukraine, and what
pressure or leverage can the U.S. use to ensure Ukraine continues down
its previously positive path? While Ukraine's democracy and electoral
process is fairly robust and free, the country continues to struggle
with entrenched corruption. What further steps can the U.S. take,
either through its aid programs or political influence, to help propel
forward Ukraine's fight against corruption in all areas of its society?
How can we work better with European nations and the EU to leverage our
collective support for Ukraine into real reforms? How well do you
believe State and USAID coordinate their activities in Ukraine? What
would you change to better utilize scarce resources in such a needy
country?
Answer. I am committed to revitalizing our bilateral relationship
with Ukraine. If confirmed, I will support Ukraine's chosen Euro-
Atlantic path, including by pushing for progress on rule of law, anti-
corruption, and economic reforms that strengthen Ukraine's institutions
and lead to a brighter future for all Ukrainians, in coordination with
Allies and partners, including the EU. State and USAID are very well
coordinated in Ukraine thanks to Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and
Central Asia (AEECA) appropriations and the role of the Coordinator of
U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. If confirmed, I will promote
accountability for those who try to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty and
territorial and institutional integrity. I believe advancing reforms is
just as important for Ukraine's future as opposing Russia's aggression.
Question. Several high-profile scandals have exposed the Western
financial system's difficulty in preventing corruption. In the FY21
NDAA, the U.S. Congress updated its anti-money laundering laws to shift
the burden of disclosure from the banks to the corporations and
beneficial owners. And the EU has been working on a rule-of-law
mechanism to link EU funds to good governance, as well as cracking down
on ``golden visas.'' This corruption hurts both the citizens of the
countries where the money was stolen and where it is stored. European
countries have found themselves at both ends of this corruption cycle.
How will the Biden administration collaborate with our democratic
allies to tackle corruption in our interconnected financial systems,
and what concrete actions will you take? How will State collaborate
with the interagency on this goal? With the Treasury Department? How
important is it that the United States and its European allies take
steps to make our own systems less friendly to kleptocracy and less
penetrable by dirty money?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support enhanced coordination with our
partners to apply diplomatic pressure, bilaterally and through key
multi-stakeholder fora, to prevent and combat corruption, building upon
recent Congressional legislation. I will prioritize foreign assistance
to strengthen governments' and civil society's capacity to do so as
well. If confirmed, I intend to work with the Department of the
Treasury and our other partners to utilize tools, such as the Global
Magnitsky sanctions program and visa restrictions, to protect our
financial systems and prevent kleptocrats from using their ill-gotten
gains in the United States. It is critical that the United States and
European allies work in tandem to curb corruption's destabilizing
impact.
Question. Several members of the EU's eastern bloc have experienced
a rise in corruption, a decline in rule of law, and a strain on
democratic institutions. Free and independent media in Poland, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria, to name a few, has been reduced and persecuted.
Ruling parties have consolidated power in important industries and in
the government. The EU has begun the process of implementing rule-of-
law conditionality to the disbursement of EU funding as a means to
combat this trend. Does the United States have a role to play in EU and
EU member states' anti-corruption efforts? If yes, what is that role?
Answer. I am concerned about the rise of corruption and attacks on
the rule of law, media, and democratic institutions in a number of
European states. I firmly support democratic values, including the rule
of law and media freedom, and, if confirmed, will work to advance these
values in multilateral fora to include the U.N. Convention against
Corruption's Conference of States Parties and the G20 Anticorruption
Group. These shared values underpin the United States' relationship
with the EU and, I understand, are a topic of frank discussions with
member state governments. If confirmed, I intend to use all tools at
our disposal to address corruption within Eastern Europe and will
encourage our EU partners to establish similar tools.
Question. The Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
(J/TIP) authors one of the most important diplomatic tools we have each
year, the Trafficking in Persons Report, which countless bodies rely on
for crucial information, including Congress. Yet, this report is
criticized for undue influence from regional bureaus or other parts of
the department. What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that
the information and tier rankings in the TIP report accurately reflect
anti-trafficking efforts and the real situations on the ground in-
country?
Answer. The United States has always been a global leader in the
fight against human trafficking. The Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
report is one of the most important diplomatic tools and information
sources on this issue. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure the TIP
Report is as objective and accurate as possible, and that tier rankings
are based solely on each country's efforts to combat trafficking, as
required by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
Question. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA) mandates that foreign assistance restrictions placed on
countries receiving a ``Tier 3'' ranking can be waived. The previous
administration used this tool, but the rollout was messy due to lack of
guidance on what exactly non-trade, non-humanitarian assistance was.
Will you continue to recommend to the Secretary that these Tier 3
restrictions be used for appropriate countries? Will you commit to
working with Congress on clarifying the scope of non-trade, non-
humanitarian assistance?
Answer. I understand the Department considers Tier 3 restrictions
and waivers carefully every year. This review informs the Secretary's
recommendations to the President, whom the TVPA requires to impose or
waive restrictions. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the State
Department's recommendations to the President on restrictions and
waivers are grounded by the facts on the ground in each country and an
assessment of what would most effectively lead to improvements in those
countries. I will welcome consultation with Congress on how to apply
the trade-related exception.
Question. The International Criminal Court has open investigations
in Afghanistan and the West Bank and Gaza. How will GCJ plan to engage
with this court on these two cases? Do you agree that both cases are
squarely outside of the court's jurisdiction?
Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. The United States and
Israel are not States Parties, and the Palestinians do not qualify as a
sovereign State. If confirmed, I will work to address U.S. concerns
about these cases through engagement with all stakeholders in the ICC
process. The Office of Global Criminal Justice provides critical
subject-matter expertise, advising the Secretary and other senior
leaders formulating U.S. policy on accountability for war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and genocide. If confirmed, I intend to ensure
engagement with the Court on these cases is part of an administration-
wide strategy.
Question. Secretary Blinken has agreed to examine a genocide
determination for the Rohingya. Do you agree with this examination and
how would you execute it?
Answer. I am appalled by the Burmese military's reign of terror
against Rohingya and members of other ethnic and religious minority
groups, as well as those related to the devastating military coup. If
confirmed, I will support the Secretary in any review process, and
ensure the Department remains focused on promoting accountability for
those responsible for abuses, seeking justice for victims, advocating
for unhindered humanitarian access, supporting the return to Burma's
democratic transition, and promoting reforms that will help prevent the
recurrence of atrocities and other human rights violations and abuses
across Burma.
Question. How will this administration engage with the office of
Global Criminal Justice? Given crises like the Rohingya and Syria,
engagement from you, if confirmed, alongside GCJ is important to
curbing the atrocities being committed against some of the most
vulnerable populations.
Answer. The Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) provides policy
advice and technical expertise to the Secretary of State and the Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human Rights on
preventing, mitigating, and responding to atrocities, including war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The office also plays a
central role in coordinating U.S. policy to promote transitional
justice and accountability, which is vital to atrocity prevention and
prospects for lasting peace and stability. If confirmed, I will ensure
GCJ's expertise is incorporated into U.S. policy formulation on these
issues as part of the administration's efforts to promote respect for
human rights and the rule of law.
Question. The CCP is actively committing genocide against the
Uyghurs and other ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang. However, the IOC has
given it the prestige of holding the Winter 2022 Olympics and
Paralympics. Do you support China hosting the Winter Games in 2022?
What other alternatives would you propose?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support extensive U.S. engagement and
coordination with allies and partners to deny the CCP the ability to
use the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to obscure China's abysmal human
rights record. This would include outreach to the U.S. Olympic and
Paralympic Committee, Olympics sponsors, and equipment and apparel
suppliers to raise awareness of and promote accountability for the PRC
Government's atrocities and human rights abuses, including genocide and
crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, as well as forced labor. I will
also consult closely with allies and partners to define our common
concerns and establish a shared approach to the PRC in advance of and
during the 2022 Winter Olympics.
Question. Can you please explain the mandate and operations of the
Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations? How does it add value
to the work of the Department? How does CSO's work differ from or
overlap with USAID's Office of Transitions Initiative?
Answer. I understand the mission of the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO) is to anticipate, prevent, and respond
to conflicts that undermine U.S. national interests. CSO's work differs
from USAID/OTI in that, as part of the State Department, CSO plays a
vital role in enhancing the Department's strategies, policies, and
programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. Top CSO priorities
include implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018 and the Global Fragility Act of 2019, which
builds upon the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review and the Women,
Peace, and Security agenda. If confirmed, I welcome Congressional
consultation on CSO's mandate and operations.
Question. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) required the formulation
of a whole-of-government strategy to identify and address the drivers
of violence and conflict in fragile states and regions. Under the
previous administration, a broadly accepted strategy was released.
Unfortunately, the process for selecting the target countries and
regions in which the strategy would be tested was fraught with
challenges. Moreover, pilot initiatives brought to light how competing
interests--namely between the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization
Operations and U.S. Embassies and USAID Missions--and a lack of
appropriate consultation with the field could undermine the future
success of GFA initiatives. The Biden administration will now be
charged with relaunching the GFA country and region selection process
and implementation plans in a manner that reflects these critical
lessons learned. If confirmed, how will you approach the GFA selection
process for target countries and regions? What, if anything, within the
country/region diagnostic and selection process needs to be changed?
Should the Sahel and the Northern Triangle automatically be included as
priority regions given the national security interests at stake, or
would you recommend reserving judgement and allowing selection to be
strictly guided by the data?
Answer. It is my understanding that the White House is leading a
renewal of the GFA country and region selection process to evaluate
previous recommendations and consider others, followed by Congressional
consultation and final approval by the President. I understand the
review takes into account the impact on fragility of COVID-19, the
global economic crisis, gender inequality, and climate change. I also
understand the selection process is based on objective criteria
outlined in the GFA, including assessed levels and risks of fragility,
violent conflict, atrocities, gender inequality, and resilience;
political will and capacity; opportunity for impact; as well as U.S.
national security and economic interests. If confirmed, I will support
these efforts.
Question. There are also concerns about an apparent lack of senior-
level buy-in from the Department of Defense, poor coordination between
the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and other key
functional bureaus within the Department of State (such as
Counterterrorism and Political Military Affairs), and poor
communication with U.S. Embassies and Missions in the field. If
confirmed, how would you work across departments and agencies to
implement the GFA? How will Embassy and Mission priorities be reflected
in selection and implementation plans? Should GFA implementation
continue to be run out of CSO, or should leadership be elevated to a
higher level, as Congress intended?
Answer. Successful GFA implementation will require fundamental
changes in the way the U.S. Government works on issues of fragility and
conflict, integrating more closely the work among functional and
regional bureaus, different agencies, the field, and Washington. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Under Secretary for Political
Affairs to ensure strong partnerships with embassies and missions. I
believe elevated senior staff buy-in and CSO's expertise and
coordination role are critical to effective implementation of the GFA,
which will require ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive
management to inform policy and programming decisions.
Question. A criticism of the previous administration was its focus
on international religious freedom issues. How will you, if confirmed,
ensure this administration does not overcorrect on IRF issues and
therefore ignore the serious concerns of religious freedom issues
globally?
Answer. I am committed to promoting and defending religious
freedom, which has long been a key U.S. foreign policy objective I was
proud to advance in my prior role as Acting Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I will look
to leverage the tools of U.S. diplomacy and foreign assistance to
advance this universal right, ensuring that efforts to promote respect
for religious freedom are fully integrated into broader policies that
promote freedom and dignity for all people.
Question. How will you work to empower the office of the Special
Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism?
Answer. I am deeply committed to combatting anti-Semitism at home
and abroad and share the concerns of Congress about rising anti-
Semitism around the world. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Special Envoy to reinforce her or his efforts, elevate the fight
against global anti-Semitism in our engagements with foreign
interlocutors, and ensure the office of the Special Envoy has the staff
and resources it needs to execute its mission effectively.
Question. The Office of Global Women's Issues continue to be a
separate office within the S bureau. Under the last administration,
there was an effort to align this office within the J family. Will this
continue to be an S office, or do you, if confirmed, plan to continue
re-alignment of S/GWI under the J family? What steps will you take to
integrate global women issue initiatives throughout the J family and
the interagency, especially on projects like Women, Peace, and
Security, and Women's Global Development and Prosperity Fund (WGDP)?
Answer. I am committed to supporting President Biden's goal of
advancing gender equality and the full empowerment of women and girls
around the world. The Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/
GWI) plays a pivotal coordination role in ensuring the Department is
bringing the full diplomatic toolbox to bear in support of gender
equality goals, including through robust collaboration with J family
bureaus and offices. If confirmed, I look forward to exploring how the
J family can enhance coordination with S/GWI and mobilize its unique
resources to support women and girls as part of a comprehensive U.S.
Government gender equality strategy.
Question. The 2020 DEA report on fentanyl flows to the United
States identifies the People's Republic of China as the primary source
of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances trafficked to the United
States, increasingly through Mexico. Mexican transnational criminal
organizations are producing increased quantities of fentanyl and
cartels, such as the Sinaloa and the New Generation Jalisco Cartel, are
the primary trafficking groups responsible for smuggling fentanyl into
the United States from Mexico. If confirmed, what specific actions
would you take to ensure the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs programs are focusing on meaningfully reducing the
flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids to the United States?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs to stop fentanyl trafficking by:
reducing diversion and illicit production of synthetic drugs;
strengthening the capacity of our partners to detect, interdict, and
share information on synthetic drug threats; building capacity to
target illicit online sales; shrinking the drug market by reducing
global drug demand; and enhancing partnerships with governments,
industry, and international organizations. If confirmed, I will work
with partners such as Mexico to reduce production and improve
interdiction, and I will continue U.S. efforts to press the People's
Republic of China to better regulate its chemical industry and
synthetic opioid precursors.
Question. On March 1st, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report with specific recommendations for the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to strengthen
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative (GAO-21-335).
If confirmed, do you commit to ensure INL takes swift action to
implement the recommendations in this report?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) swiftly implements
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommendations to strengthen
risk management for programs under the Merida Initiative. I understand
the Department concurred with GAO's important recommendations, and, for
programs under the Merida Initiative, INL is in the process of
completing an anti-fraud risk assessment; developing and implementing
an anti-fraud strategy; developing and implementing a mandatory fraud
awareness training program for staff; and re-evaluating practices for
local vetting of non-security personnel.
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship
between the Government of Cuba, the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and the Maduro
regime in Venezuela.
Answer. I am deeply concerned by the actions of the Government of
Cuba, from its treatment of its own people, to its connection to and
substantial support for the brutal Maduro regime. I understand members
of the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army (ELN), including
senior leadership, traveled to Cuba in 2018 for now-defunct peace
negotiations with the Government of Colombia. When negotiations failed,
Cuba continued to provide safe haven to ELN leadership. In January
2019, ELN claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in Colombia.
Citing peace protocols signed before the ELN negotiators traveled to
Cuba, Cuba has refused to extradite ELN leaders to Colombia. With
respect to Venezuela, Maduro and his associates use criminal activities
to help maintain their hold on power, fostering a permissive
environment for known terrorist groups, including the ELN and its
sympathizers.
If confirmed, I will commit to closely reviewing the status of ELN
leadership in Cuba and consulting with Congress as the Biden-Harris
administration reviews U.S. policy toward Cuba.
Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters at various
detention facilities, including 2,000 foreign fighters (FTF) that U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist
fighters.'' Internally Displace Camps (IDP) in Syria, like al Hol, have
become areas of systemic ISIS indoctrination of IDPs and refugees. The
process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of
former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to
peace. Yet, countries around the world with foreign terrorist fighters
have failed to make any progress to date. How does the Biden
administration plan to address this problem?
Answer. I understand the Department urges countries of origin to
repatriate their foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and associated
family members from detention facilities and camps in northeast Syria,
and to rehabilitate, reintegrate and prosecute those individuals as
appropriate. I understand the Department does this through intensive
diplomatic engagement, including through the Global Coalition to defeat
ISIS, by helping to repatriate individuals whose countries of origin
are willing to accept them, and helping develop rehabilitation and
reintegration protocols and programs. If confirmed, I will urge FTF
repatriation and leverage multilateral platforms in those efforts to
prevent ISIS from reconstituting capability in Syria and Iraq.
Question. 10 USC 127e authority allows the Secretary of Defense,
with the concurrence of the relevant Chief of Mission, to expend up to
$100 million each year to support foreign forces, irregular forces,
groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating authorized
ongoing military operations by United States special operations forces
to combat terrorism. Despite the important counterterrorism (CT)
collaboration between Department of Defense (DoD) and State Department,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee (HFAC) lack visibility into this space.
Traditionally, SFRC and HFAC have not been afforded any insight into
127e programs and what our Chiefs of Mission are concurring with. Do we
have your commitment to return to this committee and brief on areas of
DoD and State CT cooperation, particularly the integration between 10
USC 127e and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programs?
Answer. I understand the Department of State works closely with the
Department of Defense on a broad range of counterterrorism issues,
including in the Department of Defense's activities under its Title 10,
Section 127e authorities. I recognize that Congress has an important
oversight role to play in the U.S. Government's counterterrorism
efforts, and if confirmed, I will be committed to engaging with
Congress to discuss these and other counterterrorism lines of effort.
Question. The previous administration disbanded the Defense
Department's Defeat- ISIS Task Force, leading its then director
Christopher Maier to resign in November 2020. Former President Trump
similarly moved State Department's Special Envoy to the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS under the Bureau of Counterterrorism, with
Acting John Godfrey serving as that special envoy. Is this the right
staffing and organizational structure to prevent an ISIS resurgence?
Answer. I understand that achieving the enduring defeat of ISIS
remains a central priority of the administration. I do not believe the
dual-hatting of the CT Coordinator and Special Envoy reflects a
diminution of the position of the Special Envoy for the Global
Coalition to Defeat ISIS. It instead reflects the evolving nature of
the ISIS threat to encompass areas outside Iraq and Syria, and a desire
to situate the enduring D-ISIS mission within the established CT Bureau
architecture. Doing so enables effective leverage of CT Bureau's
civilian counterterrorism capacity-building assets and closer
coordinate with other bureaus. If confirmed, I will ensure that both
roles are prioritized and sustainably resourced.
Question. The Biden administration has launched a review of the
February 29 agreement with the Taliban, including the CT assurances and
posture issues associated with it. This is an issue with obvious and
important CT ramifications given the origins of this war and the
terrorist threats that endure. What role do you anticipate your bureau
playing in this review? How do you plan on ensuring U.S. CT interests
in Afghanistan are addressed?
Answer. I understand the Department of State, including the Bureau
of Counterterrorism, is a part of the interagency effort to monitor and
disrupt significant terrorist threats not only in Afghanistan but
anywhere else they might arise. If confirmed, my focus will be to
ensure our counterterrorism efforts maintain consistent pressure on
terrorist groups to deny them the time, space, and resources they need
to conduct complex, international attacks, including against the U.S.
homeland.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. My most meaningful achievements in promoting human rights
and democracy involve expanding coalitions to advance universal human
rights, countering malign influence, and elevating protection for human
rights defenders worldwide. In prior State Department leadership roles,
I expanded the first public-private partnership (PPP) for LGBT equality
to include private sector stakeholders, launched the first global PPP
against gender-based violence, and created new regional platforms to
protect journalists under siege. I helped persuade France to cancel a
multi-billion dollar defense sale to Russia in the wake of the Crimea
invasion, and successfully countered Russian disinformation efforts to
interfere with France's 2017 election. I persuaded India to launch its
first-ever third-country democracy promotion efforts with the United
States, including programs to generate self-employment opportunities
for Afghan women and build other nations' capacity to conduct free and
fair elections.
Question. The Hong Kong National Security Law, which mainland
Chinese authorities have imposed on Hong Kong, has already begun to
fundamentally transform the space for democracy and human rights in the
city. In your view, what steps should the U.S. Government take to help
defend the space for press freedom, free expression, and democracy in
Hong Kong?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stand united with our allies and
partners against the PRC's assault on Hong Kong's freedoms and its
blatant disregard for its international obligations and commitments. I
will use all available diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's
disposal, including sanctions, visa restrictions, and other measures,
to promote accountability for the egregious actions of authorities in
Hong Kong and Beijing, and I will urge our allies and partners to do
the same. If confirmed, I will also help those who have been persecuted
by the Hong Kong and Beijing authorities find safe haven in the United
States and other countries.
Question. Since the February 1 coup by the Burmese military, the
space for free expression and association has dramatically constricted
as the junta attempts to suppress a sustained and countrywide civil
disobedience movement against its rule. More than 700 civilians have
been killed, and several thousand are currently detained. The
solidarity already shown by the U.S. Government to the protestors is
encouraging, but what further specific steps do you envision that this
administration can take to ensure maximum support for human rights
activists, journalists, and prominent voices of conscience at risk, and
to urge the military to peacefully return power to the duly-elected
government as soon as possible?
Answer. The United States, under the Biden-Harris administration,
has condemned in the strongest possible terms and taken actions against
those responsible for the military coup in Burma, the horrific violence
against protesters, and the ongoing, unjust detentions of State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other
democratically-elected leaders as well as more than 3,000 civil society
actors from across ethnic and religious groups. If confirmed, I will
use all available U.S. diplomatic tools, including sanctions, visa
restrictions, and other measures, to promote accountability and build
global coalitions to support the Burmese people's efforts to
reestablish and safeguard their path to democracy.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. You were listed in the acknowledgements section of a 1990
book titled ``Stealth PACs: How Israel's American Lobby Took control of
U.S. Middle East Policy,'' published by your employer at the time, the
American Educational Trust. Can you confirm today that you do not share
the anti-Israel claims in this book or of the American Educational
Trust? Do you believe pro-Israel Americans, and pro-Israel members of
Congress, have dual loyalties?
Answer. I categorically reject the anti-Israel claims in this book
and espoused by the American Educational Trust. Further, I had nothing
to do with the content of the book. My entry-level employment at the
American Educational Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no
contact with the organization since then, and I reject the
organization's positions with respect to Israel. I deplore any
suggestion that American Jews or members of Congress who advocate for a
strong U.S.-Israel relationship have dual loyalties or are disloyal to
the United States.
Question. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs routinely
publishes a list of members of Congress who receive donations from pro-
Israel Americans. Do you believe there is something untoward about pro-
Israel Americans engaging in the political process?
Answer. I strongly support the right of every American, including
those who strongly support the U.S.-Israel alliance, to engage in the
U.S. political process, and see nothing untoward in this activity. As I
noted, my entry-level employment at the American Educational Trust
ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the organization
since then, and I categorically reject the organization's positions
with respect to Israel. I strongly support the Biden administration's
commitment to renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the
latter is underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise
their constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom
of association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's
government, and equal protection under the law.
Question. What is your view of the U.S.-Israel relationship?
Answer. I support the United States' unwavering and ironclad
commitment to Israel's security. If confirmed, I will support the
administration in working to further strengthen all aspects of the
U.S.-Israel alliance, including with respect to countering Iranian
state-sponsored terrorism, increasing international solidarity against
Hezbollah and other Iran-supported foreign terrorist organizations,
expanding global coalitions against anti-Semitism, building upon
Israel's normalization agreements with key Arab Governments, and
eliminating anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, including the U.N.
Human Rights Council and the International Criminal Court.
Question. Do you agree that U.S. policy in the region is best
advanced when working closely with our ally Israel?
Answer. Yes. President Biden has been one of Israel's strongest
supporters over the last fifty years. I understand the U.S.-Israel
alliance is deeply personal to him and, indeed, he's met and worked
closely with every Israeli Prime Minister since Golda Meir. I
understand the President believes the ties between our two countries,
rooted in strategic interests and shared values, should transcend
domestic politics. In this vein, I understand the administration will
not only further strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance, but also ensure
that it enjoys bipartisan backing. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include building
on normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel
and its neighbors.
Question. Do you fully support Israel's right to defend itself from
terrorist attacks, including taking pre-emptive action to disrupt
weapons shipments from Iran to its terrorist proxies?
Answer. Israel has the right to defend itself from terrorist
attacks, and I understand the Biden-Harris administration's commitment
to Israel's security to be a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. I
support the administration's policy to continue U.S. security
assistance to Israel and uphold Israel's Qualitative Military Edge,
which is critical to ensuring Israel has the means to defend itself. If
confirmed, I will support action, in coordination with our allies and
partners, to deter and counter Iran's destabilizing activities. If
confirmed, I will strongly support the administration's goals regarding
Israel's security.
Question. Do you support full funding for United States security
assistance to Israel as laid out in the current 10-year MOU? Do you
support the position of President Biden that conditioning aid to Israel
is wrong?
Answer. I understand President Biden's commitment to Israel's
security is ironclad. The President played an important role in helping
to negotiate the 2016 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security
assistance, among the largest aid packages in U.S. history. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's pledge to preserve the
terms of the MOU without reservation.
Question. What is your view of the Iranian regime and the country's
human rights record?
Answer. The Iranian Government has the dubious distinction of being
the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, a destabilizing force
in the region, and a longtime and systematic human rights violator.
Iran severely restricts the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of
association, freedom of religion or belief, and freedom of expression.
If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations and
abuses, which include arbitrary or unlawful detention of numerous
individuals, some of whom have faced torture and/or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment, and execution after unfair trials. I
also will work with my colleagues to consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for human rights violators.
Question. Are you committed to robust human rights programming in
Iran, regardless of how such programming may impact nuclear
negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support robust human rights programs
in Iran. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to exercise
their human rights, including through severe restrictions on the rights
to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will support all
appropriate diplomatic tools to support the Iranian people so their
voices are heard and they can hold their government accountable for its
actions.
Question. Since the passage of the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, all
but one of the U.S. Special Coordinators for Tibetan Issues have
concurrently held your position. If you are designated the Special
Coordinator, will you commit to promoting substantive dialogue without
pre-conditions between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government that
leads to a negotiated agreement on Tibet, as mandated by the Tibetan
Policy and Support Act of 2020?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed and designated as Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy
for Tibetans.
Question. If Beijing continues to refuse to engage in dialogue, as
it has done since 2010, will you insist that our dialogue with Beijing
on some issues of importance to them be linked to their resumption of
dialogue with the Tibetans?
Answer. If confirmed and designated as the Special Coordinator for
Tibetan Issues, I will work with our allies and partners to press
Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives to achieve meaningful autonomy. I will also call upon
Beijing to respect the human rights of Tibetans and to preserve Tibet's
environment as well as to respect its distinct cultural, linguistic,
and religious traditions.
Question. If confirmed, will you stand firm in communicating to
Beijing the United States position that we will not under any
circumstances accept a Chinese-controlled process to select the Dalai
Lama's successor? If the Chinese authorities attempt to force a
politically chosen successor on the Tibetan people, will you commit to
imposing serious sanctions in response?
Answer. The PRC Government must have no role in the succession
process of the Dalai Lama. PRC authorities' interference in the
succession of the Panchen Lama 26 years ago, including disappearing the
Panchen Lama as a child and attempting to replace him with a PRC
Government-chosen successor, remains an outrageous abuse of religious
freedom that I denounced as Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If confirmed, I am committed to
promoting respect for Tibetans' religious freedom and to taking all
appropriate measures to promote accountability for PRC Government
officials who attempt to interfere in the Dalai Lama's succession,
consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP is committing cultural
genocide, also known as cultural erasure, against the Tibetans, whose
civilization is distinct from that of China and boasts its own rich
language, literature, religious tradition, and culture? Will you commit
to undertaking programmatic and policy initiatives that will protect
Tibetan culture and language in Tibet and in exile?
Answer. The Chinese Government has been relentless in seeking to
suppress the distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious traditions of
Tibetans. If confirmed, I will call on Beijing to end these policies
and will explore every opportunity, including through policy and
program initiatives, to help Tibetans preserve their traditions. This
will include working with allies and partners to press Beijing to
return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives,
without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy for Tibetans.
Question. Will you commit to regularly raise the case of the
Panchen Lama and press for his release? Will you ensure that no U.S.
official meets with, or provides a public platform, for the individual
that Beijing appointed in his place?
Answer. Yes. I am saddened that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima--the Panchen
Lama--remains disappeared since his 1995 forced disappearance by PRC
authorities, separated from his community and denied his rightful place
as a prominent Tibetan Buddhist leader. If confirmed, I am committed to
supporting Tibetans' religious freedom, including their ability to
select, educate, and venerate their religious leaders, like the Dalai
Lama and the Panchen Lama, according to their own beliefs and without
government interference. I will also call on the PRC Government to
publicize verifiable proof of the Tibetan-selected Panchen Lama's
whereabouts and wellbeing and allow him to speak for himself.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden
administration will not provide aid to the PA if Palestinian officials
have not ceased payments to those convicted of terrorist acts according
to U.S. law?
Answer. I understand that the administration has been clear that
all U.S. assistance for the Palestinians, including the recently
announced assistance, will be provided consistent with U.S. law.
Question. UNRWA currently only discloses contracts over $100,000 in
its quarterly filings. However, the Annual Statistical Report on U.N.
Procurement states that U.N. agencies must disclose all contracts over
$30,000. Will you hold UNRWA accountable for disclosing all contracts
over $30,000?
Answer. I understand UNRWA discloses all of its awards, including
those above the $30,000 threshold, to the United Nations Office for
Procurement Services which then reports them together with all other
U.N. agencies in the Annual Statistical Report on U.N. Procurement,
published on the U.N. Global Market website (UNGM.org). If confirmed, I
will seek to ensure UNRWA continues to abide by all relevant U.N.
policies and regulations.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting Cuba
democracy programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that support for
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the
Cuban people to determine their own future. The recently released 2020
Human Rights Report notes the significant human rights abuses
perpetrated by Cuban Government officials. If confirmed, I will ensure
the U.S. Government continues its steadfast support for and engagement
with Cuban human rights defenders, activists, and civil society members
to bolster their important work. I also will promote human rights,
fundamental freedoms, and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow
of information to the Cuban people.
Question. If confirmed, how will you support Cuba's democracy,
civil society and human rights defenders in Cuba?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the U.S. Government continues
its steadfast support for and engagement with Cuban human rights
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their
important work. I also will promote human rights, fundamental freedoms,
and democracy, and will facilitate the free flow of information to the
Cuban people. I will also denounce the Cuban Government's abuses and
push for democratic reform. If confirmed, I will consult with Congress
about Cuba policy.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Rob Portman
Question. North Korea is a topic of personal significance to me.
Last year I gave a speech on the Senate floor to honor Otto Warmbier on
the third anniversary of his passing, and I remain in contact with Fred
and Cindy--Otto's parents who are constituents. How will this
administration approach the challenge of North Korea from a national
security and human rights perspective?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to placing human rights at the
center of our foreign policy, including with North Korea, and working
with like-minded partners to call out human rights abuses. I am deeply
concerned by North Korea's deplorable human rights abuses, including
its network of political prison and labor camps, use of forced labor,
and severe restrictions of religious freedom, and horrific treatment of
unjustly detained Americans like Mr. Warmbier. If confirmed, I will
prioritize addressing North Korea's egregious human rights record and
promoting respect for human rights in the closed country. I will also
prioritize increased coordination with our allies and partners and will
use all diplomatic tools at the U.S. Government's disposal to promote
accountability for those responsible for the unspeakable abuses that
occur in the country.
Question. I am deeply concerned regarding the ongoing reports of
atrocities and human rights abuses occurring in the ongoing civil war
in Ethiopia. As you are aware, civil wars are a unique threat, as this
type of conflict often destabilizes neighboring states, attracts
foreign fighters as well as third party proxy support for sides in the
conflict. How can we ensure that Ethiopia's fragile transition toward
democracy can continue given the current circumstances, and how can the
United States ensure accountability for crimes occurring not just in
the Tigray region, but all of Ethiopia?
Answer. The President and the Secretary of State have made clear
that securing a ceasefire and supporting a political dialogue to defuse
the political crisis in Ethiopia, including in Tigray, is an urgent
priority, and I understand they plan to appoint a special envoy to lead
a robust diplomatic effort to advance these goals. If confirmed, I will
work closely with the special envoy in this regard. In addition, I will
support the work of a joint investigation mechanism by the Ethiopian
Human Rights Commission and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights as a first step in the accountability process.
Credible, independent, and transparent investigations into human rights
violations and abuses are critical for long-term justice,
accountability, and reconciliation.
Question. Yesterday, President Biden announced his intention to
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by the 20th anniversary of the
September 11th attacks. While the American people are understandably
weary after two decades of war, any move to draw down our military
presence in Afghanistan should be based on conditions on the ground,
not in accordance with an arbitrary date. The Taliban have not upheld
their commitments during the peace negotiations process. Before any
withdrawal, we must ensure that the Taliban respects the legitimate
governing authority of Afghanistan and see a de-association from
extremist groups such as Al 'Qaeda and ISIS. We cannot repeat the
mistakes of the past, such as the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq
in 2011. That decision lead to more military intervention from the
United States, not less, while giving rise to new extremist groups that
filled the vacuum of instability. Do you share in my concern that a
complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces in September without any sign
that the Taliban is prepared to become a responsible partner in
governing? What are the chances that Afghanistan becomes a failed state
and a haven for terrorists who could once again strike the United
States Homeland?
Answer. I support the administration's decision to complete a full
military withdrawal by September 11, and to focus on diplomatic efforts
to facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Taliban and the
Afghan Government. If confirmed, I will work to ensure we remain
vigilant to the terrorist threat and that U.S. humanitarian assistance
preserves gains for Afghan women and civil society and mitigates
prospects for state failure. I understand the administration will work
with Afghan partners and Allies to counter any reemergence of a
terrorist threat and to hold the Taliban to its commitment to ensure al
Qaeda does not threaten the United States, our interests, or our
allies.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is committing a
genocide against the Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang Uygur
Autonomous Region (XUAR) that is ongoing. The Biden administration had
sent differing signals about the degree to which administration
officials assessed that genocide is indeed ongoing, but on March 22,
Secretary Blinken correctly emphasized ``the P.R.C. continues to commit
genocide and crimes against humanity.'' Do you agree with the
assessment that the Chinese Government is engaged in a genocide against
the Uyghurs and other minorities in the XUAR that is ongoing?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of State's determination that
the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing
genocide and crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. These crimes include imprisonment,
torture, enforced sterilization, and persecution, including through
forced labor and draconian restrictions on the freedoms of religion or
belief, expression, and movement. These atrocities shock the conscience
and must be met with serious consequences.
Question. What role do you see for the State Department in
countering that ongoing genocide, and more broadly the human rights
atrocities being committed by the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. I share your deep concern about the ongoing genocide and
crimes against humanity against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim,
and members of other ethnic and religious groups in Xinjiang. I
understand the Department has reinvigorated cooperation with partners
and allies and has imposed a number of measures to address these
atrocities. If confirmed, I will support ongoing efforts to broaden
this international coalition and call for an independent and unhindered
investigation. I also will support using all appropriate tools,
including those provided for in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act, to
pressure the PRC to end these atrocities and to promote accountability
for those responsible and justice for victims.
Question. The Obama-Biden administration's approach to the Israeli-
Arab conflict was justified on the basis of a theory of regional
relations in which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict prevented broader
Israeli-Arab rapprochement. Among other decisions, that administration
implemented discriminatory policies that distinguished between Jewish
communities in places Israel controlled before and after 1967. That
approach culminated in December 2016, when the Obama administration
maneuvered the United Nations Security Council into passing UNSCR 2334,
which among other things denied Israel's sovereignty over the Golan
Heights and part of its capital Jerusalem, including the Jewish
Quarter. The Trump administration systematically worked to hollow out
and render UNSCR 2334 null and void. They did so, including by
recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, by recognizing
Jerusalem as Israel's capital, by moving our embassy to Jerusalem, by
seeking to end discriminatory approaches that distinguished legally and
for the purposes of aid and trade between different Israeli
communities, and by taking several other steps. Do you believe that
Israel has sovereignty over the Golan Heights?
Answer. In considering the U.S. position on the Golan Heights, I
understand the administration gives great weight to Israel's security.
The current Syrian regime and its Iranian allies pose a significant
risk to Israel. It is apparent that the Golan Heights is critically
important to Israel's security. As long as Bashar al-Assad is in
control of Syria, it would be irresponsible to urge Israel to part with
the Golan Heights. Control of the strategic Golan Heights provides
Israel an added measure of security from the turmoil next door.
Question. Do you believe that Israel has sovereignty over
Jerusalem, including the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity
that they deserve.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
any part of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. Jerusalem itself is a final status
issue to be resolved through direct negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinians. If confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts
to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with the care and sensitivity
that they deserve.
Question. Do you believe that Israel is in illegal occupation of
the Old City of Jerusalem?
Answer. I understand the administration recognizes that Jerusalem
is central to the national visions of both Israelis and Palestinians.
Jerusalem is the capital of Israel and its ultimate status is a final
status issue which will need to be resolved by the parties in the
context of direct negotiations. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's efforts to handle all issues related to Jerusalem with
the care and sensitivity that they deserve.
Question. On January 10, 2021, the State Department designated
Ansarallah, sometimes called the Houthis, and Abdul Malik al-Houthi,
Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim, three
leaders of Ansarallah, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists
(SDGTs) pursuant to Executive Order 13224. On February 5, the Biden
administration informed Congress of its intention to revoke those
sanctions. The issue of humanitarianism was central to the public
explanation of the decision: officials at the State Department have
justified the delisting of what they described as the ``broad''
designation of Ansarallah on humanitarian grounds, e.g. that large
parts of Yemen's population live under areas controlled by the group.
Since then, the Houthis have escalated their violence across the
region, bombarding civilians in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Yemen was
already one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the world, in
large part because the Houthis and their Iranian backers block aid,
steal aid, and attack civilians. Please describe the role played by
Iran and the Houthis in deepening the humanitarian catastrophe in
Yemen.
Answer. Iran continues to provide the Houthis with training,
equipment, and monetary support, which assists them in promoting
regional instability; threatening our partners, especially Saudi
Arabia; and disrupting international shipping. Further, the Houthis use
this support to threaten Yemeni civilians, especially at this time in
the city of Marib. If confirmed, I am committed to working with our
interagency partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities.
The Houthis impede humanitarian access in the areas they control.
If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to work with our partners on
the ground to improve humanitarian access and facilitate the provision
of critical commodities and humanitarian aid to Yemeni civilians.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in general.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis. I
understand the administration heeded concerns from the United Nations,
humanitarian groups, and bipartisan members of Congress, among others,
that the designations could have had a devastating impact on Yemenis'
access to basic commodities like food and fuel, which could increase
the risk of famine. The short time that passed between the designations
and the revocations limited the impact the designations could have had
on humanitarian assistance and commercial imports, including food and
other essential supplies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which the Biden
administration's decision to lift terrorism sanctions against the
Houthis and their leaders has enhanced the ability to provide
humanitarian relief to Yemeni civilians in Marib.
Answer. As I understand, the revocations were aimed at ensuring
that U.S. policies would not impede assistance to those already
suffering what has been called the world's worst humanitarian crisis.
This has been especially critical in Marib, where the escalation of
hostilities has caused additional needs and secondary displacement. The
lifting of sanctions has allowed for the delivery of life-saving food,
emergency shelter, water, sanitation and hygiene, and essential non-
food items, such as blankets and water containers.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized for
inaction in response to Iranian human rights atrocities, and critics
have suggested that those issues were subsumed beneath the
administration's commitment to securing a nuclear deal. The Biden
administration, which is rushing to secure another nuclear deal with
Iran, has already come under similar criticism. Please describe your
assessment of the scope and nature of Iran's human rights record.
Answer. The Iranian Government severely restricts the rights to
peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of religion or
belief, and freedom of expression. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's
systematic human rights violations and abuses, which include arbitrary
or unlawful detention of numerous individuals, including American
citizens. I will work with my colleagues and U.S. allies and partners
to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for regime
officials responsible for human rights violations and abuses, including
torture, executions, persecution of religious minorities, and digital
repression.
Question. Please describe the degree to which you believe that
Iranian human rights concerns should be highlighted vs. considerations
related to nuclear negotiations or securing nuclear-related
concessions.
Answer. President Biden has been clear that Iran must never obtain
a nuclear weapon. Iran's development and proliferation of ballistic
missiles pose a threat to international security and remain a
significant nonproliferation challenge. The President has also
emphasized that human rights must be at the center of our foreign
policy. If confirmed, I will call out Iran's human rights violations
and abuses, which I did forcefully in my prior role as Acting Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. If
confirmed, I intend to work with colleagues and U.S. allies and
partners to consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability
for Iranian regime officials responsible for pervasive human rights
violations and abuses.
Question. Do you believe that imposing new human rights sanctions
against Iran, or enforcing existing ones, would violate the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or a successor agreement?
Answer. The Iranian Government denies Iranians the ability to
exercise their human rights, including through severe restrictions on
the rights to peaceful assembly, freedom of association, freedom of
religion or belief, and freedom of expression.
I support continuing to maintain and impose sanctions on Iranian
individuals and entities perpetrating human rights violations and
abuses. Human rights sanctions are independent of JCPOA provisions and
remain an invaluable, bipartisan tool to achieve the Biden-Harris
administration's commitment to center human rights and democratic
values in U.S. foreign policy.
Question. In July 1989, you were hired as director of the American
Educational Trust's speakers' bureau, according to the Washington
Report on Middle East Affairs, which is published by the organization.
The organization and outlet routinely suggest that American Jews who
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship invite hostility and
even violence because of their advocacy, that political expenditures
and activities by Americans and especially American Jews are unseemly,
and that such activities raise questions about their loyalty to the
United States. The Washington Report has also lists of members of
Congress who receive donations from Americans who politically advocate
for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship.
Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes, including
accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong U.S.-
Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are
inappropriate?
Answer. Yes. I deplore any suggestion that American Jews who
advocate for a strong U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the
United States. My entry-level employment at the American Educational
Trust ended some 31 years ago, I have had no contact with the
organization since then, and I categorically reject the organization's
positions with respect to Israel.
Question. Do you agree that these sorts of rhetoric and tropes,
including accusations that American Jews who advocate for a strong
U.S.-Israel relationship are disloyal to the United States, are anti-
Semitic?
Answer. Yes, I agree that accusations of dual loyalty against
American Jews supportive of the U.S.-Israel alliance constitute anti-
Semitic speech. I fully endorse the International Holocaust Remembrance
Alliance's (IHRA) working definition of anti-Semitism, under which
certain criticisms leveled against Israel, or Jewish persons as a
collective, can be considered anti-Semitic. I strongly support the
Biden administration's embrace of the IHRA working definition of anti-
Semitism and join the Biden administration in categorically condemning
all forms of anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I intend to combat anti-
Semitism and intolerance in all forms and will work to expand
international coalitions towards this objective.
Question. Do you agree that it is inappropriate to suggest that
Americans who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be
excluded from engaging in political activities, including donating to
members of Congress?
Answer. Yes. I categorically reject any suggestions that Americans
who believe in a strong U.S.-Israel relationship should be excluded
from engaging in political activities, including donating to members of
Congress. I strongly support the Biden administration's commitment to
renewing democracy abroad and at home, and believe the latter is
underpinned by the rights of every American to fully exercise their
Constitutional rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of religion, freedom to petition one's government,
and equal protection under the law.
Question. Do you believe that a strong U.S.-Israel relationship
boosts American national security?
Answer. Yes. I strongly support the Biden-Harris administration's
unwavering and ironclad commitment to Israel's security and, if
confirmed, will work to further strengthen all aspects of U.S.-Israel
partnership. The ties between the United States and Israel are rooted
in strategic interests and shared democratic values, and in this vein,
I understand the Biden-Harris administration will seek to further
strengthen the U.S.-Israel alliance. If confirmed, I will support the
administration's goals to work closely with Israel, to include
countering anti-Israel bias in the U.N. system, strengthening
international coalitions against anti-Semitism, and building on
normalization agreements to strengthen cooperation between Israel and
its neighbors.
Question. The term ``universal human right'' is frequently used
throughout the international community, and it was a reference you made
consistently throughout the hearing. Please provide in your own words a
definition of universal human right.
Answer. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) represents
a common understanding, which I share, of universal human rights and
freedoms around the globe. The UDHR begins by stating that all human
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. It sets out, for
the first time at the international level, rights and freedoms to be
universally protected. To me, many of these rights are inspired by
those enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and hold U.N. member states to
a common standard. The universality of human rights articulated in the
UDHR also counters false arguments put forth by China, Russia, and
other autocracies of a U.S. or Western agenda being imposed on the rest
of the world.
Question. In your view, is the concept of a ``human right'' fluid
or relative?
Answer. As human rights are universal, they are neither fluid nor
relative. As an example, the right to freedom of expression has not
changed since it was articulated even though our understanding of the
application of the right has been challenged as we adapt to new methods
of communication. From time to time, our understanding of rights may
expand; for example, where once societies held other human beings in
bondage, it is now universally recognized that slavery is a violation
of one's human rights. This does not make human rights fluid or
relative, but reflects the reality that the understanding and
application of human rights standards can evolve in a positive
direction alongside societal progress.
Question. Do you believe that certain rights are unalienable?
Answer. In its preamble, the Declaration of Independence states,
``We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.'' I believe that these unalienable rights and those
enshrined in the U.S. Constitution apply to all Americans, cannot be
denied by government, and that there is no hierarchy of rights.
Similarly, in the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
I understand and support the concept of ``inalienable'' rights that
cannot be denied or taken away from people, and which governments have
a duty to protect and to refrain from violating.
Question. The Biden administration rejoined the United States to
the United Nations Human Rights Council, a body that features some of
the worst human rights violators in the world including China, Cuba,
Somalia, and Venezuela. In your hearing you argued a lack of U.S.
presence at the Council would create a ``vacuum'' for bad actors to
direct policy initiatives. What substantive policy areas does the U.N.
Human Rights Council hold jurisdiction over or govern?
Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council (HRC), while not without
flaws, provides a venue to raise human rights violations from around
the world. It can play an important role in shining a spotlight on the
world's worst human rights violators. For example, the HRC is one of
the few places in the U.N. where China has been called out for its
abuses in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. HRC engagement allows the United
States to keep countries with the worst human rights records off the
Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to run for seats.
U.S. engagement decreased unfair HRC bias against Israel.
Question. If we accept the ``vacuum argument,'' is it your view
that United States participation in the U.N. Human Rights Council
should include the following (please explain your response for each):
Advocate for the removal of well-known human rights violators from the
Council; Withhold funding for certain activities or initiatives as a
tool to produce changes in behavior from malign actors; Use the voice
and vote of the United States at the Council to highlight human rights
atrocities, including violations of protecting the right to life, by
other nations, including nations who sit on the Council.
Answer. I understand the administration is committed to working
with partners to ensure the Human Rights Council shines a spotlight on
countries with the worst human rights records and serves as a forum for
those fighting injustice and tyranny. U.S. re-engagement should
advocate to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights
records off the Council and encourage more rights-respecting nations to
run for seats. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States
continues to seek Council reforms, including elimination of anti-Israel
Article Agenda Item 7, and promote all appropriate, available, and
effective accountability mechanisms for those who commit atrocities, to
include forced abortions and sterilization, rape, torture, and mass
killings.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Uzra Zeya by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. law with respect to
engagement with Hamas? News media reports indicate the Biden
administration has committed to ``resetting the U.S. relationship with
the Palestinian people and leadership,'' including robust engagement
and provision of aid. On April 7, the State Department announced its
intent to ``restart U.S. economic, development, humanitarian assistance
for the Palestinian people'' by providing $75 million in aid to the
West Bank and Gaza.
Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under
Executive Order 13224. I strongly support the Biden-Harris
administration commitment to disrupt and deter terrorist organizations
worldwide, including Hamas. I understand U.S. engagement in the West
Bank and Gaza and with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and
involves no engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO.
Question. What are the implications for U.S. engagement and
provision of aid if the Palestinian Legislative Council includes, or is
led by, members of Hamas? Under the Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act of
2006, the United States is prohibited from providing assistance to a
Palestinian Authority effectively controlled by Hamas.
Answer. I understand U.S. assistance for the Palestinians is
provided consistent with U.S. law. I also understand the Department
routinely assesses its foreign assistance programming, and would do so
following Palestinian elections or any other significant change related
to the Palestinian Authority.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the Biden
administration will not engage with Hamas officials and will not seek
to find technical loopholes to engaging with Hamas officials such as
considering them as members of the PLO, which they are not?
Answer. Hamas is designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under Executive
Order 13224. I understand U.S. engagement in the West Bank and Gaza and
with the Palestinians is consistent with U.S. law and involves no
engagement with Hamas, a designated FTO. If confirmed, I will comply
with U.S. law and seek to ensure that ``J family'' bureaus and offices
do the same.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 28, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Markey,
Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Ambassador Jenkins, former Secretary Fernandez,
congratulations on your nominations and my thanks for your
willingness to return to the State Department with your
demonstrated experience, strength, and commitment to advancing
our national interests.
I have spoken often of the pivotal foreign policy
challenges facing our country and the State Department, and
this hearing will be no different. If confirmed, both of you
will confront serious issues and challenges and a department in
need of repair and rebuilding.
I am heartened by the Biden administration's emphasis on
nominating knowledgeable and seasoned leaders with rich foreign
policy experience.
Ambassador Jenkins, the Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security is one of the most vital senior
positions in the Department of State. Its portfolio ranges from
nuclear weapons to terrorism and from nonproliferation to
landmines. It requires orchestrating global cooperation with
both allies and adversaries on critical issues.
As you and I have discussed, I have long been concerned
over the way that the Department of Defense has assumed the
security assistance mission that should be the exclusive
purview of the State Department and the Secretary of State.
I greatly respect the service of the men and women in our
armed forces and particularly your own 20 years of naval
service. But the person delivering assistance to officials of a
foreign government should not be wearing a uniform. They
should, instead, have the authority to advance and promote a
comprehensive foreign policy vision consistent with our core
values.
We also discussed the need for the State Department to
respect this committee's crucial statutory oversight role over
the arms sales process, including when the laws and regulations
governing those sales may have been violated.
This relationship was poisoned by the last administration.
Thus far, the relationship has been much improved, but more
work is necessary to create an effective partnership.
Make no mistake. One way or another, this committee will
conduct effective oversight, and I hope and expect that we can
depend on your cooperation.
Finally, we stand at a crossroads in our nuclear
relationship with Russia and China. We have extended the New
START Treaty with Russia for five years. The question is now
where do we go from here.
Do we seek deeper reductions in Russian strategic forces?
Should we focus on shorter-range nonstrategic nuclear weapons
not covered by New START?
Should we focus on engaging China which, although its force
structure remains smaller than the United States or Russia, is
rapidly modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces?
So I look forward to hearing your thoughts on those matters
today.
Mr. Fernandez, if confirmed, I expect that your previous
experience as Assistant Secretary for Economics, Energy, and
Business Growth will serve you well. This is vitally important
because the last four years have been especially difficult for
the bureaus that you have been nominated to lead.
They suffered from neglect, a loss of an institutional
experience, and an undervaluing of diplomacy at the highest
levels. The former administration never even bothered to
nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Oceans and
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
Given the sad state of affairs, your first priority, I
believe, has to be rebuild the E Bureaus, restore morale, and
provide clear leadership. This is especially important because
President Biden has elevated the mission of the E Bureau by
prioritizing climate change as a foreign policy imperative.
Energy, the environment, economic growth, leadership in all
of these arenas is necessary to restore U.S. leadership and
successfully combat the climate crisis.
If confirmed, you will also head the economic diplomacy
wing at the State Department. I am interested in hearing about
your views on building back better America's economic
statecraft toolkit.
Economic diplomacy is an absolutely critical domain for
competition in the 21st century, and there are many questions
to be answered about a strategy for the post-COVID
reconstruction of the global economy, as well as how to help
poor countries administer vaccines and build resilience to the
economic strains brought by the pandemic.
I am particularly interested in your views on Secretary
Yellen's proposed $650 billion in special drawing rights and
how it promotes global economic stability and growth, and I
would like to understand how you plan to engage on economic
sanctions both within the department and in the interagency
process.
So, Ambassador Jenkins and Mr. Fernandez, both of you face
steep challenges ahead, but I have no doubt that you are up to
the task.
And with that, we look forward to your testimony and turn
to the distinguished ranking member for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The two nominations before us today are important and,
indeed, really critical to our nation's foreign policy. I would
first like to start with the nomination to be Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security.
For the past few decades, the global threat landscape has
been going through a paradigm shift. Unfortunately, many in the
West have clung to the notion that we can simply rely on the
policies of the past to keep us secure today.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In just the last
10 years since the New START Treaty was ratified, the threats
facing the United States, its allies, and our collective
security have only grown.
Russia has completely modernized its nuclear forces and has
done so outside existing treaty limits. It is growing its
nuclear stockpile and is developing new so-called exotic
missile delivery systems.
In addition, State Department compliance reports have laid
out a consistent pattern of Russian noncompliance, also known
as cheating, with a majority of the international arms control
obligations it has signed.
Meanwhile, China is on pace to at least double its nuclear
stockpile over the next decade. It has tested more ballistic
missiles in 2018 and '19 than the rest of the world combined,
and is likely engaged in nuclear testing activities.
Currently, China is modernizing every element of its
nuclear triad, including larger land-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles, new ballistic missile submarines, and long-
range stealth bombers, and the Department of Defense assesses
that China is raising the alert level of much of its nuclear
force indefinitely.
Combined with lack of transparency, these actions
contribute to potential miscommunication or inadvertent
escalation in a conflict and each of these threats demands
immediate attention.
Beyond Russia and China, we continue to face mounting
threats from other malign actors like Iran and North Korea, who
continue to vie for a place on the world stage by advancing
their nuclear and missile programs and engaging in proxy and
cyber warfare.
This arms race encourages other nations to question whether
they too need to develop nuclear weapons--certainly, not a
pretty picture--and in the process, it undermines--all of this
undermines Cold War--the Cold War architecture.
The role of the Under Secretary for Arms Control is our
lead negotiator and accountability monitor to keep other
countries honest on these issues. This person must not only
have a deep level of technical knowledge but also the skills
and wherewithal to sit across the table from leaders of these
nations and push back against empty offers and veiled threats.
It is also critical that this administration recognize the
interdependence between arms control and nuclear modernization,
as explicitly as explicitly codified in the ratification of the
New START Treaty.
The Obama administration committed to nuclear modernization
in order to win ratification of the New START Treaty but
promptly scrapped those promises and abandoned those
commitments just a year later.
Trust must be rebuilt between Congress and the executive.
To rebuild this trust, the Biden administration must commit to
a full modernization of the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons
complex.
This is vital to reassure our allies who have forgone
developing nuclear weapons and instead rely on our nuclear
umbrella that we provide for them. Dismantling our capabilities
while our adversaries build their stockpiles, is inherently
destabilizing and undermines international security.
Which brings me to the last but, certainly, one of the most
important topics for this nominee, the Senate's role in
approving arms control agreements and treaties. The
Constitution plainly lays out the Senate's role in approving
these types of international agreements.
I cannot stress enough that any international agreement in
the arms control space, including reentry into a previous
agreement, must be put to the Senate for its advice and
consent, as demanded by the Founding Fathers and our
Constitution.
And to win consent, the administration should take concrete
steps to rebuild the trust previous congresses have placed in
the executive branch.
Next, we have the nomination of the Honorable Jose
Fernandez to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy and Environment. Our economy is one of our greatest
assets and we all know economic policy is a crucial part of
foreign policy.
The United States represents about 4.5 percent of the
world's population, but we account for 22 percent of the
world's economic activity. American creativity, innovation, and
determination are hallmarks of the U.S. economic model and it
is not surprising that countries around the world long to
duplicate our success.
More government spending of borrowed money or of
government-appropriated private capital is simply not the
answer to our problems or those of other countries. Spending
enormous sums at home and abroad in the hope that it will
create a better world is not sustainable.
Instead, we must carefully define our objectives. Whether
it is economic energy or environmental policy, we must be
advocates of a free market system that resists the temptation
to impose a one-size-fits-all solution to these incredibly
diverse and difficult issues.
Further, how we steward our economy and help other
countries develop is important to expanding the rule of law,
encouraging compliance to international norms, and pushing back
on corruption.
We must continue to promote the private sector-driven
market-based economy that has led to the United States and its
allies achieving a level of prosperity for our citizens never
before seen in history.
It is only through promoting this system that the West will
truly be able to offer the world a better alternative to the
socialists and parasitic Chinese economic policies and to
reinforce the system of fair play rules we, along with other
free and democratic countries, have constructed.
This is the economic landscape that lies ahead of us. With
our allies, we must rise to this challenge. I look forward to
hearing from both the witnesses on how they plan to address
these very important issues.
Thank you, Senator Menendez.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
So we will turn to our two nominees. Your full statements
will be included in the record. We ask you to summarize them in
about five minutes or so we can have a conversation.
And we will start off with Ambassador Jenkins.
STATEMENT OF HON. BONNIE D. JENKINS OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO
BE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
Ms. Jenkins. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris,
and Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating
me to be Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security.
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee.
If confirmed, I pledge to work tirelessly for the American
people and in close coordination with members of Congress and
this committee to advance our shared ideals for this great
nation.
I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my
family, and my friends and colleagues who have inspired and
supported me for so many years. I have been honored to serve
the U.S. Government as both a civilian and in uniform from
working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s to over 20 years in
the U.S. Air Force and Navy Reserves.
Most recently, I had the honor of being confirmed to serve
as ambassador for the State Department Threat Reduction
Programs from 2009 to 2017, working to bring the issues of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security front
and center.
My commitment to public service has always included
advancing opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded
the nonprofit Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and
Conflict Transformation in an effort to make sure that our
nation's policymakers are engaging in and constitute all of our
experts, regardless of race, gender, or background.
I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington
Universities teaching our future generation of policymakers. If
confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on
the challenges that our country is facing today.
An increasingly authoritarian People's Republic of China is
pursuing a destabilizing military modernization project and
rapid nuclear buildup, endangering the international rules-
based order and inflaming regional and global tensions.
Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its
ongoing support for terrorist groups and violent armed
militias.
Russia continues to violate arms control agreements and
commitments, and we face new cybersecurity and emerging
technology threats from our adversaries. Reducing the risk of
war through effective arms control, limiting Russian and
Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top
priorities, if confirmed.
We must strengthen deterrence alliance in the Euro Atlantic
and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against growing
threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible
behavior in outer space.
We must grapple with advancements and emerging technologies
that can threaten strategic stability. If confirmed, I will
strive to ensure that arms transfers and security assistance
are focused on building value-based security partnerships.
I will carefully assess all critical factors, including
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will
ensure other key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's
qualitative military edge, are upheld.
I look forward to working with this committee, if
confirmed, to look strategically at how our security assistance
authorities are structured and how they are balanced and
resourced across the Departments of State and Defense to ensure
that our tools, including our security cooperation agreements,
are the most efficient for the U.S. taxpayer and the most
effective for U.S. national security.
Renewed American leadership, as set out in the
administration's interim national security strategic guidance,
will be essential to reducing the dangers from chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their
delivery systems.
Further, working with allies and partners the United States
must continue to stand up for an open, interoperable, reliable,
and secure internet and stable cyberspace where international
law and voluntary nonbinding norms apply to state behavior.
You have my commitment that if I am confirmed I will work
in close coordination with you in our efforts to restore
Congress' role in formulating foreign policy and to ensure the
policies we enact are in the greatest interest of our national
security of the American people.
The interests we face are numerous, but our commitment to
our allies and to our American people is rock solid. We have
much work to do and I am ready to get started.
With that, I welcome your questions and I look forward to
our discussion today. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jenkins follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
Secretary Blinken for their trust and faith in nominating me to be the
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security.
It is a great honor for me to come before this committee. If confirmed,
I pledge to work tirelessly for the American people and in close
coordination with Members of Congress and this committee to advance our
shared ideals for this great nation.
I would like to thank my mother, Dorothy Jenkins, my family, and my
friends and colleagues who have inspired and supported me for so many
years.
I have been honored to serve the U.S. Government as both a civilian
and in uniform, from working on arms control treaties as a lawyer with
the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1990s, to over 20
years in the Air Force and U.S. Navy Reserves. Most recently, I had the
honor of being confirmed to serve as Ambassador for the State
Department's threat reduction programs from 2009 to 2017, working to
bring the issues of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
security front and center.
My commitment to public service has always included advancing
opportunities for all Americans. In 2017, I founded the non-profit
Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation in
an effort to make sure that our nation's policy makers are engaging in
and constitute all of our experts, regardless of their race, gender, or
background. I am also a professor at Georgetown and George Washington
Universities, teaching our future generation of policy makers.
If confirmed, I will bring this breadth of experience to bear on
the challenges that our country is facing today. An increasingly
authoritarian People's Republic of China is pursuing a destabilizing
military modernization project and rapid nuclear buildup, endangering
the international rules-based order and inflaming regional and global
tensions. Iran has continued to expand and accelerate its nuclear
program and ballistic missile development, in addition to its ongoing
support for terrorist groups and violent armed militias. Russia
continues to violate arms control agreements and commitments. And we
face new cybersecurity and emerging technology threats from our
adversaries.
Reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control,
limiting Russian and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our
efforts in biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical
weapons, and promoting a diverse workforce will be among my top
priorities, if confirmed. We must strengthen deterrence alliances in
the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific to better deter and defend against
growing threats. We must develop and implement norms of responsible
behavior in outer space. And we must grapple with advancements in
emerging technologies that can threaten strategic stability.
If confirmed, I will strive to ensure that arms transfers and
security assistance are focused on building values-based security
partnerships. I will carefully assess all critical factors, including
nonproliferation, arms control, and human rights, and will ensure other
key commitments, such as maintaining Israel's Qualitative Military
Edge, are upheld.
I look forward to working with this committee, if confirmed, to
look strategically at how our security assistance authorities are
structured, and how they are balanced and resourced across the
Departments of State and Defense, to ensure that our tools, including
our security cooperation agreements, are the most efficient for the
U.S. taxpayer, and the most effective for U.S. national security.
Renewed American leadership--As set out in the administration's
Interim National Security Strategic Guidance--will be essential to
reducing the dangers from chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. Further, working with
allies and partners, the United States must continue to stand up for an
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure Internet and a stable
cyberspace, where international law and voluntary, non-binding norms
apply to state behavior.
You have my commitment that if confirmed I will work in close
coordination with you in our efforts to restore Congress' role in
formulating foreign policy, and to ensure the policies we enact are in
the greatest interest of our national security and of the American
people. The threats we face are numerous, but our commitment to our
allies, and to the American people, is rock solid. We have much work to
do, and I am ready to get started. With that, I welcome your questions
and look forward to our discussion today.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Fernandez?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSE W. FERNANDEZ OF NEW YORK, NOMINATED TO
BE AN UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY, AND
THE ENVIRONMENT); UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT; UNITED
STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT
BANK; AND UNITED STATES ALTERNATE GOVERNOR OF THE EUROPEAN BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Menendez.
Thank you, Ranking Member Risch, and other members of this
committee for the opportunity that you have given me before--to
appear before you today.
I would like to take a couple of seconds to introduce my
family. I am blessed to have a supportive and loving family
made up of three remarkable women. All three of them walk the
talk of public service and I am very proud of them.
My wife, Andrea Gabor, is a professor at Baruch College in
New York and the author of four books, in addition to being the
mother of Sarah and Annie. Sarah, who is also here, spent a big
chunk of her law school years volunteering at a death penalty
clinic and is on her way to a graduate degree in psychology.
And not with us but very much in our thoughts is our second
daughter, Annie, who is pursuing a joint public health and
medical degree in California. I could not be here without them.
So thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce them.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's
nominee for Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth,
Energy, and the Environment. I am grateful for the confidence
shown in me by the president and by Secretary Blinken.
If confirmed, I will consult frequently with this committee
as we work to serve the interests of the American people.
Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great
Recession, I appeared before this committee as the nominee for
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic, Energy and Business
Affairs.
I come to you today under circumstances that are different
from those that we faced in 2009. But the reasons that brought
me here have not changed.
My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed
in food kitchens by charities and we lost the lease in our
first home. But when we settled in New Jersey in the town next
to Union City in Hudson County, we began to rebuild lives that
had been upended by revolution, fear, and deprivation.
A decade later, a country that owed us nothing had given me
scholarships at Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School where
I was challenged and nurtured by educators I will never be able
to repay.
In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that
trading essential liberties for economic security is a false
bargain, and I believe to my core that a humble but confident
nation that celebrates its diversity while striving to reach a
more perfect union can inspire others to tackle the existential
challenges of our time.
With the exception of my four years here as Assistant
Secretary, I practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I
have represented U.S. investors doing business abroad and
foreign investors operating in the United States.
I have advised governments in Africa, Latin America, and
elsewhere on pro-growth policies, and, unfortunately, over the
last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses
everywhere have suffered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
If confirmed, I will advance--seek to advance foreign
policy initiatives that will benefit the American people and,
particularly, our middle class, and I will focus on five
priorities.
My first will be to support the State Department's critical
role in stopping COVID-19. As Undersecretary, I would work to
advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains,
promote economic recovery, and promote effective global
systems.
My second priority will be to work on environmental and
energy policies to accelerate economic growth. President
Biden's executive order on tackling the climate crisis has
established this goal as a national priority.
There is no greater challenge than climate change and we
must work to include all countries in the effort while ensuring
that our workers will share in the benefits of the new economy.
My third priority will be to ensure that our country will
benefit from free, fair, and reciprocal trade. We need to focus
on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove
trade irritants.
We also need to support American innovation by protecting
intellectual property rights overseas and preventing strategic
competitors from gaming the system.
A fourth priority of mine will be to help maintain American
leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies.
U.S. technology companies face increasing challenges in
maintaining U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and
technology, and we need to engage diplomatically and with
industry stakeholders so that international norms and standards
are fair and transparent.
Finally, my last task will be to do what I have been doing
now for almost 40 years and that is to facilitate new market
opportunities for U.S. firms. Competing in the international
arena is a strategic imperative for the United States and an
opportunity for our companies and our workers.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fernandez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jose W. Fernandez
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and members of
this committee for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I am honored to come before you as President Biden's nominee for
Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the
Environment. I am grateful for the confidence shown in me by the
President and Secretary Blinken. If confirmed I will consult frequently
with this Committee as we work to serve the interests of the American
people.
Nearly a dozen years ago, in the midst of the Great Recession, I
appeared before this committee as the nominee for Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs. I now come to you
at a moment that is no less dire. A pandemic has robbed the lives of
more than 570,000 Americans and millions more around the world.
Generations wonder whether we can avert a climate cataclysm. Emboldened
rivals seek to expand their influence at America's expense. And
traditional allies question whether the United States will remain at
their side.
I come to you today under circumstances different from those we
faced in 2009, but the reasons that brought me here have not changed.
My family and I left Cuba as refugees in 1967. We were fed in food
kitchens run by charities and lost the lease in our first home, but
when we settled in New Jersey and my mother took a job as a seamstress
in a local factory and my father became a bank clerk, we began to
rebuild lives upended by revolution, fear and deprivation. A decade
later, in a country that owed us nothing, I had received scholarships
to Dartmouth College and Columbia Law School, where I was challenged
and nurtured by educators I will never be able to repay.
In short, I have lived the promise of America. I know that trading
essential liberties for economic security is a false bargain. And I
believe to my core that a humble but confident nation that celebrates
its diversity while striving to reach a more perfect union can inspire
others to tackle the existential challenges of our time.
With the exception of my four years in Washington as Assistant
Secretary, I have practiced commercial law in New York since 1980. I
have represented U.S. investors operating in troubled countries, and
foreign investors seeking to raise funds in our capital markets or
navigate the U.S. foreign investment system. I have advised governments
in Africa and Latin America on pro-growth policies. Unfortunately, over
the last year I have also witnessed how workers and businesses
everywhere have foundered in economies ravaged by COVID-19.
If confirmed I will seek to advance foreign policy initiatives that
will benefit the American people, and particularly our middle class,
focusing on five priorities:
1. The State Department's critical role in stopping COVID-19: As
Secretary Blinken has said ``This pandemic won't end at home
until it ends worldwide.'' As Under Secretary I would work to
advance global vaccination, secure critical supply chains,
support safe international transportation systems, and--more
broadly-- promote inclusive economic recovery and effective
global health systems.
2. Environmental and energy policies to accelerate economic growth:
President Biden's Executive Order on tackling the climate
crisis established as a national priority raising global
climate ambition and integrating climate considerations across
a wide range of international fora. There is no challenge
greater than climate change, and we must work to enlist all
countries. We also need to ensure that our workers will share
in the benefits of the new economy.
3. Free, fair, and reciprocal trade: The United States needs to focus
on common goals with our trade partners while working to remove
trade irritants. We also need to support American innovation by
enlisting partners to protect intellectual property rights
overseas and prevent strategic competitors from circumventing
the rules.
4. Leadership in the digital economy and emerging technologies: U.S.
technology companies face increasing challenges in maintaining
U.S. preeminence in cutting-edge science and technology. We
need to engage diplomatically and with industry stakeholders to
maintain U.S. competitiveness and ensure that international
norms and standards are fair and transparent.
5. Facilitating new market opportunities for U.S. firms: As the
Department's senior economic official, I would direct our
network of economic officers in embassies around the world to
help U.S. firms expand overseas, creating jobs in the United
States and contributing to our economic growth. Competing in
the international arena is a strategic imperative for the
United States and an opportunity for our companies and workers.
Let me conclude by stressing that, if confirmed, I would be honored
to serve with Secretary Blinken and my counterparts throughout the U.S.
Government in support of the President's economic policy agenda. I will
also seek your counsel throughout my tenure.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both for your testimony. We
will begin a series of five-minute rounds for members, and I
will at the beginning say I have to go to introduce two judges
to the Judiciary Committee. So I will----
Senator Risch. I will take over.
The Chairman. Yeah, absolutely. I know you would be happy
to.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I have no doubt about that. So I will start
off with my questions. Then I will turn to Senator Risch. I
should be back by then. But if not, Senator Risch, if you would
acknowledge according to the list that we have here.
Let me start off with you, Ambassador. I am glad I heard in
your statement about your commitment to work with the
committee. The leadership of State in the last administration
had a very contentious relationship with this committee on arms
sales matters, and it was clear that our legitimate statutory
oversight role was neither recognized nor respected.
So far, Secretary Blinken has fostered a very different
relationship that is professional, respectful, and
consultative. Will you continue and broaden this relationship
on arms sales oversight and will you commit to consult with us
regarding policy changes and initiatives and not merely inform
us of your decisions?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for your questions, Senator.
Yes, I can confirm that I am more than happy to consult
with you.
The Chairman. All right.
Now, I have been concerned for some time that a Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor Bureau does not have appropriate
influence on the arms sales process. The Biden administration
seems better disposed to consider the human rights components
of the arms sales process.
I plan to reintroduce my Safeguarding Human Rights in Arms
Sales Act, which seeks to reemphasize and enhance DRL's role. I
have no ideological prohibition to having U.S. arms be sold
abroad. I have no problem with that.
I do have a problem when we sell it to countries that
violate human rights or act outside of the international norm
and the use of those weapons.
So, if confirmed, will you enhance DRL's role in the arms
sales process?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, Senator. What I can certainly say is, as
I said in my statement, I view human rights as forefront and
fundamental to arms sales and arms transfers. So I will,
certainly, do what I can, if I am confirmed, at State to
include all issues and individuals in terms of promoting human
rights.
The Chairman. Now, I want to turn to the question that I
raised earlier, and I think you and I had an opportunity to
discuss this. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, DOD has
reproduced more and more of State's security assistance
authority.
It has recently attempted to reproduce State's
international military education and training program with a
focus on its own priorities as it has done with other
duplicated programs. It, essentially, runs its own foreign
military financing grant program, which is considered far more
flexible than State's.
If confirmed, will you give equal focus to all the issues
in all of the bureaus and offices under your supervision and
actively defend State's equities and authorities in this
regard?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, Senator.
Yes, I am very concerned and would, certainly, be working
with all the authorities and the offices within State and the
interagency to strengthen the role of the State Department in
this issue.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Fernandez, it is good to see your family here,
incredibly gifted family, I must say. You have got all the
bases covered. You can get educated, your health care is going
to be taken care of, and that is a pretty good deal.
So I want to know--I hope you have had an opportunity maybe
to see what this committee did last week, in a 21 to 1 vote,
passed out the Strategic Competition Act, which is something
that Senator Risch and I authored, along with many members of
this committee, intended to restore our global economic
leadership, including passages calling on the president to work
with our G-7 allies in matters relevant to economic and
democratic freedoms.
We see in this committee on a bipartisan basis as China
being our most strategic competitor, a nation that we must
confront when they violate international norms but we must also
compete with.
If confirmed, what will be your goals when it comes to the
global economy and in its post-COVID recovery, particularly as
it relates to competing with China?
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I
commend you and the committee for the work that you did last
week on the China bill. It is an issue that I think will be an
important part of my role at the State Department.
The fact of the matter is that, as you know, China is no
longer biding its time. It is challenging us in the economic
sphere every chance that it gets and it is doing so through
practices that are inimical to many of the rules that it had to
follow in order to get to where it is. The Chinese are now
trying to challenge those rules.
We have pushed back but I think we must do more, and I
think the bill that you worked on last week will be--will give
us an additional tool to do that.
One of the areas on which I think I would like to
concentrate my efforts will be to work with our allies more, to
work with our private sector more, and to provide alternatives
to other countries doing business with China.
Oftentimes, they may not have other choices, and I think
part of what we need to do is to work with our allies and to
work with our companies to talk to them about the opportunities
abroad and to get them much more involved in international
business.
The Chairman. Thank you. I am going to turn to Senator
Risch. I am going to let Senator Risch preside in this period
of time. After Senator Risch, Senator Cardin is next and then
Senator Hagerty after that. But I should be back by that time.
Thank you, Senator Risch.
Senator Risch [presiding]. I appreciate that. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
I am going to ask a few questions here and then we will
turn to Senator Cardin.
Ambassador Jenkins, as you know, the United States withdrew
from the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, commonly known as
the INF Treaty. We believed it was the right thing to do--that
is, the United States did--and so did NATO. NATO found that the
U.S. was justified in withdrawing from INF. I am told you do
not particularly agree with that decision. Is that correct?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir.
At the time the decision was made, my concern was whether,
in fact, in my view, we had a significant strategy as a next
step after that. So that was my concern at the time.
Senator Risch. Do you still--are you still in the same spot
you were?
Ms. Jenkins. I think that after I had time to see this, I
am still concerned about the strategy, going forward. But I,
certainly, understand why the U.S. withdrew. Senator Risch: All
right. And, of course, that was the result of the fact that the
treaty was a one-way street. That is, we were complying but the
Russians were not. Fair statement?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes. Yes, a fair statement.
Senator Risch. Do you have any plans of turning that
around?
Ms. Jenkins. The statement or----
Senator Risch. No.
[Laughter.]
Senator Risch. The statement is the statement. I am talking
about the--about the facts, about trying to get them back in
the lane they are supposed to be in.
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what we--what the administration
does have planned for the future, and if I am confirmed I would
be, hopefully, involved in these kind of discussions, is a way
forward to work with Russia, and the idea would be to have what
they are calling strategic stability talks, in which time it
would be an opportunity to really look at all the different
issues with Russia. But also we want to continue to engage our
allies on issues in--regarding Europe and NATO.
So I think that the idea now is to have some of these
discussions with our allies and, of course, we will have our
discussions with Russia, and then we will see where we are
after we have had a chance to start these dialogues.
Senator Risch. How about the Chemical Weapons Convention
and Russia's compliance or, rather, noncompliance? Do you have
thoughts on that?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, the use of chemical weapons is
reprehensible and I--you know, I know the U.S. has instituted
sanctions against Russia as a result of the use of nuclear--
chemical weapons against their own citizens.
The U.S. continues to make the point at the OPCW in The
Hague and also to raise the point with our allies as well. So
my view is that that use of chemical weapons is, as I said,
reprehensible.
Senator Risch. I think we all agree with that. But the
question is, how do you get them--how do you bring them to heel
to comply with the convention that they have subscribed to?
Ms. Jenkins. Sir, you continue to use sanctions. You
continue to work with our allies to put pressure on them. You
continue to work with multilateral organizations like the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
You work through the U.N. You use all the tools that you
have--in my view, use all the tools that you have at your
disposal, whether they are diplomatic or others, to actually
try to get the Russians to actually abide by what they are
supposed to be doing.
Senator Risch. How about the Biological Weapons Convention?
Ms. Jenkins. The Biological Weapons Convention is a
convention that is significant and we need to continue to put
more emphasis on the Biological Weapons Convention, to
reinvigorate it.
It is another opportunity and another way that we can
encourage Russia to abide by things that we think they should
be abiding by.
Senator Risch. And what about nuclear testing with Russia?
Ms. Jenkins. The concern there is, as you probably know,
all of the P-5 countries, all the nuclear weapons countries,
currently have a moratorium on nuclear testing. The concern
there is if countries start to test again it can open a box to
nuclear testing.
We have had a moratorium for a number of years so we want
to try to prevent a situation where countries feel that that is
something that they could be doing again.
Senator Risch. I am assuming you are familiar with the 2020
State Department compliance report that Russia is, in fact,
violating each one of these agreements. Are you familiar with
that from the agency that you are about to join, that report?
Ms. Jenkins. I am aware of the compliance report.
Obviously, I did not have any input on that.
Senator Risch. Of course.
Ms. Jenkins. And I will have much more time to examine it
after--of course, after--if I am confirmed, but after today.
Senator Risch. Are you in disagreement with their
conclusions that Russia is in noncompliance and violating all
of these conventions and treaties that we have just talked
about?
Ms. Jenkins. No, I am not in--I would not be in
disagreement with that, sir.
Senator Risch. Well, I think that underlies the heavy lift
that you have ahead of you. You have talked to me generally
about that. Can you give me any more specifics on your--on how
you intend to go down that road?
Ms. Jenkins. Well, sir, I mean, I think that what we need
to do is as the Government is planning--and I am not there so I
cannot really attest to all of the discussions that are
actually taking place in their interagency.
But as I said, what I am aware of are the next steps in
terms of engaging on issues of nuclear weapons, the use of
sanctions against Russia that have just been done. We can
continue to do sanctions, continue to put pressure on them in
other ways using the whole-of-government and all of the
different tools that we have, using diplomacy, which is--which
we have different avenues for that both bilaterally,
multilaterally, through our multilateral organizations.
You know, we think--I think we just have to use all the
tools that we have at our disposal to try to convince and to
push Russia to comply with treaties.
Senator Risch. In looking over some of the things that you
have written, I was a little perplexed. On April 21st, 2019,
you wrote, and I quote here, ``Men make nuclear weapons more
dangerous,'' end quote.
I am a little perplexed by that. How do I make nuclear
weapons more dangerous? What--could you drill down on that a
little bit for me?
Ms. Jenkins. Yeah. I do not quite recall that statement. I
am not saying I did not make it, but out of context I do not
recall. If it is--I would have to know which article that was.
But I know that I have written about the importance of
having diverse perspectives in terms of national security and
foreign policy, in terms of having different viewpoints, in
terms of having more women at the table. I assume that that is
the context that you are--you are pulling that from.
Senator Risch. Well, the--I am looking at it here and the
exact quote is, ``Men make nuclear weapons more dangerous,'' a
completed sentence. And I guess I am just perplexed as to how
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous.
Ms. Jenkins. Well, I think what--if I can recall what you
are pulling it from, essentially, what I am saying there is
that we have a situation now where we have to reassess where we
are in terms of where we have been.
We need to look at bringing more different diverse people
to the table. To date, we have not had enough significant
diversity, and it has been a situation where it has been,
essentially, men at the table.
So it is more of an issue of we need to include more people
and more diverse people because we only know what we have right
now, and we do not have that.
Senator Risch. I do not think anyone is in disagreement
that diversity is appropriate. But I just do not understand how
men make nuclear weapons more dangerous. That is very
perplexing.
Ms. Jenkins. I think--yeah, what you are pushing at is that
the context that men--without having to make any certain
statements here, that the belief that women in conflict
situations, and there has been study on this, that when women
at the table that there is more peace and peace tends to last
longer.
Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, you are up.
[No response.]
Senator Risch. Okay. We will go down in the list of people
who signed up. Senator Van Hollen, are you with us by WebEx?
[No response.]
Senator Risch. How about----
Senator Cardin. No, I am sorry. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Risch. Senator Cardin, it sounds like you, but I do
not see you.
Senator Cardin. I think I am now with you. Thank you very
much, and let me thank both of our nominees for their
willingness to serve in these two very important roles.
In both of your testimonies, you have indicated the
importance of American values in our policies. Ambassador
Jenkins, you specifically said that we need a value-based
policy as it relates to our arms issues.
And certainly, Mr. Fernandez, your family experience points
out the importance of value-based policies. So I want to ask
both of you a question but, first, let me start with Ambassador
Jenkins. And that is, our arms policy needs to be based upon
our values and our values are respect for human rights.
So when we get involved in arms sales with countries that
allow these arms to be used inappropriately against their own
people, or to deny human rights to others, we should not permit
that to happen. We need to filter our considerations of arms
sales through our human rights concerns.
What commitments can we have from you that, as you are at
the table as these types of decisions are being made that,
indeed, we will promote our values, our human rights, even
though at times it might run some challenges in our bilateral
relations with other countries?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question, Senator.
Yes, as I said, that we need to look at our values but also
we need to highlight the importance of human rights. In that, I
can--what I am aware of is that there is now a review ongoing
on our conventional arms transfer policy which will inform
decisions on transfers, and that I can certainly say, if I am
confirmed, that things will change. It will not be business as
usual.
So we need to continue to look at these on a case by case
basis. We need to look at our national security concerns. We
need to look at our strategic concerns that we have in the
region, region stability, and we also need to continue to
reassess anything that we decide to transfer to another
country.
But, ultimately, we have to consider human rights in these
issues, and if I am confirmed, I will be looking at the revised
CAT policies that are being discussed right now.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I will be working with you on those areas.
I have introduced some legislation in this regard, and I am
glad to see it is not business as usual. It is absolutely
essential that, as we talk about arms sales that human rights
be a component of those discussions.
Mr. Fernandez, I want to raise a subject I have raised
consistently with nominees that have come before our committee,
and that is the importance to standing up against corruption.
We have several tools that are available that are in your
toolkit, including the use of the Global Magnitsky statute.
There are pieces of legislation pending before this committee
that I have authored on a bipartisan basis with other members
of our committee that would set up a requirement that our
missions evaluate every country's commitment to anti-corruption
and evaluate how well they are doing, as well as making funds
available to fight corruption.
Can I get your commitment--I have gotten this from so many
of the members of the Biden administration--that you will be
focused in your work on an anti-corruption agenda, recognizing
that corruption many times is the fuel for anti-democratic
regimes being able to stay in power and abuse power?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question.
Absolutely. You have my commitment. In fact, I will tell you
that I am a firm believer from my time in the private sector
that we are never going to out compete other countries through
low environmental standards, intellectual property theft,
corruption, or lack of respect for human rights.
Transparency is part of our DNA. It is part of what we are
about as a country and it is also--I have seen it. I have seen
it be a competitive advantage.
I have seen countries say, we are going to use an American
company to build this road because we know that that contract
was not obtained through illicit means. So you have my
commitment and, in fact, I would love to work with you some
more on these issues. It is something that is in my DNA as
well, and I very much would welcome the opportunity to discuss
it further with you.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, and again, I want to thank
both of our nominees and their families. This is a tough time
to serve in government.
Both of your roles that you have been nominated for are
critically important to our national security and have
challenges, and thank you for stepping forward and I look
forward to working with both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Cardin. I
understand Senator Hagerty is with us virtually.
Senator Hagerty. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You are recognized, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch. I appreciate your holding this meeting.
My first question is for Ambassador Jenkins. Thank you for
being here today, Ambassador.
We are in a period right now where China is ramping up its
nuclear weapons capability. At the same time, Russia is
articulating a strategy of ``escalate to de-escalate''. They
are developing weapons like the Poseidon that has the
capability of destroying cities.
So at this time, I want to get your perspective on which
way the Biden administration is going to go, and if I could, I
would like to read a couple of quotes and then get your
thoughts on what direction we are going.
During her nomination hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Kath Hicks said that ``The Triad has been the bedrock of our
nuclear deterrent and I think it must be modernized in order to
be safe, secure, and credible.''
Yet, on April 10th, 2021, two Biden administration
officials gave an interview in Japan with the Asahi Shimbun
with a fundamentally different message about U.S. nuclear
policy.
During that interview, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance
Alexandra Bell and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear Missile Defense Policy Leonor Tomero said that, quote,
``There is no doubt that President Biden's goal is to reduce
the role of nuclear weapons.''
So, Ambassador Jenkins, if you are confirmed, will you
commit to supporting the modernization of nuclear weapons?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. I think I, like President
Biden, really support a safe, secure, and strong nuclear
arsenal for as long as we do have our nuclear arsenal, and I
know that this is a--this has been something that has had
bipartisan support.
I know that right now this is being led--issues of
modernization are led by our Department of Defense, our Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and Department of Energy. So what I can say is
that, obviously, I am not in the Government right now to know
what is being discussed.
But I can, certainly, say that if I am confirmed I look
forward to engaging with military components as well as
Department of Energy in the modernization and process.
And, you know, I think we can agree--as I said, it is
bipartisan--that we do need a safe, secure, and effective
arsenal.
Senator Hagerty. Well, help me rectify this, because we are
at a time right now when China and Russia are both stepping up
their nuclear programs and you have got people in the
department that, if you are confirmed, the department that you
will run, who are saying that they feel that President Biden
wants to see us reduce our nuclear capability.
How do you square that?
Ms. Jenkins. I think the way to square it is it is going to
be a whole-of-government approach in terms of how we--how we
approach these issues. I think having a strong nuclear arsenal
is not necessarily a contradiction in terms of looking at how
we can also find a way in which we can safely and adequately
reduce our arsenal.
I think a lot will depend on what is decided in terms of
how we work with countries like Russia. It will determine, I
assume, on ongoing discussions with China. So I cannot say
because I am not in the Government.
But I think that we should be able to square this by having
a whole-of-government approach in how we look at all of these
issues of the nuclear Triad, the Nuclear Posture Review, and
also the way in which we will approach countries on arms
control and disarmament.
Senator Hagerty. Ambassador, thank you. I will just say
this. We live in a competitive world. We need to take account
of what China is doing, what Russia is doing. We need not be
naive in our process.
So I hope you will take a very careful look at what your
staff, if you are to be confirmed, are saying and make certain
that we have a consistent policy and that we are not
articulating a confusing position to our own nation and to our
adversaries.
Can I turn now to a discussion that I have been looking
forward to having with Mr. Fernandez?
Mr. Fernandez, I would like to talk with you about the
Clean Network initiative that you and I have discussed. It has
been an undisputed success with some 60 countries that have
already signed up. Two hundred companies have been involved in
the Clean Network initiative, again, an initiative that enables
us to keep untrusted vendors out of our infrastructure.
We have talked about this in the past. It has built
tremendous brand equity, and given your background in mergers
and acquisitions, I am certain you realize that that type of
momentum has a great deal of value, something that we would
certainly like to see captured and the momentum continue.
If you are confirmed, would you commit to working with
Congress to secure the resources and any new authorities that
you may need to continue to move this program forward?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for your question, and we
had a conversation yesterday about this and let me repeat what
I said then, which is I very much agree that the stakes could
not be higher, that we need to trust that--and our allies need
to trust that the 5G equipment that they purchase will not
threaten national security, privacy, or basic infrastructure,
and the Biden administration has reaffirmed the importance of a
5G strategy.
The Clean Network Initiative is currently under review. We
share the goal. There has been lots of progress, and it is my
intent to try and further those goals.
In a new administration, there may be some tweaks. But you
have my commitment and you have my word that we will pursue the
same goals because they involve national security at its core,
not just for the United States but for the entire world.
And so I look forward to working with you on that and I
would be delighted to spend some time working on furthering
that objective.
Senator Hagerty. Excellent, Mr. Fernandez, and I look
forward to working with you, actually taking this approach
across other sectors--technology sectors, energy sectors--as we
think about, you know, the new infrastructure of the future,
autonomous vehicles, et cetera. I think there is a lot of
opportunity there.
One follow-up question. The State Department compiled a
list of 1,100 companies that are involved in financing the PRC
military. That list is very helpful to investment advisors as
they think about and advise their clients on which companies to
divest.
When will the State Department update that list of 1,100
companies?
Mr. Fernandez. Senator, thank you for the question. I am
not familiar with those plans. I would be happy to get back to
you on that. But I am not familiar with the--with that list of
the names that are there or the plants that the State
Department has to update them. I will certainly get back to you
on that.
Senator Hagerty. Great. It is very useful tool, and I
appreciate the update schedule when you can get it. Thank you
so much.
Mr. Fernandez. Of course.
Mr. Fernandez's Response to Senator Hagerty's Question
Mr. Fernandez. I understand that the State Department, in
consultation with the Treasury Department, is currently evaluating
entities based on required criteria under Executive Order 13959, as
amended, and relevant published Frequently Asked Questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. I understand Senator Van Hollen is
with us virtually.
Senator Van Hollen. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member, and congratulations to both witnesses on their
nominations. Thank you for your willingness to serve.
Madam Ambassador, I want to follow up a little bit on some
of the questions that Senator Hagerty raised, at least that
line of questioning. I think we have long agreed on a
bipartisan basis that our sort of strategic defense depends on
a reliable and effective nuclear deterrent.
But we have also recognized that we can make ourselves
safer through smart arms control agreements with previously the
former Soviet Union and now with Russia and others, and I was
pleased to see that President Biden chose to extend the New
START agreement by five years.
That had some bipartisan support here. I had introduced a
resolution with Senator Young to encourage that and I am glad
that the administration moved forward, and that has the
support, as you know, of our military leadership as well, who
recognizes--who recognized that that is an important part of
our stability, predictability, and verification regime.
But this five years will now give us an opportunity to look
at follow-on negotiations, strategic nuclear negotiations, or
other nuclear weapons negotiations with Russia.
How do you anticipate moving forward on that? Do you agree
that we should be looking for deeper cuts in strategic nuclear
weapons and looking at some of the Russian capabilities and
bringing them within the fold of the next arms control
agreement?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. And I think, looking forward,
and as I said, this is something also being looked at by the
administration and they are also in the process of planning the
next steps for engagement with Russia on these issues,
certainly, I think the idea would be deeper cuts.
But I think a lot of that depends. A lot of that depends on
what happens with the strategic stability talks that are being
planned.
We, certainly, want to include discussions on some of the
novel weapons that Russia have. We, certainly, want to look at
their nonstrategic nuclear weapons that they have, which they
have a lot more and are planning to build more of these type of
weapons.
So we, certainly, want to have a discussion in which we
will bring in all of these weapons systems, as I said earlier,
so we can--we can determine exactly where we need to have a
conversation on deeper cuts.
And as you--and as you have acknowledged, this will be a
decision by the administration looking at all the different
relevant factors, including having a strong nuclear arsenal.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
Let me turn quickly to China. While China is working to
develop and modernize its nuclear forces, there remain big, you
know, differentials between both the size and the quantitative
edge with respect to our nuclear arsenal.
That does not mean, however, that there is not room for
some negotiations with China to avoid miscalculations. Could
you talk a little bit about your vision of how we engage with
China when it comes to nuclear arms control?
Ms. Jenkins. China is an important country in terms of
nuclear arms issues. They are a significant threat to us, as we
have noted earlier. As noted, they are trying to increase their
nuclear arsenal two times by the end of the year. They are
strengthening their nuclear Triad. They are looking at trying
some novel systems.
So, certainly, we have to find a way to have a--to get them
at the table. As you know, it has been a challenge to do that.
There have been attempts to try to make that happen.
But I think we have to focus on results more than form. We
do think and I think the administration thinks that a bilateral
effort is the way to go and because there are certain security
issues that I think that we want to look at specifically with
China.
So we want to engage them and I believe the administration
is discussing next steps for to engage--to engage China
bilaterally to try to start the discussion so we can prevent
miscalculation, we can have more transparency, and get a much
better understanding of what is happening for everybody's
security.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
And, Mr. Fernandez, just briefly, I want to mention Power
Africa and whether you would agree that that has been a very
useful tool in terms of engaging with Africa and trying to
accomplish some of our objectives there and whether it makes
sense to expand the use of Power Africa.
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you, Senator. Thank you for your
question, and I am very familiar with your interest and
commitment to working in Africa.
I think Power Africa has been a success. It has been a
success on the renewables front. It has been a success on
regulatory reform in Africa. I think we need to expand it. I
think, as I said in my opening statement, one of the benefits,
one of the competitive advantages that we have over countries
such as China is a private sector, and we need to get our
private sector involved in infrastructure in Africa.
That may be a tall order. But I think programs such as
Power Africa are programs that we ought to deepen, and you have
my commitment to work with this committee to do that, going
forward.
I have spent a fair amount of time in Africa. I used to
commute to Ghana for about two years, privatizing its phone
company. It is a country that has great potential and it also
presents an opportunity for U.S. business and U.S. workers.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Markey, I understand, is with us virtually.
Senator Markey?
Senator Markey. Can you hear me, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Thank you. You are recognized.
Senator Markey. Mr. Chairman, can you hear me?
The Chairman. I can, and you are recognized.
Senator Markey. Beautiful. Thank you.
Ambassador Jenkins, President Trump systematically
dismantled the arms control architecture that you will oversee
as undersecretary. He was egged on--President Trump--by John
Bolton.
But, ultimately, President Trump tossed aside the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Arms Trade Treaty, the
Iran nuclear deal, the treaty on open skies, and he flirted
with taking a wrecking ball to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty by signaling an interest in conducting a, quote,
``demonstration'' nuclear test just last year.
And at home, President Trump broke with his predecessors by
increasing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in military
strategy by deploying a low-yield warhead on our strategic
ballistic submarines and developing a new nuclear sea launch
cruise missile after President George Herbert Walker Bush
retired them three decades again.
So it is clear we need to build back a better nuclear
posture, and so my question to you is are--is the Biden
administration going to carry out a review of its nuclear
policy and do you agree that every effort should be made to
follow the tradition of presidents on a bipartisan basis, going
back to George Herbert Walker Bush but exempting Donald Trump?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you, sir. It is my understanding that
there is review taking place on the Nuclear Posture Review.
There are reviews and interagency discussions, to my
understanding, on a number of issues relating to arms control,
relating to nonproliferation issues, and all the other--many of
the other issues that we are discussing today.
So there is a review of that and I, certainly, look forward
to and hope, if I am confirmed, that we can have a bipartisan
process for going forward on all these issues that are within
the T Bureau, particularly the ones we are talking today about
arms control and nonproliferation, and finding ways that we can
reassert the U.S. leadership role in arms control and
nonproliferation.
Thank you.
Senator Markey. Yeah, thank you.
Well, in 2013, President Obama's nuclear employment
guidance concluded that we could reduce our deployed stockpile
by up to one-third and still meet our deterrence and
reassurance commitments, and I hope that is the position that
the Biden administration is once again going to reaffirm.
The Trump administration reportedly flirted with conducting
the first U.S. nuclear test in over a generation in a clumsy
attempt to bring Russia and China to the negotiating table. My
PLANET Act last year helped to deny funds to make good on those
Dr. Strangelove visions.
In your view, if we were to carry out such a test, what
would the consequences be to the nuclear nonproliferation
regime?
Ms. Jenkins. Sir, for the U.S.--if the U.S. did a test that
would certainly--we, certainly, would not be considered leaders
in the nonproliferation area. We have--we would go against our
moratorium that we have on nuclear testing.
There would be lots of questions about why we are testing,
what that mean in the future. So that would create a lot of
confusion in the international community. It would create a lot
of confusion by countries in terms of our overall role and
obligations in arms control and it, certainly, would not bode
well, in my opinion, in terms of our role and our position on
nuclear testing.
Senator Markey. Good, thank you. And one final question. If
confirmed, will you advocate for the president to recommit to
the Arms Trade Treaty and work with members of this committee
to build support for future senate advice and consent on that
treaty?
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you for the question. If I am confirmed,
I would, certainly, be interested in conversations and in the
interagency on next steps or next possible steps for the U.S.
in the Arms Trade Treaty.
Senator Markey. Okay. Beautiful. Thank you, and thank you
for your service to our country.
Ms. Jenkins. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Schatz?
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
of you for being willing to serve.
Ambassador Jenkins, there was a recent DOD report in which
they essentially conceded an inability to track--to do end-use
monitoring of arms in conflict areas like Ukraine and
Afghanistan. We have seen American-made so-called nonlethal
weapons used in Egypt and in Hong Kong.
I have a couple of questions about how we do end-use
monitoring. I know there is a good partnership at the--at the
State Department with the Department of Defense to track the
weapons that we sell or provide to our foreign partners.
My understanding is that the Security Cooperation Office at
our embassies is responsible for conducting these end-use
checks. But often the people in these offices are stretched
thin, and I am wondering if this is an area where a few more
people or some new use of technology could strengthen our
oversight in terms of weapons exports.
Can you comment on this and talk about what opportunities
you see to improve the resources we dedicate to end-use
monitoring checks?
Ms. Jenkins. Yes, thank you. Thank you, sir, for that
question.
Yes, end-use monitoring is very important in terms of
ensuring that the arms transfers actually end up where they are
supposed to be.
So we, certainly, want to do everything we can to
strengthen and make sure that end-use monitoring is happening.
I am aware that there are cases, and I cannot recall which--in
which case at the moment, but I know that it has been more
successful I know in some cases where countries have actually
gone out and done--have done more in terms of end-use
monitoring and have more agreements.
I think one thing that we need to do, as you said, I think
we should always look at more options if there is technology
that can help. I think that, you know, if I were confirm happy
to look at different options that can help us. Strengthening--
if there is a need for more people to help out with that, I
think that is great.
But I think, as I was saying earlier, as we have much more
emphasis in the future on human rights, as we more have a much
stronger emphasis on these issues in general in terms of where
these--where these arms end up, I am, certainly, open to more
discussion on what we can do to make it better, in particular,
in light of the fact that we are relooking at our CAT policy
and everything else.
Senator Schatz. So I think there are a couple areas for
improvement.
First of all, technology. Second of all, just flat out
resources. You need more human beings to do this work. And then
third, sort of undergirding that, you do not want to just lay
down a layer of technology on an old system under old
assumptions.
And so I do think we need to do a comprehensive look and
just concede it is not working right now. It may be working to
greater and lesser degrees in certain countries, but where it
needs to work it is not working.
Now, there is another question that I think is essential to
this, which is that it is not just the geographic location of
whatever arms have been transferred. It is how they are used,
right, and that is a policy question.
I am wondering if we can work together on that, because it
may be that it is in the possession of those--of that country
that we transferred it to but used for something that is
antithetical to our values.
And I think that is a more ticklish kind of difficult
policy question to get to because it is after the fact. But I
still think that is our basic obligation when we think about
and use monitoring. I wonder if you can comment on that.
Ms. Jenkins. No, I think--I think you are right. I think--I
think, I mean, obviously, as you said, one question is where do
the arms land and the other one is how are they used, you know,
and giving them to a country for one purpose and they are being
used for something else.
You know, it is a challenge. You know, it is a challenge to
always--to know exactly how it is going to be used. But I think
that we, certainly, want to strengthen whatever we have now to
make sure that we can do that.
If I am confirmed I am, certainly, happy and ready to work
with you on that.
Senator Schatz. Thank you very much.
Mr. Fernandez, just a final question. Our science bureaus
play an important role in terms of our relationships with
countries in Oceania. Their work is key to protecting marine
resources and combating IUU fishing and tackling the climate
crisis.
But I worry that these issues get a little bit isolated,
stovepiped, from the day-to-day diplomacy run out of the East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau.
Can you talk about how we can make sure that oceans and
climate are elevated in our approach to Oceania so that it is
not that we are separating science and conservation questions
from the sort of big boy and big girl conversation around
geopolitics, but that those are one and the same, especially in
those areas where when you are dealing with heads of state
where climate is their main issue, right?
When you have an inundated runway or you have an inability
to farm or fish, climate is not some secondary optional
conservation question. It is an existential question.
But I think that our bureaucratic systems have to reflect
that prioritization, particularly in Oceania but also
elsewhere.
Mr. Fernandez. Thank you for your question, Senator, and I
could not agree with you more that this is an existential
question for the countries in Oceania. They are--they are
facing, in some cases, extinction because of climate change. So
I share very much your concern.
I also think that many of them--it also cuts across a
number of other areas. They also are targets of Chinese
influence, and so that is another national security challenge.
On the pollution front on the ocean, illegal fishing and
those kinds of crimes, we have offices that are all over that
and I have spoken to a number of them already, and I think
there is more we could do, going forward.
So I would very much welcome, if confirmed, the opportunity
to talk to you about that and you have my commitment that we
will certainly look at those again, because I do agree with
you. Sometimes these issues do get overlooked.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Now, I understand there are no
other colleagues seeking recognition, virtually or otherwise.
So I have one final question.
Mr. Fernandez, during my time in this committee, I focused
on reinvigorating the tools and instruments of our economic
statecraft so that the Department of State, Treasury, Commerce,
U.S. Trade Representative, and other elements of the U.S.
Government are working in tandem to promote international
development, U.S. business opportunities, and U.S. best
practices for corporate social responsibility.
I am amazed--you know, we have the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which we should. It does not allow U.S.
businesses to suborn some entity or official abroad. Other
countries do not have that. This has been one of Senator
Cardin's passions on the question of corruption.
I go abroad and I see the chancellor of Germany with a
trade mission directly engaged in trying to promote her
country's services and products. Until recently, the Brazilians
had a very powerful economic tool in their centralized effort.
So my question is what tools do we have, in your opinion,
that are currently working? What tools are not working as
effectively?
What additional authorities might you believe you might be
needing and how do we bring a whole-of-government approach to
an economic statecraft that creates greater opportunities for
U.S. companies in selling their products and services abroad,
opening up more markets, also instilling the business practices
that are better than many others in the world so it has an
economic benefit here at home?
We sell products abroad, our services abroad. We create
jobs here at home. When we instill the right business
practices, we improve governance in those countries.
Can you give me some insights as to how you are thinking
about this?
Mr. Fernandez. Sure. Thank you for the question. That is a
big question and I am glad that you asked.
The Chairman. That is why you are going to get paid the big
bucks if you get confirmed.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Fernandez. I am very glad that you brought it up. You
know, when I was here in--between 2009 and 2013, I was amazed
by the fact that I would go to countries in the Middle East
and, you know, I would go on my regular commercial flight and
next to me would be the president of another country, and that
president would come down the aisle and right behind them were
a number of companies, were a number of business people.
It was not so much of a presidential visit as much as a
Chamber of Commerce visit. We do not have that kind of ethos
yet at the State Department. We are working on it and you have
given us a number of tools.
I think what was done with the DFC is something that that
ups the ante on where we can compete with the Chinese and with
others.
We need to--and I intend to do this, if confirmed, at the
State Department--we need to do more on the training front. Our
State Department employees have to have economic statecraft at
the forefront of their tasks. It has got to be part of what
they get graded on.
And I think I would like to focus more on the training
side. I think getting more whole-of-government cooperation, for
example, on deal teams that where we embed economic officers in
some of the embassies to support American business.
We need to do more of that because at the end of the day,
becoming involved in international opportunities are not just a
strategic imperative for the United States but also business
opportunities for companies and an opportunity to create better
jobs in the United States.
And so, if confirmed, I will continue my push to try and
get economics at the forefront of what the State Department
does.
The Chairman. Well, I am thrilled to hear you say that. I
think that one of our challenges is trying to permeate
throughout the State Department and its offices, particularly
our embassies abroad, the concept that economic statecraft is
one of the core missions that are critical for an ambassador
and their staff to promote.
When I go abroad and visit our embassies--and they do
incredible work and our people are just fantastic individuals--
but I do not get the--I hear about the political component of
what is happening in the country or our bilateral relations in
dimensions that are everything but economic, in most cases.
And having that permeate to the thought that, in fact, what
we are doing to promote U.S. economic interests, which I would
argue also are about good governance issues as well within the
country and better products and services for the nations
receiving it, is, I think, an incredibly important element.
So we look forward upon your confirmation and working with
you on this because I think this is a critical issue and it
creates a real connection to Americans to understand if my
business or the company I work for gets to sell X product
abroad, my job here is not only more secure but maybe more
prosperous. And so that is something we need to do a better job
of.
Let me thank--oh, I am sorry.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Okay. So we look forward to working with you
on that. I am going to say we have a colleague who is
supposedly on his way here and in deference to him I will wait.
But I will say that when he finishes his line of
questioning, the record will remain open until the close of
business Friday, April 30th. I would urge both of you there
will be questions for the record. I would urge both of you to
respond to them fully and expeditiously as possible so that--
excuse me, so that your nominations can be considered at a
business meeting of the committee and move the process forward.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. Excuse me for one moment.
[Pause.]
The Chairman. All right. I am not quite sure when our
colleague would be here, and in deference to the rest of the
committee, I am sure he will be able to pursue his questions
for the record. He may call you as well.
I do not know if Senator Kaine has had an opportunity to
engage with both of you. But if he has then I would urge you to
do so.
And with the thanks of the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Robert Menendez
Arms Control with China
Question. The recently passed ``Strategic Competition Act''
provides a blueprint for using all of the United States' strategic,
economic, and diplomatic tools to effectively compete with China. One
section of this bipartisan bill lays out the need for effective arms
control in the face of China's military modernization and expansion.
The previous administration made a clumsy attempt to engage China in
arms control, which the PRC firmly rejected.
What approach should the United States use to begin strategic
stability talks or arms control with China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. What issues do you believe the United States should focus
on? Risk Reductions? Arms limitations?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control, in the form
of both numerical limitations and broader risk reduction measures, that
advances the security of the United States, U.S. allies, and partners.
Question. What role should U.S. Indo-Pacific allies play in our
arms control dialogue with China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I will work
with U.S. allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, to regularly urge
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control,
as doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.
Question. Should the United States seek trilateral arms control
talks involving both Russia and China?
Answer. The United States should pursue arms control measures with
Russia and China that advance the security of the United States, U.S.
allies, and partners. While there may be opportunities for trilateral
initiatives that meet this criterion, I believe the United States
should engage each country on a bilateral basis as well.
Open Skies
Question. In November of last year, the Trump administration made
the reckless decision to withdraw from the Open Skies Treaty, leaving
the United States and our allies less secure against Russia. The
administration's decision to abandon the Treaty fits into a broader
pattern of discarding arms control and non-proliferation agreements,
which has raised deep concerns among our allies about our commitment to
their security. I have urged the Biden administration to rejoin the
Treaty in a manner consistent with our constitutional structure, but
recognize that it will not be easy, and that the Open Skies treaty,
while valuable, does not address many of the current security
challenges we face from Russia.
Do you believe the United States should seek to rejoin the Open
Skies Treaty?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the Treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns
impacted the overall operation of the Treaty. That said, leaving a
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the
internal discussions on the matter.
Question. The State Department and Congress have consistently
expressed concerns about Russia's violation of some its treaty
obligations; for example, limiting the length of flights over
Kaliningrad and restricting flights near Russia's border with Georgia.
If the United States decided to rejoin the treaty would the United
States insist on resolving these compliance issues?
Answer. The United States has made it quite clear that Russia must
return to compliance and that Russia's violations are an important
consideration in our review of U.S. policy on the Treaty. I know the
administration is committed to effective arms control that advances
U.S., Allied, and partner security and will only join agreements that
are deemed to be in our security interests. Compliance is an essential
consideration in that regard.
Question. If the Biden administration decides not to rejoin the
treaty, what steps should we take to reassure our allies that we still
seek a European security system based upon transparency and
cooperation?
Answer. I know the United States is committed to effective arms
control, transparency and confidence building measures that advance
U.S., Allied, and partner security. If confirmed, I would continue the
ongoing U.S. effort to work closely with our allies in this regard and
on a host of broader security issues at NATO and OSCE. These include
ongoing efforts to modernize the Vienna Document to strengthen
transparency on military activities and increase stability in Europe.
Firearms Export Control
Question. As a candidate, President Biden pledged to return the
export control jurisdiction of semiautomatic weapons from the
Department of Commerce to the Department of State. As part of ``THE
BIDEN PLAN TO END OUR GUN VIOLENCE EPIDEMIC'', the following commitment
was made:
Additionally, Biden will ensure that the authority for
firearms exports stays with the State Department, and if
needed, reverse a proposed rule by President Trump. This will
ensure that the State Department continues to block the code
use to 3D print firearms from being made available on the
Internet.
Just this week, the appeals court for the Ninth Circuit lifted an
injunction that prevented the transfer of 3D Printed firearm technical
information from also being transferred to the Department of Commerce,
whose regulations and ability to control the publication of such
information is significantly more limited than that of the State
Department's International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) regulations. This is
a loosening of controls on these very dangerous ``ghost guns''.
I am concerned that the Department of State is not doing all it can
to fulfill the President's promise to the American People. State has
not yet even answered a letter I sent to Secretary Blinken on February
1 on this issue.
If confirmed, what will you do, specifically, to fulfill the
President's campaign promise?
Answer. I share the concerns expressed regarding the unregulated
proliferation of ``ghost guns.'' If confirmed, I commit to working,
together with my interagency colleagues, to ensure that there are
effective controls over the export of information necessary for the
manufacture of firearms, or any defense articles, no matter how those
items are manufactured.
Question. What options exist in the ITAR or other State authorities
to maintain controls on 3D Gun Printing information?
Answer. The Arms Export Control Act provides the President with the
authority to designate those items which shall be considered defense
articles and defense services and to promulgate regulations for the
import and export of such articles and services. That authority has
been delegated to the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Executive Order 13637. It is
my understanding that the Department conducts regular reviews of the
United States Munitions List, in consultation with the Department of
Defense and other relevant U.S. Government agencies, to ensure that any
defense article or defense service designated on the USML provides a
critical military or intelligence advantage such that it warrants
control under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).
Question. ITAR Sec. 126.2, ``Temporary suspension or modification
of this subchapter,'' states that ``[T]he Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Defense Trade Controls may order the temporary suspension or
modification [emphasis added] of any or all of the regulations of this
subchapter in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the
United States.''
Do you construe that passage to mean that you, if confirmed, could
direct this Deputy Assistant Secretary to, on a temporary
basis, alter the provisions of Category 1 of the ITAR to retain
the technical information that enables the 3D Printing of
firearms and components?
Answer. Under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act and
Executive Order 13637, the authority to designate defense articles and
defense services on the United States Munitions List for the purpose of
export and temporary import is delegated to the Secretary of State. If
confirmed, I commit to working, together with my interagency
colleagues, to control those defense articles and defense services that
provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence
advantage. In so doing, I will ensure that the United States Munitions
List is appropriately revised and updated using the regulatory
mechanisms that best clarify the controls and offer the greatest
transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency
consideration.
Question. Will you do so, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the United States
Munitions List is appropriately revised and updated using the
regulatory mechanisms that best clarify applicable controls and offer
the greatest transparency and opportunity for public comment and agency
consideration.
Compliance with Committee Oversight
Question. The Political-Military Affairs Bureau has refused to
provide answers to my questions or those from my staff about their
investigative and compliance activities. They have claimed that ``it
was not the policy or practice'' to answer such questions, even to
questions concerning whether certain activities are considered
``defense services'' and subject to licensing. In response, I have
initiated a GAO investigation.
If confirmed, will you continue this policy of blocking the
legitimate oversight of this committee, or will you change this
``policy and practice''?
Answer. I appreciate the critical role that Congress plays in
providing oversight. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure
that it is able to effectively perform its oversight activities. In
addition, if confirmed, I will seek to maintain the integrity of the
Department's investigations into potential export control violations,
which includes pursuing investigations of potential export control
violations in a vigorous and timely manner.
CAATSA 231
Question. CAATSA section 231 imposes secondary sanctions on
entities that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense
and intelligence sectors. The law has been instrumental in denying
billions of dollars to the Russian defense sector, but there was no
senior level leadership under the last administration in pushing for
full implementation. I expect that to change and that the State
Department will renew its diplomatic efforts at every post to ensure
that every effort is being made to deter these transactions from taking
place.
Do I have your commitment to reinvigorate the department's efforts
to ensure robust implementation of this law? Do you commit to
report back to me on the specific actions taken by the
department on CAATSA 231 implementation?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to full implementation of CAATSA 231
and to ensuring that the Department keeps you and other appropriate
Congressional Members fully apprised of our implementation efforts.
Nagorno-Karabakh
Question. Azerbaijan's use of cluster munitions, rockets, and other
such weapons during its attack on Nagorno-Karabakh last fall has
increased the need for demining funding there, which the previous
administration cut off. In his QFR responses, Secretary Blinken said
that he ``strongly support[s]'' U.S. funding for demining efforts in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
If confirmed, will you support the resumption of U.S. funding for
humanitarian demining in Nagorno-Karabakh?
Answer. The administration is deeply concerned by the renewed
hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the ongoing humanitarian
needs in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. Secretary Blinken has signaled
strong support for funding demining efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh, as
well as his intent to work with Congress, international organizations
such as the U.N., and our allies and partners to meet humanitarian
needs in the region. I understand that the Department is evaluating the
needs of affected populations and clarifying practical questions
related to the United States' ability to commit funding and implement
programs effectively.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Do you believe there is a symbiotic connection between
nuclear deterrence and arms control?
Answer. Yes, a credible, modern deterrent and arms control should
work together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Is it your understanding that that the New START Treaty
was ratified only after the Obama administration agreed to modernize
the nuclear triad and nuclear weapons complex, and that any unilateral
reduction of these programs would make the Senate far less likely to
ratify future arms control treaties?
Answer. I understand that the Obama administration pursued a
combination of diplomacy, arms control, and nuclear deterrence to
reduce nuclear dangers. If confirmed, I will provide analysis and
advice to the Secretary of State on measures for reducing nuclear
dangers, and I will be prepared to consult with members of Congress.
Question. Do you believe that unilateral U.S. reductions in the
nuclear triad and the nuclear weapons complex would enable the United
States to negotiate with Russia and China from a position of strength?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring the United States maintains an
effective, credible and modern deterrent, while simultaneously using
arms control to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Do you believe the President can rejoin the Open Skies
Treaty without it being submitted to the Senate for advice and consent
per the Treaty Clause of the U.S. Constitution?
Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.
Question. How should Russia's long-standing and ongoing violation
of the Biological Weapons Convention and China's disinformation
surrounding COVID-19 affect our efforts to strengthen U.S. biosecurity
initiatives?
Answer. Russia's Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) violation and
the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrate the need to address the full range of
biological threats--whether deliberate, accidental, or natural in
origin. We must counter known BW programs and, increasingly, organized
disinformation efforts. If confirmed, I will work with allies and
partners to strengthen the BWC's ability to manage the risks of dual-
use research and advanced biotechnologies and to improve global
laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, as well as international
preparedness. I will take a clear-eyed approach, recognizing that not
all countries will share our goals, and I will work with Global
Engagement Center colleagues to counter COVID-19 related and other
disinformation campaigns.
Question. How can we best ensure accountability for Russia and
Syria's use of chemical weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with allies and partners,
including through the U.N. and the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), to hold Russia and Syria to account for their
repeated violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). At the
OPCW, the United States supported actions to add two Novichok families
to the CWC Annex on Chemicals and to suspend Syria's rights and
privileges under the CWC. The United States has also used other
measures, including sanctions authorities against Russia and Syria. If
confirmed, I will explore further measures to address any violation of
the CWC.
Question. Which emerging technologies most threaten strategic
stability, and why? How can we best address these technologies?
Answer. I would be most concerned about any technology that
undermines the effectiveness of U.S. nuclear forces, especially the
credibility of our second-strike capability. The best way to address
potential threats is by taking steps to ensure our strategic deterrent
remains effective and credible and pursuing arms control that enhances
U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. In your testimony, you reference building ``values-based
security partnerships.'' How do you define a values-based security
partnership? Do you believe that the U.S. should only pursue security
partnerships with liberal democracies?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, the administration's foreign
policy will reflect our values and human rights will be at the center.
We will stand firm behind our commitments to human rights, democracy,
and the rule of law, and our security partnerships are no exception.
While the United States will necessarily have security relationships
with countries that are not liberal democracies, if confirmed, I will
champion values like accountability, transparency, professionalism, and
respect for human rights as we engage our security partners and help
build their capacity to address shared challenges.
Question. Should the United States re-sign and then ratify the Arms
Trade Treaty? Why or why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S.
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values,
and interests.
Question. The Obama administration repeatedly declassified the
topline number of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. Russia and China
never reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear
stockpile number without any reciprocity by Russia or China today?
Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the
same.
Question. In your opinion, why does Russia maintain a nuclear-
capable missile defense system consisting of 68 nuclear-armed
interceptors?
Answer. Despite Moscow's complaints regarding U.S. ballistic
missile defense programs and capabilities, it is clear that the Russian
Federation also believes in the importance of developing, deploying,
maintaining, and modernizing its ballistic missile defense
capabilities.
Question. It was a significant concern of the Senate during the
ratification of the New START treaty that it not constrain U.S. missile
defense. Do you agree it is imperative that the U.S. not commit to arms
control agreements that would limit U.S. missile defenses?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective
missile defense programs and will only pursue agreements that enhance
U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. The administration has made clear its intent to negotiate
another United States-Russia arms control treaty. At the same time,
U.S. intelligence leaders have found that Russia now ``possesses up to
2,000 such non-strategic nuclear warheads not covered by the New Start
Treaty'' and now has ``dozens of these [nonstrategic delivery] systems
already deployed or in development''. Indeed, 10 years after New START
was ratified, Russia's advantage under the treaty is now so profound
that, according to Secretary of State Pompeo ``[o]nly 45 percent of
Russia's nuclear arsenal is subject to numerical limits.[m]eanwhile,
that agreement restricts 92 percent of America's arsenal.'' Do you
agree, as expressed in its Resolution of Ratification for New START,
that the next arms control treaty between the United States and Russia
must include these unconstrained nuclear weapons, and not just so-
called strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. Russian President Vladimir Putin has proffered a
``deployment freeze'' on intermediate range missiles in Europe. What is
your view on this plan? In your opinion, what are President Putin's
motivations for making this proposal?
Answer. While the United States plans to pursue arms control that
addresses all Russian nuclear weapons and engage Russia in strategic
stability discussions, we must be clear that Russia's proposed
deployment moratorium proposal, which the administration opposes, would
not actually prevent a Russian build-up of ground-launched
intermediate-range missiles because Russia has already produced and
deployed multiple battalions of the 9M729, including in Western Russia.
Question. Stakeholders are generally disappointed by the results of
U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Treaties, despite the best
efforts of both nations. In your opinion, why have the treaties not
fulfilled their promise? What can the State Department or the
interagency do to make them more useful?
Answer. I understand that, initially, companies did not take
advantage of the U.S.-UK and U.S.-Australia Defense Trade Cooperation
Treaties (DTCTs), as they found the requirements for using them to be
overly burdensome and costly. Subsequently, many of the benefits
envisioned under the DTCTs were superseded by the success of Export
Control Reform, which moved many less sensitive items to the more
flexible jurisdiction of the Department of Commerce. The Department
continues to work closely with U.S. interagency colleagues and our UK
and Australian counterparts to pursue novel solutions to defense trade
issues.
Question. In your opinion, why did China stop reporting to the IAEA
on its plutonium activities and holdings after 2017? What are the
potential implications for U.S. security as a result of China's
decision to stop reporting.
Answer. While I cannot speculate on why China stopped reporting, if
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the
IAEA per Information Circular INFCIRC/549 concerning ``Guidelines for
the Management of Plutonium.'' China's lack of transparency on nuclear
issues is very troubling, and if confirmed I will pursue measures with
the PRC that preserve our national security interests.
Question. Given China's rapidly growing nuclear and conventional
military capabilities and pattern of aggression against many of its
neighbors, do you believe that China has become over-confident in its
ability to control escalation in a conflict? If so, how do you propose
the United States deal with that reality.
Answer. I agree that China has increased its aggressive behavior in
many spheres, but defer to the Intelligence Community for a specific
assessment regarding China's confidence to control escalation in a
conflict.
Question. You have previously advocated for the United States to
adopt a No First Use (NFU) policy for nuclear weapons. Do you still
hold that view today?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles
Richard, recently commented that the exceptions in China's No First Use
policy are ``large enough to drive a truck through''. What are your
thoughts on the efficacy of China's No First Use policy? Why would one
support a NFU policy for the United States when China's NFU policy is
so ambiguous?
Answer. There is ambiguity over the conditions under which Beijing
would act outside of its professed no first-use policy. China's ongoing
advances to its nuclear arsenal, from an exploration of low-yield
warheads to the development of a launch on warning posture, raise
questions regarding China's intent and undermine its claims to seek a
minimum nuclear deterrent backed by a no first-use policy. I understand
that the administration is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that
will include declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in
that process and will consult with Congress and our allies on any
policies or actions in this area.
Question. Do you believe the United States should adopt a No First
Use policy without the same concessions and policy reciprocity from
Russia and China?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. I have
thought, as many do, that the United States might consider changes to
U.S. declaratory policy that could increase stability. I understand
that there are varying perspectives on the issue, but I believe most
agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to the United States and our
allies. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the interagency
and allies and Congress to find the best ways to do this.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should adopt a Sole
Purpose doctrine? How would adopting such a doctrine impact our
deterrence options?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find the best
ways to do this, while ensuring that the United States maintains a
credible strategic deterrent.
Question. Our extended deterrence commitments to allies in the
Indo-Pacific are foundational to U.S. strategy in the region. That has
been the case for seven decades. Do you agree that extended deterrence
is key to regional stability in the Indo-Pacific, and that the United
States must continue to honor, uphold, and strengthen these
commitments?
Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in
advancing U.S. national security objectives in the Indo-Pacific, and
our strategic deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins
extended deterrence. It does so by providing assurance to allies and
partners, which are our greatest strategic asset. If confirmed, I would
work to ensure, in coordination with the rest of the Biden-Harris
administration, that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S.
allies remain strong and credible.
Question. How would the adoption of a No First Use policy or a Sole
Purpose doctrine impact our extended deterrence commitments? If we
weaken or dilute our extended deterrence commitments in the Indo-
Pacific, what do you assess would be the impact on the security
environment in the region, given the threats from China and North
Korea?
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area. This
administration is committed to reinvigorating and modernizing alliances
and partnerships around the world; this includes ensuring U.S. extended
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies remain strong and credible.
Question. The PRC currently has thousands of missiles pointed at
Taiwan, and Admiral Davidson, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command,
has noted that ``Taiwan is clearly one of [the PRC's] ambitions. during
this decade.'' How can the United States best support Taiwan's defense
against this threat?
Answer. The United States has long maintained our abiding interest
in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. If confirmed, I commit to
maintaining America's rock-solid commitment to Taiwan. The United
States will continue to make available to Taiwan the defense articles
and services necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and our
``one China'' policy. The United States sold nearly $30 billion worth
of arms to Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure
Taiwan's ability to defend itself. Our expanding security cooperation
seeks to encourage Taiwan to prioritize asymmetric capabilities
including reserve force reform.
Question. Please describe your views on U.S. export control
policies as they relate to China. What types of technologies should we
seek to limit or cut off from nefarious end users in China?
Answer. Export controls are a critical tool to counter Chinese
President Xi Jinping's strategy to bolster the PRC's military and
security services and to challenge U.S. and allied technological
leadership. It is imperative that U.S. arms embargo on China remains in
place. If confirmed, I will work with the Commerce Department and other
Departments, as appropriate, to keep dual-use controls as tight as
possible for products and end-users that pose national security
concerns, as called for by the Export Control Reform Act of 2018.
Question. Do you believe Huawei and its affiliates should remain on
the Entity List? Are there any circumstances under which you would
consider recommending the removal Huawei or any of its affiliates from
the list?
Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed
from the Entity List. Parties are placed on the Entity List for several
reasons, including posing a threat to U.S. national security and
foreign policy, and the threat that Huawei poses will remain a key
factor moving forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with
colleagues at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin
technology from being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.
Question. Do you agree that it is in our national interest to
strengthen our security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand? If so, please elaborate. If
confirmed, what specific steps will you take to advance security
partnerships with these nations, including your views on continuing
arms sales, engaging in capacity-building, and cooperating on advanced
technology with South and Southeast Asian partner countries facing
China's coercion and growing military power?
Answer. It is absolutely in the national interest of the United
States to strengthen security cooperation with Vietnam, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. Security cooperation with these
allies and partners is essential to ensuring a free and open Indo-
Pacific region, building interoperability and bolstering U.S. force
projection, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, upholding
rule of law, countering transnational crime and terror organizations,
responding to natural and humanitarian crisis, and reassuring our
allies and partners of U.S. commitment to the region, empowering them
to stand up to coercion and malign influence. It also provides
opportunities to reinforce our allies' and partners' commitment to the
rules-based international order.
If confirmed, I will work to expand engagement with these nations
at all levels, including by promoting the United States as the region's
security partner of choice and ensuring they have the arms and training
capabilities they need to protect and advance our shared interests in
the region. I will also seek to deepen and expand our overall defense
cooperation with these nations by advancing key foundational defense
agreements, which will help enable the transfer of defense articles and
establish mechanisms that allow for greater overall defense
cooperation.
Question. What is your assessment of the U.S.-Philippine
relationship and its importance to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific
region more broadly? Do you support continuing a robust security
partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including through
appropriate arms transfers consistent with existing U.S. law?
Answer. The alliance with the Philippines is foundational to the
U.S. role in the Indo-Pacific, and the relationship is based on shared
strategic interests, shared history, culture, and strong connections
between our nations. If confirmed, I support continuing our robust
security partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. I would
ensure that all arms transfers are appropriate and consistent with
existing U.S. laws, including the Conventional Arms Transfer Policy,
Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act. In this
regard, I would continue the current global policy of reviewing
proposed arms sales according to a number of factors, which include:
the degree to which the transfer contributes to ally and partner
burden-sharing and interoperability in support of strategic, foreign
policy, and defense interests of the United States; the recipient's
ability to field, support, and employ the requested system effectively
and appropriately in accordance with its intended end use; and the risk
the transfer may be used to undermine international peace and security
or contribute to abuses of human rights. When appropriate, that review
includes consultations with Congress and input from DoD and other
interagency partners.
Question. In your view, can U.S. security partnerships be a force
for good in improving human rights conditions in a particular country?
Answer. The President and Secretary Blinken have stated that human
rights must be at the center of our foreign policy. Strong U.S.
security partnerships around the world come with a multitude of
benefits, including the opportunity to positively influence a country's
human rights practices. These relationships allow us to work closely
with partners, set an example for human rights standards, and provide
training, when appropriate.
If confirmed, I will support assistance to help ensure our partner
forces are taking steps to comply with international law and protect
human rights. Additionally, I will work to ensure human rights concerns
are given full weight in arms transfer decisions, and I will support
the Leahy laws, which prohibit assistance to foreign security forces
units that are credibly implicated in gross violations of human rights.
Question. Will you ensure that the U.S. Department of State
consults with Congress before taking action on issues that could
jeopardize U.S. access to or create significant tensions in our
relationships with key defense partners in the Indo-Pacific, especially
those in Southeast Asia?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring that the Department
engages with Congress, as appropriate, on actions affecting our
security partnerships.
Question. What is your understanding of the Russian Federation's
nuclear doctrine and how it may be enacted in practice? Which aspect of
Russia's nuclear doctrine do you find potentially most problematic for
U.S. defense and strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on Russian nuclear policy, strategy, doctrine, and forces. It
is clear that Russia has a large arsenal of up to 2,000 non-strategic
nuclear weapons that is projected to grow. It has developed a wide
range of new dual-capable ground-, sea-, and air-based short- and
intermediate-range missile systems. Such weapons can range U.S. allies
and partners in Europe and East Asia--as well as U.S. forces stationed
there--and both our deterrence strategy and our approach to arms
control must address these threats.
Question. Which of the Russian Federation's new, so-called
``exotic'' weapons systems do you find the most geostrategically
concerning? Please enumerate your specific concerns and explain why
this system worries you more than the others.
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on Russia's ``exotic'' weapon systems and I will engage with
the Department of Defense on the military implications of these
systems. Based on the unclassified information that is available, the
nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile appears to be volatile,
unreliable, and dangerous, posing a threat to the entire world,
including Russia.
Question. It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in
Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in
occupied Crimea. How should the U.S. respond, if at all, should Russia
place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in your view,
dramatically change the way that the U.S. looks at Black Sea security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the U.S. intelligence
community on the location of Russian theater-range nuclear weapons and
I will engage with the Department of Defense on the military
implications of Russia's nuclear posture.
Question. The Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was founded
in 2005. Over the last 15 fiscal years, GPOI has received almost $1.3
billion in funding. This funding has accomplished several objectives,
including building self-sufficient peace operations training,
supporting partner country development, enhancing partner country
operational readiness, and expanded the participation, integration, and
leadership women in peace operations, to name a few.
GPOI has improved the capacity and operations of U.N. peacekeeping
forces in Africa and globally. Please describe the efforts you
will take to continue to integrate women into GPOI's work in
both peacekeeping troops and in leadership positions in
peacekeeping missions.
Answer. If confirmed, I will support GPOI's continued work to
increase the meaningful participation of women in peace operations by
promoting efforts to: encourage partners to increase recruitment,
training, and deployment of women in all levels and aspects of peace
operations--including in leadership and decision-making positions;
train women peacekeepers; incorporate women, peace, and security (WPS)
topics into peacekeeping training for all peacekeepers; invest in
gender-responsive upgrades at partner countries' training centers,
including female barracks and latrines; and support the U.N.'s
development of WPS training materials.
Question. GPOI provides critical training to partner countries
looking to deploy peacekeepers, which includes topics like preventing
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), violence against women, as well as
technical training. Given the high number of instances of SEA committed
by peacekeeping troops globally, how would you direct GPOI to enhance
trainings to counter these occurrences?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct GPOI to pursue activities that
enhance existing SEA prevention and accountability training
incorporated into pre-deployment training assistance. I will also
support GPOI's joint efforts with the U.N. to launch a training-of-
trainers course for National Investigation Officers who investigate
allegations of SEA against military peacekeepers, as well as to fund a
U.N. pilot course to train engagement platoons, at least half of which
are women, to interact with the local population, identify vulnerable
areas and at-risk populations, and conduct gender-responsive
assessments to improve situational awareness.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. My entire professional life has been dedicated to public
service, often in direct promotion of human rights and democracy. For
example, while at the Ford Foundation, I oversaw the funding of
activities, programs and research on issues of human rights and
democracy in my role as Program Officer of U.S. Foreign and Security
Policy, and approved joint funding with the Human Rights officer. In
addition, I also had a pool of funds for organizations doing work in
the area of ``conflicts,'' where the funds went to the issues of child
soldiers, women in peacekeeping, and the problem of illicit trafficking
of diamonds and its negative effects. At Women of Color Advancing
Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation, of which I am now the
Executive Director, I have started a working group on Human Rights to
host events and activities on issues of human rights. I am also engaged
in several activities at the U.S. Institute of Peace, including serving
on the Women Building Peace Council. Finally, my 22 years in the Air
Force and Naval Reserves have been dedicated to promoting democracy
both in the U.S. and internationally.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. My commitment to public service has always included
advancing opportunities for all Americans. Fostering diversity and
inclusion in the national security workforce is incredibly important to
me personally, and I strongly support President Biden's policy of
prioritizing diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility as a
national security imperative to ensure critical perspectives and
talents are represented in the national security workforce. If
confirmed, I commit to working with the new Chief Diversity and
Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent Management, the
Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other Department leadership to
foster an inclusive workplace in the T family so that every employee's
contribution is valued. If confirmed, I will hold T family senior
leadership accountable for the conduct of their teams and for
promulgating an environment where each individual is heard and seen.
Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which
you are nominated?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with experts across the
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human
rights abuses. I will also prioritize working with allies, seeking
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S.
policies to combat global corruption?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will commit to working with Congress
to strengthen U.S. policies, to the extent that my portfolio allows, to
combat global corruption, including efforts to improve global standards
of transparency, accountability, and good governance.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Marco Rubio
China
Question. Do you agree that Chinese state-directed Huawei is a
threat to U.S. and global security?
Answer. Yes. Telecommunications equipment made by untrusted
vendors, including Huawei, is a threat to U.S. and global security.
Allowing untrusted telecommunications suppliers to participate in or
control any part of a 5G network creates unacceptable risks to critical
infrastructure, privacy, and human rights. In addition, the Chinese
Government provides significant support to Huawei, including through
subsidies and coercive tactics against host governments, that unfairly
disadvantages market-based rivals. Huawei's history of unethical and
unlawful behavior, including intellectual property theft, compounds the
national security risks that it poses.
Question. Do you commit to use your position to oppose any measure
to remove Huawei from the Commerce Department Entity List, including
any measure to water down or provide licenses under that listing or the
Foreign Direct Product Rule?
Answer. I have no reason to believe that Huawei should be removed
from the Entity List. If confirmed, I will work closely with colleagues
at the Department of Commerce to prevent U.S.-origin technology from
being used in ways that threaten U.S. interests.
Question. On January 15, 2021, the State Department issued a fact
sheet on activity at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, which raised the
possibility that the COVID-19 epidemic could have emerged from a
laboratory accident. Do you agree that this is possible?
Answer. Yes, my understanding is that a range of possibilities
exist, including the possibility of a laboratory accident. I believe
that the full range of these possibilities should be considered. I
understand that the Biden-Harris administration supports a robust and
transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. An
impartial public health investigation, based on science, is vital to
protecting against future health security threats.
Question. If confirmed, can you commit that the administration will
take steps to investigate the origins of COVID-19, including pressing
for a full forensic investigation of the labs in question?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has been clear about its
concerns with the PRC's lack of transparency regarding the pandemic,
including Beijing's refusal to provide the international health
community timely and full access to data, scientists, records, and
samples. This information is essential to our full understanding of the
origins of the virus and how it spread. If confirmed, I am committed to
providing the appropriate diplomatic and technical support to any
relevant efforts as they relate to my portfolio.
Question. Are you concerned about China's development of biological
and chemical weapons? If confirmed, how do you plan to address these
issues?
Answer. In 2021, the State Department's Compliance Report found
that the PRC engaged in biological activities with dual-use
applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with
Article I of the BWC. The report also noted uncertainty regarding the
status of China's assessed historical biological warfare program. This
year's Condition 10(c) report raised similar concerns related to
chemical activities that prevented the U.S. from certifying the PRC's
compliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
I understand that the U.S. was unable to engage with the PRC on these
issues in 2020 due to COVID-19 travel restrictions and the PRC's
unwillingness to meet virtually. If confirmed, I will continue efforts
to address these concerns, including in bilateral meetings.
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
Question. If confirmed, would you advise the Biden administration
in the next nuclear posture review to return to language closer to the
2010 NPR?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this area.
Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear posture is
also critical for our allies and partners?
Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence plays a foundational role in
advancing U.S. national security objectives, and our strategic
deterrent, including U.S. nuclear forces, underpins extended
deterrence. It provides assurance to allies and partners, which are our
greatest strategic asset. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to reinvigorating and modernizing our alliances and partnerships around
the world; this includes ensuring our extended deterrence commitments
to our allies remain strong and credible.
Question. Do you believe that the United States nuclear arsenal is
an effective deterrent against the use of these non-nuclear weapons
against our allies?
Answer. All U.S. military capabilities contribute to extended
deterrence commitments to U.S. allies. The Biden-Harris administration
is undertaking a review of nuclear policy that will certainly include
declaratory policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process
and will consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or
actions in this area.
Question. The Obama administration declassified the topline number
of the total U.S. nuclear stockpile. However, Russia and China never
reciprocated. Would you support declassifying our nuclear stockpile
number without any reciprocity by Russia or China?
Answer. I believe that declassifying topline U.S. nuclear stockpile
numbers demonstrates the United States' serious commitment to
transparency and confidence building measures that can enable further
progress on reducing nuclear risks. If confirmed, I will work to
encourage Russia and China to be more transparent. The declassification
of U.S. stockpile numbers has not harmed U.S. national security and has
shown U.S. leadership in nuclear fora. Others have welcomed our
transparency and joined us in calling on Russia or China to do the
same.
North Korea
Question. Do you agree that the only path forward for North Korea
that the U.S. could accept is the complete, irreversible, verifiable,
denuclearization of North Korea?
Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. The Biden-
Harris administration recently completed a comprehensive review of U.S.
policy towards North Korea that reiterates the goal of complete
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. If confirmed, I look forward
to supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
the voices of North Korean defectors are included in negotiations of
any agreement with North Korea?
Answer. I am deeply concerned about North Korea's egregious human
rights record and how to promote respect for human rights in the closed
country. If confirmed, I will be committed to placing human rights at
the center of our foreign policy with North Korea and to integrating
the voices of the North Korean defector community into our approach,
including by meeting with North Korean escapees to hear their thoughts
and recommendations.
Russia
Question. Do you agree that Russia was in violation the Treaty on
Open Skies?
Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action
to return to compliance. As stated in the most recent compliance
report, Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit
over Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to
allow observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its
border with the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While
not a violation, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea as a
Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize the
treaty.
Question. Do you agree that Russia's abuses the Open Skies Treaty
and its actions posed an unacceptable risk to our national security?
Answer. In my view, while concerning, Russia's violations of the
Treaty on Open Skies by themselves do not pose a direct and immediate
threat to our national security. Russia's use of the treaty to collect
information on military and civilian infrastructure, while not
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.
Question. Russia has been implicated in the use of chemical weapons
on several different occasions in the last several years, including
assassination attempts. What should be done to counter Russia's use of
chemical weapons and its violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC)?
Answer. Russia's use of chemical weapons in assassination attempts
against not only Sergei Skripal and his daughter, but also Aleksey
Navalny, is reprehensible. In response to these attacks, the United
States exercised its sanctions authorities and imposed other measures
to send a clear signal that Russia's use of chemical weapons and abuse
of human rights have severe consequences.
At the OPCW, the United States has worked with allies and partners
to address Russia's violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,
including submitting a technical change proposal to add two families of
Novichoks to the CWC Annex on Chemicals, which the OPCW Conference of
the States Parties adopted in 2019.
If confirmed I will work within the administration to take steps to
deter Russia's use of chemical weapons, including engaging Russia
bilaterally and multilaterally as well working with allies and partners
at the OPCW Executive Council and Conference of the States Parties, and
in U.N. fora, including the Security Council. If confirmed, I will
explore further measures to address Russian non-compliance with the
CWC. There can be no impunity for the use of chemical weapons.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. For all of the missteps in converting the Singapore
Summit Communique that President Trump agreed to with Chairman Kim Jong
Un in 2018 into meaningful action, it did lay out a useful framework
that committed the two countries to work towards better relations,
cooperate on the return of Prisoner of War remains, and work towards
peace and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. Given the reality
that any full denuclearization agreement is a long term endeavor, will
you support efforts that make progress on the other elements agreed to
in Singapore, provided such actions are in concert with U.S. allies and
partners, and achieve the objective of lessening the nuclear weapons
threat from North Korea as well as the threat of war?
Answer. North Korea's unlawful weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missile programs constitute serious threats to international
peace and security and the global nonproliferation regime. I understand
that the administration recently completed a comprehensive review of
U.S. policy towards North Korea that both reiterates the goal of
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and seeks to build on
the Singapore Summit commitments. If confirmed, I look forward to
supporting the administration's efforts to pursue calibrated and
practical diplomacy with North Korea, in close consultation with our
allies and partners, in order to increase the security of the United
States, our allies, and our deployed forces.
Question. I understand the total number of Washington DC-based
full-time equivalents in the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and
Compliance as of January 2017 was 113. The number of Washington DC-
based FTEs as of late 2019 in the AVC Bureau was 94. In 2014, the
Office of Inspector General reported 48 percent of the AVC workforce
would be eligible to retire by 2019. If confirmed, what actions will
you take to address the large number of FTEs eligible to retire, how
can the ``T cone'' prioritize recruitment and hiring of diverse
candidates, and what additional flexible hiring authorities--if any--
does the Department need to fill this gap?
Answer. Rebuilding the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance is one of my top priorities. If confirmed, I will exercise
the Excepted Service Appointment Authority to bring in a diverse cadre
of arms control experts. Diversity is the key to unlocking an
organization's potential because diverse teams consistently demonstrate
high performance due to their creativity and innovation. The Department
must rebuild the AVC workforce and ensure it is well-equipped to
address the dangers posed by chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons, and their delivery systems. If confirmed, I commit to
uphold and fully implement the Department's leadership and management
tenets, including support for diversity and inclusion, to strengthen
teams across the T family of bureaus.
Question. Has the President provided any guidance to the
Departments of State, Defense, and any other agencies, detailing his
instructions for a review of U.S. nuclear policy and posture? If so,
approximately when will that review be completed?
Answer. I understand that the President has directed his
administration to conduct reviews of various nuclear policies. In
accordance with the Biden administration's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, the administration will take steps to reduce the
role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. national security strategy, while
ensuring the U.S. strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and
effective and that U.S. extended deterrence commitments to U.S. allies
remain strong and credible. In that process, the administration will
consult with U.S. allies and partners, including those in the Indo-
Pacific, as well as with Congress.
Question. The United States is not one of the 164 States Parties to
the Mine Ban Treaty, also known as the Ottawa Convention, which bans
the production and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. President
Trump opened up the geographies where the United States can use
landmines provided they have a self-destruct mechanism, which
superseded an Obama administration policy which narrowed persistent
landmine use to the Korean Peninsula. The Biden administration has yet
to rescind the permissive Trump administration-era policy. When
confirmed, can you commit to advocate as the head of the ``T cone'' for
President Biden to adopt a U.S. policy that brings us closer in line
with the obligations under the Ottawa Convention? Additionally, will
you support a robust budget request for de-mining activities in
conflict zones?
Answer. As Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield noted last month,
``President Biden believes we need to curtail the use of landmines.
[L]et me speak plainly: President Biden has been clear that he intends
to roll back [the Trump administration] policy, and our administration
has begun a policy review to do just that.'' If confirmed, I will
commit to supporting the administration's landmine policy review and
will advocate for a clear and explicit role for the State Department in
any future policy on landmines. I also will commit to consult with
experts inside and outside of the Department, and with you in Congress,
on the question of whether and how the United States should bring its
policies closer in line with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.
Thanks to bipartisan Congressional support, the United States has
been the world's leader in fighting proliferation by safely destroying
at-risk conventional weapons and saving lives by clearing of landmines
and other explosive hazards for more than 25 years.
Question. The Biden administration is currently undertaking a
global sanctions review to ensure that U.S. and multilateral sanctions
do not inadvertently prevent humanitarian aid from getting to those in
need. While food and medicine is exempt under U.S. and U.N. sanctions,
aid workers are often forced to navigate massive red tape just to bring
laptops to North Korea, which are considered ``luxury goods,'' or even
treatments for drug resistant tuberculosis. If confirmed, can you
commit to work with interested Members to make practical changes to the
implementation of existing exemptions to U.S. sanctions and seek
additional exemptions in the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committee
of items related to providing life-saving assistance to North Koreans?
Answer. Sanctions are in place to address the threat posed by North
Korea, including its ability to continue developing its nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. The U.S. Government maintains a number of
sanctions exemptions and authorizations related to humanitarian aid,
and has also led efforts to streamline the process for humanitarian
exemptions in the U.N. sanctions committee. North Korea itself has
created the most significant barriers to the delivery of aid by closing
its borders and limiting access for the personnel responsible for
implementing such projects. If confirmed, I will work to support
efforts aimed at helping humanitarian aid reach the people of North
Korea.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Rob Portman
Question. The position of arms control and international security
is one of paramount importance to our nation's defense. Both Russia and
China have made strides in their own force modernization and we must
take steps to ensure that our adversaries are in compliance with
existing arms control agreements while we look to new initiatives as
well.
New START and U.S. Nuclear Force Modernization: In January 2021,
the Biden administration agreed to an extension of the NEW Start treaty
for a period of five years, while committing to pursue new arms control
agreements with both Russia and China. As you are aware, New START does
not limit non-strategic nuclear warheads which are a growing concern as
Russia outnumbers the United States 10-1 in this category. China is on
pace to more than triple its nuclear force in the coming decade.
Cleary, more work is needed to ensure that our adversaries do not
outpace U.S. capabilities in this space.
The Obama administration in 2010 committed to Congress that it
would address the disparity between the United States and
Russia regarding non-strategic nuclear warheads, however
several administrations have failed to make progress. What
actions will you take, if confirmed, that will address this
disparity?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. Both Russia and China are in the process of expanding,
diversifying, and modernizing its nuclear arsenals. The United States
is just beginning this effort. Do you believe that a modernization of
the U.S. Triad is necessary to negotiate from a position of strength?
Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security.
Question. Do you believe that a unilateral reduction of our nuclear
forces endangers U.S. national security?
Answer. I would never support any reductions in nuclear forces that
endanger U.S. national security, but I do not believe that any type of
reduction would automatically undermine U.S. and allied security.
Question. Iran's Ballistic Missile Program and the Abraham Accords:
Iran's ballistic missile program and armed drones, including
proliferation of these technologies to terrorist organizations, are
increasingly becoming a regional threat in the Middle East. The
continued threat from Iran is just one of the many reasons why many
neighbors of Israel decided to sign normalization agreements such as
the Abraham Accords last year.
Last month, I introduced a bill called the Israel Relations
Normalization Act with Senator's Booker, Cardin, Risch, and Young, to
require the Department of State to expand and strengthen these
normalization agreements.
Do you support these normalization agreements as a means to
strengthen security in the region and pledge, if confirmed, to
pursue additional normalization agreements?
Answer. As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have said, this
administration welcomes and strongly supports the recent normalization
agreements between Israel and countries in the Arab and Muslim world. I
understand that the Department is leading the U.S. Government's
efforts, working with the National Security Council and U.S. Government
interagency, to deepen existing agreements and urge other countries to
normalize relations with Israel. If confirmed, I will look for other
opportunities to expand cooperation among countries in the region,
which is critical to strengthening regional security.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator John Barrasso
Question. In April 2019, President Trump notified the Senate that
he had decided to withdraw the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty from
the Senate and requested the Senate return the treaty to the President.
The United States notified the United Nations Secretary General that
the ``United States does not intend to become a party'' to the United
Nations Arms Trade Treaty despite its signature, adding that the United
States ``has no legal obligations arising'' from its treaty signature.
What is the current status of the United States with regards to the
United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?
Answer. On December 9, 2016, the Department transmitted the Arms
Trade Treaty (ATT) to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. On July 18, 2019, the Trump administration informed the
Treaty Depositary that the United States did not intend to become a
State Party to the Treaty and that the United States had no legal
obligations arising from its signature. The United States is
participating in ATT meetings as an observer to protect U.S. national
security interests, economic interests, and industry equities.
Question. Based on your knowledge and experience in this field,
what position have you formulated on whether the United States should
ratify the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I support reviewing the implications of
decisions taken to date on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), both in the
United States and in the ATT Conferences of States Parties, to
determine the proper relationship of the United States to the Treaty. I
believe this review should be situated within a larger evaluation of
U.S. policy on conventional arms transfers. The United States is the
largest arms exporter in the world, and it is imperative that U.S.
transfers of conventional arms are consistent with our laws, values,
and interests.
Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in
writing or in speech, the United States joining the United Nations Arms
Trade Treaty? Please provide details.
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I have not made any
statement on the issue of the United States joining the U.N. Arms Trade
Treaty.
Question. What changes to our nation's policies, regulations, or
laws would be needed to comply with the United Nations Arms Trade
Treaty?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States would not
need to change any policies, regulations, or laws to comply with the
Arms Trade Treaty. U.S. national control systems and practices to
regulate the international transfer of conventional arms already meet
or exceed the requirements of the Treaty.
Question. The United States Constitution protects the rights of
Americans to keep and bear arms. The Arms Trade Treaty would infringe
on the second amendment. Article 12 of the Arms Trade Treaty encourages
countries to maintain records on the importation of conventional arms
including small arms. It specifically requests that states maintain
records on the quantity, value, model/type and end user. These records
must be maintained for a minimum of ten years. Article 13 requires
signatory states to issue annual reports to the United Nations on all
imports and exports.
Do you support the United Nations establishing and maintaining a
gun registry on law abiding U.S. gun owners?
Answer. No. If confirmed, I will not support the United Nations
establishing and maintaining a gun registry on law-abiding U.S. gun
owners. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) establishes standards for
regulating only the international trade in conventional arms, not
domestic trade or possession. The ATT does not touch on purely domestic
arms transfers or private ownership, which are matters of national
sovereignty.
Question. China is modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces.
U.S. intelligence analysts estimate that China could double its nuclear
warheads in the next decade.
How is China modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal?
Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. According
to open-source reporting I have read, this rapid expansion includes new
delivery systems as Beijing works to establish a nuclear triad, which
will include a long-range stealth bomber, new road-mobile ICBMs,
multiple-warhead silo-based ICBMs, and a growing fleet of ballistic
missile submarines. The PRC also appears to be working on hypersonic-
glide vehicles, air-launched ballistic missiles, and low-yield nuclear
weapons that will fit into this nuclear triad. The PRC is also making
additional advances toward developing a launch-on-warning posture.
Question. What is the projected size and composition of China's
strategic nuclear forces by 2026 when the New START would expire?
Answer. During this decade, the People's Republic of China (PRC) is
likely to more than double the size of its nuclear stockpile. Precisely
because Beijing is the least transparent member of the P5 nuclear
weapon states, accurate assessments of its nuclear trajectory and
intentions are difficult. I defer to the intelligence community for a
specific assessment on the projected size and composition of China's
nuclear forces in 2026.
Question. Secretary of State Blinken noted his intent to ``pursue
arms control to reduce the dangers from China's modern and growing
nuclear arsenal.'' China has so far refused U.S. efforts to engage in
arms control negotiations.
What specific steps would you take to reduce the dangers posed by
China's modern and growing nuclear arsenal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. If confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. What specific leverage does the United States have to
force China to participate in future arms control negotiations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races, which is in the interest of
both our countries. If confirmed, I will seek to work with U.S. allies
and partners to urge Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United
States on arms control, as doing so is essential to reducing global
nuclear risks.
Question. Has the United States ever effectively used the leverage
you mentioned in question 8? Please provide details.
Answer. As I understand, the People's Republic of China has thus
far resisted engaging with the United States in any meaningful nuclear
arms control discussions. If confirmed, I will work with the
administration, along with U.S. allies and partners to regularly urge
Beijing to engage meaningfully with the United States on arms control.
Doing so is essential to reducing global nuclear risks.
Question. There is a very large disparity regarding non-strategic
nuclear weapons, also known as tactical nuclear weapons. During the New
START debate, there were a number of Senators including myself who were
extremely concerned that the treaty did not include tactical nuclear
weapons. The New START Resolution of Ratification specifically provided
the President was to address the massive disparity in the tactical
stockpiles prior to contemplating further reductions in the strategic
arsenal.
Can you assure the United States Senate that the next arms control
agreement with Russia will focus on the massive numerical
advantage Russia has over us and our allies in tactical nuclear
weapons rather further reductions in the strategic arsenal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. For more than six decades, the United States has employed
an effective and credible nuclear deterrent. The U.S. nuclear triad is
made up of the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-capable heavy bomber
aircraft. All three legs of the triad work hand-in-hand to deter our
adversaries and reassure our allies and partners. It provides weapon
systems that are survivable, stabilizing and flexible.
Please describe how each leg of the U.S. nuclear triad contributes
to the effective and credible nuclear deterrent?
Answer. SSBNs are the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad.
Nuclear-capable bombers are the most flexible. ICBMs are the most
responsive and contribute to deterrence by requiring an adversary to
exhaust a large number of warheads to destroy a smaller portion of the
U.S. deterrent.
Question. Based on your expertise, are ICBMs on ``hair trigger''
alert or are they safe and secure?
Answer. In overall terms, U.S. ICBMs are not on ``hair trigger''
alert. U.S. nuclear forces are safe and secure as the United States
maintains multiple redundant technical and procedural measures in place
to prevent the unauthorized or accidental launch of U.S. missiles. I
defer to the Department of Defense to discuss the specifics.
Question. Do you believe the ground based strategic deterrent will
start an arms race with Russia and China?
Answer. No, replacing elements of the U.S. nuclear triad will not
cause an arms race. If confirmed, I will work with the administration
to head off costly arms races and re-establish U.S. credibility as a
leader in arms control. I will also work to pursue new arms control
agreements and arrangements by engaging in meaningful dialogues with
Russia and China on a range of emerging military technological
developments that implicate strategic stability.
Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.
Have you ever expressed, implicitly or explicitly in writing or in
speech, support for eliminating any leg of the nuclear triad?
Please provide details.
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not made any statement
saying that any leg of the nuclear triad should be eliminated.
Question. Based on your knowledge and background, what is your
position on the United States modernizing our ICBMs with the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrent, our submarines with the Columbia class, and
our bombers with the B-21 Raider?
Answer. A credible, modern deterrent and arms control should work
together to address nuclear threats and increase our security. If
confirmed, I will review each element of the current modernization
program during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review, and I will
advise that the United States undertake the modernization necessary to
sustain a credible strategic deterrent.
Question. Have you ever supported, implicitly or explicitly in
writing or in speech, any delay or budget cuts related to or the
elimination of any of the U.S. nuclear modernization programs? Please
provide details.
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I have not explicitly
supported any delay or budget cuts to, or elimination of, the
modernization program. I have asked questions about the total amount of
funding that will be spent on the modernization program.
Question. What specific steps will you take to advocate for
modernization of the U.S. nuclear program?
Answer. The United States will ensure its strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective. If confirmed, I will advise that
the United States undertake the modernization necessary to sustain a
credible strategic deterrent.
Question. On December 4, 2019, you retweeted a post from PSR
Nuclear Weapons Abolition supporting the United States adopting a no
first use of nuclear weapons policy.
Please explain why you support the United States adopting a ``no-
first use'' policy.
Answer. I understand that the administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. As our country continues to face threats from around the
world, we should not take any action that will hinder our missile
defense options. The United States must always remain in charge of our
missile defense, not Russia or any other country. I have concerns about
the efforts of Russia to limit our missile defense and actions the
Obama administration took on this issue.
Can you commit to me that, in any arms control discussions with
Russia for which you are responsible, the United States will
never agree to any limitation on our missile defense programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. support for effective
missile defense programs and will only pursue arms control agreements
that enhance U.S., allied, and partner security.
Question. President Putin announced Russia's development of new
strategic nuclear weapons. The weapons include a nuclear powered cruise
missile, a nuclear powered underwater drone that could be armed with a
nuclear warhead, and a hypersonic missile. President Putin declared
that these new additions to Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal would
render U.S. missile defense ``useless.''
How would you ensure the new weapons are covered under Russia's
treaty and arms control obligations?
Answer. The New START Treaty limits Russia's Avangard hypersonic
glide vehicle and will limit the Sarmat heavy ICBM at the appropriate
point in its development cycle. If confirmed, I will work to ensure
that we use the time provided by the five-year extension of the New
START Treaty to pursue with Russia, in consultation with Congress and
U.S. allies and partners, arms control that addresses all Russian
nuclear weapons, including novel strategic systems and non-strategic
nuclear weapons.
Question. Does the United States have a current or prospective
missile defense system to intercept these weapons? If not, what
specific actions would you recommend the U.S. Government take to
respond to and counter these new strategic nuclear weapons?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Department
of Defense to better understand their capabilities to deter, and if
deterrence fails, defend against, attack from the novel strategic
systems being developed by the Russian Federation. If confirmed, I
anticipate working closely with the Department of Defense to review
U.S. capabilities to ensure the United States has robust capabilities
to deter, and if deterrence fails, defend against, attacks on the U.S.
Homeland and to examine ways that our allies can contribute to
enhancing U.S. national security.
Question. During your testimony, you discussed pursuing deeper cuts
to our nuclear weapons systems.
At a time when Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear
weapons, would you advocate for the United States to make
unilaterally cuts to our nuclear deterrent?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review all relevant information on
specific programs during the course of the Nuclear Posture Review and
report my conclusions back to the committee. Prior to the review, it
would be premature to speak to the sizing, including possible
reductions, of U.S. forces.
Question. The U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Force Treaty (INF), the Open Skies Treaty and the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action. You opposed the United States withdrawing from each of
these international agreements.
Given your tweet confirming your statement that U.S. actions to
withdraw from the INF treaty undermines global security, what
is your view on whether the United States should rejoin the INF
treaty?
Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the U.S. withdrawal, it
is not possible to re-enter it. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019,
statement that ``Russia bears sole responsibility for the demise of the
Treaty.'' Russia's material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to
return to compliance led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the
Treaty's termination. The United States should work with its allies and
partners to ensure Russia gains no advantage by possessing this class
of missile.
Question. Based on your detailed knowledge on this treaty and
strong statements opposing the United States leaving the treaty, do you
believe the United States should rejoin the Open Skies Treaty?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
Many of our Allies pointed out that none of these compliance concerns
impacted the overall operation of the treaty. That said, leaving a
treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia continues to violate it are
two different things. I understand an interagency review of Open Skies
is underway. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about
internal discussions on the matter.
Question. Why do you support the United States rejoining the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that Iran
does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to addressing the many other
issues of concern related to Iran. The JCPOA was concluded to ensure
Iran never acquires nuclear weapons, and it provides the most intrusive
verification and monitoring procedures ever negotiated. I understand
that the Biden-Harris administration is engaging in meaningful
diplomacy to achieve a mutual return to compliance with JCPOA
commitments as a first step, but the work will not end there. The
administration intends to build on the JCPOA and use it as a platform
to lengthen and strengthen the constraints on Iran's nuclear program
and to address other critical issues.
Question. The United States has not ratified the 1996 Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
Do you support the United States ratifying the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty? If so, why?
Answer. Yes. The United States maintains the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal without having to conduct nuclear
explosive tests. It is in our national security interest to prevent a
world in which states are completely unconstrained from conducting such
tests. An in-force CTBT would aid in that effort.
Question. The United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons entered into force in January 2021. It is the first
multilateral legal document to outlaw nuclear weapons.
Based on your experience and background in arms control, what is
your view of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons?
Answer. While I understand and share the desire to make progress
toward a world without nuclear weapons, the TPNW is not the right way
to achieve that goal. The TPNW risks undermining U.S. deterrence
relationships that are still necessary for international peace and
security and may reinforce divisions that hinder our ability to work
together to address pressing proliferation and security challenges. All
NATO Allies remain opposed to the TPNW, as repeatedly stated by the
North Atlantic Council, most recently in December of 2020. The best way
to achieve a world without nuclear weapons is through a process that
takes into account the international security environment and seeks
effective, verifiable arms control and disarmament measures.
Question. On January 3, 2020, you tweeted, ``What is the U.S. logic
to the strike on Qasem Soleimani?''
The United States took decisive action on January 3, 2020, to
prevent an imminent attack by a ruthless terrorist on Americans
and our allies in the region. As the head of the Quds Force,
General Soleimani created, supported, and directed a network of
terrorist organizations that launched attacks across the
region. As a war criminal, Soleimani was responsible for
wounding and killing hundreds of Americans and he would have
killed many more if given the chance.
Based on your tweet, why did you disagree with the top U.S.
commander in the region that the Soleimani strike re-
established a deterrent in the region?
Answer. The tweet you referenced above was a retweet, without
commentary, of a CNN article titled, ``What is the U.S. logic to the
strike on Iran's Qasem Soleimani?'' The article was an analysis of the
likely factors that went into the previous administration's decision to
strike Soleimani. I have not expressed disagreement on this issue with
the ``top U.S. commander in the region.''
Question. Why do you believe America is not safer today because
Qasem Soleimani is gone?
Answer. Qasem Soleimani was a key architect of much of Iran's
malign behavior. He had blood on his hands, including American blood,
and I do not regret the killing of such an enemy of the United States.
The question is not whether Soleimani was good or bad; the question is
whether this action made the American people safer, based on the
likelihood of Iranian retaliation and the broader strategic context in
which the strike took place. I did not comment that America is not
safer today because Qasem Soleimani is gone, nor do I have access to
strategic assessments that would enable that conclusion, but it is a
question that I and others have raised.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. The Trump administration made great progress unwinding
the United States from outdated Cold War-style arms control agreements
with Russia. Many of those treaties--and the approach behind them--
eroded American national security by constraining us, permitting
Russian noncompliance, and of course not constraining the Chinese at
all.
One significant step was to end U.S. participation in the Open
Skies Treaty (OST). The Russians had been in chronic
noncompliance for a decade, and were declared noncompliant in
2017: certain overflights of the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad,
flights in the vicinity of the enclaves that they essentially
invaded and carved off of the country of Georgia, not allowing
some overflights of Russian military exercises, etc. It was
long past time to withdraw.
You've publicly indicated that the U.S. withdrawing from the OST
was a mistake.
Do you believe the U.S. should reenter OST or a similar agreement?
Answer. I share President Biden's view that it was a mistake to
withdraw from the treaty, notwithstanding Russian compliance issues.
That said, leaving a treaty, and rejoining a treaty while Russia
continues to violate it are two different things. I believe we should
carefully consider the costs and benefits of rejoining before making
any decision. As part of this analysis, we should consult with Allies
and partners who are States Parties to the treaty, including on any
future steps.
Question. Do you believe that if the U.S. did reenter OST or a
similar agreement, such a step would require the advice and consent of
the Senate?
Answer. I believe that Congressional authorization would be
required for the United States to rejoin the Treaty on Open Skies.
Question. If you believe that the U.S. should reenter OST or a
similar agreement, please describe your strategy for ending chronic
Russian noncompliance.
Answer. If the administration were to decide to take steps to
rejoin OST, I would recommend working with the interagency on ways to
expand and enhance our work on compliance as it relates to the
agreement.
Treaties/INF
Question. Another Cold War-style treaty from which the Trump
administration withdrew was the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. China had arguably been the biggest beneficiary of the
INF Treaty. According to then-Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command
Harry Harris (now U.S. ambassador to South Korea), roughly 95 percent
of China's missile forces would fall within INF Treaty parameters. The
Treaty held us back from developing the technologies we needed to
counter the Chinese.
Do you believe it was a mistake to exit the INF?
Answer. I agree with NATO's August 2, 2019, statement that ``Russia
bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty.'' Russia's
material breach of the INF Treaty and refusal to return to compliance
led to the U.S. withdrawal and thus to the treaty's termination. The
United States should work with its allies and partners to ensure Russia
gains no advantage by possessing this class of missile.
Question. Do you believe the U.S. should reenter the INF or a
similar agreement?
Answer. As the INF Treaty terminated upon the United States'
withdrawal, it is not possible to re-enter it. I look forward to
working with Congress and relevant agencies and departments on ways to
create new arms control agreements that serve U.S. interests.
Question. How do you believe that the missile asymmetry created by
INF compliance in the Pacific affects America's efforts to operate
within the first and second island chains in a conflict over Taiwan or
the South China Sea?
Answer. China's expansion of its nuclear and missile arsenal
presages a more dangerous future, with a larger number of sophisticated
intermediate-range delivery systems able to target U.S., allied, and
partner forces in the Indo-Pacific. I defer to the Department of
Defense for a direct assessment of their effects on regional U.S.
military operations and posture.
Question. How should the U.S. craft an arms control framework that
secures its ability to operate within contested zones in the Indo-
Pacific?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal, coupled with efforts
designed to bolster deterrence in the region. It is critical that the
United States consult closely with Indo-Pacific allies and partners to
ensure arms control efforts both reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
U.S. security strategy and ensure U.S. extended deterrence commitments
remain strong and credible.
Treaties/CEF
Question. The 1996 Flank Agreement to the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is one of the canonical examples where the
United States negotiated arms control restrictions that the Russians
serially violated, but nevertheless it took years for the U.S. or its
allies to formally unwind from the Treaty. Under most interpretations,
Russia was never in compliance with the 1996 limits, though it arguably
complied with parts of the Adapted treaty. You participated in
negotiations regarding the Flank agreement. Please describe--
Your assessment about whether the Russians ever came into
compliance with the Flank parameters.
Your assessment of whether the Flank Agreement enhanced U.S.
national security.
Your role in formulating, reviewing, and approving the Flank
Agreement, including--
Your overall role in formulating, reviewing, and
approving the Agreement.
Your role in the delegation, including who you
reported to.
Answer. My understanding is that Russia has not been in compliance
with the May 1996 flank limits, but is within the overall treaty
limits. If Russia remains within the overall conventional treaty
limits, I believe such limits continue to promote both U.S. and U.S.
allied national security interests as envisioned when the treaty was
negotiated.
As noted, the flank limits text was negotiated in 1996, at a time
when I had already transitioned to working on the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and was working on CTBT
backstopping in Washington, DC. I was therefore not involved in
the drafting of the final text of the agreement. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
Question. Any role you had in reviewing the final text of the
Agreement. If you did not have a role in reviewing the agreement, why
not and who provided legal advice for reviewing?
Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
Question. Any role you had in approving the final text of the
Agreement. If you did not have a role in approving the agreement, why
not and who provided legal advice for approving?
Answer. I was not involved in the drafting of the final text of the
agreement because I had moved on to working on the CTBT. I refer you to
the Department as to its staffing of this issue at that time.
China/NPT
Question. The Chinese plan to triple their nuclear arsenal in the
coming years.
What leverage does the U.S. have to get China to the negotiating
table?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work within the administration, in
consultation with U.S. allies and partners, to pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal. It is to be hoped that Beijing will come to
see that arms control is in its security interest: not a trap designed
to weaken China's defenses, but rather a mechanism to reduce risk and
the chances of uncontrollable arms races. U.S. allies and partners will
be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them to
regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States on
arms control.
Question. What is your plan to realistically get China to the
negotiating table for a credible arms control agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's pursuit
of arms control measures to reduce the dangers from the People's
Republic of China's growing nuclear arsenal. U.S. allies and partners
will be key to success, and if confirmed I will seek to work with them
to regularly urge the PRC to engage meaningfully with the United States
on arms control. I understand that the administration is in the process
of crafting specific proposals, and, if confirmed, I commit to
consulting with Congress regarding the arms control approach the
administration foresees pursuing with China.
Question. I introduced a bill last session that would impose
sanctions on parts of the Chinese military sector unless they come into
compliance with their already-existing NPT Article VI obligations for
`good faith' negotiations.
Do you believe China is meeting its NPT Article VI obligations?
Answer. China's nuclear weapons build-up risks undermining decades
of international progress toward nuclear disarmament. If confirmed, I
will consult with legal and policy experts at the Department of State
on a variety of matters related to China's behavior in the nuclear
weapon arena, including its compliance with Article VI.
Iran/NPT
Question. As traditionally understood, Article IV of the NPT
entitles member states to the benefits of peaceful civil-nuclear
technology to the extent that they are members in good standing with
the NPT. In the last administration, Special Representative of the
President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed
to the SFRC in writing that ``Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the NPT cannot be described as `good.'''
Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive
seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute
non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to address the
serious, outstanding issues related to potential undeclared nuclear
material in Iran. As a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, Iran
is obligated not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.
Under the JCPOA, Iran reaffirmed this commitment, and if confirmed, I
will work to ensure that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.
Question. All three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad are required to
maintain a reliable, credible and effective deterrent. This is
especially true as Russia continues to modernize its nuclear forces and
China is increasing its nuclear forces in an attempt at nuclear parity.
Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear Archive
seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute
non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT. If
yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. Iran's long history of denial and concealment regarding its
past nuclear weapons program is of serious concern. The Biden-Harris
administration has stated that it will not take Iran at its word
regarding assertions about its nuclear program, and fully supports the
IAEA as it uses its safeguards authorities to investigate any
indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in Iran. If
confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that Iran never acquires
a nuclear weapon.
Question. Do you consider Iran a member in good standing of the
NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and if confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Given Iran's past noncompliance with both its safeguards
agreement and its NPT obligations, its failure to fully and
substantially address IAEA questions related to past activities
relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device, its
retention and concealment of documents, equipment, and personnel
related to its past nuclear weapons program, and its failure to fully
address current IAEA questions related to potential undeclared nuclear
materials and activities in Iran, Iran's nuclear activities are cause
for serious concern.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must,
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking
nuclear activities, including its obligations under Article II of the
NPT and its NPT-required safeguards agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology for any reason? If yes, please explain why. If no,
please explain why.
Answer. Article IV of the NPT recognizes the right of all the
Parties to the Treaty, including Iran, to develop research, production
and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination
and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Iran must,
however, comply with its international obligations when undertaking
nuclear activities, including its obligation under Article II of the
NPT not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.
Iran/UNSCR 2231 Snapback
Question. UNSCR 2231 ended a long-standing international arms
embargo against Iran, described across the previous six resolutions
terminated by paragraph 7(a) of the resolution. After an effort to
extend that embargo, the Trump administration took two measures. First,
it invoked the ``snapback mechanism'' described in paragraphs 10-15 of
UNSCR 2231, reversing the termination of those resolutions. You and
others have publicly suggested that the U.S. was not entitled to invoke
that mechanism. Second, the Trump administration implemented EO 13949,
``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional
Arms Activities of Iran,'' which authorizes sanctions for transfers to
and from Iran of arms or related material or military equipment. As a
result, the U.S. established a baseline deterrent against major arms
sales to Iran. Multi-billion dollar arms agreements publicly described
and anticipated by Russia, China, and Iran did not occur.
However, in February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded that
decision.
Do you agree with the decision to rescind invoking the snapback
mechanism?
Answer. The snapback mechanism was designed to provide leverage to
help ensure Iran performed its commitments under the JCPOA. The
previous administration invoked snapback in a way that was never
contemplated by the deal, namely after unilaterally exiting it.
Virtually none of our allies or partners recognized this invocation of
snapback. The Biden-Harris administration believes that the United
States will be in a stronger position to counter the full range of
threats posed by Iran, including its nuclear program, by working in
close concert with our allies.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons
from Russia. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'')
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which
ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O.
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer to Iran of items on the U.N. Register of conventional arms
expired in October 2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed
to working with our allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing
activities in the region, including its acquisition of advanced weapons
from China. If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners on
the Security Council to dissuade countries from providing advanced
weapons to Iran and fueling Iran's efforts to undermine the stability
of its neighbors in the region. The United States retains numerous
unilateral authorities, including E.O. 13949 (``Blocking Property of
Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'')
to deter and sanction transfers to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. The provisions in UNSCR 2231 prohibiting the sale, supply,
or transfer from Iran of arms and related materiel expired in October
2020. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working with our
allies and partners to counter Iran's destabilizing activities in the
region, including its sales of weapons and arms. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with our partners on the Security Council to dissuade
countries from purchasing such equipment from Iran and fueling Iran's
efforts to undermine the stability of its neighbors in the region. The
United States retains numerous unilateral authorities, including E.O.
13949 (``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to
Conventional Arms Activities of Iran'') to deter and sanction transfers
to and from Iran of advanced weapons.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology?
Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and
urging the Council to address such activities.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such
ballistic missile technology?
Answer. United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 2231
calls upon Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
including launches using such ballistic missile technology. The United
States uses a number of tools to prevent transfers of equipment and
technology to Iran's missile programs and call attention to Iran's
missile development efforts. This includes reporting to the Security
Council launches by Iran that use technologies related to ballistic
missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons and
urging the Council to address such activities.
JCPOA/Treaty
Question. I believe that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) and any similar arms control agreement with Iran should be
brought to the U.S. Senate as a treaty for the Senate's advice and
consent. Officials from the Biden administration have indicated in
public and private they disagree with that stance, because it is
important in the context of such agreements to allow the U.S. to act
``without the constraints of international treaty law.'' I disagree
with that analysis, which fails to account for the Senate's
prerogatives in general, and in the context of the JCPOA cannot be
reconciled with the Obama-Biden administration's move to lock in the
JCPOA at through United Nations Security Council Resolution UNSCR 2231,
which sought to constrain U.S. behavior at the level of international
law.
Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement should be
brought to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent? If not, why
not?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program, as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.
Question. Do you believe that the JCPOA or a successor agreement
should not be brought to the Senate for advice and consent specifically
because it would constrain U.S. options? If so, please describe those
constraints.
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the
Secretary, Special Envoy Malley, and other members of the
administration in consultations on any agreement relating to Iran's
nuclear program, and to complying with the provisions of INARA.
Question. If a future agreement with Iran is not submitted to the
U.S. Senate for its advice and consent, do you believe that a future
administration would be within its legal prerogatives to dismantle it?
Answer. Secretary Blinken has committed to consulting fully with
Congress on any agreement relating to Iran's nuclear program as called
for under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (INARA). The JCPOA was
negotiated as a non-legally binding arrangement and transmitted to
Congress under INARA in 2015, and it underwent close congressional and
public scrutiny. If there were to be a U.S. return to the JCPOA, the
arrangement would impose no legal constraints on the United States'
ability to protect its interests, including, for example, by ceasing
participation in the deal if Iran were to fail to adhere to its JCPOA
commitments.
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?
Answer. I have several priorities I would like to engage on if
confirmed, the broadest and most important of which is to play a role
in reducing the risk of nuclear war through effective arms control. I
believe it is also critical that we make progress on limiting Russian
and Chinese nuclear expansion, strengthening our efforts in
biosecurity, pursuing accountability for the use of chemical weapons,
and promoting a diverse workforce. If confirmed I hope to work to
strengthen deterrence alliances in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific
to better deter and defend against growing threats, and to help
position the U.S. Government and State Department to grapple with
advancements in emerging technologies that can threaten strategic
stability. Finally, I intend if confirmed to strive to ensure that arms
transfers and security assistance are focused on building values-based
security partnerships.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. China voluntarily agreed, in 1997, to report its annual
civil plutonium production figures and related activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), along with the U.S., UK,
France, Russia, Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, and Germany. The last
Chinese report, which covered 2016, was submitted in 2017.
There is no public record of the U.S. taking them to task for no
longer reporting this information, which is troubling due to their
development of a fast-breeder reactor program.
Furthermore, the Commander of USSTRATCOM indicated, at an open
Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 14 April 2021, that ``this
will change the upper bounds of what China could choose to do, if they
wanted to, in terms of further expansion of their nuclear
capabilities.''
Do you know if this has been discussed, with the Chinese, in
diplomatic circles? Will you commit to meeting with me, if
confirmed, to discuss this issue further?
Answer. I have not been privy to such conversations. However, if
confirmed, I will call on China to submit its declaration report to the
IAEA per Information Circular (INFCIRC)/549 concerning ``Guidelines for
the Management of Plutonium.'' If confirmed, I would be happy to meet
with you to discuss this issue further.
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Bonnie R. Jenkins by Senator Bill Hagerty
Nuclear Modernization
Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit supporting the
modernization of U.S. nuclear forces? Please begin your answer with yes
or no.
Answer. Yes, the United States should have a modern, credible, and
effective deterrent.
Question. In your view, why is the modernization of U.S. nuclear
forces critical to protecting the security of the United States?
Answer. The United States must maintain a credible nuclear
deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. Nuclear weapons will
continue to exist beyond the planned service lives of existing U.S.
nuclear forces and modernization is necessary to sustain a credible
deterrent.
Question. In your view, do you agree that the role of nuclear
weapons should be reduced in U.S. foreign policy, as stated by two
Biden administration officials in an interview with the Asahi Shimbun?
Please begin your answer with yes or no. In an interview with Asahi
Shimbun, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Arms
Control, Verification, and Compliance Alexandra Bell and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Missile Defense Policy
Leonor Tomero publicly stated that ``there is no doubt that President
Biden's goal is to reduce the role of nuclear weapons.''
Answer. Yes, as the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance
states, ``We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in
our national security strategy, while ensuring our strategic deterrent
remains safe, secure, and effective and that our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.''
No First Use Policy
Question. If you are confirmed, will you commit to upholding the
longstanding U.S. policy of not adopting a ``no first use'' policy?
Please begin your answer with yes or no. Admiral Charles Richards, who
heads the U.S. Strategic Command, said that his ``best military advice
would be not adopt a no-first-use policy.'' During her nomination
hearing, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kath Hicks said that a ``no first
use'' policy is not in the interest of the United States.
Answer. The President of the United States determines U.S.
declaratory policy. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. If confirmed, I will participate in that process and will
consult with Congress and our allies on any policies or actions in this
area.
Question. In your view, what are the conditions in which the United
States can actually use a nuclear weapon? On January 2021, you argued
for declaring a ``no first use'' policy, stating that ``the United
States needs to define the conditions where we can actually use a
nuclear weapon.''
Answer. The President of the United States determines the
conditions under which the United States would consider the use of
nuclear weapons. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a
review of nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory
policy. I have thought, as many do, that the United States might
consider changes to U.S. declaratory policy that could increase
stability. I understand that there are varying perspectives on the
issue, but I believe most agree that we want to reduce nuclear risks to
the United States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the interagency and allies and Congress to find
the best ways to do this.
Question. What risks might U.S. allies face if the United States
were to adopt a ``no first use'' policy?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is undertaking a review of
nuclear policy that will certainly include declaratory policy. If
confirmed, I will participate in that process and will consult with
Congress and U.S. allies on any policies or actions in this area. It
would be premature to speculate about risks prior to the completion of
this review.
China & Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
Question. In your view, if a country with nuclear weapons, which is
a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
deliberately and repeatedly refuses to engage in good faith
negotiations on the issue of arms control, would you agree that country
is in violation of Article VI of the NPT? Please begin your answer with
yes or no. Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons clearly stipulates that countries with nuclear weapons should
``pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race.'' In recent years, the United
States repeatedly attempted to engage China on the issue of arms
control, but Beijing refused, asserting that ``the time is not yet
ripe'' for such discussions.
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's
behavior in the nuclear weapon arena, including its compliance with
Article VI of the NPT. It is urgent for China to take on greater
responsibility, transparency, and restraint with respect to its nuclear
weapons arsenal.
Security Assistance
Question. If you are confirmed, what metrics would you rely upon to
determine whether China is violating VI of the NTP Treaty?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with legal and policy experts
at the Department of State on a variety of matters related to China's
behavior in the nuclear weapons arena, including considerations
relevant to assessing compliance with Article VI of the NPT.
On the Next Arms Control Treaty
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms
control treaty should include China? Please begin your answer with yes
or no.
Answer. No. While the United States will pursue arms control
measures to reduce the dangers from the People's Republic of China's
growing nuclear arsenal, arms control agreements and arrangements must
be tailored to the security challenges they are intended to address.?
Although there may be opportunities for the United States and Russia to
engage the PRC in a trilateral forum, I do not believe that all future
arms control endeavors with Russia must include the PRC.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit that the next arms
control treaty with Russia must address all nuclear warheads, to
include Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons? Please begin your
answer with yes or no.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we use the time
provided by a five-year extension of the New START Treaty to pursue
with Russia, in consultation with Congress and U.S. allies and
partners, arms control that addresses all Russian nuclear weapons,
including novel strategic systems and non-strategic nuclear weapons.
Incorporating Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control
is a longstanding and bipartisan U.S. objective.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to regularly briefing
Congress on the status of diplomatic engagements with China on the
issue of arms control?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed I commit to regularly consulting Congress
on the status of the Biden-Harris administration's approach to China
and arms control.
Iran and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Question. In your view, is Iran in compliance with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? Please begin your answer with
yes or no.
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
NPT, and if confirmed, I will work with legal and policy experts to
monitor and assess Iran's NPT compliance. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon, and I share that commitment.
Question. If yes, how is Iran in compliance when it has not
answered the IAEA's questions on undeclared nuclear material and
activities?
Answer. I have serious concerns about Iran's compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in light of the IAEA's ongoing
safeguards investigations and Iran's failure to provide the IAEA with
the cooperation necessary to resolve them. If confirmed, I will work
with legal and policy experts to monitor and assess Iran's NPT
compliance. Iran must engage and cooperate fully with the IAEA in a way
that leads to credible, concrete progress and toward resolution of
these issues. Like President Biden, I have full confidence in the IAEA
to pursue any indications of undeclared or diverted nuclear material
that could contribute to any renewed Iranian pursuit of a nuclear
weapon.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to providing no
sanctions relief to Iran until they comply with the IAEA's requests to
resolve the outstanding issues on undeclared nuclear materials and
activities? The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments noted that
during the 2020 reporting period, the IAEA Director General (DG) issued
several reports on Iran that make clear that serious, outstanding
concerns remain regarding possible undeclared nuclear material and
activities in Iran today.
Answer. Iran is obligated under its NPT-required safeguards
agreement to declare to the IAEA nuclear material and nuclear
activities in Iran. Iran's failure to provide substantive or
technically credible responses to the IAEA's questions related to
possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities in Iran is cause
for serious concern. If confirmed, I will strongly support the IAEA's
ongoing investigation in Iran into indications of possible undeclared
nuclear material and, along with the rest of the international
community, expect full Iranian cooperation with inspectors--without
delay--as the IAEA works toward conclusions. President Biden has made
clear he is committed to ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear
weapon.
Open Skies Treaties
Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia has violated, and
continues to violate, the Treaty on Open Skies? Please begin your
answer with yes or no. The 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
noted that in ``2020, the United States continued to assess that Russia
was in violation of the Treaty on Open Skies (OST).'' In May 2020, the
Director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center
said: ``For years, Russia has used the Open Skies Treaty to collect
intelligence on civilian infrastructure and other sensitive sites in
America, posing an unacceptable risk to our national security.''
Answer. Yes, Russia has violated, and continues to violate, the
Treaty on Open Skies. I am not aware that Russia has taken any action
to return to compliance. As stated in this year's compliance report,
Russia has not rescinded its illegal 500-kilometer sublimit over
Kaliningrad. Russia also remains in violation for refusing to allow
observation flights to approach within 10 kilometers of its border with
the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While not a
violation of the treaty, Russia has also declared an airfield in Crimea
as a Russian Open Skies refueling airfield, in an attempt to politicize
the treaty.
Question. In your view, do you agree that Russia abuses the Treaty
on Open Skies and its actions posed an unacceptable risk the security
of the United States and our allies?
Answer. My view is that Russia's violations of the Treaty on Open
Skies, while concerning, by themselves do not pose a direct and
immediate threat to U.S. national security. Russia's use of the treaty
to collect imagery of military and civilian infrastructure, while not
prohibited by the treaty, could pose a risk, although I understand
there are measures in place to mitigate that risk.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Robert Menendez
Rebuilding the Bureaus
Question. Neglect of the Economic Growth, Environment, and Energy
Bureaus has resulted in a serious brain drain from the bureaus and hurt
morale among the dedicated workforce of these Bureaus. The previous
administration's skepticism and outright hostility towards
environmental stewardship, climate change, clean energy diplomacy and
economic cooperation were not only tone deaf and out of touch with the
interests of the rest of the world, but were demoralizing to the very
thoughtful and engaged personnel within these bureaus.
How will you restore morale among personnel, build back the ranks
of the ``E'' bureaus and offices, and demonstrate leadership
and interest in the E Bureaus' priorities?
Answer. Rebuilding the ``E'' family will require commitment and
dedication, not only in recruiting but in training and retention
efforts. We will also need to pay special attention to groups whose
lack of representation at the State Department predates the previous
administration. If confirmed, with your support and the help of my
colleagues at State, I intend to pay special attention to this effort.
Question. How will you continue and build on this tradition of
leadership to advance the values of transparency and accountability
that the U.S. Government has championed across MDBs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will champion the values of transparency
and accountability across all U.S. engagements with the multilateral
development banks. In large part due to our significant shareholding
size, the United States is in a position to continue to work with
fellow shareholders to ensure the MDBs promote transparency and
accountability in order to build more support among all stakeholders
for the very important work they do to address systemic barriers to
economic development.
Question. The U.S. National Contact Point (NCP) to the OECD is one
of the only avenues for justice for harm caused by companies; however,
reports have documented meaningful shortcomings in the NCP's ability
for facilitating accountability and remedy. How will you ensure that
the U.S. NCP is strong and effective to address business and human
rights grievances?
Answer. The U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises (Guidelines) serves an important role in
promoting and implementing the Guidelines, and in facilitating the
resolution of allegations brought against a company. The Guidelines
provide important recommendations by governments to companies on
responsible business practices, including with respect to human rights.
If confirmed, I will review the current work of the U.S. NCP, consider
feedback from concerned stakeholders, and take appropriate steps to
ensure that the mechanism we have in place to address grievances is a
meaningful one.
Question. What is your assessment of the push for an Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) capital increase?
Answer. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is a vital source
of development finance for Latin America and the Caribbean and provides
a high-quality alternative to unsustainable borrowing from China or
other creditors. IDB lending and policy advice will be important for
supporting the region in emerging from the multiple crises it faces. If
confirmed, I intend look closely at the IDB's plans and current
financing needs in collaboration with Treasury and other agencies.
Question. How can Congress best work with the administration to
advance this goal (of an IDB capital increase)?
Answer. Discussions on the Inter-American Development Bank's (IDB)
resources should occur from the bottom up, considering the views of all
shareholders, including Congress and IDB management. Such discussions
should include fulsome analyses of financial conditions, how its use of
resources addresses the region's challenges, and the IDB's role within
the larger financing and policy landscape for the region. If confirmed,
I would look closely at the IDB's plans and current financing needs in
collaboration with Congress, Treasury, and other agencies.
Question. How do you see the Under Secretary facilitating climate
into the operations of State Department bureaus where the concept of
``Climate Diplomacy'' may still be new?
Answer. Among the many pressing international priorities on
President Biden's agenda, reasserting American leadership in combating
the global climate crisis is among the most critical--having been
identified by the President as one of the four ``historic'' crises
confronting the United States. If confirmed, I plan to work closely
with Secretary Kerry and his team to advance our climate diplomacy
work. I understand that Secretary Kerry's climate diplomacy work is
closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am also
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E'' family
of bureaus and offices, and supporting the Biden-Harris
administration's broader diplomatic engagement.
Question. Can you describe how you see yourself, if confirmed,
working in cooperation with the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate
in realizing the full-scale integration and consideration of climate
into our foreign policy apparatus?
Answer. If I am confirmed, while I will report to Secretary
Blinken, I plan to work closely with Special Presidential Envoy Kerry
and his team to advance our climate work. Addressing the climate crisis
is going to take a whole-of-government and whole-of-Department of State
approach. If confirmed, I will have the privilege of overseeing two of
the bureaus most actively engaged in climate change diplomacy: the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs, and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate a close
working relationship with SPEC to ensure we are working together to
advance this policy priority.
Question. Is it in the U.S. interest, or a sound reflection of U.S.
values, to respond to BRI investments in fossil fuels by offering
financing for comparable fossil fuel energy projects that have
significant environmental impacts?
Answer. It is in the U.S. interest to work with countries to
understand the full economic and environmental impact of energy
investments and the availability of cost-effective, clean, and low-
carbon alternatives to fossil fuels. This includes, but is not limited
to, countries where the PRC is investing through its One Belt, One Road
(OBOR) initiative. If confirmed, I commit to coordinating across U.S.
Government agencies to work with international partners and expand
competitive financing options for cost-effective, low carbon
alternatives to PRC-backed, heavy-emitting infrastructure projects.
Question. Should the U.S. compete by providing better clean energy
alternatives that provide wide ranging health, economic growth and
social benefits to BRI energy projects that exacerbate the climate
crisis and harm local health and the environment?
Answer. It is critical that countries' energy needs be met in a
safe, and fiscally and environmentally sustainable, manner. If
confirmed, I commit to working with institutions like DFC and EXIM to
advance U.S. clean energy financing options, with a focus on building
partners' capacities to assess and mitigate financial and environmental
risks in the energy sector. I also commit to supporting international
initiatives, such as the Blue Dot Network, to certify quality
infrastructure projects that uphold global standards and are vital to
strengthening shared climate, social, and environmental standards.
Question. Do you believe it is in the U.S. economic interest, and
sound environmental policy, for the U.S. to pay foreign entities to
take our plastic waste to create energy?
Answer. It is in the economic and environmental interest of the
United States to support environmentally sound management of plastic
waste and scrap. If confirmed, I will work with international partners
to better understand international trade flows of plastic waste and
scrap as the State Department and other Departments and agencies
consider these important policy questions.
Question. Would you support a prohibition on export of U.S. plastic
waste for foreign energy production?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support upholding and implementing
U.S. export laws for waste and scrap, and supporting U.S. industry in
understanding the policies of other countries related to trade in
plastic waste and scrap. I understand that the Biden-Harris
administration is still reviewing its position on international waste
and scrap issues, and if confirmed I look forward to participating in
that review.
Question. If confirmed, what specific steps will you take to
increase U.S.-India cooperation on clean energy and address climate
change?
Answer. I understand that U.S.-India cooperation on climate and
clean energy is a core element of the bilateral relationship. President
Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-India Climate and Clean
Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders Summit on Climate on
April 22, 2021. Advancing India's ambitious 2030 climate and clean
energy targets, such as reaching 450 GW of renewable energy, will be
critical to confronting the climate crisis. If confirmed, I intend to
ensure that the State Department plays a leading role in advancing
U.S.-India collaboration, including by building on existing initiatives
through the Bureau of Energy Resources to mobilize clean energy finance
and integrate renewable energy into a flexible power system.
Question. What role would you anticipate having in the
implementation of the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030
Partnership?
Answer. President Biden and Prime Minister Modi launched the U.S.-
India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership at the Leaders
Summit on Climate on April 22, 2021, elevating climate and clean energy
collaboration to the core of the bilateral relationship. The
Partnership goals are to support India's deployment of 450 GW of
renewable energy by 2030, scale up innovative technologies, and build
capacity for climate adaptation. If confirmed, I intend to ensure the
State Department plays a leading role in this Partnership--through
promoting clean energy finance, technical assistance on regulatory
reform, and support for innovation and technology scale-up--and
provides the resourcing to achieve the ambitious 2030 agenda.
Question. If confirmed, will you support the establishment of a
U.S.-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center?
Answer. I am familiar with the goals of the Eastern Mediterranean
Security and Energy Partnership Act and, if confirmed, I will work with
Congress and the Department of Energy to support the U.S.- Eastern
Mediterranean Energy Center. I understand that the Department of Energy
is working with counterparts from Israel, Greece, and the Republic of
Cyprus, along with the State Department's Bureau of Energy Resources,
to determine the Center's scope of activities, and expects to have a
framework for establishment of the Center in the coming weeks.
Question. Will you commit to prioritizing labor rights and support
for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh, if confirmed?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing labor rights
and support for labor unions in relations with Bangladesh. In 2013,
President Obama suspended Bangladesh's trade benefits under the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) because the Government of
Bangladesh had made insufficient progress in affording Bangladeshi
workers internationally recognized worker rights. Since then,
Bangladesh has made a few amendments to its labor law, but workers
continue to face dismissals, blacklisting, and violence for attempting
to join or form unions or demonstrate for their due wages and benefits.
In response, the Department of State, USAID, and Department of Labor
fund programs to improve workers' rights and safety in the garment,
shrimp, and domestic work sectors, as well as for migrant workers. I
understand that the State Department also coordinates with USAID, the
International Labor Organization, and other partners to encourage
Bangladesh to enact reforms to bring its labor legislation in line with
international standards. If confirmed, I will ensure my team amplifies
this work, and raises concerns about labor rights at the highest levels
of the Government of Bangladesh.
Question. How specifically will you ensure that labor rights and
labor unions are prioritized in initiatives such as High-Level
Consultations on Economic Partnership with Bangladesh?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with leadership in the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of Labor, and U.S.
Trade Representative to ensure labor rights and labor unions are
prioritized in initiatives with Bangladesh, including the High-Level
Consultation on Economic Partnership. President Biden made clear in his
address to a joint session of Congress on April 28: middle class
workers grow the economy and unions build the middle class. Likewise,
economic partnerships are only possible because of workers, so labor
rights must be viewed as a priority across topics and sectors, rather
than a standalone issue.
Question. Will you commit to working with international partners to
combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the oceans?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working with international
partners to combat plastic pollution and marine debris in the ocean. I
plan to work with colleagues at the Department and across the
interagency, along with stakeholders, as the United States prepares for
negotiations under the fifth United Nation Environment Assembly
meeting, which is expected to deliberate on options for global action
to address ocean plastic pollution in February 2022. If confirmed, I
will also work with staff to implement the Department's activities
under Save Our Seas 2.0, including building international partnerships
to build capacity to address marine debris.
Question. Will you help guide the State Department, working with
other relevant federal agencies and multilateral institutions, to
examine the environmental risks and social impact of foreign plastic
waste processors that claim to recycle plastic waste?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will help guide the Department,
including collaborating interagency partners and relevant multilateral
institutions, to better understand the environmental and social impacts
of foreign plastic waste processors that claim to recycle plastic
waste.
Question. Will you make exploring the potential for new
international agreements on land-based sources of marine debris and
derelict fishing gear a priority for the Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs Bureau?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to addressing ocean plastic
pollution and working with countries and stakeholders to find
innovative solutions to address land-based sources of marine debris as
well as derelict fishing gear. The Biden-Harris administration has not
taken a position on launching a new global instrument and is still
developing its perspective on the best approaches to addressing marine
litter and plastic pollution. If confirmed, I will work with
interagency, stakeholders and international partners as we consider
different approaches, including new global instruments.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively
executing U.S. foreign policy, to include diplomatic engagement to
advance U.S. global health security interests overseas--the Department
of State, USAID, or CDC?
Answer. I understand that the United States takes a whole-of-
government approach, under the President's leadership, and in
coordination with the National Security Council, to advance U.S.
foreign policy, including advancing U.S. global health security
interests overseas. The President appointed a Coordinator for the
Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security at the Department of
State. This role leads diplomatic engagement on behalf of the U.S.
Government on health security matters, coordinating closely with
relevant departments and agencies. I understand that the Chief of
Mission ultimately has authority and responsibility for U.S. activities
in a respective country and is responsible for coordinating and
effectively executing U.S. foreign policy. Staff across the U.S.
interagency, including from the Department of State, USAID, and CDC,
have critical roles to contribute to this effort.
Question. Who is responsible for coordinating and effectively
executing U.S. foreign assistance overseas, to include diplomatic
engagement to advance U.S. global health security interests in
countries of all income categories--the Ambassador (Department of
State), the Mission Director (USAID), or CDC country representatives?
Answer. I understand that under the direction of the President, the
Secretary of State is responsible for the supervision and general
direction of U.S. foreign assistance. I understand that the U.S.
Ambassador, with Chief of Mission authority and responsibility for U.S.
activities in a country, is responsible for ensuring adequate
coordination among U.S. departments and agencies in country, as to best
utilize the expertise of technical agencies such as USAID and CDC and
ensure coordination across equities. The implementation of specific
programs falls under USAID Mission Directors and CDC country
representatives, who have important roles in directing country teams in
the responsible and effective use of U.S. foreign assistance overseas.
Question. Who is best placed to coordinate the execution of a
comprehensive U.S. global health security strategy overseas, including
by resolving conflicts between implementing agencies and
organizations--the Department of State, USAID, or CDC?
Answer. I understand that the Chief of Mission in a given country
has ultimate responsibility for U.S. activities in the country, and the
National Security Council coordinates implementation of U.S. foreign
policy across agencies. I understand that the Department of State,
USAID, CDC, DOD, and other agencies collaborate closely to coordinate
and resolve conflicts in the execution of U.S. global health security
strategy overseas.
Question. Given the leading role assigned to the Department of
State by National Security Memorandum-1 (21 January 2021) and Executive
Order 13747 (4 November 2016) in advancing U.S. global health security
and diplomacy, the enormity of U.S. foreign assistance dedicated to
advancing global health priorities overseas, and the fact that the
major implementer of U.S. global health assistance overseas--USAID--
falls under the foreign policy guidance of the Department of State, do
you believe the Office of International Health and Biodefense, as
currently structured, is fit for purpose?
Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of global
health security. The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs' Office of International Health and Biodefense
(OES/IHB) advances these interests through diplomacy and foreign policy
implementation bilaterally and multilaterally, in close coordination
with the interagency. I understand that OES leadership will continue
coordinating with relevant Department of State bureaus and offices and
interagency partners to review global health security needs and assess
the need for any additional resources, working with Congress.
Question. Do you agree that the PEPFAR model, to include the
coordinating role played by the Department of State and the
implementing roles played by USAID and the CDC, has been successful?
Answer. Yes. PEPFAR uses a whole-of-government model to harness the
comparative advantages of seven U.S. Government implementing agencies,
including USAID and CDC, with leadership and coordination through the
U.S. Department of State, including at the country level through U.S.
Chiefs of Mission worldwide. It may be the most rigorous global health
program in terms of data collection. PEPFAR's interagency program
implementation has been critical to PEPFAR's success in controlling the
HIV/AIDS pandemic. As PEPFAR's work continues, it is seen as a model in
global health, even in the context of COVID-19.
Question. As more and more countries approach epidemic control, do
you believe this (PEPFAR) model could be adapted to advance broader
global health security and diplomacy objectives, as the Obama
administration envisioned under the GHI?
Answer. The current pandemic highlights the importance of
strengthening global health security capacity and health systems.
Various models for U.S. foreign assistance programs, including PEPFAR,
have successfully bolstered health outcomes globally. Bureaus and
offices at the Department of State--including the Office of the U.S.
Global AIDS Coordinator, Office of International Health and Biodefense,
and Office of Foreign Assistance--continue efforts to leverage the
successes of various aid models to effectively strengthen global health
security capacity, and I will look forward to reviewing those efforts
and models if confirmed.
Question. As the Department and U.S. interagency work to help
developing nations build their infrastructure and provide their energy
needs, will you commit to considering all energy sources and fuels
types that make the most sense for each project, particularly with
respect to the needs of developing countries? Will you commit not to
make general prohibitions on coal, oil, or natural gas projects?
Answer. I am committed, if confirmed, to help developing countries
address their energy needs and support the Biden-Harris
administration's whole-of-government approach to ensure that climate
considerations are fully integrated into our energy-related
engagements. This includes supporting developing countries as they plan
for a low-emissions future that decarbonizes key sectors, increases
competitive energy and infrastructure development, and increases energy
access to sustainably meet growing demand. If confirmed, I will work
within the Department and interagency to coordinate support to
countries to meet their climate, energy access, and energy security
needs in ways that further our climate and energy goals.
Question. If a capital increase is authorized for the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB) this Congress, if confirmed, will you
commit to working to establishing appropriate safeguards, transparency
and conditionality measures to protect debt-vulnerable IADB member
countries of that borrow from the IADB to restructure Chinese bilateral
debt held by such countries? Do you also commit to establishing
measures to protect such countries from incurring subsequent Chinese
bilateral debt?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with our allies and
partners to distinguish our approach to development from China's by
ensuring that economic viability and transparency are built into the
projects we support at the Inter-American Development Bank. I will also
work to confront China's economic abuses and advocate for the highest
transparency and accountability standards to promote development
investments that are both beneficial and sustainable over the long
term.
Question. China, through its Belt and Road Initiative, is financing
and constructing infrastructure projects around the globe. These
projects build relationships that will last years if not decades
between China and other countries. Depending on the terms of the
financing and the quality of the construction, China may secure an
unfair advantage in the relationship to the detriment of the interests
of the host country as well as the United States. How do you propose
the United States counter these practices and strengthen relationships
with countries in need of infrastructure development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the United States
distinguishes itself from Beijing's state-led approach to development,
including the ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative, by promoting private-
sector driven alternatives. The United States' approach focuses on
partnerships that strengthen local capacity and promote
entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance, fair practices, and
internationally recognized environmental, social, and labor standards.
If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies, and through
existing U.S. Government agencies such as the Development Finance
Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and others, to promote and support
infrastructure investments with high standards that ensure such
projects are beneficial and sustainable over the long term.
Question. People's Republic of China (PRC) companies are making
significant headway an important but often overlooked technology area:
undersea cables. The prior administration focused on this issue through
its Clean Cable initiative, and by providing financing for specific
cable projects in the Indo-Pacific. Please describe your understanding
of PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications for
United States interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this area of
technology if you are confirmed?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration views
undersea cables as critical to America's national security and economic
prosperity. If confirmed, I will fully support Department efforts that
prioritize protecting this critical infrastructure and work with allies
and partners to prevent untrusted, high-risk, and unproven vendors,
like those with ties to the PRC, from increasing their market share
through unfair practices.
Question. After years of negotiations, on December 30th, 2020-
nearly the final day of the German Council presidency--the European
Union (EU) announced it had reached an agreement with China on an
investment deal. What is your view of the EU's decision to conclude
this agreement at this moment?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about China, including
through the recently relaunched U.S.-EU dialogue on China and on issues
related to trade and investment. Ultimately, the onus will be on China
to show that any new pledges in the Comprehensive Agreement on
Investment (CAI) on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and
subsidies are not just cheap talk, and the EU will need to hold the
Chinese Government accountable. If confirmed, I will seek to engage
with European counterparts on how to advance our shared economic
interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive actions, as well
as on China's failures to uphold its past international commitments.
Question. What are the economic and geopolitical implications of
this agreement? Please be specific. Will it affect the EU's willingness
to push back on China for its malign behavior, such as using the EU's
new human rights sanctions regime? Do you believe that this agreement
with affect, negatively or positively, U.S. attempts to hold China
accountable for its malign trade and investment practices?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our
shared economic interests and counter China's aggressive and coercive
actions, including trade and investment practices. The economic and
geopolitical implications of the deal will depend on whether it is
ratified and, if so, whether the Chinese Government follows through on
its commitments. The United States applauded the EU's imposition of
sanctions in March under its global human rights sanctions regime
against PRC individuals in connection with serious human rights abuses
in Xinjiang, an action taken in unity with the United States, Canada,
and the United Kingdom.
Question. The prior administration stood up an initiative called
the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network, designed to
advance the development of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality
infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening capacity-
building programs; providing transaction advisory services and project
preparation assistance to support sustainable infrastructure; and
coordinating the provision of United States assistance for the
development of infrastructure. If confirmed, do you commit to
supporting and continuing this program?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continuing the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network (ITAN). Public financing alone
cannot fulfill the $15 trillion global infrastructure gap over the next
twenty years--we must mobilize private financing of quality
infrastructure, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Participants in ITAN
representing 14 U.S. agencies have collaborated to identify and provide
support for dozens of projects with a market value of $190 billion. I
will work to continue helping foreign partners build better enabling
environments to mobilize greater private sector financing in quality
infrastructure investment through ITAN.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing advocacy,
assistance, and other necessary initiatives to encourage, promote, and
support greater investment in and economic and commercial engagement
with Southeast Asia?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to supporting increased
investment, economic, and commercial engagement in Southeast Asia.
Transparent, inclusive, and resilient economic growth is key to
ensuring that Southeast Asia remains free and open. Through our Indo-
Pacific programs, if confirmed, I will work with U.S. Government
economic agencies to help countries in the region attract quality
investments, increase transparency, secure project financing for key
transactions, and advocate for U.S. firms. I will also seek to work
through multilateral organizations, such as APEC and ASEAN, to improve
regional business environments, reduce trade barriers, and increase
commercial ties between U.S. businesses and the region.
Question. How can the United States build more reliable trade and
investment partnerships with African countries, particularly when the
region faces severe economic impacts from the coronavirus pandemic,
external debt, and inflationary pressures? What will it take to
overcome these myriad challenges, and how do you believe the United
States can assist?
Answer. I believe that fostering debt transparency is a key
requirement for building back better in Africa. I understand that the
United States supports the Paris Club-G20 Debt Service Suspension
Initiative and the Common Framework for Debt Treatments, both of which
include debt transparency requirements. If confirmed, I will advance
U.S. engagement in the multilateral debt initiatives, as well as
ongoing World Bank and IMF support for economic recovery in Africa. The
World Bank has provided $50 billion for African countries, while a
significant portion of the IMF's $110 billion in COVID-related rapid
financing has gone to Africa. If confirmed, I will also support
development of a plan for a $650 billion IMF special drawing rights
allocation.
Question. Our strategy to counter malign foreign actors like the
People's Republic of China (PRC) in African countries cannot be limited
to still-nascent programs like Prosper Africa and aged initiatives like
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). The United States' plan
will also require strategic, targeted, and well-resourced ``whole-of-
country'' initiatives that address not only the economic side of the
issue, but the governance, cultural, and diplomatic sides as well. How
can the United States better develop country- or city-level strategies
(for Africa's ever-growing mega-cities) to properly incentivize U.S.
private sector engagement in critical sectors to ensure they are well-
positioned to compete?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that U.S. companies can
compete on an even, transparent playing field. I will enhance our work
to improve the investment climates on a country-by-country basis and
inform U.S. firms of Africa's opportunities. U.S. businesses provide
world-class products and services that Africans seek to grow their
economies. If confirmed, I will examine how we can better coordinate
our financing support across U.S. agencies. The Prosper Africa
initiative has been working to coordinate many of these efforts, but we
can do more. If confirmed, I will also support our soft power efforts,
including engaging with youth and diaspora, and encouraging educational
opportunities.
Question. Should the United States prioritize support of Africa's
efforts to realize implementation of the African Continental Free Trade
Area (AfCFTA) or carve out strategic Free Trade Agreements with
countries like Kenya? For regional economic blocs like the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)?
Answer. I understand that the United States, while not a party to
the AfCFTA, supports its goals of improved harmonization and
coordination of trade in Africa. The agreement has the potential to
foster a better business climate that would increase opportunities for
U.S. businesses. If confirmed, I look forward to supporting USTR on any
trade matters and strengthening alliances with our key partners, like
Kenya and the Regional Economic Communities across Africa. With respect
to Kenya, I understand USTR is closely reviewing the negotiations that
have taken place to date.
Question. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 establishes
an Office of Sanctions Coordination within the Department of State. If
confirmed, do you commit to work with my office and this committee to
ensure that this office succeeds and fulfills its statutory mandate?
Answer. Yes. I share the Department's appreciation for Congress's
deep and continued involvement in sanctions issues. If confirmed, I
will work to leverage available expertise and resources throughout the
Government on sanctions issues, including as the Department works to
stand up the Office of Sanctions Coordination established in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, and will work with your office and the
committee.
Question. Do you anticipate that the Office of the Special Envoy
for Climate will coordinate with the E bureau? If so, how? Do you have
an understanding of what the reporting structure would look like? In
the event of a disagreement between your office and the Special Envoy's
office, to whom would the matter be elevated?
Answer. While the Under Secretary position I have been nominated to
reports to Secretary Blinken, if confirmed, I plan to work closely with
Special Envoy for Climate (SPEC) Kerry and his team to advance our
climate work. I understand Special Envoy Kerry's climate diplomacy work
is closely coordinated with the Department's. If confirmed, I am
committed to further integrating the climate agenda in the ``E''
(Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment) family. If confirmed, I
will have the privilege of overseeing the two bureaus most engaged in
climate diplomacy: the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
and Scientific Affairs and the Bureau of Energy Resources. I anticipate
a positive working relationship with SPEC.
Question. One of the irritants in the United States' relationship
with our closest allies is the question of taxation of digital
companies. Understandingly, European countries would like to tax
companies operating in their territories, but this would have a direct
and targeted harm on U.S. companies, since the U.S. is home to most of
the largest tech companies. Resolving this issue is of primary
important both for our relationship with Europe, for pushing back on
the influence of Chinese tech companies, and for the health of the U.S.
tech companies. In this role, you would have a large part to play in
the negotiations to resolve this issue. How do you view the issue? What
do you believe is the right compromise? What are the consequences for
not resolving it?
Answer. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration is
committed to finding a multilateral solution to the current set of
international tax issues?that require collective action.??If confirmed,
I would seek to work within my role to pursue a strong international
minimum tax?to?end?the race to the bottom in corporate taxation,
ensuring multinational enterprises pay their fair share. This should
also include?an equitable way to address the allocation of profits
generated through the deployment of intangible property, including to
resolve the issues that have been used to justify?Digital Services
Taxes. If confirmed, I look forward to working alongside colleagues
throughout the U.S. Government to advance these efforts.
Question. Do you commit to continuing the previous administration's
support for the Three Seas Initiative as a way to assist the
infrastructure development of Eastern Europe in a sustainable way and
to counter China's Belt and Road and 17 + 1 Initiative?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to continuing strong U.S.
Government support for the Three Seas Initiative (3SI), a commitment
already voiced by Secretary Blinken on several occasions. 3SI meets
multiple strategic objectives of the Biden-Harris administration,
including promoting the economic development and critical
infrastructure resilience of some close U.S. Allies. 3SI contributes to
closing development deficits left by communism; fostering the overall
integration of Europe; strengthening Central and Eastern European
resilience against, and Western alternatives to, Russian malign
influence and the PRC's Belt and Road and 17+1 initiatives; and
advancing multilateral partnership and transatlantic ties.
Question. What do you view as the DFC's role in this (3 Seas)
Initiative? What additional steps can, and should, the U.S. Government
take to incentivize the private sector to take the risks necessary to
invest in the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Development Finance Corporation to maximize U.S. investment in Three
Seas Initiative (3SI) projects and in finding other ways, in
coordination with members, international financial institutions, and
private capital markets to support 3SI goals in the energy, digital,
and transport sectors. The needs in the 3SI region cannot be addressed
solely by the public sector; the United States must incentivize private
capital and U.S. business to invest in this stable region whose
economic indicators have long been strong and positive. The U.S.
Government should also promote U.S. business investment in 3SI
projects.
Question. Do you view the sanctions in the Protecting European
Energy Security Act (PEESA), as amended, as a statutory requirement or
an optional authority??
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
PEESA, as amended, is an important tool to stop the Nord Stream 2
pipeline and ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy
supply that enhances rather than undermines its collective security. I
understand that the Department continues to assess all potential
targets involved in the construction of Nord Stream 2, to identify
persons that engaged in conduct that meets the specific terms of the
statute.
Question. Do you believe that it is possible to prevent the
completion of NordStream 2, or is it inevitable?
Answer. Nord Stream 2 is a threat not only to Europe's energy
security, but also to strategic stability on the continent. The
administration will continue to work with allies and partners, using
the tools at its disposal, to prevent the completion of the pipeline
and to ensure that Europe has a reliable, diversified energy supply
that enhances, rather than undermines, its collective security. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Department continues to work to bring an
end to the project.
Question. Are U.S. sanctions on entities involved in NordStream 2
extraterritorial, as some have claimed?
Answer. The administration has made clear that any entity involved
in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should
immediately abandon work on the pipeline. I understand the
administration continues to engage European allies and partners to make
our opposition to the pipeline and the potential sanctions risk clear
and will continue to underscore strong, bipartisan U.S. opposition to
this Russian malign influence project.
Question. Do you believe it would be appropriate for the
administration to negotiate a deal with Germany (or any foreign power)
involving the waiving of mandatory sanctions absent prior consultations
with Congress?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, there is no such deal. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with Congress on this matter
and others.
Question. Do you commit to upholding U.S. law and sanctioning
entities that are building or supporting the building of the NordStream
2 pipeline?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
I understand the Department continues to work to bring an end to the
pipeline, which it views as a threat to European energy security and as
a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. How will you use your position as Under Secretary of
Economic Growth, Energy, and Environment to use U.S. economic power to
partner with, rather than coerce, European allies and partners to
strengthen their mechanisms to push back on China, including
strengthening and diversifying their economies, incentivizing western
investment into eastern and southern Europe, building strong export
control regimes, and reinforcing their investment screening mechanisms?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the People's Republic of China
is the only country with the economic, diplomatic, military, and
technological power to seriously challenge the stable and open
international system. To address this challenge, the United States must
engage from a position of strength, which requires working with allies
and partners since this combined weight is much harder for Beijing to
ignore. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with European
partners who share our concerns to build resilience and reduce reliance
on the PRC, and look forward to making progress on the issues you raise
in upcoming G7 meetings, the U.S.-EU Summit and U.S.-EU China Dialogue,
and in other venues.
Question. What are the most immediate and critical areas for State
to prioritize in this effort? Will you have the capacity to prioritize
both the removal of irritants in our relationship AND work to weaken
China's economic power over Europe?
Answer. Our European partners share many of our concerns regarding
the PRC's efforts to challenge the current economic order, but we will
not always see eye to eye, even with our closest allies. We must work
together to build resilience by both protecting and promoting our
technological advantages. We must work together to ensure global norms
and standards reflect our values. We must work together to secure our
global supply chains and promote fair trade. Managing our differences
is essential to achieving our shared objectives and, if confirmed, I
will ensure we find the common ground that will allow us to do so.
Question. The EU struck an investment deal with China last
December, and yet, the U.S.-EU talks on trade and investment, through
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) negotiations,
have crumbled. While the U.S. Trade Representative has primacy over
trade talks, in this role, how will you push for enhanced trade and
investment between the United States and the EU? What do you see as
areas ripe for immediate cooperation in trade and investment? Do you
believe there is room, despite protectionist instincts on both sides of
the Atlantic, to complete any trade and investment agreements during
the Biden administration? Will you push both sides to compromise for
the sake of economic growth and unity against malign economic actors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's active
engagement with EU and European counterparts on how to advance our
shared economic interests. Failed FTA negotiations and tariff wars have
badly damaged the U.S.-EU trade relationship over the past seven years.
Resolving the trade disputes including Airbus-Boeing, Section 232 steel
and aluminium, and Section 301 determinations in response to digital
services taxes, in a manner that supports domestic jobs and growth in
the United States, would remove key irritants in the relationship and
allow us to focus on future challenges.
Question. Will you support a trade agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom? Do you believe that a US-UK free trade
agreement would be a benefit to the United States as well as the UK?
How will you work with the UK and EU to ensure that both sides of the
Brexit deal uphold their commitments, which is to the benefit of the
U.S., EU, and UK?
Answer. President Biden has been clear that he will make
significant new investments in the United States for American workers
before he signs any new trade deals. Now that a U.S. Trade
Representative has been confirmed, I understand that the administration
is reviewing the status of the negotiations and the text of the U.S.-UK
FTA to determine the best way forward. If confirmed, I look forward to
working closely with Department colleagues and USTR to engage with the
UK Government on strengthening our ties across a wide range of economic
issues. Further, President Biden has warned that any trade deal is
contingent upon respect for the Good Friday Agreement.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. What are your most meaningful achievements to date in
your career to promote human rights and democracy? What has been the
impact of your actions?
Answer. While chairing the American Bar Association's Interamerican
Law Committee at the height of the internal wars in Central America, I
organized a network of lawyers from the hemisphere who sought to
promote human rights and help mediate labor law conflicts in the
region. Together with bar associations from Central America, from 1986
to 1989 we organized conferences in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala
and Costa Rica that focused on the use of arbitration. The conferences
received much attention in these jurisdictions, and at least in one
country resulted in draft labor law legislation that incorporated
arbitration procedures. While the results were modest and violence
against labor unionists continues to this day, our efforts served to
highlight alternative dispute resolution methods to adjudicate often-
bloody conflicts.
In 1999 journalist Horacio Verbitsky filed a complaint with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the Republic of
Argentina over his conviction for publishing criticisms of Argentine
Government officials, including then-President Menem. At the request of
a Columbia Law School professor, my team and I researched the
applicable law and prepared a first draft of Mr. Verbitsky's legal
brief. The case was ultimately decided in favor of Mr. Verbitsky.
In 2013, the Rana Plaza building in Dhaka, Bangladesh collapsed,
killing more than 1,100 garment workers and injuring an additional
2,500-plus. The disaster followed several accidents in garment
factories in the country. Shortly afterwards, as Assistant Secretary of
State for Economics, Energy and Business, I led a U.S. Government visit
to Bangladesh, where we informed Bangladeshi officials that the United
States would revoke GSP privileges over worker conditions. I followed
up with several meetings in Washington DC with two industry groups that
had been created by European and U.S. clothing retailers to improve
worker conditions in Bangladesh. My main concern was that, although
both groups had similar objectives, they were often in competition and
were dissipating efforts that could not be wasted. Our meetings led the
groups to agree on common standards and greater coordination. I
understand that, largely through the efforts of both industry groups,
safety has improved at the larger factories in Bangladesh, although
more work remains to be done in smaller enterprises.
Question. Research from private industry demonstrates that, when
managed well, diversity makes business teams better both in terms of
creativity and in terms of productivity. What will you do to promote,
mentor, and support your staff that come from diverse backgrounds and
underrepresented groups?
Answer. Successful international economic policy is predicated on
having a diverse and representative staff. President Biden has made
diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility a national security
imperative. Secretary Blinken has committed to recruit and retain a
workforce that truly reflects the American people. Diversity and
inclusion make our diplomatic team stronger, smarter, more creative,
and more innovative. If confirmed, I commit to working with the new
Chief Diversity and Inclusion Officer, the Bureau of Global Talent
Management, the Secretary's Office of Civil Rights, and other
Department leadership to foster an inclusive workplace in the E
``family,'' promoting, mentoring, and supporting the advancement of
diverse staff.
Question. Fighting corruption is one of the most important ways
that we can promote democracy and human rights worldwide. What steps
would you take to address global corruption within the role for which
you are nominated?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to work with experts across the
Department and interagency to promote and defend democracy. Through the
targeted deployment of accountability tools, foreign assistance, and
diplomatic engagement, we can address endemic corruption and human
rights abuse. I will prioritize working with allies, seeking
opportunities to promote our shared ideals together. I will work to
expand opportunities for U.S. companies to compete for and win business
globally by advancing the fight against foreign bribery and corruption,
strengthening transparency and good governance, and promoting
responsible business conduct.
Question. Do you commit to work with Congress to strengthen U.S.
policies to combat global corruption?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to
strengthen U.S. policies to combat global corruption, including efforts
to bolster enforcement of foreign bribery laws and improve global
standards of transparency, accountability, and good governance. These
efforts directly support the American middle class through job creation
by helping to level the playing field for U.S. business.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In 2015, you wrote an article stating that the loosening
of restrictions on telecommunications investments in Cuba ``had the
greatest potential to accelerate the growth of civil society in Cuba.''
Although I believe that increasing connectivity and allowing the free
flow of information to the Cuban people will help increase the
communication among the Cuban people, ETECSA, Cuba's only
telecommunication company sets high prices, and shuts down the access
to those who voice opposition against the regime. Just recently the
regime shut down internet access in response to the San Isidro
protests. Can you describe your views towards Cuba today?
Answer. As a refugee from Castro's Cuba, I have no illusions about
the Cuban Government. Many human rights activists from across the
island rely on expanded internet access to communicate with each other
and strengthen networks with other groups in Cuba and abroad, but the
Cuban Government has restricted the country's internet access to keep
independent media and journalists from reporting on government
repression. If confirmed, I will seek to engage directly with Cuban
civil society, and will work to design policies to empower Cuban civil
society and recognize their leadership on these issues. Further, I will
directly engage the Cuban Government on human rights issues, including
freedom of expression.
Question. As you know, the Cuban military plays a large role in
controlling the flow of money in the Cuban economy. They use this
control to support the Cuban regime. Do you support restricting
financial transactions with the Cuban military as a way to promote
freedom in Cuba?
Answer. The Cuban people face great hardship as they deal with the
pandemic and decades of an oppressive government's economic
mismanagement. I understand that the Biden-Harris administration has
committed to reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, including the U.S. posture
regarding economic sanctions, to ensure they help empower the Cuban
people to determine their future. If confirmed, I will support the
Department's review, and I look forward to consulting with Congress on
this issue.
Question. As you know, Taiwan has long pursued a bilateral trade
agreement with the United States. Late last year, the Taiwanese
Government expended tremendous political capital to lift a ban on the
import of American pork, which was the last major stumbling block to an
agreement with Washington. If confirmed, will you urge the U.S. trade
Representative to prioritize free trade agreement negotiations with
Taiwan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to deepening trade, investment,
and other economic ties with Taiwan, which is a critical economic
partner. Trade with Taiwan advances U.S. interests and helps create
economic opportunity and prosperity in the United States. If confirmed,
I will work with the U.S. Trade Representative to strengthen U.S.
economic ties with Taiwan as an important priority.
Question. China engages in economic predatory behavior through
initiatives like Belt and Road, conducts malign influence operations
around the world, steals IP, and is working to reshape the
international rules-based system to its benefit. If confirmed, how will
you use your role to counter China's malign activities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to work with partners and allies
to promote democratic governance and transparency. In contrast to the
PRC's approach to development, I will work to ensure that we continue
to focus on strong fiscal, social, and environmental safeguards in the
projects we support. This includes building partnerships and local
capacity, and promoting U.S. leadership in science, technology, and
innovation. Further, if confirmed, I will work to promote the highest
standards in development investments that are both beneficial and
sustainable over the long term, and advocate for these standards in
international standard-setting bodies. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Congress on this issue.
Question. Do you think that the Belt and Road Initiative challenges
U.S. strategic and economic interests? If so, could you expand on that?
Answer. The PRC's opaque and unilateral approach to its overseas
lending and investments creates unknown financial risks and undermines
the efforts of the international community to advance development in a
transparent, accountable, and sustainable manner that includes
appropriate social and environmental safeguards. If confirmed, I will
actively contribute to the Biden-Harris administration's efforts to
counter this malign PRC influence, including by working with partners
and allies to offer sustainable, market-based alternatives and help
countries increase transparency and accountability of existing PRC
lending.
Question. How do you think the U.S. should work with our allies to
make them aware of the repercussions of tightening economic engagement
with China?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken said, the PRC is the only country with
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to
seriously challenge the stable and open international system. The
United States must address this challenge from a position of strength,
which requires working with allies and partners. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure our partners and allies are aware of the risks posed by
Beijing's economic statecraft. These risks include vulnerability to
predatory and unsustainable lending, malign investment, economic
coercion, ICT networks with equipment that can be manipulated or
controlled by the PRC, pressure to prioritize the PRC's interests in
international organizations, and unfair competition from the PRC's
state-owned enterprises.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Edward J. Markey
Question. If confirmed, you will serve as the Alternate Governor at
the World Bank, the EBRD and the IDB. All three of these banks are
involved and have influence in countries where sexual minorities are
discriminated against and where there is violence and persecution based
on sexual identity and gender preference. Will you commit for the
United States to use its vote and voice to improve the situation in
these countries and ensure that all citizens can benefit from
development programs supported by these multilateral banks?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that programs
financed by the multilateral development banks are inclusive and reach
the most vulnerable and marginalized groups in society, including those
who may be victims of persecution based on their sexual orientation,
gender identity, or sex characteristics. If confirmed as Alternate
Governor, I will work with the U.S. Governor to promote inclusivity in
the development programs we support.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Rob Portman
Question. As the senior economic officer of the State Department,
your responsibilities often overlap with those of the Department of
Commerce, the Treasury Department, the United States Trade
Representative (USTR), among other agencies. I am interested in hearing
what you see as your role in this effort and how you will work with
other agencies to advance our goals?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the U.S. Trade
Representative, the Department of Commerce, the Department of the
Treasury, and others in the administration to ensure that all U.S.
trading partners live up to their commitments in trade agreements, and
I will encourage a whole-of-government approach to addressing these
challenges. If confirmed as the State Department's senior economic
officer, I will work to ensure the interagency considers the foreign
policy implications of all decisions while taking into account the
economic impacts on U.S. businesses, as well as those of our allies and
partners.
Question. You have spoken in the past about how our trading
partners must live up to their commitments, especially as it pertains
to workers' rights. Currently, in the Xinjiang region of China, Uyghurs
are currently being forced to produce products in atrocious conditions.
How do you recommend we deal with this situation and how should we hold
China accountable?
Answer. The PRC is engaged in human rights violations and abuses in
Xinjiang, including forced labor, that shock the conscience and must be
met with serious consequences. The United States has used several tools
to confront the PRC's use of forced labor, including sanctions and
Withhold Release Orders to prevent products made with forced labor from
entering the United States. If confirmed, I will work with our
interagency partners to use all appropriate levers available to us as
we seek to eliminate all forms of human trafficking. In addition, I
will work with allies and partners to promote accountability and call
on Beijing to respect the human rights of Uyghurs and all other
religious and ethnic minorities across China.
Question. The State Department, in concert with the Treasury
Department and USAID, works to negotiate and executive conservation
agreements under the Tropical Forest Conservation Act (TFCA) program.
If you are confirmed to be Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy,
and the Environment, will you commit to prioritizing additional TFCA
deals using the funding that Congress has provided?
Answer. If confirmed I would welcome new TFCA deals and would
actively seek such, including for coral reefs.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator John Barrasso
Question. If confirmed, what role would you have in formulating
U.S. policy at the multilateral development banks?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead three bureaus at the Department
of State that play an important role in formulating the agency's views
on projects and policies at the multilateral development banks,
including the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, which
coordinates that process. In support of the Department of Treasury's
role as the U.S. Government lead on multilateral development banks
issues, the Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights,
and recommendations that contribute to our Government's oversight of
those institutions.
Question. How are the authorities divided up between the State
Department and the U.S. Department of Treasury when it comes to
international financial institutions?
Answer. The Department of the Treasury is the lead agency for U.S.
engagement with the international financial institutions. The
Department of State provides advice, expertise, insights, and
recommendations in support of the Department of the Treasury's role.
Question. How does ending financing of fossil fuel projects at
multilateral development banks help alleviate poverty and promote
development?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support multilateral development
banks' (MDBs) continued focus on energy policies that increase energy
access, accelerate development, and reduce poverty. I will encourage
MDBs to recognize and address the linkages between climate change and
poverty, food insecurity and migration. The lack of recurring fuel
costs for many clean energy systems allows countries to spend funds on
development priorities rather than on the unpredictable costs of fuel.
Question. What role will you play in the administration's U.S.
international climate finance plan?
Answer. The U.S. International Climate Finance Plan (``Plan'')
outlines how U.S. agencies will work with each other, the private
sector, and other partners to most strategically mobilize investment
for energy transformation and climate adaptation. The Plan recognizes
the importance of suitable investment climates, leveraging private
capital, and positioning the United States to seize the economic
opportunity of a low-emissions future by promoting U.S. exports and
private investment into low-carbon and climate-resilient technologies
and services, which can be a catalyst for job growth here at home. If
confirmed, I would leverage the resources of the Department to advance
these objectives.
Question. What specific steps will you take to help U.S. businesses
increase exports of American energy resources, including coal, oil, and
natural gas?
Answer. America's energy resource abundance and exports have helped
stabilize global markets, increased energy access and, in some cases,
reduced energy costs, spurring economic growth and prosperity. If
confirmed, I will work within my role at the State Department to help
ensure that U.S. energy exporters are treated fairly in foreign
markets. I also look forward, if confirmed, to further expanding the
scope of U.S. solutions and U.S. businesses that can be supported
through our diplomatic efforts as we embrace a diverse array of energy
technologies, such as carbon capture, that can assist countries with
their decarbonization goals, energy security, and development
priorities.
Question. How will you ensure the State Department is helping
developing countries with all types of energy projects, including oil,
gas, and coal?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with developing countries to
optimize technologies according to nationally integrated resource
plans, which will cost-effectively meet clean energy deployment and
energy access goals, while also driving economic growth. As developing
countries navigate the transition to a clean energy economy and build a
climate-resilient future, finance will play a crucial role. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's climate finance plan to
promote the flow of capital toward climate-aligned investments and to
assist developing countries' implementation of emissions reduction
measures.
Question. With billions of people without power, do you believe the
United States should be promoting fossil fuels that are affordable and
reliable, such as coal and natural gas, while supporting new
technologies that reduce their carbon output?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a foreign energy policy that
advances energy access and energy security alongside decarbonization
goals. While renewable energy and energy storage are increasingly the
cheapest, most effective way of promoting energy access, carbon capture
and storage technologies, if commercialized, could abate or decarbonize
power generated by existing fossil-fuel infrastructure. If confirmed, I
will work within the Department and with other agencies to coordinate
efforts to support countries to meet their climate, energy access, and
energy security needs in ways that further our climate and energy
goals.
Question. Instead of regulating and placing impossible restrictions
on the undeveloped energy sectors of the developing nations, we should
be encouraging growth so that these countries can compete in the
international marketplace, create jobs, and alleviate poverty. Do you
agree?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to encouraging growth in
developing nations and creating jobs and alleviating poverty. I
understand that the Biden-Harris administration seeks to support
developing nations' energy sectors to achieve this goal, while also
comprehensively addressing multiple diplomatic goals, including climate
change. Often, energy resources with the lowest costs--which can also
offer health and environmental benefits--cannot compete due to barriers
in existing regulatory and market structures, as well as country risk
factors. If confirmed, I hope we can work together to ensure
multilateral development banks support investments to increase access
to affordable and reliable energy for development and support cleaner
energy to support our climate change efforts.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Ted Cruz
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in notifications
provided by the State Department to Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. I am committed to working to ensure that information
provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format
that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while complying
with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State classification
guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling and storage of
classified information.
Question. What are your goals for your bureau, if confirmed?
Answer. During my confirmation hearings I listed five priorities
for the ``E'' family, which I would like to summarize here:
Support the administration's efforts to end COVID-19 globally, in a
manner that reinforces America's global leadership, strengthens
our alliances, and counteracts Russian and Chinese ``vaccine
diplomacy.''
Promote environmental and energy policies that tackle climate
change, and ensure that our companies and workers lead the
world in the clean energy revolution.
Insist on free, fair and reciprocal trade rules that our trade
partners--both allies and adversaries--must adhere to, and that
enable U.S. companies and workers to compete on a level playing
field. Based on my experiences in the private sector, I am
convinced that U.S. businesses and workers can thrive in the
global marketplace if given fair shot.
Help create alliances to maintain U.S. leadership in the
technologies of the future. This includes confronting efforts
to undermine American innovation, impose biased norms and
standards and appropriate our intellectual property.
Expand the international footprint of our workers and companies by
providing information about opportunities abroad and
facilitating U.S. participation in international projects. In
particular, meeting the developing world's infrastructure needs
should be a strategic imperative for the United States and a
business opportunity for our companies.
Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses child labor
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that
include critical minerals.
Answer. I understand that the U. S. Government is conducting a
review of the critical minerals supply chain in accordance with
Executive Order 14017 (America's Supply Chains). I understand that the
State Department has found that PRC authorities are increasingly
placing the young children of interned Muslims in Xinjiang in state-run
boarding schools, orphanages, and ``child welfare guidance centers.''
Reportedly, older children among these groups are placed in vocational
schools, where some may be victims of forced labor. If confirmed, I am
committed to helping end the forced labor of children in all sectors,
including those involving critical minerals.
Question. Please assess the degree to which China uses slave labor
for producing critical minerals, and manufacturing products that
include critical minerals.
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to do everything in my authority to
help end State-sponsored forced labor, which is increasingly prevalent
in China. In 2013, the National People's Congress ratified a decision
to abolish ``re-education through labor'' (RTL), a punitive system that
subjected individuals to extra-judicial detention involving forced
labor, from which the Government reportedly profited. I understand that
the Government closed most RTL facilities by October 2015; however, the
Government reportedly converted some RTL facilities into state-
sponsored drug rehabilitation facilities or administrative detention
centers where, according to civil society and media reports, forced
labor continues.
Question. Please assess the degree to which supply chains for
critical minerals, and products made with critical minerals, run
through the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
Answer. State-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the PRC
Government's mass detention and political indoctrination campaign
against predominantly Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur
Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). Authorities have detained more than one
million members of ethnic and religious minority groups, including
Uyghurs, Hui, ethnic Kazakhs, and ethnic Kyrgyz, in as many as 1,200
``vocational training centers.'' If confirmed, I am committed to
eliminating forced labor from critical mineral supply chains, including
any that run through Xinjiang.
Question. Over the last several years, the United States has taken
a bipartisan, bicameral, whole-of-government approach to stopping the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Production halted for a year after President
Trump signed into law the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act
(PEESA) and remained halted until after now-President Biden was
elected. According to public reports, the Germans and Russians believe
that the Biden administration will not impose crippling sanctions
mandated by PEESA, as amended--and unfortunately, thus far, they have
proven correct. Can you commit to using your role, if confirmed, to
ensure the imposition of sanctions pursuant to PEESA, as mandated by
Congress?
Answer. PEESA is U.S. law, and if confirmed, I will uphold the law.
Congress has provided tools that ensure that Europe has a reliable,
diversified energy supply that enhances rather than undermines its
collective security. The Department of State continues to work to bring
an end to the pipeline, which is a threat to European energy security
and a tool of Russian coercion. If confirmed, I will work with the
Department to continue to assess and evaluate evidence available to
determine the applicability of PEESA, as amended.
Question. Please assess the effect that allowing Nord Stream 2 to
come online would have on American national security and European
energy security.
Answer. The administration has made clear its belief that Nord
Stream 2 is a geopolitical, Kremlin malign influence project that
threatens European energy security, including that of Ukraine and
eastern flank NATO Allies and partners, while dividing the continent.
The administration will continue to work with allies and partners,
using the tools at its disposal, to ensure that Europe has a reliable,
diversified energy supply that enhances, rather than undermines, its
collective security.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Jose W. Fernandez by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What is your understanding of the current status of the
Blue Dot Network under the Biden administration's State Department?
Answer. The Blue Dot Network seeks to promote the development of
quality, sustainable infrastructure around the world by certifying
projects that uphold global infrastructure principles. I understand the
State Department and the interagency continue to work with our
Australian and Japanese partners to develop the technical details of
the initiative, including a methodology and metrics for certifying
quality infrastructure projects in the developing world.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to advancing and fully
implementing the Blue Dot Network?
Answer. If confirmed, I fully intend to advance and implement the
Blue Dot Network initiative to certify quality infrastructure projects
in the developing world. As the global economy recovers from the
pandemic, infrastructure financing will play a central role in creating
an economic recovery that is sustainable and long-lasting. Rigorous
standards will ensure that infrastructure investment in developing
countries serves the best interests of their citizens and are
consistent with their economic, climate, environmental, and social
goals.
Question. Do you plan to replicate the model created by the Clean
Network Initiative across other tech sectors, infrastructure, and
energy?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration views emerging
technologies, infrastructure, and energy as critical to America's
future national security and economic prosperity. If confirmed, I will
support Department efforts to work with allies and partners to create
an international environment that is competitive and open to innovation
by American technology, infrastructure, and energy providers.
Question. What is your understanding of the Indo-Pacific Business
Forum and what it accomplished when it was held in November 2019?
Answer. The 2019 Indo-Pacific Business Forum (IPBF) underscored the
U.S. commitment to broad-based economic and commercial engagement in
the Indo-Pacific. The IPBF is the premier conference where business
leaders and government policy makers meet to discuss economic issues in
the Indo-Pacific region. At the 2019 Forum, over 1,000 U.S. and Indo-
Pacific business and government leaders discussed investment
opportunities and new policy initiatives in infrastructure, energy,
digital, and healthcare. Building on this success, in 2020 the United
States organized an IPBF which attracted record attendance with 2,900
participants--including three U.S. cabinet secretaries--and over $10
billion in deal signings and announcements.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you plan to continue and improve
the Indo-Pacific Business Forum that the Biden administration
inherited?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work with U.S. Government
economic agencies to continue and improve upon the Indo-Pacific
Business Forum (IPBF). The event draws together business leaders,
policymakers, and media from across the Indo-Pacific and serves as a
venue to highlight U.S. economic policy developments, sign commitments
for new investments, and build relationships between the private sector
and governments. As with the 2020 forum, I understand that the 2021
forum will likely be a hybrid in-person and online event for maximum
flexibility and engagement, and to help American businesses bring key
commercial transactions to closure.
Question. If you are confirmed, do you commit to consulting with
Congress on ways to make progress in the Indo-Pacific with respect to
sectors such as energy, tech, and infrastructure?
Answer. If confirmed, I will be committed to open and robust
communication with Congress, including through consultations on energy,
technology, and infrastructure issues in the Indo-Pacific. Central to
our efforts, the United States will promote private-sector alternatives
in these areas. I intend to focus on partnerships that strengthen local
capacity and promote entrepreneurship, transparency, good governance,
fair practices, and internationally recognized environmental, social,
and labor standards.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Murphy, Kaine, Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Young, Cruz,
Rounds, and Hagerty.
Also present: Senator Whitehouse
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Ambassador Nichols, Ambassador Sison, congratulations on
your nominations, and thank you for your willingness to
continue serving our country, as well as your families.
We understand that that is a sacrifice of all of those who
are part of the family and in terms of this continuing service,
so we appreciate that as well.
At this pivotal moment for our foreign policy in the State
Department, I am heartened that President Biden has nominated
individuals to two critical positions.
I believe that your experience and commitment will be
assets to the department and critical to the defense of our
interests and values.
I understand that the Senator from Rhode Island will be
introducing Ambassador Nichols this morning, and that the
Senator from Maryland, a member of this committee, will be
introducing Ambassador Sison.
I do not see Ambassador Whitehouse yet. I know he is very
busy in Judiciary affairs. So he is probably is on his way
here.
So let us recognize the Senator Van Hollen first for an
introduction.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations to both the nominees.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, colleagues, thank you
for the opportunity to introduce to you the president's nominee
to serve as our next Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, Ambassador Michele Sison.
And in this nomination, President Biden has not only
selected a nominee with impeccable credentials, unimpeachable
character, and a deep knowledge of foreign policy, he has also
wisely selected a longtime Marylander.
I had met Ambassador Sison before, but my conversation with
her yesterday makes me even more confident that she has the
knowledge and experience we need at this critical moment in our
history.
President Biden is determined to renew American engagement
around the world and leadership in international organizations
and, if confirmed, I am confident Ambassador Sison will
faithfully help achieve this goal.
Ambassador Sison has had a distinguished career at the
highest levels of the United States Foreign Service. Her
experience spans nearly four decades and six presidents.
She has served as our ambassador four times to different
places: first, to the UAE, then to Lebanon, then to Sri Lanka
and the Maldives, and most recently, to Haiti, a post she was
appointed to in 2018 and a post which brought her full circle
from her first diplomatic position as the human rights officer
at Embassy Port-au-Prince in 1982.
Throughout her 39 years at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy,
she has served in a variety of roles that have taken her across
the world, representing our nation's interests in West Africa,
South Asia, and elsewhere.
She also spent four years as the United States deputy
representative to the United Nations from 2014 to 2018, a
position that makes her ideally prepared for this new post.
She also has a long track record of collaborating with U.N.
peacekeepers and has gained a firsthand knowledge of the U.N.
entities responsible for development, humanitarian relief, and
human rights in the field.
Her superb talents have been recognized by our country many
times. She is decorated with numerous awards for her service,
including Superior Honor awards, the ambassadorial level awards
for her contributions to counter proliferation and combating
trafficking in persons, and she has received both a
Distinguished Service Award and the Presidential Rank Award of
meritorious service.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I could go on, but
it would consume the entire hearing. So let me end with this. I
grew up in a Foreign Service family and lived in some of the
countries where Ambassador Sison has served.
I know a good diplomat when I see one, and Ambassador Sison
fits the bill. She exemplifies the very best of what it means
to serve our country as a career Foreign Service officer.
I urge the committee to support her nomination.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Van Hollen.
And after that sterling recommendation, Ambassador, maybe
you should just rest your case. But we are not going to let you
off that easy.
In any event, thank you, Senator Van Hollen. I understand
that Senator Whitehouse is with us virtually.
Senator Whitehouse. I am, Chairman.
The Chairman. Please proceed. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, and thank
you, Ranking Member Risch, for welcoming me to your committee
today.
Like Senator Van Hollen, I come from a Foreign Service
family. I am the black sheep in a family of--my grandfather,
father, uncle, and cousin who were all Foreign Service
officers.
So it gives me particular pleasure to be here to recommend
a career Foreign Service officer and a native Rhode Islander,
Brian Nichols, as the nominee for Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs.
My father served for decades, not exactly on the champagne
circuit but in countries embroiled in conflict and upheaval,
where the comforts and security of America often felt very far
away. But he always felt he was doing rewarding and deeply
important work.
Brian Nichols has had a similar career serving in
challenging State Department roles in South and Central
America, Southeast Asia, and Africa.
He has won department honors for his contributions to
State's trade development mission and helped lead the
department's international narcotics and law enforcement work.
He has been our United States ambassador to both Peru and
Zimbabwe, a country emerging from decades of dictatorial rule
and dire economic hardship. So he knows the ropes and he has
skills developed in our small, tight knit, and diverse state.
Rhode Islanders have, I think, an unusual ability to reach
beyond seeming difference and even simmering enmity to find
shared values and common humanity, and Ambassador Nichols is a
shining example of that skill.
Building consensus is as simple, he says, as understanding
people, a very Rhode Island quality, a very diplomatic quality,
and one which Ambassador Nichols has demonstrated throughout
his distinguished career.
I am confident that if we confirm his nomination, he will
serve all Americans well and make us proud.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse, for your
introduction of Ambassador Nichols.
Ambassador Nichols, your nomination comes at a time when
the Western Hemisphere is reeling under a cascade of
challenges: the devastation wrought by COVID-19, the fraying of
democratic consensus, major migration crises, and a void a four
years of American absence that China is seeking to fill. The
task at hand is immense.
With death rates among the highest in the world, COVID-19
is inflicting a terrible toll on the hemisphere, and the United
States has to step up. As we accumulate surplus vaccines, we
must prioritize vaccine access for countries in the hemisphere
as part of our global efforts to ensure that the most
vulnerable are vaccinated.
And as the region's economic health has a direct impact on
the United States, we have to take bold steps to facilitate its
recovery. That is why this committee voted to authorize a
capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank last
month.
Additionally, Latin America is facing the recurrence of
flawed elections, deterioration of the separation of powers,
attacks on journalists and freedom of the press, and entrenched
autocrats in Havana, Caracas, and Managua.
Indeed, we know where democratic decay can lead. After two
decades, Venezuela is now a land of unbridled criminality and
kleptocracy, where a humanitarian crisis has forced more than 5
million people to flee their homeland.
While the scale is distinct, we also know that irregular
migration from Central America is rooted in decades of low
levels of democratic governance.
Deficit, or I should say, deficient institutions are unable
to meet the needs of the people and too many leaders have
exploited weak rule of law to place their personal interests
over those of their citizens.
Given the scale of the challenge, I am pleased to see that
Vice President Harris is heading the administration's
diplomatic efforts in Central America.
Under her leadership, we are already seeing an increased
humanitarian response and a strong reaction to leaders that
seek to undermine democracy.
So, Ambassador Nichols, I look forward to discussing with
you. I appreciate our visit yesterday. We had a whole tour de
force of the Western Hemisphere, and we look forward to
discussing with you how we will address some of these
challenges and best to collaborate to ensure your success.
Ambassador Sison--I am sorry, Sison. I do not know why I
am--it is in my mind. But, Ambassador Sison, I apologize.
Welcome to your sixth Senate confirmation hearing. It is
deeply reassuring that President Biden nominated you, a
diplomat with extensive experience, immense skill, and a
demonstrated management record to be the next Assistant
Secretary for the Bureau of International Organization Affairs.
Over the course of the Trump administration, we witnessed a
dramatic and troubling erosion of U.S. government leadership at
the U.N. We tried to pull out of the World Health Organization
in the middle of a pandemic.
We undermined international protections for women, girls,
and LGBTI individuals, and we defunded or reduced funding to
key agencies. We refused to pay our dues in full to U.N.
peacekeeping operations and, as a result, the United States has
accrued $1.1 billion in arrears.
When we shun our responsibilities and fail to lead, other
countries take note and seek to take advantage, to the
detriment of our interests and security.
China and Russia have sought to fill the vacuum left by our
absence. It is time for renewal and engagement with the United
Nations and its agencies, like the World Food Programme and
UNFPA.
In the wake of the devastating COVID-19 pandemic, we must
redouble the Biden administration's effort at restoring U.S.
leadership at the WHO and other international health and
humanitarian organizations.
The world will be closely watching how we more effectively
engage within and work to strengthen international
organizations.
So I look forward to hearing your views and working with
you to ensure we restore our critical leadership role.
In closing, at a time of unprecedented challenges around
the world, America needs outstanding leadership at the State
Department. We look forward to your testimony.
And now I am going to return to the distinguished ranking
member for his remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to both
of you for your willingness to serve. Certainly, outstanding
credentials. It is not often we see a panel like this with the
depth of experience that the two of you have.
I want to start at where the chairman started and that is
on the issues in the Western Hemisphere. I am increasingly
concerned that while a majority of nations in our hemisphere
are considered democracies, authoritarian regimes in Venezuela,
Nicaragua, and Cuba have systematically dismantled democratic
institutions and have committed some of the world's worst human
rights abuses.
These bad actors undermine their own countries, but they
also undermine their neighbors. Transnational criminal
organizations and malign state actors benefit from and
contribute to these authoritarian regimes and pose a
significant threat to the peace and stability of our
hemisphere.
More broadly, I remain exceedingly concerned about the
malign influence of China and Russia throughout our hemisphere
and the apparent increase of that.
China's predatory lending practices and spread of
corruption threaten the sovereignty and the privacy of our
southern neighbors.
At the same time, Russia has exported repressive tactics to
allow authoritarian regimes to maintain control and crackdown
on dissent.
Beyond external malign influence, poor governance,
violence, and lack of economic opportunity in countries like El
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have prompted waves of
illegal migrants to show up at our southern door.
The previous administration negotiated a number of
agreements with these countries, and the current
administration's failure to capitalize on those agreements has
only fueled a surge of migrants over the past few months, along
with other precipitating factors, and demonstrates a
significant challenge to our government's ability to protect
our homeland.
Lastly, as you know, Ambassador Nichols, the Columbia River
Treaty between the United States and Canada is a great example
of two nations managing a shared resource. I want to impress
upon you the importance of a successful and timely conclusion
to these negotiations for the entire North West congressional
delegation.
As you know, a number of us on a bipartisan basis have been
working diligently with the department to move the negotiations
forward. We stand ready to continue to assist the
administration however we can in this effort.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts on all of these
important matters. Next, we have the nomination for Secretary
of State for International Organization Affairs. This position
oversees a wide range of multilateral organizations, the
largest being the United Nations. The United States remains the
biggest donor to the U.N. in both assessed and voluntary funds.
While the Chinese Communist Party has increased its
assessed dues, it is still severely lags behind the United
States and our allies in voluntary contributions.
The Chinese Communist Party uses its minimal donations to
leverage a large-scale malign influence campaign to reform
global governance, as they call it, such that the international
system is more conducive to its own interests.
As detailed in my report last fall on transatlantic
cooperation on China, the Chinese Communist Party does so in
part by inserting favorable language into U.N. resolutions,
orchestrating the election of its top diplomats at U.N.
agencies, and using its veto power as a member of the U.N.
Security Council to block efforts to expose human rights
violations.
This fall, the United States will have an opportunity to
negotiate the scales of assessment of U.N. peacekeeping to be
consistent with U.S. law. Currently, the United Nations
assesses the United States at 27.9 percent.
As you know, this is not congruent with U.S. law. No
country should pay more than 25 percent, and in 1994, the
Congress of the United States enacted a bill that imposed 25
percent on U.S. contributions for this program. That law
remains in effect today.
This mandate should be upheld during the upcoming
negotiations. I will remind the administration that this is
U.S. law and it must be used in the negotiating position.
I also remain concerned, really concerned, by the
administration's recent decision to resume funding to the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees
in the Near East, also known as UNRWA.
This was done without securing, without insisting on,
without even asking for any reforms. Over the years, the agency
has employed individuals affiliated with Hamas, a U.S.-
designated terrorist organization.
UNRWA schools have been used to store Hamas weapons and
there have been numerous cases of UNRWA textbooks containing
material that is anti-Semitic. U.S. government assistance to
UNRWA should cease unless true reform, as described above, is
secured.
Finally, I am also concerned about the administration's
decision to seek a seat at the U.N. Human Rights Council,
again, without seeking any reforms.
The Council is a broken body that focuses the majority of
its time on bullying our ally, Israel, and allows some of the
greatest human rights abusers like China, Cuba, Russia, Iran,
and Venezuela a seat at the table.
I know it is a bumper sticker to say, oh, we are always
better off with a seat at the table when issues are being
discussed than not being there. That is not always true,
particularly in this instance, when you are sitting there
rubbing elbows with the worst human rights abusers on the
planet.
Only true reform will bring legitimacy back to that Council
and the administration should work to secure substantial
changes.
With that, I thank both of you for being here today, your
willingness to serve, and recognize the sacrifices of both you
and your families in this effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
We will now turn to the two nominees. We ask you to
summarize your testimony in about five minutes. Your full
statements will be included in the record.
And we will start off with Ambassador Nichols.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN A. NICHOLS OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER MINISTER,
NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (WESTERN
HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS)
Mr. Nichols. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to
appear before you today as the President's nominee to serve as
the next Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere
Affairs.
I owe a deep debt of gratitude to President Biden, Vice
President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the confidence that
they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our
hemisphere.
The opportunity to appear before this committee for the
third time as a nominee to serve the American people steels my
resolve to fight for the values that our nation holds dear--
democracy, the rule of law, and the innate dignity of every
individual.
With over 32 years serving our nation at some of our most
challenging missions around the world, if confirmed, I look
forward to bringing all my skills and experience to bear in
that fight.
President Biden has said that democracy holds the key to
freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity, and if we work
together with our democratic partners with strength and
confidence, we will meet every challenge and outpace every
challenger.
My experience serving in our embassies in North, Central,
and South America, as well as directing our policy towards the
Caribbean, convinces me of the vital urgency of the President's
words.
Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to
America's welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's
fortunes cannot be separated from those of our closest
neighbors.
If confirmed, I look forward to drawing on the enormous
talent and dedication of the community of professionals within
the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, as well as civil
society throughout the Americas, our own private sector, and,
of course, our Congress to advance America and the region's
progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous
region.
I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an
inclusive, compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our
nation's prowess and professionalism.
We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships
throughout the Western Hemisphere, especially with our closest
neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean.
The situation in Central America demands our urgent
attention and unflagging efforts to promote democracy,
prosperity, and security, addressing the root causes of
irregular migration.
The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate
change, and a recession in many countries have opened the door
to malign influences from outside our region.
We will build upon the shared values, family ties, economic
opportunities, and commitment to fundamental freedoms to
counter those malign actors and deliver a better future for the
people of our region.
My professional achievements owe to the women who surround
me: my wonderful wife, Geri, a retired senior Foreign Service
officer, my talented daughters, Alex and Sophie, and my
brilliant mother, Mildred.
They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrifice for my
career, and nurtured me with their love and support.
In 1959, my late father began our family's adventure in
diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving as a Fulbright Scholar
and then partnering with the U.S. Information Agency on various
projects in Europe, and helping to start the American Studies
Program at the Free University of Berlin.
My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the
Senate confirm me, to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my
tenure as ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. I have led my
team in responding to the multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis
in Zimbabwe.
As ambassador to Peru, I led a large mission that focused
on improving the rule of law, fighting transnational crime and
corruption, and promoting respect for human rights,
particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups.
I also led a unified mission initiative to promote American
businesses and grow American jobs, earning the department's
Charles Cobb Award for those efforts.
Prior to that, as the principal deputy assistant secretary
for international narcotics and law enforcement, I helped
direct a team of nearly 7,000 professionals who worked to
expand access to justice, protect civilians, and combat crime
around the world.
I have hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs
in Mexico and Central America, as well as crafting innovative
justice sector outreach to Afro descendant and indigenous
populations in the Americas.
Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the
highest standards of our great nation and strengthen our
diplomacy. I look forward to partnering with you to advance
America's interests in the Western Hemisphere.
I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now
and in the future. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Brian A. Nichols
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members
of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the
President's nominee to serve as the next Assistant Secretary of State
for Western Hemisphere Affairs. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to
President Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for the
confidence they have placed in me at this crucial moment in our
Hemisphere.
The opportunity to appear before this committee for the third time
as a nominee to serve the American people steels my resolve to fight
for the values that our nation holds dear: democracy, the rule of law,
and the innate dignity of every individual. With over 32 years serving
our nation at some of our most challenging missions around the world,
if confirmed I look forward to bringing all my skills and experience to
bear in that fight. President Biden has said that ``democracy holds the
key to freedom, prosperity, peace, and dignity. . . . And, if we work
together with our democratic partners, with strength and confidence, we
will meet every challenge and outpace every challenger.'' My experience
serving in our embassies in North, Central, and South America as well
as directing our policy towards the Caribbean convinces me of the vital
urgency of the President's words.
Our home, the Western Hemisphere, remains central to America's
welfare, our prosperity, and our future. America's fortunes cannot be
separated from those of our closest neighbors. If confirmed, I look
forward to drawing on the enormous talent and dedication of the
community of professionals within the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, as well as civil society throughout the Americas, our own
private sector, and, of course, our Congress to advance America and the
region's progress toward a more democratic, secure, and prosperous
region.
I have spent most of my career within the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs. If confirmed, I will strive to build an inclusive,
compassionate, and diverse team that reflects our nation's prowess and
professionalism. We will work to expand our engagement and partnerships
throughout the Western Hemisphere--and especially with our closest
neighbors Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean. The situation in Central
America demands our urgent attention and unflagging efforts to promote
democracy, prosperity, and security--addressing the root causes of
irregular migration. The disastrous effects of the COVID-19 pandemic,
climate change and a recession in many countries have opened the door
to malign influences from outside our region. We will build on the
shared values, family ties, economic opportunities, and commitment to
fundamental freedoms to counter those malign actors and deliver a
better future for the people of our region.
My professional achievements owe to the women who surround me: my
wonderful wife Geri, a retired Senior Foreign Service Officer, my
talented daughters Alex and Sophie, and my brilliant mother Mildred.
They have pushed me to be a better person, sacrificed for my career,
and nurtured me with their love and support. In 1959, my late father
began our family's adventure in diplomacy and foreign affairs, serving
as a Fulbright Scholar, then partnering with the U.S. Information
Agency on various projects in Europe, and helping to start the American
studies program at the Free University of Berlin.
My own past assignments provide rich experience, should the Senate
confirm me to serve as Assistant Secretary. During my tenure as
Ambassador to Zimbabwe, I have fought tenaciously for democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. I have led my team in responding to the
multi-dimensional humanitarian crisis in Zimbabwe. As Ambassador to
Peru, I led a large mission that focused on improving the rule of law,
fighting transnational crime and corruption, and promoting respect for
human rights, particularly of women, girls, and disadvantaged groups. I
also led a unified mission initiative to promote American businesses
and grow American jobs, earning the Department's Charles Cobb Award for
those efforts.
Prior to that, as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, I helped direct a
team of nearly 7,000 professionals who work to expand access to
justice, protect civilians, and combat crime around the world. I have
hands-on experience shaping our rule of law programs in Mexico and
Central America, as well as crafting innovative justice sector outreach
to Afro-descendant and Indigenous populations in the Americas.
Should the Senate confirm me, I will aim to exemplify the highest
standards of our great nation and strengthen our diplomacy. I look
forward to partnering with you to advance America's interests in the
Western Hemisphere.
I stand ready to answer any questions you might have now and in the
future.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Sison?
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHELE JEANNE SISON OF MARYLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER
AMBASSADOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
(INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS)
Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's
nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, IO. I am grateful to
President Biden and to Secretary Blinken for this opportunity.
I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica,
who are watching virtually today. Their love has supported me
as I represented our country around the world and at the United
Nations.
Over the past 39 years, I have been privileged to serve
under six U.S. administrations and as ambassador four times
overseas to the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and
Maldives, and Haiti.
Given that experience, as well as service in Togo, Benin,
Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq, and at the U.S.
mission to the United Nations, I know that the United States
cannot address today's global challenges alone.
From climate change to the COVID-19 pandemic, we must work
in partnership with other nations. President Biden has made it
clear that we will put our core U.S. values at the center of
our foreign policy.
As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New
York, I saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in
crafting strategic cross-regional partnerships. These alliances
are key in safeguarding multilateral institutions from those
such as the People's Republic of China that seek to bend the
U.N. system to their authoritarian agendas.
We must actively out compete efforts by nations that stand
in opposition to our U.S. values on human rights, democracy,
labor rights, and transparent economic practices.
If confirmed, this will be at the top of my agenda. It is
important that we uphold the rules-based order that upholds and
promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and
protects human rights.
The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to
preserve a free and open market, a free and open internet, and
in advancing global governance in areas such as technology,
trade, and climate change.
These rules and values benefit American interests and the
American people. From the World Food Programme to UNICEF to the
International Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in
leading the international system, driving forward reforms with
our partners.
We must also ensure that the voices of civil society,
women, ethnic and religious minorities, and other marginalized
communities are heard.
I have seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and
humanitarian workers protect civilians and save lives in places
critical to U.S. national interests.
I have witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership
when we insist on results and when we press for accountability,
including accountability related to sexual exploitation and
abuse.
We are the largest contributor to the U.N. system. It is in
our interest to lead in promoting genuine reform. Thus,
ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral bodies
is a key priority.
We must promote qualified independent candidates to lead
multilateral institutions and we must leverage the commitments
of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are shared.
We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N.
system. The IO bureau support strong U.S. leadership at the
U.N. and multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national
interests, protect the American people, promote U.S.
prosperity, and drive the reforms needed to ensure the
effectiveness of international organizations.
As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and
our amazing civil service subject matter experts are our force
multipliers in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global
action.
If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and
building strong morale within the IO bureau will be at the top
of my list, and if confirmed, I also pledge, number one, to
look hard at U.N. and international organization management and
budgeting practices and at how agencies implement ethics rules,
including whistleblower protection; number two, to insist on
effective peacekeeping operations that advance political
solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates, and include
women's participation; number three, to consult with you as we
work together to meet the challenges of today's strategic
competition and as we prove that respect for human rights,
transparency, and democratic norms can and will prevail.
If confirmed, I know that you will be counting on me to
make sure that U.S. taxpayer dollars are well spent and that
our multilateral policies and programs improve the lives of the
world's most vulnerable citizens, contribute to international
peace and security, and serve the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I
welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Michele J. Sison
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee.
I am honored to appear before you as President Biden's nominee to
serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization
Affairs, IO. I am grateful to President Biden and to Secretary Blinken
for this opportunity.
I want to recognize my daughters, Alexandra and Jessica, who are
watching virtually today. Their love has supported me as I represented
our country around the world and at the United Nations.
Over the past 39 years, I've been privileged to serve under six
U.S. administrations and as U.S. Ambassador four times overseas: to the
United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Maldives, and Haiti.
Given this experience--as well as service in Togo, Benin, Cameroon,
Cote d'Ivoire, India, Pakistan, Iraq and at the U.S. Mission to the
U.N.--I know that the United States cannot address today's global
challenges alone.
From climate change to the COVID 19 pandemic, we must work in
partnership with other nations. President Biden has made clear that we
will put our core U.S. values at the center of our foreign policy.
As U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative at the U.N. in New York, I
saw that our nation is stronger when we lead the way in crafting
strategic, cross-regional partnerships. These alliances are key in
safeguarding multilateral institutions from those, such as the People's
Republic of China, that seek to bend the U.N. system to their
authoritarian agendas.
We must actively out-compete efforts by nations that stand in
opposition to U.S. values on human rights, democracy, labor rights, and
transparent economic practices. If confirmed, this will be at the top
of my agenda. It's important that we uphold the rules-based order that
upholds and promotes our values, advances sustainable development, and
protects human rights.
The United States has a strong stake in leading efforts to preserve
a free and open internet, and in advancing global governance in areas
such as technology, trade, and climate change.
These rules and values benefit American interests and the American
people. From the World Food Program, to UNICEF, to the International
Telecommunication Union, we have a deep stake in leading the
international system--driving forward reforms with our partners.
We must also ensure that the voices of civil society, women, ethnic
and religious minorities, and other marginalized communities are heard.
I've seen firsthand how U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian workers
protect civilians and save lives in places critical to U.S. national
interests.
I've witnessed the positive impact of U.S. leadership when we
insist on results, and when we press for accountability--including
accountability related to sexual exploitation and abuse. We are the
largest contributor to the U.N. system; it is in our interest to lead
in promoting genuine reform.
Thus, ensuring the transparency and integrity of multilateral
bodies is a key priority. We must promote qualified, independent
candidates to lead multilateral institutions, and we must leverage the
commitments of other countries to ensure that financial burdens are
shared.
We must also fight bias against Israel across the U.N. system.
The IO Bureau supports strong U.S. leadership at the U.N. and
multilateral venues to advance our U.S. national interests, protect the
American people, promote U.S. prosperity, and drive the reforms needed
to ensure the effectiveness of international organizations.
As a Foreign Service practitioner, I know that our skilled
diplomats at our missions abroad, our talented negotiators, and our
amazing Civil Service subject matter experts are our force multipliers
in the multilateral arena and in mobilizing global action.
If confirmed, prioritizing diversity and inclusion and building
strong morale within the IO Bureau, will be at the top of my list. And,
if confirmed, I also pledge:
to look hard at U.N. and international organization management and
budgeting practices, and at how agencies implement their ethics
rules, including whistleblower protections;
to insist on effective peacekeeping operations that advance
political solutions, have realistic and achievable mandates,
and include women's participation; and,
to consult with you as we work to meet the challenges of today's
strategic competition--and as we prove that respect for human
rights, transparency, and democratic norms can and will
prevail.
If confirmed, I know you will be counting on me to make sure that
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the
American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you, and I welcome
your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador.
We will start a series of five-minute rounds and I will
start.
Ambassador Nichols, we had a good tour of the hemisphere
yesterday so I am not going to revisit all of those. But there
is one or two I do want to drill down on.
As Miguel Diaz-Canel assumed the leadership of Cuba's
Communist Party and completed his transition to what I believe
is dictator and chief, the Cuban regime repeatedly has used the
mantra of ``somos continuidad,'' which means ``we are the
continuation,'' to make it clear that they need to maintain a
single-party authoritarian state.
Nevertheless, in a renewed wave of civic activism,
including protest by artists, singers, and others in the San
Isidro movement, a, largely, Afro-Cuban movement, there is a
demanding greater respect for democratic values and an end to
human rights abuses.
So what our policy is, moving forward, is going to be
incredibly important. Let me ask you a couple of questions. Do
you believe that the attacks on our diplomatic personnel, known
as the Havana syndrome, either were conducted by the Cubans or
are known in terms of who conducted them by the Cubans?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just note, by way of entry, that I know that our
Cuba policy is under review within the administration. But let
me offer a few thoughts, and if confirmed, I look forward to
contributing to that process.
Our priority in Cuba, as the rest of the hemisphere, needs
to be democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Countries
should not be grandfathered because they have failed to respect
those tenets.
The new First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba does
not appear to me to be significantly different from his
predecessors. But time will tell on that point.
With regard to the Havana syndrome--my knowledge of the
process of looking into that is limited, but I certainly
believe that, given the amount of control that the Communist
Party has in Cuba, there are more things that they can tell us
about what was going on at that time.
And I think that the process that the Secretary has
designated, led by Ambassador Pamela Spratlen and the Health
Incident Response Team, working with our interagency partners,
is an important opportunity to get to the bottom of these
incidents, and if confirmed, I commit to contributing to that
process.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that.
It is impossible, if you understand Cuba's state-controlled
system and its security apparatus to believe that anything can
happen in the island without some knowledge of the Cuban
regime, which they, certainly, have not shared with us, and now
we find these attacks proliferating in other parts of the
world.
Do you believe that the practice of the Cuban regime of
taking 20 percent of remittances to Cuban families, then
converting the balance of the remittance to Cuban pesos that
are worth a fraction of what Americans send to their families,
that can only be used at state-owned stores is an acceptable
practice?
Mr. Nichols. Again, the Cuba policy is under review. But I
do believe that those who are most responsible for abuses of
human rights and democracy in Cuba should not benefit from
remittances going to the Cuban people.
Our priority needs to be what is best for the Cuban people
and focus our efforts on supporting them, and I believe that
the best ambassadors for doing that are the American people
and, particularly, the Diaspora here.
The Chairman. Well, let me hone in on my question because I
have a limited time.
I appreciate all of that but here is the point. If we want
to help the Cuban people, taking 20 percent off of the $100 I
send to my aunt, converting the other $80 of U.S. dollars into
pesos, which is worth a fraction, and then being able, largely,
to only buy at a government store, which is jacked up in
prices, is not helping the Cuban people.
It is, certainly, helping the regime. So I am for sending
my remittances to my aunt, but I want her to get the
remittances I send.
Let me ask you this. Do you believe that sending, as the
regime does, Cuban doctors abroad, then taking away their
passports and getting paid for their services without fully
paying the doctors is human trafficking?
Mr. Nichols. I believe that their labor rights are being
violated in large measure, and I think it has many
characteristics of human trafficking, yes.
The Chairman. And do you believe that the militarization of
the Cuban economy, whereas Raul Castro's son and son-in-law,
high-ranking officers of the Cuban military, is an acceptable
practice for U.S. businesses to engage with?
Mr. Nichols. I think that we should be working to promote
diversity in the economy in Cuba and focusing our efforts on
what is best for the Cuban people.
The roles of senior officials and family members in the
economy goes in the opposite direction and, if confirmed, I
look forward to contributing to the department's review of our
policies within the interagency.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well, let me just say that, and I will
end on this note, so an American business wants to do business
in Cuba or they want to do, you know, tourism or they want to
sell agricultural products.
They either have to go to Raul's son or son-in-law, both
high-ranking officials of the Cuban military who control the
two, quote/unquote, ``companies'' that are run by the regime.
You become a partner with the state, in essence, a partner
with those who oppress its people, and your partner is high-
ranking officials of the Cuban military.
I do not know if we, for example, would accept that in
China. I do not know if we would accept it elsewhere. And it
is, certainly, not a help to the Cuban people.
So I look forward to continuing that conversation.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to talk about a parochial issue.
That is the Columbia River Treaty. How engaged have you been on
that issue or have you been, prior to coming on board here?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you. I have received a briefing on the
treaty from our negotiators and legal team. I have not
participated in the deliberations with regard to the
negotiation.
Senator Risch. Okay, thank you.
I hope you will familiarize yourself with this. I can tell
you, this is not a partisan issue. Indeed, we have been--we--
when I say we I am talking about the Senators, particularly
from the Northwest, have been working with the negotiating team
from the State Department, and we found them really good to
work with.
They are working on an issue that is incredibly complex and
incredibly difficult with a friend and neighbor but with whom
we have, obviously, competing interests as we try to complete
the negotiations.
I have trouble with some of my colleagues here whose last
brush with the Columbia River was when they took geography in
either grammar school or high school.
So they are learning how important the Columbia River is to
those of us that have water that flows into the Columbia and
the effects that it has upstream on us.
So, first of all, I do want to tell you, you have got a
good team in place. We intend to continue to work with them,
and it is bipartisan and I hope that we will continue down that
road, and I look forward to your help in that regard.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I look forward to
working with you on that, if confirmed.
The Columbia River and its basin have important
implications for hydroelectric power, green energy, the
environment and, obviously, flood control and the economy of
the western part of our nation.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Sison, I want to underscore to you the
disappointment a lot of us had when the administration jumped
right back into UNRWA.
What UNRWA has done over the years is very disheartening
and it is impossible to explain to the United States taxpayers,
particularly my constituents, how the funds that--U.S. taxpayer
dollars that flowed into UNRWA could be used to print textbooks
that I have no doubt you have seen that have anti-Semitic
materials in them--and this is paid for by U.S. dollars--and
also the other things that UNRWA has done, allowing their
facilities to be used for military facilities and that sort of
thing.
Again, we want to participate always in these things. But
when they are doing stuff like that, it becomes very difficult,
and particularly when the funds have now been freed up for
UNRWA to get those funds again, and we are a huge contributor
to that operation.
What are your thoughts on that?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and thank you for that
question.
The issue of transparency, accountability, and oversight
with regard to the U.N. Relief Works Agency, UNRWA, and across
the U.N. system would be a key priority, if confirmed.
On UNRWA specifically, it is absolutely critical that we
insist on neutrality, and that goes for the staff of UNRWA, the
policies, the programs, the educational materials, that you
have mentioned.
If confirmed, I will be insisting on these red lines of
complete neutrality, no educational materials, whether it is
textbook or online educational resources that contain
references to anti-Semitism, incitement.
These are important issues and, if confirmed, I would be
working with U.N. counterparts and others in the IO bureau and
across our State Department to insist that these red lines are
not crossed and that internal controls are maintained.
Thank you.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that, and I appreciate
your commitment and your thoughts in that regard. It always
amazes me when something like this happens where the funds were
freed up without a commitment.
I mean, if they will not make the commitment before they
get the money, how in the world can you possibly think they
will make the commitment after they get the money?
So it amazes me how we transfer funds like this without
getting anything back for it.
And my time is up and I thank you for that commitment.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
I understand Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
Senator Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want
to thank both of our distinguished nominees for their service
to our country.
Ambassador Sison, I am proud that you are a Marylander. I
heard Senator Van Hollen's introductions. We are very proud of
your career service, diplomatic service, to our country.
It is, clearly, going to be challenged as we reassert
America's diplomacy globally in the work that we do with our
international organizations.
So I look forward to working with you.
Ambassador Nichols, I, again, thank you for your career of
public service. Both of you have served our nation with
distinction and honor, and I join the chairman in thanking you
and your families for your willingness to continue in public
service.
Ambassador Nichols, you and I had a chance to talk. I just
want to underscore a few of the points.
One area that affects both of the individuals that are
before us is the U.S. role in the OAS. I mention that because
Senator Wicker and I had introduced legislation that became law
for a parliamentary dimension within the Organization of
American States.
And I point that out, the more that we can get legislators
working with our diplomats, particularly in international
organizations or regional organizations, I think the more
effective it will be.
So I look forward to a stronger parliamentary arm within
the OAS. We have a very strong parliamentary arm within OSCE. I
think we could improve our representation at the United
Nations.
We have two of our members who are designated to represent
the Senate. I think working with each other we can strengthen
unity in U.S. foreign policy goals.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to ask you about a subject that
we talked about at some length and that is making anti-
corruption a key part of our policy in our hemisphere. We have
seen an erosion of good governance.
We knew that in Northern and Central America. We see
significant challenges as countries have gone back on their
commitment for their anti-corruption institutions.
We see this in so many countries, of course, and Cuba is a
country that the chairman has mentioned frequently is a corrupt
country, Venezuela, et cetera.
We have legislation that you and I have talked about that
passed our Senate last Congress that we are going to try to get
to the finish line this time that will fine tune the missions--
each of our missions in each of our countries on anti-
corruption.
I want to just get your comments as to how high a priority
this will be when you are confirmed.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
Fighting corruption is vital to our efforts to strengthen
democracy in our hemisphere and around the world. I want to
thank you and the other members of this body for the tools that
you have given us.
I believe that we should robustly use our Treasury OFAC
sanctions, our 7031(c) sanctions, and the full range of tools
available to deal with those who would steal from the public
purse, deprive the peoples of the region of their resources and
their wealth.
And given my experience in my current assignment and
previously in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement, I look forward to deploying those tools robustly
in support of democracy around the region.
I would also like to note that I fully concur that the
Article One branch of government and its engagement around the
hemisphere with other legislatures will be an important tool in
supporting democracy.
Senator Cardin. Let me raise one more issue with you, if I
might, and that is the Caribbean states. For too long we have
not given them the attention that they need. We have not done
well with their voting at the United Nations or at OAS, for
that matter, and there are many Caribbean states. It does not
take too much attention or resources to strengthen our ties.
What strategy do you have in order to increase our
partnership with the Caribbean states?
Mr. Nichols. If confirmed, I look forward to building on
our shared values with the Caribbean and their commitment to
democracy and the rule of law.
I believe that our engagement with the Caribbean region
needs to include a robust presence and, if confirmed, I look
forward to advocating for that.
We need to leverage our development tools around the
region, work with our multilateral partners, and international
financial institutions to get them the resources that they
need, and to make sure that we are attending to those issues
that hold them back in their development.
Senator Cardin. Dr. Sison, I would just underscore the
point that we could do much better in getting support at the
United Nations if our missions recognized how important those
votes are to United States foreign policy.
We have got to connect the dots in more capitals around the
world so that we have stronger support at the United Nations,
and letting us know in Congress where we can be helpful and
getting those types of relationships that can help us advance
our foreign policy.
I hope you have a strategy to help us do that.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and, indeed, the
necessity of building broad cross-regional alliances and
partnerships is critical across the U.N. and multilateral
venues, whether we are talking about New York or Geneva,
really, across the multilateral space.
And I do appreciate the offer that I just heard for the IO
Bureau and, if confirmed, I will take you up on this. I think
that so many of the members of this committee have built deep
relationships with leaders across the world and, if confirmed,
I would hope that I would be able to turn to you and ask for
some help but with enough advance notice and placing a call or
two when and if needed.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young, I understand, is with us virtually.
Senator Young. Thank you, Chairman. I am not sure my
picture is appearing. Can I be heard?
The Chairman. You are certainly heard but not seen.
Senator Young. Okay. Well, I will just go ahead and dive
in.
So building on Senator Cardin's questions pertaining to the
Caribbean Basin, as you know, Mr. Nichols, the Senate is
considering a far-reaching China package, which includes
American policies towards the Western Hemisphere, which, if
confirmed, you will be tasked with overseeing.
One of your first responsibilities would be managing the
creation of a strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness,
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in Latin
America and the Caribbean.
I want to know what policies you believe have worked in the
past in these areas and how we might better work to improve
some of these policies across the region to reduce our
neighbors' vulnerability to Chinese influence.
And, you know, you might include specifically how the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative could be utilized to push
back on Chinese infrastructure developments.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
I think that we have a robust menu of policies and options
that I would seek to leverage, if confirmed. We need to work
across the board in institution strengthening, using our Agency
for International Development for political party
strengthening, for grass roots policy support at the human
level.
I think we've got to take advantage of our international
financial institution partners and make sure that they are
helping to advance democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
in the region, particularly the Inter-American Development Bank
as a tool within our own region.
The Organization of American States is similarly an
important tool that, within its Charter, it is committed to
those tenets of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
that we hold dear.
Working throughout the region, as I have, justice sector
support has been crucial and, I think, very successful in many
countries around the region, and providing units and
organizations that respect human rights and the rule of law
that support democracy and the extent to which we can build
upon those resources will be important.
I think CBSI has been an important tool throughout the
region. In terms of the future and the way forward, we need to
look to leverage that asset in building institutions, making
trade, communication, service sector improvements.
Senator Young. Okay. All right.
I am sorry to interject. Our time is just somewhat limited,
understandably, in this format. So, my apologies, sir, I am
going to move on because I have some other things I would like
to turn to.
I just returned from our southern border with Mexico. I
spent all day Friday down there in the Yuma, Arizona, area,
where I actually spent some time years ago as a United States
Marine, participating in counter trafficking operations and
monitoring some of the activities there, working with other
agencies.
The challenges continue. In fact, I think it is fair to say
we are hearing this, Republicans and Democrats alike, that we
have an ongoing crisis at the southern border, and that crisis
has underscored the importance of identifying the root cause of
unchecked immigration from the Northern Triangle region.
Despite $3.6 billion in U.S. aid over the 2016 to 2021
fiscal years, immigration policy from the new administration
has still resulted in a staggering number of migrants fleeing
these countries.
And I suppose we do not need to really fixate on the
massive uptick we have seen in the last couple of months.
Everyone is aware of it.
Despite billions of dollars in U.S. aid to these
economically distressed countries, why have we seen a recent
surge in immigration when it was, largely, controlled for the
past several years?
Mr. Nichols?
Mr. Nichols. I think there are a variety of reasons but I
point to a couple that are driving the uptick. One is a loss of
economic opportunities driven by climate disasters and climate
change in the region, corruption, violence, rule of law, a lack
of hope, and we need to work to address the root causes of
those challenges urgently.
I will keep my answer brief, but happy to go into it
further, if you would like, sir.
Senator Young. Well, thank you for your time. I would also
add the message from the White House has not been particularly
helpful. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you both for your past service to
this country and for your willingness to be considered for
these important posts at this critical time.
Ambassador Nichols, I want to begin with you. As we heard
from Senator Young, so much of the focus on America's borders
has been on the southern border between the United States and
Mexico.
But I want to ask about our northern border with Canada,
because for states like New Hampshire that border Canada, the
border closures have been very disruptive both for businesses
that go back and forth across the border to do business, but
also for many of our residents who have relatives in Canada and
have been limited in their travel.
Now, I understand that these were done because of the
pandemic. But we are coming up on an end to the most recent
extension of that border closure in May, and I wondered if you
have any sense of what will happen on May 21st when the current
restrictions expire and whether we need to keep this border
closed or how soon we might be able to safely reopen it.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
I am not yet confirmed. I have not been privy to the
deliberations on that topic. I know that the HHS and Homeland
Security are looking at this issue carefully.
I believe that the decision will be driven by the best
science available. We are making important progress in our own
country against the pandemic, and I hope that we'll be able to
see progress with regard to the border soon.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Do I have your commitment
that, once confirmed, that you will look at this issue closely
and urge an examination that recognizes the challenges that are
faced by that border closure?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Sison, I still have fond memories of my visit to
Lebanon during your tenure there as ambassador. Sadly, things
have significantly declined in Lebanon since that time, and I
know that you are very familiar with UNIFIL's mission in
Lebanon, how important it has been to the country and to its
relations with its neighbors.
If confirmed, how will you approach the mandate renewal in
August and how can the U.S. be a moderator between the Lebanese
Armed Forces, UNIFIL, and Lebanon's neighbors?
Ms. Sison. Good to see you again, Senator, and good
morning.
As with all peacekeeping missions, we want to make sure
that at the time of mandate renewal and discussion at the U.N.
Security Council that we are looking at realistic and
achievable mandates, that we are looking at mandates that
include women in peacekeeping as both military and police
peacekeepers, that when possible that this mandate promotes the
political solution, and that we look at the reforms in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency, to deliver on that mandate, and, of
course, the mandates need to be well resourced as well to be
effective.
UNIFIL has played a stabilizing role in southern Lebanon,
and we are seeing this at the present time as well. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to consult with you,
Senator, and other members of this committee on how we can make
peacekeeping the most effective and efficient investment and
that the peacekeepers are resourced to perform their mandates
effectively.
Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. One of the most pressing issues
facing the Security Council at the U.N. is the need to maintain
humanitarian aid in Syria.
How can you and the State Department and those of us in
Congress support Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield's efforts to push
back against Russia's obstructionism in allowing that
humanitarian aid to those who need it?
Ms. Sison. Senator, I absolutely agree with you on the
urgency of keeping humanitarian delivery, these corridors open.
The reauthorization of Bab al-Hawa for another 12 months is
completely a priority and, if confirmed, would be looking to
push on the other two cross-border points that are not
currently authorized to be used.
The suffering that we see, particularly in northeast and
northwestern Syria, is alarming: food insecurity, the inability
to deliver badly-needed medical and other items, particularly
in this period of the COVID pandemic.
So, if confirmed, I do look forward to consulting closely
with you and with working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-
Greenfield and her team on this critical issue of the
reauthorization of the cross-border delivery.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. But I just want to weigh in
in support of your point about the Havana syndrome and our
efforts that we should be making with the Cuban regime to press
them more on what they know.
And, Ambassador Nichols, I would also just like to weigh
in. I appreciate the administration's appointment of Ambassador
Spratlen.
But the fact is, in Congress, we are still not getting the
information we need on what is actually happening with so-
called Havana syndrome government wide, nor are we seeing the
coordination that I think we would all hope to see and the
assurance that those people who are affected are getting
absolutely the best health care that they need.
So I hope you will share that with the State Department.
Mr. Nichols. I will, Senator, and those who were injured in
those attacks and the health of our people throughout our
service and throughout our government are my highest priority.
The Chairman. Senator Rounds?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to both of you for your service to our country.
You, clearly, are both very well qualified and we appreciate
your offer of continued service.
Ambassador Nichols, I am concerned about, I guess, the
ongoing and, in some cases, increasing Chinese and Russian
engagement in the Western Hemisphere.
One example is China's launching of a vaccine diplomacy
strategy into Latin America, while Russia is launching
countless disinformation campaigns in Latin America to
discredit the West, specifically, the United States.
What do you think should be done to address this and what
resources are available to you for that purpose? I know that
you have indicated that there are some organizations and so
forth.
But when it comes to their very aggressive approach to
provide misinformation about our country but also to gather
additional leverage within the Western Hemisphere, share with
me your thoughts and what tools you would see available to you.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator, and I fully share your
concerns.
We have a number of tools available to us. We have the
Global Engagement Center pushing back on disinformation. We are
bolstering our public diplomacy at the embassy level throughout
the hemisphere, and I think that is a very important tool.
We have shared values, and we need to point out to the
peoples of the region the shared values that we have, and the
difference between what we consider important and what the real
costs of the engagement that the malign actors from outside our
hemisphere, like China and Russia, are engaging in.
The Chinese offer all sorts of things. They don't come for
free. The Chinese are getting something out of it, and we need
to push back aggressively with a variety of tools.
They also offer in their economic engagement unfair
competition practices and corruption, and when we see that we
need to call it out.
Senator Rounds. I think sometimes their offer of assistance
to a contrary is seen as a first step in where, later on, they
will start asking for small favors and then move into more
demands.
In our case, I would suspect that there are times in which
we are seen as looking at some of our neighbors and saying, we
expect you to behave in a particular way, and rather than
talking about our shared values we try to impose values upon
them.
Share with me your thoughts about the differentiation
between our shared values and times in which we might be seen
as placing our values upon them. I think it is a critical
difference.
Mr. Nichols. I think that there are advantages in our
hemisphere and that our founding documents in this hemisphere
lay out what the nations of this region believe in and what
they have committed to.
The OAS is the world's oldest regional multilateral
organization, and its Charter lays out values very clearly that
all of the nations in this hemisphere have signed onto, and I
think we can point to those.
We can point to polling of the publics in this hemisphere
and their value for democracy, human rights, and the rule of
law, and I think when we talk about what the Chinese and the
Russians are really offering, what they are really asking of
governments, there is a big difference between what one
individual official in a government might want and what, I
think, the people of that nation might want.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Ambassador Sison, the COVID-19 pandemic, certainly, put a
spotlight on the World Health Organization. Concerns have been
expressed that the WHO lacks sufficient resources to manage a
global pandemic as well as maintain its integrity.
Do you think that the WHO is resourced to handle a global
pandemic, and do you believe that it is still an unbiased
organization, despite Chinese influence?
And, finally, how do you think the Department of State can
help to strengthen the organization?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator.
Indeed, the issue of the World Health Organization--WHO's
need to be fit for purpose and modernized is an important one,
and there is an issue, of course, of the need for sustained
financing.
We do not want to start down a road and only to find that
we are not able to continue down the road as we work to
strengthen WHO's ability in surveillance detection, in
infectious disease prevention, the ability to respond, to
insist that all member states report transparently.
But, of course, that sustained financing needs to be
matched with a strong focus and, if confirmed, this would be a
top priority on transparency, accountability, and oversight of
the WHO's operations.
You mentioned the word integrity and, absolutely, we need
to make sure that the WHO's assessments, findings, reports, are
science based, expert led, free from outside influence.
And, again, we need to insist that all member states comply
with the international norms on infectious disease reporting,
international health regulations. We need full transparency on
this. Could not agree more, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Murphy?
Senator Murphy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you both for your willingness to continue to serve, especially
in these very important roles.
Ambassador Nichols, I wanted to turn to the topic of
Venezuela. You know, by no metric can anyone suggest that
President Trump's policy in Venezuela was a success. Maduro was
more cemented in power at the end of his four years.
But there has been some interesting developments over the
past few months. We have seen some compromises by the Maduro
government on humanitarian access, the creation of a new
electoral council, willingness to join the Norway-hosted talks.
And so I am interested to learn from you your early
thoughts about how the United States can help push this
momentum along, capitalize it, and then, specifically, whether
this is the time to talk about restoring diesel swaps.
I have believed for a while that the United States should
be engaged in this policy as a way to relieve humanitarian
suffering inside the country.
But I wonder if this policy now makes even more sense,
because not only does it provide an avenue to try to get much-
needed economic relief to people who are suffering, but it also
may be a way to show that the United States is open to helping
to be a part of these sort of grass shoots of negotiating room.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
There needs to be a key focus in our policy, in my view,
which I should caveat that I understand is under review within
the administration. So this will be my personal views.
But I believe that we have a major advantage in dealing
with Venezuela, that there is a broad multilateral coalition
working to promote democracy in Venezuela, and that is
something that we need to leverage aggressively to push the
Maduro regime towards free and fair elections.
We need to support the Venezuelan people, both at the
political level in the form of opposition leaders and interim
President Guaido, as well as pushing for humanitarian
assistance and ensuring that the people of Venezuela do have
access to the help that they need.
With regard to diesel swaps right now, as I understand it,
there is enough diesel capacity within Venezuela, at least for
the next six months or so.
I think that is something that needs to be watched, and if
we see that there is a problem there for the Venezuelan people
I think that is something to be looked at.
But I think maintaining economic pressure to negotiate on a
government that has shown that it will use dilatory tactics to
prevent progress toward free and fair elections in addition to
things like releasing political prisoners and allowing a free
press, we have to be very cautious on.
Senator Murphy. Yeah, no doubt, as Senator Menendez
regularly reminds us, this is Maduro's game is to sort of
entertain hopes of reform, stringing the international
community and the United States along with, you know, nothing
to be found at the end of the rainbow.
And so I think we go into this with eyes wide open. But it
is also interesting that Guaido himself has proposed the
incremental lifting of U.S. sanctions as an incentive to try to
continue along this path.
But I look forward to working with you on this as the
review continues.
Ambassador Sison, I wanted to talk to you about a topic
that regularly comes up in this committee, and that is Yemen.
We have a U.N. and WFP appeal that is right now about one-third
funded.
Now, it is never 100 percent funded, but in prior years we
have been able to stave off famine by making sure that we are
at least 80, 90 percent funded on that appeal. There are some
pretty important countries like Qatar that have made sort of no
contribution.
There is talk of a second donors conference to try to make
sure that we put our foot onto the pedal, because we are
looking at a 2021 famine, a new outbreak of cholera, if we do
not rally the world community through the U.N., through WFP, to
make sure that the money is there.
And by the way, the United States put in less money this
year than we did last year, which is not exactly helping the
situation.
Just your thoughts on how we can make sure we get the
humanitarian dollars we need in Yemen.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and share your concern
about the food insecurity and the need for humanitarian access
to the vulnerable populations in Yemen and, in fact, just flew
up for the hearing from Haiti.
But we did have WFP Executive Director David Beasley with
us a couple of weeks ago, and we actually discussed Yemen and
the alarming situation there with the mounting food insecurity.
So, if confirmed, you have my absolute commitment that I
would be working both with stakeholders to create these broad
partnerships with other donors and like-minded countries, also
to support Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield and her team up
in New York because, of course, the U.N. Security Council has
put an enormous amount of effort and work into maintain
Security Council voice--united Security Council voice on Yemen.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting and talking with
you more on this important topic.
Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you very much to you both.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch, thank you. And, Ambassadors, thank you for your service.
Greatly appreciated.
I would like to, first, talk about the Western Hemisphere.
I am from Tennessee. Since the border collapsed in late
January, we have experienced a dramatic increase in drug
trafficking, in overdoses, in human trafficking.
We have now got unaccompanied minors coming into Tennessee.
Our schools and hospitals are asking whether we have the
capacity to deal with this.
This has become the most urgent crisis in America from a
national security standpoint, from an economic security
standpoint, from a humanitarian standpoint.
So earlier this month, I traveled to Guatemala and to
Mexico to meet with leaders there to try to get at the bottom
of what the problem is, what is driving this.
I did not hear much talk about climate change. What I heard
was that we are sending messages from here, whether it is talk,
election talk, about how people will be treated if a certain
outcome occurs, whether it is talk about the potential for a
$15 minimum wage, whether it is talk about checks for illegal
immigrants, or the fact that we have extended unemployment--
plussed-up unemployment benefits all the way to September,
which is creating a giant job opening here in America.
Coyotes are taking these messages and marketing them to
very vulnerable people. They are encouraging these vulnerable
people to put their life savings on the line and to risk their
lives, to make a very dangerous journey, a journey in which
more than half of them are involved in some--in some way in
crime, whether they become part of the drug trafficking, part
of the sex trafficking, or in some other way violated horribly.
This is a very dangerous humanitarian crisis that is
occurring at our border. The leaders of these countries are not
happy about this at all. They blame us, in large part, but they
also see opportunity.
That is what I was trying to get at and I want to share
these with you, Ambassador Nichols, these observations, that
when I met with the president of Guatemala, he said, look, I am
not asking for you to send money or fund NGOs, but help us
technically--night vision goggles, technical training, so we
can manage our own border. Our own national sovereignty is
being violated, he told me. We want to cooperate. We think we
can cooperate, and if we can get our border under control and
bring the rule of law more in line, we will see more
infrastructure investment, which is what they desperately need.
We have tools here. This committee has jurisdiction over
some of the tools that we can help them with infrastructure
investment, but we need to get the rule of law and public
safety in order there.
I think there are great opportunities to cooperate with
them, and I would look forward to working with you toward those
ends.
They also want to see us stop the national security problem
that they have got too because they do not know who is entering
their country. It is a real issue.
It sounded even more so when I talked with the Mexican
Foreign Minister and the Minister of Economy of Mexico. They
have a grave concern about who is coming across their southern
border and, again, they highlighted that opportunity for us to
cooperate on a security basis, again, with training, with
technology, with equipment. These are ways to help them address
the problem.
But the most clear and urgent problem is dealing with our
own border, to stop sending the wrong messages that are
encouraging this sort of behavior. And what is happening,
particularly in Mexico, is that with the movement of coyotes,
the overwhelming force that is occurring at our southern
border, that it is creating an opening for the cartels to move
even more drugs, more sex trafficking, more contraband across
our borders.
The cartels are getting larger and more powerful by the day
and it is making it that much more difficult to manage the
situation in Mexico, in Guatemala, and other countries in that
region.
So I would look forward to working with you on this grave
national security crisis, and I hope that you will commit to do
that with me.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. I look forward to working
with you and the other members of this body, if confirmed, on
these issues.
I know that colleagues within the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement and Population, Refugees and
Migration, under the leadership of Vice President Harris and
with the participation of Special Envoy Zuniga are working hard
on the issues that you have discussed.
Senator Hagerty. We need to do more, but thank you for that
commitment.
Ambassador Sison, again, thank you for your service.
Still related to this area, what was very clear to me is
that China is increasing the movement of fentanyl and fentanyl
precursors into Mexico. These are getting manufactured and then
trafficked across our border. It appears that all the
cooperation between Mexico and the United States to interdict
this has collapsed.
I would be very interested in your thoughts on how, in the
position that you are, hopefully, going to go to how you can
increase our cooperation with Mexico to push back against China
and their importation of this illegal drug that is killing our
children.
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and I share your concerns
about these illegal drugs coming into our country, as both a
mother and a grandmother.
There is, definitely, an important role within the U.N. and
multilateral space to push this U.S. priority forward and, if
confirmed, I look forward to consulting with you, working with
you and with stakeholders, in organizations such as the
Universal Postal Union because there is a postal piece of this.
And the work that we have done on some of the standards has
actually made a difference in the multilateral sphere in
enforcing and moving these norms into the international space
as well as in the U.N. body that deals with drugs and crime.
Senator Hagerty. I look forward to working with you, and I
will just add this. The Mexican authorities made clear to me
that they do not have the technology to examine the cargo that
is coming in from China. They felt like we could help them
significantly there.
You think about x-ray technology, heat-sensing technology,
the types of things that they could use to deal with the fact
that China has become very clever at hiding fentanyl and the
precursors that are being shipped in to their country and then
being remanufactured.
So I appreciate that commitment and look forward to working
with you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine is recognized and he has graciously agreed to
preside while I go to the Finance Committee. After Senator
Kaine, at this point, no Republican colleagues who have sought
recognition virtually are present.
So it would be Senator Booker, who is with us virtually,
and then Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Kaine [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and
congratulations to the witnesses for your service and for your
nominations.
I want to ask three Western Hemisphere questions to--
Ambassador Nichols, to you about the Northern Triangle, and
then I cannot resist taking advantage of having the Haitian
ambassador with us today to ask a question about Haiti,
Ambassador Sison.
So, Ambassador Nichols, the Northern Triangle. We have seen
real backsliding in the Northern Triangle on governments'
transparency, corruption, violence, economic opportunity
issues.
Recently, in both Guatemala and El Salvador, there have
been a sacking of judges and prosecutors who have been known
for trying to prosecute corruption. Even more troubling, in
Honduras the Honduran election of 2016 was a sham and the OAS
called for it to be rerun.
Instead of supporting the OAS, the U.S. recognized the
government of Honduras, and what did we get for it? What we got
for it was the government canceling transparency initiatives,
canceling anti-corruption initiatives, and now the president of
Honduras is implicated in a couple of high-profile drug
smuggling prosecutions in the United States.
Obviously, if we are going to try to deal with this
migration problem, one of the key pillars to it is
strengthening governance, security, transparency in the
Northern Triangle.
I suspect that there will be a request that we invest funds
to do that, and I want to be supportive. But how can we invest
funds to promote those ends when the governments in the
Northern Triangle are often the causes or at least, in some
cases, the causes of the problems rather than the solutions?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator.
It is not enough to win office democratically. People have
to govern democratically, and central to that is the importance
of the separation of powers and a strong independent judiciary,
and that is something, if confirmed, that I will argue for
vociferously with our partners throughout the hemisphere and,
particularly, in the Northern Triangle.
We have programming that has been successful around the
world in strengthening the justice sector, and we need to press
forward with those efforts, particularly in the Northern
Triangle countries.
Corruption is a noxious influence in that region, in that
part of our hemisphere, and we need to leverage the tools that
you have given us to call out those corrupt actors who are
preventing the course of justice from flowing properly.
We also need to leverage our development assistance and our
multilateral partners to ensure that the institutions are built
and people get the support that they need so they are not
attracted to populist and easy solutions that quickly turn to
ashes in their mouths.
Senator Kaine. Mr. Ambassador, I think all those are the
right answers and I also think they are the things that we have
tried to do for years with very little effect. So I hope we
will not be in a Groundhog Day of repeatedly doing something
and seeing it not work.
Let me make one point on economic opportunity in the
region. Again, we would want there to be stronger economic
opportunities so people can stay. But how do we invest in
stronger economies with governments that have not proven to be
reliable partners?
I have an idea. U.S. employers employ a lot of people in
the Northern Triangle in the retail sector, in the textile
sector.
Rather, if we are going to try to increase economic
opportunities, I would hope State and Commerce and others, the
vice president's office, would pull together American employers
who employ folks in the region and say, for example, what could
we do as policy that would make you hire and invest more in the
Northern Triangle.
I will give you an example. There is probably a couple
hundred thousand textile workers in the Northern Triangle who
are employed by American firms.
This is just a brainstorm, but if we were to say, for
example, the purchase of PPE during the pandemic was revealed
to be a critical national security issue, we should only buy
PPE that is American made or that is made with American product
in nations with whom we have free trade agreements.
That would pull a huge part of the PPE supply chain out of
China and it would give a strong preference for the production
of PPE in the Northern Triangle, which is produced with
American cotton in factories in that region. Something like
that would lead to significant economic expansion or
opportunities there.
So I hope, as we focus on economic opportunities, get the
advice of the American companies that are already there.
Ambassador Sison, there is this, you know, obviously, huge
challenge in Haiti, deep unrest over the term of the president,
and a five-year term, but there is huge unrest over when did it
start.
What is the U.S. doing to try to help solve this dilemma
and pave a way for a less corrupt Haiti, going forward?
Ms. Sison. Good morning, Senator, and good to see you
again.
The U.S. and, I will say as the sitting ambassador, U.S.
ambassador to Haiti, we have been really urging all
stakeholders, so the political actors, the economic leaders,
civil society leaders, to come together and work in an
inclusive manner to reach an accord that will serve the Haitian
people.
And I say this because the political impasse has had an
impact over the last two years on the security situation. We
see increased gang violence has had a negative effect on the
economic side, including economic development side.
The focus has got to be, I believe, on rule of law,
combating corruption, promoting justice sector reform, and
moving ahead on insisting that these overdue legislative
elections, which should have been held in late 2019, do move
ahead.
The president has been ruling by decree because there is no
legislature. So to get a president out of ruling by
presidential decree, there need to be free, fair, and credible
legislative elections later this year, as announced by the
government of Haiti, followed by a presidential election, so
that at the end of the sitting president's term there is an
elected president to take his place. The----
Senator Kaine. And thank you, Ambassador. I am over my time
and I need to gavel myself out of order and--but thank you for
that answer.
I believe Senator Cruz is on his way, but I believe Senator
Markey, we are going in seniority and you are up next.
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Ambassador Nichols, thank you for your service over the
years. I want to talk a little bit about climate change and the
United States government and its ability to use Global
Magnitsky to strike back at those who are committing crimes
against environmental defenders.
I know that you have experience in working on these issues.
So could you please tell us what you believe we can do as a
country to counter environmental human rights violations in the
Western Hemisphere?
Because, clearly, we are at a tipping point and we have to
make sure that we are using all of the influence of our
government.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
It is a complex question. I will touch on a few examples.
For example, if you are dealing with a company that is
illegally dumping mining tailings in a river, suborning local
officials, and improperly taking resources out of a nation,
that seems to me like an example where you could leverage the
full range of anti-corruption tools in response to illegal
mining practices.
In Peru, artisanal and illegal gold mining was a huge
problem and linked to narcotics trafficking, and when I was
ambassador there, we worked intensively on leveraging law
enforcement tools against those responsible, especially in that
nexus of narcotics and illegal mining.
Senator Markey. Yeah, gold mining, logging, wildlife
trafficking, environmental degradation, all of that. I have
introduced legislation, the Targeting Environmental and Climate
Recklessness Act, and it is just to reinforce the reality that
all across these countries, brave climate defenders in Central
and South America are risking their lives peacefully in order
to ensure that these carbon-intensive industries and
unsustainable business practices are wreaking havoc on local
communities.
And what my legislation would do is it would give the
United States, give you, the ability to target foreign
individuals and companies engaged in destructive climate
actions to ensure that existing human rights and corruption
sanctions under Global Magnitsky are used to strike back at
those committing crimes against environmental defenders.
Can I just follow up? Just looking at the Amazon, if I may,
and the degradation of that forest, which are, as we know, the
lungs of the planet, how can we better work to prioritize its
protection with the countries that it spans across in South
America, in your opinion, Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Nichols. Thank you very much, Senator.
I think engaging with the key Amazon nations, starting with
Brazil but also Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia that is crucial. Our
diplomacy can have an important effect on their policies.
I know Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Kerry is
deeply engaged in that exercise. Programmatically, we can
leverage our development assistance on the issue of climate,
particularly on the protection of forests and rain forests in
the region.
We also need to think about how do we leverage our trade
agreements, which include environmental provisions, to protect
the environment and, if confirmed, I look forward to working
with you on these issues.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. And just moving to
Colombia, quickly, if I could, I am very concerned about the
escalation of violence in Colombia.
My question to you is what do you believe we should be
doing? What steps should the United States government be doing
in order to use our political influence to decrease the--that
violence and the suppression of ordinary citizens in that
country?
Mr. Nichols. The situation in Colombia is a complicated
one. Colombia is a long-term ally of the United States and we
need to be engaging with President Duque, as I know, our
ambassador and key leaders in the administration are, one, to
work to deescalate the challenges, two, to address the economic
crisis caused by the pandemic, which sort of was one of the
reasons why the fiscal package that President Duque introduced
was introduced, and three, to prioritize getting back on track
to implementation of the 2016 peace agreement in Colombia.
And if confirmed, I look forward to working towards those
goals.
Senator Markey. Thank you, sir. Thank you both for your
service.
The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member, and again, congratulations to both of you on your
nominations.
Ambassador Sison, in my introduction this morning, I
mentioned your experience in the area of international
humanitarian relief, and in your new position and confirmed you
will be a key player in that arena.
Now, I support an immediate ceasefire in the fighting
between Israel and Hamas. But whenever the rockets and the
bombs stop falling, we will have a humanitarian disaster in
Gaza.
As you well know, there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza
before the fighting started and now it is much worse. We all
know that Hamas is a terrorist organization that controls Gaza.
We also know that Israel has the right to self-defense, and
I am glad that the United States and this committee have
assisted Israel in the development and the deployment of the
Iron Dome, which has intercepted thousands of Hamas rockets.
But I also think that the United States and the
international community needs to do everything we can when the
fighting stops to assist the millions of innocent Gazans who
are trapped there and have nothing to do with Hamas.
So my first question is a simple one. Do you agree?
Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I certainly share your concern
about the human suffering associated with this outbreak in
violence, and I do believe that providing humanitarian
assistance to the Palestinian population with, again, all the
transparency, accountability, and oversight built into that,
while maintaining our long-standing security relationship with
Israel is in the U.S. interest.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Just to give an extent of the challenge we are going to
face with the international community, this is--I am just
quoting here from the New York Times' report today in terms of
the humanitarian crisis:
``The fighting has destroyed 17 hospitals and clinics in
Gaza, wrecked its only coronavirus test laboratory, sent fetid
wastewater into its streets, and broke water pipes serving at
least 800,000 people.
Sewage systems inside Gaza have been destroyed. A
desalinization plant that helped provide fresh water to 250,000
people in the territory is offline. Dozens of schools have been
damaged or closed, forcing some 600,000 students to miss class
and some 72,000 Gazans have been forced to flee their homes.''
Now, as your answer did and my question did, I am focused
now on post-conflict humanitarian relief to millions of people
who have nothing to do with the conflict in Gaza.
So do you agree that the United States and international
relief agencies should insist that all parties involved give
access consistent with security requirements, but access to
provide humanitarian relief in Gaza?
Ms. Sison. Senator, yes, the issue of humanitarian access
to provide needed food, medical items, particularly in this
time of the COVID pandemic, is absolutely critical.
If confirmed, I would be working with the IO team and other
stakeholders across our government and with U.N. partners not
only to emphasize the urgency of working towards sustainable
calm, but to ensuring that needed humanitarian relief with the
built-in safeguards on transparency, accountability, oversight
is delivered to the most vulnerable populations.
Thank you, Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador.
Now, we also have an ongoing humanitarian disaster in
Ethiopia. President Biden has called for a ceasefire in that
conflict and we, the United States, are working with
international relief agencies to try to get humanitarian relief
to those there.
This committee two days ago had a briefing with Ambassador
Feltman and I had a follow-up conversation with Ambassador
Feldman, the Special Envoy, yesterday. Can you just talk
briefly about what we need to be doing and demanding in terms
of providing humanitarian assistance in that conflict?
Ms. Sison. Indeed, Senator, I share your concern about the
increasing food insecurity that we see. The U.N. and the
International Organizations Bureau have an important role to
play and, if confirmed, I would be working with a number of
these U.N. agencies, including World Food Programme and others.
There are other associated human rights issues that I also
believe the IO Bureau would be working on and, if confirmed,
calling out those who are perpetrating these human rights
abuses, these armed actors, widespread reports of sex- and
gender-based violence and other atrocities.
We would want to continue to speak with one voice at the
U.N. Security Council on these issues, and I look forward, if
confirmed, to working with Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield
up there in New York as well as the U.N. agencies providing
this humanitarian relief and using the appropriate space to
call out those armed actors and others perpetrating these
atrocities and abuses.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you.
Senator Coons and I were in Sudan just a short time ago and
visited one of the refugee camps that have been set up by
UNHCR, and I think it is important the United States continues
to support that effort as well as the World Food Programme.
They are doing essential humanitarian work.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
your service. Congratulations on your nominations.
Ambassador Sison, let me start with you. You have
emphasized repeatedly that you intend to work to ensure that
American taxpayer dollars are well spent at the U.N. and other
organizations.
But Americans are deeply concerned about the structure and
leadership of those organizations. Organizations like the Human
Rights Council are hopelessly biased, especially against the
nation of Israel, and they are mendaciously sympathetic to
countries like Iran that commit atrocious human rights abuses.
It is no surprise why that is the case, given that those
are the sorts of countries that make up a majority of the
members of the Human Rights Council.
To take another example, the U.N.'s Commission on the
Status of Women, the body's top legislative body on women's
rights, recently elected Iran as a member. The Iranian regime,
of course, enforces a broad array of gender apartheid policies
and, concerningly, when asked, the Biden administration
declined to condemn that farce.
I worry that no amount of financial accountability can
reform these deeply problematic organizations as long as we
allow them to be led by countries that are antithetical to
their purpose.
I would like your opinion on that. How can financial
oversight, which you have discussed, fix these deep problems,
especially if the Biden administration is unwilling to speak
out clearly against them?
Ms. Sison. Senator, the issue of U.S. leadership is
critical, I believe, to addressing the need for reform, and I
agree with you there is a need for reform in many of these
institutions.
We need the U.S. back at the table pushing for these
reforms. There is the issue, yes, of financial accountability,
transparency, oversight, but there is also the issue of U.S.
leadership building strong cross-regional partnerships and
alliances so that our U.S. core values--protection of human
rights, labor rights, and economic transparency--are at the
forefront.
We need to remind some of our like-minded of what we all
signed on to in the Charter of the United Nations because its
foundational document is strong on the human rights.
On the Human Rights Council, Senator, I do believe that
when we are at the table and as we are coming back to the--to
the HRC, we have the ability to better defend Israel from de-
legitimization, from unfair targeting, from discriminatory
efforts because we are there and we are present.
We have seen when we are there that the number of items
brought up under this article, Agenda Item 7, the only single
country targeting of Israel in that space, that we are able to
push back by coming back also and, of course, with our
candidacy better able to create these cross-regional alliances
to encourage more human rights right-minded countries to firm
up its members.
Senator Cruz. But does the hypocrisy of some of the worst
human rights abusers being themselves members, does that
concern you?
Ms. Sison. Indeed, it does. But we have also seen, Senator,
the Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on Venezuela.
The Human Rights Council has put the spotlight on China and the
treatment of Uighurs, has put the spotlight on Hong Kong.
So the issue of our people-to-people diplomacy creating
these strong cross-regional alliances of like-minded countries
to make sure that our core U.S. values are at the forefront.
This is why we need to be at the table and back.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
Ambassador Nichols, I would also like to ask you, briefly,
about Mexico, and our relationship with Mexico is complicated.
They are a neighbor. We share a land border.
But they are also a country with its own interests, and
when it comes to foreign policy we need to use all the foreign
policy tools we have.
Recently, the Mexican Government has taken a range of steps
to downgrade counternarcotics cooperation with the United
States, and in one incident, Mexico even released sensitive
information that we provided to them in violation of the U.S.-
Mexico Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty.
I have introduced legislation to try to address some of
these concerns. But, of course, there is an enormous role for
the State Department to play in conveying American concerns and
priorities.
Do you also share these concerns with Mexico's behavior in
connection with, cooperation with, the United States in
counternarcotics and treaty violations, and how should we
address those issues?
Mr. Nichols. Our cooperation with Mexico on rule of law,
counternarcotics, justice issues, is vital. It is long
standing. I had the pleasure of working on those issues when I
was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement.
If confirmed, I look forward to engaging proactively with
the government of Mexico on our security cooperation. It is
vital for both of our nations. Mexican cooperation is something
that we need and they need.
The challenges as was discussed in terms of things like
fentanyl and precursors, other opiate trafficking into the
United States, illegal activities on the border--we need each
other to resolve those, and I look forward to working with our
law enforcement colleagues on the U.S. side, with our embassy
Law Enforcement Working Group in Mexico City, and with Mexican
officials, if confirmed, to press forward to ensure the highest
level of cooperation, Senator.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
We normally do not have second rounds. But as I understand
it, Senator Hagerty has--I am going to extend the courtesy to
you.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, and Senator
Kaine, I am actually following up on a point that you raised.
If I could borrow you for two minutes. But I just wanted to add
a comment that Senator Kaine inspired.
In my recent visit to Guatemala and to Mexico, one thing
that was clear to me that they were very interested in
cooperating on was the fact that we are working very
aggressively to reshore businesses from China.
We are all very concerned about security of our supply
chain. Those companies that are coming back to the United
States, I want to get every job I can. Let me be clear. I want
every one of those jobs in America that I can get.
But to the extent that they are not coming back to America,
rather than have them go to some other Southeast Asian country,
why not find a way to work together to bring them into our
hemisphere and to bring them to our friends there who need the
economic opportunity, which this may help stem some of the root
cause?
I do not want to overlook the immediate concern. We have to
fix the border crisis now. But mid- and long-term, there is a
real opportunity here.
Leaders cited CAFTA as a way to address this. You wisely
brought this up, Senator, and I think taking a look at CAFTA,
which actually presents now some restrictions and some
constraints on what they can do, all of those constraints are
being actually picked up by China right now because they are
not part of that free trade agreement.
We need to look very aggressively at what we can do with
the FTAs that are in place, what we can do with economic
development on a joint basis.
I think that the United States can do a great deal to help
these countries improve the rule of law and create the proper
constructs.
Again, we have the mechanisms to help them with
infrastructure because of the various funding mechanisms that
exist here in Washington and elsewhere.
But creating that economic opportunity and seizing this
trend right now coming from China is something that I encourage
you very much to focus on.
Thank you.
Mr. Nichols. Thank you, Senator. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with you on that.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
The Chairman. Thank you. One or two final questions.
Venezuela, despite the recent charm offensive, and that is
what I consider it, the fact remains that Nicolas Maduro is a
brutal dictator whose regime has committed, from my
perspective, crimes against humanity, perpetrated fraud in the
country's presidential and legislative elections, responsible
for Venezuela's massive humanitarian crisis.
So I, first of all, want to commend the president,
President Biden, for providing TPS for Venezuelans. But with
Venezuela descending into a failed state status, I know that
interim President Guaido and a coalition of democratic actors
are pushing for comprehensive negotiations, both presidential
and legislative ones, as well as a return to democratic
governance and increase aid to address the humanitarian crisis.
So, Ambassador Nichols, is not that something that we
should be able to get our arms around and supportive of and
seek an international mobilization for a simple proposition,
internationally supervise the fair and free presidential and
legislative elections?
Mr. Nichols. Mr. Chairman, I agree that is something that
the international coalition should be focused on. Our
multilateral partners play an important role.
As you wisely state, the Maduro regime's goal is to delay,
to deflect, to distract, and I think, cognizant of that, we
need to take an approach that limits the regime's ability to do
those things.
As I said earlier, our multilateral partners are a vital
tool in that regard. But the protagonists of this need to be
the Venezuelan people and the Venezuelan opposition, led by
interim President Guaido.
The Chairman. Mm-hmm. You are familiar, or maybe I should
add, are you familiar with the roles that, for example, Russia,
China, and Turkey are playing in Venezuela? Russia, not only
through its entity there that they use for what I call
mercenary soldiers, but also I hope you are familiar with
reports of Russia taking out gold bars out of Venezuela and
part of the national patrimony going to Russia, the realities
of Turkey's banks being used to flush the cash out of Venezuela
and try to evade our sanctions. Are you familiar with those
elements?
Mr. Nichols. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and the broad efforts by
China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, others, to work around the
sanctions regime that exists is deeply worrisome, and I think
that the--those of us who wish to see democracy in Venezuela
need to aggressively challenge those actions and work to ensure
that the profits of their criminal activities are not returned
to the regime.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One last question for you. President Bukele in El
Salvador--we had President Bukele here. We met with him before
after he was elected but before he took office. He said all the
right things then. He has done all the wrong things since then.
His firing of the attorney general, his elimination of
the--all of the judges of the Constitutional Court, have all of
the elements of a massive power grab consolidation in an
autocratic way.
You know, he probably thinks that if we do not just go
along with him he will turn to China. How should we face the
challenges there?
Because I think beyond El Salvador it is going to send a
hemispheric message that is very bad if we do not, you know,
stand up for the principles of observance of the Constitution,
rule of law, and other elements.
Mr. Nichols. As I said, Mr. Chairman, it is not enough to
win office democratically or win elections democratically. Our
friends and our rivals need to respect the rule of law and
govern democratically and we need to hold them to account when
they fail to do so.
El Salvador is a country that has been a long-time ally. I
served there from 1991 to 1993. We, as a nation, have
sacrificed much and provided a great deal of assistance to El
Salvador to try and put it on a path towards success, and we
need to use all of the tools that we can to ensure that El
Salvador remains on a forward path and that the challenges that
it faces can be overcome.
And I look forward to working on those issues, if
confirmed.
The Chairman. Mm-hmm.
And finally, Ambassador Sison, I do not want you to feel
that I have no affection for your position. So our legislation
that Senator Risch and I put together on a bipartisan basis
here passed the committee 21 to 1.
The Strategic Competition Act creates a special
representative for advancing U.S. leadership in the United
Nations.
That person would be responsible for, among other things,
promoting U.S. leadership and participation in the U.N. system
with a particular focus on issue areas in which authoritarian
countries are increasing their influence and steering the U.N.
agenda.
We are alarmed, as you have heard here from several
members, about the increasing influence and role of
authoritarian countries in U.N. bodies. What is your assessment
as to how we can best counter those efforts?
And I know that there has been within your department to be
a section that has been created. How do you see the role of
this Special Representative playing within it?
Ms. Sison. Thank you, Chairman, for this question and also
thank you to the members of this committee for the bipartisan
focus on this need for the U.S. to engage vigorously in this
strategic competition, and if confirmed, this is at the top of
my agenda.
Indeed, the International Organizations Bureau is in the
process of establishing and launching a new Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel office. You mentioned the Special
Representative position, and I look forward, if confirmed, to
working with all stakeholders in this space.
The Special Representative, the IO Office of Multilateral
Strategy and Personnel, what are we going to focus on? A,
making sure that we get independent qualified U.S. candidates
or like-minded candidates if there is no U.S. appropriate
individual into these top U.N. leadership positions.
This is critical running the State Department and the
Secretary of State, have put their weight behind, for example,
an excellent U.S. candidate at the International
Telecommunication Union, focused on that issue of candidates'
long game, looking ahead at investing in the U.N.'s Junior
Professional Officer program one to two years, having young
Americans gain this experience and then be set up for mid-level
and beyond positions to bring in our core U.S. values--
adherence to democratic norms, protection of human rights.
China uses this program extensively. We need to be in
there. Work with our embassies abroad, our ambassadors and
charges, our USAID missions, to make sure we are looking into
the weeds as well.
We do not want to see U.N. agency documents coming out of
these field offices that have Belt and Road Initiative or
Communist Party of China language in their strategic program
strategy documents out in the field. We need to be alert to
this.
And I would add to this list of priorities preserving this
space for Taiwan's participation at the expert technical level
in the World Health Assembly, which is coming up next week up
at ICAO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and at
Interpol.
These are transnational threats: global health security,
civil aviation safety and security, transnational crime.
Taiwan's experts' input should be heard.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, and I strongly support your views
on Taiwan being included at those levels internationally.
Finally, for you, it was reassuring to hear Ambassador
Greenfield reiterate her commitment to countering anti-Israel
bias and unilateral Palestinian actions in international fora
and multilateral organizations like the U.N. and U.N. agencies.
I think such a commitment is more pressing than ever as we
search for ways to deescalate the current conflict and return
to a two-state solution process.
If confirmed, will you work to counter anti-Israel bias at
the U.N. and other multilateral organizations?
Ms. Sison. Yes, Senator, I will. I will push back, if
confirmed, as I have done in the past in many different tours
of duty against the de-legitimization of Israel, unfair bias,
discrimination against Israel, anti-Semitism.
Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Well, Senator Risch?
[No response.]
The Chairman. With that, we appreciate your testimony. This
record will remain open two business days. So right at--close
of business Thursday.
Okay, I have to check with my ever-ready staff.
This record will remain open until the close of business on
Thursday. There may be questions for the record that are
submitted by members.
I urge both of you to answer them fully and expeditiously
as soon as possible so that your nominations may be considered
at a business meeting.
And with the thanks of the committee for your presence,
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:57 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Canada is a NATO ally, a NORAD partner, a member of the
Five Eyes, and a top trade partner to the United States, and our two
countries have worked in close strategic partnership around the world
in recent decades. However, the Trump administration introduced
unnecessary friction into this important relationship, including
imposing Section 232 tariffs on Canada. What is your assessment of the
U.S.-Canada relationship and what steps will you take to repair this
important bilateral partnership?
Answer. Our relationship with Canada is very strong. Relations with
the United States remain the centerpiece of Canada's foreign policy.
President Biden and PM Trudeau issued the ``Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-
Canada Partnership'' at their February virtual meeting. If confirmed, I
look forward to supporting the roadmap priorities, which include
combatting the pandemic and cooperating on economic recovery,
accelerating climate ambitions, advancing diversity and inclusion,
bolstering security and defense, and building global alliances.
Our two governments coordinate daily at multiple levels and across
multiple agencies on matters ranging from major global issues to our
shared border, rivers, and lakes, our trade relationship, and joint
security through NORAD and NATO. If confirmed, I look forward to
furthering that cooperation.
The United States and Canada enjoy the most extensive and
integrated economic partnership of any two nations in the world. While
the Section 232 actions were deeply unpopular in Canada, the almost
400,000 people in pre-pandemic times and the nearly $1.7 billion worth
of goods and services that crossed our border daily are a testament to
the importance and scale of our economic relationship. Canada is the
primary foreign market for more than 30 U.S. states. Millions of U.S.
and Canadian middle-class jobs--including well-paying jobs in the
manufacturing sector--depend on our partnership. Given the thousands of
businesses and the various, complex sectors operating across our
borders, disagreements arise from time to time. That is understandable
and expected. If confirmed, I would commit to working with our U.S.
interagency colleagues to resolve these issues with Canada in a fair
and transparent manner and ensure we put the interests of U.S. workers,
farmers, ranchers, and businesses at the forefront of our foreign
policy so that they are treated fairly under the terms of the United
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
Question. The Government of China arbitrarily detained two Canadian
citizens--Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor--in retaliation for
Canada's decision to detain Meng Wanzhou at the request of U.S.
prosecutors. For two years, Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor have been held in
substandard conditions and routinely denied consular access by the
Canadian Government. What is your assessment of the detention of Mr.
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor and how will you work with the Trudeau Government
to help secure their release?
Answer. If confirmed, I would make clear that the United States
stands with Canada in calling on Beijing to immediately release Mr.
Kovrig and Mr. Spavor. I will work closely with my counterparts in the
Canadian Government to help secure their release. The United States
rejects the PRC's use of arbitrary detention as a political tool. Human
beings are not bargaining chips.
The United States has endorsed the Canada-led multilateral
Declaration Against Arbitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations,
together with over 60 countries. We are in discussions with Canada and
other likeminded partners through the Partnership Action Plan to
coordinate collective action against the practice of politically
motivated, arbitrary detentions of foreign nationals to exert pressure
on their governments.
Question. Mexico was the deadliest country in the world for
journalists in 2020, accounting for almost a third of journalists
killed this year, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists.
Despite President Lopez-Obrador's pledge to tackle violence against
journalists in 2018, his government continues to underfund the Federal
Mechanism for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders and Journalists.
How will you engage on the issue of press freedoms in Mexico and
advocate for increased protections for journalists?
Answer. Respect for human rights is fundamental, and a free and
active press is an integral part of a healthy democracy. The killing of
journalists and human rights activists undermines freedoms of
expression and association, as well as regional security.
The Department is committed to supporting efforts to increase
respect for human rights and press freedom. Through USAID, the
Department supports Mexico's National Protection Mechanism for
Journalists and Human Rights Defenders and works with state-level
counterparts to expand the protection measures available for these
groups. USAID also supports the Specialized Prosecutor's Office for
Crimes Against Freedom of Expression to investigate and sanction
aggressions against journalists and defenders.
If confirmed, I will strongly promote respect for human rights and
the rule of law and end impunity. We will continue to urge Mexican
authorities to investigate and prosecute those responsible for crimes
against journalists and human rights activists wherever they occur.
Question. Arms trafficked from the United States into Mexico have
reached disturbing levels and, in some cases, transnational criminal
organizations operating in Mexico possess more sophisticated weapons
than those of Mexican law enforcement, all of which is enabling
dangerous groups to expand their influence and activities in the
country. If confirmed, what steps would you take to address
international arms trafficking from the U.S. into Mexico?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the
rule of law in Mexico. I recognize that illegal weapons trafficking
from the United States constitutes a major source of the arms used by
criminal organizations in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working
with you and other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency
colleagues, and Mexican Government officials to address border security
and arms trafficking.
Question. Central America's Northern Triangle struggles with
widespread insecurity, weak rule of law and extreme levels of poverty.
These challenges are the main causes pushing people to leave their
countries. If confirmed, what priorities will you establish to address
citizens security, strengthen democratic governance, and facilitate
conditions for equitable economic growth in the Northern Triangle?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize programs that directly
impact everyday Central Americans to improve citizen security,
strengthen democratic governance, and create the conditions for
equitable economic growth, especially in areas prone to high
emigration. To build political will, I will work across the U.S.
Government to utilize a broad range of tools of diplomacy, public
diplomacy, sanctions and visa revocations, and targeted foreign
assistance programs to combat corruption, strengthen judiciaries, and
promote transparency.
Our citizen security programs seek to transform the relationship
between police and the communities they serve. We will work with civil
society and partner governments to address community needs, including
health and education, promote transparency, and hold government
institutions accountable. Finally, if confirmed, I will work with our
interagency partners to help create conditions for equitable economic
growth, including by supporting businesses owned by women and
disadvantaged groups.
Question. Across Central America, citizens have fled their homes
and migrated from their countries in search of safety and opportunity.
Additionally certain undemocratic leaders have facilitated the
criminality that leaves many Central Americans unable to see a future
in their country. If confirmed, how will you prioritize the use of
foreign assistance to support democratic civil society and struggling
citizens, while also holding accountable certain leaders that have
facilitated criminality and placed their own interests above their
citizens?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support assistance programs to
strengthen civil society and their efforts to denounce corruption,
promote justice, protect human rights, and advocate for the needs of
vulnerable populations. I will seek to build on administration efforts
to consult with civil society representatives, both throughout the
region and in the United States, to ensure their perspectives and input
inform our policies and program design. It is critical that we work to
guard civic space that allows for the free exercise of rights, and use
all available tools to promote accountability for corrupt actors in the
region.
Question. In November 2020, more than 7 million people were
affected and hundreds of thousands were forced into shelters after two
devastating hurricanes struck Central America, positioning already
vulnerable individuals at greater risk. If confirmed, how will
prioritize support for recovery and relief efforts from these
hurricanes and how will this align with a broader, longer-term effort
to aid Central America in mitigating the impacts of climate change?
Answer. If confirmed, I will coordinate closely within the
Department and the interagency, including by supporting international
engagement efforts led by Vice President Harris to internationalize the
effort and secure more donor commitments for responding to the immense
humanitarian needs in Central America. The Department, together with
USAID and others, provided immediate humanitarian relief in the
aftermath of the hurricanes and continues to remain actively engaged in
rebuilding efforts. In April, the U.S. Government announced an
additional $310 million in humanitarian support to the region and is
working to secure increased donor commitments to address acute needs.
We will continue to work to address the immediate needs while
strengthening the capacity of Central American Governments for disaster
risk mitigation and preparedness.
Question. Since taking office in 2007, Nicaraguan President Daniel
Ortega has conducted widespread, systematic attacks against civilians,
including murder, torture, and arbitrary detentions. Moreover, in
recent weeks and months, the Ortega Government has taken a number of
steps to undermine the possibility of free, fair and transparent
elections in November 2021. If confirmed, how will you prioritize
support for Nicaraguan civil society in light of the enactment of these
troubling laws and how will you work with international partners to
promote a free, fair and transparent electoral process in Nicaragua?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned by a series of
repressive laws that have been passed since October 2020 which aim to
suffocate civil society in Nicaragua and quash freedom of expression.
The regime has taken repressive action against several media outlets,
and the administration has publicly denounced these actions. President
Ortega's actions against civil society, the media, and the democratic
opposition will only further distance him from the global community. If
confirmed, I will actively work to defend Nicaragua's civil society
groups, and will continue to work through diplomatic efforts,
coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy actors,
and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for free
and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
administration will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS,
EU, and elsewhere to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free
and fair elections.
Question. During his campaign, President-elect Biden characterized
Colombia as a ``keystone'' of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America,
pledging that restoring the partnership our countries would be a
priority. If confirmed, what would be your priorities for and approach
to strengthening the U.S.-Colombia relationship?
Answer. I agree with President Biden that Colombia is a vital
strategic partner. If confirmed, I will support efforts to advance the
many priorities we share with Colombia, including promoting sustainable
peace and reconciliation; combatting narcotics trafficking and the
transnational criminal groups that threaten hemispheric security;
coordinating an effective diplomatic and humanitarian response to the
crisis in Venezuela; protecting human rights; addressing the climate
crisis; assisting Colombia to strengthen its health system; expanding
economic ties, and promoting inclusive economic growth that will
benefit the citizens of both countries.
Question. Five years ago, Colombia signed a historic peace accord
with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, there
have been delays in implementation due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the
Venezuela crisis, and the economic impacts of both, as well as
continued security challenges. How will you support Colombia as it
implements the accord amidst these many growing challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the efforts of the Colombian
Government and people as they continue to work towards a just and
lasting peace and a more prosperous future. I believe that successful
implementation of the 2016 peace accord is vital to sustainable
progress on a broad range of priorities, including security, stability,
counternarcotics, human rights, justice, and economic development. I
will ensure that the United States continues to support the
implementation of the accord through diplomatic engagement and foreign
assistance programming. Our priorities include assisting Colombia to
extend the benefits of the accord to vulnerable populations in
conflict-affected areas.
Question. In recent weeks, Colombia has confronted nationwide
protests. While the majority of the protests have been peaceful, there
have been incidents of violent protests, vandalism, and blockades--
which have had a negative impact on the broader population. There also
have been acts of violence and excessive use of force committed by
Colombian security forces. Additionally, there have been incidents of
citizens taking up arms and firing on protesters. What is your
assessment of the protests, the acts of excessive force committed by
security forces, and the attacks by armed citizens? How can the United
States best support Colombia during this difficult period?
Answer. Colombia is a long-time and close partner. I am saddened by
the loss of life during protests in Colombia this May. Citizens in
democratic countries have the unquestionable right to protest
peacefully. Violence and vandalism is not acceptable; nor are acts of
vigilantism. If confirmed, I will encourage the Colombian Government to
continue investigating all allegations of police misconduct and address
any violations of human rights. I will also support the efforts of the
Colombian Government and people as they continue to engage in dialogue
to resolve the current situation and work together toward a more
prosperous and peaceful future, particularly through continued
implementation of the 2016 peace accord.
Question. Over the past four years, the U.S.-Ecuador relationship
has improved significantly. After a decade of tensions, both countries
have advanced multiple security, development, and economic agreements.
What is your assessment of the U.S.-Ecuador relationship and if
confirmed, what steps will you take to support the U.S.-Ecuador
partnership?
Answer. Over the last few years, the United States and Ecuador have
improved relations and built a cooperative bilateral relationship based
on shared values related to democracy, sustainable development and
prosperity, transparency, security, and the fight against drug
trafficking, organized crime, and corruption. Ecuador is a steadfast
regional partner. The United States seized this opening to increase
bilateral cooperation across the board.
If confirmed, I will continue to pursue increased cooperation with
the Ecuadorian Government in areas of mutual benefit for both our
countries. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency to
ensure we are exploring all areas of cooperation with Ecuador and
seeing where the U.S. can strategically provide assistance. The United
States will continue supporting Ecuador's efforts to implement much-
needed economic reforms to strengthen the economy, balance public
finances, and revive growth in Ecuador, which is imperative given the
devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The United States is proud
to stand with the Ecuadorian people as they continue on the path to
sustainable prosperity.
Question. The Bolsonaro Government in Brazil has been highly
criticized for its role in deforestation and forest destruction. While
annual deforestation has increased over the past 11 years, the spike
seen in 2019 is, according to many experts, was a direct result of the
Government's actions. President-elect Biden has been outspoken about
the need for a better approach to deforestation in the Amazon. If
confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing environmental issues as a core
agenda item for our bilateral relationship with Brazil and how will you
approach the issue of Amazon deforestation?
Answer. Addressing deforestation is key to achieving Brazil's
climate and development goals. If confirmed, I look forward to
prioritizing efforts to combat the climate crisis and other
environmental issues. We want to work with the Brazilian Government,
Indigenous and Quilombo communities, and civil society to build
economic value for Brazilians through forest management and protection
rather than deforestation and to explore ways to increase investment
into forests, combat conservation crimes, improve land titling, and
create sustainable value chains to conserve biodiversity.
Question. As the crisis in Venezuela poses continued risks for U.S.
national security and regional stability, what priority will you place
on strengthening coordination with our closest partners to improve the
effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian aid, and diplomacy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the State Department
continues to prioritize strengthening coordination with our closest
partners to improve the effectiveness of our sanctions, humanitarian
aid, and diplomacy. The United States needs to work with partners and
allies to build multilateral pressure on the illegitimate Maduro
regime, promote accountability for regime officials' and their
enablers' criminal activities, implement appropriate sanctions against
those who undermine democracy or abuse human rights, and provide
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of the Venezuelan
people.
Question. Given the Maduro regime's fraudulent legislative
elections in December 2020 and the seating of a new, illegitimate
National Assembly, what diplomatic efforts will you pursue to support
Interim President Juan Guaido and Venezuela's democratic opposition, as
well as their ability to address the suffering of the Venezuelan people
and counter Maduro's dictatorship?
Question. If confirmed, I will remain committed to working with our
Venezuelan and international partners to foster an environment where
all Venezuelans can chart a peaceful course out of the current crisis,
with full respect for the freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and an end to attacks against human rights
defenders, journalists, and political opposition actors.
I will work with partners and allies to increase multilateral
pressure on the illegitimate Maduro regime, promote accountability,
including through the use of appropriate sanctions, of regime officials
and their enablers for their criminal activities, undermining
democracy, or abuse of human rights. If confirmed, I will also
prioritize providing humanitarian aid to ease the suffering of people
affected by the Venezuelan regional crisis.
Question. What is your assessment of efforts by our geopolitical
competitors and adversaries--Russia, China, and Cuba--to prop up the
Maduro regime in Venezuela?
Answer. I understand Russian support for the Maduro regime includes
military advisors and proxies, disinformation mechanisms, political
influence on the world stage, and financial backing. PRC companies such
as ZTE support the Maduro regime by providing technology to surveil
Venezuelans and reward regime supporters while punishing critics. Cuban
military and intelligence advisors actively support Maduro through the
provision of security forces, intelligence officers, and providing
direction to regime actors. Collectively, these efforts provide
substantial and worrisome support to the Maduro regime, which I will
work to counter, if confirmed.
Question. China's presence in Latin America has grown over the past
four years amidst a combination of U.S. neglect and aggression towards
the region, as well as increased Chinese economic, diplomatic, and
military engagement. How will you improve cooperation with our
hemispheric partners, so as to reassert our leadership, deepen our ties
with partner governments, and improve our competitiveness in the
region?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners'
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery.
If confirmed, I will work to broaden our diplomatic presence, promote
increased educational and cultural exchanges, and help our partners
face rule of law challenges.
Question. As the Government of China has expanded its presence in
Latin America, aspects of its engagement have been characterized by
predatory foreign investment, unsustainable loans to the region, or
even through aggressive violations of international boundaries as we
saw in the case of large Chinese illegal fishing off of the coast of
the Galapagos Islands. What is your assessment of these aspects of
China's engagement in Latin America and as Assistant Secretary of State
what tools will you utilize to strengthen U.S. engagement and
competitiveness in the region?
Answer. The hemisphere faces longstanding challenges of economic
inequality, corruption, and weak democratic institutions, all of which
have been exacerbated by the pandemic and make the region more
vulnerable to aggressive and coercive practices, including by the
People's Republic of China (PRC).
If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to work with partners
and share resources and expertise to support COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and economic development that creates jobs essential
for regional pandemic recovery. With likeminded partners and allies, I
will continue efforts to offer higher-standard, transparently governed
infrastructure alternatives and push back on PRC economic pressure. I
will also continue to raise concerns and distinguish ourselves from PRC
infrastructure projects to advocate for the highest environmental,
social, and labor standards to ensure investments are beneficial,
sustainable in the long term, transparent and respect the rule of law.
If confirmed, I will support the continued engagement of constructive
actors who share our values, such as Taiwan.
I will also continue to work with the interagency and partners in
our region to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing,
which impacts local fisheries and national economies, including through
developing a coordinated regional response to increase regional
capacity to counter IUU fishing activities by PRC fleet and those of
other flag states.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific
timeline to complete its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Venezuela?
Answer. I understand the interagency is working diligently on the
Venezuela policy review, which remains ongoing. There is widespread
agreement on the need to restore democracy through free and fair
elections, and to adopt a multilateral approach toward a negotiated
solution to the crisis caused by the illegitimate Maduro regime. If
confirmed, I will continue our work to encourage free and fair
elections, urge the release of political prisoners, confront the
escalating humanitarian crisis, and bring relief to the Venezuelan
people, including the millions who have fled Venezuela.
Question. Do you commit to thoroughly and promptly brief the
committee on the outcome of this policy review as soon as it is
complete?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with
Congress as we seek to address the Venezuela crisis.
Question. In your view, how would you describe the nature of the
Maduro regime?
Answer. The United States does not recognize Maduro's dictatorial
regime as the Government of Venezuela. His repression, corruption, and
mismanagement have created one of the worst humanitarian crises this
hemisphere has seen. The Maduro regime enables criminal and terrorist
networks and openly cooperates with many malign actors, which poses a
serious threat to U.S. national security.
Question. What would you say are the pitfalls and potential
incentives that could persuade such a regime to peacefully give up
control of Venezuela?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a negotiated solution to the
Venezuelan crisis that leads to free and fair presidential and
parliamentary elections and a return of the rule of law and democracy
in Venezuela. The United States stands ready to support such a
negotiation, led by the Venezuelans themselves. I am committed to work
with our partners inside Venezuela and in the international community
to pressure Maduro to commit to a serious process. Recognizing the
difficulties of engaging with such a regime, a potential incentive
would be the lifting of economic sanctions and acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of a Government in Venezuela--which, as the administration
has noted previously, can and will only occur if democracy is restored.
A pitfall of engaging with the Maduro regime is that the regime
continues to buy time while dividing the opposition and the
international community, seeking only minimum concessions to obtain
some domestic and international legitimacy without addressing the main
issues that will lead to the restoration of democracy in Venezuela. I
commit to remaining clear-eyed about these risks, if confirmed. I will
seek to engage with Interim President Guaido and other Venezuelans who
wish to promote democracy and the international community to promote
positive change and mitigate the risks laid out above.
Question. To what extent is the Maduro regime providing safe haven
to transnational criminal organizations, including U.S.-designated
foreign terrorist organizations?
Answer. The illegitimate Maduro regime allows and tolerates the use
of its territory by terrorist organizations and non-state armed groups,
including the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident members of
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, among others. The regime's
practically nonexistent international drug control cooperation,
usurpation of the judicial system and military and security services
for its own illicit ends, public corruption, and cooperation with
criminal elements have provided ideal conditions for transnational
criminal organizations to thrive.
Question. To what extent do senior members of the Maduro regime
support and protect various transnational criminal groups operating
within the borders of Venezuela?
Answer. I understand that, at times, regime officials have openly
welcomed transnational criminal groups' presence in Venezuela. During
the closing remarks of the 2019 Sao Paolo Forum in Caracas, Maduro
stated that Iv n M rquez and Jesus Santrich (former Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) leaders who were at that time missing and
widely presumed to have left the peace process and returned to
terrorist activities) were both welcome in Venezuela. The regime
leverages drug trafficking, illegal and illicit gold mining, and a
variety of black-market financial transactions to enrich its leaders
and evade sanctions, necessarily working with transnational criminal
organizations. These operations could not take place without
acquiescence or approval at the highest levels.
Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships
between senior members of the Maduro regime and transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. I understand the regime is complicit with transnational
criminal organizations, including dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin National Liberation
Army (ELN), and Hezbollah sympathizers. Maduro and his associates use
criminal activities to help maintain their illegitimate hold on power.
Profit-seeking networks between FARC dissidents, ELN, and other
Venezuelan non-state armed groups facilitate the regime's public
corruption and graft schemes, to include those involving senior members
of the Maduro regime.
Question. In your view, what is the nature of the relationships
between Venezuelan security forces and transnational criminal
organizations?
Answer. Profit-seeking ties between dissident members of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian-origin
National Liberation Army (ELN), and Venezuelan paramilitary groups
facilitate the public corruption and graft schemes of the regime to
include other members of the armed forces. According to the Department
of Justice indictments of Maduro and 14 other regime officials unsealed
in March 2020, some senior Venezuelan political, intelligence, and
military officials have facilitated drug trafficking through the
country since at least 1999. Venezuelan security services have also
clashed with transnational criminal organizations, such as FARC
dissident groups and the ELN. While Venezuelan security services do
occasionally confront and even kill non-state armed group members, it
is difficult to know if that reflects national strategy or local
conflicts of interest on the part of regime commanders.
Question. Do actions by the Maduro regime related to transnational
criminal activities undermine U.S. counter-narcotics cooperation with
Colombia? Do actions related to transnational criminal activities
undertaken by the Maduro regime undermine the 2016 Colombian agreement
with the FARC?
Answer. The historically weak government presence at the border
between Colombia and Venezuela has allowed terrorist groups to operate,
particularly Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents,
the National Liberation Army (ELN), and other criminal networks
involved in trafficking and smuggling. A number of FARC dissidents
engage in terrorist and other criminal activities, particularly in
border regions and areas previously controlled by the FARC. Colombian
drug-trafficking organizations--including various dissident FARC
factions, the ELN, and other criminal groups--orchestrate the shipment
of illicit drugs through Venezuela.
Question. Is the National Electoral Council named on May 5, 2021, a
credible step to advance a negotiated and peaceful solution to
Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian crises?
Answer. The goal of the United States is a peaceful, stable, and
democratic Venezuela. While the National Electoral Council (CNE) that
was named was slightly less imbalanced than others in recent memory, it
is no substitute for a comprehensive process leading to free and fair
presidential and parliamentary elections and other guarantees, which
are long overdue.
The CNE in question was composed by an illegitimate body--a
national assembly Maduro installed based on fraudulent elections on
December 6, 2020. The real test is whether the CNE guarantees the right
of Venezuelans to freely choose their representatives, not merely its
composition.
Given Maduro's track record, if confirmed, I will work assiduously
with our international partners to continue to press for the
fundamental changes needed, including lifting bans on political
parties, the unconditional release of political prisoners, invitations
to credible international electoral observers, a public electoral
calendar, and the unhindered access and distribution of humanitarian
aid.
Question. Can the humanitarian crisis affecting Venezuela be
resolved under Maduro's watch?
Answer. Venezuelans are suffering from one of the worst economic
and humanitarian crises outside of a war in modern history. Since 2017,
more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have been forced to flee their
country.
The illegitimate Maduro regime mismanages the economy, plunders
public coffers, and impedes access to critical humanitarian assistance,
including lifesaving food and nutrition aid. If confirmed, I will work
to open more possibilities for humanitarian workers, organizations, and
assistance to reach the Venezuelan people in Venezuela and beyond.
Since 2017, the United States has provided more than $1.2 billion
in humanitarian, economic, development, and health assistance to help
Venezuelans, including more than $1 billion in humanitarian assistance,
both inside Venezuela and throughout the region.
Question. Has the Biden administration determined a specific
timeline for completion of its ongoing review of U.S. policy in Cuba?
Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully
reviewing U.S.-Cuba policy, to ensure it advances the goals the
administration is trying to achieve in empowering the Cuban people to
determine their future. I understand there is no set timeline for the
review, and the administration is eager to consider views from a
variety of stakeholders from various sectors and viewpoints. If
confirmed, I will support the Department's review with an eye toward
assessing its impact on the political and economic wellbeing of the
Cuban people as well as the promotion of democracy and human rights,
and I look forward to consulting with Congress regularly on this issue.
Question. Should Cuba be removed from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism (SST) while they continue to provide safe harbor to violent
U.S. fugitives?
Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. If
confirmed, I look forward to supporting the administration's review of
Cuba policy and consulting regularly with Congress. Our priority in
Cuba, as the rest of the Hemisphere, needs to be democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. Countries should not be grandfathered
because they have failed to respect those tenets.
Question. If confirmed, would you support Cuba's removal from the
SST list without verifiable assurances that it would cease to foster a
permissive environment for international terrorists?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully and thoroughly review all
material related to the decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor
of Terrorism, including the underlying rationale. I look forward to
supporting the administration's review of Cuba policy, if confirmed.
Question. The United States has extradition treaties with
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties cover crimes that
are often committed in relation to human trafficking activities feeding
the illegal migration crisis at our southern border. If confirmed, do
you commit to consider and report to the committee ways in which the
U.S. could better leverage existing bilateral extradition treaties with
the countries in Northern Central America to combat illegal migration
from the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to evaluate our extradition treaties
with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. These treaties can be
powerful tools for combatting crime, including human trafficking and
migrant smuggling. I will consider all available tools at the
Department's disposal to help address the root causes of irregular
migration in and from Central America, including corruption and
impunity, and I will continue to consult closely with Congress on these
issues.
Question. The United States has leveraged sanctions and diplomatic
efforts, but what other actions do you think are needed to
significantly ramp up pressure ahead of the November general elections
in Nicaragua?
Answer. I believe we need to continue to work through diplomatic
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for democratic
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
United States will continue working closely with our partners in the
OAS, EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan Government to implement free
and fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful
reforms by the May OAS deadline, if confirmed, I will work with our
partners to use the diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal, and
will continue to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU,
and the United Kingdom. The United States will keep using our voice,
vote, and influence so that international financial institution lending
does not support non-democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important
that the United States and our allies clearly state that we will give
credibility to and work with the winner of a free and fair election,
but it will be extremely difficult to work constructively with a
government emerging from a fraudulent election.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend reviewing Nicaragua's
continued participation in--and access to--the full benefits afforded
under the Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) should the
November elections fail to meet international standards?
Answer. CAFTA-DR has improved the lives of the people of Nicaragua
and the United States. In order to continue to build on that
partnership and expand our economic partnership, the U.S. should make
clear that Nicaraguans would benefit from good governance,
transparency, and the rule of law. Given the deterioration of those
democratic principles in Nicaragua, we are already ensuring that trade
capacity building and technical assistance, including joint efforts on
customs and border management, labor, environment, and agriculture, are
not directed toward the Nicaraguan Government. If the November
elections are not free and fair, the U.S. would continue to review the
Nicaraguan Government's participation in these trade-related
activities, with a view toward promoting good governance and
transparency in the region.
Question. According to the 2019 State Department Report on Human
Rights in Nicaragua, ``there were numerous reports that the Government
or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings'' in response to
the April 2018 pro-democracy protests, where the Government's violent
crackdown left at least 325 people dead; over 2,000 injured; hundreds
illegally detained; tortured, and disappeared; and more than 80,000
exiled in neighboring countries. An Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR) team concluded in July 2018 that the Nicaraguan security
forces' actions could be considered crimes against humanity. The Office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights also describes Nicaragua
as suffering from a ``climate of widespread terror.'' If confirmed,
what specific actions would you support to hold members of the Ortega-
Murillo regime accountable for serious human rights abuses and crimes
against humanity?
Answer. The administration is committed to promoting accountability
for Ortega and his collaborators who undermine democracy or violate
human rights, and will continue to call out abuses when they occur. The
United States was a co-sponsor, along with 51 countries, of the March
2021 U.N. Human Rights Council resolution which called for justice and
accountability in Nicaragua. If confirmed, I will intensify our efforts
to promote and protect freedoms of expression, association, and
peaceful assembly, and I will urge the Ortega regime to fully and
unconditionally release all arbitrarily detained persons. The United
States will continue to use the economic and diplomatic tools at our
disposal, including targeted sanctions and bilateral and multilateral
engagement, to support Nicaraguans' calls for human rights, democracy,
and justice.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work with my office to
clear the backlog of extraditions from Mexico to the United States?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. It is critical that the United States and Mexico
work together to dismantle transnational criminal organizations and
their operations, reduce impunity and corruption, and strengthen the
rule of law in Mexico. If confirmed, I commit to working with you and
other members of the U.S. Congress, my U.S. interagency colleagues, and
Mexican Government officials to ensure we are working closely together
to move extradition requests as quickly and effectively as possible.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. How can the State Department and interagency partners
encourage Northern Triangle governments to promote a culture of tax
compliance among their citizens and businesses? Will you commit to
ensure that the State Department works with these governments to
fulfill the legal and financial obligations necessary to foster an
attractive investment environment and stimulate economic growth,
including the timely refund of excess taxes paid by U.S. companies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with interagency partners to
provide technical assistance to host governments as they pursue more
efficient, transparent, fair governance, including support for e-
government solutions. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring the Department
works with governments to foster a more attractive business environment
as an important component of our efforts to address the root causes of
migration.
Question. How can we work with Central American governments to
improve the operating environment for business, including U.S.
companies? What steps will you take to promote the speedy and fair
resolution of commercial disputes, especially in Honduras?
Answer. I share your commitment to support U.S. investor and
property interests in Central America. The Department urges foreign
governments, including at the highest levels when appropriate, to
resolve outstanding commercial disputes. The Department generally takes
no position on the merits of any specific claim or dispute but
advocates for a fair, transparent, and expeditious resolution. The
Department will continue to assist in resolution of outstanding U.S.
citizen claims as appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. What is your view of the state of democracy in Latin
America?
Answer. Our hemisphere is overwhelmingly committed to democracy,
but there are troubling signs of backsliding in the region that require
sustained and serious attention. September 11 will mark the 20th
anniversary of the 2001 Inter-American Democratic Charter, which
reflects the commitment of OAS member states to promote and defend
democracy in the region. Through public diplomacy, increased engagement
by civil society, and coordination with like-minded partners, the
United States is promoting accountability for the actions of the Maduro
regime and Cuba that undermine democracy and human rights; using
diplomatic and economic measures and working multilaterally with
partners to urge Nicaragua to hold free and fair presidential and
legislative elections in November; and holding the government of Haiti
to its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential
elections in 2021 to put an end to Haiti's prolonged rule by decree and
facilitate a peaceful transfer of power to a newly elected president in
February 2022.
The weakening of democratic institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, is troubling. If confirmed, I will join the
administration's commitment to supporting the rule of law and democracy
in these countries, including through the use of Congressionally
mandated corrupt actors lists to designate and sanction those
responsible for the degrading of democracy in Central America. If
confirmed, I will intensify efforts to work with allies and partners to
further strengthen democratic institutions and support democracy
throughout the region.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to bolster our
democratic partners in the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work toward our strategic goal of a
more inclusive, secure, prosperous, and democratic hemisphere aligned
with U.S. values and interests. I will lead our team to support
independent civil society throughout the region, and will encourage
governments to support and promote press freedom and the safety of
journalists and to counter those who may seek to undermine democracy
and security. We will seek to work with allies, partners, and
multilateral institutions to promote a shared vision to respect human
rights and fight corruption and impunity, such as we do with our
support of the Citizen Corruption Observatory. This initiative stemmed
from the 2018 Summit of the Americas and builds the capacity of civil
society to monitor governments' implementation of anticorruption
efforts. In addition, we will work with USAID to enhance the region's
anti-corruption efforts by bolstering the capacity of stakeholders to
engage in advocacy, oversight, and monitoring.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to supporting ongoing U.S.
programs which promote democracy and human rights in Cuba, such as
through funding the office of Cuba Broadcasting?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to ensuring that support for
democracy and human rights is at the core of our efforts to empower the
Cuban people to determine their own future. I will also ensure the U.S.
continues its steadfast support and engagement with Cuban human rights
defenders, activists, and civil society members to bolster their
important work; promote human rights, fundamental freedoms, and
democracy; and facilitate the Cuban people's uncensored access to
information.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensure that the U.S. does
not lift restrictions or sanctions on Cuba until conditions are met
pursuant to U.S. law?
Answer. The administration has committed to carefully reviewing
U.S.-Cuba policy, including how it implements relevant legislation and
our posture regarding economic sanctions on Cuba, to ensure they
advance the goals the administration is trying to achieve in empowering
the Cuban people to determine their future. We will do so in adherence
to U.S. law. If confirmed, I will support the Department's review of
the policy with an eye toward assessing its impact on the political and
economic wellbeing of the Cuban people and the promotion of democracy.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting regularly with Congress on
this issue. Throughout my career, I have worked diligently to promote
respect for the rule of law, human rights and democracy. Democracy and
support for human rights will be at the core of our policy toward Cuba.
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to prioritize Venezuela,
and continue to work with regional allies, to hold the Maduro regime
and his cronies accountable?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly with international
partners and regional allies to promote accountability for the Maduro
regime by building multilateral pressure and implementing appropriate
and coordinated sanctions against regime officials and their enablers
who undermine democracy, abuse human rights, or engage in other corrupt
or criminal activity. A secure, democratic, and prosperous Venezuela
would mean a more secure, democratic, and prosperous region. In this
fundamental aspect, Venezuela is a top priority for the region.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to supporting the legitimate
government of Venezuela under President Juan Guaido and working to
unify the opposition to the Maduro regime?
Answer. If confirmed, my team and I will continue to support the
efforts of the interim government led by Juan Guaido to peacefully
restore democracy and rule of law in Venezuela via free and fair
presidential and parliamentary elections. We are encouraged by and will
continue to support unity on the fundamental goal of free and fair
elections, and the pursuit of the guarantees required to restore
democracy and rule of law to the country.
Question. If confirmed, what would you propose the United States do
to support a free and fair elections?
Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to work through diplomatic
efforts, coordinated multilateral pressure, support for pro-democracy
actors, and targeted economic measures, as appropriate, to advocate for
free and fair presidential and legislative elections in Nicaragua. The
United States will continue to work closely with partners in the OAS,
EU, and others to urge the Nicaraguan government to implement free and
fair elections. If the Ortega regime fails to take meaningful reforms
by the May OAS deadline, we will work with our partners to use the
diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal. We will continue efforts
to coordinate on targeted measures with Canada, the EU, and the United
Kingdom. We will continue to use our voice, vote, and influence so that
international financial institution lending does not support non-
democratic actors in Nicaragua. It is important that the United States
and our allies clearly state that we will give credibility to and work
with the winner of a free and fair election, but it will be extremely
difficult to work constructively with a government emerging from a
fraudulent election.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to prioritizing efforts to
counter vaccine diplomacy by China in the region?
Answer. COVID-19 is the most pressing challenge to our collective
health, well-being, and economic security in a century. If confirmed, I
will continue the U.S. commitment to collaborate with partners across
the globe, including Taiwan, to end the pandemic and mitigate its
severe public health and economic impacts. The Biden administration has
already loaned AstraZeneca vaccines to Mexico and Canada. If confirmed,
I will work to support a science-based approach that prioritizes an
equitable distribution of vaccines to countries in our region.
President Biden announced the United States will donate at least 80
million vaccine doses to meet global needs by the end of June, far more
than any other nation has donated, including the People's Republic of
China or Russia. Importantly, our shots do not come with strings
attached; the United States views vaccines as a tool to end the
pandemic, not a means to achieve political outcomes.
The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi for the COVAX
Facility, having contributed $2 billion with plans to donate an
additional $2 billion by 2022. I understand all countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean have received one or more COVAX shipments,
except for Cuba and Haiti who do not participate in COVAX. If
confirmed, I will continue to ensure our close coordination with COVAX
and other partners to ensure safe and effective vaccines are delivered
in a way that is equitable and follows the science and public health
data.
Question. What are your views on the need to prioritize the region
for distribution of excess and surplus vaccines?
Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region. If
confirmed, I will work within the administration to coordinate with our
partners in the region to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, including
through the distribution of vaccines. The United States has loaned
Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of AstraZeneca
vaccines, respectively, and the administration is currently considering
the best manner in which to implement President Biden's further
commitment to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If
confirmed, I will work to prioritize the region and advocate that it
has the tools necessary, including via both bilateral and multilateral
mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic and prepare
for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.
Question. How might the United States support Ecuador's efforts to
diversify its economy and decouple from China?
Answer. The United States remains Ecuador's largest trading
partner, with $10.2 billion in total two-way trade in goods in 2020. In
December of 2020, the United States and Ecuador finalized the
negotiation of a Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency, an agreement
that is a positive step forward in our trade relationship.
The United States is committed to increasing investment in Ecuador
through projects that support long-term sustainable growth and
prosperity. This includes enabling private sector investment in climate
mitigation, adaptation, and resilience, as well as investments in clean
energy. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC)
will also look to support investments in gender equality, financial
inclusion, and recovery from COVID-19. The United States has provided
funding and training to help the energy ministry and electric utility
adopt new regulations to attract private investment in the electricity
sector, as well as design and conduct Ecuador's first-ever competitive
and transparent tenders for power sector projects, resulting in awards
to qualified companies. The United States also is helping women with
small businesses, through programs such as the Academy for Women
Entrepreneurs and providing lines of credit to Ecuadoran banks to
secure loans for small and medium enterprises. USAID in Ecuador is also
working to pursue the most impactful projects investing in the most
underserved communities. If confirmed, I will work with Ecuador to
expand our partnership.
Question. What steps can the administration take to support other
countries that would like to develop 5G networks without Huawei or
other Chinese tech support?
Answer. The Biden administration is working throughout the region
to communicate the risks associated with telecommunications equipment
from untrusted, high-risk vendors and to support the growing number of
governments and businesses concerned with safely capturing the benefits
of 5G without jeopardizing national and economic security or personal
privacy.
If confirmed, I would connect countries interested in developing
secure 5G networks with trusted equipment and service providers,
highlight available U.S. government financing tools, and underscore the
potential for emerging technologies like open radio access networks
(open RAN) to increase diversity, innovation, and transparency in 5G
supply chains.
Question. As Colombia is facing many challenges, including the
influx of almost 2 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants, in
addition to violence presented in the country. What U.S. assistance to
Colombia do you think would be most effective to ensure Colombia can
face these challenges while also respecting the civil rights of
protesters?
Answer. Colombia is a vital strategic partner that shares our
democratic values. I recognize the devastating impacts the COVID-19
pandemic has had on the Colombian people and economy, as well as the
fiscal challenges associated with its generous reception of Venezuelan
refugees and migrants. If confirmed, I will ensure the United States
continues to leverage diplomatic engagement and foreign assistance to
help Colombia address urgent needs, including strengthening its health
system, promoting inclusive economic growth to recover from the
pandemic, facilitating an effective humanitarian response to the
Venezuela crisis, and expanding security, state presence, and access to
justice throughout the country, including continuing human rights
training for security personnel.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to encourage the
government of Haiti conducts upcoming presidential elections in a
manner that is free and fair?
Answer. I believe the Haitian people deserve the opportunity to
elect their leaders and restore Haiti's democratic institutions. If
confirmed, I will prioritize efforts to hold the government of Haiti to
its commitment to hold free and fair legislative and presidential
elections in 2021, and to work with Haitian political, economic, and
civil society stakeholders across the spectrum, as well as
international partners, in support of elections this year.
I recognize that the legitimacy of Haiti's 2021 elections and the
government's credibility with the Haitian population will depend on
factors such as whether there is consensus on a political accord, the
participation of credible political actors, widespread voter
registration, and security and voter turnout on election day. The U.S.
government is providing more than $3 million to the Consortium for
Elections and Political Processes Strengthening, which includes the
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and
International Foundation for Electoral Systems. The Consortium's pre-
elections activities include focusing on improving electoral
administration, strengthening the competitiveness of political parties,
educating voters on electoral processes, promoting transparent
electoral processes, and ensuring inclusive voter participation in
Haiti. The United States also provides advice, training, and equipment
to build the Haitian National Police's capacity to provide security.
U.S.-supported training and equipment for the police's public order
unit will help them prevent and respond to potential violence at voting
centers.
Observers from organizations such as the Organization of American
States (OAS) provide a regional voice and can help ensure free and fair
elections. If confirmed, I will seek support from multilateral
organizations, such as the OAS, and would welcome other international
observers.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What are the Biden administration's plans to address
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering
the growing number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the
border?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to rebuilding
a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while ensuring public
safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the weeks ahead, working with
the world's democracies, if confirmed I will help coordinate a
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.
Question. Do you believe that the Biden administration should
prioritize providing COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and
South America given the proximity to the United States and the growing
number of illegal migrants who are currently crossing the border?
Answer. Vaccine distribution is a priority in the region, and if
confirmed, I will work with the interagency, COVAX, and other partners
to prioritize the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines in a way that
follows the science and public health data. The administration has
loaned Canada and Mexico 1.5 million and 2.7 million doses of
AstraZeneca vaccines, respectively, and is currently considering the
best manner in which to implement President Biden's further commitment
to donate at least 80 million surplus vaccines. If confirmed, I will
work to prioritize the region and advocate that it has the tools
necessary, especially vaccines, including via both bilateral and
multilateral mechanisms, to bring a quick end to the current pandemic
and prepare for, detect, and respond to the next pandemic.
Question. What is the United States currently doing to counter
China's growing influence in Central and South America and what can the
United States do more?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) represents a serious
challenge to U.S. interests in the region, with its growing security
ties and infrastructure investments. If confirmed, I will lead our team
to meet this challenge by advancing our positive agenda for the
hemisphere. We will build on our shared values of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. We will welcome our allies and partners'
expertise and resources to support the region's COVID-19 response,
entrepreneurship, and sustainable infrastructure. We will support high-
standard investment in infrastructure and transparent economic
development that creates jobs essential for regional pandemic recovery.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with our allies and partners
in Central and South America to help the region address the pandemic
and recover from the related economic crisis. We will work to ensure
competitive and transparent investment environments that help level the
playing field for U.S. and other trusted businesses, strengthen our
security and law enforcement cooperation, and promote secure
telecommunications networks. We will draw attention to and counter
illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. We will support and
expand Taiwan's bilateral relationships in Central and South America.
Question. Do you believe that Taiwan's ability to maintain formal
diplomatic relations with countries in the Western hemisphere benefits
U.S. strategic interests? Nine out of fifteen countries with formal
diplomatic relations are in the Western hemisphere. As part of China's
push to de-legitimize Taiwan, Beijing has used various tactics,
including COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy, infrastructure assistance, elite
capture, corrupt practices, to compel countries in the Western
hemisphere to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
Answer. As a strong democracy, Taiwan is an essential partner in a
region overwhelmingly committed to democratic values, human rights, and
the rule of law. If confirmed, I will continue U.S. efforts to support
Taiwan's diplomatic and unofficial relationships across the Western
Hemisphere region. Together with like-minded countries we can support
good governance, transparent investments, and economic growth.
Question. What is the Biden's administration's plans to address the
increasing COVID-19 concerns in Central and South America considering
the high number of migrants that are crossing the border each day?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration remains committed to
rebuilding a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system while
ensuring public safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with the world's democracies to coordinate a
multilateral effort to end the pandemic. The United States will
continue to review non-essential travel restrictions at land borders to
help protect against cross-border transmission of COVID-19 and will
consider easing restrictions when it is safe to do so. The
administration is considering the best manner in which to implement
President Biden's further commitment to donate at least 80 million
surplus vaccines. The United States is also the largest donor to Gavi
for the U.N. COVAX Facility, having already contributed $2 billion with
plans to donate an additional $2 billion by 2022.
Question. Do you agree that the Biden administration should
prioritize COVID-19 vaccines to countries in Central and South America
considering the proximity to the United States and the high number of
migrants that are crossing the border?
Answer. I agree that the United States should continue to do more
to help the world by taking a leading role in ending the pandemic
globally and building a coordinated, multilateral effort around the
world aimed at ending the pandemic. Our overarching aim is to get as
many safe and effective vaccines to as many people as fast as possible.
If confirmed, I will work with COVAX and other partners to prioritize
the equitable delivery of COVID-19 vaccines that follows the science
and public health data.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Brian A. Nichols by Senator Brian Schatz
Question. The Caribbean region has abundant solar and wind
resources, yet its electricity is overwhelmingly generated by fossil
fuels. In 2012, Aruba set a target of 100 percent renewable energy by
2020. In 2019, 81 percent of its electricity still came from fossil
fuels. Likewise, in 2011, Grenada established a goal of 100 percent
renewable energy by 2030. With diesel currently providing 98.5 percent
of the island's electricity, it is not on track to meet its goal.
Question. The United States works with Caribbean partners to
promote energy supply diversification, to develop cost-effective and
resilient power systems, and to help create investment opportunities
for U.S. and Caribbean firms.
The Department has identified diversification of energy supplies
away from a single source of fuel and promotion of U.S. exports,
particularly renewable energy, as two primary objectives in promoting
Caribbean energy security.
If confirmed, I will redouble our commitment to these efforts. The
Caribbean's high dependency on imported diesel for power generation and
low reliability of electric service and frequent power outages have led
to the highest average electricity prices in the Western Hemisphere.
Question. What are the barriers to renewable energy development in
the Caribbean, and how will you work to address these barriers and
expedite renewable energy development as Assistant Secretary of State
of Western Hemisphere Affairs?
Answer. Barriers to renewable energy development in the Caribbean
include limited economies of scale, inadequate policy and regulatory
frameworks, and antiquated transmission and distribution
infrastructure. Integrating clean power generation also requires
significant investments in transmission infrastructure and technologies
such as battery storage to accommodate variable generation.
Caribbean nations have nevertheless made progress in energy
diversification and U.S. cooperation has worked to advance stronger,
more resilient, and more efficient power systems.
Question. Would it make sense to help an initial island or two
decarbonize as models for the region?
Answer. Several Caribbean islands, including Jamaica and Nevis,
have engaged with the United States to develop renewable energy
sources. These are indeed model projects.
Our whole of government effort promotes energy diversification and
resilient energy systems through improved governance, increased access
to financing, and donor coordination. If confirmed, I will work with
interagency partners, multilateral organizations, and Caribbean nations
to advance those efforts.
We address the barrier of high-cost financing for energy project
development through a $25 million guarantee agreement with National
Commercial Bank of Jamaica to help provide loans for clean energy
projects across the Caribbean and a $10 million credit guaranty to
catalyze $20 million in loans for clean energy borrowers, focused on
off-grid solar projects.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. President Biden's recent Presidential Memorandum on
Advancing the Human rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
Queer and Intersex Persons Around the World calls on the State
Department to build coalitions of like-minded nations in international
organizations to fight against LGBTQI+ discrimination. What more could
the International Organization Bureau do to advance that mandate?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to utilizing the diversity and
talent within the IO Bureau to play a leadership role in promoting the
human rights and social inclusion of LGBTQI+ persons abroad. IO leads
an Interagency Working Group on leveraging multilateral tools to
address LGBTQI+ issues and, if confirmed, I will ensure this group
works to advance these issues across various multilateral fora, to
include the United Nations, regional organizations, international
development banks, and multi-stakeholder coalitions, such as the Equal
Rights Coalition as well as the U.N. LGBTI Core Group. If confirmed, I
will also work to strengthen existing multilateral mandates like the
U.N. Independent Expert on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and
advance efforts to increase Global South support for the human rights
of LGBTQI+ persons. If confirmed, I will also work to increase civil
society engagement in the IO Bureau's efforts to advance the human
rights of LGBTQI+ individuals.
Question. Debates at the U.N., and the programmatic activities of
U.N. agencies, often revolve around government repression that leads to
refugee flows, terrorism, and civil conflict.? Some of the populations
most directly impacted by that repression are minority populations--
whether sexual, ethnic, gender or racial in character. How can the U.N.
be more active and impactful in heading off the causes of this
repression, and in condemning it when it occurs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage U.N. leadership to enhance
its advocacy as well as U.N. monitoring and implementation efforts to
address such repression. I will work closely with our U.N. partners to
condemn violations of international law and continue the United States'
strong support for the promotion and protection of human rights,
including through access to justice, and humanitarian response and
durable solutions for displaced persons. I will maintain strong U.S.
engagement with and support for key U.N. mechanisms and bodies such as
the Human Rights Council. I will encourage U.N. partners to take
concrete measures to protect minority rights and deepen partnerships
with stakeholders to address the root causes of repression.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The upcoming U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Syria Cross
Border mandate renewal is of grave concern to me and my colleagues in
Congress. Not only should this administration work to renew the one
remaining crossing, Bab Al-Hawa, but it should actively work to build
consensus in the Security Council to re-open two previously closed
crossings, Bab Al-Salam and Yarubiyah.
If confirmed, how would you engage with partners in the UNSC to
ensure this mandate renewal passes?
Answer. Unhindered access to humanitarian assistance in Syria is an
urgent priority for the United States, as it should be for all nations.
If confirmed, I will ensure that the Department continues its sustained
high-level engagement with Security Council members and regional
stakeholders, as well as with U.N. leadership, to include Secretary-
General Antonio Guterres, to underscore the importance of the
reauthorization and expansion of the U.N. cross-border humanitarian
assistance mechanism.
Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that Secretary Blinken
and even President Biden engage at the highest possible levels on this
important issue?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will recommend that senior Department
and White House officials continue to engage with key stakeholders on
this issue, as that engagement is already underway. President Biden
encouraged Security Council action on Syria when he hosted Permanent
Representatives from the U.N. Security Council in March during the U.S.
presidency of the Security Council. Also in March, Secretary Blinken
represented the United States in the Syria humanitarian briefing to the
Security Council and made clear the importance of this issue to help
relieve the humanitarian crisis in Syria.
Question. How will you, if confirmed, work to ensure that U.S.
taxpayer dollars that fund U.N. humanitarian assistance are not being
used to effectively subsidize the Assad regime, which blockades
assistance to innocent Syrians through seizure of cross-line assistance
attempts?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with Department of
State and USAID colleagues, U.N. stakeholders, and NGOs to ensure that
aid intended for Syrians in need reaches its intended recipients and
does not benefit the Assad regime. The United States remains the single
largest humanitarian donor to the Syrian people. The United States
further supports all methods of delivering humanitarian assistance to
the Syrian people throughout the country, including both cross-border
and cross-line deliveries; however, cross-line deliveries from Damascus
alone, even if executed properly and unhindered, do not have the
capacity to fully address the needs of the Syrian people.
Question. The recent establishment of the office of ``Multilateral
Personnel and Strategy'' within the bureau of International
Organizations structure presents new avenues to address the growing
malign influence across the U.N. system.
How will you empower this office to address the systematic Chinese
and/or Russia malign influence within the U.N.?
Answer. I believe the establishment of the new office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more
strategically engage across the multilateral system to counter
authoritarian countries' efforts to undermine its institutions, values,
and principles. The U.S. approach toward China and Russia at the U.N.
will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S. policy agenda
centered on human rights, individual freedoms, transparency, and good
governance. When China and Russia seek to undermine the international
rules-based order, the United States will take decisive action to
oppose those efforts. If confirmed, I will work to empower the new
office and look forward to working with Congress to ensure it is well-
equipped to lead this work.
Question. What is your strategy for increasing American
representation in the U.N. system including through the Junior
Professional Officer program, appointments, and elections?
Answer. Successfully increasing the number of U.S. citizens
employed at all levels of the U.N. system requires a multifaceted
approach that will involve identifying and recruiting qualified
candidates, providing information on the application or election
process, and advocating for their selection where appropriate. If
confirmed, I will institutionalize efforts to establish and expand
these capabilities on behalf of qualified U.S. candidates, and to
consult closely with Congress to ensure that these efforts are
sufficiently resourced. I will also work with the interagency and our
allies and partners to support the election of qualified, independent
U.S. citizens and other likeminded candidates for key leadership roles
in the U.N. system.
Question. Do you believe that a designated U.N. Integrity
Coordinator should be appointment and empowered to work across the
Department to lead this effort?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize ensuring that the IO Bureau
has the resources and staffing it needs to coordinate across the
Department and with our partners and allies to advance an affirmative
agenda and counter efforts by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and
other countries to undermine the values at the foundation of the U.N.
and multilateral system. That includes working with all relevant
players, and in consultation with Congress. Addressing the challenges
posed by these countries requires strong U.S. leadership to defend the
foundational principles, values, and rules of the international system,
and to support qualified and independent candidates for key leadership
roles. I understand that IO appreciates the support that Congress has
provided to date on strengthening these efforts, and has already begun
to adapt its structure to prioritize this work.
Question. Please detail your strategy for engaging with the
International Criminal Court, including with relevant bureaus like
Global Criminal Justice, regarding their ongoing investigations into
U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Israel.
Answer. I strongly agree with the administration's objection to
attempts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) to assert
jurisdiction over U.S. and Israeli personnel. President Biden and
Secretary Blinken have been clear that the United States will continue
to oppose attempts by the ICC to assert such jurisdiction. The United
States and Israel are not States Parties to the Rome Statute, and the
Palestinians do not qualify as a State.
Question. U.S. Taxpayers have sent billions to U.N. Relief and
Works Agency since the 1950s when it was originally established. Given
the administrations resumption of funds without securing much needed
reform, please detail your engagement plans to ensure no more taxpayer
dollars are sent to a bloated organization straying from its mandate.
Answer. If confirmed, I will insist that UNRWA adhere to the U.N.
principles of neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination, and
protection of human rights, as well as insist on strict UNRWA internal
controls. The best way for the United States to influence UNRWA's
operations and ensure its provision of quality education, health
services, and emergency humanitarian relief consistent with U.N.
principles is to maintain our close working relationship with and
assistance to UNRWA. This allows the United States to direct funding to
priority areas of focus, especially ensuring neutrality in teaching
materials, staff activities, and operations, while strengthening
transparency, accountability, and internal oversight. If confirmed, I
commit to working with you to ensure the Agency has the capacity to
fulfill its service delivery mandate from the U.N. General Assembly in
line with U.N. principles, and to achieving meaningful and sustainable
reforms to UNRWA's operations.
Question. Preparations for the next scales of assessment
negotiation are underway. The Biden administration should make this a
top priority by negotiating a 25% cap on peacekeeping assessments
without compromising the existing fixed rate of 22% for the regular
budget. No one nation should pay over 25% for either budget. What
strategies will you use, if confirmed, to negotiate our assessed
peacekeeping dues to 25%?
Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N.
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand the
administration is strategizing for engagement on this issue. If
confirmed, I will work with Ambassador Thomas-Greenfield and her team
to advance U.S. interests in reaching agreement in the U.N. General
Assembly to lower the U.S. assessment rates and to make sure other
countries pay their fair share.
Question. Do you believe this administration should pay back
arrears accrued before 2017?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress to determine how best to meet our financial obligations,
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping funding.
Question. U.S.-assessed and voluntary contributions to the U.N., as
appropriated under the Contributions to International Organizations
(CIO), Contributions for International Peacekeeping Operations (CIPA),
and International Organizations and Program (IO&P) accounts, represent
only a small fraction of total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system.
If confirmed, will you assist in compiling and sharing with
Congress a comprehensive report on total U.S. contributions,
from all sources, to the U.N. and its specialized agencies and
programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will lead the efforts of the State
Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs to meet its
statutory responsibility to publish annual reports to Congress on all
U.S. Government contributions to international organizations.
Question. Will you ensure that other donors remain apprised of the
full depth and breadth of U.S. contributions from all sources?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the annual reports on
contributions created by the Bureau of International Organization
Affairs are published on the Department of State's public website,
thereby ensuring that they are available to other donors and the public
generally.
Question. Whereas assessed contributions are determined on a scale
and provide no discretion to nations, voluntary contributions are
provided to advance specific U.S. goals and objectives. Moreover,
voluntarily funded agencies, including the World Food Programme (WFP)
and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), must compete for resources and
are subject to rigorous transparency and accountability measures. If
confirmed, will you seek to ensure that the Secretary General adopts a
rigorous performance matrix, transparency requirements, and
accountability measures that apply across the U.N. system, including to
agencies and programs funded through assessed contributions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to achieve a coordinated,
government-wide effort to assess the performance of, and promote
transparency and accountability at, international organizations in the
U.N. system, including those funded through assessed contributions.
Question. Last Congress, I introduced the Multilateral Aid Review
Act to assess the value of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral
entities, including the U.N. and its affiliated agencies. If confirmed,
would you support a comprehensive review of U.S. investments in
multilateral organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing this issue
closely and working with Congress to ensure effective oversight of the
U.N. and its affiliated agencies. I am committed to ensuring prudent
management of U.S. taxpayer investments in multilateral entities,
including a constant focus on results, accountability, and the
elimination of waste, fraud, and mismanagement.
Question. What is your view of the relationship between the United
States and the United Nations (U.N.)?
Answer. I agree with the view of President Biden and Secretary
Blinken that many of the biggest threats we face are transnational in
nature and must be addressed collectively, including through
international organizations. Since the U.N.'s founding 75 years ago,
the United States has been critical to the U.N.'s success, and the
United Nations, in turn, has been central to U.S. efforts to secure
international peace and security. If confirmed, I will look forward to
working with Congress to ensure the U.S. relationship with the United
Nations remains constructive, continues to serve America's national
security interests, and promotes our core U.S. values.
Question. What are your thoughts regarding the U.N. Human Rights
Council (HRC)?
Answer. The U.N. Human Rights Council plays an important role in
promoting and protecting human rights, humanitarian access, and
fundamental freedoms globally, but has serious flaws as well. I am
committed to seeking HRC reforms, particularly regarding the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel, and to its membership. When the
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we
can better advocate to protect Israel from unfair bias on the Council.
Recently, our engagement has helped lead to a reduction in the number
of resolutions targeting Israel. Our engagement also helps us in our
efforts to keep some of the countries with the worst human rights
records off the Council, and to encourage countries with better records
to run.
If confirmed, I will ensure the United States continues to
prioritize needed reforms as part of our re-engagement with the
Council.
Question. Now that the Biden administration has stated its intent
to run for re-election to the HRC, what reforms will the Biden
administration seek?
Answer. The United States is committed to seeking reforms of the
U.N. Human Rights Council, particularly with respect to the Council's
disproportionate focus on Israel and its problematic membership. When
we have had a seat at the table, we have been able to advocate on
Israel's behalf, and we have seen changes like a reduction in the
number of resolutions targeting Israel. We have also seen that when the
United States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we
have been able to engage with our allies and partners to keep off some
of the countries with the worst human rights records and to encourage
countries with better records to run for seats. If confirmed, I will
ensure the United States prioritizes these specific reforms.
Question. Does the Biden administration believe the HRC devotes a
disproportionate amount of attention to criticizing Israel while
ignoring more pressing human rights crises?
Answer. Yes. The United States remains concerned about the
disproportionate focus by the U.N. Human Rights Council on Israel,
including Agenda Item 7. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to
unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations,
including at the Human Rights Council. It is critical that the U.S.
show up and engage with the Council directly. U.S. engagement at the
Council can be a force for positive change and for holding countries
with the worst human rights records to account.
Question. Understanding that the HRC has been ``broken,'' in large
part, by allowing human rights abusers to obtain seats on the Council,
do you believe that conditioning U.S. participation on reform is
beneficial?
Answer. I am committed to seeking reforms of the Human Rights
Council, particularly with respect to the Council's membership and its
disproportionate focus on Israel. We have seen that when the United
States plays an active and constructive role on the Council, we can
engage with our allies and partners to keep some of the countries with
the worst human rights records off the Council and to encourage
countries with better records to run for seats. We can also advocate on
Israel's behalf. With U.S. engagement, we have seen changes such as a
reduction in the number of resolutions targeting Israel. If confirmed,
I will ensure the United States continues to prioritize needed reforms
as part of our re-engagement with the Human Rights Council.
Question. There have been efforts to have the United States rejoin
the World Tourism Organization. If confirmed, would you support the re-
entry of the United States to the World Tourism Organization? What
benefits would the United States receive by re-joining this
organization?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure careful consideration and
review before any efforts are made to rejoin the World Tourism
Organization.
Question. What are your views on the need for management reform at
the U.N.?
Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to look hard at U.N. and
international organization management and budgeting practices, and at
how agencies implement their ethics rules, including whistleblower
protections.
Question. How will you work to address barriers to advancing U.N.
management reforms, especially those created by the different
priorities among member states?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to harness allies and likeminded
member states who strongly support U.N. management reform to overcome
any barriers that stand in the way of advancing reforms. It must be in
the interests of all members to make implementation of reforms an
urgent priority to make the United Nations the effective, efficient,
and responsive organization it needs to be in the 21st century.
Question. How will you measure success in implementing management
reforms at the U.N.?
Answer. If confirmed, my metric of success will be to ensure that
U.S. taxpayer dollars are well-spent, and that our multilateral
policies and programs improve the lives of the world's most vulnerable
citizens, contribute to international peace and security, and serve the
American people.
Question. What policies does the U.N. need to implement to maintain
fiscal responsibility and accountability within the U.N. system?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that international
organizations within the U.N. system are accountable and responsible
for the U.S. taxpayer resources they receive. This includes continuing
the longstanding U.S. policy of promoting budget discipline, as well as
continuing efforts to ensure that other countries pay their fair share.
Question. While the U.N. has taken steps to improve its efficiency,
operational effectiveness, and accountability, the continuing need for
reform is obvious to most observers, including strong supporters of the
institution. The U.N. Secretary-General has committed to an agenda of
reform. The push for reform by the United States is one of the main
drivers behind the reform movement's progress to date.
In your opinion, what are the top three reforms that the U.N. could
undertake over the next two years that will have the greatest
impact?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure international
organizations in the U.N. system adhere to the best management and
oversight practices, including in the areas of protecting
whistleblowers, addressing sexual exploitation and abuse, promoting
zero tolerance for corruption, and ensuring financial and managerial
transparency. This means greater transparency not only in budgeting
practices, but also in U.N. procurement practices.
The United States expects to see tangible results from management
reforms, including improved program delivery and greater
accountability. Delegating more authority to U.N. teams in the field,
closer to the point of mandate implementation, is also a key and
necessary reform.
Question. The United States is the largest donor to the World Food
Programme, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and other U.N.
agencies. Will you continue this pattern of voluntary donations to
address some of the world's most pressing issues?
Answer. I am fully committed to upholding the Biden-Harris
administration's promise to restore U.S. leadership and support for
U.N. agencies, and to advance U.S. priorities in multilateral fora and
at the United Nations. Voluntary contributions are an effective tool of
U.S. leadership that allow us to ensure organizations are accountable,
transparent, and responsive to humanitarian needs. The United States
has long been the largest global contributor of humanitarian assistance
and has increased its contributions due to the devastating impacts of
COVID-19. Of course, we owe it to U.S. taxpayers and to the
beneficiaries whose lives depend on U.N. programs to insist on
continued reforms aimed at greater U.N. effectiveness and efficiency.
Question. How do you plan to monitor the activities of the U.N.
Population Fund (UNFPA) and ensure that it is not complicit in China's
campaign of coercive abortion and sterilization of Uyghur women?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our government's due
diligence through our membership on the U.N. Population Fund's (UNFPA)
Executive Board, including through the Board's country program document
review mechanism. UNFPA does not condone China's coercive population
policies nor does it operate in Xinjiang.
Question. There have been credible allegations that the U.N. Office
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights shared the names of Chinese
dissidents who were attending U.N. Human Rights Council sessions with
the Chinese Government.
If confirmed, how will you investigate these allegations?
Answer. President Biden has said he would defend the rights of
activists, political dissidents, and journalists around the world to
speak their minds freely without fear of persecution and violence. If
confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for a detailed
understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S. Government
personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Question. What reforms will you seek to ensure that this practice
is never again used?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ask relevant Department officials for
a detailed understanding of this issue and will ensure that U.S.
Government personnel prioritize this matter in engagements with the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.
Question. The United States is the single largest financial
contributor to U.N. peacekeeping activities. Congress authorizes and
appropriates U.S. contributions, and it has an ongoing interest in
ensuring such funding is used as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
Do you believe that any nation, including the United States, should
pay more than 25 percent of the U.N. peacekeeping budget?
Answer. The next negotiations among member states on U.N.
assessment rates will take place later in 2021, and I understand that
the administration is currently strategizing on how to engage on this
issue. If confirmed, my team and I will do everything we can to make
sure that other countries pay their fair share. If confirmed, I commit
to consulting with you and your staff on this important matter.
Question. What is your position on U.S. repayment of U.N.
peacekeeping arrears? As memorialized in the 1999 Helms-Biden
agreement, the Late Ambassador Holbrooke, then-President Clinton, then-
Secretary General Kofi Anan, and then-Senator Biden all believed that
the United States has no obligation to pay, and thus should not pay,
the roughly $500 million in ``contested arrears'' that were explicitly
excluded from the $1.6 billion Helms-Biden agreement. However, since
then, the U.N. has insisted upon keeping on its books, and the Obama
administration sought to pay over Congressional objections. Do you
commit not to pay these ``contested arrears'' per Congressional intent
as outlined in the Helms-Biden agreement?
Answer. If confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to work with
Congress to allow the United States to meet our financial obligations,
including addressing the substantial level of arrears that have
accumulated over the past four years and the 25-percent cap on
peacekeeping funding.
Question. Are there any specific steps you believe the U.N. should
take to reduce the overall size of the U.N. peacekeeping budget? If so,
what are they?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to reviewing and assessing all
existing peacekeeping missions to ensure they are still necessary for
the promotion of international peace and security. I will also work to
ensure they are as effective and efficient as possible, while providing
they have the necessary resources to fully implement their mandates,
including well-trained and well-equipped troops and police. I would
press for structural changes, including aligning U.N. procurement with
industry best practices, right-sizing mission support components, and
reforming human resources to reduce staff costs. I would also press for
the U.N. to implement financial reimbursement penalties for troop- and
police-contributing countries for poor or under-performance, in line
with the U.N. Security Council resolution 2436.
Question. Are there any specific U.N. peacekeeping missions you
would support reducing or terminating in order to reduce U.N.
peacekeeping costs? If so, what active and ongoing missions do you
believe should be reduced or terminated?
Answer. U.N. peacekeeping operations are among the most effective
mechanisms of burden-sharing in addressing the global challenges to
international peace and security. We must ensure peacekeeping
operations are using their resources as effectively and efficiently as
possible to promote sustainable political solutions to conflict. Toward
that end, I will, if confirmed, closely scrutinize missions, especially
when their mandates come up for renewal by the U.N. Security Council.
Question. There have been numerous proposals to expand U.N. support
for regional peacekeeping operations-particularly those deployed under
the auspices of the African Union-ranging from providing limited
logistical support to fully financing training, equipment, deployment,
and sustainment costs through the use of assessed U.N. peacekeeping
contributions. Whether regional missions would initially be subject to
approval by the U.N. Security Council (like the AMISOM mission in
Somalia was) is a topic of debate. However, using the U.N. as a
financing mechanism for peacekeeping operations that do not fall under
the command and control of the U.N.; lack adequate accountability
measures; and place long-term political and financial obligations upon
Member states absent Security Council oversight is a matter of serious
concern. If confirmed, will you pledge to ensure that any peacekeeping
mission funded by U.N. peacekeeping dollars is mandated and overseen by
the Security Council?
Answer. The United States has long supported strengthening
strategic AU-U.N. partnerships to better address collective peace and
security threats on the continent. If confirmed, I will strive to
ensure that any AU peace operation that receives U.N. financial support
is mandated by and preserves the primacy of the U.N. Security Council
and complies with applicable international human rights law and U.N.
conduct and discipline standards.
Question. The United Nations maintains several particular bodies
and departments that focus on the Palestinians. These include the
Division on Palestinian Rights (DPR), the Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (CEIRPP), and the
United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine
(UNISPAL).
Will you work to challenge the existence and funding of these
departments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will oppose efforts to unfairly single out
or delegitimize Israel through one-sided resolutions, reports, and
other actions across the United Nations.
Question. The United States lacks a veto over membership decisions
in U.N.-specialized agencies that the Palestinians could target for
membership. When the Palestinians obtain membership, the United States
must cut funding to that organization as required under two laws
enacted by a Democratic-led Congress in the early 1990's. U.S. Code
Title 22, Section 287e note, states:
No funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act or any other
Act shall be available for the United Nations or any
specialized agency thereof which accords the Palestine
Liberation Organization the same standing as member states.''
(Adopted as Public Law 101-246 in 1990.)
The United States shall not make any voluntary or assessed
contribution: (1) to any affiliated organization of the United
Nations which grants full membership as a state to any
organization or group that does not have the internationally
recognized attributes of statehood, or (2) to the United
Nations, if the United Nations grants full membership as a
state in the United Nations to any organization or group that
does not have the internationally recognized attributes of
statehood, during any period in which such membership is
effective.'' (Adopted as Public Law 103-236 in 1994.)
The language in these provisions is clear and provides no
discretion or waiver authority. Will you support their enforcement as
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support compliance with U.S. laws.
Question. Over the past several years, the Palestinian Authority
has received votes in various U.N. bodies to upgrade its status. Such
attempts undermine the long-held belief that peace between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority can only come about as a direct result of
direct negotiations.
What is your plan to stop initiatives like this from even coming
before U.N. entities, or the General Assembly, for a vote?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both
with the parties and with international partners, that the only
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.
Question. How will you address future attempts by the Palestinian
Authority to achieve statehood through the United Nations?
Answer. I believe that efforts by the Palestinians to join
international entities are premature and counterproductive. There are
no shortcuts to Palestinian statehood outside direct negotiations
between the parties. If confirmed, I will continue to make clear, both
with the parties and with international partners, that the only
realistic path forward to end this conflict is through direct
negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace.
Question. The United States has long maintained a policy of
opposing many one-sided Security Council resolutions that, more often
than not, criticize Israel but fail to address other issues such as
Palestinian terrorism.
Do you support the use of an American veto to block one-sided anti-
Israel resolutions in the Security Council?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to uphold President Biden's
strong commitment to Israel and its security. This includes opposing
efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through one-sided
resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United Nations,
including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Human Rights
Council, and other bodies.
Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis of U.S.
policy interests and how they relate to the issue under consideration.
Question. What do you believe should be the standard employed in
deciding whether to veto or not?
Answer. Each decision to employ the veto is considered on the basis
of U.S. policy interests and how they relate to the issue under
consideration.
Question. Do you believe that there is a disproportionate focus on
Israel at the U.N.? How would you counter this at the U.N.?
Answer. Yes, and if confirmed I will continue the United States'
opposition to efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel
through one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the
United Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly,
the Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues to promote
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N.
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N.
positions.
Question. In a report requested by the U.N. Human Rights Council,
the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi said in September 2020 that there
had been ``little'' in the way of ``positive changes'' since President
Evariste Ndayishimiye ``assumed office'' in June 2020, and concerns
remain about human rights abuses committed both domestically against
Burundian citizens and through Burundi's engagements in the region.
What are your views on the human rights situation in Burundi? Do
you believe the United States is in a position to reset its
relationship with Ndayishimiye's Government, given the seeming
continuity in human rights abuses from the former Nkurunziza
Government?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by ongoing serious human rights
violations in Burundi, while recognizing some recent positive signs.
The Government has committed to releasing over 4,000 prisoners and
released some journalists jailed during the 2020 elections, convicted
perpetrators of elections related crimes, started dialogue with
previously banned local media, and engaged the international community.
If confirmed, I will carefully assess the human rights situation in
Burundi and seek to build on that progress.
Question. How would you evaluate the performance of Burundian
troops in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)? How can the
U.S. better monitor their human rights record in Somalia? Are there
opportunities to build in stronger human rights reporting for AMISOM,
including to better monitor the human rights record of Burundian troops
in Somalia? How can the U.S. push for greater capabilities of AMISOM to
monitor the human rights performance of Burundi and other peacekeeper
contributing countries under mission? What can the U.N. do regarding
the AMISOM Mission to decrease dependency on Burundian troops in
Somalia?
Answer. I share your concerns about AMISOM's abilities to monitor
the performance and conduct of contingents assigned to it. Somalia is a
very challenging operating environment. The United States attempts to
mitigate these challenges by drawing on multiple sources, including
NGOs, media, U.N. agencies, intelligence reporting, and diplomatic
contacts. We also regularly urge the AU to monitor contingents'
performance and conduct and investigate and respond to reported abuse.
If confirmed, I will work with the U.N., the Bureau of African Affairs,
and AMISOM to continue to improve these efforts.
Question. The Anglophone conflict in Cameroon is one of the world's
most neglected yet intensely brutal conflicts.
How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security Council to hold
regular formal briefings and discussions on the Anglophone
crisis in Cameroon, adding it formally to its agenda? If so,
how do you propose the U.S. engage member states that have
worked to block previous efforts to prioritize and regularize
the Anglophone crisis within the U.N. Security Council?
Answer. The United States engages U.N. Security Council member
states regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone crisis and the
severity of the humanitarian crisis in Cameroon. For example, we raise
the Anglophone crisis during briefings by the Secretary-General's
Special Representative and Head of the U.N. Office for Central Africa
(UNOCA) Francois Fall. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage UNOCA
to engage the Government of Cameroon and ask other U.N. member states
to play a constructive role to resolve the Anglophone crisis.
Question. Do you agree that the U.N. has a vital role in supporting
inclusive internationally-mediated dialogue among the many actors in
the Anglophone Crisis to find a lasting and sustainable solution to the
crisis, addressing root causes and underlying grievances? If yes, what
precisely should that role be, and how will you push for that within
the U.N.?
Answer. Yes. The United States fully supports the U.N. Office in
Central Africa (UNOCA)'s role in promoting inclusive political dialogue
in Cameroon, which includes the resolution of the Anglophone crisis.
The importance of this work was reinforced in the strategic review of
UNOCA conducted in 2020. If confirmed, I will support UNOCA's role and
priorities when its mandate expires on August 31, 2021. The United
States also fully supports the Swiss-led mediation of the Anglophone
crisis, which the U.N. also supports.
Question. The Cameroonian Government has consistently failed to
investigate and prosecute perpetrators of atrocities committed against
its civilians. It has proven itself unable to hold high-ranking
government and military officials responsible for these crimes. How can
the U.S. engage other like-minded countries in the U.N. to pursue
accountability for atrocities committed in Cameroon, both by government
and armed group actors?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the tools we have at the United
Nations to press for a resolution to this conflict and to hold
accountable those responsible for human rights violations and abuses. I
will also seek opportunities to engage with like-minded countries that
share a desire to bring this conflict to an end. If confirmed, I will
also engage other U.N. member states on the importance of the rule of
law and ending impunity in Cameroon and explore ways we can work
together to move toward a resolution.
Question. How can the United States more effectively encourage
France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the
government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the Anglophone
conflict?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the different tools we have to
press for a resolution of this conflict, including through discussions
with counterparts from France and the UK. The United States routinely
raises the situation in Cameroon with French officials and will
continue to pursue a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the
Anglophone regions.
Question. Russia's dominant presence in CAR is alarming on several
fronts, not just as it relates to the Central African country's
internal and regional security, but also vital U.S. national security
interests. Will you commit to closely monitoring Russia's presence in
CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., particularly as it relates
to internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will closely monitor Russia's presence
in CAR and corresponding activity at the U.N., with a particular focus
on internal and regional security arrangements and the arms embargo.
Russia's close ties to the Touadera Government, involvement in CAR's
security sector, and stake in its natural resources are extremely
concerning. If confirmed, I will carefully review all the diplomatic
tools available to respond appropriately to Russia's activities in CAR.
Question. How can the United States best protect its interests in
CAR and the broader region while also ensuring that other members of
the U.N. Security Council are prioritizing the MINUSCA mission over
their own foreign military operations in the country?
Answer. The humanitarian situation and ongoing conflict in CAR is
deeply concerning. So, too, are reports of anti-MINUSCA propaganda and
allegations that foreign security actors are failing to deconflict
their activities with MINUSCA, committing human rights abuses, and
impeding humanitarian access. MINUSCA continues to provide crucial
stabilization support, human rights monitoring, assistance to CAR's
justice sector, and support for elections. If confirmed, I will engage
with our partners in the region and in Europe, as well as in the U.N.,
to ensure that MINUSCA remains well-resourced and can fully carry out
its mandate, especially the protection of civilians.
Question. How does the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) contribute to
the peace and security of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)? How
effective is MONUSCO's current mandate and what changes might you
propose should you be confirmed? What should the U.S., our European
allies, and the U.N. peacekeeping mission (MONUSCO) be doing to support
a peace process and end of the conflict in Eastern Congo?
Answer. MONUSCO serves U.S. national security interests by
assisting the DRC Government in its stabilization and peace
consolidation efforts and supporting DRC's security forces to combat
threats posed by armed groups and transnational criminal networks. The
mission also uses its good offices to assist President Tshisekedi's
efforts to end impunity for certain human rights violations and to
advance security sector reform. If confirmed, I will continue U.S.
engagement through our ambassador, the U.N., and regional and
international partners to support efforts to stabilize the region. I
will also press for the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) to implement
reforms to improve performance and for MONUSCO's responsible and
sustainable transition and drawdown.
Question. How can the U.S. better push for the U.N. Security
Council to hold regular formal briefings and make statements about the
ongoing conflicts and humanitarian crises in Ethiopia, including but
not limited to the conflict in the Tigray region? How should the US.
engage member states that have worked to block previous efforts to
prioritize and regularize discussion of Ethiopia by the U.N. Security
Council?
Answer. Opposition from Russia, China, and other member states to
formal meetings and public statements on the deeply troubling
humanitarian and security situation in Ethiopia impedes the Security
Council from speaking with one voice. If confirmed, I am committed to
calling out those member states for their unwillingness to uphold the
fundamental responsibility of the Security Council to address threats
to international peace and security like the crisis in Ethiopia. I will
also work closely with likeminded partners to raise the profile of
Ethiopia in other fora and press for other U.N. bodies like the Human
Rights Council to take up this important issue.
Question. There has been considerable discussion about modifying
the mandate of the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and
AMISOM to better address the challenges faced in Somalia.
In your view, how can the U.S. engage in future mandate renewal
processes, including with the penholder (U.K.), to have frank
discussions about what we hope to achieve through UNSOS/AMISOM
and how to push the government of Somalia to make progress?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to reviewing AMISOM's mandate
closely with the UK, the AU, and other key stakeholders to ensure that
it advances an approach that is sustainable, holistic, and
appropriately geared toward supporting stabilization, counterterrorism,
and transitioning security responsibilities to more capable,
professional, and accountable Somali security forces. While military
operations remain critical, addressing the drivers of Somalia's
persistent instability, and the evolving hybrid threat posed by al-
Shabaab, will require the Somalis and the international community,
including AMISOM and the U.N., to utilize a broader range of tools.
Question. U.N. Special Representative James Swan commented in
November 2020, following Somalia's decision to forgo direct universal
suffrage elections for a selection process similar to that of 2016,
that ``we urge Somali leaders to prepare consensually a roadmap with
clear timelines and benchmarks to ensure one-person-one-vote elections
take place in 2024/25.'' To what extent do you feel, in reviewing the
mandate for AMISOM, that consideration should to be given as to how the
U.N. could play a bigger role in supporting and making preparations for
universal suffrage elections in the future?
Answer. The U.N. plays a critical role in assisting Somalia with
stabilization and democratic development reforms. Among the U.N.
elements operating in Somalia, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Somalia
(UNSOM) is mandated with advising and assisting Somalia on political
reforms, and is best suited to lead U.N. efforts in preparing the
country for universal suffrage in the future. If confirmed, when
UNSOM's mandate comes up for renewal in August 2021, I will work to
ensure that support for democratic and electoral reforms, including
supporting preparations for universal suffrage elections, remain at the
core of UNSOM's responsibilities.
Question. The United States voted with other members of the
Security Council in December to end the mandate of the United Nations--
African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), despite warnings
that Sudan's Government had not yet demonstrated its ability to protect
civilians in Darfur. The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights notes
``severe gaps in protection by State authorities, as well as a lack of
accountability for violations.''
What, in your view, should UNITAMS' role be in helping to address
these issues?
Answer. The United States is committed to supporting Sudanese
efforts to address civilian protection concerns in Darfur and
throughout the country. I believe UNITAMS can play an important role in
supporting Sudan's civilian-led transitional government as it works to
address protection concerns, strengthen rule of law institutions, and
build trust among the Sudanese people. If confirmed, I will push the
Security Council to provide UNITAMS the resources and tools to support
these important initiatives.
Question. What is your view of the request by Sudan's transitional
government to lift the U.N. arms embargo on Darfur? What changes if any
should be made to the U.N. sanctions regime established pursuant to
resolution 1591 (2005)?
Answer. U.N. sanctions remain an important tool in the
international community's response to the situation in Darfur. With the
adoption of resolution 2562, the U.N. Security Council has requested
the Secretary-General to conduct a review of the situation in Darfur
and to provide by July 31, 2021 a report containing recommendations for
clear and well identified benchmarks that could serve in guiding the
Security Council to review the measures on Darfur under the 1591
regime. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the appropriateness of
adjustments to the U.N. Sudan sanctions regime.
Question. How does the United Nations Interim Security Force for
Abyei (UNISFA) contribute to the peace and security of Sudan and South
Sudan? How effective is UNISFA's current mandate and what changes might
you propose should you be confirmed?
Answer. UNISFA has effectively prevented tensions over the status
of Abyei or other border areas from escalating into conflict between
Sudan and South Sudan. It has also played an important role in
preventing and responding to conflict between local communities in the
absence of local administration. However, both Sudan and South Sudan
need to renew efforts to establish interim administrative and security
bodies and restart talks on resolving Abyei's political status. If
confirmed, I will work with colleagues to ensure that UNISFA's mandate
remains appropriately focused, particularly with regard to the
protection of civilians.
Question. One of the key lessons from the Brahimi Report was that
if a peace operation is to be part of implementing a peace agreement,
it should have a role in the process and a seat at the table--in South
Sudan, though the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) does
not. Should UNMISS's political strategy be reexamined, and if so how,
and how would you go about building support within the Council for a
more robust role for the mission? Should UNMISS have a greater role in
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and/or security
sector reform (SSR)?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor closely the U.N. Mission in
South Sudan (UNMISS) with a view to making it as efficient and
effective as possible to fulfill its mandate of protecting civilians,
facilitating humanitarian assistance, supporting implementation of the
Revitalized Peace Agreement and supporting respect for human rights.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector
reform are essential building blocks for the peace process in South
Sudan. If confirmed, I will evaluate the role of UNMISS in these areas.
Question. The Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and
Response recently released its final report, in which the authors
evaluated the WHO's response to the COVID-19 pandemic and made
recommendations to prevent future pandemics from occurring. Included
were recommendations to reduce the WHO Director General's term to a
single seven-year term and adopt merit-based recruitment standards for
other leadership staff; refocus the WHO on its core capabilities
(upholding norms, providing policy and technical guidance, collecting
and sharing critical global health data, and coordinating--rather than
implementing--emergency responses); strengthen the International Health
Regulations, including by giving WHO the right to conduct assessments
without advance approval by Member States; create a Heads of State-
level Global Health Threats Council; and create a multilateral
incentive fund to sustainably finance pandemic preparedness and
response. Do you agree that the World Health Organization is in need of
reform and, if so, what specific reforms should the United States seek
to advance at the upcoming World Health Assembly?
Answer. Yes, the World Health Organization is in need of reform,
and if confirmed I will support our efforts to make the WHO stronger,
more independent and efficient. Proposed reforms will be informed by
assessments of the COVID-19 response and past outbreaks, including the
Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response and the other
two independent reviews of WHO and Member State performance. The United
States is working with partners in bilateral and multilateral fora to
improve WHO's functioning, transparency, and accountability. This
includes a focus on core areas such as science, data collection, and
evaluation and promotion of evidence-based approaches. Reform requires
improved human resources and financial management practices. Reform
proposals should also incorporate policies throughout the organization
that are gender-sensitive and respect human rights as well as the
social determinants of health. Member states also need to live up to
their commitments as expressed within the International Health
Regulations.
Question. Do you agree with the recommendations of the IPPPR? Which
ones?
Answer. I understand that the State Department and other agencies
are reviewing the IPPPR recommendations alongside those of other
assessments. After so many lives lost, the global community and each
country must take immediate, tangible actions to both end this pandemic
and to prepare for the next by taking steps to improve preparedness and
response capabilities, including by increasing sustainable financing,
enhancing biosurveillance with clear ``triggers'' for action, and
expanding pandemic-related manufacturing with rapid surge capacity. If
confirmed, I will seek to strengthen the global health architecture to
promote preparedness, transparency, accountability, innovation, and
impact, so that the global community will be better prepared to
successfully prevent the next outbreak from becoming a pandemic.
Question. If the U.S. is unwilling to leverage contributions, how
will you ensure that far-reaching reforms are enacted?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advance reforms at the WHO through
advocacy, diplomacy, and dialogue, and will work with a broad coalition
of like-minded member states to ensure that WHO reforms advance and
apply lessons learned from the pandemic response. I would also seek to
implement innovative approaches such as the non-binding U.S.-WHO
Partnership Arrangement, a model pioneered by the United Kingdom, to
include defined metrics and timelines for improvement. If confirmed, I
look forward to consulting with you and your staff on this important
matter.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, what will you advise the Biden
administration do regarding UNRWA?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advise that the administration
continue to make clear to UNRWA that adhering to the U.N. principles of
strict neutrality, tolerance, anti-discrimination and protection of
human rights is non-negotiable. UNRWA's mandate is set by the U.N.
General Assembly and is to provide essential services directly to
Palestinian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. U.S. resumption of aid allows the Department to ensure UNRWA
provides cost-efficient and effective services to its beneficiaries and
that UNRWA upholds the highest level of transparency, accountability,
tolerance, and neutrality. If confirmed, I would work with others in
the Department to advise the administration on meaningful and
sustainable reforms to UNRWA's operations, including strengthening
UNRWA internal controls and the Advisory Committee's oversight of UNRWA
management.
Question. If confirmed, will you continue U.S. efforts to push back
against international organizations, like the U.N., as they single out
and attack Israel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the United States' work in
opposing efforts to unfairly single out or delegitimize Israel through
one-sided resolutions, reports, and other actions across the United
Nations, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the
Human Rights Council, and other bodies. If confirmed, I also look
forward to working with our Israeli diplomatic colleagues, to promote
the election of Israel to U.N. leadership posts, inclusion in U.N.
working groups, and support for qualified Israeli candidates for U.N.
positions.
Question. Iran was recently elected to the U.N. Commission on the
Status of Women. Given Iran's treatment of women, this election damages
the credibility of this institution. If confirmed, will you actively
work to oppose Iranian membership in such international bodies?
Answer. I deeply share the concern that is the premise of your
question, which is that some U.N. bodies include countries that do not
live up to the objectives of the organization. In some cases, this is
because the objectionable country runs on a clean regional slate which
the majority of U.N. member states are unwilling to oppose.
For the CSW, the United States wants to see member state candidates
who champion gender equality, oppose discrimination against women,
promote women's empowerment, and further their well-being. In the case
of this election, the U.S. called for a vote despite a clean regional
slate due to the presence of countries on the slate that do not uphold
these values. If confirmed, for each particular election, I will ensure
we examine the entire list of candidates and determine who we should
support and who we should oppose.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to direct U.S.
representatives at international organizations to oppose growing
Russian and Chinese influence at these institutions?
Answer. At the U.N., the People's Republic of China drives an
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the
United States and is inconsistent with the founding documents and
principles of the U.N. itself, including on human rights, labor rights,
transparency, and coercive economic practices. The PRC's efforts harm
international organizations and their transparency, efficiency, values,
and influence. If confirmed, I commit to work with U.S. representatives
to international organizations to oppose the influence of the People's
Republic of China, Russia, and others and to work with our partners and
allies to lead on an affirmative agenda that strengthens the
international rules-based order and its foundational values and
principles.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Todd Young
Question. Do you agree that international organizations and
multinational forums have become a key battleground in the strategic
competition between the United States and China?
Answer. Yes, and strategic competition with the People's Republic
of China is one of the central challenges of the 21st century. The
United States is able to respond to this challenge from a position of
strength when we are engaged and leading international organizations,
not pulling back and ceding the terrain to China to write the rules and
norms that animate international institutions. If confirmed, I will use
our engagement in the U.N. system to push back against the influence of
China, and any country that seeks to undermine the rules-based order. I
will steadfastly oppose activities that undermine the values,
principles, and rules of the U.N. and other international
organizations, and I will promote U.S. values and interests alongside
our allies and partners.
Question. The United States has repeatedly been boxed out by
China's comprehensive strategy of whipping votes for leadership
positions of specialized agencies: how would you lead the IO Bureau to
ensure that the United States is laying the groundwork years in advance
of vacancies to increase American or allied representation of these
agencies?
Answer. The integrity of the U.N. and other international
organizations is vital to U.S. multilateral interests. If confirmed, I
will ensure that the IO Bureau, including the new Office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel, prioritize and implement a robust
and timely strategy to identify opportunities across the U.N. system to
increase the representation of qualified and independent American and
likeminded candidates at all levels. I will also coordinate closely
with our allies and partners to plan for and support the election of
qualified, independent candidates who will uphold the U.N.'s
foundational principles, values, and norms, including a focus on human
rights and economic transparency.
Question. What lessons can be learned by the 2020 election for the
Director General role at the World I.P. Organization--or, WIPO--and how
the United States proactively helped win support for the Singaporean
candidate, beating out a Chinese official?
Answer. The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 2020
election was a powerful example of the strength of U.S. diplomacy and
the importance of ensuring strong leadership in standard-setting
bodies. Coordinating with partners and allies to rally support for
qualified and independent candidates who promote transparency,
accountability, and the rule of law is and will continue to be a recipe
for success in future leadership elections within U.N./international
bodies. We also need to emphasize that the PRC is driving an
authoritarian agenda that stands in opposition to the values of the
United States and the U.N.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Michele Jeanne Sison by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. What more should the United States do to ensure China
does not achieve its objective of reshaping and dominating
international institutions? PRC nationals now lead four of the United
Nations' 15 specialized agencies and groups, and have added many
Chinese nationals to the staff of these organizations. Some 30 United
Nations agencies and institutions have signed memorandums in support of
China's Belt and Road project.
Answer. I believe the United States must engage strategically to
defend, strengthen, and revitalize the international order and its
foundational values, rules, and principles, including through
rebuilding and strengthening our alliances and partnerships. If
confirmed, I will seek to improve the U.N.'s effectiveness and
transparency, support qualified and independent candidates for key
positions in U.N. agencies, advance strong reforms including
whistleblower protections, and take targeted actions to oppose efforts
by the PRC that undermine a rules-based international order. If
confirmed, I commit to combatting PRC attempts to insert its domestic
ideology and policy language into U.N. and multilateral policy
documents. We must also work with the boards of U.N. organizations to
increase oversight of the U.N.'s work in order to uphold the U.N.'s
values rather than the promotion of a single country's flagship
program.
Question. If confirmed, do you support standing up an office within
the Bureau of International Organization to specifically address the
threat of growing Chinese influence in global institutions?
Answer. Yes, I believe the establishment of the new office of
Multilateral Strategy and Personnel in the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs will enable the United States to more
strategically engage across the multilateral system and uphold its
foundational principles, values, and norms. Our approach toward the
People's Republic of China (PRC) at the U.N. and other international
organizations will derive from a clear and compelling affirmative U.S.
policy agenda, and when the PRC seeks to undermine the international
rules-based order, we will take action to oppose those efforts. If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress to consider
other ways to effectively outcompete the PRC and advance U.S.
multilateral priorities.
Question. Do you agree that China under the Chinese Communist Party
is pursuing a systematic, decades-long campaign to achieve global
preeminence and reshape the international order to the CCP's benefit?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages in conduct
around the world that undermines the international system that has
supported global peace and security, stability, prosperity, and human
rights for more than 75 years. The PRC drives an authoritarian agenda
that stands in opposition to the foundational values and principles of
the U.N. and other international organizations. If confirmed, pushing
back against the PRC's attempts to reshape the international system
will be a top priority of mine. I will rally support with allies,
partners, and other countries to oppose the PRC's efforts to undercut
international institutions, values, and rules, and will ensure that the
United States advances an affirmative agenda centered on human rights,
individual freedoms, transparency, and good governance.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to pushing the World Health
Organization to conduct a transparent and thorough investigation
regarding the origin of COVID-19 as a critical step to preventing the
next pandemic?
Answer. Yes. If I am confirmed, I will press the WHO to conduct a
thorough second phase of the COVID-19 study in China. The world needs
to understand how this pandemic originated so that we can better
prepare our governments, our people and our public health institutions
for future health crises. That is why we are continuing to work with
the WHO and with other Member States to support a science-based and
expert-driven study of the pandemic's origins that is free from
interference or politicization.
Question. Do you believe it is prudent for the United States to
support gain-of-function research in China?
Answer. As underscored by the COVID-19 pandemic, all nations,
including China, must commit to cooperation that is rooted in openness,
transparency, and scientific independence. As a general matter, I
believe scientific cooperation between nations is crucial to addressing
transnational threats to global health.
On the particular matter of research funding, I would defer to the
relevant authorities, including the Department of Health and Human
Services and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. via
Videoconference, Hon. Chris Van Hollen, presiding.
Present: Senators Van Hollen [presiding], Kaine, Booker,
Young, and Rounds.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND
Senator Van Hollen. The nominations hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
Welcome, everybody, to the committee, and I do want to
begin by giving a special salute and shout out to my colleague,
Senator Mike Rounds, who is the ranking member of the Global
Health and Africa Subcommittee, and look forward to working
with him and all our colleagues on the subcommittee and the
full committee on the large range of pressing issues that are
before the subcommittee and the full committee.
I see we have also been joined by my colleague, Senator
Kaine from Virginia, and I am sure others will be joining us as
we go.
Let me acknowledge our nominees and congratulations to all
of you on your nominations to be ambassadors to these
countries, and thank you for your service.
We have with us today Ambassador Larry Edward Andre, Jr.,
to be the United States Ambassador to Somalia, Ambassador Maria
E. Brewer to be the United States Ambassador to Lesotho,
Ambassador Tulinabo Mushingi to be U.S. Ambassador to Angola
and Sao Tome and Principe, and Ms. Elizabeth Moore Aubin to be
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and Mr. Eugene S. Young to be
the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Congo, and
finally, last but not least, Mr. Christopher John Lamora to be
the United States Ambassador to Cameroon.
Again, welcome everybody, and I am going to give some brief
opening remarks, turn it over to my colleague, Senator Rounds,
and then we will hear from each of you.
Today's hearing is first and foremost a nominations
hearing. But in the broader sense, it is an opportunity for us
to reexamine our nation's diplomatic relationships with
countries across Africa.
President Biden has made clear his mission to restore
America's role on the world stage as a force for democracy, for
diplomacy, for human rights, and for international cooperation.
Those principles must be front and center in our ongoing
engagement with African countries and with their citizens. The
best way to advance that cause is by focusing on the
opportunities for action, opportunities to invest in and engage
with some of the fastest growing countries and economies in the
world.
By 2050, the population of Africa is expected to double and
will account for one quarter of the world's population. Africa
is also the youngest continent in the world, and 60 percent of
Africans are under the age of 25.
These young people will be at the vanguard of the next
global generation, helping to lead the charge in innovation,
technology, business, and economic growth. Our investment in
their futures will help ensure greater prosperity, opportunity,
peace, and security, both abroad but also here at home.
That cause holds an added measure of urgency as we confront
the reality that many of our biggest threats are interconnected
and global.
As we have seen throughout the past year, viruses know no
borders and our ability to defeat COVID-19 and tackle future
outbreaks as well as outbreaks of other diseases requires our
participation and our leadership in a global and coordinated
response.
The same is true for taking on the climate crisis, which,
obviously, has impact here at home and everywhere in the world.
It is a key driver of the plight of displacement in many
countries like Somalia.
It also represents a real opportunity at home and around
the world for the production of new sources of clean energy,
both for Africa and for the global economy.
We are engaging in projects that advance these goals and
others through ventures lie the Power Africa initiative and
President Biden's pledge on the coronavirus fight front to
donate now hundreds of millions of doses worldwide and our
contribution to COVAX.
So the United States has now pledged $4 billion to fight
COVID-19 through COVAX. Prior to today, the president has
announced 80 million doses that we would contribute to
countries around the world, and just this afternoon it was it
was indicated that tomorrow the president will announce the
United States intends to purchase another 500 million doses to
help defeat COVID-19 around the world.
Of the 25 million original doses, the first tranche of
doses that the United States will distribute 5 million will be
devoted to Africa. So this is an important moment for the
United States to take a leadership role in that area, and so
many others.
My colleagues on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and
Democrats, have been right to also recognize that China is
using its mercantilist and debt trap strategies to gain more
influence in countries around the world, including Africa, and
if we keep up business as usual we will give China a free pass
to use that leverage to export its model of authoritarianism to
governments in developing countries.
I think we are all pleased that just yesterday the United
States Senate passed on a bipartisan basis legislation to
significantly increase our competitiveness here at home but
also to reassert U.S. leadership in many of these areas
overseas.
So, for example, a part of that bill that emerged from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee included an increase of $100
billion authorization for the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation, which we hope will be investing in Africa.
Africa, of course, is not a monolith. All of you know that
better than anybody. You are all going to countries that have
their own unique histories and own complex issues and
challenges.
And so today gives us an opportunity both to address those
individual issues as well as a take a look at the broader
situation.
So let me now turn it over to Senator Rounds for any
opening statement he wishes to give, and then I will introduce
our nominees and then turn it over to them for questioning.
Senator Rounds?
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROUNDS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH DAKOTA
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I most
certainly appreciate your opening comments, and I think that
this is one of those committees where bipartisan agreement can
be found and I think we begin today in a very good way.
I am very pleased to see such a qualified panel of nominees
before us today, with three previously confirmed by the
committee to serve in ambassadorial posts as well as
experienced State Department personnel with great records of
service.
I want to thank you and your families for your service to
our country.
Ambassador Andre, your deep background with Africa will
serve you well if you are confirmed to be our next ambassador
to Somalia. I look forward to hearing your views on Somalia, a
country struggling to overcome 30 years of instability in order
to achieve democratic development and viable national
institutions.
Somalia's successful revolution, socially, politically and
economically, is vital for our interests in the region to
include significant counterterrorism efforts against the
violent extremist group al-Shabaab.
If confirmed, it will be critical that you maintain a close
relationship with Congress to help assure a prudent way
forward.
Ambassador Brewer, if confirmed, your experience as
ambassador to Sierra Leone, a small nation where the U.S.
relationship focuses on foreign assistance, particularly in the
health sector, would make you well placed to serve as our
ambassador to Lesotho, and I commend you for your desire to
lead a U.S. embassy and a USAID team, a small mission to help
mentor the next generation of the Foreign Service.
Given the challenges in fully staffing posts in Africa,
seasoned diplomats willing to serve in such a mentorship role
are definitely needed. I look forward to hearing your thoughts
on how USAID programs and trade relations with Lesotho can help
that nation advance politically and economically.
Ambassador Mushingi, if you are confirmed, I will be glad
that we will be sending such an experienced diplomat with
experience in five African countries to be our next ambassador
to Angola and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
Seems to me that Angola's reformist President Lourenco
continues to provide an opportunity to deepen our relationship
with that nation. I look forward to hearing how you, if
confirmed, would support those reform efforts.
Ms. Aubin, your experience in Algeria would well qualify
you, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to that nation. I
look forward to hearing from you about how you would lead our
embassy in Algiers, in context of the problem sets facing the
North African region, and Algeria's ongoing political
challenges.
Also Of particular interest to me are your views on how we
can best meet the challenges of Morocco's unfortunate
annexation with U.S. approval, I might add, of Western Sahara,
an action which I find deeply troubling.
Mr. Young, your experience in sub-Saharan Africa and as an
economic and commercial officer at numerous posts will prepare
you well, if confirmed, to be our next ambassador to the
Republic of Congo. I look forward to hearing from you about
Congo and particularly how you would advance our relationship
with that nation in the face of tremendous corruption and
increased Chinese influence.
Mr. Lamora, your Africa experience makes you well prepared
for the difficult post for which you have been nominated.
I am interested in your views on how the U.S. can work with
the Cameroonian institutions as well as with other nations to
address violent extremism, as well as the Anglophone crisis
affecting the northwest and southwest regions of Cameroon.
I would also like to hear from you on the tremendous
challenges to democratic development posed by the Government's
crackdown on political opposition and press, the president's
reelection to a seventh term in 2018 election marred by
violence and absence of a clear successor with concerns for
further instability should he die or become incapacitated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you
for providing some background on each of these nominees.
I am going to provide a little more background on each of
them because I think it is important that people who are tuning
in to the committee recognize the breadth and depth of
experience that these diplomats have, and I think we can take
great pride in the fact that the president has nominated this
distinguished group of individuals.
So Ambassador Andre, Jr., is currently the charge
d'affaires ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Juba, South Sudan.
He is a former ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Mauritania
and to the Republic of Djibouti, which has a majority ethnic
Somali population and a peacekeeping contingent in Somalia.
Ambassador Andre's earlier assignments also include service
as the political counselor in Nairobi, Kenya, at which time his
section oversaw Somali affairs.
He is the recipient of more than a dozen notable senior
State Department awards, including the Director General Award
for reporting. So thank you for joining us.
Ambassador Brewer recently served as the United States
Ambassador to the Republic of Sierra Leone. Prior to that role,
Ambassador Brewer was the Deputy Director of Career Development
and Assignments at the State Department's Bureau of Human
Resources, and she also served as the deputy chief of mission
and charge ad interim at the U.S. Embassy in Abuja, Nigeria.
In Nigeria, she oversaw a $500 million annual PEPFAR
program as part of a global campaign to fight HIV/AIDS. She
earned the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award.
Ambassador Mushingi is currently the U.S. ambassador to
Senegal and the Republic of Guinea Bissau. Earlier in his
career, Ambassador Mushingi served as the United States
Ambassador to Burkina Faso and as the deputy chief of mission
to the United States Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
In Washington, Ambassador Mushingi served as executive
director at the Executive Office of the Secretary of State, and
in 2017 he received the prestigious Palmer Award for the
Advancement of Democracy.
Ms. Aubin is currently the acting Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
Throughout her three decades of service she has held the posts
as executive director of the Joint Executive Office of the
Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian
Affairs, deputy chief of mission of the United States Embassy
in Ottawa, Canada, executive director of the Bureau of Western
Hemisphere Affairs, and deputy chief of mission at the United
States Embassy in Algiers, Algeria.
Ms. Aubin has received numerous State Department awards,
including multiple performance awards for her work in the
senior Foreign Service.
Mr. Young is the economic counselor at the U.S. Embassy in
Jerusalem, Israel. Previously, Mr. Young was the charge
d'affaires and ad interim and deputy chief of mission at the
United States Embassy in Vienna, Austria, and counsel and
senior civilian representative at the U.S. consulate in Herat,
Afghanistan, and deputy chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in
Ljubljana, Slovenia.
He has also served as the economic counselor at the United
States Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, and U.S. Consul General in
Durban, South Africa. His service has been honored with several
State Department awards, and I welcome him as well.
Mr. Lamora is currently the deputy chief of mission at the
United States Embassy in Accra, Ghana, which is the fifth
largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa. Previously, he was
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central Africa
and African Security Affairs.
Mr. Lamora has nearly 30 years of Foreign Service
experience, 12 of which has been spent focused on African
policy security, economic development, and partnerships, and he
has served in three African countries including Cameroon. He is
the recipient of numerous State Department awards as well.
So thank you all very much, again, for your prior service.
We look forward to the discussion today.
And with that, I call upon Ambassador Andre to deliver an
opening statement.
Ambassador Andre?
STATEMENT HON. LARRY EDWARD ANDRE, JR., OF TEXAS, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINSTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA
Mr. Andre. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished
members of the committee, greetings from South Sudan. I am
honored to come before you today as President Biden's nominee
to be the next United States Ambassador to the Federal Republic
of Somalia.
I am grateful to the president and Secretary Blinken for
their confidence in me. My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my
children, Ruhiyyih and Isidore Andre, are watching online.
I thank all my family, friends, and colleagues for their
support.
Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace
Corps volunteer in Senegal. I then worked in Chad on post-war
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990,
intending to continue my focus on Africa. I am now serving my
tenth tour on the continent.
My three domestic assignments were also Africa related. I
have served at our embassies in each of the countries that
border Somalia.
If confirmed, I will draw on these experiences to lead our
U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team in advancing our partnership with
Somalia's people and their federal and state governments for
greater peace and prosperity.
I commit to keep you and your staff informed of our
progress.
Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving in
dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an
ambassador toward all resident Americans and toward all U.S.
Government employees in country.
If confirmed, I will promote the safety of American
citizens and of my embassy colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, the United States needs a stable Somalia as
do the Somali people, East Africa, and the international
community. If confirmed, I will work with Somalia's federal and
state governments, Somali civil society, regional organizations
and like-minded international partners to promote stability
through credible elections and governance reforms that advance
peace and prosperity.
Mr. Chairman, among other needed reforms, Somalia would
benefit from a compromise leading to national consensus on the
relationship between the federal government and state
governments. The nature of Somali federalism has remained an
open question for too long.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch al-Shabaab.
There is a smaller ISIS Somalia presence in the north. Both
international terrorist networks threaten our interests in the
region and aspire to attack Americans.
If confirmed, I will continue the work of Ambassador
Yamamoto, applying the full range of tools to help Somalis
defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism.
I will also coordinate with the African Union's
peacekeeping operation in Somalia. I will be guided by our
shared goal of more operationally capable and professional
Somali security forces that respect human rights, protect
civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for abuses.
In recent years, Somali security forces have made progress
in this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and
the United Nations has contributed to that progress.
Mr. Chairman, aside from political and security challenges,
Somalis also confront a variety of natural calamities, economic
dysfunction, and deficient educational and other public
services. These difficulties contribute to poverty, hunger, and
displacement.
If confirmed, I would support the work of our development,
humanitarian, and economic professionals in coordination with
Somali authorities and international organizations to provide
aid from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote
inclusive economic growth.
Ethnic Somali communities around the world are known for
their resourcefulness, dynamism, and entrepreneurial spirit.
Under the right conditions, Somalia will thrive due to the
qualities of the Somali people.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I
thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager
to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, greetings from Juba, South Sudan. I am honored to come
before you today as President Biden's nominee to be the next United
States Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Somalia. I am grateful to
the President and Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me.
My wife, Ouroukou Andre, and my children, Ruhiyyih Andre and
Isidore Andre, are watching online. I thank all my family, friends, and
colleagues for their support.
Mr. Chairman, I first came to Africa in 1983 as a Peace Corps
Volunteer in Senegal, and then in Chad working on post-war
reconstruction. I joined the State Department in 1990. I am now serving
my tenth tour in Africa. With an additional three domestic Africa-
related assignments, my over 31-year diplomatic career has focused
almost exclusively on the continent. I have served at our embassies in
each of the countries that border Somalia. If confirmed, I will draw on
these experiences to advance our partnership with Somalia's people and
their federal and state-level governments toward greater peace and
prosperity.
The United States needs a stable Somalia, as do the Somali people,
East Africa and the international community. If confirmed, I will work
with the Somali federal government, Somalia's state governments,
regional organizations, and like-minded international partners to
promote stability through credible elections that advance peace and
prosperity. Mr. Chairman, Somalia's political stability also requires
compromise leading to national consensus on the relationship between
the federal government and state governments. The nature of Somali
federalism has remained an open question for too long.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Somalia and their neighbors are
attacked regularly by al-Qaeda's East Africa branch, al-Shabaab. There
is a smaller ISIS-Somalia presence in the north. Both international
terrorist networks threaten our interests in the region and aspire to
attack our country. If confirmed, I will continue the work of
Ambassador Yamamoto to bring to bear the full range of tools to help
Somalis defend themselves and rid their country of terrorism. I will
also coordinate with AMISOM, the African Union's peacekeeping
operation. I will be guided by our shared goal of more operationally
capable and professional Somali security forces that respect human
rights, protect civilians, and hold accountable those responsible for
abuses. In recent years, the Somali National Army has made progress in
this direction. The U.S. military, the European Union, and the United
Nations have contributed to that progress.
Mr. Chairman, having spent much of my career serving at U.S.
embassies in dangerous places, I feel deeply the responsibility of an
Ambassador toward all resident Americans and to all U.S. Government
employees and contractors. If confirmed, I will lead our team in
Somalia to take all necessary measures to promote the security of
American citizens and of U.S. Government colleagues while we work with
the Somali people, their government, and our international partners to
advance shared objectives.
Aside from political and security challenges, Somalis also confront
a variety of natural calamities, economic dysfunction, and deficient
educational and other public services that contribute to poverty,
hunger, and displacement. If confirmed, I would support the work of our
development, humanitarian, and economic professionals, in coordination
with Somali authorities and international organizations, to provide aid
from the American people to Somalis in need and to promote inclusive
economic growth.
If confirmed, I will lead our U.S. Embassy Mogadishu team to
advance peace and prosperity through diplomacy, defense, and
development efforts in partnership with the Somali people and their
federal and state governments. I commit to keep you and your staff
informed.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I thank you
for this opportunity to appear before you. I am eager to respond to
your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
And next, we will hear from Ambassador Brewer.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA E. BREWER OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER MEMBER
OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO
Ms. Brewer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds,
members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before you
as you consider my nomination as U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom
of Lesotho.
I thank President Biden for this opportunity and for the
trust that he and Secretary Blinken have shown in my ability to
serve our country again as U.S. Ambassador.
If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this
committee as we advance U.S. objectives in Lesotho. I would
like to thank my husband, Mark, and our 12-year-old daughter,
Arina, for their love and support, along with my parents,
William and Maria Pallick, who are watching from their home in
Texas. Also, today is my father's 77th birthday. So I would
like to say happy birthday, Dad.
Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of
State, I have substantial experience working on African
affairs, most recently as the U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone.
My experience has taught me the need to develop diverse
teams that reflect the countries we serve and to foster high
morale in challenging environments.
If confirmed, I will draw on this experience to pursue U.S.
goals and protect U.S. interests in Lesotho. Promoting
democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and of what
we wish to accomplish in Lesotho.
Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to reduce political
instability, strengthen its institutions, and professionalize
its military. These goals align with our own.
Our embassy has made great strides in promoting the rule of
law, civilian control of the Lesotho's military, and government
accountability.
If confirmed, I will collaborate with this committee, the
interagency, and the Government of Lesotho to strengthen
Lesotho's institutions, reinforce its ability to meet the needs
of its people, and build capacity to be a better partner to us.
Last year taught every country that promoting the health of
its people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system
strengthening is at the center of our assistance.
With one in four adults afflicted by HIV/AIDS, and many
children orphaned by it, shoring up the Lesotho's capacity to
fight HIV/AIDS will remain a critical component of U.S.
engagement.
The President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR,
generously funded by Congress, has transformed the Lesotho.
Lesotho is one of the first countries to reach epidemic
control, surpassing U.N. AIDS targets and cutting new
infections by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered
Lesotho's capacity to confront COVID-19.
Curbing the spread of these pandemics contributes to global
health security, which benefits Americans here at home. To
increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective
partner, Lesotho needs economic development.
AGOA, the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating more than 45,000
private sector jobs. More progress is needed improving work
conditions and preparing Lesotho for its post-AGOA future.
I will support economic diversification, continued progress
on AGOA eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the
business climate, if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the
lives of Basotho, but also improves conditions for U.S.
companies seeking to do business with Lesotho.
The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the
countries whose governments do not fully comply with the
minimum standards in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act.
The State Department has worked with the Government of Lesotho
to urge it to devote resources to combating trafficking in
persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this message
and we are seeing real progress.
If confirmed, I commit to pressing Lesotho for increased
prevention and prosecution of these crimes and increased
protection for victims. I will paramount the safety and
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho and the entire U.S.
Embassy team, including U.S. citizen employees, their families,
and our Lesotho colleagues.
If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the
security of our mission and oversee its operation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you.
If confirmed, I welcome the challenge and privilege of
protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as the U.S.
ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Maria E. Brewer
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the committee,
It is an honor to appear before you as you consider my nomination as
U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Lesotho. I want to thank President
Biden for this opportunity and for the trust that he and Secretary
Blinken have in my ability to serve our country again as U.S.
ambassador. If confirmed, I look forward to collaborating with this
committee as we advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in Lesotho. I am
honored and fortunate to have my husband, Mark, and our twelve-year-old
daughter, Arina, here with me today. I thank them for their constant
love and support, along with my parents, William and Maria Pallick, who
are watching from their home in Texas.
Having served nearly 25 years with the U.S. Department of State, I
have substantial experience working on African affairs, most recently
as U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone. My experience has taught me the
need to develop diverse teams that reflect the country we serve and to
foster high morale in challenging environments. If confirmed, I will
draw upon this wealth of knowledge and management experience to pursue
U.S. goals and to protect U.S. interests in Lesotho.
Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S. values and
of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. As Secretary Blinken noted,
``strong democracies are more stable, better partners to us, more
committed to human rights, less prone to conflict, and more dependable
markets for our goods and services.'' Along with its Southern African
Development Community partners, Lesotho seeks to implement reforms to
reduce political instability, strengthen its institutions, and
professionalize its military. Our embassy has already made great
strides in promoting the rule of law, civilian control of Lesotho's
military, and government accountability. If confirmed, I will
collaborate with this committee, the interagency, and the Government of
Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to reinforce its ability
to meet the needs of its people, and to build its capacity to be a
better partner to us.
The last year taught every country that promoting the health of its
people is a core imperative. In Lesotho, health system strengthening is
at the center of our assistance efforts. With one in four adults living
with HIV/AIDS and many more children orphaned by it, shoring up
Lesotho's capacity to confront HIV/AIDS will remain a critical
component to U.S. engagement. PEPFAR, which Congress generously funds,
has transformed Lesotho, which was one of the first countries to reach
epidemic control, surpassing UNAIDS targets and cutting new infections
by half. Our health partnerships have also bolstered Lesotho's capacity
to confront COVID-19. Curbing the spread of these pandemics in Lesotho
contributes to global health security which benefits Americans at home.
If confirmed, I will seek to sustain momentum in these areas.
To increase internal stability and its ability to be an effective
partner, Lesotho needs economic development. AGOA--the African Growth
and Opportunity Act--revolutionized Lesotho's economy, creating over
45,000 private sector jobs in Lesotho, making it the second largest
sub-Saharan supplier of textiles and apparel to the United States.
Nevertheless, there is still important progress to be made,
particularly improving work conditions and preparing Lesotho for its
post-AGOA future once the Act expires in 2025. I will work diligently
to support economic diversification, continued progress on AGOA
eligibility criteria, and overall improvement of the business climate,
if confirmed. Doing so not only improves the lives of Basotho, but also
improves conditions for U.S. companies seeking to do business with
Lesotho.
The Department of State in 2020 ranked Lesotho among the countries
whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards in the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act and which are not making significant
efforts to comply. The Department has worked assiduously with the
Government of Lesotho to urge it to devote resources to combatting
trafficking in persons. Lesotho and its people are receptive to this
message and making real progress. If confirmed, I will commit to
pushing Lesotho for increased prevention and prosecution of these
crimes and increased protection for victims.
In addition to these policy aims, I hold paramount the safety and
security of U.S. citizens in Lesotho, and the entire U.S. Embassy team,
including U.S. citizen employees, their families, and our Basotho
colleagues. If confirmed, I would do all within my power to ensure the
security of our Mission and oversee its operations.
In closing, I would like to thank you all again for the opportunity
to appear before you today. If confirmed, I would welcome the challenge
and privilege of protecting and advancing U.S. interests in Maseru as
the U.S. Ambassador. I look forward to any questions you may have.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. I think
the full committee would like to extend a happy birthday to
your father.
And now we will turn to Ambassador Mushingi. The floor is
yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. TULINABO S. MUSHINGI OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO
BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, AND TO SERVE
CONCURRENTLY AND WITHOUT ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION AS AMBASSADOR
EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege, indeed, to appear before you
today as President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S.
Ambassador to the Republic of Angola and to the Democratic
Republic of Sao Tome and Principe.
I thank the president and the secretary of state for their
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished
committee's consideration.
I appear today with unfailing support of my wife of 40
years, Rebecca, who has also served our country, working for 13
years with the U.S. Peace Corps, and of our beloved daughter,
Furaha.
My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, from
Ethiopia to Senegal, as well as through various assignments in
Washington, D.C., have prepared me to deliver meaningful
results for the American people in the role for which I have
been nominated.
If confirmed, I will work to foster stronger ties between
the United States and Angola and Sao Tome and Principe.
President Lourenco's economic and political reform agenda
aligns with U.S. interests and presents us a unique opportunity
to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with this fast-
emerging economy and rising African nation.
As the Government of Angola fosters a better business
climate, U.S. companies seek tremendous trade and investment
opportunities, and recently, U.S. companies have achieved major
successes in the energy and IT sectors.
Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic
development and conservation efforts. Since 1995, U.S.A. has
been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola, investing
more than $145 million dollars to clear land mines.
The 2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened
Animals Act helps to combat wildlife trafficking and to protect
land and water resources.
If confirmed, I will reinforce our commitment to help
Angola eliminate the threat of land mines and protect its
natural resources.
Deep ties bind the United States and Angola. An estimated
one-quarter of all African Americans have Angolan roots. In
fact, the first enslaved Africans to arrive in what is now the
United States in 1619 were from what is now Angola.
If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this history
while sharing the experience of the United States of America as
we continue to seek to improve our nation.
Turning to Sao Tome, Sao Tome and Principe has a small land
footprint but a large and strategically important maritime
domain in the Gulf of Guinea shipping lanes.
Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters and
share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. Sao Tome and Principe
also has a long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers
of power.
I will focus on these priorities, if confirmed. As the
world hopefully emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, we expect
to see more Americans coming to Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe. The safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always
paramount.
Finally, American diplomacy works best when our diplomats
best exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an
interagency embassy team that reflects the values of our
country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished
members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear before
you today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Angola and to the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and
Principe. I thank the President and the Secretary of State for their
confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this distinguished
committee's consideration.
I appear today with the unfailing support of my wife Rebecca, who
has also served our country working for 13 years with the U.S. Peace
Corps, and our beloved daughter Furaha.
My work across Africa, from Mozambique to Morocco, Ethiopia to
Senegal, as well as through assignments in Washington, DC, has prepared
me to deliver meaningful results for the American people in the role I
have been nominated for. If confirmed, I will work hard to foster
stronger ties between the United States and Angola and Sao Tome &
Principe.
Bilateral relations between the United States and Angola have
markedly improved in recent years. President Lourenco's economic and
political reform agenda aligns with U.S. interests and presents a
unique opportunity to develop a mutually beneficial partnership with
this fast-emerging economy and rising African nation.
Angola plays an influential role in Africa and is looking to
diversify its ties away from historic alliances. As such, it has
attracted high-level U.S. visits and interaction since 2019, and if
confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the U.S.-Angola
partnership.
Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and good
governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and promoting
accountability for human rights violations. Angola still faces many
challenges as it addresses a stagnant economy, exacerbated by the
impacts of the COVID pandemic. If confirmed, I will continue to press
for political and economic reforms, support the fight against
corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
As the Government of Angola fosters a better business climate, U.S.
companies see tremendous trade and investment opportunities. Recently,
U.S. companies have achieved major successes in the energy and IT
sectors. If confirmed, I will work with the U.S. interagency team to
advocate for U.S. businesses while supporting Angolan efforts to comply
with international standards and improve regulatory adherence.
Angola's legacy of land mines continues to impede economic
development and environmental conservation. Since 1995, the United
States has been the largest donor to demining efforts in Angola,
investing more than $145 million to clear landmines and other dangerous
explosive hazards so the people of Angola can advance a wide range of
social and economic development efforts safe from buried bombs. The
2018 Defending Economic Livelihoods and Threatened Animals (DELTA) Act
helps to combat wildlife trafficking and coordinate with transboundary
land and water resource governance authorities. If confirmed, I will
reinforce our commitment to help Angola eliminate the threat of
landmines and protect its natural resources.
Deep ties bind the United States and Angola: an estimated one-
quarter of African-Americans have Angolan roots. The first enslaved
Africans to arrive in what is now the United States in 1619 were from
what is now Angola. If confirmed, I will look to be honest about this
history, while sharing the experience of the United States as we
continue to seek improve our nation. I will seek to expand our growing
people-to-people ties and promote programs focusing on talented Angolan
youth.
Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. STP successfully completed a
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Threshold Program in 2011, and
further MCC engagement is a priority for the future. STP also has a
long tradition of democracy and peaceful transfers of power. I will
focus on these priorities if confirmed.
As the world hopefully emerges from the COVID pandemic, we expect
to see a resurgence in the number of Americans coming to Angola. The
safety of our staff and U.S. citizens is always paramount.
Finally, American diplomacy works best when American diplomats best
exemplify our nation. If confirmed, I will promote an interagency
Embassy team that reflects the values of the United States.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Next, we will turn to Ms. Aubin for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH MOORE AUBIN OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE PEOPLE'S
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ALGERIA
Ms. Aubin. Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member
Rounds, and members of this committee for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel
an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and
Virginia Moore, who raised me to put country over self, and I
owe them everything for preparing me to take on my chosen
vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign Service officer, and to my
husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible love and support.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to
serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic People's
Republic of Algeria, and I appreciate deeply the confidence he
and Secretary Blinken have shown.
I served in Algeria from 2011 to 2014 as the Deputy Chief
of Mission, so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the
Amenas gas production facility, and I, along with every member
of the embassy, did not stop working until American hostages
were released and three deceased Americans brought back to
their families.
It was a formative experience. If confirmed, my highest
priority will be to keep all Americans in Algeria safe.
If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities:
first, strengthening our security cooperation to fight
terrorism and promote regional stability; second, expanding
investment opportunities for U.S. companies to deliver economic
benefits to the American people; third, advocating for
necessary political and economic reforms to foster stability as
Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an
important relationship with Algeria, and I will work to
increase the impact of U.S. activities there. I also believe in
the enduring value of deepening people-to-people ties. Embassy
Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs that
strengthen our security, economic governance, educational, and
cultural ties.
Algeria's large youth population is curious about America
and wants to learn English. That is an opportunity I hope to
make the most of.
If confirmed, I will return to a country that has changed
in important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the
Algerian Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms
to strengthen Algeria's political system. Legislative elections
will occur in three days. The Algerian public continues to
demonstrate peacefully for core civil rights and liberties.
I will continue to press for expanding observance of human
rights, including freedoms of expression and association and
space for civil society.
Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s and
it has maintained its stability through rigorous
counterterrorism efforts, national reconciliation programs, and
de-radicalization initiatives.
Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a
difficult neighborhood. It played a critical role in brokering
reconciliation in Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord.
Algeria provides security assistance to Tunisia and Niger.
It actively participates in the African Union, the Arab League,
the OIC, and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union Center for
Study and Research on Terrorism.
While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains
one of the key regional producers of oil and gas, ranking ninth
in the world in gas reserves and sixteenth in oil reserves, and
has vast promise for renewables.
If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this
vital energy sector for our mutual benefit.
The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which
to continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with
the U.S. signed in Algiers in 1795 to American troops
liberating Algeria in World War II, to the United States being
the first country to recognize Algerian independence on July
3rd, 1962 to Algeria playing a role of creative and active
mediation to help release the 52 American diplomat hostages
from Iran, we have an enduring partnership that can face the
opportunities and the challenges of the 21st century together.
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen, Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you.
If confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent
America to the Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and
talented mission there.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you
today. As the Texas-born child of a U.S. Air Force officer, I feel an
immeasurable debt of gratitude to my parents, Tom and Virginia Moore,
who raised me to put country over self, and I owe them everything for
preparing me to take on my chosen vocation 31 years ago as a Foreign
Service Officer; and to my husband, Daniel Aubin, for his incredible
love and support.
It is a huge honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve as
the U.S. Ambassador to Algeria, and I deeply appreciate the confidence
he and Secretary Blinken have shown in me.
I served in Algeria from 2011-2014 as the Deputy Chief of Mission,
so I was there for the 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas gas
production facility. I, along with every member of the Embassy, did not
stop working until American hostages were released, and three deceased
Americans brought back to their families. It was a formative
experience. If confirmed, my highest priority will be to keep every
American safe in Algeria.
If confirmed, I hope to advance three critical priorities. First,
strengthening our security cooperation to fight terrorism and promote
regional stability. Second, expanding investment opportunities for U.S.
companies to deliver economic benefits to the American people. Third,
advocating for necessary political and economic reforms to foster
stability as Algeria navigates a post-COVID economy.
Although it rarely makes the front page, we have an important
relationship with Algeria, and I will work to increase the impact of
U.S. activities there.
I also believe in the enduring value of deepening people-to-people
ties. Embassy Algiers supports an ever-growing spectrum of programs
that strengthen our security, economic, governance, educational and
cultural ties. Algeria's large youth population is curious about
America and wants to learn English. That's an opportunity I hope to
make the most of.
If confirmed, I will return to a country that is changed in
important ways since I last lived there. Last year, the Algerian
Government adopted a package of constitutional reforms to strengthen
Algeria's political system. Legislative elections will occur in three
days. The Algerian public continues to demonstrate peacefully for core
civil rights and liberties. I will continue to press for expanding
observance of human rights, including freedoms of expression and
association, and space for civil society.
Algeria fought against violent extremism in the 1990s. It has
maintained its stability through rigorous counterterrorism efforts,
national reconciliation programs, and de-radicalization initiatives.
Algeria has found ways to export this peace dividend in a difficult
neighborhood: it played a critical role in brokering reconciliation in
Mali with the 2015 Algiers Accord; it provides security assistance to
Tunisia and Niger; it actively participates in the African Union, the
Arab League, and the OIC; and it hosts AFRIPOL and the African Union
Center for Study and Research on Terrorism.
While new investments are essential, Algeria also remains one of
the key regional producers of oil and gas ranking ninth in the world in
gas reserves and 16th in oil reserves, and has vast promise for
renewables. If confirmed, I will promote U.S. companies as they seek to
partner with Algerian firms to advance development of this vital energy
sector for our mutual benefit.
The United States and Algeria have a rich history on which to
continue to build. From the Treaty of Peace and Amity with the U.S.
signed in Algiers in September of 1795, to American troops liberating
Algeria in World War II; from the United States being the first country
to recognize Algerian independence on July 3, 1962, to Algeria playing
a role of creative and active mediation to help release the 52 American
diplomat hostages from Iran. We have an enduring partnership that can
face the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century together.
Thank you, Chairman Van Hollen and Ranking Member Rounds, and
members of the committee for this opportunity to address you. If
confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to represent America to the
Algerian people and to lead our tremendous and talented mission there.
I look forward to your questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you very much for your
testimony.
Next, we are going to hear from Mr. Young.
STATEMENT OF EUGENE S. YOUNG OF NEW YORK, A CAREER MEMBER OF
THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF CONGO
Mr. Young. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of
the committee, it really is an honor to appear before you today
as the president's nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of
the Congo.
I am very grateful for the trust and confidence that
President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. I want
to acknowledge my remarkable wife, Zoe, and our two boys today.
I know they are watching and I thank them for their enduring
support and love.
I believe my mother, Margaret, is also watching from home
and I am so grateful to her and my late father, Sanford, for
their encouragement, their care, and their rock-solid
upbringing. I think my brother, Roland, is out there too, and I
am grateful to him as well with his family. So thanks for this
chance.
Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in
Brazzaville and the local staff at the embassy, the United
States has built a strong relationship with the Republic of the
Congo. We have been able to deepen the ties between our
governments, engage in regular and serious dialogue, and work
on issues of mutual concern.
Our countries are working together to effectively fight
COVID, to protect our shared environmental heritage, and to
combat trafficking in persons. If confirmed, I will seek to
maintain this improved U.S.-Congo partnership.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well
know, the Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous
position in Central Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies
in a region beset with challenges.
In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola
outbreak from across the Congo River and accommodated refugees
fleeing the Central African Republic.
Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain Forest, an
invaluable ecological treasure known as the second lung of the
world, but one--I am sorry, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. It is okay. Take your time.
Mr. Young. Congo is also home to the Great Congo Rain
Forest, an invaluable ecological treasure known as the second
lung of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent
exploitation.
Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its
economy but also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to
the country's immediate future.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to
address these challenges and to ensure the safety and security
of American citizens in Congo as well as for our American and
Congolese staff at the embassy.
Working with this committee, the various agencies of the
U.S. Government active in Congo, other donor nations, and
multilateral organizations, I will continue the good work our
mission is supporting across key economic and social sectors in
Congo.
If confirmed, I will focus on encouraging democratic
progress, supporting efforts to protect the Congo Basin,
working with Congo to protect against this, our current
pandemic and future pandemics, as well as encouraging the
diversification of the Congolese economy.
And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our
embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more
transparent and inviting business environment.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee,
thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee
and other interested members of Congress to advance U.S.
interests in Congo, and I am very happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eugene S. Young
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the President's
nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of the Congo. I am grateful
for the trust and confidence that President Biden and Secretary Blinken
have placed in me.
I would like to acknowledge my wife, Zoe, and our two sons today
and thank them for their enduring support and love. I believe my mother
Margaret is also watching from home and I am so grateful to her and my
late father, Sanford, for their encouragement, care and rock solid
upbringing.
Thanks to the hard work of our diplomats on the ground in
Brazzaville and the local staff at the Embassy, the United States has
built a strong relationship with the Republic of the Congo. We've been
able to deepen the ties between our governments, engage in regular and
serious dialogue, and work on issues of mutual concern. Our countries
are working together to effectively fight COVID, to protect our shared
environmental heritage, and to combat trafficking in persons. If
confirmed, I will seek to maintain this improved U.S.-Congo
partnership.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as you well know, the
Republic of the Congo occupies a vital but tenuous position in Central
Africa. Congo itself is stable, but it lies in a region beset with
challenges. In the past year, Congo has dealt with a suspected Ebola
outbreak from across the Congo river and accommodated refugees fleeing
the Central African Republic. Congo is also home to the great Congo
rainforest, an invaluable ecological treasure, known as the second lung
of the world, but one that is in danger of imprudent exploitation.
Congo's significant oil reserves, which have boosted its economy, but
also fueled corruption, will still be crucial to the country's
immediate future.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to address these
challenges and to ensure the safety and security of American citizens
in Congo as well as for our American and Congolese staff at the
Embassy. Working with this committee, the various agencies of the U.S.
Government active in Congo, other donor nations and multilateral
organizations, I will continue the good work our mission is supporting
across key economic and social sectors in Congo. If confirmed, I will
focus on encouraging democratic progress, supporting efforts to protect
the Congo Basin, working with Congo to protect against this and future
pandemics, as well as encouraging the diversification of the Congolese
economy. And for U.S. business, I will continue the efforts of our
Embassy team in seeking a level playing field and a more transparent
and inviting business environment.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the committee, thank
you once again for the opportunity to appear before you today. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and other
interested members of Congress to advance U.S. interests in Congo and I
am happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you for your testimony.
And now we will turn to Mr. Lamora. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER JOHN LAMORA OF RHODE ISLAND, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND
PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC
OF CAMEROON
Mr. Lamora. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Rounds,
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege and
an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's
nominee to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of
Cameroon.
I thank the president and the secretary of state for their
confidence in me, and I am equally grateful for this
distinguished committee's consideration.
While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my
family from joining us in person, I nonetheless want to
recognize my husband, Eric, my sister, Michelle, and my
nephews, Jack and Patrick, who have all supported and
encouraged me over many years and who are watching today from
home.
I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be
here today.
The United States was one of the first countries to
establish diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since
then, nearly 4,000 Peace Corps volunteers have served in
Cameroon. It is a country with great cultural and geographic
diversity, a capsule of the entire continent: active volcanoes,
rain forest jungles teeming with wildlife, broad savannas, and
a beautiful coastline.
I was fortunate to have had the opportunity to experience
much of this personally when I served in Cameroon previously.
Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces
significant challenges, as you well know.
The United States is deeply concerned by the continued
violence in Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as
peaceful protests in late 2016 have tragically escalated into a
protracted violent crisis with more than 3,000 persons killed
and more than 1 million internally displaced.
Children have been threatened and in some places killed for
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have
been attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous
obstacles in carrying out their work.
We condemn violence in all its forms regardless of who is
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the
civilian population, regardless of their location or
affiliation.
No one undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or our
tolerance, whether members of the security forces or of armed
separatists groups. We are acting vigorously to help resolve
the crisis and, if confirmed, I commit that that will be my
highest priority.
This week, secretary of state established a policy imposing
visa restrictions on those undermining efforts to peacefully
resolve the situation.
We continue to have discussions about Cameroon with the
Cameroonian Government and to other Cameroonians, as well as
with key international partners to foster greater, stronger,
and more unified engagement. This will remain our highest
priority in our Cameroon policy.
Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are
all too common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including
health, security, and governance.
The Cameroonian people have enormous potential. I have seen
it firsthand. If I am confirmed, our embassy team and I will do
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon
make that potential a reality.
The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to
reaching that day. As a global health security agenda Phase 1
country, Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen
its ability to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious
diseases with pandemic potential.
Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR
and the president's Malaria Initiative, such that it has
reduced its HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic
control within the next two years.
On security, the United States continues to support
Cameroon and its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint
effort to defeat Boko Haram and its offshoot, ISIS West Africa.
This is a key element of the fight against global
terrorism. Our support, however, is neither limitless nor
without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must abide by
accepted human rights norms and those who violate those norms
must be held appropriately accountable.
In the same vein, there is still substantial work to be
done to promote democracy, human rights, combat corruption, and
ensure accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or
the citizens' trust.
We must continue to press on all these important issues
while helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including
civil society, to find a path to peace.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of the committee,
I thank you once again for this opportunity to appear before
you, and if confirmed, I look forward to working with you and
others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in Cameroon.
I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Christopher John Lamora
follows:]
Statement of Christopher John Lamora
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the
committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to serve as the U.S. Ambassador to the
Republic of Cameroon. I thank the President and the Secretary of State
for their confidence in me. I am equally grateful for this
distinguished committee's consideration.
While the virtual nature of this hearing precludes my family from
joining us in person, I nonetheless want to recognize my husband Eric,
my sister Michelle, and my nephews Jack and Patrick, who have all
supported and encouraged me over many years and who are watching today
from home. I also want to pay homage to my late parents, Thomas and
Elizabeth Lamora, without whose love and support I would not be here
today.
I'm grateful as well to my Africa Bureau family, whose
collegiality, confidence, friendship, and mentoring have sustained me
and fostered my personal and professional growth for nearly three
decades -- from my first assignment at the U.S. Consulate in Douala,
Cameroon from 1992-1993 to my past three years as Deputy Chief of
Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Accra, Ghana.
The United States was one of the first countries to establish
diplomatic relations with Cameroon in 1960. Since then, nearly 4,000
Peace Corps Volunteers have served in Cameroon. It is a country with
great cultural and geographic diversity, a capsule of the entire
continent: active volcanoes, rainforest jungles teeming with wildlife,
broad savannahs, and a beautiful coastline. I was fortunate to have had
the opportunity to experience much of this personally when I served in
Cameroon previously.
Unfortunately, this beautiful, warm, and welcoming country that
launched my love of Africa nearly 30 years ago also faces significant
challenges, as you well know.
The United States is deeply concerned by the continued violence in
Cameroon's Anglophone regions. What began as peaceful protests in late
2016 has tragically escalated into a protracted violent crisis with
more than 3,000 persons killed and more than one million internally
displaced. Children have been threatened, and in some cases killed, for
attending school. Schools, hospitals, and religious sites have been
attacked. Humanitarian actors continue to face numerous obstacles in
carrying out their work.
We condemn violence in all its forms, regardless of who is
perpetrating it, and call for an end to the suffering of the civilian
population regardless of their location or affiliation. No one
undermining peace in Cameroon has our support or tolerance, whether
members of the security forces or of armed separatist groups.
We are acting vigorously to help resolve the crisis. This week, the
Secretary of State established a policy imposing visa restrictions on
those undermining efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis. We continue
to have discussions about Cameroon with the Cameroonian Government and
other Cameroonians, as well as with key international partners to
foster greater, stronger, and more unified engagement. Working to
resolve this crisis is, and will continue to be, the single highest
priority in our Cameroon policy.
Cameroon also faces a number of other challenges that are all too
common in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, including health, security,
and governance. The Cameroonian people have enormous potential; I've
seen it first-hand. If I am confirmed, our Embassy team and I will do
everything we can to help the people and Government of Cameroon to make
that potential a reality.
The coronavirus pandemic has added a layer of difficulty to
reaching that day. As a Global Health Security Agenda Phase I country,
Cameroon partners with the United States to strengthen its ability to
prevent, detect, and respond to infectious diseases with pandemic
potential. Cameroon also benefits from U.S. assistance through PEPFAR
and the Presidential Malaria Initiative, such that it has reduced its
HIV prevalence and is working to achieve epidemic control within the
next two years.
On security, the United States continues to support Cameroon and
its Lake Chad Basin neighbors in their joint effort to defeat Boko
Haram and its offshoot, ISIS-West Africa. This is a key element of the
fight against global terrorism. Our support, however, is neither
limitless nor without conditions. Cameroonian security forces must
abide by accepted human rights norms, and those who violate these norms
must be held appropriately accountable.
In that same vein, there is still substantial work to be done to
promote democracy, and human rights, combat corruption, and ensure
accountability of those who violate Cameroonian laws or the citizens'
trust. We must continue to press on all these important issues while
helping the Cameroonian Government and people, including civil society
find a path to peace.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you once again
for this opportunity to appear before you. If confirmed, I look forward
to working with you and others in Congress to advance U.S. interests in
Cameroon. I would be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Lamora, and thank you
all very much for your testimony. And as somebody who grew up
in a Foreign Service family, I understand and grateful you
acknowledged that representing United States is a family affair
and a team effort.
With that, given my colleague's, Senator Rounds, time
constraints, I think I will just turn it over to you, Mike, if
you want to begin the questioning. I understood you said you
had to leave shortly. So I do not know how much time you have
got.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You were cutting
out a little bit there. But if you would allow me, I would make
quick work of my time and ask a few questions if that is okay
with you, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Absolutely. No, I want to make sure you
have a chance to ask whatever you want. So why do you not lead
off?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
courtesy.
Ambassador Andre, as you know, Somalia is wracked by a
political crisis over the September 17th agreement to forego a
``one person one vote'' election in favor of an indirect
selection process similar to that of 2016 and 2017.
However, I am particularly curious about how you see
Somalia as a longer-term political situation. Looking past the
current political crisis, what are the reasonable benchmarks
the United States should expect with regard to Somalia's
democratic development?
Mr. Andre. Thank you, Senator, for that question. Looking
forward to the immediate situation, as you said, we need to
assist the Somalis to develop a permanent constitution.
They are using a provisional one right now. The Somali
political class recognizes that the indirect method that they
have used in the past and that they are intending to use this
time is a stop-gap measure until they are able to have the
``one person one vote'' direct elections, which all seem to
agree is their ending point.
They do not control all of their territory at this point
and they do not want to disadvantage Somalis who, having
nothing to do with their own will, are trapped behind the lines
and territory controlled by terrorist networks.
So the constitution and getting to that direct election
that you refer to.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Aubin, I am very concerned about the recent U.S. policy
change to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.
I have been to the Sahrawi people's refugee camps twice. I
was impressed by their strong desire for independence and
frustration with the long delay of the time period for a
referendum to determine whether Western Sahara should become a
part of Morocco or be an independent nation.
Please tell me how you think this change in U.S. policy has
impacted U.S.-Algeria relations, and also under what
conditions, if any, might Algeria increase military assistance
to the Polisario to support it against Morocco?
Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Rounds.
Algeria has supported the political process led by the U.N.
and by the U.N. Secretary General's personal envoy for Western
Sahara.
So I think Algeria welcomes the fact that we are resuming
active diplomacy and supported of the U.N., and together with
our international partners want to bring a halt to the violence
and restart a credible U.N. process.
We are working privately with all the parties involved and
discussing the path forward. To your question about military
assistance, I do not believe Algeria is providing military
assistance. It is not something they highlight.
But, most definitively, they have called for a de-
escalation of violence and for the political process to
continue.
Senator Rounds. Thank you.
And, Mr. Chairman, I have a couple questions that I will
offer for the record. But I appreciate your courtesy in
allowing me to move forward first and I thank you, and at this
point I will have to step out of the meeting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all the nominees
before us. I most certainly have appreciated your comments
today.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you
for your questions, and look forward to working with you. So I
am going to also start with Ambassador Andre.
And, you know, as was referenced earlier in this hearing,
we have a continued al-Shabaab presence in Somalia. We also
have the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from Somalia, a
decision made by the previous president.
How has that decision to withdraw U.S. forces impacted the
situation in Somalia, in your opinion?
Mr. Andre. Well, Senator, in my capacity as ambassador in
Djibouti, I was present in January when AFRICOM took on that
instruction. It was a repositioning of U.S. forces from Somalia
to elsewhere in the region, which has slowed the tempo of our
efforts to assist the Somali people with their security but it
has not stopped it.
We continue to build the capacity of Somalia security
forces, support AMISOM, African Union's peacekeeping force, and
to keep the U.S. embassy open and operational.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, I appreciate that. In fact, I was
just speaking the other day with the mayor of the city of
Salisbury, Maryland, who happens to be a member of the Maryland
National Guard and was recently deployed to Djibouti as well,
and we talked a little bit about that sort of redeployment, as
you said.
I have also heard concerns from others in the region that
there has been some vacuum created, although there is,
obviously, an attempt to compensate for that.
You referenced in your testimony Somali federalism. So how
does the--and we are heading into elections here. Can you just
talk a little bit about how the situation in Somalia compares
with the regional situation in Somaliland and then Puntland?
And I know that Somaliland and Puntland have different
relationships than with the national sort of government, at
least as seen by Puntland.
So could you just describe that and what the challenges are
and what role, if any, the United States should play in
mediating this effort, especially in the context of elections?
Mr. Andre. Yes, Senator.
I want to emphasize, as I said in the testimony, the
importance of establishing, through consensus and compromise, a
consistent pattern, a framework, for the relations between the
central government and the states.
Twenty years ago, I spent some time in Puntland. I was
there looking mostly at fisheries issues, and they have been
able to govern themselves well.
They see themselves very much as a part of Somalia. But
they are also very interested in having significant control
over their own governance.
There are other federal states of Somalia that have
different understandings and different relationships.
Somaliland, as you know, does not consider itself part of
Somalia.
The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which
includes Somaliland. So the picture here is a bit confused
because there is not a consistent relationship between the
center and the states.
That is something for Somalis to work out. They have many
international examples to choose from, to consider, as the
Somali people build that compromised national consensus on what
the nature of Somali federalism should be.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Turning to Ambassador Brewer and Lesotho, you referenced in
your testimony the AGOA agreement, which has helped the Lesotho
economy. But at the same time, I think Lesotho would like to
see greater diversification in its economy outside the textile
sector.
Are there things that the United States can do to be
helpful to that effort by the Government of Lesotho?
Ms. Brewer. Thank you, sir, for that question. Thank you,
Senator.
We do see that AGOA has been a massive help to that
country. About 12 percent of the GDP in 2019 came from AGOA
from the export of mainly textiles, as you note, sir.
But there are many opportunities for U.S. companies, and
one of the challenges of serving in Africa, particularly in
smaller countries such as Sierra Leone and Lesotho, is how to
attract those U.S. companies, how to encourage them that they
will have their goods and services treated fairly and they will
have a level playing field when they get there.
So one of the issues that, if confirmed, I will be carrying
forward with the host nation will be the need to have a
welcoming climate, a business climate that encourages
international companies, including those from the U.S., to
come. That means anti-corruption. That means a rule of law.
That means political stability.
All of these are ingredients that lead to, you know,
diversification. So, certainly, we see potential in the energy
sector through Power Africa, through a whole of U.S. Government
engagement.
We understand that the Government of Lesotho would like to
increase their agricultural output.
I am originally from Indiana, a state with a proud
agricultural tradition, and I think there is a lot that America
can do, certainly, through the commercial sector to be able to
help them with goods, services, and equipment.
So I think there is great potential and I believe that the
U.S. is there ready to help. We are the partner of choice, we
have a great reputation, and I think we can assist them through
a commercial context, not just through foreign assistance.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
And you mentioned also the success of our efforts on HIV/
AIDS in Lesotho and we look forward to keeping in touch with
you on that, especially the extent to which Lesotho has been
able to take ownership of that.
I am told that there are no other committee members on
right now. And if that is the case, I will continue asking
questions of our nominees.
Ambassador Mushingi, the United States has signed a number
of cooperative agreements with Angola in recent years,
including engagements with Prosper Africa, the Women's Global
Development and Prosperity Initiative, Young African Leaders
Initiative.
Could you talk about the areas that you think create the
most, you know, fruitful opportunities of engagement with
Angola and also what you see is our biggest challenges? And I
should say a lot of you covered a lot of our questions in your
opening statements.
That will cut down on the questions. But I do want to talk
to you about some of the issues that do remain.
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator. Clearly, we see an
opportunity here to engage now with Angola, especially since
the new regime took over about three years ago.
Where we have a big opening here is really on promoting
economic recovery, promoting a two-way trade between our two
countries, and opening these opportunities to U.S. companies in
Angola, a country of more than 30 million people, and we see
this desire of the Angolans to move away from their traditional
historic alliances and that is where we come in as the U.S.
The majority of the Angolans, as you described in your
opening remarks about the youth born in Angola or in many of
the other African countries, know what is going on outside of
Angola, know what the U.S. can bring to the table.
And each American company, what I call the U.S. model, has
these three ingredients that so far have been missing in Angola
and that really--Angolans want to take advantage of.
One of them is the transparency, the second one is the
transfer of technology, and the third one is creation of jobs.
So those are the opportunities that I see for American
companies in Angola.
But moving forward as far as extending the cooperative
agreement you were talking about, on the security cooperation
we see also an opportunity here to get into the door because
the history of Angola has been--their security cooperation with
Russia has been there for a long time, and now the signing of
our cooperative agreement a few years ago between the ministry
of defense and our DOD we see an opening where the security
forces are eager to be trained by us, are eager to be equipped
by us, are eager to see the intelligence technologies and how
they can use that for their own security in the region.
Finally is, of course, the security of the region and to
everyone that Angola can help us in the region, whether we are
talking about southern Africa region but also Central Africa
and what is in that, in the Central African Republic, in the
DRC--Democratic Republic of the Congo--in Uganda and Rwanda as
well.
Over to you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. I think you
have covered some of this. You mentioned Russia. But I think of
all the countries that we are talking about at this hearing,
China probably has established the greatest amount of influence
and footprint in Angola.
To what extent does China's economic and diplomatic and
military influence in Angola impact our interests there?
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
Yes, China and Russia have these traditional relations with
Angola. It is no secret to anybody that, indeed, when we look
at the major infrastructure projects many of them have been
developed by China. But also, when we look at the debt issue,
again, China is at the top of the list for that country.
Now, where we come in is, again, as I said, for our U.S.
companies, and we saw a few successes that I referred to
earlier in my testimony, in the last few months three American
companies that have been able to penetrate the market and win
over the competition in various sectors.
We have looked at telecommunication, IT, solar energy, but
also energy, and both were U.S. companies, the latest three
successes we have seen. And I think, for me, the way I see this
is for us to talk about what we, the U.S.A, are bringing to the
table and let the Angolans decide themselves.
At the end of the day, I am confident that we can compete
in this market and, indeed, not only compete, but we can win in
this market. Over to you, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Ambassador.
Just one question on Sao Tome and Principe, which is you
mentioned their sort of government structure and process, which
has been, I think, one that we have encouraged and supported.
With respect to their economy, my understanding is they
would also like to diversify their economy a little bit more.
What role can the United States play with respect to that
objective?
Mr. Mushingi. Thank you, Senator.
One role that we can play is, really, to build on what we
already have. As I said, it is a small land footprint but the
long maritime borders and for us talking about maritime
security, that is one thing where, really, we can play the
biggest role.
But I was really happy to see that when I looked at the
American companies that are on the ground--Kosmos Energy,
Caterpillar, Dell--so that gives me an idea of the openness
that Sao Tome has to American businesses with American models
and, if confirmed, that is what I will be pushing, and
especially many of those companies or agencies that work in the
security area when we are talking about maritime security in
the Gulf of Guinea. Over.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Ms. Aubin, the United States, as you know, has praised
Algeria for its cooperation on counterterrorism issues and
regional matters, and you referenced in your testimony its role
as a mediator, notably, in Mali in 2015.
At the same time, its close ties to and its arms deals with
Russia, especially in the aftermath of the CAATSA legislation
passed here in Congress, have been concerning.
So what do you see as the main areas of agreement between
the United States and Algeria and some of the areas of
friction?
Ms. Aubin. Thank you for the question, Senator Van Hollen.
I see the U.S. and Algeria having a lot of areas of
agreement: regional stability in the Maghreb, the desire to
have a more inclusive economic environment, and, certainly,
they are very interested in the Human Rights Report--
Trafficking in Persons Report and other reports that we do, and
they are working to make gains in those areas.
You are right about Russia and Algeria's military
relationship. Algeria procured two-thirds of its arms from
Russia between 2015 and 2019. So that is an issue, and the sale
of C-130s were part of the United States' larger policy goal of
deterring Algeria from engaging in sanctionable activity.
And if confirmed, I will prioritize that in my
conversations with Algerian officials.
Senator Van Hollen. No, I appreciate that, because there
were the arms sales, as you say, dating back to 2015 and
before. But I think more concerning have been some of the arms
sales since the CAATSA legislation passed.
What impact, if any, have you seen has that had on the
calculations of the Algerian Government in terms of purchases?
Ms. Aubin. So thank you for allowing me to clarify that I
think the C-130 sales helped deter that, and I think the United
States needs to continue conversations with Algeria to explain
what Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act
really means and how that will impact our relationship, moving
forward.
And so that is something that I will prioritize in my
conversations when I get there. Algeria has had a policy of
sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs and that is
how they have moved forward in their bilateral relationships.
But I think this is a really important point and if
confirmed, I will continue to raise that with Algerian
colleagues.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. No, I appreciate that, and
Senator Rounds mentioned his opposition to the former
administration's policy change with respect to recognition of
Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara.
You already answered that question. I do want to go on
record in agreement with my colleague, Senator Rounds, on that
matter.
So let me turn now to Mr. Young, if I may, and a couple
questions, because you covered a lot of it in your testimony
with respect to the Republic of Congo.
One of the concerns I am sure you have seen expressed here
on the Hill, in the United States, and elsewhere, has been the
regional impact of weak control over the security sector and
abuses committed by Congolese peacekeepers and park rangers.
Can you speak a little bit to that issue and, you know,
what role you can play in expressing our concerns and what kind
of changes that we can expect?
Mr. Young. Thank you, Senator. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is really important that we continue to direct
dialogue with the Government on issues like these that my
predecessor and our embassy is still having at this point, to
have that regular dialogue, to have an open discussion.
In terms of the peacekeepers that you mentioned, sir, my
understanding, and this is one of the positive signs that we
have seen, and that is that those peacekeepers that I think you
are referring to were, in fact, held accountable for the crimes
that they committed.
So that was one plus that we have seen recently. But it is
important that we--across this and across all of these issues
around democratic progress that we have a dialogue with the
Government, we have dialogue with civil society, with youth,
with the security and maintain some of the training programs we
have had with security forces and with law enforcement. I think
those can help address the issues that you are referring to,
sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, right. No, I am referring to the
situation in Central African Republic, their troops there, and
we do look forward to working with you to make sure that
everyone is held accountable in what happened there.
Let me turn to Mr. Lamora. And as you referenced in your
testimony, Cameroon has seen significant violence in recent
years owing to the Anglophone Conflict as well as the Boko
Haram insurgency in the far north.
I represent a very active and engaged and terrific
Cameroonian-American constituency in the state of Maryland and
I have been engaged with them in conversations about their
concerns about what is happening.
Can you talk a little more about what the United States can
do to support a peaceful resolution of Cameroon's Anglophone
Conflict?
Mr. Lamora. Thank you, Senator.
Yes. One of the things that we have been trying to do and
will try to do with Cameroon is to bring the parties together
to get them to talk. There has not been complete willingness on
any side thus far to come to the table.
As you are aware I know, sir, the Swiss have led a process
of trying to do that and we have supported and aligned
ourselves with that. I think an important thing that we have
been doing increasingly in recent weeks is to engage the French
at higher levels.
France has a long-standing close relationship with the
Government in Yaounde. Secretary Blinken recently raised his
concerns, our concerns, about Cameroon with his French
counterpart. I think greater French engagement certainly would
help. We are hopeful that we can move that forward.
As I mentioned in my testimony also, following on the
resolution that the Senate passed, S.R. 684, that talked about
the possibility of sanctions, Secretary Blinken announced these
visa sanctions, visa restrictions, earlier this week on those
who are impeding peace in the Anglophone regions, in
particular.
So I think there is a variety of things that we can do and
that our international partners can do. But, ultimately, we can
help move them all in the best direction we can.
But it will have to be the Cameroonian Government, the
parties to the violence, and the Cameroonian people who really
commit themselves to finding a peaceful way forward.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Thank you all. I am getting word that another committee I
serve on with the attorney general may be wrapping up and I
hope to get over there and have a chance to ask him some
questions.
So let me thank all of you, again, for your previous
service to our country. I look forward to supporting your
nominations and, again, thank you for what you do and to your
families.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Robert Menendez
Gulf Influence in Somalia
Question. Countries such as the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
Turkey are playing an increasing role in the Horn of Africa,
particularly in Somalia, though much of their efforts remain bilateral
and somewhat opaque. What seems certain, however, is that despite all
four of these countries being allies and friends of the United States,
their agendas and efforts often do not align with our own.
What is your assessment of the influence of these actors in the
Horn of Africa?
Answer. The Gulf states, particularly the UAE and Qatar, have
significant influence in Somalia by virtue of their political,
economic, and security engagement.
Our NATO ally Turkey's relationship with Somalia is strong. Turkey
has built schools, hospitals, and infrastructure in Somalia. It also
provides extensive security assistance focused on the recruitment,
training, and equipping of both police and Somali National Army forces.
Question. Are their collective efforts contributing to or taking
away from peace and stability in the region?
Answer. The Gulf rift has had a destabilizing impact on Somalia, as
Gulf states vied for influence with the Federal Government (FGS) in
Mogadishu and Federal Member States (FMS). The dispute distracted the
FGS and its FMS from implementing security sector, political, and
economic reforms critical to stabilizing the country, including
countering the influence of al-Shabaab and ISIS.
Meanwhile, in recent months Turkey joined other countries when the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) issued a joint
statement welcoming the May 20 Summit. It did not join statements of
concern about President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo's term extension or
subsequent violence in Mogadishu, which were issued immediately prior.
Question. If the latter, what is the United States doing to try and
bring their efforts more in line with our own?
Answer. The United States repeatedly has urged external actors,
including the Gulf states, not to use Somalia as a proxy battleground
for bilateral disputes. We hold regular consultations with these
governments and demarche them to join us and likeminded partners in
seeking political progress and stability in Somalia.
Vision for Somalia
Question. Infighting between Somalia's Federal Member States and
the central member states continues to threaten the stability of the
country; the United States conducted airstrikes in Somalia against Al
Shabab and Al Qaeda for over a decade while Al Shabab continues to
carry out major attacks in cities and in the countryside; and Gulf
actors compete for influence. Tensions between Ethiopia, Sudan,
Eritrea, Kenya, and Somalia threaten the stability of the entire Horn
of Africa.
What are the United States' goals in Somalia in the short, medium,
and long term?
With the grave potential for instability in yet another country in
the Horn of Africa, what will be your priorities if confirmed?
How do you plan to work with Special Envoy Feltman and other
Ambassadors in the region to develop a coherent and integrated
approach to U.S. policy in the Horn?
Answer. The United States' near- and medium-term objectives in
Somalia are to degrade terrorist groups that pose a threat to U.S.
persons and interests; strengthen Somalia's security forces so that
they can assume greater responsibility from the African Union Mission
in Somalia (AMISOM); advance political reconciliation and governance
reforms necessary for lasting stability; and promote economic growth
and opportunity that will reduce Somalia's dependence on U.S. and
international assistance, while delivering humanitarian aid to people
in need. It is our hope that, over time, these efforts will lead to a
peaceful, stable, democratic Somalia that respects human rights and
fundamental freedoms and that can provide security and services for its
citizens.
If confirmed, I will build on the work of Ambassador Yamamoto to
bring to bear the full range of tools to help Somalis defend themselves
and rid their country of terrorism. I will support Somalia's completion
of a peaceful, inclusive, transparent, and timely electoral process and
strengthened cooperation among Somalia's national and federal member
state governments. And I will support the work of our development,
humanitarian, and economic professionals to provide aid to Somalis in
need and to promote inclusive economic growth.
The stabilization of Somalia is an international challenge that
requires close coordination with its neighbors and other international
stakeholders. I am committed to working closely with our Special Envoy
for the Horn of Africa Envoy Jeffrey Feltman and our ambassadors in
East Africa and in other critical partner capitals to ensure a cohesive
and coordinated approach.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre, Jr. by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Somalia was identified as a special case due to ongoing
conflict, insecurity, and protracted humanitarian crises. Given the
complicated security situation and sustained insurgency by Al-Shabaab
across the country, how will you work with the host government and U.S.
Government interagency to help Somalia improve efforts of protection,
prosecution, and prevention?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Government's
interagency commitment to working with the Somali federal and member
state governments to help build the capacity of Somali institutions to
prevent trafficking, prosecute those engaged in the illicit activity,
and protect victims.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom report, the Somalian Government is listed as continuing to
discriminate against non-Islamic religions, including Christianity. In
addition, Al-Shabaab has committed egregious crimes against those who
practice religions other than Islam. What is your assessment of this
particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of
International Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-
country?
Answer. Al-Shabaab's brutal treatment of those whose beliefs differ
from their own is appalling. If confirmed, I would condemn Al-Shabaab's
ruthless acts and urge that Somalia's laws allow all people to worship
in a manner of their choosing. If confirmed, I would engage senior
officials in the Federal Government of Somalia, as well as its Federal
Member States, to advocate for religious freedom and express concern
over actions by authorities against individuals and groups attempting
to practice their faith freely. If confirmed, my team will continue to
work closely with the Office of International Religious Freedom.
Question. In the 2020 Human Rights Report, Somalia was identified
as having committed or baring witness to severe human rights abuses
specifically committed by Al-Shabaab.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. Al-Shabaab is the leading perpetrator of human rights
violations in Somalia. Working with the Somali Government, AMISOM, and
like-minded partners to degrade al-Shabaab militarily and economically
while bolstering Somali governance and institutions should reduce their
operational space to commit abuses against Somali and foreign
nationals.
If confirmed, I would continue to engage with the highest levels of
the Somali Government, sub-national authorities, and local communities,
members of the diplomatic corps, the U.N., and NGOs to promote respect
for human rights for all Somalis.
AMISOM
Question. There is much discussion about AMISOM's mandate in
Somalia and potential realignments. If your opinion, what adjustments
to AMISOM's mandate are needed to improve its effectiveness?
Answer. AMISOM remains critical to Somalia's stabilization, and its
continued presence is necessary to provide time and space to build
effective Somali security institutions. The United States supports a
smart and deliberate conditions-based transition from AMISOM to Somali
security forces. If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with
the African Union, AMISOM troop contributors, the U.N., EU, and other
international stakeholders to support revisions to AMISOM's mandate to
enable it to conduct more effective operations against al-Shabaab,
while supporting the development of Somali security forces that can
ultimately take over the country's security.
Somaliland
Question. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward
Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity
over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a
more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?
Answer. The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which
includes Somaliland. Given Somalia's federal system, I believe it is in
the U.S. interest to maintain positive engagement with Somalia's
national and regional government authorities, while also encouraging
those authorities to strengthen cooperation with one another. In June
2020, in my capacity as U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, I attended
Djibouti-hosted talks between senior representatives of Somaliland and
Somalia. This experience provided insights into the points of view of
both sides and where their interests overlap. If confirmed, I am
committed to continuing to engage with regional administrations like
Somaliland to promote good governance, stability, and economic
development, and to explore opportunities to strengthen cooperation.
__________
'Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Cory A. Booker
Violence and Instability in Cameroon and Beyond
Question. U.S. relations with Cameroon have been mostly positive,
although?they have been adversely affected by concerns over human
rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization.
Cameroon plays a key role in regional stability and remains a regional
partner in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.
Last year, I joined with 19 of my Senate colleagues to sign a
resolution calling for a ceasefire in Cameroon, and remain
deeply concerned by the ongoing violence there. I am curious as
to what you think it will take to conclude and uphold a
ceasefire, guaranteed humanitarian access, and establish a
process of political dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make resolving the Anglophone crisis
my top policy priority. Our position remains that all sides must end
violence and engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
Government is focused on countering armed separatists in the field and
maintains that its convening of a Grand National Dialogue in 2019 and
decentralization efforts thus far, including regional elections in late
2020 and the establishment of a special status for the two Anglophone
regions, address the root causes of the crisis. I believe the
Government must do more to resolve the crisis. Specifically, it must be
willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
armed separatist groups, as well, must be willing to engage peacefully
in such a dialogue and cease human rights abuses, as called for in the
Senate resolution.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground and look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In 2019, the United States took the relatively rare step
of terminating Cameroon's AGOA eligibility due to persistent gross
violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have
impacted the Government's behavior in the ongoing conflict. If
confirmed, what other measures do you plan to take to hold state and
non-state actors in Cameroon accountable for human rights abuses?
Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone
regions of Cameroon. This decision reflects the continuing U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue and promote respect for human rights.
This decision followed cuts in security assistance in recent years,
and, as you noted, the determination that Cameroon was ineligible for
AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S.
Government's resolve to back up words with actions.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground, as well as the Cameroonian Government and people, to
identify tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In addition to the internal violence related to the
Anglophone Crisis, Cameroon is also facing threats from Boko Haram and
ISIS West Africa. How do we square our support for Cameroon's efforts
against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa with our concerns about human
rights abuses and political abuses inside Cameroon? In other words, how
can the State Department ensure that President Biya does not use
foreign counterterrorism assistance to fund its efforts against
Anglophone separatists in the Southwest and Northwest part of the
country?
Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important. Since early 2019, we
have significantly reduced security assistance because the Government
of Cameroon had not taken sufficient action to investigate credible
accusations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces
or hold the perpetrators accountable. The United States continues to
review security assistance on a case-by-case basis so that assistance
we provide aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect
for human rights. We vet potential recipients of security assistance,
consistent with the Leahy laws, and do not provide assistance to
Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S.-
granted assistance is explicitly prohibited from being used in the
Anglophone regions. We have made this prohibition clear at all levels
of the Cameroonian Government and we carefully monitor the use of U.S.
assistance to ensure this commitment is followed. Risk of misuse or
potential diversion to the Anglophone regions are key criteria in our
security assistance decision-making.
Since our cuts, the Cameroonian Government has taken some limited
steps towards holding security forces accountable, including the
conviction of four soldiers for murder in August 2020 and the arrest of
soldiers believed to be responsible for one case of extrajudicial
killings and one case of alleged torture of a detainee. While we hope
these steps indicate a willingness to address the problem, abuses by
government forces continue.
Between FY 2019 (the last year for which there is full obligation
data) and FY 2020 funding, the State Department has obligated
approximately $8.3 million in assistance to support the Cameroonian
military. This funding supported professional military education;
technical support for unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms; small boat training; communications training;
and air-to-ground integration training. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is not misused by Cameroonian
security forces, and would actively and fully address verified reports
of such misuse.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Larry Edward Andre by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Andre, The U.S. maintains a very modest
embassy on the compound of the Mogadishu International Airport, and our
diplomats are extremely limited in their ability to leave the airport
complex.
What is your perspective on this posture, and what do you believe
is its impact on U.S. diplomatic relations with Somalia and our allies?
Answer. If confirmed, the safety of U.S. citizens in Somalia and of
U.S. Embassy personnel will be my highest priority. I will work with
the Diplomatic Security Service to maximize the ability of our
diplomats to advance our goals and interests through engagements
throughout Somalia whenever possible through effective risk mitigation
and management decisions. I am doing that now in my role as Charge
d'affaires in South Sudan, which can be a dangerous place. I will
consider both the security environment in Somalia and specific
opportunities to advance the goals assigned to us through an
interagency process. I will ensure we remain able to engage effectively
with all levels of the Somali Government as well as with our
international partners, many of whom are also located on the Mogadishu
International Airport compound.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Ambassador Brewer, as you know, Lesotho has been plagued
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime
minister has served a full term for the past decade.
In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are
some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the
development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?
Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S.
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a
complicated history with several instances of political and armed
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals.
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement.
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build
its capacity to be a better partner to us.
Question. Ambassador Brewer, support to the health sector, mainly
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.
What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S.
support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?
Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social
stability.
Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover,
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to
infectious disease threats.
If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers'
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report (TIP), Lesotho was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of
significant efforts by the Government to increase prosecution,
protection, and prevention. How will you work with the Lesotho
Government to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?
Answer. I understand Lesotho was placed on Tier 3 due to chronic
poor progress towards addressing our recommendations and credible
allegations of official complicity. The Government of Lesotho has taken
many steps to combat trafficking in persons since the release of the
2020 TIP Report. The Government convicted and sentenced the first
trafficker in four years; closed key legislative gaps in anti-
trafficking laws; criminalized all forms of sex trafficking and
outlined stringent penalties; increased its investigations into
official complicity; and launched a five-year anti-trafficking national
action plan. The Secretary will release the 2021 TIP Report with
updated tier rankings and updated prioritized recommendations this
summer. If confirmed, I will continue to press for progress on
recommendations in the TIP Report.
Question. Given Lesotho's enclosure by South Africa, a Tier 2
country, are there connections to be made with South Africa and the
U.S. Embassy there to improve trafficking regionally?
Answer. Trafficking is indeed a regional problem that demands a
regional response. If confirmed, I will not only lead our bilateral
engagement urging the Government of Lesotho to pursue and punish
traffickers and better protect victims, but will also work with the
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
and the U.S. Embassy in Pretoria to encourage regional solutions and
inter-governmental cooperation to combat cross-border trafficking.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom report, Lesotho was identified as partially tolerant of
religious freedom. What is your assessment of this particular issue and
if confirmed, how will you work with the Office of International
Religious Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-country and expand on
the work the U.S. Embassy is currently undertaking to prevent further
discrimination of religious minorities?
Answer. As noted in the 2020 International Religious Freedom
report, the constitution of Lesotho prohibits religious discrimination
and provides for freedom of conscience, thought, and religion,
including the freedom to change religion or belief and to manifest and
propagate one's religion. Religious leaders of all faiths have told the
U.S. Embassy that there is broad religious tolerance among the people
of Lesotho.
Some business and government leaders occasionally express distrust
of entrepreneurs of South Asian origin, many of whom are Muslim.
Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy is unaware of any act of discrimination
targeting Lesotho's Muslims, whether those who have recently immigrated
to Lesotho or the longstanding Muslim communities in the north of the
country.
If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. Embassy's regular contact
with religious, government, business, and civil society leaders to
discuss religious freedom and tolerance and the need to be proactive in
preventing discrimination against adherents of the country's growing
minority religions, particularly Islam.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Lesotho was identified as having committed human rights abuses,
including using the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown as a
fac*ade to stifle freedom of assembly and movement.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
Answer. Many observers argued that Lesotho's previous
administration used the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to stifle
freedoms of peaceful assembly and movement. That was a clear human
rights concern, as are ongoing problems such as trafficking in persons,
police brutality, and child labor. The United States is also concerned
about prolonged pretrial detentions and prison conditions. Some other
concerns detailed in the 2020 Human Rights Report include reports of
unlawful or arbitrary killings by security forces, arbitrary arrest and
detention, and mistreatment while in custody. There are also issues
with official corruption, a lack of judicial independence, violence
against women, and continued criminalization of consensual same-sex
sexual conduct between adults.
The mission pushes for greater accountability in cases of police
abuse and encourages the Lesotho Mounted Police Service to strengthen
its police complaints board, with some success. The mission also works
to promote better understanding of community-based policing via
training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy in
Botswana. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts as I engage the
Government of Lesotho to address concerns detailed in the 2020 Human
Rights Report.
Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy maintains excellent relationships with all
of Lesotho's major civil society organizations, who rely on us to act
as a voice of conscience both in the public sphere and in our private
consultations with the Government. If confirmed, I will continue to
work closely with Lesotho's community of civil society organizations. I
will also encourage them to focus their attentions on the most pressing
human rights concerns and will look for synergistic opportunities to
cooperate with these groups to advocate for reform, accountability, and
protection of human rights.
Question. In your opinion, is Lesotho a potential target for
improved U.S. trade and investment? What tools should the U.S. apply in
Lesotho to encourage export diversification and investment by American
firms?
Answer. Yes. Several economic sectors in Lesotho have growth
potential, including water (hydropower and pipeline infrastructure),
diamonds, tourism, agriculture, and power generation. The Government
has also noted that it seeks to improve transportation and its
information technology infrastructure. In 2019, the United States
exported about $1 million in goods to Lesotho, mostly machinery,
medical instruments, and aircraft. In the same year, the United States
imported around $325 million in goods, mostly apparel, precious stones,
and some machinery.
Lesotho is a long-time beneficiary of trade benefits under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which has helped create over
45,000 jobs in the textile industry. According to 2019 numbers, AGOA
exports accounted for approximately 12% of Lesotho's GDP ($325 million
out of $2.7 billion). One of the AGOA eligibility requirements is that
a country must have established, or make progress towards establishing,
a market-based economy. This creates a more-level playing field for
U.S. companies and serves as a useful counterweight to actors seeking
to influence Lesotho to adopt policies that would be counter to U.S.
interests. By creating a more-level playing field for U.S. companies
overseas, we contribute to economic prosperity at home, too. Several
U.S. brands already manufacture products in Lesotho. If confirmed, I
will utilize initiatives such as Prosper Africa to actively seek
opportunities to increase reciprocal trade and investment.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Maria E. Brewer by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Brewer, As you know, Lesotho has been plagued
with political instability since independence in 1966, and no prime
minister has served a full term for the past decade.
In light of Lesotho's recurrent political instability, what are
some opportunities that you see for the U.S. to support the
development of Lesotho's democratic institutions?
Answer. Promoting democratic governance is at the core of U.S.
values and of what we seek to accomplish in Lesotho. Lesotho has a
complicated history with several instances of political and armed
instability, driven in part by politicians pulling the security
services into political disputes and the security sector's inability to
remain neutral. In recent years, Embassy Maseru has worked to improve
civilian-military relationships, encourage the neutrality of security
and law enforcement bodies, and support Lesotho's ongoing efforts to
depoliticize its security forces. The mission also collaborates with
like-minded partners (including the UK) to advance these goals.
Building on existing U.S. Embassy efforts to promote civilian control
of Lesotho's military and government accountability, if confirmed, I
look forward to working with this committee, the interagency, and the
Government of Lesotho to strengthen Lesotho's institutions, to further
promote the professionalization of Lesotho's security forces and to
foster improved civilian oversight of the military and law enforcement.
I will also continue to work with the interagency to identify ways to
reinforce Lesotho's ability to meet the needs of its people and build
its capacity to be a better partner to us.
Question. Ambassador Brewer, Support to the health sector, mainly
through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, is a
significant element of the U.S./Lesotho bilateral relationship.
What is your assessment of the importance and effectiveness of U.S.
support to combatting HIV/AIDs and other public health emergencies in
Lesotho, including the COVID pandemic?
Answer. America's interests at home are strengthened by improving
lives globally. Investments in preventing disease and improving public
health and nutrition are among our best means to articulate and embody
our values, while simultaneously pursuing our national security
interests. U.S. support to combat HIV/AIDS and other public health
emergencies in Lesotho is important because it is both the right and
the smart thing to do. In Lesotho, our PEPFAR investment has seen a
remarkable return in terms of lives saved and increased social
stability.
Largely because of U.S. support, Lesotho is one of the first PEPFAR
countries to achieve the UNAIDS targets for epidemic control; moreover,
it has cut its rate of new HIV infections in half since 2016. These
historic achievements lay the groundwork for an HIV/AIDS-free
generation and are landmarks in PEPFAR's 18-year history.
U.S. health and development investments in Lesotho, including but
not limited to PEPFAR, are important and effective, certainly in terms
of controlling the HIV/AIDS pandemic, but also in terms of combatting
COVID-19, TB and other communicable diseases; confronting health-
related issues such as immunizations, clean water, and sanitation; and
enhancing health security by preventing, detecting, and responding to
infectious disease threats.
If confirmed, I will ensure good stewardship of U.S. taxpayers'
investment in health and development in Lesotho. Building on the
outstanding success achieved through our previous and existing
partnerships with the Government and people of Lesotho, I will also
work to secure sustainability and help Lesotho move towards self-
reliance in meeting the future needs of its population.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. What role can the United States play in efforts of the
Lourenco administration to root out corruption and repatriate stolen
assets?
Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The
Government should also ensure that private sector financial
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the
appropriate authorities for action.
U.S. engagement includes technical assistance for Angola's
Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance. If confirmed, I
would seek to expand cooperation on potential corruption
investigations, capacity building in the justice system in constructing
corruption cases, and capacity building in the Extractive Industry
Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting mechanisms.
Question. In advance of elections in 2022, what can the U.S.
Embassy do to ensure free political expression and the conduct of fair
elections?
Answer. The U.S. Government has encouraged the Government of Angola
to follow through on its commitment to hold local government elections,
which would be a positive step in the democratization process of
Angola, giving people direct representation at the local level of
government. If confirmed, I will continue to communicate this message.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that Embassy Luanda
exercises proper management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao
Tome and Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, with your help, I will work to deepen the
U.S. partnership with both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. I have
experience being accredited as ambassador to two countries
concurrently, and will draw on that experience to ensure proper
management and oversight of the U.S. presence in Sao Tome and Principe.
Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in
your career to date to support democracy and human rights? What has
been the impact of your actions?
Answer. Promoting democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human
rights has been a central theme throughout my 30-year career at the
Department of State. From my early postings to the current one, I have
endeavored to share with host country counterparts the U.S. position on
human rights and democracy. My strategy has always been to honestly
explain our position showing the benefits of respecting human rights
and promoting democratic principles, a winning proposition for the host
country as well.
I have supported the conduct of peaceful elections, passing laws on
inclusive participation in elections, and raising disability awareness.
I have advocated against restrictive LGBTQI+ laws, empowered women's
participation in elections, given a voice to civil society, and
emphasized the importance of a free press.
As Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau, our promotion of free and fair
elections with credible and appropriately transparent processes led to
the first ever peaceful transition of power between two civilian
presidents in the history of the country.
During my tenure as Ambassador in Burkina Faso, I advised against a
proposed constitutional amendment to presidential term limits, designed
to extend the time in office of an already long-term sitting president.
Additionally, I pushed the Government of Transition of Burkina Faso for
timely elections during a sensitive time when some voices were
considering a delay. Finally, following the free and fair presidential
election, Burkina Faso and its people witnessed the first ever peaceful
transition of power from one civilian government to another.
Previously, in Mozambique I participated as an international observer
in the country's first-ever democratic elections and worked closely
with the rest of the Embassy team to empower the Mozambican people as
they freely elected their leaders.
As the Deputy Chief of Mission in Ethiopia from 2009-2011, I
encouraged the Ethiopian Government to allow civil society and
opposition political parties to operate freely. Our Embassy efforts
helped provide a path for opposition parties in Ethiopia to publicize
their platforms, thus allowing a broader range of Ethiopian citizens to
have a voice in their government, resulting in an increase in voter
registration and participation.
Based on my dedication to promote and support respect for human
rights and democracy during my career, I am honored to have been
selected for the AFSA's Mark Palmer Award for the Advancement of
Democracy in 2017. This award is given to members of the Foreign
Service, by their peers, for the promotion of U.S. policies focused on
advancing democracy, freedom and governance through bold, exemplary,
imaginative and effective efforts during one or more assignments.
Question. What issues are the most pressing challenges to democracy
or democratic development in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe? These
challenges might include obstacles to participatory and accountable
governance and institutions, rule of law, authentic political
competition, civil society, human rights and press freedom. Please be
as specific as possible.
Answer. Angola has made tangible progress towards transparency and
good governance, while initiating the fight against corruption and
promoting accountability for human rights violations and abuses.
However, the legacy of corruption, lack of capacity and weak
institutions are the biggest challenges, along with the need for
increased professionalism in law enforcement. Civil society, press
freedoms and political competition exist in Angola, but would benefit
from further strengthening.
Sao Tome and Principe (STP) has a small land footprint but a large
and strategically important maritime domain in the Gulf of Guinea
shipping lanes. Enhancing the country's ability to monitor its waters
and share information on maritime activity and piracy is a key
component to improve regional security. If confirmed, I will continue
to encourage Sao Tome's support for democracy, human rights, and rule
of law and to support its development efforts.
Question. What steps will you take--if confirmed--to support
democracy in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What do you hope to
accomplish through these actions? What are the potential impediments to
addressing the specific obstacles you have identified?
Answer. The Government of Angola has made significant improvements
on human rights-related issues over the last few years, and if
confirmed, I will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials
to support progress in this area. I will work to ensure the United
States and Angola hold a human rights dialogue in 2021, which will give
the United States an opportunity to assess progress and press on
remaining human rights and democracy issues. Finally, the United States
has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow through on its
commitment to hold local government elections in 2022, which would be a
positive step in the democratization process of Angola, giving people
direct representation at the local level of government and if
confirmed, I will continue to encourage the Government to prioritize
forward progress in this area.
Sao Tome and Principe has a long record of good governance and
support for democracy and human rights, and if confirmed, I will work
with its government to encourage and support these priorities.
Question. How will you utilize U.S. Government assistance resources
at your disposal, including the Democracy Commission Small Grants
program and other sources of State Department and USAID funding, to
support democracy and governance, and what will you prioritize in
processes to administer such assistance?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance to Angola currently advances
democracy and governance through several avenues, including by
providing assistance to advance electoral reforms, enhance fiscal
transparency and accountability, and promote increased participation by
women in the political process. Additionally, the United States
supports the introduction and expansion of good governance within
financial administration and service delivery systems, which bolsters
transparency, citizen participation, and accountability within planning
and financial management processes. If confirmed, I will continue to
engage within the Department and with interagency partners to support
the establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded
programs that advance U.S. interests in Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe. I also will emphasize the importance of making continual
progress on democracy and governance as an element of both countries'
AGOA eligibility.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with civil society
members, human rights and other non-governmental organizations in the
U.S. and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil
society in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe? What steps will you
take to pro-actively address efforts to restrict or penalize NGOs and
civil society via legal or regulatory measures?
Answer. Human rights NGOs--local, regional, and international--are
active in both Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. Civil society
organizations, regardless of where they are registered or where they
operate, can be critical allies in advancing democratic governance,
expanding respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
assisting the United States to strengthen its bilateral and
multilateral relationships. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging
broadly to help advance these objectives. I will leverage our strong
relationships in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to communicate
privately or publicly (as the situation dictates) to proactively
address efforts to restrict or penalize civil society through legal or
regulatory measures.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with democratically
oriented political opposition figures and parties? What steps will you
take to encourage genuine political competition? Will you advocate for
access and inclusivity for women, minorities and youth within political
parties?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to meet with democratically
oriented political opposition figures and parties, and I will advocate
openly in support of access and inclusivity for all individuals in
Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe, including women, minorities, and
youth. If confirmed, I will work with the host governments, civil
society, and like-minded missions to encourage genuine political
competition. I will emphasize the importance of promoting diverse
viewpoints and supporting an open arena for peaceful, good faith
discussions of political differences.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on freedom of the press and address
any government efforts designed to control or undermine press freedom
through legal, regulatory or other measures? Will you commit to meeting
regularly with independent, local press in both Angola and Sao Tome and
Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with media practitioners, like-
minded missions, civil society, government, and international partners
to underscore the importance of an independent, professional, and open
media to a free and democratic society. I will seek resources to
continue support to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe's media, including
professional exchanges, targeted training programs, and seminars to
educate journalists and media stakeholders about their rights. Angolan
and Sao Tomean journalists have participated in U.S. Government-
sponsored professional exchange programs on investigative reporting,
safeguarding freedom of expression, and the media's role in
strengthening democratic institutions.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with civil
society and government counterparts on countering disinformation and
propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-state actors in the
country?
Answer. If confirmed, I will engage with civil society and
government actors on countering disinformation and malign propaganda by
foreign state and non-state actors. I also will commit to working with
like-minded partners in Angola and in Sao Tome and Principe to counter
disinformation and malign propaganda campaigns.
Question. Will you and your embassy teams actively engage with
Angola and Sao Tome and Principe on the right of labor groups to
organize, including for independent trade unions?
Answer. The United States has a long and proud tradition of
supporting the rights of workers, including to form labor
organizations, internationally. If confirmed, I will commit to engage
with unions, relevant government offices, and the private sector to
support labor rights.
Question. Will you commit to using your position, if confirmed, to
defend the human rights and dignity of all people in Angola and Sao
Tome and Principe, no matter their sexual orientation or gender
identity?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will strive to defend the human rights
and dignity of all individuals in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe, no
matter their sexual orientation or gender identity.
Question. What challenges do the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face in Angola and in Sao Tome and
Principe?
Answer. President Lourenco has expanded legal protections for
LGTBQI+ persons since he was elected, including decriminalization of
homosexuality. However, LGBTQI+ persons in Angola tell us culturally
they face resistance in being accepted, even at the family level. While
not criminalized, homosexuality is stigmatized in Sao Tome and
Principe. Members of the LGBTQI+ community can face ostracism and
violence.
Question. What specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ
people in Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to defend the human rights and
dignity of all individuals in Angola, no matter their sexual
orientation or gender identity. I will seek ways to expand Embassy
support for the efforts of LGBTQI+ NGOs in Angola, including through
advocacy, leadership development opportunities, and programmatic
support. Similarly, I will reach out to the LGBTQI+ community in Sao
Tome and Principe to respond to its concerns.
Question. Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensuring that you fully
brief Members of Congress and/or their staff each time you are in
Washington for visits or consultations during your tenure as Ambassador
to Angola and Sao Tome and Principe?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit, in coordination with the State
Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to appropriately respond to
requests for briefings and information by this committee.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator James E. Risch
Strengthening Angola and the Region
Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.
Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in
the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at
political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What
can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to
diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue
combatting corruption?
Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions,
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement.
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.
Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda.
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?
Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has
systematically raised its level of active participation in
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations.
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.
Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and
economic reforms that have pleased international financial
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Cory A. Booker
Strengthening Angola and the Region
Question. After decades of corrupt and authoritarian rule under
former President dos Santos, Angola has undergone a remarkable
transition since President Lourenco came to power in 2017. Under
Lourenco, Angola has undertaken an economic and political reform agenda
that aligns with U.S. interests and presents a unique opportunity to
develop a mutually beneficial partnership.
Four years into President Lourenco's term, Angola appears headed in
the right direction with a growing economy, tangible efforts at
political reform, and a focus on combatting corruption. What
can the United States do to help Angola as it seeks to
diversify its economy, improve governance, and continue
combatting corruption?
Answer. Angola still faces many challenges in the form of high
debt, a legacy of corruption, lack of capacity, and weak institutions,
along with the need for increased professionalism in law enforcement.
Civil society, press freedoms and political competition exist in
Angola, but would benefit from further strengthening. If confirmed, I
will continue to press for political and economic reforms, support the
fight against corruption, and buttress Angola's development efforts.
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Government to continue providing
technical assistance and to cooperate further on potential corruption
investigations, and on capacity building in the justice system in
constructing corruption cases. As Angola explores options to diversify
its economy and to create an environment more welcoming to investors, I
will seek to foster continued U.S. investment if confirmed.
Question. Angola has a reasonably strong military, and recently
played a helpful role in mediating conflict between Uganda and Rwanda.
Is Angola prepared to take more of a leadership role in the region? Do
you see potential for Angola increasing its participation in
peacekeeping or other stability operations on the continent?
Answer. I understand that under President Lourenco, Angola has
systematically raised its level of active participation in
international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the
International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Southern
Africa Development Community (SADC), successfully proposing candidates
for leadership roles. Using these leadership roles, Angola has shown a
willingness to be at the forefront of resolving some of the continent's
most difficult crises, including its current role in encouraging
stability in the Central African Republic and Chad.
Angola also recently enacted legislation which provides the
structure for its military to be deployed in peacekeeping operations.
The United States can better engage Angola to serve as a constructive
voice in Southern and Central Africa by consulting with the Angolan
Government in Luanda and in Washington, exchanging views and
encouraging mutually beneficial courses of action.
Question. Despite Angola's vast natural resource reserves and
economic reforms that have pleased international financial
institutions, much of the country still lives in poverty and remains in
need of assistance? How can the United States help ensure that Angola's
wealth and opportunity reach all corners of the country?
Answer. U.S. Government assistance programs in health and landmine
clearance improve the health and living conditions for Angolans
throughout the country. Our programs stress capacity building within
the Angolan Government and reinforce the need to address the issues of
all Angolans. In addition, multiple small grant programs target
economic development throughout the country. If confirmed, I will
continue to engage within the U.S. Government to support the
establishment and continuation of complementary and expanded programs
that advance U.S. interests in Angola.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Tulinabo S. Mushingi by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. Ambassador Mushingi, the election of a new president in
Angola in 2017 provided a clear opportunity for the U.S. to support
political and economic reforms, including in the areas of anti-
corruption and human rights. While the Angolan administration continues
to make progress, there continues to be limited U.S.-support for Angola
in the democracy and governance space.
What opportunities do you see for U.S. engagement and assistance in
this space?
Answer. The Government of Angola needs to continue to improve its
public financial management capacity as well as to strengthen
accounting, oversight, and auditing capabilities. It should also
increase law enforcement and judicial capacity to investigate and
prosecute corruption and financial crimes and better coordinate the
efforts of public institutions working on the investigations. The
Government should also ensure that private sector financial
institutions are regularly reporting suspicious transactions to the
appropriate authorities for action.
U.S. engagement in this space will include technical assistance for
Angola's Financial Intelligence Unit and Ministry of Finance.
Additional opportunities exist for the USG to cooperate further on
potential corruption investigations and possible sanctions, capacity
building in the justice system in constructing corruption cases/
prosecutions in international courts, and capacity building in the
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) reporting
mechanisms.
The Government of Angola has made significant improvements on human
rights-related issues over the last few years, and if confirmed, I and
the Embassy will continue to engage with Angolan Government officials
to support progress in this area. In 2020, the United States and Angola
held their third ministerial level dialogue on human rights, discussing
the need for respect for freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of
expression as well as the continued need for training of law
enforcement, which the U.S. will continue to support, consistent with
Leahy law and Department policy. I understand the United States and
Angola are planning the 2021 human rights dialogue, which will give the
U.S. an opportunity to assess progress and press on any remaining
issues. Finally, Post has encouraged the Government of Angola to follow
through on its commitment to hold local government elections, which
would be a positive step in the democratization process of Angola,
giving people direct representation at the local level of government.
Question. Ambassador Mushingi, China's presence looms large in
Angola. Angola is one of China's largest borrowers in Africa, with more
than $20 billion in outstanding debt to some Chinese entities.
How can the United States help Angola to begin chipping away at
that debt and the restraint put on Angola's economy and
political system by China?
Answer. As a key condition of its IMF program, Angola cannot hold
new oil collateralized debt. The United States supports the Debt
Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) agreed to by the G-20 which has
suspended official bilateral debt payments for 40 countries including
Angola since May 2020. Rolling back dependency on oil will require
significant investment in other economic sectors to stimulate growth.
The Embassy has leveraged U.S. interagency technical assistance and
high-level messaging to support Angola's anti-corruption campaign and
economic reforms, especially ongoing efforts to improve transparency
and compliance in the financial sector. An improved environment will
make U.S. firms more competitive in Angola. I understand that the
Embassy has successfully advocated for U.S. investors to break into
sectors long dominated by Chinese companies, such as
telecommunications. President Lourenco lobbied U.S. private sector
representatives in a December 2020 virtual roundtable to invest in
Angola, demonstrating the high-level desire to attract U.S. investment
in various sectors. If confirmed, I will lead the Embassy to continue
reporting on opportunities for American companies and advocate for them
to compete for tenders and other investment opportunities as the
Angolan economy diversifies. Programs such as the DFC and Prosper
Africa will also help target alternatives to Chinese investment and
commercial interests.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Algeria was identified as Tier 3 due to lack of significant
efforts to combat human trafficking in the reporting period. The
Government made little to no attempts to improve resources for victims,
including punishing victims for crimes their traffickers forced them to
commit. What steps would you take as Ambassador, if confirmed, to
engage with the host government and civil society organizations on
bolstering efforts to improve prosecution and protection efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, improving Algeria's efforts to combat human
trafficking will be one of my highest priorities. The Embassy is
already working with the Algerian Government to improve its efforts to
investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and proactively
identify and assist trafficking victims, including by offering
technical support. If confirmed, I will urge Algerian officials to pass
a standalone Trafficking in Persons (TIP) law this year to bring their
legal framework in line with international commitments and to formalize
their victim referral mechanism. We will continue to support Algerian
efforts to raise awareness of TIP in the law enforcement community,
including through trainings for prosecutors and judges.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom Report and the 2021 U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom Annual Report, the U.S. identified Algeria as having poor
religious freedom conditions, with the Government continuing its
repression of Christian and minority Muslim communities. What is your
assessment of this particular issue and if confirmed, how will you work
with the Office of International Religious Freedom to bolster religious
freedom in-country?
Answer. Government-led persecution of marginalized minorities,
including Christian and minority Muslim and non-Muslim religious
groups, continues to be a significant issue in Algeria. Our Embassy is
in regular contact with a wide variety of religious leaders in Algeria
and maintains an active dialogue with the Algerian Government on
religious freedom issues. The United States Government has publicly and
privately stressed the importance of religious tolerance and the equal
and transparent application of the laws governing religious
organizations. If confirmed, I will raise issues of religious
persecution identified by the Office of International Religious Freedom
with the Algerian Government and encourage embassy reporting on
specific cases.
Question. Algeria was subsequently designated as a Special Watch
List country by USCIRF for its actions to systematically repress
religious minorities. If confirmed, will you suggest Algeria for the
State Department's Special Watch List for engaging and tolerating
severe violations of religious freedom?
Answer. USCIRF's Special Watch List (SWL) functions as a warning to
avoid possible Country of Particular Concern (CPC) designation by the
Department of State. For countries designated as CPCs, the
International Religious Freedom Act provides the Secretary of State
with a range of policy options to address serious violations of
religious freedom. The SWL applies to countries that we deem to have
engaged in or tolerated severe violations of religious freedom, but
that do not meet all of the CPC criteria. If confirmed, I will
prioritize the promotion of religious tolerance and impress upon the
Algerian Government the seriousness of the potentiality of a SWL or CPC
designation, and actions that could be taken now to preclude these
designations.
Question. If confirmed, will you encourage embassy officials to
attend public country proceedings on church closures to emphasize USG
concern regarding this issue?
Answer. The Algerian Government continues to use COVID-19
restrictions and the status of churches as un-registered associations
to justify closures. If confirmed, I will encourage embassy officials
to attend public proceedings on church closures, as appropriate, to
emphasize U.S. Government concern regarding this issue and to urge the
Algerian Government to allow the legalization of religious minority
groups by approving their requests to be registered associations.
Question. The constitutional referendum passed in November
indicates a further erosion of religious freedom conditions in country.
Please describe your potential engagement with the Algerian Government
regarding this referendum.
Answer. The Algerian constitution provides for freedom of worship,
but religious minorities continue to face difficulty registering as
legally recognized organizations. Though the new constitution allows
for the creation of a religious organization by declaration, the
Government needs to amend the 2012 Law of Associations to implement
this change. The State Department's Annual Human Rights and Religious
Freedom Reports for Algeria cite this need and, if confirmed, I will
continue to advocate for religious freedom.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Algeria was identified as having committed severe human rights abuses,
including government sanctioned attacks on freedom of assembly for
protestors in early 2020. If confirmed, what steps will you take to
address these instances with the host government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the promotion of human
rights and impress upon Algerian leaders the importance of these
issues. The annual Human Rights Report regularly garners press
attention and is studied carefully in Algeria. If confirmed, I commit
to continuing my predecessors' tradition of meeting with human rights,
civil society, and other non-governmental organizations in the United
States and in Algeria to support their efforts on advancing human
rights. Our embassy is in regular contact with human rights activists
and journalists in Algeria and maintains an active dialogue with the
Algerian Government on human rights issues.
Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. If confirmed, I will direct my embassy to maintain contact
with civil society organizations in Algeria to support civil society
development. Funding for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI)
and other civil society assistance programs will empower nascent civil
society in Algeria, building capacity to better represent citizens'
interests and hold the Government accountable. If confirmed, I will
also urge the Algerian Government to issue an updated NGO law to ease
restrictions on registering and operating civil society organizations.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Elizabeth Moore Aubin by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. During the last two years we have seen significant
political events in Algeria. These include a mass leaderless protest
movement, a contentious election resulting in a successor to the long
serving former president and a new constitution. What are your thoughts
about how the events of the past two years have affected the U.S.-
Algeria partnership and what opportunities do you think it creates for
the U.S.?
Answer. The U.S.-Algeria bilateral relationship has remained strong
through the momentous events of the last two years. Algeria has taken
steps towards political and economic reform and the United States will
continue to support efforts that expand observance of human rights,
including freedoms of expression and association. We will also work to
facilitate U.S. investment opportunities to deliver economic benefits
to the American and the Algerian people. If confirmed, I will also
promote the embassy's entrepreneurship programs for youth and women as
well as pursue a grant-funded project to expand English language
instruction in Algeria to better prepare Algerians for professional and
commercial opportunities at home and abroad.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Eugene S. Young by Senator James E. Risch
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Republic of the Congo was upgraded to Tier 2 due to increased
efforts to eliminate trafficking, but the Government still lacks
adequate resources to screen vulnerable populations and lacks a
national action plan and clear understanding of anti-tracking laws. How
will you work with the host government and local civil society
organizations to address these issues if you are confirmed as
Ambassador?
Answer. As you note, the Congolese Government has shown the
political will to address trafficking issues. The Government has
drafted a national action plan against Trafficking in Persons but has
yet to ratify it. The Congolese successfully prosecuted seven human
traffickers and successfully repatriated eight victims in the past
year. If confirmed, I will continue the positive work begun under my
predecessor. My team and I will use the resources available from the
State Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
to help train and equip the Congolese police, judiciary, and
legislators, as well as support the NGOs on the ground doing the heroic
day-to-day work of identifying trafficking victims and their
traffickers.
Question. The U.S. Embassy is actively engaging with government
officials and organizations on religious freedom issues, including
supporting virtual events with religious leaders and youths. How will
you, if confirmed, continue this work and bolster efforts already
underway?
Answer. One of the major components of Congo's stability is the
ability of different religious groups to coordinate and work together
to promote civil society and meet the needs of the Congolese people.
This collaboration dates all the way back to the 1960s at the formation
of Congo as an independent country. If confirmed, I will continue our
Embassy team's efforts to bring together religious organizations,
international partners, private businesses, and members of the
Government to ensure international religious freedom continues to be a
priority of our bilateral relationship.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, the
Republic of the Congo was identified as having committed human rights
abuses, notably that political activists and civil society members,
including human rights defenders, continued to face intimidation,
harassment and arbitrary detention by the Government or other state
actors.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
How will you direct your embassy to work with civil society
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. I share your concern about these developments and the
treatment of journalists and human rights activists in the Republic of
the Congo. This concern is something repeatedly conveyed by our staff
at Embassy Brazzaville to the highest levels of the Government. This
focus on human rights is a practice that I will continue if confirmed.
While Congo's human rights record is far from clean, we have seen
some progress. Congolese peacekeeping troops who were accused of human
rights violations while in CAR in 2016 did face consequences, and our
ongoing training with the Congo military educates troops about human
rights protections. If confirmed I would work alongside civil society
organizations to bring increased attention to human rights violations
and abuses and to offer what we can in terms of training programs and
other resources to promote respect for human rights.
Question. As U.S. Ambassador, how will you engage with the
international financial institutions, including the IMF, in the
Republic of Congo over their engagement with the Sassou Nguesso
administration despite significant corruption and lack of transparency
in finances and debts?
Answer. Across Africa our goal is to increase debt transparency.
Debt transparency is vital for maintaining debt sustainability,
facilitating resolutions when necessary, and minimizing corruption. The
Republic of Congo is in debt distress in part due to non-transparent
Chinese lending. We can't always stop governments from excessive and
corrupt borrowing, but setting the standard of transparency makes it
harder to borrow corruptly and unsustainably. In fora such as the IMF
where we can better control the terms of loan and financial programs,
if confirmed, I will seek to engage in the process to insist on the
inclusion of transparency measures.
Question. The Congo River Basin is one of the major focuses of U.S.
supported conservation and environment programming, including through
the Central Africa Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE). How
can the U.S. better engage with the Republic of Congo these efforts?
Answer. Our embassy in Brazzaville has been hard at work ramping up
our environmental cooperation with the Congolese. Thanks to the team's
efforts, Congo's Minister of Tourism and Environment was the first
African to speak at the international round table discussion before the
recent Leaders' Summit on Climate. Our embassy is also working with the
Congolese to develop side events focusing on the Congo rainforest for
the upcoming COP 26 conference. Finally, a new USAID position in
Brazzaville is set to come online later this summer. If confirmed, I
will continue these efforts to engage Congo on this important area of
bilateral cooperation.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Eugene S. Young by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. As you know, Congo's president is one of Africa's longest
serving leaders with power vested in him and a network of family and
associates. One result has been prolific corruption in the oil sector.
I'm curious about your thoughts on what tools you think you would
employ as U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Congo to encourage anti-
corruption and democratic development in one of the most kleptocratic
and closed political and civic environments in Africa?
Answer. Corruption inhibits economic and democratic development and
runs counter to American values. It damages trade, guts institutions,
and destroys citizens' confidence in their government. Recent calls for
more American investment in Congo to counter malign influence show me
the Congolese people want to address this problem as well. If
confirmed, I will push hard for that investment, and the transparency
and fair dealing it brings. In addition, I will work with international
partners such as the World Bank and IMF to increase transparency in
Congo's borrowing, procurement, and financial systems.
Question. Congo has seen a rapid accumulation of debt over the past
decade--much of it owed to China. Given this increase in China's
influence, what opportunities do you think there are for us to increase
our engagement with the Republic of Congo, both to support development
in line with American values and to counter China's role in the
country?
Answer. China's investment in the Republic of Congo is
considerable. Chinese debt of over $4 billion risks permanent damage to
Congo's future growth. However, there are important strengths in the
U.S.-Congolese relationship that we can focus and build on to help
counter Chinese influence. America's continued appeal as a country of
ideas, future trends, and freedom resonates with the Congolese,
especially the youth. Drawing a distinction with China by highlighting
and demonstrating America's strengths is our best way of countering
China's influence over the long term. Our areas of collaboration with
the Government of Congo include environmental protection, human rights,
and health development, among many others. These are areas where we
believe the United States can do the most good for the American and
Congolese people.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Robert Menendez
Politics and Economy
Question. How do you intend to capitalize on the heightened
attention Secretary Blinken and recent sanctions have brought to the
Anglophone crisis, and how will you advance engagement with the French
to work toward a peaceful resolution?
Answer. The Secretary's decision to impose visa restrictions on
those involved in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects the U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone
crisis and support respect for human rights. This decision followed
cuts in security assistance in recent years and the determination that
Cameroon was ineligible for AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These
actions demonstrate the U.S. Government's resolve to back up words with
actions. The United States will continue to consider all potential
diplomatic tools to advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone
Northwest and Southwest Regions.
We continue to engage other UN member states, particularly the
French, in bilateral and multilateral fora and at all levels on the
importance of rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to
explore ways we can work together to move towards a resolution of the
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. If confirmed, I will
make resolving the Anglophone crisis my top policy priority and will
engage in discussions with France and other partners on the ground and
look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. What have been the impacts on Cameroon's economy and
U.S.-Cameroon commercial ties of the termination of Cameroon's AGOA
eligibility, and how would you seek to expand and protect U.S.
commercial interests there?
Answer. Cameroon was found ineligible for AGOA in 2019 and lost
AGOA benefits starting on January 1, 2020 under the criterion that
excludes countries that engage in gross violations of internationally
recognized human rights. Cameroon can regain AGOA eligibility by
preventing such violations, by strengthening human rights protections
in the law, and by impartially and transparently investigating reports
of such violations and holding accountable those responsible.
In 2018, Cameroon exported roughly $220 million in goods and
services to the United States; of that figure, $63 million was exported
under AGOA, over 90 percent of which was crude petroleum. The United
States will continue to pursue robust and diverse commercial ties,
deploying other tools at our disposal toward realizing the enormous
potential of this relationship for our mutual prosperity and economic
growth. More than any government program, however, the entrepreneurial
initiative of Cameroonian and American businesses and a business
climate that helps them flourish will be the key to stronger commercial
ties between the United States and Cameroon. If confirmed, I will urge
the Government to take tangible steps to improve the business climate,
advocate on behalf of U.S. companies, and direct our embassy to
continue to look for opportunities to expand commercial ties, using all
the tools and resources that we have at our disposal.
Question. It was recently reported that most of a $335 million
loan to fight COVID-19 from the IMF could not be accounted for. How
will you address endemic corruption and work to increase transparency
and accountability of the Government of Cameroon?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the challenges in the
fight against corruption in Cameroon. The United States is concerned
about allegations about misuse of funding aimed at helping Cameroon
respond to the pandemic. The Embassy provides financial and technical
support to the fight against corruption. The Department of Treasury's
Office of Technical Assistance assists the Ministry of Finance,
specifically the Taxation Directorate, to identify and manage
compliance and institutional risks and facilitate the efficacy of
internal audit and employee anti-corruption investigations. Another
transparency and good governance activity is the Fiscal Transparency
Innovation Fund (FTIF). In 2018, the Department of State, through the
FTIF, granted $276,500 to a financial auditing firm to train financial
practitioners in the public and public sector on modern financial
reporting norms and develop a plan for the adoption of International
Financial Reporting Standards.
If confirmed, I would continue to explore opportunities like these
to address endemic corruption in Cameroon and engage other diplomatic
and international missions with a view to leveraging our resources and
voices to advocate for change. I would also urge the Government to take
meaningful steps to hold those complicit in corrupt practices
accountable, change institutional practices that facilitate corruption,
and do so transparently to help restore public faith in governance
practices.
COVID-19
Question. How has COVID-19 impacted our health programs, and how do
you intend to leverage U.S. Government bilateral global health program
platforms to help the people of Cameroon respond to and address the
impacts?
Answer. Cameroon has made significant efforts in managing the
COVID-19 outbreak, despite challenges around national coordination,
resurgence of cases fueled by limited adherence by the general
population to mitigation measures, and concerns about mismanagement of
COVID-19 funds. The COVID-19 pandemic has interrupted routine
immunizations and service delivery across Cameroon's health sector, but
we continue to support recovery of health systems and sustain gains
made through the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the Global
Health Security Agenda, the President's Malaria Initiative, and other
global health programs.
Across U.S. agencies present in the health sector, including the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense
(DOD), and Peace Corps, we have invested over $600 million since 2010
to strengthen the health system and fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria, and other diseases, including COVID-19. U.S. public health
experts have worked hand-in-hand with Cameroonian officials on COVID-19
preparedness and response efforts, helping to build capacity for
emergency management, surveillance, laboratory testing, case
management, and infection prevention and control. If confirmed, I will
ensure that health diplomacy remains a priority. I will encourage the
Government of Cameroon to increase spending on health, support efforts
to improve accountability in the provision of health care nationwide
and continue to work towards reaching epidemic control of HIV/AIDs
within the next two years.
Democracy & Human Rights
Question. What are the most important actions you have taken in
your career to date to support democracy and human rights? What has
been the impact of your actions?
Answer. I have spent most of my career as a consular officer,
focused on the protection of U.S. citizens and the application and
enforcement of U.S. immigration law. I also served as an election
observer in both Cameroon (1992) and the Central African Republic
(1993), and I worked to improve prison conditions in the Dominican
Republic (2002-05). In Ghana, where I was Deputy Chief of Mission
(2018-21), we dedicated significant effort to combatting child labor in
the fishing and cocoa sectors, addressing trafficking in persons, and
promoting respect for the human rights of all individuals in Ghana.
Through our DOJ Resident Legal Adviser, we also worked with the
Ghanaian Ministry of Justice and court system to implement reforms on
pre-trial detention, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and
strengthening the public defender corps, all of which gave Ghanaians
greater and more equitable access to justice.
Question. What issues are the most pressing challenges to democracy
or democratic development in Cameroon? These challenges might include
obstacles to participatory and accountable governance and institutions,
rule of law, authentic political competition, civil society, human
rights and press freedom. Please be as specific as possible.
Answer. Many Cameroonians and outsiders perceive poor governance to
be the root of most problems in the country. They view the bureaucracy
as slow-moving and suffering from internal competition, cite corruption
as an endemic problem, and point to the ongoing investigation into the
alleged misused of funds aimed at helping Cameroon to combat the COVID-
19 pandemic as a tangible example of the issue. There are also concerns
about the lack of space for political opposition leaders, human rights
defenders, journalists, and others to operate in if they espouse views
that run counter to the Cameroonian Government's views and policies.
Cameroonians are also frustrated with lapses or failure of delivery of
public services, deteriorating infrastructure, poverty, and lack of
progress on decentralization. They hope that the Government will
address the root causes of extremism in the Far North and those that
led to the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and address
allegations of human rights violations and abuses by security forces.
Question. What steps will you take--if confirmed--to support
democracy in Cameroon? What do you hope to accomplish through these
actions? What are the potential impediments to addressing the specific
obstacles you have identified?
Answer. Building the capacity of civil society to promote respect
for human rights and democracy is a top priority for our mission in
Cameroon. The United States provides funding to local organizations
focused on supporting dialogue and peace initiatives related to the
crisis in Anglophone regions, strengthening the rule of law, improving
the legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil
engagement and human rights.
Civil society actors focused on the protection of human rights and
the promotion of democracy and good governance operate in a difficult
political environment. They often face consistent harassment and
arrests for exercising their oversight role and exposing human rights
violations and abuses committed by the Government.
If confirmed, I will continue to advance opportunities to
strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and amplify
their voices, encourage the Government to collaborate with these
organizations for the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we
coordinate our efforts with diplomatic and international missions.
Strengthening civil society will allow them to better advocate for
change to improve the lives of ordinary Cameroonians.
Question. How will you utilize U.S. Government assistance resources
at your disposal, including the Democracy Commission Small Grants
program and other sources of State Department and USAID funding, to
support democracy and governance, and what will you prioritize in
processes to administer such assistance?
Answer. Supporting democracy and governance is a priority for our
mission in Cameroon. Through a $550,000 grant from the Bureau of
Conflict and Stabilization Operations, we conducted programming from
August 2019 through December 2020 that sought to strengthen civil
society's capacity to support dialogue and peace initiatives related to
the crisis in Anglophone regions. Each year, we support organizations
with an estimated $400,000 through Africa Regional Democracy funding,
with projects focused on strengthening the rule of law, improving the
legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil
engagement. We use Ambassador's Special Self-Help Funds, approximately
$75,000 each year, to support grassroots community organizations to
find local solutions to basic problems.
In 2019, USAID launched for the first time the Civil Society
Sustainability Index (CSO SI) in Cameroon. The CSO SI assesses the
capacity of civil society to serve as both a short-term partner in
implementing development solutions and a long-term actor in ensuring
that development outcomes are sustained. To further bolster the
capacity of the civil society sector, USAID designed a new Civil
Society Strengthening and Community Resilience program. The anticipated
program will primarily focus on strengthening civil society capacity to
deliver services and promote citizen engagement.
If confirmed, I will continue these efforts to bolster Cameroon's
civil society capacity, exploring all potential funding options that
could help us achieve this objective. I will also assess what
additional resources we can tap and programs we can undertake to
advance democracy.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with civil society
members, human rights and other non-governmental organizations in the
U.S. and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil
society in Cameroon? What steps will you take to pro-actively address
efforts to restrict or penalize NGOs and civil society via legal or
regulatory measures?
Answer. The promotion of respect for human rights is a central
pillar in our relations with Cameroon. If confirmed, I will continue
and strengthen the relationships built by the mission and the
Department of State more broadly with civil society members, human
rights and other non-governmental organizations in the United States
and with local human rights NGOs, and other members of civil society in
Cameroon. I will continue to advance opportunities to strengthen the
capacity of civil society organizations and amplify their voices,
encourage the Government to collaborate with these organizations for
the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we coordinate our efforts
with diplomatic and international missions.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to meet with democratically
oriented political opposition figures and parties? What steps will you
take to encourage genuine political competition? Will you advocate for
access and inclusivity for women, minorities and youth within political
parties?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continue and strengthen the
relationships our mission has built with democratically oriented
political opposition figures and parties. I will strive to support the
efforts of these figures and parties to develop a more inclusive
political environment in Cameroon, including their efforts to advance
electoral reform. I will urge the Government to ensure the freedoms of
association and peaceful assembly for all political actors, even those
who do not agree with the Government. Through public statements, small
grants and other programming, and direct engagements, I will advocate
for a political environment that is inclusive of women, youth,
minorities, and Cameroonians who might otherwise be marginalized.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with
Cameroon on freedom of the press and address any government efforts
designed to control or undermine press freedom through legal,
regulatory or other measures? Will you commit to meeting regularly with
independent, local press in Cameroon?
Answer. If confirmed, I will actively engage with Cameroon on press
freedom issues. I will call on the Government to prevent and stop the
harassment and arrests of journalists whose reporting is critical of
the Cameroonian Government's policies, which has a negative impact on
press freedom. I will also underscore the need for the Government to be
transparent as doing so would make independent media outlets better
positioned to share accurate information with ordinary Cameroonians. We
will also continue to prioritize providing training and other capacity
building opportunities for journalists. If confirmed, I will commit to
meeting regularly with independent, local press in Cameroon.
Question. Will you and your embassy team actively engage with civil
society and government counterparts on countering disinformation and
propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-state actors in the
country?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue and, as appropriate, expand
upon the Embassy's ongoing engagements with civil society and
government counterparts to promote the importance of countering
disinformation and propaganda disseminated by foreign state or non-
state actors in the country.
Question. Will you and your embassy teams actively engage with
Cameroon on the right of labor groups to organize, including for
independent trade unions?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will commit to actively engage with
Cameroon on the right of labor groups to organize, including for
independent trade unions, and call out incidents when this right is
restricted.
Question. Will you commit to using your position, if confirmed, to
defend the human rights and dignity of all people in Cameroon, no
matter their sexual orientation or gender identity?
Answer. Promoting human rights and democracy is a priority for our
mission in Cameroon. If confirmed, I will use all diplomatic tools at
my disposal to defend the human rights and dignity of all people in
Cameroon, no matter their sexual orientation or gender identity.
Question. What challenges do the lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender and queer (LGBTQ) people face in Cameroon?
Answer. Cameroonian society is conservative, with many Cameroonians
vehemently opposed to the idea that basic civil, legal, and human
rights extend to Cameroon's LGBTQI+ citizens. The constitution provides
for equal rights for all citizens, but Cameroonian laws do not
explicitly prohibit discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons in housing,
employment, and access to government services such as health care.
Since 2020, there has been an uptick in arrests of LGBTQI+ individuals.
The overwhelming majority of these cases do not meet basic due process
standards. Defendants have been accused and convicted based on their
manner of walking or appearance, as well as unsubstantiated rumors. The
recent sentencing of two transgender women to five years in prison for
``attempted homosexuality'' highlights the threats and stigma LGBTQI+
Cameroonians face.
Question. What specifically will you commit to do to help LGBTQ
people in Cameroon?
Answer. Promoting the basic human rights of LGBTQI+ people is a
challenging endeavor in a society as conservative as Cameroon. It is,
however, a priority of the Biden-Harris administration, and, if
confirmed, I commit to carrying out the President's mandate. It is
critically important that we remain aware and take account of the local
context in carrying out this mandate. As I saw most recently in Ghana,
the embassy's overriding principle must always be ``First, Do No
Harm.'' Even as we have the best intentions, we must not inadvertently
make the situation worse. For instance, it may not always be
appropriate to issue public statements in response to a given arrest,
but to engage in quiet, closed-door diplomacy that minimizes additional
risks to LGBTQI+ people. In gauging how, when, and whether to engage on
this topic, it is invaluable to understand the local LGBTQI+ community,
and I commit that, if confirmed, the Embassy team and I will engage
with the LGBTQI+ Cameroonians and their allies.
Congressional Consultations
Question. Will you commit, if confirmed, to ensuring that you fully
brief Members of Congress and/or their staff each time you are in
Washington for visits or consultations during your tenure as Ambassador
to Cameroon?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit, in coordination with the State
Department's Bureau of Legislative Affairs, to appropriately respond to
requests for briefings and information by this committee. As a former
Pearson Congressional Fellow, I firmly believe that Congress has an
important role to play not only in foreign policy legislation but also
during the implementation process. It cannot be a one-way street in
which the State Department merely advises Congress after the fact of
the actions we have undertaken. Our foreign policy is stronger when the
two branches of government coordinate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator James E. Risch
Anglophone Crisis Negotiations
Question. In January, the Senate passed a bipartisan resolution
(S.Res.684), which calls on the State Department to engage other
partners in helping end the Anglophone conflict, and specifically calls
out the French, whom the Senate believes could get all the parties to
the table. Secretary Blinken reportedly raised Cameroon with his French
counterpart at a recent G7 meeting.
How is the Department mobilizing other partners to assist Cameroon
to find peace and justice, and how do you plan to lead such an
effort once in-country?
Answer. The Secretary's decision to impose visa restrictions on
those involved in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects the U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone
crisis and support respect for human rights. This decision followed
cuts in security assistance in recent years and the removal of
Cameroon's AGOA eligibility on January 1, 2020. These actions
demonstrate the U.S. Government's resolve to back up words with
actions. The United States will continue to consider all potential
diplomatic tools to advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone
Northwest and Southwest Regions.
We continue to engage other U.N. member states, particularly the
French, in bilateral and multilateral fora and at all levels on the
importance of rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to
explore ways we can work together to move towards a resolution of the
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions. If confirmed, I will
make resolving the Anglophone crisis my top policy priority and will
engage in discussions with France and other partners on the ground and
look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. What is your stance regarding U.S. leadership in
mediating an end to the conflict in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon
and do you classify it as an armed conflict at this stage of the
crisis?
Answer. The United States has an important role to play in pushing
for a resolution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions. If confirmed,
I will continue to support the Swiss Government's efforts to advance
dialogue with all sides and explore ways with the international
community to move this effort forward. I will also support other
meaningful initiatives that could advance peace on the ground,
including local initiatives, and to amplify the voices of Anglophones
who support peace. The United States stands ready to provide additional
support if asked to do so and if appropriate.
Per the Geneva Conventions, which the United States has ratified,
the International Committee of the Red Cross has the purview to
designate a conflict as a non-international armed conflict. To date,
they have not done so.
Question. Why do you think the Government of Cameroon has not
heeded the U.S. calls for cessation of hostilities and a negotiated
resolution of the conflict in the North West and South West regions?
Answer. The Cameroonian Government continues to focus on
neutralizing the armed separatists through combat in the field and to
advance disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts in both
regions to put an end to the violence and insecurity. The Government
also believes that implementation of the recommendations offered during
the Grand National Dialogue held in 2019 will address the grievances
held by many Anglophone Cameroonians. This includes advancing
decentralization, such as by holding regional elections in December
2020. If confirmed, I will continue to call for an inclusive dialogue
without preconditions and for all parties to end violence.
Question. Would you support mediation or accountability efforts by
international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council or the
African Union?
Answer. The United States regularly engages U.N. Security Council
member states and other countries regarding the need to resolve the
Anglophone crisis. We also regularly raise the Anglophone crisis with
the Secretary General's Special Representative and Head of the U.N.
Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) Francois Fall. The United States
supports UNOCA's role in promoting inclusive political dialogue in
Cameroon and the resolution of the Anglophone crisis. We will continue
to encourage UNOCA to engage the Government of Cameroon and encourage
other U.N. member states, specifically including our P3 partners France
and the UK, to play a constructive role to resolve the crisis. The
United States has engaged and will look to increase our engagement with
the African Union on Cameroon. If confirmed, I will highlight the need
for efforts by international actors to be complementary and not compete
with one another.
Sanctions
Question. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States would impose visa restrictions on individuals who are
believed to be responsible for, or complicit in, undermining the
peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone regions of
Cameroon. While I did applaud this important first step, I believe
additional accountability measures are needed.
What is your view regarding the use of sanctions to bring those
responsible to account for their abuses and undermining of
peace in Cameroon?
Answer. The decision to impose visa restrictions on those involved
in undermining peace in Cameroon reflects U.S. commitment to advance
dialogue to peacefully resolve the Anglophone crisis and support
respect for human rights. This decision followed cuts in security
assistance in recent years and the removal of Cameroon's AGOA
eligibility on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S.
Government's resolve to back up words with actions. The United States
will continue to consider all potential diplomatic tools to advance
dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest
Regions.
Trafficking in Persons
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Trafficking in Persons
Report, the U.S. downgraded Cameroon to Tier 2 Watch List for
recruiting child soldiers, a lack of standard operating procedures and
convicting fewer trafficking crimes. Additionally, the Government has
not passed anti-trafficking legislation to conform to international
law. Yet, the Government did investigate more trafficking cases and
identify more victims.
If confirmed, how will you build on Cameroon's successes and
strengthen their weaknesses, most notably, aiding in
establishing a national framework for anti-trafficking?
Answer. The United States regularly engages with Cameroon on the
issue of human trafficking. We have provided training to government and
civil society stakeholders through the International Visitors
Leadership Program and presented draft language for anti-trafficking
legislation that would bring national law in line with international
norms. We will continue to work with the Government of Cameroon to
ensure that its security forces do not violate their internal
regulations and recruit or use child soldiers. We will also encourage
the Government to urge vigilance committees to refrain from doing so.
If confirmed, I will ensure that we will continue to engage
constructively with the Inter-ministerial Committee on Trafficking in
Persons and encourage the Government to make progress in the fight
against human trafficking by focusing on milestones that need to be
achieved on key deficiencies and by engaging more robustly with civil
society.
International Religious Freedom
Question. In the State Department's 2020 International Religious
Freedom Report, the Department noted Cameroon as having poor religious
tolerance, including threats of non-state actors like ISIS-WA and Boko
Haram.
What is your assessment of this particular issue, and if confirmed,
how will you work with the Office of International Religious
Freedom to bolster religious freedom in-country?
Answer. Religious leaders wield significant influence and are
potential allies in bringing peace to the Northwest, Southwest, and Far
North Regions where persistent violence from non-state actors, armed
separatists, and government actors infringes upon religious freedom and
all aspects of life in the affected communities. The United States will
continue to work with religious leaders and the Government to encourage
greater cooperation and respect for the right to practice religion
freely and unencumbered.
If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to resolve the ongoing
conflict in the Anglophone regions through a framework that supports an
inclusive peace process. Peaceful resolutions to the many ongoing
conflicts in Cameroon will be pivotal in reducing the incidence of
abuses against religious freedom. Under my direction, if confirmed, the
embassy will also engage with the Office of International Religious
Freedom and other key offices to determine how best we could assist
religious leaders.
Human Rights
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, the
Department identified Cameroon as having committed severe human rights
abuses. Amnesty International categorized the state-sanctioned behavior
as ``Security forces and armed groups continued to commit human rights
violations and abuses. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced
due to violence; and gender-based violence against women was
widespread.''
If confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances
with the host government?
Answer. Promotion of human rights remains a key element of our
bilateral relations with Cameroon. While we have seen some progress in
this area with specific cases, we would like the Government of Cameroon
to share information about what it is doing to address human rights
violations by security forces and to take steps to address violations
writ-large beyond training. If confirmed, I will continue to call for
accountability and transparency related to allegations of human rights
violations committed by the Government. I will direct the embassy to
look for opportunities to work with the Government to reduce incidences
of human rights violations and urge them to hold accountable those
found responsible for these violations.
Question. How will you direct your embassy to work with civil
society organizations to improve the human rights situation on the
ground?
Answer. Building the capacity of civil society is a top priority
for our mission in Cameroon. We provide funding to local organizations
focused on supporting dialogue and peace initiatives related to the
crisis in Anglophone regions, strengthening the rule of law, improving
the legislative process, promoting access to justice, enhancing anti-
trafficking efforts, monitoring elections, and promoting civil
engagement and human rights.
If confirmed, I will continue to advance such opportunities to
strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations and amplify
their voices, encourage the Government to collaborate with these
organizations for the betterment of Cameroon, and ensure that we
coordinate our efforts with diplomatic and international missions.
Question. In December 2019, the Trump administration curtailed U.S.
military assistance to Cameroon because of gross human rights
violations, including women and children's extrajudicial killings. To
date, has there been an improvement in the Cameroon military's human
rights record? If confirmed, how do you intend to work with the
Government of Cameroon and its military leadership to improve on this
issue?
Answer. Since early 2019, the United States has significantly
reduced security assistance due to the Government of Cameroon's
unwillingness to share information in response to credible accusations
of gross violations of human rights by its security forces. The
Government has since taken some steps towards holding security forces
accountable, which we commend. These include the murder conviction in
August 2020 of four soldiers for the 2015 killing of two women and two
children in the Far North, the arrest and ongoing prosecution of
soldiers believed to be responsible for the February 2020 extrajudicial
killings in Ngarbuh, Northwest Region, and the arrest of soldiers
involved in a case of alleged torture of a detainee in early 2021.
However, the United States would like to receive more information from
the Government of Cameroon on actions it has taken and plans to take to
address allegations of human rights violations and to put measures in
place that advance human rights that go beyond human rights training.
If confirmed, I will continue to encourage the Government to
provide updates on investigations into allegations of human rights
violations and continue to work with Cameroonian armed forces on areas
of mutual interest. I will continue to review security assistance on a
case-by-case basis so that assistance we provide aligns with U.S.
interests, including promotion of human rights, and U.S. law requires
those receiving our security assistance be vetted prior to receiving
assistance.
Biya Succession
Question. If confirmed, you will arrive in Cameroon at a time when
there is a lot of speculation about the wellbeing of the country's
president, Paul Biya, who is 88 years old and has been in power for
four decades. Does the State Department have a contingency plan in
place should the country be thrust into a succession battle during your
tenure?
Answer. President Biya's current term of office doesn't end until
2025, and Biya has not made clear whether he intends to run for
reelection at that time. The State Department has a plethora of
experience responding to various political transitions around the
world, should such a scenario arise. We will draw on that experience,
and our regularly updated emergency plans for all scenarios, including
natural disasters or other major events. If confirmed, I will ensure
that crisis management planning will remain a top priority for our
Mission.
Question. In several Francophone African countries--Togo, Gabon,
Democratic Republic of Congo, and recently Chad--dying and long-serving
presidents have manipulated fragile constitutions to pave the way for
their sons to replace them should they pass away while in office. Is
such a scenario likely in Cameroon, and if so, what should be the U.S.
position if this occurred?
Answer. The United States supports peaceful, timely, and civilian-
led transitions of power to a democratically elected government
throughout the world. We advocate for free, fair, and secure elections
that reflect the will of the people in all countries, including
Cameroon. President Biya is serving a seven-year term, and the next
elections are to be held in 2025. The Cameroonian constitution outlines
a democratic process in the event of a succession. If confirmed, I will
advocate for good governance, peace, prosperity, and the promotion of
human rights in Cameroon, as well as for efforts by Cameroon to support
stability in the region despite the ongoing conflicts within its
borders.
Security
Question. Another crisis that confronts Cameroon is in the Far
North region, where the country is part of the multinational Task Force
battling Boko Haram and other violent extremists in the Lake Chad
Basin. In the past year, Boko Haram attacks on civilian populations
have increased. Some analysts believe that Cameroon may have moved
military equipment and personnel initially assigned to this region of
the country into the Anglophone areas of the North West and South West.
To what extent is this divided focus undermining Cameroon's
contribution to fight against Boko Haram and broader
counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel?
Answer. Cameroon has always played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important.
Cameroon has been a leader in both the efforts to address piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against terrorism and has contributed
troops to the United Nation's peacekeeping mission in the Central
Africa Republic since 2014. The ongoing violence in the Anglophone
regions and the Far North, along with insecurity on its eastern border,
could put at risk Cameroon's ability to continue to lead these efforts
to ensure the security of Central African region.
If confirmed, I will continue to push for the Government to pursue
dialogue with separatists armed groups in order to end the violence in
the Northwest and Southwest. We will also continue to push the
Government hold those found responsible for violations of human rights
accountable for these violations.
Question. While restrictions currently exist, which security
assistance, if any, should the U.S. prioritize to Cameroon in the
future?
Answer. All U.S. security cooperation activities with Cameroon take
place in full coordination with the Government of Cameroon. The United
States works with Cameroonian armed forces on areas of mutual interest.
If confirmed, I will ensure that our security assistance will continue
to focus on assisting the Cameroonian military in its efforts against
ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram as part of the Multinational Joint Task
Force, maritime security, training, and assistance to develop
professional military forces, and health security through disease
vector research and HIV/AIDS assistance.
Regional Impact
Question. Do you agree that a further escalation of the conflict in
the Anglophone regions of Cameroon contributes to greater instability
in neighboring Nigeria and could soon jeopardize vital U.S. interests
in the Gulf of Guinea and most of West and Central Africa?
Answer. Cameroon has always played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in achieving and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important, despite the continuing
crises within the country's borders.
Cameroon has been a leader in both the efforts to address piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea and the fight against terrorism. The country has
also contributed troops to the United Nation's peacekeeping mission in
the Central Africa Republic since 2014. The ongoing violence in the
Anglophone regions of the country, combined with the need to address
the continuing threats posed by Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in the Far North
Region and insecurity on its eastern border, could put Cameroon's
ability to continue to lead these efforts to ensure the security of the
Central Africa region at risk.
If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Government to pursue
dialogue with separatists armed groups in order to end the violence in
the Northwest and Southwest Regions. We will also continue to call on
the Government to hold those found responsible for violations of human
rights accountable for these violations.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Anglophone Crisis
Question. The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon has killed thousands,
displaced more than 800,000, and kept more than one million children
out of school. In January, the Senate passed S.Res.684, which I
introduced with Senator Risch, calling on the Government of Cameroon
and separatist armed Anglophone groups to end all violence, respect the
human rights of all Cameroonians, and pursue a genuinely inclusive
dialogue toward resolving the ongoing conflict. The resolution also
called on the U.S. Government to help bring about and support that
dialogue.
If confirmed as Ambassador to Cameroon, what steps would you take
to help initiate the dialogue process, and how would you ensure
that all relevant stakeholders are represented?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to urge all parties to end
violence and to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions.
I would make clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to
advance mediation between the Government and separatist armed group
leaders and encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move
this effort forward.
The United States regularly engages U.N. Security Council member
states regarding the need to resolve the Anglophone crisis. We raise
the Anglophone crisis regularly during briefings by the Secretary-
General's Special Representative and Head of the U.N. Office for
Central Africa (UNOCA) Francois Fall. We will continue our engagement
with France and other key allies both bilaterally and in multilateral
fora to find ways to work together to achieve tangible progress towards
peace. The U.S. Government will continue to consider all the tools at
our disposal aimed at promoting a peaceful resolution of the ongoing
violence, which has resulted in much suffering.
Question. I appreciate Secretary Blinken's recent decision to
impose visa restrictions on some of those responsible for undermining
peace in Cameroon. Are any financial measures, such as Global Magnitsky
sanctions, also being considered?
Answer. The recent decision to impose visa restrictions on some of
those responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is one of many
possible approaches we can take to push for peace and dialogue. It is
yet another sign of our commitment to back up words with actions. The
U.S. Government will continue to consider all the tools at our disposal
to encourage a peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Northwest and
Southwest Regions.
Question. How could we be better engaging our international
partners, especially France, to address this conflict?
Answer. The United States remains closely engaged with France and
other international partners regarding the crisis in Cameroon,
including at the highest levels. For example, Secretary Blinken
discussed Cameroon in May with French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le
Drian, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland
discussed Cameroon in high-level meetings with the French. We continue
to support the efforts by the Swiss-led process to encourage dialogue
between the Government and the armed separatist groups. We also support
efforts by the U.N. Office in Central Africa (UNOCA) to advance peace
in Cameroon.
If confirmed, I will engage with all of these actors and determine
how best we can work together to make a positive difference on the
ground. Advancing peace in Cameroon will be my top priority.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Mike Rounds
Question. As you know, the U.S. has limited leverage with Cameroon
regime, particularly since the suspension of security assistance. With
these limitations, I am curious about your view on potential U.S.
leadership in mediating an end to the crisis in the Anglophone regions?
If this is even feasible, are there resources you think could help
mediation?
Answer. The United States is deeply concerned about continued
violence in Cameroon and condemn all attacks against civilians. There
is no military solution to this crisis; dialogue is needed to restore
peace and improve respect for human rights. The United States appeals
to all parties to enter into a broad-based dialogue without pre-
conditions.
The United States has an important role to play in pushing for a
resolution to the crisis in the Anglophone regions. If confirmed, I
will continue to support the Swiss Government's efforts to mediate
dialogue and explore ways with the international community to advance
this effort and other meaningful efforts. I will also review the
different tools, including the implementation of appropriate measures
under U.S. law such as the visa restrictions that the Secretary
recently announced and coordinating with appropriate Department of
Justice prosecutions of those inciting violence. We have to press for a
resolution to this crisis, including through discussions with French
Government officials and P3 counterparts. The United States has
provided and will continue to provide strong support for peace, but the
responsibility for the resolution of the crisis in the Northwest and
Southwest Regions ultimately lies with the Cameroonian people.
Question. In the north of Cameroon, terrorism has accelerated.
Meanwhile, in other regions, violence between security forces and armed
separatists claiming to represent the Anglophone minority has spurred
concerns over Cameroon's territorial unity.
Do you think the U.S. is adequately leveraging diplomatic and
assistance tools, both with Cameroonian stakeholders and our
European and African allies, to address these challenges as
well as challenges to democratic development?
Answer. I understand we continue to engage Cameroonian stakeholders
and key international actors bilaterally and multilaterally on the
importance of the rule of law and ending impunity in Cameroon and to
explore ways we can work together towards a peaceful resolution of the
violence in the Northwest and Southwest Regions, and advance good
governance and promote respect for human rights nationwide.
Our diplomatic engagement is deployed at various levels, including
at the most senior level of the U.S. Government. For example, Secretary
Blinken discussed Cameroon in May with French Foreign Minister Jean-
Yves Le Drian, and Undersecretary for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland
discussed Cameroon in high-level meetings with the French. We also
engage regularly with U.N. Special Representative Francois Fall who
heads the U.N. Office for Central Africa.
The United States regularly reviews our assistance to ensure that
we do no harm, that we support civil society, human rights defenders,
and humanitarian workers, and that we comply with Leahy laws. We have
consistently said all those responsible for human rights violations and
abuses must be held accountable, and we have taken actions to back up
this principle. If confirmed, I will continue to consider what more can
be done to address Cameroon's complex challenges, always with a view to
benefit the Cameroonian people.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Christopher John Lamora by Senator Cory A. Booker
Violence and Instability in Cameroon and Beyond
Question. U.S. relations with Cameroon have been mostly positive,
although they have been adversely affected by concerns over human
rights abuses, in particular in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest
Regions, and the pace of political and economic liberalization.
Cameroon plays a key role in regional stability and remains a regional
partner in countering terrorism in the Lake Chad Region.
Last year, I joined with 19 of my Senate colleagues to sign a
resolution calling for a ceasefire in Cameroon, and remain
deeply concerned by the ongoing violence there. I am curious as
to what you think it will take to conclude and uphold a
ceasefire, guaranteed humanitarian access, and establish a
process of political dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make resolving the Anglophone crisis
my top policy priority. Our position remains that all sides must end
violence and engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
Government is focused on countering armed separatists in the field and
maintains that its convening of a Grand National Dialogue in 2019 and
decentralization efforts thus far, including regional elections in late
2020 and the establishment of a special status for the two Anglophone
regions, address the root causes of the crisis. I believe the
Government must do more to resolve the crisis. Specifically, it must be
willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. The
armed separatist groups, as well, must be willing to engage peacefully
in such a dialogue and cease human rights abuses, as called for in the
Senate resolution.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground and look for tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In 2019, the United States took the relatively rare step
of terminating Cameroon's AGOA eligibility due to persistent gross
violations of human rights. Unfortunately, this does not appear to have
impacted the Government's behavior in the ongoing conflict. If
confirmed, what other measures do you plan to take to hold state and
non-state actors in Cameroon accountable for human rights abuses?
Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the peaceful resolution of the crisis in the Anglophone
regions of Cameroon. This decision reflects the continuing U.S.
commitment to advance dialogue and promote respect for human rights.
This decision followed cuts in security assistance in recent years,
and, as you noted, the determination that Cameroon was ineligible for
AGOA starting on January 1, 2020. These actions demonstrate the U.S.
Government's resolve to back up words with actions.
If confirmed, I will consider all potential diplomatic tools to
advance dialogue and end violence in the Anglophone Northwest and
Southwest Regions. We will engage in discussions with other partners on
the ground, as well as the Cameroonian Government and people, to
identify tangible ways to advance peace in Cameroon.
Question. In addition to the internal violence related to the
Anglophone Crisis, Cameroon is also facing threats from Boko Haram and
ISIS West Africa. How do we square our support for Cameroon's efforts
against Boko Haram and ISIS West Africa with our concerns about human
rights abuses and political abuses inside Cameroon? In other words, how
can the State Department ensure that President Biya does not use
foreign counterterrorism assistance to fund its efforts against
Anglophone separatists in the Southwest and Northwest part of the
country?
Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important. Since early 2019, we
have significantly reduced security assistance because the Government
of Cameroon had not taken sufficient action to investigate credible
accusations of gross violations of human rights by its security forces
or hold the perpetrators accountable. The United States continues to
review security assistance on a case-by-case basis so that assistance
we provide aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect
for human rights. We vet potential recipients of security assistance,
consistent with the Leahy laws, and do not provide assistance to
Cameroonian security force units where there is credible information
that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. U.S.-
granted assistance is explicitly prohibited from being used in the
Anglophone regions. We have made this prohibition clear at all levels
of the Cameroonian Government and we carefully monitor the use of U.S.
assistance to ensure this commitment is followed. Risk of misuse or
potential diversion to the Anglophone regions are key criteria in our
security assistance decision-making.
Since our cuts, the Cameroonian Government has taken some limited
steps towards holding security forces accountable, including the
conviction of four soldiers for murder in August 2020 and the arrest of
soldiers believed to be responsible for one case of extrajudicial
killings and one case of alleged torture of a detainee. While we hope
these steps indicate a willingness to address the problem, abuses by
government forces continue.
Between FY 2019 (the last year for which there is full obligation
data) and FY 2020 funding, the State Department has obligated
approximately $8.3 million in assistance to support the Cameroonian
military. This funding supported professional military education;
technical support for unarmed intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms; small boat training; communications training;
and air-to-ground integration training. If confirmed, I would work to
ensure that U.S.-provided equipment is not misused by Cameroonian
security forces, and would actively and fully address verified reports
of such misuse.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
Room SD-106, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Kaine, Schatz, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, Portman, Young,
Cruz, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider nominees for three important
positions, Ambassador Todd Robinson to be Assistant Secretary
of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Ambassador Daniel Kritenbrink to be Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Mr.
Brett Holmgren to be Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.
So congratulations to the three of you on your nominations.
We appreciate your commitment and willingness to serve our
country and your families as well.
Ambassador Robinson, it is nice to have you back before
this committee for another confirmation hearing, this time as
the nominee to lead the Bureau of International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, which we know as INL, one of the most
important offices for strengthening democratic governance and
the rule of law globally.
INL's work around the world is critical to countering
narcotics trafficking, criminal syndicates, money laundering,
and other financial crimes, addressing the criminal use of
ransomware and malware, combating illegal mining and fishing,
and supporting efforts to combat gender-based violence.
Over the last decade, authoritarian leaders have
increasingly wielded criminality and kleptocracy as tools to
debilitate democracy at home and foment instability beyond
their borders.
I welcome President Biden's recent directorate establishing
the fight against kleptocracy as a key national security
priority and making it clear that we will tackle its corrosive
impact.
INL has a central role to play in that fight. INL is also
at the forefront of our international efforts to combat
narcotics trafficking. CDC data shows that over 70,000
Americans died from drug overdoses in 2019, including over
2,800 in my home state of New Jersey.
I am particularly concerned about the lethal impact of
fentanyl as well as the illicit production and trafficking
routes that extend through Mexico and back to China. While we
must improve our public health responses to address drug abuse
domestically, INL's work is essential to countering drug
trafficking by transnational criminal organizations.
So I look forward to hearing from you about your vision for
the Bureau and your plans for strengthening justice systems and
law enforcement cooperation to advance our national security
interests.
Ambassador Kritenbrink, I am also pleased to have you back
before this committee for another confirmation hearing. I think
the last time we saw each other was in China, and your post
there--your career as a public servant and your extensive
experience in the region will be critical as you take on this
important role.
In recent years and under administrations and Congresses of
both parties the United States has reassessed and rebalanced
our approach to the Indo-Pacific to take into account the
reality of our competitive relationship with China.
Although this new era of strategic competition may not be
what many of us had hoped for in the U.S.-China relationship,
it is our reality and we must deal with it with clear-eyed
pragmatism, starting with rebuilding and replenishing the
sources of our national strength here at home and our alliances
and partnerships abroad.
The recently passed Senate China competition package,
including the Strategic Competition Act that the ranking member
and I and other members of this committee authored, marks our
effort to contribute to that process.
Beyond China, the region you will be responsible for is
rich with pressing challenges, from North Korea's nuclear and
missile programs, which only grew stronger under President
Trump's ill-conceived North Korea policy, to a coup plunging
Burma back into chaos, to a roll back in human rights and
democracy across the region.
I know that you are intimately familiar with these issues
and we look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we can best
position the United States for success there in the years
ahead.
Mr. Holmgren, the independent analysis of the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has long been
recognized as among the best, most reliable, and most careful
of the intelligence community.
We have today a nominee for the Assistant Secretary of INR
that brings a great breadth of experience to its mission.
Mr. Holmgren has held significant experience relevant to
INR's mission, including serving as a senior director for
intelligence and for counterterrorism at the National Security
Council, as well as service at the Central Intelligence Agency
and the Pentagon.
I have little doubt that such experience would be of
immense benefit to the State Department Bureau.
INR is an invaluable resource for the Secretary of State,
senior officials, and department overall. Indeed, the Bureau
could also be of immense benefit to this committee.
Our oversight of U.S. foreign policy would be better served
by more regular contact and briefings from INR, and I look
forward to that engagement with you should you be confirmed,
something that has been missing in the past and I hope, under
your leadership, we can engage with the committee more
robustly.
In closing, the three of you have an immense task ahead,
but I have no doubt about your knowledge and experience will
serve you well and the nation well as you take on these new
responsibilities.
I look forward to each of your testimony. Let me turn to
the ranking member for his opening remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, these
are important nominations we are hearing today. There is a
broad swath of responsibility here and an important
responsibility.
Personally, my top two foreign policy priorities are China
and global health. Regarding China, my main concerns are the
Chinese Communist Party's aggression and coercion in the Indo-
Pacific and the urgency of the Taiwan issue.
To counter Chinese aggression, I believe we must ensure
that the State Department is appropriately resourced in terms
of funding and personnel in the Indo-Pacific.
I am interested to hear from you, if confirmed, plans to
advocate for this critical region in this--in the State
Department budgeting process.
Additionally, our network of alliances and partnerships is
key to advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The U.S.
security commitments, including extended deterrence and
commitments to help allies and partners develop advanced
capabilities, are crucial to this effort, and it is important
to remember U.S. policy will only be successful if we work
closely with our allies.
Also, I am particularly concerned about Chinese aggression
against Taiwan. Taiwan is an important democratic partner, and
how we support and work with Taiwan will have significant
implications for our strategy in the region and our alliance
system. Taiwan must be a main focus of the administration and
the State Department.
Regarding global health, the Indo-Pacific region is in
great need of more COVID-19 vaccines, especially given China's
aggressive vaccine diplomacy.
Supporting our partners as well as countries in need during
this global health crisis will be a mark of U.S. commitment to
the region.
Finally, I believe it would be a mistake to use U.S.
taxpayer dollars to buy and distribute Chinese vaccines.
Moving on to the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State
for Intelligence and Research, I am concerned about reports of
directed energy attacks against State Department personnel,
both abroad and here at home.
This has been widely written about, greatly discussed, but
the amount of information available is pretty de minimis. The
Bureau of Intelligence and Research will play an important role
in helping to identify the perpetrator and the means of these
attacks.
The Assistant Secretary also has a responsibility to
provide our committee and the Intelligence Committee with up to
date information on all investigations into these attacks.
If confirmed, I expect to be in regular contact on this
important issue. In addition to supporting the intelligence
needs of the Secretary of State, INR must also work closely
with the intelligence community.
It is imperative that the Bureau maintain its analytical
independence from policymakers within the State Department to
ensure information is objective and accurate.
Finally, the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.
Transnational criminal organizations, money laundering, and
trafficking of people, narcotics, and weapons undermine
international stability and pose complex threats to U.S. public
health and security.
INR plays an important role in improving the capacity of
our foreign partners to disrupt and dismantle transnational
criminal activity. But these efforts do not exist in a vacuum.
I am concerned about the negative impact the
administration's decision to reduce our military presence in
Afghanistan will have on narcotics production and associated
criminal activities, including funding terrorism.
I am also concerned that the administration's open borders
policy has incentivized record-breaking waves of illegal
migrants and undermine U.S. efforts to improve governance,
security, and economic prosperity in Mexico and in the North
and Central America.
I look forward to hearing plans you have to overcome these
and other international law enforcement challenges, should you
be confirmed.
We have a lot to cover today, and with that, I yield back
my time, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, we will start with our nominees and their
testimony. All of your full records will be included in the--I
am sorry. Your full statements will be included in the record.
We ask you to summarize in about five minutes or so so we can
have a conversation with you.
We will start with Ambassador Robinson and work our way
down. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. TODD D. ROBINSON OF NEW JERSEY, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF CAREER MINISTER,
NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS), VICE KIRSTEN DAWN
MADISON
Mr. Robinson. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today as the nominee to be the Assistant
Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.
I am honored by President Biden's nomination and the
support of Secretary Blinken for the opportunity to continue to
serve the American people.
I would like to take the opportunity to recognize the
support of my friends, colleagues, and, most importantly, my
family, my mother, Willetta BaCote, and my brothers, Mark
Robinson and Jeffrey BaCote. Their encouragement has been
invaluable to me.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, INL, which I called home for three and a half years as
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, is a key component in
protecting the American people by countering crime and
supporting the rule of law to maintain stability abroad.
I look forward to the possibility of leading my Foreign
Service, civil service, contractor, and local staff INL
colleagues working in Washington and more than 90 countries.
If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to tackle
the great challenges laid out in the president's national
security agenda, including combating narcotics trafficking,
addressing transna-tional organized criminal threats,
corruption and cybercrime, countering Chinese malign influence,
and tackling issues of bias and discrimination in criminal
justice systems.
Stopping illegal drugs like synthetic opioids from reaching
America will be among my highest priorities. We know some
terrorist organizations traffic drugs to fund their illicit
activities. Transna-tional criminal organizations have
seemingly limitless appetites for illicit profits from
synthetic drugs.
If confirmed, I will prioritize INL's critical engagement
with partners and allies to combat this threat. Transnational
criminal organizations are not static, so INL cannot be either.
Working with our interagency partners, such as the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, INL can lead the
effort to ensure that our programs are better coordinated and
show results.
Example--after the People's Republic of China scheduled
fentanyl as a regulated chemical class in 2019, direct flows of
fentanyl from the PRC to the United States dropped
precipitously.
However, nonfentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals
continue to flow from the PRC to Mexican criminals that
manufacture the fentanyl and traffic it to the United States.
If confirmed, I will prioritize continued diplomatic
engagement at all levels to decrease the shipment of these
precursors from the PRC and to reinvigorate shared security
cooperation between the United States and Mexico.
In fact, U.S.-Mexico cooperation must continue to address
another high priority issue, the management of migration across
the region and to the U.S. southern border.
Strategic thinking and data will help us address irregular
migration and build a smarter border. INL is working closely
within the administration to shape a central America--Central
America root causes strategy to look at the drivers of this
migration.
I know this topic is a high priority to members of the
committee and I look forward to hearing your thoughts on how we
can make our foreign assistance dollars more effective on this
issue.
If confirmed, I vow to respond to these complex challenges
using the experience gained in relationships built over my 35-
year Foreign Service career.
Another global challenge we confront today is corruption.
Simply put, corruption kills. I saw its effects in Guatemala
where political, economic, and social elites, at times working
with criminal organizations, buy judges and threaten
independent and courageous judicial actors.
I saw it in Venezuela, where the Maduro regime reaps ill-
gotten profits by selectively distributing food and pillages
that nation's natural resources.
As President Biden and Secretary Blinken have noted,
corruption undermines U.S. foreign policy and national security
interests around the world, and damages the credibility of
countries where U.S. businesses may want to invest.
INL, with our interagency partners, acts as a bulwark
against global corruption, and if confirmed, I would seek to
enhance this work by identifying like-minded crime fighters
around the world, build their capacity to prevent, investigate,
and prosecute corruption, and reinvigorating multilateral
global anti-corruption networks.
INL can also use rewards and visa restrictions to promote
accountability for corrupt actors globally. If confirmed, I
commit to working with the Congress on advancing America's
interests at home and abroad.
Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Todd D. Robinson
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today as
the nominee to be the Assistant Secretary of State for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. I am honored by the President's
nomination and the support of Secretary Blinken for the opportunity to
continue to serve the American people.
I would like to take the opportunity to recognize the support of my
friends, colleagues and, most importantly, my family--my mother,
Willetta BaCote, and my brothers Mark Robinson and Jeffrey BaCote.
Their encouragement has been invaluable to me.
The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs--
INL--which I called home for three and a half years as a Deputy
Assistant Secretary, is a key component in protecting the American
people by countering crime and supporting the rule of law to maintain
stability abroad. I look forward to the possibility of leading my
foreign service, civil service, contractor, and local staff INL
colleagues working in Washington and more than 90 countries.
If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress to tackle the great
challenges laid out in the President's national security agenda
including combating narcotics trafficking; addressing transnational
organized criminal threats, corruption and cybercrime; countering PRC
malign influence; and tackling issues of bias and discrimination, in
criminal justice systems.
Stopping illegal drugs, like synthetic opioids, from reaching
America will be among my highest priorities. We know some terrorist
organizations traffic drugs and other commodities to fund their illicit
activities. Transnational criminal organizations have seemingly
limitless appetites for illicit profits from synthetic drugs. If
confirmed, I will prioritize INL's critical engagement with partners
and allies to combat this threat.
Transnational criminal organizations are not static, so INL cannot
be either. Working with our interagency partners such as the
Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, INL can lead the effort
to ensure that our programs are better coordinated and show results.
Example: after the People's Republic of China (PRC) scheduled fentanyl
as a regulated chemical class in 2019, direct flows of fentanyl from
the PRC to the United States dropped precipitously. However, non-
fentanyl opioids and precursor chemicals continue to flow from the PRC
to Mexican criminals that manufacture the fentanyl and traffic it to
the U.S. If confirmed, I will prioritize continued diplomatic
engagement at all levels to decrease the shipment of these precursors
from the PRC, and to reinvigorate shared security cooperation between
the United States and Mexico.
In fact, U.S.-Mexico cooperation must continue to address another
high priority issue--the management of migration across the region and
to the U.S. southern border. Strategic thinking and data will help us
address irregular migration and build a smarter border. INL is working
closely within the Administration to shape a Central America Root
Causes Strategy to look at the drivers of this migration. I know this
topic is a high priority to many Committee Members and I look forward
to hearing your thoughts on how we can make our foreign assistance
dollars more effective on this issue. If confirmed, I vow to respond to
these complex challenges using the experience gained and relationships
built over my 35-year Foreign Service career.
Another global challenge we confront today is corruption. Simply
put, corruption kills. I saw its effects in Guatemala where political,
economic, and social elites--at times working with criminal
organizations--buy judges and threaten independent and courageous
judicial actors. I saw it in Venezuela where the Maduro regime reaps
ill-gotten profits by selectively distributing food rations and
pillages that nation's natural resources. As President Biden and
Secretary Blinken have noted, corruption undermines U.S. foreign policy
and national security interests around the world and damages the
credibility of countries where U.S. businesses may want to invest.
INL, with our interagency partners, acts as a bulwark against
global corruption. If confirmed, I would seek to enhance this work by
identifying like-minded crime fighters around the world; building their
capacity to prevent, investigate, and prosecute corruption; and
reinvigorating multilateral global anticorruption networks. INL can
also use rewards and visa restrictions to promote accountability for
corrupt actors globally.
Criminals and state-actors use technology to target the American
people, our institutions, and critical infrastructure. The detrimental
impact of cybercrime on America is clear, with one in four U.S.
households affected, and annual losses reported to the FBI last year of
$4.2 billion. If confirmed, I will want INL to build the necessary
know-how and cross-border cooperation to address 21st century
transnational security challenges.
Finally, given its decades of criminal justice sector reform
experience, INL has a unique responsibility to work with foreign
partners to recognize, prevent, and counter bias and discrimination
within their criminal justice systems. If confirmed, INL programs and
partnerships will continue to reflect a respect for human rights and
best practices in balancing individual rights with public safety.
If confirmed, I commit to working with the Congress on advancing
America's interests at home and abroad. Thank you for this opportunity
and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Holmgren?
STATEMENT OF BRETT M. HOLMGREN OF MINNESOTA, NOMINATED TO BE AN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH), VICE
ELLEN E. MCCARTHY
Mr. Holmgren. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, it is an honor to appear before you
today as the nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau of intelligence and Research.
I am deeply grateful to President Biden and Secretary
Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me, and to
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines for supporting
my nomination.
I would not be here today if it were not for the love and
support of my family, my wife, Dana, my son, Teddy, my parents,
Michael and Mary, and my siblings, Stacy, Christa and Ryan.
Each of them has inspired me to live my life with a sense of
purpose, love, and humility.
Like many Americans of my generation, the tragic events of
9/11 were a turning point in my life. I left my home state of
Minnesota 18 years ago to pursue a career in public service, to
defend the freedoms, values, and liberties we all cherish.
I came to Washington with a sense of optimism, and a deep
and abiding belief in the ideals of this country, that America
is a force for good in the world and that all men and women are
created equal with the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness.
Those ideals derived from my upbringing in Minnesota, where
I was surrounded by family who believed deeply in the role of
public service.
Both of my grandfathers were World War II veterans, and my
parents, both of whom were public school teachers for 40 years,
instilled in my siblings and me the importance of service.
I still share that same sense of optimism and commitment to
public service that I brought with me to Washington two decades
ago.
While I may be a new face to members of this committee, I
have a long track record of working on intelligence and foreign
policy issues. As an analyst first at the Defense Intelligence
Agency and later at the CIA, I authored all sorts of analytic
products to inform policy decisions.
Through deployments overseas, including in war zones, I
have seen firsthand the key role that intelligence plays in
shaping national security and the tremendous sacrifices of our
diplomats, intelligence officers, and warfighters.
Throughout my career, I have also served in policy roles in
the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff at the
White House.
These experiences gave me a richer understanding of the
vital role and the limitations of intelligence in shaping
policy. Most significantly, I gained through these experiences
a greater appreciation for the importance of analytic
objectivity and the need for the intelligence community to tell
the policymaker what they need to know, not what they want to
hear.
I have been nominated for this position at a time when the
United States and its allies are facing a diverse
interconnected array of threats against the backdrop of a
global pandemic that is straining governments and societies,
fueling unrest, and accelerating global competition.
From China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, the continuing
threat of terrorism, cyber, emerging technologies, these
threats pose new challenges and opportunities.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that INR has a unique role to play
in addressing these challenges. As the oldest civilian
intelligence agency in the United States, the Bureau has a long
and proud history of providing policymakers with valuable
insights into America's most pressing national security issues,
while empowering diplomats with the information and analysis
needed to advance U.S. foreign policy.
If confirmed, I look forward to leading this remarkable
institution. I understand the role comes with important
responsibilities, including serving as the principal
intelligence adviser to the Secretary of State and as the head
of one of the nation's 18 intelligence agencies, providing
timely objective all-source information to inform consideration
of foreign and national security policies, and finally,
assuring that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement
activities are conducted consistent with and supportive of U.S.
foreign policy objectives.
If confirmed, four inter-related imperatives will shape my
approach to leading INR.
First, I will ensure that INR's capabilities and resources
are aligned and strategically prioritized to address the most
pressing challenges and opportunities to include China, Russia,
Iran, North Korea, as well as global health security, cyber,
climate change, and how to capitalize on the revolution in open
source intelligence.
Second, I will prioritize investments in INR's greatest
assets, its people. We must continue to attract, train, and
retain the best and brightest while placing much greater
emphasis on diversity recruitment.
Third, I will focus on upgrading INR's technology to
empower its analysts with the tools they need to improve the
delivery of INR's products and services to better support its
customers, especially U.S. diplomats overseas.
Finally, I will insist on strong cybersecurity practices
throughout INR to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of its data systems and networks.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize the important
role that I believe congressional oversight plays in ensuring
that U.S. intelligence activities are lawful, ethical, and
consistent with our values.
If confirmed, I look forward to partnering closely with
Congress as we confront the many challenges ahead.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holmgren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brett M. Holmgren
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as the nominee to
be Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research. I am deeply grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken
for the confidence they have placed in me, and to Director of National
Intelligence, Avril Haines, for supporting my nomination.
I would not be here if it were not for the love and support of my
family: my wife, Dana, our son Teddy, my parents, Michael and Mary, and
my siblings Stacie, Krista and Ryan. Each of them has inspired me to
live my life with a sense of purpose, love, and humility.
Like many Americans of my generation, the tragic events of 9/11
were a turning point in my life. I left my home state of Minnesota
nearly 18 years ago to pursue a career in public service to defend the
freedoms, values, and liberties we all cherish. I came to Washington
with a sense of optimism and a deep and abiding belief in the ideals of
this country--that America is a force for good in the world, and that
all men and women are created equal with the right to life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.
Those ideals derive from my upbringing in Minnesota, where I was
surrounded by family who believed deeply in the role of public service.
Both of my grandfathers were World War II veterans. My parents, both of
whom were public school teachers for 40 years, instilled in my siblings
and me the importance of service. I still share the optimism and
commitment to public service that I brought with me to Washington
nearly two decades ago.
While I may be a new face to many of the members here today, I have
a long track record of working in and with the Intelligence Community.
As an analyst, first at the Defense Intelligence Agency and later at
Central Intelligence Agency, I authored all-source intelligence
products to inform policy decisions. Through deployments overseas,
including in warzones, I have seen firsthand the key role that
intelligence plays in shaping national security and the tremendous
sacrifices of our diplomats, intelligence officers, and warfighters.
Throughout my career, I have also served in policy roles at the
Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff at the White House.
These experiences gave me a richer understanding of the vital role and
the limitations of intelligence in shaping policy. Most importantly, I
gained a greater appreciation for the importance of analytic
objectivity and the need for the Intelligence Community to tell the
policymaker what they need to know, not what they want to hear.
I have been nominated for this position at a time when the United
States and its allies are facing a diverse, interconnected array of
threats against the backdrop of a global pandemic that is straining
governments and societies, fueling unrest, and accelerating global
competition. From China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, to terrorism,
cyber, climate change, and evolving technologies, these threats pose
new challenges and opportunities for the Intelligence Community.
INR plays a unique role in addressing these challenges. As the
oldest civilian intelligence agency in the United States, the Bureau
has a long and proud history of providing policymakers valuable
insights into America's most pressing national security issues, while
empowering our diplomats with the information and analysis to advance
U.S. foreign policy.
If confirmed, I look forward to leading this remarkable
institution, serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the
Secretary of State and the head of one of the Nation's 18 intelligence
agencies. INR's responsibility to provide timely, objective, all-source
analysis and to assure that intelligence and sensitive law enforcement
activities are consistent with, and supportive of, our foreign policy
objectives is more critical than ever.
If confirmed, four interrelated imperatives will shape my approach
to leading INR. First, I will ensure that our capabilities and
resources are aligned and strategically prioritized to address the most
pressing challenges and opportunities, to include China, Russia, Iran
and North Korea, as well as global health, cyber, climate change and
how to capitalize on the revolution in open-source intelligence.
Second, I will prioritize investments in INR's greatest asset--its
people. We must continue to attract, train, and retain top talent while
placing greater emphasis on diversity recruitment.
Third, I will focus on upgrading INR's technology infrastructure to
empower our analysts with the tools they need to improve the delivery
of our products and support our customers, especially our diplomats
overseas.
Finally, I will insist on strong cybersecurity practices throughout
INR to safeguard the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
our data, networks, and systems.
In closing, I want to recognize the important role that
Congressional oversight plays in ensuring that U.S. intelligence
activities are lawful, ethical, and consistent with our values. If
confirmed, I look forward to partnering with Congress as we confront
the many challenges ahead.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Holmgren. Thank you.
Ambassador Kritenbrink?
Am I pronouncing your name correctly?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL J. KRITENBRINK OF VIRGINIA, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
(EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS), VICE DAVID STILWELL
Mr. Kritenbrink. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today. I am deeply grateful to President
Biden, Vice President Harris, and Secretary Blinken for their
confidence in me.
I want to thank my wife, Nami, children, Mia and Joe, my
parents, Don and Joyce, and sisters, Kay and Nancy, for their
love and support.
It would be the honor of a lifetime to serve as Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a region
in which I have been engaged for 24 out of my 27 years in the
U.S. Foreign Service.
If confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with the
Senate and, of course, with this committee.
President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed diplomacy
at the center of U.S. foreign policy and emphasize the
centrality of a free and open Indo-Pacific to the security and
prosperity of the American people.
If confirmed, I would focus on the following six
priorities.
First, revitalizing ties with allies and partners. Our
network of alliances and partnerships is our greatest strategic
asset, enabling us to pool our strengths to advance shared
interests, deter common threats, and promote universal values,
to include our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that
is rules based and unconstrained by coercion, the peaceful
resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation and over flight,
and respect for human rights.
If confirmed, strengthening these relationships will be my
top priority. The priority placed on our treaty alliances was
demonstrated by President Biden's hosting of his Japanese and
Republic of Korea counterparts in April and May.
The president's hosting of the first ever Quad leaders
summit in March showed the resolve of the Indo-Pacific
democracies--Australia, India, Japan and the United States--to
work together to support the region.
I support ASEAN's centrality and, if confirmed, will work
to strengthen our partnership, our strategic partnership, with
ASEAN, including treaty allies Thailand and the Philippines.
If confirmed, I will reinforce our partnership with friends
in the Pacific Islands, including our unique relationship with
the Freely Associated States. I will also further develop our
robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan.
Second, prevailing in our strategic competition with China.
The People's Republic of China is our biggest geopolitical
test.
I support approaching the PRC from a position of strength
by working with allies and partners, engaging with
international organizations, standing up for our values, and
investing in our diplomatic and military capabilities and the
American people.
Secretary Blinken has said our approach to China will have
competitive, adversarial, and cooperative aspects. The United
States will counter PRC attempts to erode the international
rules-based order, push back on unfair PRC trade practices,
secure critical supply chains, protect sensitive U.S.
technology, and build our strength at home.
We will continue holding Chinese authorities responsible
for the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang, the trampling of autonomy
and civil liberties in Hong Kong, and systematic repression in
Tibet.
We will bolster partners' capacity to resist PRC
intimidation and oppose China's unlawful maritime claims. We
will also cooperate with Beijing when in our interests, such as
on the climate crisis, counter narcotics, and nonproliferation.
As President Biden has said, we are not looking for
conflict, but welcome stiff competition and will defend U.S.
interests across the board.
Third, reducing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear
and missile programs. President Biden has stated we remain
committed to the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and will work with allies to address that threat
through diplomacy and deterrence.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure North Korea and others
abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions while supporting a
calibrated and practical diplomatic approach that prioritizes
the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed
military forces.
Fourth, supporting inclusive economic policies that benefit
all Americans. If confirmed, I will ensure that our diplomats
in the region fight for every job in the interests of American
workers by insisting on market access and fair treatment,
stopping intellectual property theft and currency manipulation,
and combating corruption.
Fifth, promoting democracy and human rights. Our values and
our example are critical to successful diplomacy in Asia.
If confirmed, I would work with our allies and partners to
support democracy, promote human rights, and stand against
abuses wherever they occur.
In Burma, I would work with partners to press the military
to reverse course following the February 1 coup, cease
violence, release those unjustly detained, including American
citizens, and return Burma to the democratic path chosen by its
people.
I would work to support the people of Burma by holding
accountable those responsible for violence. I would also
promote accountability for PRC officials responsible for human
rights violations across China.
Sixth, if confirmed, I pledge to address global priorities
in the region, particularly combating COVID-19 and the climate
crisis.
If confirmed, I will also prioritize the safety and well
being of my team, maintain their focus on top goals, and ensure
they represent the diverse talents of the American people.
Thank you for inviting me to testify here today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kritenbrink follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am deeply grateful to President Biden, Vice President Harris, and
Secretary Blinken for their confidence in me. I want to thank my wife
Nami, children Mia and Joe, my parents Don and Joyce, and sisters Kay
and Nancy, for their love and support.
It would be the honor of a lifetime to serve as Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, a region in which I have
been engaged for 24 out of my 27 years in the Foreign Service. If
confirmed, I look forward to consulting closely with the Senate.
President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed diplomacy at the
center of U.S. foreign policy, and emphasized the centrality of a free
and open Indo-Pacific to the security and prosperity of the American
people. If confirmed, I would focus on the following six priorities.
First, revitalizing ties with allies and partners. Our network of
alliances and partnerships is our greatest strategic asset, enabling us
to pool our strengths to advance shared interests, deter common
threats, and promote universal values--including our commitment to a
free and open Indo-Pacific that is rules-based and unconstrained by
coercion; the peaceful resolution of disputes; freedom of navigation
and overflight; and respect for human rights. If confirmed,
strengthening these relationships will be my top priority. The priority
placed on our treaty alliances was demonstrated by President Biden's
hosting of his Japanese and Republic of Korea counterparts in April and
May. The President's hosting of the first-ever Quad Leaders Summit in
March showed the resolve of the Indo-Pacific democracies Australia,
India, Japan, and the United States to work together to support the
region. I support ASEAN centrality and, if confirmed, will work to
strengthen our strategic partnership with ASEAN, including treaty
allies Thailand and the Philippines. If confirmed, I will reinforce our
partnership with friends in the Pacific Islands, including our unique
relationship with the Freely Associated States. I will also further
develop our robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan.
Second, prevailing in our strategic competition with China. The
People's Republic of China is our biggest geopolitical test. I support
approaching the PRC from a position of strength, by working with allies
and partners, engaging with international organizations, standing up
for our values, and investing in our diplomatic and military
capabilities--and the American people. Secretary Blinken has said our
approach to China will have competitive, adversarial, and cooperative
aspects. The United States will counter PRC attempts to erode the
international rules-based order, push back on unfair PRC trade
practices, secure critical supply chains, protect sensitive U.S.
technology, and build our strength at home. We will continue holding
Chinese authorities responsible for the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang,
the trampling of autonomy and civil liberties in Hong Kong, and
systematic repression in Tibet. We will bolster partners' capacity to
resist PRC intimidation and oppose China's unlawful maritime claims. We
will also cooperate with Beijing when in our interests, such as on the
climate crisis, counternarcotics, and nonproliferation. As President
Biden has said, we are not looking for conflict but welcome stiff
competition and will defend U.S. interests across the board.
Third, reducing the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear and
missile programs. President Biden has stated we remain committed to the
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and will work with
allies to address that threat through diplomacy and deterrence. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure North Korea and others abide by U.N.
Security Council resolutions while supporting a calibrated and
practical diplomatic approach that prioritizes the security of the
United States, our allies, and our deployed military forces.
Fourth, supporting inclusive economic policies that benefit all
Americans. If confirmed, I will ensure our diplomats in the region
fight for every job and the interests of American workers by insisting
on market access and fair treatment, and by stopping intellectual
property theft and currency manipulation. We will also work with
regional partners to foster economic development that is transparent
and sustainable, including via APEC.
Fifth, promoting democracy and human rights. Our values and our
example are critical to successful diplomacy in Asia. If confirmed, I
would work with our allies and partners to support democracy, promote
human rights, and stand against abuses wherever they occur. In Burma, I
would work with partners to press the military to reverse course
following the February 1 coup, cease violence, release those unjustly
detained, including American citizens, and return Burma to the
democratic path chosen by its people. I would work to support the
people of Burma by holding accountable those responsible for violence.
I would also promote accountability for PRC officials responsible for
human rights violations across China. Throughout the region, we will
champion transparency, the rule of law, civil society, and independent
media.
Sixth, addressing global priorities, particularly combating COVID-
19 and the climate crisis. On COVID-19, if confirmed, I pledge to
support our work with regional partners and international initiatives
such as COVAX and the Quad Vaccine Partnership to provide U.S.
leadership in the fight to end the pandemic. On the climate crisis, I
would work to advance climate solutions with countries in the region,
which include some of the world's largest emitters as well as those
most vulnerable to climate change.
If confirmed, I will also prioritize the safety and well-being of
my team, maintain their focus on top goals, and ensure they represent
the diverse talents of the American people.
Thank you for inviting me to testify. I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you all. We will start a round with
five minutes. I am going to ask, first, before that some
perfunctory questions that we ask all of our nominees.
It is very brief questions that speak to the importance
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials
in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking
from you.
So I would just simply ask you each to provide a yes or no
answer.
Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and
designated staff when invited?
Mr. Robinson. Yes.
Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you commit to keep the committee fully and
currently informed about the activities under your purview?
Mr. Robinson. Yes.
Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation while policies are being developed, not just
providing notification after the fact?
Mr. Robinson. Yes.
Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
The Chairman. And finally, do you commit to promptly
responding to requests for briefings and information requested
by the committee and its designated staff?
Mr. Robinson. Yes.
Mr. Holmgren. Yes.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
Now, Ambassador Kritenbrink, as you know, and I think the
Senate has spoken with collectively and nearly one voice and
that is not easy these days, we believe that China is our major
geostrategic challenge in the world, and you address some of
that in your remarks.
The Senate passed a sweeping China competitive bill. That
includes the strategic competition that this committee put out
led by the ranking member and myself and supported by the 19
members of the committee, a truly bipartisan effort.
What do you think of that legislation? What tools would
you, if confirmed, want to see in your toolbox that Congress
can provide? And can you elaborate on how you plan on
approaching the China challenge?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me say again what an honor it is to be here today and I
think, Mr. Chairman, you have identified, obviously, very
correctly the major challenge that the United States faces
today, and I would argue that our friends and partners around
the world face today.
I do believe, Mr. Chairman, as I attempted to outline in my
statement, for us to prevail in this strategic competition with
China we need to do so from a position of strength.
I think we are stronger when we do that together with our
like-minded partners around--our like-minded partners and
allies around the world.
But, Mr. Chairman, I think we will do our best when we are
fully united here at home as well. I am very grateful to you
and members of this committee for the support and leadership
that you have shown on these issues. I know when Secretary
Blinken testified last week he stated his strong support for
the bill that you described.
And I might say, as a career diplomat, the more tools and
resources that the Senate and other members of Congress can
give us as diplomats the more effective we can be.
Of course, to prevail in this long-term competition with
China, I think it will be, largely, determined by how we do as
a nation together and many of the investments we make here at
home.
But I am very grateful for the leadership that the Senate
has shown on these issues, and I can pledge to you that with
the resources made available to us we will compete and we will
prevail in this competition with China in every domain.
The Chairman. Let us talk about some of the elements of
that competition. In Taiwan, given the increased muscle flexing
and threatening rhetoric from Beijing, some policymakers and
analysts have called for an end to the policy of strategic
ambiguity with regard to Taiwan.
There is increasing concern that Beijing may seek to make
the cross-straits an early test for this administration. How
can the United States most effectively signal our resolve and
deter Chinese aggression towards Taiwan?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I do think showing strength and clarity and deterrence is
key. What I think is crystal clear to me, Senator, is the
United States commitment, rock-solid commitment, to meeting our
obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act, to provide Taiwan
with the means to maintain a credible self-defense.
If I were confirmed, I pledge to the committee that I will
work very hard to support meeting those obligations and,
further, to support further developing our very robust
unofficial relationship with our Taiwanese democratic partners.
It is one of our most important partners in----
The Chairman. Let me ask you--I agree. Do you support
strategic ambiguity or do you think we need additional clarity
or a new framework for managing the cross-strait relations?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, my own view is that the
framework outlined by our long-standing one-China policy based
on the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqus, and
the six assurances to Taiwan provides the framework that has
ensured cross-strait stability and Taiwan security for these
many decades.
I do think that maintenance of that status quo and of that
security is a dynamic situation. As the threat from the PRC
grows, as Beijing's aggressive and bullying behavior vis-a-vis
Taiwan grows, I think that our response has to be calibrated as
well.
But I am confident that the framework that we have and
meeting those obligations in the Taiwan Relations Act gives us
the tools to do so.
The Chairman. Mr. Holmgren, let me ask you, we rely on the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research for insights and particular
perspective that sometimes varies from the rest of the
intelligence community, and when there is an opinion or
assessment that is different for the IC, it is critical that we
understand those differences.
Do you agree to be candid with the committee when those
differences occur and to make sure we understand where and why
INL comes to different conclusions?
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think that, as you know, INR has a long and proud history
of speaking truth to power and telling it like it is, and if
there are instances where INR reaches a conclusion that is
different than the rest of the intelligence community, I
believe, absolutely, that it would require informing and
engaging with this committee.
The Chairman. Thank you.
One other question. The Bureau of Intelligence and
Research's analysis is going to be critical to our
understanding as policymakers and in response to a number of
pressing issues, including the apparent attacks on U.S.
personnel and the origins of COVID-19.
Do you commit to engaging proactively with the committee as
INR's work on these matter advances and to keep us fully
informed on your assessments both on these and other critical
matters?
Mr. Holmgren. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to follow up, Mr. Kritenbrink, on the Taiwan issue
that was raised by the chairman.
What--I had the same questions he had, and I think all of
Congress does, really. But what--from your expertise and your
experience in this area, what do you think the end game is here
for the--for the Chinese Communist Party as far as Taiwan is
concerned? And what do you think the end game is and how do you
think they intend to achieve it?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Mr. Ranking Member, I am reluctant
to try to put myself in the shoes of the leadership in Beijing,
but they have stated that their long-term goal is
reunification.
I think where I believe that we should remain focused and,
if confirmed, where I would remain focused as EAP Assistant
Secretary would be on meeting our obligations and
responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. I am confident
that we have the tools to do so.
For example, through the support of this committee and
others in Congress, the United States has made available to the
authorities on Taiwan more than $30 billion in arms sales since
2009.
I think it is also incumbent upon us to further develop our
robust relationship with Taiwan in every sector. They are a top
10 trading partner, which is vitally important. We have
important cultural and other relations as well.
They play a very critical important role, we believe, in
international health and, therefore, we should support growing
Taiwan's international space as well to make sure that they
fully participate in organizations where sovereignty is not
required and have a meaningful role in those that do.
So I believe, Mr. Ranking Member, that we have the tools to
continue to grow this robust partnership with Taiwan and to
meet our commitments to ensure that Taiwan can maintain a
credible self-defense.
Senator Risch. I appreciate your thoughts in that regard.
All good thoughts. I guess what crosses my mind is that we all
know that the Communist Party wants reunification.
We also know that that is not the same view that Taiwan
has, and, obviously, where you have two different views that
are very much opposed, at some point in time it is going to
come to a crossroads and that is what I am concerned about is
what happens at that point.
What--how is that resolved?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir, Mr. Ranking Member.
I think the best thing that we can do is to continue to
demonstrate our resolve and our commitment to meeting our rock-
solid obligations, and I think by doing so I am confident that
we can continue to effect the stability across the strait that
we have benefited from for many years.
But, Mr. Ranking Member, I would, again, reemphasize we are
deeply concerned by the increase in aggression and harassment
and coercion that we have seen directed at Taiwan, and we
continue--we intend and if I were confirmed I would intend to
continue to show our resolve to, again, meeting our obligations
under the Taiwan Relations Act.
Senator Risch. I appreciate that. There is no doubt that
the coercion and harassing and everything else has ratcheted up
tremendously to the point, for instance, where Taiwan is having
trouble scrambling jets every time that there is an incursion
into airspace.
And that is done intentionally, there is no doubt, and that
is something that is going to be on our plate, I think, sooner
rather than later.
Mr. Holmgren, the matter of the Havana syndrome issue, as
you know, has been kicking around for some time and, obviously,
we are in an open session and cannot talk about all the details
of it.
But I am assuming that you have been involved in that in
some fashion. Am I right on that or not?
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Ranking Chairman. I very much
share the concerns about these incidents. I have spoken to some
of the victims of these attacks, and I can tell you they are
they are suffering and their families are suffering.
And, if confirmed, I would have no higher priority than
ensuring the safety and security of U.S. citizens, their
families, and U.S. personnel overseas and would commit to
ensure that INR is continuing to support the department and the
interagency, especially CIA and DOD, with information and
analysis around the origins of these incidents. So I believe it
is a serious increase.
As a testament, I have committed to asking for a classified
briefing, if confirmed, on my first day in office.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. This is, certainly a vexing
problem and I can tell you it is very high up on the priority
of this committee and the Intelligence Committee, particularly
since it affects our hard-working people around the world and
outside the United States.
Mr. Robinson, the--Afghanistan produced and, I guess,
continues to produce about 90 percent of the world's opium, and
with us downsizing in Afghanistan, this is going to be the
problem that it was before we ratcheted up there. It is going
to raise its ugly head again.
What are your thoughts on this?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that question.
I share your concerns, frankly, about the production and
distribution of opioids from Afghanistan. We know that they are
also interested in, perhaps, trying to get back into government
and my--what I would say to the Taliban and to anybody there
who is producing narcotics or opioids is that, you know, if you
want to be seen as credible and you want to be treated as part
of the international community, then you cannot do these
things.
The other part of that, though, is while we may be drawing
down in Afghanistan, there are programs that INL would wish to
continue in that region. The hard part is figuring out how to--
how to do that and keep our people safe.
So those are the two--sort of the two priorities we would
have. One, you know, making sure that we are continuing
programs that would go against, obviously, narcotics
trafficking and sending very strong messages to those in
government that they also have to commit to fighting against
the narcotics trafficking.
But it is also very important if we are going to continue
our programs there, and we want to continue our programs there,
to make sure that we are taking care of our people and making
sure that they can be there safely.
Senator Risch. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand that Senator Cardin is with us virtually.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And let me start by thanking all three of our nominees for
their prior service to our country and their willingness to
serve in these critical positions that they have been appointed
to.
I want to talk about the issue of fighting corruption, and,
Ambassador Robinson, I must tell you, I think you said it very
succinctly in your--in your statement--in your testimony when
you said that corruption kills. It also is the fuel for
autocrats in fighting democracies and trying to bring our
democratic countries down.
Freedom House just recently issued their 2021 report that
shows that we have the continuing trend of erosion of
democratic states, and one of the principal reasons has been
the growth of corruption that fuels this type of activity.
I enjoyed our conversation, but I just really want to drill
down a little bit more on specifics. You laid out part of that
in your comments to our committee. But I want to just get your
assurance that you will work with Congress and leverage both
branches of government in fighting corruption.
There is legislation pending in the United States Senate
that I have introduced with Republican colleagues, bipartisan
legislation that would establish a greater capacity within our
missions and State to understand the circumstances of
corruption in each country, to use a rating system similar to
what we do in trafficking in persons so that we can have
consequences and international standards as to what we expect
countries to do to fight corruption.
We have legislation that would establish specific funds so
we can respond quickly to opportunities to help countries deal
with corruption, and we have the Magnitsky sanctions to make
them permanent.
So do I have your assurances that you will work with
Congress to strengthen our tools to fight corruption globally?
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Senator. You have a firm
commitment to work with Congress, to use all of the tools that
we have in our toolbox to fight corruption, and I will further
commit that you will not find a more stronger advocate to fight
corruption than me.
It was to my--to my great joy to see the Biden/Harris
administration raise corruption to the national security level.
I think that that will--that will help us go after official
corruption, unofficial corruption, in the region and around the
world.
And further, it will give us greater tools to identify
crime fighters around the world that we can partner with to
fight this--to fight this scourge. There is no doubt corruption
undermines democratic institutions around the world, and I know
the bread and butter--INL's--one of INL's main jobs is going
after those who would--who would take part in corrupt acts.
Senator Cardin. I would just quote from my friend, Kara-
Murza, who is one of the leading opposition leaders in Russia,
who says that Putin steals from the Russians to spend it in the
West.
So he uses the corrupt resources in order to try to
undermine our system, and we have got to speak out against
that. The Magnitsky sanctions are, of course, one area at some
of these other tools that we are suggesting can help.
I just really want to underscore that we are all sincere
about this. But we need the push of Congress to help prioritize
within each of the missions countries that have significant
problems of corruption to focus on this issue.
So I am going to hold you to your commitment to work with
us to strengthen those tools so that we can all fight this a
little bit more effectively.
Mr. Kritenbrink, Asia--China, of course, is the most
significant country in that region from the point of view of
concern about the United States on the erosion of governance.
Their One Road policy is, certainly, based upon using
marketing--government-controlled economies and corruption to
try to control the economics of the world. The Belt and Road
Initiative really needs to be addressed.
Do you--are you committed to working with us to root out
the way that it is based in corruption, stealing intellectual
property, intimidating countries, so that we can take China on
in a more aggressive way?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, Senator, absolutely. I would--I would
simply say that I agree with you wholeheartedly that we need to
counter China's Belt and Road Initiative, as it is offered
through means of coercion, corruption, lack of transparency,
unsustainable debt loads, and the like.
Countries, I think, need to be very careful in signing on
to the Belt and Road. But I think even more importantly,
Senator, we need to have an affirmative agenda, affirmative
programs that we can offer as an alternative, and I am very
grateful to you and other members of Congress for giving us
those tools, whether it is the BUILD Act or other resources we
have at our disposal.
I would also note, Senator, that I was encouraged by the
communiqu that came out of the G-7, and it is quite clear to me
that our democratic partners around the world see eye to eye
with us on this challenge.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank each of you for your service.
I would like to start with you, Mr. Robinson, if I might.
The issue that I have been deeply concerned about is fentanyl,
and the impact on youth in my home state has been significant,
particularly so since the borders have collapsed. In late
January, we have seen an increase not only in overdoses but in
deaths from fentanyl.
And I would like to read a definition to you, if I might,
to see if we are on the same page. According to United States
law, a weapon of mass destruction is defined as the following.
One of these definitions is a weapon that is designed to cause
death or serious injury through toxic or poisonous chemicals.
Would you define fentanyl as a weapon of mass destruction
under these sort of circumstances?
Mr. Robinson. Senator, that is a great question. I do not
know if I would define it as a weapon of mass destruction. But
I absolutely am heartbroken by what fentanyl is doing to our
communities across the United States.
I think--I think that we have a lot of work to do here at
home on the demand side. But, more importantly, I think that
there is very much we can do in terms of diplomatic engagement
to work with our partners in Mexico, to work with our partners
in--well, to work with China to stop the flow of precursors to
Mexico and stop the distribution from Mexico by narcotic----
Senator Hagerty. Yes. I was just in Mexico about two weeks
ago meeting with their foreign minister and economic minister,
and they are deeply concerned at the increase in inflow of
fentanyl and its precursors from China coming into Mexico. It
is being mixed there, shipped across the borders, and killing
our children.
So as a parent, as an American, I very much appreciate your
efforts here and I look forward to working with you, should you
be confirmed, in pushing back against what I would call a
weapon of mass destruction that is being unleashed against our
population here.
Thank you.
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, sir.
Senator Hagerty. Ambassador Kritenbrink, it is wonderful to
see you again. My regards to Nami and to your two children.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty. Again, thank you for your service at a
most challenging time. I think you are the perfect person----
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty.--be brought forward for this position. I
would like to talk with you about an area that you and I have
had plenty of conversations before, and that is--that is the
Quad and the Indo-Pacific.
I think that we have made great strides with our allies in
the Quad. I think there is a lot more that we can do. I would
love to get your perspective on how we might engage other
nations in that effort.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator, very much for your
comments.
I fully agree. I think the Quad is a vitally important
mechanism. I was deeply impressed and grateful for the
president's hosting of the first ever leaders level Quad
summit, and I think it truly has shown that the four Quad
democracies in the region have decided to stand together and
advance these interests and these values that we share.
But they have also agreed, we have also agreed, to work in
very practical areas, and I think, as a career diplomat, I am
focused on the ways in which we, together with our partners,
can move the needle in the region in practical ways.
So the Quad leaders summit issued a roadmap and a work plan
for the rest of the year focused on public health,
particularly, combating COVID-19, focusing on climate, but also
issues related to technology, and I know you and I have
discussed that in detail.
I think--I think we need to focus in those practical ways,
but I do agree with you, Senator, it cannot be just the Quad.
It has to be all of our like-minded partners, whether it is our
treaty allies, whether it is our important friends and partners
in ASEAN or across the region.
I think most of the region is united behind the vision of a
region that is peaceful, stable, where countries large and
small play by the rules, large countries do not bully small
countries. I think that is where we need to focus our energy.
Senator Hagerty. I appreciate your perspective on----
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, the Quad is central.
Senator Hagerty. Yeah, I appreciate your perspective on
that.
I would just like to turn to one more thing and that is the
movement of supply chains from China out--you know, companies
that are trying to derisk their exposure to China.
Of course, I want every one of those companies to come back
to American shores, to see those jobs back in America. But to
the extent that those jobs do not come back here, what are the
opportunities that we might have with some of our allies in the
region to work together for joint economic prosperity, to work
together to strengthen our economic ties, and that will bring
our national security ties even closer?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
I fully agree. I think we need to focus on supply chain
resiliency, security, to make sure that neither we nor the
world are completely dependent upon and vulnerable to one
country.
Again, as we do that, the preference, of course, would be
to bring most of those home. Where that is not possible, I
think ensuring that those supply chains are diversified and
resilient and strong is key, particularly, working with like-
minded democratic partners, I think, especially in the
technology space, especially related to semiconductors, but
also, as we discovered in COVID-19, even personal protective
equipment and other medical equipment as key.
But I think--when I think about our competition with China,
I do think these issues related to our economic competition,
particularly related to technology and the resilience of our
supply chains, will probably be central to that competition.
And I would be committed to doing everything possible, both
within the State Department and across the U.S. Government, to
advance----
Senator Hagerty. Should you be confirmed, I look forward to
working with you closely.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you for your service, Ambassador
Kritenbrink.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Kaine?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to this
panel of nominees. I think you are all very highly qualified
for these positions. Look forward to supporting you.
Ambassador Kritenbrink, I think I am going to spend my five
minutes with you talking about a topic that matters a lot to
me, the Chinese persecution of Uighurs in the Xinjiang
province.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
Senator Kaine. There is a sizable Uighur population in
Virginia, and I have talked to many of my constituents as well
as just following news about this.
The leadership of Xi Jinping has seen China not only become
bolder and more effective in projecting malign influence and
power worldwide, but the Government has become more ruthless in
many ways--uses of technology, forced sterilization, separation
of families, and attempting to reduce and disperse its Uighur
Muslim population.
Both Secretaries of State Pompeo and Blinken have indicated
that this is a genocide under the technical term, an
intentional and very strategic effort, in the words of China's
own officials, to, basically, carry out the elimination or
reduction of the Uighur population and other Muslim populations
in Xinjiang province.
Last week, we had a joint subcommittee hearing in this
committee. It was the first joint subcommittee hearing we had
had in seven years and it was about China's atrocities in the
Xinjiang province.
The chair--the subcommittee I chair on Western Hemisphere,
Global Democracy, and Human Rights worked together with the
Subcommittee on East Asia, chaired by Senator Markey. Senators
Rubio and Romney were very involved in this.
And we heard from a number of witnesses in very powerful
ways. One was my constituent, Ms. Rushan Abbas. She spoke very
movingly about her sister, Dr. Gulshan Abbas, who has been in
detention for three years. Her birthday was last Saturday, her
third birthday in prison.
They know she is in prison. They do not know where she is,
but they did find out that she was secretly sentenced in a
secret trial to a 20-year prison term. She is a physician who
had made her career in the Xinjiang province just helping
patients.
U.S. efforts, global efforts thus far to combat the
terrible atrocity have not been effective. So what more can we
do as a committee, as an administration, as a country, to
increase pressure on China to end this grim persecution of the
Uighur and other Muslim populations in Xinjiang?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your
comments and your leadership on this issue.
I agree completely with your assessment of the challenge. I
had the privilege of viewing most of your hearing last week and
I, too, was moved by the testimony, particularly of Ms. Abbas.
The ongoing genocide in Xinjiang shocks the conscience. We
estimate more than 1 million Uighurs have been forcibly
detained, put into reeducation camps, forced to provide labor,
and many other disturbing allegations about how they are being
treated.
I think, Senator, working together with this committee, our
obligation is to continue to shine a very bright light on this
ongoing genocide, and I have been gratified to see that our
other partners around the world, whether it is the G-7 or
Japanese and Korean partners or our Quad partners as well have
all spoken out against the abuses happening there.
But more importantly, Senator, I think we need to continue
to take steps using all the tools that the U.S. Government has
at its disposal to hold to account the leaders who are carrying
out these atrocities.
And if I were confirmed, I would be committed to doing just
that. I know that we have used a variety of tools, including
Global Magnitsky tools, to sanction a number of the leaders,
officials, and entities who are carrying out this repression in
Xinjiang, including the Xinjiang party secretary, Chen Quanguo.
And if I were confirmed, Senator, I pledge that we will
continue to work not just to shine a bright light on the
abuses, but also to take steps to hold those responsible
accountable.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Two additional items in my last 40 seconds is related to
the same topic.
First, a lot of U.S. companies may be directly or
indirectly, even unknowingly, facilitating this persecution in
Xinjiang through their contacts in the region.
Human Rights Watch had witness before us last week, Dr.
Sophie Richardson, who indicated that they have written U.S.
companies to get information to try to make sure the companies
are aware of the dangers and they, generally, have not gotten
responses.
It is my hope that we might work together with you, should
you be confirmed, so that a request by the U.S. Government
might produce a response from some of these companies.
And then, in addition, we need to work with allies outside
the region. China is engaged in a pretty aggressive practice of
having Uighurs arrested----
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
Senator Kaine.--in countries like the UAE and Egypt and
Saudi Arabia, allies in the United States, and then deported
back to China, and we need to work with our allies to make sure
that they do not facilitate the long arm of this gruesome
persecution campaign all over the globe.
And I would look forward to working with you on that
together as well.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Senator, again, I fully agree with your assessment and your
recommendation on both points. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with you and members of the committee on both of those
issues.
Senator Kaine. Great. Thank you so much.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I understand Senator Young is with us virtually.
Senator Young. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Robinson, in the midst of this global pandemic,
Americans have continued to suffer under the scourge of
narcotics trafficking, much of that being trafficked through
our southern border.
Despite some public calls for the designation, the Trump
administration notably refrained from designating the Mexican
drug cartels as a foreign terrorist organization.
As the cartels use kidnapping, execution-style killings,
the targeted killing of journalists and politicians, and with
the flow of narcotics and violence into the United States
continuing unabating it seems clear that the legal standard for
this designation of foreign terrorist organization has been
met.
But I understand that Mexico may oppose such a designation.
If confirmed, Mr. Ambassador, would you consider such a
designation?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, for that--for that
question, and I absolutely share your concerns with--about the
malign influence of narcotics traffickers and the threats they
pose to communities throughout the region.
I think, you know, it is probably worth, you know, looking
at. I am not a lawyer so I do not know what the legal
definition is.
But there is no doubt that the influence of narcotic
traffickers throughout the region is crushing to communities,
not just in the United States but in Mexico, in Colombia, and
throughout Central America.
And I will, certainly, commit to you that we will use all
of the necessary tools to go after these criminal organizations
and traffickers.
Senator Young. Well, I thank you for that. Perhaps you
could--I understand you are not being--you are not an attorney,
and you will want to refer to others' analysis.
I am an attorney. I do not want to overstate my
qualifications to make this assessment, and attorneys can
disagree.
But it seems to me that the legal definition is, indeed,
met as I look at the different pillars that need to be
analyzed. Time does not permit me to get into those.
But I also understand that there will be diplomatic
considerations that play into this. What secondary effects may
undermine the effectiveness of such a designation? This would
be diplomatic analysis on your part.
Mr. Robinson. I think that is--I think that is a great
question. I would--you know, I would have to talk to--you know,
should I be confirmed, I would make it my--one of my missions
to talk to governments in the region to find out what secondary
effects there may be.
I, certainly, do not see why there would be obstacles to
using maximum efforts to go after the narcotics traffickers and
criminal organizations, and if this is a tool that we could
effectively use, I would, certainly, want to engage with the
governments in the region and governments globally to see what
further we could do to sanction these groups.
Senator Young. Like I said, I will look forward to working
with you on that. I am encouraged by what seems to be an
aggressive bias for action on this. I expect the Mexicans may
indicate a lack of motivation to work with us on other matters
if we go this direction.
That can be a concern, and there may be some--an increased
migration flow into this country of Mexican nationals fleeing
terrorism if the terrorist designation is made.
But with that said, would you commit to working with my
office in working through this matter should you be confirmed,
sir?
Mr. Robinson. Should I be confirmed, absolutely, Senator. I
will work with your office.
Senator Young. Okay, thank you. I know our time is winding
down. I just wanted to put one other matter, a stake sort of in
the ground about my interest in it. Perhaps we can work
together, should you be confirmed.
One of the missions of your bureau is to enforce maritime
rights and practice law enforcement at sea in the Indo-Pacific
region. Admittedly, Ambassador Robinson, this is a mission
larger than any single federal agency.
It will involve collaboration and cooperation with the Navy
and the Coast Guard and other entities and agencies and
individuals.
And given China's predatory actions at sea throughout the
Pacific, I would be interested in exploring your priorities for
INL's practicing of maritime law enforcement throughout the
Pacific, especially in Oceania, and seeing where INL might
better coordinate with the Coast Guard, moving forward. I would
like to help do anything I can to ensure that INL is successful
in this mission.
So thank you for your desire to serve.
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. And I agree, I think that
that INL has a fairly good story to tell about cooperation in
that region on maritime security.
I know when I was deputy assistant secretary we worked very
closely with partner countries, allies in the region, on that
issue. We did the same in West Africa.
And so I would be happy to, should I be confirmed, work
with your office on this.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Young. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
each of you for your willingness to be considered for these
critical posts at this time.
I would like to begin with you, Ambassador Robinson,
because I come from a state that has been very hard hit by the
opioid epidemic, and fentanyl has been the killer.
We have one of--have had one of the highest overdose death
rates in the country, and so I share the concerns that have
been expressed on both sides of the aisle about how we respond
to this and I appreciated your comments.
Senator Portman, who is also a member of this committee,
and I recently introduced legislation to build the capacity of
foreign law enforcement agencies to detect an interdict
fentanyl and other synthetic drugs, and also to try and
increase collaboration between the United States and foreign
countries.
As someone who has worked in this arena in the past, can
you tell me if you think there are particular best practices or
areas where cooperation has really worked to make a difference
to address this issue?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator, and it is a very
important point. I just want to emphasize how heartbreaking it
is to know--to see the ravages of this drug on American
communities and, particularly, communities like your state--in
your state.
Actually, INL, working on the--with the interagency,
working with our partners in DEA and the Department of Justice,
we have been able to do lots of training and capacity building
globally, working with like-minded police organizations in
countries around the world on training, identifying strategies,
you know, making sure they are looking at going after the money
and going after governments that participate in these things.
So there is a--there is a whole range of tools that we can
use to work with police organizations on these issues, and I
would be happy to explore that with your office, should I be
confirmed.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. Perhaps you could look at
the legislation that we are introducing and see if there are
ways that we can make it more effective and other
authorizations or other needs that you might have at INL.
Mr. Robinson. Yeah, absolutely, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Mr. Holmgren, you have been asked about Havana syndrome,
and this is something that my office heard about almost
immediately after the attacks because I have some constituents
who have been affected by it.
And I am still concerned that six months into this new
administration that we are still hearing from some of those
people who have been affected about the lack of coordination,
about the inability to meet with leadership, and particularly
at State about the willingness of State to cooperate with the
Department of Defense and the red tape that is still involved
with getting treatment.
So can you commit to not just trying to get to the bottom
of that but to finding out what is causing it and why there is
not more, at this point, coordination around how we are
responding to this serious concern that is affecting too many
employees within the federal government?
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator, for that important
question and for your leadership--excuse me--on this issue.
I absolutely commit to understanding if there are ways in
how we can improve the interagency coordination process on this
and, in particular, what role INR can and should be playing to
both support the department but also, as you mentioned, the
interagency.
I understand that the NSC has established a coordination
cell. I think that is a good--a very good positive development
to bring together the different parts of the interagency and
that State has now--has a lead, a person responsible for
coordinating the State Department's efforts.
And so, if confirmed, I am--I am eager to be involved in
that. As I said up front, I have friends and former colleagues
from CIA and other places that are affected by this, and so I
think it is--I take it as a personal responsibility to address
the issue.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I really appreciate that.
And I will say to you what I have said to others, that I
think one of the challenges with this issue is the classified
nature of all of the information, and it makes it very
difficult when there is an unwillingness of our State
Departments and agencies to share with members of Congress what
is going on and also to share with members of the public.
So I would urge you to look at ways in which we can
unclassify information that is not going to be harmful so that
people really understand what is going on.
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator. I hear your concern and I
pledge to do that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Schatz?
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Schatz. I was giving you--I do not
know if it is a promotion.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Some would consider it a promotion.
Senator Schatz. We can ask Ambassador Hagerty if that is a
promotion or not.
The Chairman. He is here, so I do not know. That may be the
answer. I am sorry.
Senator Schatz?
Senator Schatz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
your service.
Ambassador Kritenbrink, I want to start with Oceania.
Secretary Blinken spoke at the Pacific Island Conference of
Leaders a week ago.
These kinds of engagements are really meaningful. They
underscore our commitment to the region, including helping them
to confront COVID and the climate crisis.
Can you just talk about how you will engage in Oceania and
your role to ensure that it will be elevated in our Indo-
Pacific strategy?
And I think, you know, generally speaking, as we think on
this committee, in the broader Senate, in the media, when we
think about our Asia Pacific strategy, when we think our Indo-
Pacific strategy, everyone is immediately thinking about China
and China only.
And it occurs to me that there is a vast ocean full of
nations----
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Senator Schatz.--that we need to reengage with that are our
longtime partners and allies and friends, and for both moral
reasons and strategic reasons, we need to reengage, and I am
wondering if you can comment on that.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your
comments and for your leadership on these issues.
I fully agree with your assessment. If confirmed, I would
be committed to making sure we expand our robust engagement
with the countries--with the Pacific Island countries.
I think, Senator, the first issue that you identified is
one of the most important. First, we have to show up. We have
to demonstrate our commitment by engaging and participating in
meetings and organizations like the PIF.
Secondly, Senator, I believe that we need to engage across
the board because we have a number of vital national interests
that are implicated amongst our Pacific Island friends.
You mentioned climate, of course. Important security issues
at play, issues related to illegal and unregulated fishing. Of
course, climate change is an existential threat for many of
these partners and, of course, COVID-19 is a great challenge
across the region.
If I were confirmed, Senator, I would be committed to
upping our engagement across the board to advance those
interests and to ensure that our strategic competitors like
China as well do not take advantage or use their malign
influence to advance their interests at the expense of ours or
our partners in the Pacific Islands.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
Ambassador Robinson, I want to stay on Oceania for the
moment. I introduced a bill with Senator Murkowski to elevate
all of Oceania in U.S. foreign policy.
One aspect of this bill is to increase our ability to
counter the Chinese Government's foreign practices--foreign
corrupt practices in Oceania, and much of that work runs
through INL.
We have heard, though, that INL does not have the resources
to be present in the Oceania region to the extent that you may
wish and that they have had to make quote/unquote, ``hard
choices'' about not prioritizing the Pacific Islands.
I was glad, however, to see that the president's budget
carves out funding in INL to counter the Chinese Government's
global malign influence campaign. But we need to make sure that
Oceania is part of that effort.
Can you talk about what you see in Oceania and what we
ought to do about it through INL?
Mr. Robinson. Thank you, Senator. I think that is a--that
is a very important question.
You know, as you have pointed out, most of our focus has
been on focusing on the malign influence of China in the
region. I suspect I would have to look more closely, but I
suspect much of the work we are going to do INL would do in the
region, if I am confirmed, would focus on China's malign
influence.
But there are--you know, there are other issues in the
region that we can--that we can and should focus on, and we
spoke about it a little earlier. Working with like-minded
partners on maritime safety, for instance, will be key.
And, you know, INL can take a look at issues a little bit
outside of our area. We do work on wildlife trafficking. We do
work on illegal mining. We do work on illegal fisheries.
And so all of those issues or many of those issues might
get us closer to the region and closer to the issues that you
are raising.
Senator Schatz. Final question. I will make it quick.
You know, I have been working on Lacey Act amendments. I
know Senator Merkley and others have prioritized this over the
many, many years.
The thing with the Lacey Act is it does not quite get to
about half of all of the tropical deforestation, which is the
result of illegal deforestation for commercial agriculture.
And so I am wondering if we can work with you and the other
relevant federal agencies to get more supply chain transparency
and also to dig into the root causes that result in
deforestation, clear cutting for agriculture and for commodity
development.
The Lacey Act was a very important start, but we are sort
of stuck there, and even our partners in the business community
who want to do the right thing have great difficulty in terms
of the supply chain transparency.
So I think it is time for another round of collective
thinking about what is the next iteration of the Lacey Act so
that we can actually make sure that we do not just declare that
we find illegal deforestation offensive to us and to the globe
but that we are actually going to crack down on it, and I am
wondering if I can have your commitment to work with us on
that.
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Senator, you have my commitment.
Senator Schatz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member. Congratulations to all of you on your nominations.
Let me start with you, Ambassador Kritenbrink.
Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. I was pleased to see the statements
made by President Biden and others at the recent NATO summit
regarding a more coordinated coherent strategy with respect to
China's efforts to use its centralized economic power to export
its authoritarian model, and I was pleased to hear your
response to Senator Hagerty with respect to the Quad and you
also mentioned other allies in the area including, of course,
South Korea and others.
One of the important issues that has come up with respect
to the situation in the South China Sea is the importance of
something many of us have been in favor of for a long time,
which is ratifying the Law of the Sea Treaty.
In your opinion, would that be an important step that the
United States could take along with the international community
to provide clear rules of the road that would benefit not just
the United States but others in the region and around the
world?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for your
question.
I know that when Secretary Blinken was asked that same
question in testimony last week, he stated that he was not yet
aware if there was an administrative--administration position,
but that he personally supported the ratification and believed
it would be helpful.
I think what I would say, Senator, is whatever we can do to
reinforce the rules-based international order where countries
large and small play by the rules the better.
The great irony, of course, is that even though the United
States has not ratified UNCLOS we do abide by it because we
believe it represents customary international law.
China, of course, has ratified it and violates it on a
daily basis.
Nonetheless, Senator I am--I would be supportive of any
action that strengthens our position on maritime issues,
including our legal rates.
Senator Van Hollen. So would not it put the United States
in a stronger position vis-a-vis China and its violations of
the Law of the Sea Treaty if the United States were a party to
the agreement?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, I would associate myself with
Secretary Blinken's comments on that last week.
Senator Van Hollen. I will take that--I understand. He said
he was personally in favor of it and I----
Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. So----
Mr. Kritenbrink. But can I just underscore? I think you
have hit the nail right on the head that we have to advance our
interests in supporting the rules-based international order.
Many other things we need to do in the maritime domain as
well, but that is a key one. Thank you, sir.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Let me ask you about a piece of legislation that we passed
a couple years ago here. It was called the BRINK Act. I
authored it together with Senator Toomey, and it was designed
to close some of the loopholes in the sanctions that we have
imposed on North Korea.
There was a recent U.N. panel of experts report on the
implementation of international sanctions against North Korea,
and they painted a picture of a very leaky sanctions regime,
especially with respect to some goods flowing from China.
They also mentioned key imports, refined petroleum and
coal, had surged into North Korea last year. So the BRINK Act
establishes a secondary sanctions regime similar to the earlier
Iran sanctions regime that helped bring Iran to the table for
the JCPOA.
Could you commit to working with us and the Department of
Treasury to make sure that we fully apply this law? And what is
your current assessment of, you know, the role sanctions can
play in putting pressure on the North Korean regime?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much.
If confirmed, I can assure you that I would look forward to
working with you and your team on these issues.
As I noted at the outset, the Biden ministration--Biden/
Harris administration is committed to the denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, and, if confirmed, I would support an
approach that relies both on sanctions enforcement and
deterrence as well as a practical calibrated approach open to
democracy.
If confirmed, I would be delighted to learn more about the
BRINK Act and how we can strengthen the sanctions regime.
But, Senator, I do agree, enforcing the sanctions regime
with tools that we have, together with U.N. tools, I think is
vitally important to the denuclearization goals that we have.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you. And again, thank all of you
for your service.
And Mr. Holmgren, let me just say I think INR is one of
those great agencies in the federal government that punches way
above its weight.
So I hope you will hold your own within the IC because, in
my experience, INR has called it right more than the other
agencies, on average.
Mr. Holmgren. Thank you, Senator. It is an honor to be
nominated to lead INR.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cruz?
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Congratulations to
each of the three of you.
Mr. Holmgren, let us start with you. If confirmed, you
would be the principal intelligence adviser to the secretary
and other State Department principals.
You would be charged with driving the intelligence
apparatus advising the secretary of state on the risks and the
benefits of reentering any nuclear deal with Iran.
I want to ask you about that. One of the most troubling
aspects of the catastrophic Obama Iran nuclear deal were the
enormous holes in verifying Iranian compliance.
Some of those holes were obvious, such as giving Iran weeks
to clean up sites before inspections and functionally
prohibiting inspection of military facilities.
Others were less obvious but even more damaging. One side
deal forced the IAEA, the United Nations' nuclear watchdog, to
prematurely close investigations into past Iranian nuclear
weapons work, leaving the scope and the nature of Iran's
weapons program unknown.
According to Bloomberg, the Obama administration provided
Congress with a classified annex, saying that the deal could
still be verified if Iran fully complied and did not cheat.
Today, we know, of course, the deal failed to detect vast
portions of Iran's nuclear weapons program. We know it because
of daring raids and revelations by our Israeli allies.
We know that between the implementation of the deal in
January 26 to May 2018 the IAEA was not aware that Iran was
concealing a nuclear weapons archive, nor was the IAEA aware
that Iran was contained--had containers at a warehouse called
Turqazabad where the IAEA later reportedly discovered traces of
man-altered uranium.
The agency subsequently visited three other undisclosed
sites and found nuclear material at two of them. The IAEA has
never inspected any facility run by the SPND, a military
organization employing nuclear weapons scientists, which, until
last year, was run by the founder of Iran's nuclear weapons
program. That is unknown sites and zero military facilities
inspected.
Despite all of this, the Biden administration is rushing to
reenter the Iran deal.
Mr. Holmgren, do you support reentering the deal in light
of those failures?
Mr. Holmgren. Senator Cruz, thank you for that question.
As a former intelligence analyst who focused on the Middle
East, I very much appreciate the multi-dimensional threat that
Iran poses--their state sponsorship of terrorism, their nuclear
ambitions, cyber, human rights violations, and their ballistic
missile capabilities.
So I very much appreciate the threat. If confirmed to lead
INR, which is part of the intelligence community, my commitment
to you and to this entire committee is that we will supply
objective information and analysis regarding all of Iran's
malign activities to include its compliance with the--with the
nuclear requirements as part of the JCPOA even if those
conclusions diverge from your policy interests, but especially,
because I think it is even more important, if the intelligence
community has a different view based on all sorts of
information of where policymakers are that we would absolutely
provide that information to support the secretary but also
other policymakers as well as this committee.
Senator Cruz. In your assessment, what additional measures
would be required to close the loopholes that allowed these
failures in the prior deal?
Mr. Holmgren. Senator, I am not--I am not privy to--I have
not been in government the last few years so I am not privy to
the--any classified details and additional measures.
But what I could tell you is that, from an intelligence
perspective, I think having an incredibly strong collection and
analytic regime focused on Iran's compliance would be--
certainly, would be a top priority.
As I mentioned in my opening remarks, I view Iran as one of
the top big four threats we face, and so making sure that INR
has the resources and the expertise to provide objective
analysis would absolutely be a priority for me, sir.
Senator Cruz. Okay.
And, Mr. Kritenbrink, the Obama administration implemented
a policy that forbade our Taiwanese allies from displaying
symbols of their sovereignty, whether flags or medals or
uniforms, on U.S. soil.
During the Trump administration, I pressed the Trump
administration to change that policy to reverse the ban, and
they did so.
Unfortunately, after Secretary Blinken came through his
confirmation hearing where I asked him about it and he
committed to maintaining the policy of allowing Taiwan to
display its symbols of sovereignty, subsequently, the Biden
State Department reversed that policy and now prohibits our
Taiwanese allies from displaying their symbols of sovereignty.
This committee just a few weeks ago took up legislation I
had to reverse the new Biden ban and to return to the
preexisting policy that allowed Taiwan, like our other allies,
to display their symbols of sovereignty.
This committee passed that overwhelmingly. The Senate
passed it overwhelmingly in a bipartisan manner. If confirmed,
will you restore the previous policy allowing our Taiwanese
allies to display their symbols of sovereignty, and if not, why
not?
Mr. Kritenbrink. Senator, thank you very much for the
question.
I want to emphasize at the outset, Senator, if confirmed, I
would be absolutely committed to growing our robust and vitally
important partnership with democratic Taiwan.
I would argue that our partnership with Taiwan is perhaps
stronger than it has ever been, from our commitments
demonstrated under the Taiwan Relations Act, including $30
billion in arm sales since 2009, to the provision of vaccines,
to our close health cooperation to the visit by three members
of the Senate in just the last few weeks.
I think we have made clear our commitment to growing that
partnership with Taiwan.
Senator, since 1979, for decades now, the United States has
followed a set of contact guidelines for our engagement with
Taiwan, and my understanding, Senator, is for decades now those
guidelines have outlined that during our important engagements
with our unofficial--our Taiwan counterparts to advance our
unofficial relationship that symbols of sovereignty are not
allowed on U.S. Government property.
And those guidelines, as I understand them, Senator, have
been in place for decades and were in place for the vast
majority of the previous administration as well.
Based on the briefings and discussions that I have had,
Senator, the new guidelines that have been enacted under the
Biden administration are significantly liberalized. They are
explicitly designed to further develop our relationships and
our partnership with Taiwan, and they have been welcomed by the
Taiwan leadership, including President Tsai herself.
So I can assure you, Senator, that I am committed in every
way to growing our partnership with Taiwan and I will hasten to
add that, of course, I will always enforce U.S. law.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
Ambassador Robinson, I am going to close up with you, I
think, because this will be the last set of questions. I do not
want you to think I--you have no--none of my attention. So let
me just, briefly, make a statement about Mexico.
I had some deep concerns about Mexico over the last year.
In the fall, the United States arrested Mexico's former defense
minister on drug trafficking charges. Very literally this case
highlighted that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are
capable of co-opting individuals at the highest levels of
Mexico's Government.
When we released General Cienfuegos, albeit under some
rather murky circumstances, the Lopez Obrador government
responded by publishing U.S. law enforcement documents, in
violation of our mutual legal assistance treaty and then
pushing a law to the Mexican Congress that seemed intent on
constraining bilateral law enforcement cooperation.
I understand how important the U.S. trade, economic,
political, and security relationship is with Mexico and I am
fully supportive of efforts to strengthen it.
However, we have to be clear eyed. We cannot ignore
evidence about the links between certain members of Mexico
security forces and drug traffickers.
So, if confirmed, I trust you will give these issues your
full attention?
Mr. Robinson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman.
I share your concerns and look forward, should I be
confirmed, to working with the interagency and working with the
Congress to addressing and focusing on these issues.
The Chairman. And one last question for you. We had a very
good in-depth discussion so a lot of the issues have been
raised.
As I thought, fentanyl and others have been raised. I am
increasingly concerned by reports that the Assad regime is
earning hard currency in the face of international sanctions
and cratering currency and economy by manufacturing and
exporting Captagon, a potent and addictive amphetamine, often
with the cooperation of Hezbollah.
This drug is being smuggled, often by Hezbollah, across
Lebanon's border with Syria and through Lebanon's weak import
and export controls to be distributed throughout Europe and the
Middle East, prompting bans on Lebanese exports recently that
the Lebanese economy can ill afford.
What steps can we take to counter such drug smuggling,
including assistance to strengthen the Lebanese border and
customs enforcement?
Mr. Robinson. Mr. Chairman, that is a great question.
INL has a great track record on working with the government
of Lebanon on training and capacity building, and we will
continue. Should I be confirmed, I would make sure that we
would continue to do that.
I would also say that we can work with the interagency--we
have been working with the interagency to track these
shipments, particularly with DEA, and working with like-minded
partners in the region.
We know Saudi Arabia is particularly concerned about this,
the trafficking of this drug, and we can continue to work with
like-minded partners on this issue.
The Chairman. Well, I just want to highlight it because, of
course, we often hear about fentanyl, as we should because it
is causing deaths in America. But in this case of this
Captagon, you have got a lot of bad players.
You have Hezbollah, you have Assad, and undermining what
little is left of the Lebanese economy. That is a bad trifecta,
at the end of the day.
So I hope that you will make it one of your priorities upon
confirmation.
Mr. Robinson. I share your concern, Chairman, and should I
be confirmed, we will absolutely track it.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator? All right.
With that, with the thanks of the committee, this record
will remain open until tomorrow at the close of business.
There may be questions for the record. We would urge the
nominees to answer those questions expeditiously so you can be
considered for a business meeting.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator James E. Risch
Central America/Illegal Migration
Question. Given your previous experience in Central America and at
INL, can you describe the nexus between transnational criminal
organizations and human smuggling/trafficking across Central America
and Mexico? What financial benefits would you estimate drug trafficking
groups are reaping from the increased flows of illegal migrants
arriving at our Southwest border?
Answer. Systemic corruption and impunity contribute to the
permissive environments that enable the illicit activities of
transnational criminal organizations across Central America and Mexico,
some of which are involved in smuggling migrants across countries'
borders or are profiting from the exploitation of individuals in sex
trafficking or forced labor, including forced criminal activity. I
understand corruption, insecurity, and low levels of trust in
institutions are among the root causes driving irregular migration in
the region, including to the United States, and undermine economic
growth and development, weaken the rule of law, and lead to a loss of
hope. If confirmed, I will continue to press these governments to take
concrete actions to combat corruption and impunity, improve democratic
governance, and strengthen the rule of law. Reliable estimates of the
ill-gotten financial gains of drug trafficking groups or transnational
criminal organizations are hard to confirm, but remain a concern.
Mexico/Illicit Narcotics
Question. What specific actions would you encourage Mexico take to
meaningfully tackle transitional criminal activities through its
territory, including trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit
narcotics?
Answer. INL strengthens Mexico's capacity to reduce the production
and trafficking of fentanyl and other illicit drugs. I understand that
INL supports Mexico's recent steps to regulate fentanyl precursor
chemicals and encourages Mexico to increase and better integrate its
investigations into precursor chemical diversion, drug production, and
trafficking. If confirmed, I will ensure the Department works to
strengthen cooperation on this vital issue through the cabinet-level
security dialogue committed to during Vice President Harris' June 8
meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.
Venezuela
Question. Can you describe how the Maduro regime's involvement in
transna-tional criminal activities impacts peace and stability in
Colombia?
Answer. Colombia has worked hard to extend effective state presence
throughout its national territory, but the Maduro regime's
mismanagement and its tolerance of illicit activities and evident lack
of interest in controlling such activities within its own borders has
made Colombia's task vastly more difficult. The Maduro regime's profit-
seeking ties with dissident members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia, the Colombian-origin National Liberation Army, and
Venezuelan paramilitary groups facilitate illicit activity, public
corruption, and graft schemes. These relationships, combined with
historically weak government presence at the border between Colombia
and Venezuela, have allowed Colombian terrorist groups and
narcotraffickers to operate with impunity. Venezuelans and Colombians
are the victims of the Maduro regime's inability or unwillingness to
provide security within Venezuela and of the predatory behavior of
these criminal groups.
Cuba/State Sponsor of Terrorism
Question. Should Cuba be removed from the list of state sponsors of
terrorism (SST) while they continue to harbor U.S. fugitives and U.S.-
designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations?
Answer. I understand the administration has committed to carefully
reviewing decisions made in the prior administration, including the
decision to designate Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
If confirmed, I look forward to supporting the administration's
review of Cuba policy. Our priority in Cuba, as the rest of the
Hemisphere, needs to be democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Afghanistan
Question. Given the Biden administration's decision to withdraw
troops from Afghanistan, how can INL realistically and effectively
counter Afghanistan's opium problem or provide oversight of existing
counternarcotic programs?
Answer. I understand that most cultivation and production of poppy
in Afghanistan occurs in areas under Taliban influence or control,
compounding the challenge of implementing effective counternarcotics
projects. INL has a constructive working relationship with the Afghan
Government and supports specialized counter-drug enforcement units in
Afghanistan, such as the National Interdiction Unit and the polygraphed
Sensitive Investigative Unit, with enablers including a modern wiretap
system and a team of U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration mentors.
These units have mounted successful operations in insurgent-held areas.
Additionally, INL funds border and customs police to effectively search
and profile passengers and cargo at ports of entry, treatment for
Afghans suffering from substance use disorders, licit alternatives to
poppy for farmers, and capacity building for the Afghan Government. If
confirmed, I look forward to continuing to utilize a tiered approach to
monitoring existing projects, including third party monitors for end-
use monitoring and implementation activities, and multiple
organizations to provide assessments and evaluations on INL activities.
Lebanon-Internal Security Forces (ISF)
Question. As Lebanon faces a potential state collapse, please
comment on continued assistance to the ISF in Lebanon.
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize our support to
the ISF, a key partner in maintaining peace in Lebanon. Following the
August 2020 Port of Beirut explosion, I understand INL increased
efforts to provide basic equipment support to the ISF, including PPE as
it dealt with the COVID crisis, address internal corruption, and
improve internal and external cooperation through cross functional
collaboration. This includes human resource automation efforts, which
can reduce administrative demands, increase productivity, reduce costs,
and provide more transparency and accountability within the ISF.
Continued support to the ISF can help mitigate further instability in
Lebanon.
West Bank-Palestinian Security Forces (PASF)
Question. Is this an appropriate focus for the PASF without
securing concessions on pay to slay? How have Israeli attitudes towards
the PASF evolved following recent violence with Hamas and Gaza? USSC
has also suggested that PASF should be allowed to attend US military
training and schools. Is this an appropriate use of taxpayer dollars
given the PASF's non-state status?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure INL delivers its assistance
consistent with its authorities and other U.S. laws. The shift in focus
reflects improved performance and maturity by the PASF since we began
providing assistance in 2007. I understand that INL believes taking
this new focus will sustain that trend. The PASF units INL assisted
performed well in their daily missions as well as during crises,
especially including the latest round of violence, when they had to
coordinate with Israeli security forces. The PASF will receive their
operational training at their own training centers in Jericho. If
confirmed, I will ensure that any decision to send a small selection of
well-vetted senior officers to U.S. military institutions is based
solely on a commitment to provide them the best leadership training
available that will make them better officers and further improve the
performance of the PASF.
Libya
Question. How does INL plan to work with the MOI in Libya to re-
establish a governmental monopoly on the use of force and reduce the
presence of non-state militias and mercenaries?
Answer. A move away from the informal and hybrid relationships that
have developed over the past war-torn years will require a combination
of different strengths across the Department to address these
challenges, particularly with disbarment, demobilization, and
deradicalization, and to facilitate the movement towards
relegitimization of criminal justice institutions and law enforcement.
To that end, I understand INL aims to help build the capabilities
of legitimate institutions that can provide for civilian security
focused on their needs, incorporate the rule of law, and include
greater emphasis on appropriate use of force that is compliant with
international standards on human rights. INL is developing
opportunities with the Ministries of Interior and Justice to return
criminal justice facilities previously damaged by the hostilities
witnessed in Libya back to Ministry of Justice control and out of the
hands of militias.
Tunisia
Question. How does INL plan to work to ensure allegations of police
violence and credibility and transparently investigated, and those
found responsible held to account? Are there ways in which INL can
tailor programming to ensure police officers and unit commanders are
held accountable for instances of excessive use of force? What role
should Tunisia's police unions play moving forward?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure INL continues to work across
the Tunisian criminal justice sector to foster and institutionalize
transparency and accountability. INL's law enforcement programming
incorporates international best practices, including the use of modern
policing techniques, methods of internal accountability, transparency
to the public, and citizen-oriented approaches. INL complies with
statutory provisions to vet units and individuals for potential gross
violations of human rights and encourages the Government to investigate
and hold accountable those responsible. The 2014 Tunisian constitution
permits internal security forces to unionize; however, it does not
define the unions' role beyond the prohibition to strike, and INL does
not work with the unions.
Question. Are there specific steps that INL can take to advance
security sector reform in Tunisia? What does INL consider to be the
most pressing priorities in terms of advancing a wider security sector
reform agenda?
Answer. Given security challenges, the need for broad reform, and
limited resources, security sector reform in Tunisia has not been
linear. Within this dynamic environment, INL designs its programming in
Tunisia to address civilian criminal justice sector reform holistically
across law enforcement, justice, and corrections. INL prioritizes
assistance to the Government of Tunisia to improve core operational
capacities and competencies in support of fair, transparent, and
independent criminal justice organizations responsive to citizens'
needs.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Addressing Corruption and Kleptocracy
Question. The Combating Global Corruption Act obliges the Executive
to identify corruption in countries and rank them; establishes minimum
standards for combating corruption; and evaluates foreign persons
engaged in grand corruption for consideration under the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act.
If confirmed, in what ways will you strengthen efforts at the State
Department to focus on combating corruption abroad?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the department to combat
corruption as a top foreignpolicy priority of the Biden-Harris
Administration. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs plays a key role in the promotion of
internationally recognized standards and commitments to prevent and
combat corruption, provides targeted foreign assistance to strengthen
criminal justice systems and institutions to both resist and root out
corruption abroad, and implements visa restrictions to promote
accountability for corrupt actors. I will work to expand these efforts
and our partnerships and coordination across the interagency to ensure
the range of foreign assistance and diplomatic tools are brought to
bear in cultivating strong, transparent institutions to prevent and
combat corruption abroad.
Question. Do you see opportunities to improve our whole-of-
government approach towards fighting corruption?
Answer. The United States enforces one of the most robust
anticorruption frameworks in the world. The President's National
Security Study Memorandum on the fight against corruption presents a
unique opportunity to further integrate the expertise of U.S. federal
agencies into these efforts and create a more expansive and effective
whole-of-government response to this complex threat. The Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs maintains deep
partnerships across the interagency in support of our shared mission to
disrupt and deter transnational organized crime and corruption, both at
home and abroad. If confirmed, I will continue to support these vital
partnerships, and the State Department's commitment to this
Administration priority.
Strengthening the Global Magnitsky Act
Question. The Global Magnitsky Act has proven valuable as a tool
that can penalize human rights abusers and corrupt actors without
rupturing bilateral relations. The Global Magnitsky Act sunset was
removed in the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act of 2021.
Do you agree that ``Magnitsky-like'' sanctions are an effective
tool for countering human rights abusers and corruption around
the world?
Answer. The Global Magnitsky sanctions program is an effective and
impactful tool as part of our broader efforts to combat corruption and
promote human rights globally. The Global Magnitsky sanctions program,
along with other similar tools, such as Section 7031(c) visa
restrictions, promotes accountability of corrupt actors and human
rights abusers and deters future corruption and human rights abuse
abroad.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to robustly implementing
the Global Magnitsky Act through high-impact sanctions designations,
including by appropriately staffing relevant State Department offices
and bureaus?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the Department and
interagency to use all available tools, including the Global Magnitsky
sanctions program, to combat corruption globally. The Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has a
dedicated team focused on implementing a range of deterrence tools,
including supporting implementation of the corruption prong of Global
Magnitsky. If confirmed, I will continue to support robust
implementation of these tools in conjunction with INL's foreign
assistance and diplomatic efforts to disrupt and deter corruption
abroad.
Question. If confirmed, would you support the permanent
authorization of Global Magnitsky sanctions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the permanent authorization
of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. This sanctions
program has demonstrated its impact and supports our broader efforts to
prevent and combat corruption and protect human rights abroad.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Marco Rubio
Guatemala
Question. Given your extensive background and experience in Central
America, most recently as United States Ambassador to Guatemala, you
understand the threats these nations are facing--not just from violent
transnational criminal organizations, but also from external malign
actors like China and Russia, which are trying to gain a foothold in
our hemisphere.
Do you believe that the United States' approach should be to
disengage from these governments and cut our assistance to
them?
Answer. It is in the U.S. national interest for Central American
countries to have strengthened democratic governance, expanded economic
opportunity for their citizens, and the capacity to address the
security challenges that cause many to flee the region and present
direct harms to the United States. U.S. foreign assistance is an
essential element of our regional strategy that includes strengthening
civil society, promoting transparency and rule of law, combating
corruption, and improving respect for human rights. If confirmed, I
will work to ensure that our foreign assistance is accompanied by
robust U.S. diplomatic engagement and appropriate oversight. President
Biden is clear-eyed about the challenge and has insisted governments
step up as true partners in creating the conditions for economic
opportunity and security, which includes fighting corruption and
impunity.
Question. During your time as United States Ambassador to
Guatemala, please describe your knowledge, if any, of Russia's
involvement in Guatemala's mining sector.
Answer. During my tenure, our embassy kept track of various issues
affecting Guatemala's economy, including in the area of energy and
mines. If confirmed, I will prioritize countering the malign influence
of Russia and other actors in Guatemala and elsewhere as part of our
efforts to bolster good governance and combat corruption.
Question. What is your knowledge of the legal issues related to the
EXIMBAL nickel mine, owned by Russian interests, and the (then)
Canadian-U.S.-owned San Rafael mine?
Answer. According to news reports, the Constitutional Court (CC)
initially suspended operations of the EXIMBAL nickel mine in July 2019
for failure to conduct consultations with affected indigenous
communities under International Labor Organization convention 169 (ILO
169), confirming the decision again in June 2020. However, the mine,
owned by Switzerland-based Solway Investment Group, continued
production until February, when the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM)
suspended the mine's exploitation license to conform with the CC's July
2019 ruling, confirmed again by the CC on March 1.
Operations of the San Rafael mine have been suspended since 2017,
also for failure to conduct community consultations in accordance with
ILO 169. In 2018, the CC ordered the Guatemalan Government to conduct
community consultations prior to reopening the mine.
Question. Can you provide the most recent update on the cases
mentioned above?
Answer. I understand that in June, deputies from the political
party Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza alleged to the MEM that Fenix
mine continues to conduct some operations illegally, despite its
ordered suspension. Pre-consultations with local indigenous groups
under ILO 169 are scheduled to begin July 15 in Izabal. The pre-
consultation process for the San Rafael mine began on May 21 in Santa
Rosa. The next meeting is scheduled for June 20.
Question. Can you describe the role played by Gazprombank and VTB
Bank, two entities sanctioned by Treasury, in the mining sector in
Guatemala?
Answer. I do not have current information about the role played by
Gazprombank and VTB in Guatemala's mining sector. On the issue of
sanctions, if confirmed, I will prioritize working with colleagues
across the interagency to pursue appropriate measures, including visa
revocations and sanctions, to promote accountability for corruption.
Question. Are you aware of any evidence that Guatemalan authorities
worked with VTB Bank through CICIG?
Answer. No. To my knowledge, CICIG was an independent, U.N.-backed
commission that helped Guatemala build capacity and make progress in
the fight against corruption during its tenure.
Assistance with Law Enforcement Agencies
Question. If confirmed, will you ensure strict oversight of U.S.
support for security forces under the control of the Palestinian
Authority and ensure any assistance complies with all U.S. legislative
restrictions on these funds?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I will ensure strict oversight of U.S.
support for security forces under the control of the Palestinian
Authority (PA). I will ensure any assistance complies with all U.S.
legislative restrictions on these funds. I understand INL provides its
assistance through letters of agreement that ensure strict oversight,
and conducts end-use monitoring of the materials it supplies to ensure
it is accounted for and being used for the purposes it was provided. I
understand INL will implement a robust vetting process, including Leahy
vetting and vetting through the Department's Risk Analysis and
Management Office, to mitigate the risk that U.S. Government resources
could benefit terrorist groups or their supporters. If confirmed, I
will ensure INL also vets all recipients of PA assistance, including
students enrolled in training programs, for suspected terrorist
organization affiliation and human rights violations. If the vetting
results show any level of doubt, INL will exclude them from the
program.
Question. If confirmed, what actions do you intend to take in order
to combat Hezbollah?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to continuing our support to Lebanon
and exploring ways to adapt our support to address the pressing needs
of key partners in the security and judicial sectors such as targeted
interventions to improve criminal information collection, analysis, and
sharing; build on efforts to eliminate security vacuums that criminals
and terrorists exploit by expanding police professionalization efforts;
and solidify and sustain anti-crime gains through the delivery of
specialized skills. Such support bolsters legitimate institutions in
Lebanon and can help counter Hezbollah's malign influence.
Question. What is your position on reports of Hezbollah financing
itself with networks involved in the drug trade in Latin America?
Answer. I am concerned about Hezbollah's purported role as a
facilitator of the narcotics trade. Financial supporters, facilitators,
and sympathizers of Hezbollah operate in the Western Hemisphere,
raising funds in support of the organization through a variety of
illicit activities, including narcotics trafficking and trade-based
money laundering. As a part of INL's broader efforts to combat
transnational crime, I understand INL will continue to prioritize anti-
money laundering and counternarcotics programming globally.
Question. What is your view on U.S. cooperation with law
enforcement authorities in Ukraine?
Answer. I understand the United States has worked closely with
Ukraine's Ministry of Internal Affairs to advance sweeping law
enforcement reforms since 2014, starting with the creation of the
Patrol Police. The Ministry continues to be a constructive partner on
law enforcement reform, to include providing support and development of
the Patrol Police in the major cities and rolling out the newly
established Territorial Community Police Officer initiative in rural
communities throughout Ukraine. The foundation of both reform efforts
incorporates the respect for human rights and adopts international best
policing practices to ensure officers are trained to be accountable,
service-oriented, and transparent. If confirmed, I look forward to
continuing this cooperation on advancing meaningful law enforcement
reform in Ukraine.
Question. What actions will you take to work with the law
enforcement agencies of our partners and allies to prevent the export
of products produced with the forced labor of Uyghurs in China?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to working
with partners and allies to address the People's Republic of China
(PRC) Government's ongoing atrocities in Xinjiang and will consider and
support the use of all appropriate tools to promote accountability for
those involved, including import restrictions for goods made with
forced labor. If confirmed, I will support Secretary Blinken's call on
other governments to take ``concrete actions'' to ensure no companies
or governments provide the PRC with products or services that
facilitate repression in Xinjiang or purchase goods from Xinjiang made
with forced labor. If confirmed, I will also strengthen our law
enforcement partnerships and coordination with allies to ensure we are
taking a multilateral approach to stopping the genocide and crimes
against humanity in Xinjiang, including by working with the interagency
in its efforts to identify and block the import to the United States of
goods produced through forced labor.
Question. Please elaborate with specificity on the issues you kept
track of with respect to energy and mines during your tenure.
For example, did you discuss litigation involving the U.S.-based
Tahoe Resources' El Esocabal silver mine (Minera San Rafael),
owned by Canadian-U.S. interests, with anyone, and if so, with
whom? Please detail what was discussed.
Did you discuss the nickel mine owned by the Russian concern CGN,
located in Izabal, known variously as EXIMBAL?
Answer. I had several discussions on this issue with various
persons during my time in Guatemala. In fact, for the purposes of
advocacy for U.S. business, Tahoe Resources was treated as an American
company despite its ownership being largely Canadian. I believe we made
this determination after consultation with the Department of Commerce.
I know I had at least two (maybe more) meetings with representatives of
Tahoe Resources in Guatemala and one in Washington, DC. I discussed the
issue with Guatemalan congressional representatives. I discussed the
issue with members of Guatemala's court system (both Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court). I also discussed the issue with members of
Guatemala's executive branch (both the President, the Vice President,
and cabinet members). In addition, I discussed the issue with visiting
U.S. congressional delegations.
Among the issues discussed were:
1. The possibility of clearing a path for the mine to open or reopen
successfully;
2. The value of the mine to the community around the mine and the
value of the mine to Guatemala to show it was open for foreign
direct investment;
3. The obstacles to full functionality of the mine and the role of a
consultative process between the mining company and the local
community;
4. The mining company's journey through Guatemala's judicial process.
I do not recall that I ever discussed EXIMBAL. However, that is not
to say it was not discussed by other U.S. officials at the embassy.
These issues--San Rafael and/or EXIMBAL--would have been largely
handled by the Economic Section and/or the Commercial office.
Question. Did you ever meet with any legal representative of either
Gazprombank or VTB Bank?
If so, what dates and how many times?
Did you discuss Russia's involvement in the mining sector with
them, or litigation involving EXIMBAL or Minera San Rafael? If
so, please provide details.
Answer. I do not recall that I ever met with any representative of
Gazprombank or VTB Bank.
Question. How frequently did you meet with the attorney general of
Guatemala?
In your meetings and conversations, did you discuss Russia's
involvement in the mining sector with the attorney general?
Did you discuss litigation involving Minera San Rafael? If so,
when?
Answer. I met formally and informally with the attorney general of
Guatemala on a fairly regular basis between 2014-2017. I do not believe
the attorney general and I ever discussed Russia's involvement in the
mining sector. I also do not believe we discussed litigation involving
Minera San Rafael.
Question. How frequently did you meet with members of Guatemala's
Constitutional Court?
In your meetings and conversations, did you discuss Russia's
involvement in the mining sector with them?
Did you discuss litigation involving Minera San Rafael?
Answer. Over the course of my three years in Guatemala, I met with
members of the Constitutional Court both formally and informally on a
regular basis. Other embassy representatives did as well. Apart from
the political upheaval that occurred during that time, we had technical
programs with the supreme and constitutional courts involving case
tracking systems and equipment to expand the ability of the courts to
reach beyond the capital.
I do not believe I discussed Russia's involvement in the mining
sector with any court members. The Minera San Rafael issue was
discussed as the case wound its way through the Supreme and
Constitutional Courts.
Question. Did you meet with any non-governmental organizations
involved in court-ordered consultations with respect to the Minera San
Rafael to discuss issues related to the mining sector?
Answer. Since I met with several NGOs on numerous topics during my
time as Ambassador over four years ago, I do not recall specific
conversations with respect to the Minera San Rafael issue. If this
issue was discussed, it would have been to understand Tahoe Resources'
concerns to see if any agreement could be brokered between the two
sides.
Question. What past information did you have with regard to the
role played by Gazprombank and VTB in Guatemala's mining sector dating
back to your tenure as U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala or as Senior
Advisor for Central America in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs?
Answer. I do not recall that I had any prior knowledge of either
Gazprombank or VTB in Guatemala's mining sector. It was not something I
was tracking during my time in Guatemala or later in Washington.
Question. Did you meet with any agents of either Gazprombank or VTB
bank? If so, how many times? Was CICIG discussed?
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I have never met with any
representatives of either bank.
Question. According to testimony from Bill Browder before the CSCE
in 2018, VTB Bank--an entity sanctioned by the U.S. Department of
Treasury--gained legal status as an ``interested party'' in a legal
case against the Bitkov family. In 2015, a criminal case was opened
against the Bitkovs at CICIG's direction. Immediately after, officers
raided the Bitkov's home and detained the family.
During your time as Ambassador to Guatemala, were you ever briefed
on this issue? If so, when? If so, what was your takeaway when you were
in this post?
Answer. To the best of my recollection, I was never briefed on this
issue. Any knowledge I had of this issue came from open sources. There
were some local newspaper articles on the Bitkovs and I also remember a
long in-depth article about their case in either the Atlantic Monthly,
Vanity Fair, or the New Yorker magazine. To my knowledge, while I was
in Guatemala (2014-17), the State Department was not tracking the
Bitkov case beyond the fact that they had been swept up in a larger
probe of corruption within the Guatemalan Government.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Todd D. Robinson by Senator Ted Cruz
Question. In recent months the Mexican Government has shifted to a
confrontational and in some senses even adversarial approach to the
United States, including by undermining the Drug Enforcement Agency's
(DEA) capability to operate in Mexico, publishing sensitive information
that had been shared by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
maneuvering to ensure the freedom of former Defense Minister Salvador
Cienfuegos Zepeda from drug charges. To what degree are you concerned
about the status of the U.S.-Mexican relationship in these dimensions?
Answer. U.S.-Mexico security cooperation remains a top national
security priority. If confirmed, I look forward to comprehensive
conversations with the Mexican Government to deepen our security
cooperation and ensure it works for the benefit of the United States
and Mexico. I look forward to working to strengthen collaboration
through the cabinet-level security dialogue committed to during Vice
President Harris' June 8 meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that the Mexican
Government understands their recent actions against the DEA are
unacceptable and returns to a posture of cooperation?
Answer. Law enforcement cooperation between the United States and
Mexico is vital to countering the shared threat of transnational crime.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Mexican Government to
strengthen this cooperation, including through the cabinet-level
security dialogue committed to during Vice President Harris's June 8
meeting with Mexican President Lopez Obrador.
Nicaragua
Question. What role, if any, should INL play in regards to the
situation in Nicaragua?
Answer. I condemn the Ortega regime's repression of its own people
and the clear erosion of democratic norms in Nicaragua. Civil society
must be supported to promote accountability for human rights abuses and
corruption. INL engages with relevant elements of civil society in
Nicaragua--including independent media, human rights, and
anticorruption organizations--to address narcotics and criminal
threats, improve civic education, and strengthen the rule of law
through discreet programs aimed at minimizing the risk to individuals
from government persecution. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing
these efforts.
Bolivia
Question. How do you plan to engage with the Government of Bolivia
on drug production, trafficking, and interdiction?
Answer. I am concerned about drug production and trafficking in
Bolivia. Should the Arce administration be interested in partnering
with the United States to combat narcotics trafficking and associated
criminality, if confirmed, I welcome the opportunity to enhance
coordination with Bolivia.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator James E. Risch
Directed Energy Attacks/Havana Syndrome
Question. INR plays a role in supporting the U.S. Government's
efforts to identify the perpetrator and means of the directed energy
attacks against State Department personnel, as well as a key role in
providing SFRC with up to date information on all USG investigations
into these attacks.
How is INR contributing to the investigation into these nefarious
sonic attacks on our US diplomats?
Answer. My understanding is that INR has provided intelligence
support to the Department on the anomalous health incidents since
January 2017, and is facilitating the passage of available information
and material between relevant elements of the Intelligence Community
and the Department. If confirmed, I am committed to getting up to speed
quickly on this matter, and I will have no higher priority than
supporting the Department and the IC in ensuring the safety of U.S.
personnel, their family members, and U.S. citizens overseas.
Question. Will you commit to keeping this committee fully informed
as this investigation progresses?
Answer. Yes. Secretary Blinken has committed to working with
Congress on this matter. If confirmed, I will also commit to working
closely with Congress on this issue and will keep this committee fully
informed of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's assessment of
these incidents.
Question. Will you commit to redoubling efforts to identify the
culprit? And will you do a survey of the policy issues/regional focus
the victims were working on?
Answer. My understanding is that INR is coordinating with multiple
agencies to identify the cause and culprit of these incidents, to
include understanding where the various incidents occurred. If
confirmed, I will make sure INR continues to leverage its deep
expertise to assist the Department, the Intelligence Community, and the
interagency in protecting all U.S. personnel overseas.
State Department and Membership in the Intelligence Community
Question. INR also plays an important role in supporting the
intelligence needs of the Secretary of State, but it also plays a role
in the intelligence community (IC). It is imperative that INR maintain
its analytical independence from policymakers within the State
Department while also best supporting those same policymakers.
How do you propose to ensure that INR remains in-step with the
intelligence community while maintaining an autonomous
analytical State Department point of view?
Answer. I believe that constant training and adherence to the
Intelligence Community's analytic tradecraft standards, as well as a
willingness of leadership to support analysts in speaking truth to
power, are at the core of protecting the independence and integrity of
INR analysts and Intelligence Community products. INR has a well-earned
reputation for deep expertise and analytic independence while still
supporting State Department policymakers. If confirmed, I commit to
ensuring that INR maintains both its analytic objectivity and quality
and timely support to policymakers.
Question. Do you feel that detailees from other IC components would
be beneficial for INR? Will you commit to increasing the number of
detailees at INR from other IC components to better plug into IC
capabilities and improve the connection of intelligence to policy?
Answer. Having served as a detailee when I was in the Intelligence
Community (IC), I believe strongly in the value of exposing IC analysts
to other departments and agencies and believe that the receiving
agencies receive an extraordinary benefit from bringing in outside
expertise and perspectives. Such detail assignments can build bridges
across the IC and provide useful points of view to both agencies. If
confirmed, I am committed to reviewing the status of detailees to INR
and will look for ways to strengthen joint duty assignments to benefit
both INR and the broader IC.
Question. If confirmed, will you make more resources available to
ensure the Department employees have more access to the classified
email systems used by other agencies to share and discuss intelligence
relevant to policy makers?
Answer. I understand that INR allows appropriately cleared
Department personnel to access intelligence reporting and analysis
directly through a classified system, which includes an e-mail
capability. I believe that we can balance the need to protect sensitive
information with the need for access for appropriately cleared
Department personnel. If I become aware of sensitive intelligence that
Departmental personnel need to see in order to do their jobs, I would
advocate for and seek to facilitate that access, consistent with
appropriate clearances and the need to protect sensitive sources and
methods.
Question. How do you propose to better distribute timely
intelligence to regional bureaus? Is there more INR can do to improve
communication between INR and the regional bureaus to improve
collection guidance?
Answer. I believe INR has a responsibility to help facilitate
access to intelligence and analysis by regional bureaus for
appropriately cleared personnel. Customer feedback (including from
regional bureaus) into collection guidance is also key to improving
intelligence support to policy. If confirmed, I will review INR's
existing processes for providing intelligence to regional bureaus and
for receiving collection requirements and will make improvements, if
necessary.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to fully uncover
the origin of SARS-CoV-2? Do you commit to make this a priority?
Answer. It is vital that we understand the origins of SARS-CoV-2 in
order to prevent or minimize the risk of another global pandemic in the
future. On May 26, 2021, the President asked the Intelligence Community
(IC) to redouble its efforts to collect and analyze information that
could bring us closer to a definitive conclusion, and to report back to
him in 90 days on the origins of SARS-CoV-2. If confirmed, I am
committed to prioritizing INR's efforts to support the IC's work to
understand the origins of SARS-CoV-2.
Question. What actions do you believe are important to take to
prevent the next pandemic?
Answer. I believe the Intelligence Community, of which INR is a
component, has an important warning function to play in evaluating all
sources of information and providing assessments that could shed light
on an emerging pandemic in the future. If confirmed, I commit to
reviewing INR's analytic resources and expertise related to global
health security and will ensure that INR provides accurate and timely
intelligence to policymakers on such matters moving forward.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Brett M. Holmgren by Senator Ted Cruz
JCPOA Verification
Question. Under a plan aimed at facilitating the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) prematurely closed its file on the Possible Military
Dimensions (PMDs) of Iran's nuclear program. The decision rendered
permanently opaque the scope and nature of Iran's weapons program, and
was broadly criticized for foreclosing the possibility of baselining
that program--a critical prerequisite to robust monitoring and
verification. According to Bloomberg, the Obama administration provided
Congress with a classified annex saying that the deal could still be
verified if Iran fully complied and didn't cheat.
It has now been confirmed that under the deal, the IAEA failed to
detect vast portions of Iran's nuclear weapons program. Between the
implementation of the deal in January 2016 to May 2018, the IAEA was
not aware that Iran was concealing a nuclear weapons archive. Nor was
the IAEA aware that Iran was storing containers at an alleged nuclear
warehouse reportedly called Turquzabad, where the IAEA later reportedly
discovered traces of man-altered uranium. The agency subsequently
visited three other undisclosed sites and found nuclear material at two
of them. According to public reports, the IAEA has never inspected any
facility run by SPND, a military organization employing nuclear weapon
scientists, which until last year was run by the founder of Iran's
nuclear weapons program
Do you support reentering the deal, in light of these failures?
Answer. I believe it is critically important that the Intelligence
Community (IC) and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) focus
on the range of threats posed by Iran--from its state sponsorship of
terrorism and nuclear ambitions to its development of ballistic
missiles. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that INR, which is a component
of the IC, provides the Secretary of State and other policymakers with
the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran to inform
policymakers as they assess the best possible options to address Iran's
nuclear ambitions.
Question. In your assessment what additional measures would be
required to close the loopholes that allowed these failures?
Answer. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a component of the
Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of State and other
policymakers with the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran
to inform policymakers as they assess the best possible options to
address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also ensure that INR has the
resources and expertise to address this threat.
Iran/NPT
Question. As traditionally understood, Article IV of the NPT
entitles member states to the benefits of peaceful civil-nuclear
technology to the extent that they are members in good standing with
the NPT. In the last administration, Special Representative of the
President for Nuclear Nonproliferation Jeffrey L. Eberhardt confirmed
to the SFRC in writing that ``Iran's standing as a non-nuclear-weapon
State Party to the NPT cannot be described as `good.' ''
Do you consider Iran's past possession of the Nuclear Archive
seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute
non-compliance by Iran of its obligations under the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. nuclear activities and will ensure that INR provides the
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and
intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you consider Iran's past concealment of the Nuclear
Archive seized by Israel, including the materials in the Archive
relevant to the development of nuclear weapons, to constitute non-
compliance by Iran of its obligations under the NPT. If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you consider Iran a member in good standing of the
NPT? If yes, please explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology pursuant to Article IV the NPT? If yes, please
explain why. If no, please explain why.
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available
intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and intentions of
Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you consider Iran to be entitled to benefit from
nuclear technology for any reason? If yes, please explain why. If no,
please explain why.
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research (INR) prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's nuclear
activities and will ensure that INR provides the best available
intelligence and analysis with respect to its use of nuclear
technologies.
Iran/UNSCR 2231 snapback
Question. UNSCR 2231 ended a long-standing international arms
embargo against Iran, described across the previous six resolutions
terminated by paragraph 7(a) of the resolution. After an effort to
extend that embargo, the Trump administration took two measures. First,
it invoked the ``snapback mechanism'' described in paragraphs 10-15 of
UNSCR 2231, reversing the termination of those resolutions. You and
others have publicly suggested that the U.S. was not entitled to invoke
that mechanism. Second, the Trump administration implemented EO 13949,
``Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to Conventional
Arms Activities of Iran,'' which authorizes sanctions for transfers to
and from Iran of arms or related material or military equipment. As a
result, the U.S. established a baseline deterrent against major arms
sales to Iran. Multi-billion dollar arms agreements publicly described
and anticipated by Russia, China, and Iran did not occur.
However, in February 2021, the Biden administration rescinded that
decision. In June, it was revealed that Iran had dispatched two
warships believed to be carrying arms intended for transfer to Caracas.
The Biden administration declared it would take ``appropriate
measures'' to counter this ``threat.''
What measures does the administration believe it has to counter the
reported shipment of arms to Venezuela by Iranian warships?
Answer. I have never publicly suggested that the United States was
not entitled to invoke the ``snapback mechanism.'' If confirmed in my
role as the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, I will
ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a
component of the Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of
State and other policymakers with the best available intelligence and
analysis on Iran to inform policymakers as they assess the best
possible options to address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also
ensure that INR has the resources and expertise to address this threat.
According to press reports on June 17, 2021, the Iranian ships
believed to be headed towards Venezuela recently changed course and are
currently headed towards the coast of Africa.
Question. Do you agree with the decision to rescind invoking the
snapback mechanism?
Answer. If confirmed in my role as the Assistant Secretary for
Intelligence and Research, I will ensure that the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR), which is a component of the
Intelligence Community, provides the Secretary of State and other
policymakers with the best available intelligence and analysis on Iran
to inform policymakers as they assess the best possible options to
address Iran's nuclear ambitions. I would also ensure that INR has the
resources and expertise to address this threat.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and Russia. If
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on
Iran's destabilizing activities and cooperation with Russia and will
ensure that INR provides the best available intelligence and analysis
that describes the actions and intentions of Iran and Russia to help
inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you believe that Russia would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Russia purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which
ones?
Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and Russia. If
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and
intentions of Iran and Russia to help inform treaty compliance
verification.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China sold advanced weapons to Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and China. If
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and
intentions of Iran and China to help inform treaty compliance
verification.
Question. Do you believe that China would be in violation of any
UNSCR if China purchased advanced weapons from Iran? If so, which ones?
Answer. I believe it is vitally important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
destabilizing activities and cooperation between Iran and China. If
confirmed, I will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on
Iran's destabilizing activities and will ensure that INR provides the
best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions and
intentions of Iran and China to help inform treaty compliance
verification.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including
launches using such ballistic missile technology?
Answer. I believe it is critically important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
Iran's ballistic missile program and nuclear ambitions. If confirmed, I
will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's ballistic
missile program and nuclear ambitions and will ensure that INR provides
the best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions
and intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
Question. Do you believe that Iran would be in violation of any
UNSCR if Iran conducted any activity related to ballistic missiles
capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using such
ballistic missile technology?
Answer. I believe it is critically important for the Intelligence
Community and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) to focus on
Iran's ballistic missile program and nuclear ambitions. If confirmed, I
will ensure that INR prioritizes analysis focused on Iran's ballistic
missile program and nuclear ambitions and will ensure that INR provides
the best available intelligence and analysis that describes the actions
and intentions of Iran to help inform treaty compliance verification.
EO 14034
Question. On June 11, the Biden Administration published in the
Federal Register Executive Order 14034, which revoked Executive Order
13942 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and
Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect
to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply
Chain), Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat
Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National
Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain), and Executive Order 13971 of January 5,
2021 (Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software
Developed or Controlled by Chinese Companies). Those three EOs had
restricted applications controlled by Chinese companies. According to
EO 13971, ``[b]y accessing personal electronic devices such as
smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software
applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from
users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and
private information. This data collection threatens to provide the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and
proprietary information--which would permit China to track the
locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of
personal information.''
Please assess the potential intelligence risks associated with
these applications including the risk to State Department
personnel and their families overseas.
Answer. Since I have not been in government for the last five
years, I am not privy to any classified assessments or intelligence
that has informed this administration's or the last administration's
executive orders. However, I take seriously the threat posed by the use
of Chinese-developed software, hardware, firmware or Chinese-operated
communication networks, and I believe it is vitally important that U.S.
departments and agencies conduct threat and risk assessments of any and
all foreign-owned--especially Chinese--software, firmware and hardware
to minimize the risk posed to U.S. government employees and their
family members.
If confirmed, I will ensure that INR provides the best available
intelligence and analysis to help inform policy decisions about what
steps to take the minimize the Chinese counterintelligence risk to
State Department personnel and their families.
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF.
Can you commit to ensuring that unclassified information is not
unnecessarily comingled with classified information in
notifications provided by the State Department to Congress? If
not, why not?
Answer. I have a deep and sincere commitment to transparency and
Congressional oversight of intelligence activities. If confirmed, I am
committed to working to ensure that information provided to Congress
is, to the fullest extent possible, in a format that facilitates its
access by authorized personnel, while complying with Executive Order
13526, the Department of State classification guide, and the executive
branch rules on the handling and storage of classified information.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Robert Menendez
North Korea
Question. If confirmed, how would you recommend that the Biden
administration approach North Korea?
Answer. Our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. Our policy toward the DPRK will not focus on
achieving a grand bargain, nor will it rely on strategic patience.
Instead, the United States will take a calibrated, practical approach
that is open to, and seeks to establish diplomacy with, the DPRK to
make progress that increases the security of the United States, our
allies, and our deployed forces. At the same time, the United States
will continue to implement sanctions and work with our partners and
allies to promote the full implementation of U.N. Security Council
resolutions. The United States will continue to consult closely with
the Republic of Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners at every
step of the way. If confirmed, I will work to support the
administration's approach as we work toward this goal.
Question. What is the pathway to denuclearization and a stable,
peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula?
Answer. The United States will pursue diplomacy and dialogue, based
on previous commitments such as those in the 2018 Panmunjom Declaration
and Singapore Joint Statement, while continuing to implement U.S.
sanctions and working with partners and allies to promote
implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. This will be
essential to achieve the complete denuclearization of and a permanent
peace on the Korean Peninsula. The United States will take a
calibrated, practical approach to make progress that increases the
security of the United States, our allies and our deployed forces. The
United States has and will continue to consult closely with the
Republic of Korea, Japan, and other partners as we pursue complete
denuclearization and a stable, peaceful and prosperous Korean
Peninsula. If confirmed, I will work to support that objective and
advance our diplomacy to that end.
Question. What does success with North Korea look like?
Answer. Our goal remains the complete denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. The United States will take a calibrated, practical
approach that is open to and seeks to establish diplomacy with the DPRK
to make progress that increases the security of the United States, our
allies and our deployed forces. This will be essential to achieve the
complete denuclearization of and a permanent peace on the Korean
Peninsula. If confirmed, I will work to achieve that goal.
Burma
Question. If confirmed, what are the first three steps that you
would recommend to the Secretary to reset our policy towards Burma?
Answer. If confirmed, first, I will continue to use all tools
available to exert pressure on the junta and deny the regime
international credibility. I will encourage the international community
to do the same in order to restrict the junta's access to financial
institutions and enhance scrutiny of any financial ties to or
transactions with the military. I will further strengthen our robust
engagement within the U.S. interagency to identify ways to exert
pressure on the military regime, including financial pressure applied
both bilaterally and multilaterally. Second, if confirmed, I would work
to continue to support Burma's pro-democracy movement, including the
``National Unity Government'' (NUG), various ethnic and religious
groups, and others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic
transition. The United States will continue to encourage our partners,
allies, and other members of the international community to engage
representatives of the pro-democracy movement, including in
international organizations and major international events. Third, if
confirmed, I will continue to promote human rights, justice, and
protections for members of Burmese civil society and all people from
Burma, and encourage other countries to adopt programs similar to the
Temporary Protective Status (TPS) extended to people from Burma in the
United States in March for 18 months. In sum, if confirmed, I will
utilize every tool and opportunity available to the United States and
the international community to expose the junta's horrific brutality,
deny the junta credibility, promote accountability, and support the
human rights and aspirations of the people of Burma, who yearn for
democracy and do not want to live another day under military rule.
South China Sea
Question. I welcomed the Trump administration's clarification of
our legal position on China's unlawful claims in the South China Sea.
But, as you know, international law is not self-enforcing, and having
now taken this position, it is critical that we make our legal position
a reality, not just rhetoric.
What does the Biden administration intend to do to implement this
new approach? What consultations are you planning with partners
and allies on how to forge a unified approach to the South
China Sea?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has reaffirmed the July
2020 policy statement on the U.S. position on maritime claims in the
South China Sea and regularly consults with partners and allies to
support international law in this crucial waterway. The United States
has made clear that we stand with Southeast Asian claimant states in
resisting Chinese intimidation. The administration is committed to
using all of the tools at its disposal--diplomatic, military, economic,
and informational--to uphold a free and open South China Sea. If
confirmed, I would support U.S. efforts across each of these domains.
Freedom of navigation and adherence to international law in the
South China Sea are vital interests for the entire international
community. As a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts with allies and
partners in Asia and beyond, we have seen a greater willingness by
countries to underscore the importance of making and pursuing maritime
claims in accordance with international law. Ten nations, including the
United States, have formally protested China's unlawful maritime claims
through the United Nations. An increasing number of countries are also
demonstrating their commitment to freedom of navigation through
transits, presence operations, and working with Southeast Asian
claimants to strengthen their maritime domain awareness and law
enforcement capacity. If confirmed, I would support the many U.S.
programs designed to build our partners' maritime capacity. Moreover,
if confirmed, I would also support the activities of the U.S. military,
including freedom of navigation operations and presence operations,
designed to demonstrate that U.S. forces will fly, sail, and operate
anywhere that international law allows.
Hong Kong
Question. How can the United States--working with our partners in
the international community--be effective in exercising leverage to
support the people of Hong Kong?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stand united with our allies and
partners in speaking out for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
promoting accountability for the PRC's assault on Hong Kong's autonomy,
and seeking to support people in Hong Kong. I will strengthen
coordination with allies and partners on joint actions and messaging,
recognizing that a multilateral approach will have the greatest effect
in promoting accountability and stopping Beijing's erosion of Hong
Kong's autonomy. Together with partners and allies, I will continue to
demonstrate the depth of international concern about Hong Kong and the
strength of international support for Hong Kongers.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator James E. Risch
Indo-Pacific Strategy
Question. What should our main goals be in the short-, medium-, and
long-term be in the Indo-Pacific? What are the areas in which the State
Department can strengthen its role in pursuing these goals?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to a free and
open Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, to achieve this, I will work to
revitalize ties with our allies and partners; prevail in our strategic
competition with China; reduce the threat posed by North Korea's
nuclear and missile programs; support inclusive economic policies that
benefit all Americans; promote democratic resilience and respect for
human rights; and address global priorities, particularly combating
COVID-19 and the climate crisis. Investing in our capabilities and
working with allies and partners, including in regional organizations,
will be critically important to prevailing in our strategic competition
with China and in defending the international rules-based order, its
foundational values, and international law. If confirmed, I pledge to
work closely with Congress in advancing these priorities.
Question. In terms of specific regional initiatives, what aspects
of the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific strategy will be retained;
what will be changed; and what will be discarded?
Answer. The Trump administration recognized that the United States
has deep and enduring interests in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific
region accounts for half the world's population and two-thirds of
global economic growth, and it sits on the front lines of our strategic
competition with China. To protect U.S. interests in this important
region, if confirmed, I will deepen ties with our allies and partners,
including regional organizations, and promote the values we share,
including the rules-based international order and freedom of the seas
and skies, prosperity, good governance, and human rights. I will work
to prevail in our strategic competition with China while countering PRC
attempts to erode the international rules-based order. The United
States will remain focused on enhancing U.S. economic engagement in the
region, including on infrastructure, clean energy, and the digital
economy. If confirmed, I will also work together with partners to
address shared challenges such as transnational crime, climate change,
pandemic recovery, global health security, and the threat posed by the
DPRK's nuclear program.
Vaccines for the Indo-Pacific
Question. Several Indo-Pacific countries, such as the Philippines--
a U.S. treaty ally-have purchased U.S. vaccines directly from U.S.
companies. Do you believe the United States should lift export controls
on its vaccines so that these countries can secure the supplies they
have purchased? Do you believe U.S. allies and partners should receive
priority for delivery of vaccines purchased?
Answer. The administration's top priority is saving lives and
ending the pandemic. The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge that
requires a global response, and we have not imposed any bans on the
export of vaccines or vaccine inputs. If confirmed, I will work with
the rest of the U.S. Government to facilitate access to vaccines to
countries in need. We are working with partners to increase vaccine
manufacturing and distribution, as well as to respond to country
requests. Our principles for sharing U.S. vaccines include achieving
broad global coverage and responding to surges and other urgent
situations and public health needs, while being responsive to country
requests. The administration considered public health criteria,
including the potential impact of the donated doses in reducing the
global burden, incidence, and severity of COVID-19 and limiting the
emergence and spread of SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern. We also
considered factors such as the effect on U.S. national and economic
security and recipient countries' access to other sources of vaccines.
Question. Which countries would you consider to be priority
countries for U.S. vaccines in the Indo-Pacific? What is the country-
by-country breakdown of the vaccine donations that the Biden
administration has already announced in the Indo-Pacific, whether
through COVAX or through bilateral donations?
Answer. On June 3, the administration announced that the United
States will share at least three-quarters of its first 25 million
donated vaccine doses (approximately 19 million) through COVAX. Of
these doses, approximately seven million will go to the Indo-Pacific:
India, Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Maldives,
Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Papua New
Guinea, Taiwan, and the Pacific Islands. Of the remaining 25 percent of
the 25 million vaccine doses (approximately six million) to be shared
directly, the Republic of Korea has received one million Johnson &
Johnson doses. Our principles for sharing U.S. vaccines include
achieving broad global coverage and responding to surges and other
urgent situations and public health needs, while responding to country
requests. We also considered factors such as the effect on U.S.
national and economic security and recipient countries' access to other
sources of vaccines. If confirmed, I commit to making combating the
COVID-19 pandemic and strengthening global health security in the
region a top priority.
Question. With regard to U.S.-purchased vaccines: Your answer
indicates that the United States has not imposed any sort of export
restrictions with respect to U.S. manufactured COVID-19 vaccines. Does
this mean the administration has no restrictions--including de facto
restrictions--on U.S. companies delivering vaccines purchased via a
commercial contract? Please explain.
Answer. The United States has not imposed any bans on the export of
vaccines or vaccine inputs. The United States is committed to using all
available tools, including the Defense Production Act (DPA), to expand
domestic vaccine manufacturing and ensure that all Americans can be
vaccinated quickly, effectively, and equitably. But these actions are
not export prohibitions, and manufacturers in the United States are
free to export such products so long as they first fulfill the terms of
their contracts with the U.S. Government. What we're all dealing with
here is a global shortage of materials-that's a very different issue
and separate from the DPA. Pfizer and Moderna are now exporting doses
abroad and we have already lifted the DPA priority ratings for
AstraZeneca, Novavax, and Sanofi.
Question. With regard to U.S.-donated vaccines: The United States
is also buying up vaccine stocks and donating them to other nations.
Are our donations being prioritized over commercial orders? If so, how
are we prioritizing those donations (including for countries seeking
vaccines commercially and through COVAX simultaneously)?
Answer. On the 500 million Pfizer doses, thanks to our work scaling
up Pfizer's manufacturing, they will be able to deliver on these 500
million doses without relying on the Defense Production Act. The world
is embarking on an unprecedented vaccine production effort and there is
more production demand than can be supplied at this time. At the same
time, the United States Government orders make up a small part of the
demand on supply, and the manufacturing companies are making the
allocation decisions.
Our work on a vaccine supply strategy is guided by a three-part
approach. First, having successfully secured enough vaccine supply for
Americans, we are donating surplus U.S. vaccine supply and encouraging
other countries with surplus supplies to do the same. We will continue
to donate additional vaccine doses across the coming months as supply
becomes available--but we know that won't be sufficient. So, second, we
are working with U.S. vaccine manufacturers to significantly increase
vaccine supply for the rest of the world. And third, we are working
with our partners, investment entities, pharmaceutical companies and
other manufacturers to create the kind of global vaccine production and
manufacturing capacity and capabilities that can not only help the
world beat this pandemic, but also help prepare the world to respond to
potential future threats.
Question. Please provide a country-by-country breakdown of vaccine
donations to the Indo-Pacific as stated in the question. Of all the
donations announced, how many doses will each country receive (and
when)?
Answer. On June 4, 1.1 million doses of the J&J vaccine arrived in
the Republic of Korea. On June 20, 2.5 million doses of the Moderna
vaccine arrived in Taiwan. We are in active conversations with
potential recipient countries about needs, absorptive capacity, and
national vaccine plans, as well as logistics and legal considerations,
and that will in part determine allocation and distribution plans. As
we do so, we will work through logistics like coordinating with country
health ministries and organizations like UNICEF and the World Health
Organization, as appropriate. Our immediate goal is to get doses on the
ground as quickly as possible--but again, this is a complex logistics
operation. We will continue to work to keep you all updated as these
doses land in country.
On June 21, the Biden-Harris administration announced plans to
allocate the remaining 55 million doses towards the commitment to
donate 80 million doses by the end of June, including: Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Pacific Islands. We continue to work
with the White House and the interagency to facilitate access to these
doses.
COVID Origins
Question. Do you support a thorough investigation by the U.S.
Government into the origins of COVID-19? Do you commit, if confirmed,
that EAP will prioritize this issue and contribute to any State
Department or interagency processes? Will you commit that EAP will not
prevent the release of findings or outcomes of the investigation that
could potentially strain our relationship with China?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration has made clear it supports
a robust and transparent investigation into the origins of the COVID-19
pandemic. The administration has called for a second phase of the World
Health Organization's investigation into COVID-19 that must take place
in China and have full access to all information on the origins of the
virus. An impartial public health investigation into the origins and
early spread of any novel outbreak is vital to protecting against
future health security threats. It is imperative to have transparency
on the early events of the pandemic and determine how COVID-19 spread
so future emergence events with pandemic potential can be averted. The
Biden-Harris administration has committed to continuing to review all
available information about the origins of COVID-19, and President
Biden has requested the U.S. intelligence community redouble their
efforts to collect and analyze information relevant to the origins of
the virus, report back on their analysis and their recommendations for
areas of further inquiry that may be required, including specific
questions for the PRC. If confirmed, I commit to ensuring EAP continues
supporting these efforts to identify the origins of the pandemic and
will share relevant information with Congress as appropriate.
Biosecurity Issues
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. Department of State has a
role to play in determining whether the United States conducts, funds,
or engages in research and development or other cooperation on gain-of-
function research or other potentially high-risk research related to
pathogens, viruses, or toxins? From your perspective, what role should
EAP play in cases where these concerns relate to Indo-Pacific countries
within EAP's purview?
Answer. The Department of State participates in the interagency
processes, led by the National Security Council and the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, that address oversight
policies for research that might pose particular concerns. These
policies require careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where
appropriate, measures to mitigate risks. Subject to these policies,
decisions about the funding of specific research proposals are made by
the responsible funding agency. If confirmed, I will work with other
State Department bureaus and the interagency to make sure that EAP
provides any necessary information in a timely manner to make informed
decisions in the best interest of the United States.
Question. Should the United States conduct, fund, or engage in
research and development or other cooperation on gain-of-function
research or other potentially risky research related to pathogens,
viruses, or toxins with countries where we have concerns about any or
all of the following: (1) biosecurity standards, (2) violations of the
International Health Regulations, (3) intellectual property theft of
vaccines or health-related technology, or (4) compliance with the
Biological Weapons Convention?
Answer. Factors that bear on the risk of accident, misuse, or
misappropriation should be taken fully into consideration in
considering whether to conduct, fund, or engage in such research.
Federal funding and oversight policies help guide these decisions for
research that might pose particular concerns. These policies require
careful consideration of risks and benefits, and where appropriate,
measures to mitigate risks. If confirmed, I will work with other State
Department bureaus and the interagency to make sure that EAP provides
any necessary information in a timely manner to make informed decisions
in the best interest of the United States.
Question. What is the benefit to the United States and to global
health more broadly of providing to China innovative intellectual
property related to vaccines?
Answer. Incentives for innovation, including the protection of
intellectual property (IP), are crucial to support innovative new
treatments against COVID-19 and other devastating diseases. The United
States supports voluntary licensing agreements on mutually agreed terms
and opposes forced technology transfer. The administration believes
strongly in IP protections and the importance of safeguarding U.S.
innovation from illicit acquisition. The decision to support a waiver
of IP protections for COVID-19 vaccines reflects the extraordinary
circumstances of this pandemic. We are committed to working with other
WTO members and will be clear-eyed about potential risks as we enter
text-based negotiations. These negotiations will take time given the
consensus-based nature of the WTO and the complexity of the issues
involved. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to support efforts to
combat the COVID-19 pandemic and strengthen global health security in
the region.
Defense Issues
Question. Do you believe that extended deterrence is foundational
to U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region? Will you commit that you
will advocate against policies, whether declaratory policy or
otherwise, that erode or dilute U.S. extended deterrence commitments?
Answer. Yes. Extended deterrence is foundational to U.S. strategy
in the Indo-Pacific region. If confirmed, I commit to advance policies
that strengthen our extended deterrence commitments to our allies and
partners.
Question. In your experience, how would U.S. treaty allies react to
major change in U.S. declaratory policy with respect to nuclear
weapons, such as the declaration of a sole purpose doctrine? What
impact would declaration of a sole-purpose doctrine have on U.S.
extended deterrence commitments in the region, and therefore overall
stability and security in the region?
Answer. The United States is committed to maintaining a strong,
credible deterrent to defend the United States and our allies, while
also taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. Extended
deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region plays a critical role in
advancing U.S. national security interests, including providing
assurance to allies and promoting nonproliferation. If confirmed, I
commit to advance policies that strengthen our extended deterrence
commitments to our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will also
consult closely with our allies and with Congress as we review the
vital role the U.S. nuclear arsenal plays in extended deterrence.
Question. Will you prioritize the issue of overseas basing by the
People's Liberation Army, as raised by Deputy Secretary Sherman on her
recent trip to Cambodia?
Answer. I have serious concerns about the PRC's military presence
and construction of facilities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of
Thailand. During her recent trip to Cambodia, Deputy Secretary Sherman
sought clarifications on the demolition of two U.S.-funded buildings at
Ream without notification or explanation and observed that a PRC
military base in Cambodia would undermine its sovereignty, threaten
regional security, and negatively impact U.S.-Cambodia relations.
Maintaining an independent and balanced foreign policy is in the best
interests of the Cambodian people. If confirmed, I will make this a
priority issue.
Question. Is the status of the Philippines and Thailand as States
Parties to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons consistent
with their treaty alliances with the United States?
Answer. U.S. alliances with the Philippines and Thailand are forged
in common experiences and shared values, and they serve as an anchor
for peace and security across the Indo-Pacific region. The United
States remains fully committed to these deep and abiding alliances. If
confirmed, I will consistently convey current U.S. policy to oppose the
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which does nothing to
address pressing proliferation and security challenges.
Question. How can the United States expedite providing advanced and
critical capabilities to Indo-Pacific treaty allies and other key
partners? Do you commit to prioritizing expediting such capabilities to
regional allies and partners?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working closely with the Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs and Congress to ensure Indo-Pacific
treaty allies and key partners are receiving the advanced and critical
defense and security capabilities necessary for their national security
and to advance the U.S. national interest in peace and stability of the
region.
Each year, the United States provides hundreds of millions of
dollars in security assistance and cooperation to critical allies and
partners to advance our foreign and national security goals for the
region. This assistance provides training, equipment, and assets to
security partners across the Indo-Pacific region.
The United States arms export regime ensures close allies and
partners have access to advanced capabilities, provided they have a
track record of protecting the technology, respecting human rights, and
using the equipment for its intended purpose. The State Department
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs continually reviews exports
available for important Indo-Pacific allies.
Economic Engagement
Question. What role can the State Department play in expanding U.S.
economic engagement in Southeast Asia? What are the current obstacles
to U.S. commercial activity in that part of the region?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with partners and allies to
address Southeast Asia's most pressing economic needs: access to
expertise and capital to help build the infrastructure, energy, and
digital foundation to allow these countries to grow their economies.
Through major economic initiatives like the Infrastructure Transaction
and Assistance Network, Asia Enhancing Development and Growth through
Energy, and the Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership, the
State Department and our interagency partners are providing technical
assistance, commercial advocacy, and financing for projects. We will
also continue to engage through APEC, ASEAN's economic track, and
further deepen our commercial engagement through events like the annual
Indo-Pacific Business Forum to underscore the U.S. commitment to the
region's economic growth. If confirmed, I will also ensure that our
diplomats in the region fight for every job and the interests of
American workers by insisting on market access and fair treatment,
stopping intellectual property theft and currency manipulation, and
combating corruption.
Question. Do you commit to robust support of the Infrastructure
Transaction and Assistance Network? Will you prioritize coordination
and cooperation with the interagency on deployment of U.S. Government
tools to support infrastructure abroad?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to prioritizing coordination
and cooperation with the interagency to promote quality infrastructure
development in the Indo-Pacific region. The Infrastructure Transaction
and Assistance Network plays a key role in providing the technical
assistance, advocacy, and financing tools necessary for the region's
growth. I commit to continuing the program's efforts to promote
transparent, private-sector infrastructure investments in the region.
Energy Policy
Question. The Biden administration has taken multiple steps to
prevent the United States from engaging with other countries on coal,
oil, and natural gas. This includes disallowing the U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation from financing fossil fuel development
projects. In the Indo-Pacific, nations like Vietnam and Indonesia are
still heavily reliant on coal and gas and are not in an economic
position to switch to other alternative fuels quickly. In the absence
of U.S. engagement or engagement from other partners like Japan, what
alternatives will Southeast Asian countries have in satisfying growing
energy demands? Is it in the U.S. interest, for example, for these
countries to become reliant on coal from China, which is building and
financing coal plants all over the world?
Answer. The Indo-Pacific presents concurrent challenges of rapidly
growing energy demand coupled with reliance on unsustainable fossil
fuels, aging infrastructure, and outdated market mechanisms to deliver
energy requirements. U.S. engagement to address these challenges, while
simultaneously reducing greenhouse gas emissions, will focus on
bolstering partners' energy security, supporting sustainable
development goals, and implementing decarbonization strategies.
If confirmed, I will work with other State Department bureaus as
well as with the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation--
and through the Asia Enhancing Development and Growth through Energy
(EDGE) program and the Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance
Network (ITAN)--to support countries' improved energy efficiency, the
deployment of renewable energy infrastructure and technologies, and
financing for projects in the Indo-Pacific region.
Counter PRC Malign Influence Fund
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to conduct oversight of how
funds are appropriated to the Countering PRC Malign Influence Fund
(originally called the Countering Chinese Influence Fund) and how they
are used by the Department? Do you commit that these funds will only be
directed to projects and initiatives that have a direct nexus to malign
influence from China? Do you commit that you will take steps to ensure
this fund will not be pulled from to support efforts unrelated or
tangentially related to China that the Department wants to fund for
advancing other priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Deputy
Secretary and other senior leaders in the Department and at USAID to
engage in a full review of the CCIF to ensure the funds are used
strategically in a manner that advances U.S. economic, diplomatic,
military, and technological leadership in our strategic competition
with China and in support of a stable and open international system.
The PRC's use of coercive and corrupting tools of influence to
undermine and interfere in countries are a major concern for the United
States and our partners around the world. I support the CCIF's overall
goals and objectives, including efforts to increase transparency and
accountability associated with the Belt and Road Initiative.
International Organizations and Human Rights
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that the
Government of Thailand respects freedom of expression and internet
freedom?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to prioritize human rights in
our relationship with Thailand, including on freedom of expression and
Internet freedom. I believe that free and open access to, and the free
exchange of, information and ideas, including through the Internet, is
fundamental to democracy and important to all people. I will urge the
Royal Thai Government to respect the rights of those who exercise their
freedom of expression and to protect human rights across the board,
consistent with Thailand's international obligations and commitments.
China Human Rights
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to pressure the
Government of China to respect the rights of minority groups, in
particular the Uyghurs, Turkic Muslims, Tibetans?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will
work with partner and allies to address our shared concerns regarding
the human rights situation in the People's Republic of China, and will
consider all appropriate tools to promote accountability for those
responsible for abuses.
Hong Kong
Question. As the Chinese Communist Party has increased its
repression of the people of Hong Kong, how will you work to promote
freedom of speech and expression?
Answer. The State Department will consider all available tools to
promote freedom of speech and expression, including public diplomacy
and statements, joint messaging with like-minded partners, the
imposition of sanctions and visa restrictions, and the use of the Hong
Kong Policy Act to underscore that Hong Kong is no longer autonomous.
If confirmed, I will proactively support these efforts.
Trafficking in Persons
Question. In last year's State Department Trafficking in Persons
Report, Singapore was ranked as a Tier 1 country after spending 10
years on Tier 2. Singapore has made significant strides in
identification and protection of victims, partnering with NGOs and
foreign governments to develop trainings for police and civil society,
as well as building trafficking shelters.
In last year's State Department Trafficking in Persons Report,
Singapore was ranked as a Tier 1 country after spending 10 years on
Tier 2. Singapore has made significant strides in identification and
protection of victims, partnering with NGOs and foreign governments to
develop trainings for police and civil society, as well as building
trafficking shelters.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to work with Singapore and
like-minded stakeholders to capitalize on this success?
Answer. Singapore has taken steps to curb human trafficking,
including through adoption of the 2014 Prevention of Human Trafficking
Act, which criminalizes all forms of human trafficking. The State
Department works closely with the Singapore Interagency Task Force on
Trafficking in Persons and Singaporean civil society to address this
challenge. If confirmed, I pledge to continue working closely with
Singapore on anti-trafficking efforts.
Question. How can we use Singapore as a model for the region to
support victims and eventually eradicate human trafficking?
Answer. The State Department believes Singapore's efforts can offer
a positive example in combating trafficking in persons for other
countries in the region. After spending ten years as a Tier 2 country,
Singapore ranked Tier 1 in the 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report for
the first time since 2006. Singapore has demonstrated serious efforts
in prosecuting labor trafficking, as well as with the identification
and protection of victims. Singapore has also partnered with foreign
governments to offer victim identification trainings for its officials.
The Government is also taking steps to prevent trafficking within its
large migrant worker population by introducing new measures to decrease
the risk of indebtedness for foreign workers. If confirmed, I will make
combating trafficking in persons a priority, and will look for ways to
use the Singapore experience as an example for other countries to study
in making progress on these issues.
Human Rights Regionally
Question. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated an already
precarious human rights situation across Southeast Asia. Authoritarian
governments have used COVID-19 restrictions as a facade to further
squash dissent, protestors, online expression and discussion, as well
as other practices of human rights. If confirmed, what are you
priorities for protection of human rights regionally?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work across the interagency to promote
human rights in the region and hold accountable perpetrators of
violations and abuse. At the center of our whole-of-government efforts
for a free and open Indo-Pacific is building the capacity of our
partners to promote civil society, rule of law, transparency, and good
governance across the region. I will prioritize addressing systemic
challenges that enable malign influence, including the atrocities
against Uyghurs and other minority groups in Xinjiang, as well as
repression in Tibet; a further crackdown on freedom online; attacks
against Burmese protesters; the assault on freedoms in Hong Kong; and
the targeting of activists and journalists in places like Cambodia and
Malaysia.
Question. How will you work with other stakeholders at the
department, interagency, and on the ground regionally to combat the
growing encroachment on human rights by authoritarian governments?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our partners within the
State Department, including the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, as well as interagency partners such as USAID, Treasury, and
DoJ, to promote anti-corruption and fiscal transparency, democracy
assistance, youth and emerging leader development, media and internet
freedom, and to protect fundamental freedoms and human rights for all
in the region. I will also work with likeminded governments, civil
society, and private sector partners to support and empower human
rights defenders and civil society organizations.
Burma
Question. It has been roughly four and a half months since the
violent military coup in Burma, endangering thousands and threatening
ending democracy in country. Since the coup, we have seen thousands of
arbitrary arrests, detentions, and a severe crackdown on human rights.
If confirmed, how will you engage with the relevant stakeholders to
support human rights defenders in country and work to return Burma to a
civilian-led rule?
Answer. If confirmed, I will utilize every tool and opportunity to
expose the junta's horrific brutality, promote accountability, and
support the aspirations of the people of Burma, including ethnic and
religious communities, who yearn for democracy and do not want to live
another day under military rule. The United States will continue to
support Burma's pro-democracy movement, including the ``National Unity
Government'' (NUG), various ethnic and religious communities, and
others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic transition. In
addition, the United States will continue to encourage our partners,
allies, and other members of the international community to engage
representatives of the pro-democracy movement, including in
international organizations and major international events.
The United States has also engaged the pro-democracy movement,
including the NUG, at high levels, and has encouraged other countries
to do so as well, which has served to further empower and support human
rights defenders in the country. If confirmed, I will make it a top
priority to support the Burmese people and work to return Burma to the
democratic path chosen by its people.
Question. The plight of the Rohingya must also not be forgotten. I
am deeply concerned about the potential forced return of Rohingya
refugees from Bangladesh to Burma, which constitutes a violation of
international law. What steps will you take alongside the bureaus of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (DRL), and alongside our international partners to support
the already robust United States Government (USG) response to the
Rohingya refugee crisis?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to promote justice and
accountability for the atrocities and other abuses the military has
committed against the people of Burma, and humanitarian assistance for
all vulnerable communities in and from Burma, including Rohingya. The
United States will continue providing this life-saving humanitarian
assistance, including through ongoing coordination with international
partners.
In addition to urging the military to restore the democratically
elected government, release all those unjustly detained, and end
violence, I will ensure achieving justice and accountability for
atrocities against Rohingya remains pivotal to our policy. The United
States continues to support the voluntary, safe, dignified, and
sustainable return of Rohingya refugees and internally displaced
persons, when conditions allow.
During his confirmation hearing, Secretary Blinken promised a
comprehensive review of military atrocities against Rohingya. If
confirmed, I intend to support that process and secure international
support for any determination made by the Secretary.
Vietnam
Question. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) bore witness or
committed significant human rights abuses during the reporting period
for the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report, including torture,
arbitrary killings, serious restrictions on free expression, the press,
and the internet, significant corruption, trafficking in persons, as
well as substantial interference with the freedom of assembly and
association. If confirmed, please describe your action plan for
engaging with the CPV regarding the improvement of human rights in
country.
Answer. I am concerned about the human rights situation in Vietnam,
and if confirmed, I would be committed to pushing for improvements.
Despite progress in some areas, including labor rights, the trend of
escalating harassment, unjust arrests and convictions, and increasingly
harsh prison sentences of journalists and activists for peacefully
exercising their right to express their opinions is deeply troubling.
Vietnam is an extremely important partner in the Indo-Pacific region,
but that partnership will reach its fullest potential only when the
Vietnamese Government improves its human rights record.
If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Vietnam to improve
its implementation of its human rights obligations and commitments. I
will urge the Government of Vietnam to encourage law enforcement and
the judicial system to effectively and fairly enforce existing
constitutional guarantees and laws protecting human rights, including
freedom of religion or belief. I will continue to raise our concerns
with the Government of Vietnam, including during the annual U.S.-
Vietnam Human Rights Dialogue, and call on Vietnam to respect and
protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, consistent with its
international obligations and commitments.
Repatriation of Foreign Terrorist Fighters
Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters housed at various
detention facilities around the world. This includes at least 2,000
Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist fighters.'' Many of these
FTFs are housed at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, like al
Hol in northeastern Syria. The al-Hol IDP camp has become fertile
ground for ISIS recruitment of vulnerable populations, posing a serious
risk to global security. Despite this risk, countries with foreign
terrorist fighters have failed to make any progress to date towards
repatriating their nationals.
Can you commit to working with countries in the East Asia Pacific
region to help mitigate the threat posed by FTFs including
through increased support to humanitarian agencies providing
assistance to vulnerable IDP populations?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with countries in the
East Asia Pacific region to help mitigate the threat posed by FTFs,
including through encouraging increased support to humanitarian
agencies providing assistance to vulnerable IDP populations. I will
also urge partners to provide additional support to vulnerable IDP
populations within Syria. The U.S. Government strongly believes that
repatriations--followed by appropriate prosecution of the FTFs in
domestic courts of law--is the best way to keep these fighters off the
battlefield and hold them accountable for their crimes. The United
States regularly engages in diplomatic discussions with our local
partners (including the Syrian Democratic Forces) and foreign allies on
this dire issue. We have and will continue to work through ASEAN fora
to address FTF issues and capacity building for the ASEAN Humanitarian
Centre for disaster management.
Question. How do you plan to engage with EAP countries to advance
repatriation efforts of their nationals, which remains a critical to
ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS?
Answer. The U.N. has expressed serious concern at the deteriorating
security and humanitarian situation at al-Hol and Roj camps in
northeast Syria, and is urging all member states to repatriate their
citizens without delay. If confirmed, I will urge partner nations to
repatriate their citizens without delay. We continue to strongly
encourage countries to take back their citizens from Syria and Iraq.
The United States believes that repatriations, followed by a.)
prosecution of FTFs would be the best way to keep fighters off the
battlefield and address security threats; and b.) rehabilitation and
reintegration of associated family members are the best ways to end the
humanitarian crisis in al-Hol and Roj IDP camps.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. In your engagements with Beijing, will you require
meaningful progress as a precondition for further rounds of dialogue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support the administration's approach
to work with China when it is in our national interest to do,
conducting practical, results-oriented diplomacy that will require
meaningful progress from Beijing.
Question. Do you commit to raise issues that Beijing deems
``sensitive''--such as human rights, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, and the
Uyghurs--regardless of whether doing so may affect the CCP's
willingness to engage in further dialogue?
Answer. Yes. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to
putting democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to
standing up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If
confirmed, I will always be willing to speak out on behalf of our
values.
Question. As you know, the CCP has failed to uphold many of its
agreements with the United States. Xi Jinping told President Obama that
Beijing would not use its intelligence services to steal intellectual
property for commercial gain. Xi made the same promise to President
Trump in 2017 and 2018, but this theft has not stopped. Xi promised
President Obama that China would not militarize the South China Sea.
And in Hong Kong, Beijing has violated its commitments under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
Can you name a single bilateral agreement between the United States
and the PRC that Beijing has honored in full and without later
reneging?
Answer. China's failure to uphold past international commitments is
a significant factor in how we will develop our approach to China. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's approach of remaining
clear-eyed and keeping these past shortcomings in mind as we deal with
Beijing.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP can be trusted to uphold any
of its commitments, including those pertaining to climate change?
Answer. I believe the United States must judge Beijing by its
actions, not its words, and work with allies and partners to impose
costs on China when it violates international norms and agreements. We
know that addressing the climate crisis will require significant
additional action by China. As such, we will continue to press Beijing
to raise its climate ambition significantly during this critical
decade. At the end of the day, we will consider what Beijing actually
does--not what it says it will or won't do--to determine whether the
PRC is serious about climate action.
Question. How will you ensure that Beijing fulfills its climate
change commitments given its record of broken promises?
Answer. We know the climate crisis will not get addressed
successfully without significant additional action by China. The Paris
Agreement sets forth a robust transparency framework, under which
Parties, including China, will need to report and be reviewed with
respect to their greenhouse gas emissions and the extent to which they
implement and achieve their respective nationally determined
contributions. The United States will continue to press Beijing to
raise its climate ambition significantly, including to update and
implement existing Paris Agreement targets as ambitiously as possible.
If confirmed, I would consider what Beijing actually does--not what it
says it will or won't do--to determine whether the PRC is serious about
climate action.
Question. Do you believe that the Chinese Communist Party's united
front and intelligence activities inside the borders of the United
States, and those of our allies and partners, challenge the integrity
of our policymaking? Why and how should we address this problem?
Answer. It is important that we bring greater transparency to bear
on PRC influence activities in the United States and abroad. China's
use of information operations and other coercive and corrupting efforts
to undermine and interfere in democracies poses a threat to the United
States and our allies and partners. If confirmed, I will push back on
Beijing's attempts to write the rules of the information age by working
with allies and likeminded partners to support an affirmative,
democratic vision for the global information space, while building
resilience against these threats and exposing China's influence
activity. I would also work to educate important U.S. constituencies,
including state and local governments, on these threats.
Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the requirements that PRC
diplomats report certain categories of meetings to the U.S. Government,
including meetings with educational institutions and Chinese community
groups?
Answer. It is important that there is transparency in China's
influence activities in the United States. If confirmed, I commit to
review this policy carefully.
Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the prior
administration's designation of multiple Chinese media outlets as
foreign missions, as well as its visa restrictions on PRC reporters
(who frequently act as intelligence gatherers as much as reporters)?
Are you prepared to explain and defend the difference between these PRC
media outlets and a genuine free press?
Answer. It is important that there is transparency in China's
influence activities in the United States. If confirmed, I will always
be prepared to explain and defend the difference between China's state-
run media outlets and a genuine free press.
Question. If confirmed, will you maintain the prior
administration's policy of denying visas to certain classes of PRC-
national researchers, including those who have concealed their
affiliation with the People's Liberation Army?
Answer. National security is the State Department's top priority
when adjudicating visa applications. It is a critical U.S. interest to
make sure that we protect the technology and intellectual property that
is produced in this country and that, if used to advance the PRC's
military modernization, could undermine our security. We must likewise
guard against efforts by visa applicants to unlawfully conceal
information in the course of the visa application process and, where
appropriate, take legal action. If confirmed, I will review the tools
available to address these challenges, including visa policy.
Chinese Influence Operations
Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to support Australia, and
other victims of PRC economic coercion and United Front activities, to
build resistance to the CCP's political influence inside their
countries?
Answer. If confirmed, I would not leave Australia and other allies
and partners alone in the face of PRC economic coercion and United
Front activities. We will face down these threats from a position of
collective strength. I will work with the Global Engagement Center
(GEC) to counter PRC propaganda and disinformation, including through
programs that identify and expose the PRC's malign influence tactics
and techniques and puncture Beijing's false narratives. I will also
support continued coordination and cooperation through the counter
disinformation working group with Australia, announced at Australia-
United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) last year. U.S. and
other foreign firms have also faced economic coercion such as boycotts
and other pressure tactics for challenging PRC preferred narratives. If
confirmed, I will work to align our actions with those of democratic
and like-minded partners to counter these threats and to advance
bilateral and multilateral efforts that build resilience abroad to PRC
covert, coercive, and corrupt activities. Efforts to diversify supply
chains, support increased trade between like-minded partners, and
encourage best practices to screen potentially threatening investments
will help to build resilience and reduce the impact of PRC coercion.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that human rights
concerns are integrated into every senior bilateral engagement, and
that specific prisoner cases are raised at the highest levels, both
publicly and privately?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure that human rights issues are integrated into bilateral
engagements with the People's Republic of China at all levels. This
requires not only general statements but also raising specific cases,
both publicly and privately, as appropriate.
Question. Do you see the link between China's pervasive, egregious
human rights abuses, and its failure on so many other fronts to be a
responsible global actor?
Answer. I am alarmed by human rights violations and abuses in China
and call on PRC authorities to respect the human rights and fundamental
freedoms to which their citizens are entitled, consistent with China's
international obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I will work to
continue holding accountable PRC authorities responsible for abuse,
while also countering PRC attempts to erode the international rules-
based order.
Question. What are the appropriate tools for holding the PRC and
its officials accountable for its atrocities against Uyghurs and other
Muslims in Xinjiang? If confirmed, do you commit to using such tools in
a timely fashion?
Answer. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is committing crimes
against humanity and genocide in Xinjiang against Uyghurs, who are
predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious
minority groups. If confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to
promote accountability for those responsible and deter future abuses,
to include but not limited to, actions already implemented by the U.S.
Government: visa restrictions, import restrictions, export
restrictions, and financial sanctions.
Question. What actions can the U.S. take to address the issue of
forced labor in Xinjiang, including to protect against retaliatory
actions from China?
Answer. The U.S. Government has condemned the People's Republic of
China (PRC) Government's retaliatory actions against individuals,
businesses, and organizations that stand up for human rights. If
confirmed, I will consider all appropriate tools to promote
accountability for PRC Government actors and entities responsible for
the atrocities and human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced
labor, and work with interagency partners to address PRC actions. I
also commit to working with the like-minded countries and the private
sector to counter economic retaliation against companies when they take
actions to avoid complicity in PRC human rights and forced labor
abuses.
Question. How can the U.S. best provide support to civil society
actors in Muslim-majority countries who are conducting advocacy on this
issue?
Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to working with partners and
allies, civil society, advocates, and other groups around the world to
address our shared concerns over the PRC Government's atrocities in
Xinjiang.
Question. Will you work to ensure that discussions over arbitrary
mass detention and forced labor in Xinjiang are integrated into trade
discussions?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to putting
democratic values at the center of our foreign policy and to standing
up for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. If confirmed, I will
work to ensure we continue integrating our Xinjiang concerns into
bilateral engagements with the People's Republic of China at all
levels.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with
countries hosting Uyghur communities to ensure they do not summarily
deport Uyghurs to China?
Answer. The PRC Government's atrocities in Xinjiang raise serious
refoulement concerns. If confirmed, I will work with other governments
to ensure that Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of
other ethnic and religious minority groups that have escaped repression
in Xinjiang are not forcibly returned to China.
Question. Do you believe the United States can and should use its
diplomatic and economic leverage to protect Uyghurs from unjust
deportation from other countries back to China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consider all available tools to ensure
that Uyghurs and other vulnerable individuals are not forcibly returned
to China.
Question. Do you believe that the CCP is engaged in a deliberate
campaign of cultural erasure against Tibetans, whose civilization is
distinct from that of China and boasts its own rich language,
literature, religion, and culture?
Answer. The PRC Government has deliberately suppressed the distinct
cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of Tibetans. If confirmed,
I will make addressing these abuses a priority.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to convey clearly to Beijing
the United States position that we will not accept a Chinese-controlled
process to select the next Dalai Lama?
Answer. The PRC Government should have no role in the succession
process of the Dalai Lama or any other Tibetan Buddhist lama. If
confirmed, I will call on the PRC to respect the religious freedom of
Tibetans, including by ending its interference in the selection,
education, and veneration of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders.
Question. If the Chinese authorities attempt to force a politically
chosen successor on the Tibetan people, will you commit to impose
serious sanctions in response?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consider the use of all appropriate
tools, including financial sanctions and visa restrictions, to promote
accountability for PRC officials responsible for abusing the religious
freedom of Tibetans, including by interfering in the succession process
of the Dalai Lama, consistent with the Tibetan Policy and Support Act
of 2020.
Question. Would you, if confirmed, personally commit to pressing
the PRC leadership to address Tibetan concerns through the resumption
of dialogue with the Dalai Lama, or his representatives, without
preconditions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with our allies and partners to
press Beijing to return to direct dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his
representatives, without preconditions, to achieve meaningful autonomy
for Tibetans.
Question. Will you commit to regularly raise the case of the
Panchen Lama and press for his release?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to engaging the PRC Government on
the case of the Panchen Lama.
Question. Will you ensure that no U.S. official meets with, or
provides a public platform to, the individual that Beijing appointed in
his place?
Answer. The PRC Government should have absolutely no role in the
succession process of the Dalai Lama. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure all U.S. engagements reflect this position.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to direct our diplomatic
missions in the region, including in Hong Kong, to do their utmost to
assist Hong Kongers who fear political persecution under the National
Security Law, and use all consular options, including Special Public
Benefit Parole, to provide safe harbor?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that our diplomatic missions in
the region, including Hong Kong, will continue to do their utmost to
assist Hong Kongers who fear persecution, to include working to pursue
all options, as appropriate, to provide avenues for those who seek to
depart.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to ensuring that the State
Department maintains a high degree of pressure on Beijing for its
violations of Hong Kong's autonomy and prioritizes this issue above all
other competing interests in Hong Kong?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the State Department
will continue to put pressure on PRC and Hong Kong officials
responsible for undermining Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy as
promised in the Sino-British Joint Declaration and Basic Law.
Maintaining Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy is a central focus of
our policy toward Hong Kong.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to appoint only senior
officers as Consul General who are strongly committed to the
democratization of Hong Kong?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with State Department leadership
and human resources to identify suitable candidates for Consul General
who will carry out the Department's policy of advocating for Hong
Kong's high degree of autonomy, promote fundamental freedoms and human
rights, and build support for international pressure on the PRC to meet
its obligations under the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to advocate on behalf of
Hong Kong protesters who are imprisoned for violations of the so-called
National Security Law, or for similar politically motivated charges,
both in your private conversations with Hong Kong and PRC central
government officials, as well as in public diplomacy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will advocate by any available means on
behalf of Hong Kong people imprisoned on politically motivated charges.
We continue to stand with the people of Hong Kong and for their human
rights, and fundamental freedoms. I will ensure that we continue to
support the aspirations of people in Hong Kong and for the system and
rights that the PRC promised them.
Question. Did you agree with former Secretary Pompeo's decision to
decertify Hong Kong as sufficiently autonomous to warrant special
treatment under U.S. law?
Answer. On March 31, in conjunction with the Hong Kong Policy Act
Report, Secretary Blinken again certified to Congress that Hong Kong
does not warrant differential treatment under U.S. law in the same
manner as U.S. laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. If
confirmed, I am committed to continuing to work with Congress and our
allies and partners around the world to stand with people in Hong Kong
against the PRC's egregious policies and actions that undermine the
autonomy and freedoms promised in the Sino--British Joint Declaration
and Hong Kong's own Basic Law.
Question. If confirmed, will you use decertification and all other
available means to deny legitimacy to the government of the Hong Kong
Special Administration Region until the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under Basic Law are restored?
Answer. The State Department has a variety of policy tools
available to deny credibility to the government of Hong Kong, including
the Hong Kong Policy Act, under which we certified again this year that
Hong Kong is no longer autonomous. In addition, under Executive Order
13936, the Department has authority to impose sanctions on Hong Kong
and People's Republic of China (PRC) officials in connection with
efforts to undermine Hong Kong's autonomy. The Hong Kong Autonomy Act
also authorizes sanctions on foreign persons that materially contribute
to the failure of the PRC to meet its obligations under the Sino-
British Joint Declaration or Hong Kong's Basic Law, as well as on
foreign financial institutions that knowingly engage in significant
transactions with such persons. If confirmed, I will continue to
evaluate all available tools and use them as necessary to pressure the
Government.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to robust efforts to
increase Taiwan's international space and to counter Beijing's attempts
to isolate Taiwan in international organizations and beyond?
Answer. Yes. The Biden-Harris administration's support for Taiwan
is rock-solid. If confirmed, I plan to continue to deepen our ties with
Taiwan in the face of PRC efforts to constrain its international space
and to support Taiwan's membership or meaningful participation in
international organizations.
Question. If President Biden follows through with his campaign
promise to assemble a summit of democracies, will you ensure that
Taiwan is invited to participate and at the same level as other
participants?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support President Biden's commitment
to host a Summit for Democracy. I believe the global community of
democracies would benefit from Taiwan's participation in such events
and could learn from Taiwan's experience of democracy under pressure
due to foreign malign influence, including disinformation campaigns
that seek to undermine its democratic processes.
Question. Do you agree with former Vice President Pence's statement
that ``America will always believe that Taiwan's embrace of democracy
shows a better path for all the Chinese people?''
Answer. Yes. Taiwan is a leading democracy and a critical economic
and security partner. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen U.S.
ties with Taiwan as an important priority.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to use your position as
Assistant Secretary to promote Taiwan as a model of democratic success
that China and others should emulate?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to work with allies and
partners to highlight the positive role that Taiwan plays in addressing
global challenges and encourage them to stand with Taiwan in defending
against threats to its democratic values.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to do your utmost to ensure
that Taiwan's requests for the sale of military equipment will be
processed as quickly as possible?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support making available to
Taiwan the defense articles and services necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act and our ``one China'' policy.
Question. Will maintaining Taiwan's defense capabilities be a top
priority for EAP under your leadership?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, in response to the growing PRC threat, I
will continue deepening our unofficial security relationship with
Taiwan to ensure it has sufficient capabilities to defend itself,
consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act.
The United States notified more than $32 billion worth of arms to
Taiwan since 2009, but arms sales alone cannot ensure Taiwan's ability
to defend itself, nor should the impact of arms sales be judged on
total value alone. Our expanding security cooperation seeks to
encourage Taiwan to prioritize cost-effective, resilient, distributed,
and sufficient capabilities. We are also encouraging Taiwan to
prioritize reserve force reform, civilian defense capabilities, and
cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience.
U.S. security cooperation with Taiwan is calibrated to meet the
threat from the PRC and is consistent with the U.S. ``one China''
policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three
Communiques, and the Six Assurances. If confirmed, as part of that
cooperation, I also will encourage Taiwan to spend on defense an amount
commensurate with the growing threat it faces.
Question. Do you commit to wholeheartedly support the full scope of
bilateral defense cooperation, including joint trainings and exercises
and any other substantive exchanges that will enhance Taiwan's security
posture?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will support engagement that would
advance U.S. interests and foreign policy objectives. The United States
has long maintained our abiding interest in peace and stability in the
Taiwan Strait.
In response to the growing PRC threat, we will continue deepening
our unofficial security relationship with Taiwan to ensure it has
sufficient capabilities to defend itself.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with our U.N. Ambassador to
look for bold and creative ways to promote Japan's candidacy for
permanent membership on the U.N. Security Council?
Answer. A reformed Security Council that is representative,
effective, and relevant is in the best interest of the United States
and all U.N. member states. If confirmed, I would support a modest
enlargement of the Security Council for both permanent and non-
permanent members, provided doing so does not diminish its
effectiveness or its efficiency, and does not alter or expand the veto.
Regarding member state suitability, we remain principally focused on a
country's ability and willingness to contribute to international peace
and security.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with your counterpart in
Tokyo, and at the Department of Defense, to ensure that U.S. forces and
Japanese forces are planning for possible Taiwan contingencies?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the United
States and our allies and partners pool our collective strength to
advance shared interests and deter common threats. We will underscore
the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.
Question. Will you encourage Tokyo to engage in security
cooperation with Taiwan to complement existing U.S. cooperation with
Taiwan?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will encourage our allies and partners
to continue to work together to advance our shared prosperity,
security, and values in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan is a capable,
thoughtful, and dynamic ally that has helped us to secure our interests
and values in Asia more effectively than we could have done alone.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to strengthen U.S. relations
with Mongolia and protect its sovereignty against potential
encroachment by the People's Republic of China?
Answer. Yes. Mongolia is a democracy and our strategic partner, and
if confirmed, I will work to continue strengthening our bilateral
relationship and supporting Mongolia's sovereignty.
Question. If President Biden follows through with his campaign
promise to assemble a summit of democracies, will you ensure that
Mongolia is invited to participate?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support President Biden's commitment
to host a Summit for Democracy. Participating governments will be
expected to deliver on both domestic and international commitments that
advance democracy, fight corruption, and protect human rights. As a
vibrant democracy, I expect Mongolia will be favorably considered for
participation.
Will you, as a matter of policy, seek to increase U.S. investment
in Mongolia and bilateral trade ties?
Answer. Yes. As Mongolia's strategic partner and proud ``third
neighbor,'' the United States will continue to seek opportunities to
increase both bilateral trade and U.S. investment in Mongolia.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with your counterpart in
Ulaanbaatar to promote programs to protect the Mongolian language,
culture, and Buddhism, and wherever possible, to extend such promotion
to Mongolians in the PRC?
Answer. Yes. Mongolia holds a unique place in world history and
possesses a rich culture stretching back centuries. If confirmed, I
will work to promote programs that protect Mongolian language, script,
culture, and Buddhism, wherever they are found.
Question. Mongolia's presidential election on June 9, 2021 was
conducted in a manner that was free and fair, but the incumbent
president was blocked from running for reelection in a manner that many
Mongolians found troubling. The Mongolian People's Party (MPP) now
controls the presidency in addition to holding a supermajority in the
parliament and yielding significant influence over the judiciary. If
confirmed, do you commit to efforts to guard against democratic
backsliding in Mongolia and to ensure that the MPP does not revert to
its authoritarian past under the influence of its authoritarian
neighbor?
Answer. Mongolia recently conducted a free and fair presidential
election, its eighth since the country's peaceful transition to
democracy in 1990. As strategic partners, Mongolia and the United
States share a common commitment to democratic values and the
strengthening of democratic institutions. The U.S. has a strong
strategic interest in ensuring Mongolia remains a stable and viable
democracy. If confirmed, I will continue the U.S. tradition of working
closely with our Mongolian counterparts to deepen their democracy and
to strengthen good governance and civil society in Mongolia.
Korea
Question. If confirmed, what will you do to expand U.S.-ROK trade
and investment ties, and encourage Seoul to diversify its trade and
investment away from China in order to reduce its vulnerability to
Chinese economic coercion?
Answer. The U.S.-ROK Alliance is bolstered by our strong and
growing economic relationship and grounded in our shared democratic
values. If confirmed, I will support the full and faithful
implementation of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which remains
the foundation of our bilateral trade and investment relationship and
an important pillar of our bilateral relationship. I will work, in
cooperation with my U.S. Government colleagues, to continue to expand
robust U.S.-ROK economic ties, promote Korean investment in the United
States, and enhance our mutual prosperity and security through close
collaboration on supply chain diversification, regular coordination on
economic security matters, and enhanced cooperation between our two
countries to advance our common vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific
and world.
Question. What is your opinion of the South Korean Government's
decision to ban the distribution of leaflets and other materials into
North Korea by North Korean human rights organizations?
Answer. As a global policy, the United States advocates for the
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms around the world.
With regards to the DPRK, if confirmed, I will continue to promote the
free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK. It is
critical for the North Korean people to have access to fact-based
information not controlled by the North Korean regime. The United
States promotes and supports freedom of expression around the world,
including with valued allies like the Republic of Korea.
The United States has been in close contact with the ROKG to
express our strong views about the importance of the free flow of
information into the DPRK and freedom of expression.
We respect the fact that the ROK, as a democracy with an
independent and strong judiciary, has tools in place to allow for
review of the law.
If confirmed, I will continue to work with our partners in the NGO
and North Korean escapee community to promote human rights in North
Korea and North Koreans' access to information.
Question. If confirmed, how would you respond to a resurgence of
the protest movement in Thailand?
Answer. The United States supports freedom of expression and the
right to peaceful assembly as essential to Thailand's democracy. The
United States does not support any political party or position in
Thailand; we support the democratic process, human rights, and the rule
of law. If confirmed, I will continue to urge the Royal Thai Government
to respect the human rights of those who exercise their freedom of
expression. I will also call on the Royal Thai Government to respect
the human rights of those who have been arrested or detained, including
adequate access to medical care and the legal counsel of their
choosing. Thailand is a valued U.S. ally and partner, and the strong
relations we have built up over time allow the United States to engage
constructively with the Royal Thai Government.
Our shared history, shared interests, and the common values that
unite our peoples make me confident that we can continue to navigate
these challenges for the good of both countries.
Question. How will U.S. policy promote human rights and democracy
in Thailand going forward?
Answer. The United States strongly supports human rights and
democracy in Thailand, the Indo-Pacific, and around the world. We are
committed to a long-term partnership with Thailand, and the promotion
of democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedoms has been a major
part of U.S. engagement with Thailand for many years. If confirmed, I
will continue to support our robust diplomatic engagement to advance
democracy and the protection of human rights in Thailand. I will call
on the Royal Thai Government to respect human rights and fundamental
freedoms and to act in a manner consistent with its international
obligations and commitments.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work to counter PRC influence
in Thailand and increase awareness of the risks of dependency on trade
and investment from China?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen our alliance with
Thailand and our partnerships in Southeast Asia, while also working to
counter the PRC's malign influence in the region. I will review our
approach to enhancing economic engagement with Thailand and regional
partners. I will encourage internationally accepted best practices in
trade and investment and an open and inclusive approach to economic
development. Furthermore, if confirmed, I am committed to working with
Thailand to combat COVID-19 and climate change; to strengthen our
defenses, including in cyberspace; and to produce and secure the
technologies of the future. Additionally, I will support Thailand as a
regional leader in the Mekong region and key partner in the Mekong-U.S.
Partnership.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to deny legitimacy to the
junta that seized power in February?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to use all tools available to
exert pressure on the junta and deny the regime international
credibility. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, we worked quickly
to impose sanctions on those responsible for the coup, as well as
state-owned enterprises and military-affiliated companies that are
providing financial resources to the military regime. The United States
has worked with our international partners to deny the regime access to
hundreds of millions of dollars in resources in international financial
institutions, as well as pushed for an arms embargo and restriction on
the export of dual use technology. We have encouraged the international
community to use all levers available to restrict the junta's access to
financial institutions and enhance scrutiny of any financial ties to
the military.
In addition, the United States has engaged the pro-democracy
movement, including the ``National Unity Government'' (NUG), at high
levels, which has served to further deny international credibility to
the regime. If confirmed, I will utilize every tool and opportunity to
expose the junta's horrific brutality, promote accountability, and
support the democratic aspirations of the people of Burma, including
ethnic and religious communities, who yearn for true democracy and do
not want to live another day under military rule.
Question. Do you commit to block the junta's efforts to replace the
legitimate representatives of Myanmar at international organizations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to support the
Burmese people and work to return Burma to the democratic path chosen
by its people. The United States has strongly condemned the military's
actions to overturn the will of the people of Burma as freely expressed
in elections in November 2020. The United States has also engaged the
pro-democracy movement, including the ``National Unity Government''
(NUG), at high levels, which has helped deny international credibility
to the regime. The United States will continue to support Burma's pro-
democracy movement, including the NUG, various ethnic and religious
groups, and others working peacefully to restore Burma's democratic
transition. If confirmed, I will support U.S. efforts to continue
encouraging our partners, allies, and other members of the
international community to engage representatives of the pro-democracy
movement, including in international organizations and major
international events, and push for dialogue among all relevant
stakeholders to secure a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Burma.
Question. If confirmed, will you work with the Treasury Department
to impose punishing sanctions on all industries that fund the Tatmadaw,
including the oil and gas industry and the mining industry?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue our robust engagement within
the U.S. interagency, including the Treasury Department, to identify
ways to exert additional pressure on the military regime, including
financial pressure. The United States has already sanctioned over 30
military leaders, adult family members, commanders, and military units
responsible for the coup and the horrific violence. We have sanctioned
top revenue generators for the military, including the largest military
conglomerates, the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) and Myanmar
Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL). We have designated the largest state-
owned enterprises in the gems, timber, and other sectors that the
military has used to enrich itself at the expense of the people of
Burma. In addition, we have successfully led an international effort
with partners and allies, including the UK, Canada, and EU, to sanction
the same individuals and entities, further denying the military
international credibility and access to revenue.
While we have sought to impose significant sanctions on the regime,
the United States has also been careful to avoid steps that could hurt
the interests of the people of Burma and deepen the humanitarian
suffering caused by the coup, and negatively impact our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that, in identifying
potential additional targets designed to exert pressure on the military
regime, including the oil and gas industry and the mining industry, we
also continue to study and take into account the impact on the people
of Burma.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Ted Cruz
Taiwan
Question. If confirmed, will you restore the Trump administration's
policy allowing our Taiwanese allies to display symbols of their
sovereignty? If not, why not?
Answer. In keeping with longstanding U.S. policy across Democratic
and Republican administrations, the United States Government does not
permit displays of Taiwan sovereignty, including flags, on United
States Government premises. Though the United States does not maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, U.S. support for Taiwan has never
been stronger, as demonstrated by, for example, ongoing arms sales
designed to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense
capability, the provision of vaccines announced by three U.S. Senators
during their visit to Taipei on June 6, and the repeated and
unprecedented public mentions of Taiwan in the recent U.S.-Japan joint
statement, U.S.-ROK joint statement, U.S.-EU joint statement, and G7
leaders' communique.
To deepen and broaden our unofficial relationship with Taiwan, the
Biden-Harris administration also issued new Guidelines for Interacting
with Taiwan (``contact guidance''), which are more permissive than any
previous iterations. Taiwan has welcomed the new contact guidance,
including through statements by President Tsai, Foreign Minister Wu,
and TECRO Representative Hsiao. If confirmed, I will work to further
develop our robust ties with our democratic partner Taiwan and ensure
we fulfill our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act.
EO 14034
Question. On June 11, the Biden administration published in the
Federal Register Executive Order 14034, which revoked Executive Order
13942 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and
Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect
to the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply
Chain), Executive Order 13943 of August 6, 2020 (Addressing the Threat
Posed by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps To Address the National
Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain), and Executive Order 13971 of January 5,
2021 (Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software
Developed or Controlled by Chinese Companies). Those three EOs had
restricted applications controlled by Chinese companies. According to
EO 13971, ``[b]y accessing personal electronic devices such as
smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software
applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from
users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and
private information. This data collection threatens to provide the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and
proprietary information--which would permit China to track the
locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of
personal information.''
Please assess the potential intelligence risks associated with
these applications including the risk to State Department
personnel and their families overseas.
Answer. Under Executive Order (E.O.) 13873, Securing the
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,
the Secretary of Commerce evaluates potential threats to the United
States presented by information and communications technology or
services designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons
owned or controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of
the People's Republic of China and other designated foreign
adversaries.
To enhance this effort, on June 9 President Biden issued E.O.
14034, which instructs the Secretary of Commerce to evaluate
transactions involving foreign adversary-connected software
applications that may pose a risk to Americans' data, utilizing clear
criteria that may indicate a heightened risk, including software
applications that are owned, controlled, or managed by persons that
support foreign adversary military or intelligence activities, or are
involved in malicious cyber activities, or involve applications that
collect sensitive personal data. If confirmed, I will work with
colleagues at the Department of Commerce in assessing these risks, as
well as the risk to State Department personnel and their families
overseas.
State Department
Question. The Obama administration was broadly criticized,
especially in the context of its Middle East policy, for co-mingling
unclassified documents with classified documents. This practice
requires that documents be placed in a secure location, unnecessarily
limiting access to unclassified documents and stifling public debate.
The Biden administration already seems to be repeating such practices:
according to an exchange during the State Department press briefing on
February 11, a notification describing the lifting of terrorism
sanctions on Iran-controlled terrorists in Yemen was unnecessarily
transmitted to a Congressional SCIF. Can you commit to ensuring that
unclassified information is not unnecessarily comingled with classified
information in notifications provided by the State Department to
Congress? If not, why not?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to working to ensure that
information provided to Congress is, to the fullest extent possible, in
a format that facilitates its access by authorized personnel, while
complying with Executive Order 13526, the Department of State
classification guide, and the executive branch rules on the handling
and storage of classified information.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Daniel J. Kritenbrink by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. Ambassador Kritenbrink, I would like to bring to your
attention the case of Greg Kelly, a Tennessee constituent who, in my
view, has been wrongly detained for nearly three years in Japan. I'm
deeply concerned about Mr. Kelly's treatment by the Japanese legal
system.
After being taken into custody in November 2018, Mr. Kelly--who
maintains his innocence--was forced to wait for nearly two years for
his trial in Japan even to begin in September 2020. News media now
report that it has been proven at trial that the entire case against
Greg Kelly was fabricated for the sole purpose of preventing Renault
from taking over Nissan. There is no deadline by which the court in
Japan must deliver a verdict in Mr. Kelly's case, and he likely faces
the prospect of no decision until well into next year.
If confirmed, do you commit to working with me and to using every
tool at your disposal to get Greg Kelly back to the United
States and home with his family?
Answer. One of the most important tasks of the Department of State
and U.S. embassies and consulates is to provide assistance to U.S.
citizens who are incarcerated or detained abroad. We take this
obligation to assist U.S. citizens arrested or detained abroad
seriously. Mr. Kelly's case is a high priority for the Bureau of
Consular Affairs and the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The
Department is actively monitoring Mr. Kelly's case and Embassy Tokyo's
American Citizens Services unit has been in frequent, regular contact
with Mr. Kelly and his legal teams. While the Department cannot
intercede on the merits of his case, the Department monitors
developments in his case very closely. The Department continue to urge
the Japanese authorities to ensure Mr. Kelly's trial and verdict are
concluded as expeditiously as possible. If confirmed, I will make Mr.
Kelly's case a priority, and I look forward to working closely with you
and your office on his case.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 13, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Hon. Robert Menendez, chairman of the committee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Kaine,
Markey, Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee shall come to order. We are here to
consider nominees for four important positions: Ambassador
Gentry Smith to the Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic
Security, Ambassador Rena Bitter to be Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs, Ms. Monica Medina to be the
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Mr. Marc Knapper to
be the Ambassador to Vietnam.
Congratulations to the four of you on your nominations, our
thanks for your willingness to serve our country in this
capacity, and the members of your family because this is a
family sacrifice as well. So we appreciate their sacrifices.
I see that our distinguished colleague and member of this
committee, the senator from Massachusetts, is going to be
introducing Ms. Medina this morning.
So we will turn to him first before any opening statements.
Senator Markey?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much and
Ranking Member Risch, thank you so much as well.
It is my pleasure this morning to introduce President
Biden's nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for the
Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific
Affairs, and my friend for 38 years, Monica Medina.
It is impossible to think of anyone more qualified for this
job.
The Chairman. You knew her in your infancy then?
Senator Markey. And, again, I am now in the infancy of my
second adulthood, as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
makes it possible for us to enjoy extended political life
expectancy.
It is impossible to think of anyone more qualified for this
job. Monica has been working for decades and across multiple
administrations on environmental law and policy.
She understands the interconnected world we live in and
knows that the 21st century U.S. foreign policy goes not simply
beyond the water's edge, but to the seas and the skies and the
sands of the world where universal threats and their solutions
lie.
Monica won a Reserve Officers Training Corps scholarship
while at Georgetown University, and while working at the
Defense Department in the Obama administration, she worked to
end discrimination against women in the military, to provide
them with opportunities that were previously closed to them
simply because of their gender.
Monica has always been a fierce fighter for justice and
never backs down from a tough challenge, and she has confronted
some of the world's toughest global challenges.
Ms. Medina has called out the connection between illegal
wildlife trafficking and organized criminal networks. She has
fought against illegal fishing, which is tied to global piracy
and human rights violations.
Just like the climate crisis, these are global spanning
threats to our national security, and Monica's expertise in
these areas is why former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and
the Center for Strategic and International Studies have turned
to her as an expert and advisor.
Monica knows that we cannot protect ourselves at home
without a robust strategy abroad, and diplomacy is not just
something that she has practiced in international work. She has
worked across the aisle with stakeholders from different states
and industries in the United States to protect our oceans and
our ocean economy.
After the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, she worked with the
five Republican governors of affected states to get $1 billion
in restoration funds from oil company BP so that states could
quickly start rebounding from the disaster.
Her work at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration was praised by groups like the Seafood
Harvesters of America, who support her experience and legacy of
protecting our oceans, and the workers and communities that
depend upon them.
Louis Pasteur once said that science knows no country
because knowledge belongs to humanity, and is the torch which
illuminates the world.
Science is the highest personification of the nation
because that nation will remain the first which carries the
furthest the works of thought and intelligence.
Monica Medina has dedicated her career to promoting
America's excellence in these two realms, the tools of science
and the values of humanity, because it is there where America's
excellence and promise to the world is to be found.
She knows that, and throughout her distinguished career,
she has become supremely prepared for the role of Assistant
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and
Science.
She has been training for it in every position in which she
has served, every mission that she has fulfilled, every
discussion she has held with key stakeholders.
I am so grateful for her continued commitment to our
country and planet, as well as for our years of friendship, and
I hope my colleagues will join me in supporting her for this
important position.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Markey. A rather glowing
introduction----
Senator Markey. Well deserved.
The Chairman [continuing]. And we know that you have, I am
sure, well earned. I know that you may have other committee
business to do, and so at your leisure you are welcome to
depart from us, and thank you for your introduction.
Let me turn to our panel, speak briefly about each of them,
turn to Senator Risch, and then we will listen to your
testimony.
Ambassador Smith has served the United States and the State
Department during his entire professional career with two and a
half decades, ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic
personnel and U.S. citizens here and abroad.
He has been a special agent protecting the secretary of
state, the regional security officer in multiple foreign posts,
a deputy assistant secretary and senior advisor in the Bureau
of Diplomatic Security.
He has served as director for the Office of Foreign
Missions for which he was previously confirmed by the Senate.
There is no question in my mind that he is fully qualified and
deeply experienced for this position.
Ambassador Smith's experience and commitment will be
needed, as the State Department faces multiple challenges in
keeping its personnel safe, including a relatively new one.
Indeed, U.S. personnel have recently faced the prospect of
silent stealthy assaults from what may be some sort of directed
energy weapons, first employed in Cuba and now showing up in
other parts of the world.
These incidents deserve the full attention of the United
States in order to ensure accountability and that the parties
responsible are brought to justice, but most of all, to protect
personnel.
So, Ambassador Smith, I trust that, if confirmed, you will
be devoted in your efforts to meet this and all threats against
U.S. diplomatic and other personnel.
Ms. Medina, as our colleague, Senator Markey has said, your
knowledge and experience, including as Principal Deputy
Undersecretary of Oceans and Atmosphere at the Department of
Commerce and in various leadership roles focused on ocean
conservation and environmental policy, suits you well for this
position.
If confirmed as Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of
Oceans, International, Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
you will be responsible for maintaining U.S. leadership on
cooperative efforts to maintain the health and sustainability
of the world we all share.
If confirmed, you will also be responsible for managing
U.S. diplomacy on addressing global plastic pollution,
protecting endangered species, and combating wildlife
trafficking, representing the U.S., the Montreal Protocol, and
the Arctic Council, among others.
I know you are up to that challenge. As you may know, I co-
authored the Save Our Seas 2.0 Act, and I look forward to
working with you on the next steps to combating plastic
pollution and other global environmental problems.
Ambassador Bitter, I am pleased to see you back before the
committee. Your service in Laos these past several years,
apparently, may not have made headlines in Washington, but it
has been with distinction.
The position you are nominated for as Assistant Secretary
for Consular Affairs is perhaps one of the most challenging
positions in the department today.
The effects of the COVID pandemic have been particularly
felt in the CA on the massive repatriation of American citizens
abroad carried out by the department last year, to the
financial challenges resulting from the consular office fee-
for-service model at a time when fees have dried up as a result
of decreased international travel.
That is something that has changed dramatically. We have
now a huge demand and a big backlog on passports, which several
colleagues on the committee have raised with me. I am sure that
may be raised with you as to how we deal with it.
The mismanagement of the department, broadly speaking, and
the Consular Affairs in particular over the past four years
leaves the next Assistant Secretary with no shortage of
challenges.
As Consular Affairs is also the part of the department that
has the most engagement with American citizens processing
passports and visas, supporting overseas travelers in need, and
the like, it is also a bureau that receives a high level of
congressional scrutiny.
While the challenges in the bureau are evident, I am
confident in your abilities and capacity to serve capably in
this position.
Finally, I am pleased to see Marc Knapper before the
committee for consideration as our next ambassador to Vietnam.
We look to develop a genuine strategic partnership with
Hanoi, one animated by our shared interests and our values, and
I can think of few more qualified Foreign Service professionals
than Mr. Knapper to be entrusted with this important task.
In closing, while the four of you have a series of
challenges ahead, I am confident that your knowledge and
experience will serve you well as you take on your new
responsibilities upon confirmation. I look forward to each of
your testimonies.
And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking
member for his opening comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the witnesses for being here today and being willing to serve
in these positions, and your families, who we know share the
sacrifices that you make.
I want to start with the nomination of Assistant Secretary
of State for Oceans and International Environment and
Scientific Affairs.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed what I believe to be
serious gaps in U.S. international pandemic prevention,
preparedness, and, importantly, response efforts. This includes
the failure of the Department of State over multiple
administrations of both parties to adequately prioritize global
health policy and diplomatic engagement beyond the PEPFAR
program.
We now realize how important that is. PEPFAR, of course,
was an exception to that. It was very successful, and it is
important that we duplicate the success that we had in PEPFAR
in what will undoubtedly be future challenges of a global
health nature.
Ms. Medina, if confirmed, you will lead the bureau
responsible for ensuring foreign policy coherence and program
integrity for global health and biosecurity.
I look forward to hearing from you how you plan to improve
State's leadership in these vital areas, which, as I said, I
think suffer some shortcomings, which have become painfully
obvious as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In addition, COVID-19 has brought to light the risks of
collaboration on life sciences research with countries that do
not share our interests like China.
If confirmed, you will have a role in overseeing
international scientific cooperation and global health
security, and it is critical that you work across the
department to prevent the misuse of such research.
Lastly, as we discussed when we met last month, the
Columbia River Treaty remains an important issue to myself and
the rest of the Northwest delegation. I look forward to hearing
more about how you plan to make Columbia River Treaty
negotiations a priority.
Next, we have the nomination of Assistant Secretary of
State for Diplomatic Security. For decades, the State
Department has struggled with what has been dubbed colloquially
a bunker mentality, which greatly over-prioritizes security to
the detriment of our diplomatic effectiveness.
Security is undoubtedly very important, but as with all
things, it must be put in its proper place. This severe risk
aversion often keeps our diplomats cooped up behind embassy
walls instead of engaging with the local community and
conducting traditional diplomacy.
America's adversaries do not place similar burdens on their
diplomats, putting the United States at a strategic
disadvantage.
Earlier this year, I introduced legislation to improve the
process for investigating security incidents abroad so that the
department's diplomats can safely do their jobs, promote U.S.
interests with host countries, and engage local populations
with appropriate protection.
If confirmed, it will be vitally important to ensure the
department learns to manage risk more effectively.
Ambassador Smith, I look forward to hearing your thoughts
on these issues.
Moving on to the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State
for Consular Affairs, the Bureau of Consular Affairs has a
unique opportunity to demonstrate how the State Department
assists U.S. citizens every day while also advancing our
national interests.
Whether it is helping Americans who lost a passport on
vacation get home or visiting U.S. citizens who have been
incarcerated abroad, Consular Affairs often directly serves the
American people.
However, last year's travel restrictions and resulting loss
of visa fee revenue greatly hurt the Bureau's finances,
potentially affecting its ability to provide these important
services.
As vaccination rates climb, there will be more people
seeking to travel. Demand for passports and visas are rapidly
increasing, leading to significant delays in processing times.
Ambassador Bitter, I look forward to hearing your plan to
get Consular Affairs fully operational and to reduce these
extremely irregular passport processing times.
Finally, we have the nomination of Ambassador to Vietnam.
Vietnam is an important U.S. partner and an ASEAN member. I am
very glad to see the recent U.S. donation of 2 million Moderna
vaccine through COVAX to Vietnam in addition to separate
donations to Indonesia and Malaysia.
Southeast Asian countries need vaccines. Given the
importance of this region to the United States and the pressure
some countries are facing from China to accept its clearly
substandard vaccines, it is crucial that the United States
continue to prioritize deliveries to our partners there.
We need to redouble our efforts following the
nontransparent COVAX procurement deal announced earlier this
week that will allow China to profit mightily from the
distribution of its substandard vaccines, all of this very
erotic.
Beyond vaccines, I think it is crucial that we advance
collaboration with Vietnam in important areas such as the South
China Sea and the Mekong region, and the crisis in Myanmar.
We should also continue to prioritize all forms of energy
engagement, including liquefied natural gas.
Finally, in closing, I continue to support engagement with
Vietnam to promote freedom of speech and religion.
Mr. Knapper, I look forward to hearing how you will tackle
all these issues if you are confirmed.
We have a lot to cover today, and I will yield back.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
All right. We will start our testimony from our nominees.
We would ask you to summarize your statement at about five
minutes.
All of your full statements will be included in the record,
without objection, and we will start with Ambassador Smith and
then move down the aisle.
Ambassador Smith?
STATEMENT OF GENTRY O. SMITH, OF VIRGINIA, NOMINATED TO BE AN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (DIPLOMATIC SECURITY)
Mr. Smith. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you
today as President Biden's nominee to be the Department of
State's Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security.
I am grateful for the confidence that the president and
Secretary Blinken have placed in me and I am humbled by the
opportunity to lead such an outstanding organization.
In the 105-year history of diplomatic security, I am just
the third DS agent to be nominated to serve as Assistant
Secretary.
In my 30-year career with the Foreign Service, I am proud
to have served as a DS agent for 27 years prior to my
appointment as the director for the Office of Foreign Missions,
a position that I held into my retirement in 2017.
I would like to thank you for your continued and unwavering
support for both the department and for diplomatic security. I
am very proud to be associated with the outstanding women and
men who labor tirelessly to protect America's diplomatic
facilities, critical information, and, most importantly,
American lives.
They also conduct extensive important law enforcement
investigations necessary to keep our country safe.
I want to thank my wife, Georgette, our adult children and
their spouses, and our six adorable grandchildren for the love
and support and for allowing me to return to rejoin an
institution that I love.
It is, indeed, an honor to lead the dedicated special
agents, security engineers, diplomatic couriers, security
technicians, and other specialized personnel in providing a
secure environment in which to conduct U.S. foreign policy.
I first joined Diplomatic Security in 1987 after proudly
serving as a police officer in Raleigh, North Carolina. These
were the early days of building the Diplomatic Security
Service.
I grew up in the organization as it grew to meet increasing
global security challenges as well as domestic challenges and
U.S. national security interests.
Having served in Cairo during both Gulf wars and Rangoon
during a period of unrest and uncertainty that rivals the
current situation, I am familiar with the importance of strong
leadership and requisite security operations.
Upon returning to the U.S. and serving in senior positions
in Diplomatic Security, I am proud to have collaborated closely
with other department colleagues, the intelligence community,
DOD, and members of Congress to construct and improve
diplomatic facilities here and abroad while enabling our
personnel to project U.S. Government interests around the
world.
I am also proud and honored to have received Senate
approval to lead the Office of Foreign Missions during my last
tenure with the department.
My body of work within the department and subsequent
experiences as an independent consultant in the private sector
is what has prepared me to assume leadership as the assistant
secretary for Diplomatic Security.
I am aware that there will always be challenges as we seek
to advance U.S. interests around the world. With support and
continued guidance from members of this committee and Congress
as a whole, my top priority, if confirmed, will be to help to
ensure that the department effectively protects its physical
assets, information, and, most importantly, lives.
At the same time, however, I recognize that effective
diplomacy is virtually impossible without the ability to take
considered risk in service of strategic goals and objectives.
It will be my responsibility to evaluate various threat-
mitigating strategies and help the department make the best
possible calculations in support of American diplomacy.
Risk management is particularly critical in high-threat
countries, most notably at the moment in Afghanistan as
American troop levels are drawn down.
Closer to home, we need to do more to promote diversity,
equity, inclusion, and accessibility within our ranks, while
empowering diplomatic security agents to conduct effective
investigations in support of protective details, as well as
passport and visa fraud.
The recent SolarWinds intrusion has underlined the
importance of DS' role in maintaining a 24/7 watch on the
department's global cyber infrastructure, a challenge which
promises to intensify over the coming years.
I also look forward to overseeing further improvements in
our law enforcement and other security training at the
department's new Foreign Affair Security Training Center in in
Blackstone, Virginia.
Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely
with this body to ensure your interests and concerns are
properly address and that we work together to protect our
personnel, facilities, and national interests abroad and
domestically.
Thank you for your time and consideration, and I am happy
to entertain any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gentry O. Smith
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee. I am honored to appear before you today as President Biden's
nominee to be the Department of State's Assistant Secretary for the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. I am grateful for the confidence that
the President and Secretary Blinken have placed in me, and I am humbled
by the opportunity to lead such an outstanding organization. In the
105-year history of Diplomatic Security, I am just the third DS agent
to be nominated to serve as Assistant Secretary.
In my 30-year career with the Foreign Service, I am proud to have
served as a DS Agent for 27 years prior to my appointment as Director
of the Office of Foreign Missions--a position I held until my
retirement in 2017. I would like to thank you for your continued
unwavering support for both the Department and Diplomatic Security. I
am very proud to be associated with the outstanding women and men who
labor tirelessly to protect America's diplomatic facilities, critical
information, and, most importantly, American lives. They also conduct
extensive, important law enforcement investigations necessary to keep
our country safe.
I want to thank my wife Georgette, our adult children and their
spouses, and our six adorable grandchildren for their love and support,
and for allowing me to rejoin an institution that I love. It is indeed
an honor to lead the dedicated Special Agents, Security Engineers,
Diplomatic Couriers, Security Technicians, and other specialized
personnel in providing a secure environment in which to conduct U.S.
foreign policy.
I first joined Diplomatic Security in 1987, after proudly serving
as a Police Officer in Raleigh, North Carolina. These were the early
days of building the Diplomatic Security Service. I grew up in the
organization as it grew to meet increasing global security challenges,
as well as domestic challenges to U.S. national security interests.
Having served in Cairo during both Gulf Wars and in Rangoon during a
period of unrest and uncertainty that rivals the current situation, I
am familiar with the importance of strong leadership and requisite
security operations. Upon returning to the U.S. and serving in senior
positions in Diplomatic Security, I am proud to have collaborated
closely with other Department colleagues, the Intelligence Community,
DoD and Members of Congress to construct and improve diplomatic
facilities here and abroad while enabling our personnel to project U.S.
Government interests around the world. I am also proud and honored to
have received Senate approval to lead the Office of Foreign Missions
during my last tenure with the Department.
My body of work within the Department, and subsequent experience as
an independent consultant in the private sector, is what has prepared
me to assume leadership as the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security. I am aware that there will always be challenges as we seek to
advance U.S. interests around the world.
With support and continued guidance from members of this committee
and Congress as a whole, my top priority, if confirmed, will be to help
ensure the Department effectively protects its physical assets,
information, and, most importantly, lives. At the same time, however, I
recognize that effective diplomacy is virtually impossible without the
ability to take considered risks in service of strategic goals and
objectives. It will be my responsibility to evaluate various threat
mitigation strategies and help the Department make the best possible
calculations in support of American diplomacy. Risk management is
particularly critical in high threat countries, most notably at the
moment in Afghanistan as American troop levels are drawn down.
Closer to home, we need to do more to promote diversity, equity,
inclusion, and accessibility within our ranks while empowering
Diplomatic Security agents to conduct more effective investigations in
support of protective details, as well as passport and visa fraud.
The recent SolarWinds intrusion has underlined the importance of
DS's role in maintaining a 24/7 watch on the Department's global cyber
infrastructure--a challenge which promises to intensify in the years to
come.
I also look forward to overseeing further improvements in our law
enforcement and other security training at the Department's new Foreign
Affairs Security Training Center in Blackstone, Virginia.
Finally, if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this
body to ensure your interests and concerns are properly addressed, and
that we work together to protect our personnel, facilities, and
national interests abroad and domestically.
Thank you for your time and consideration. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Bitter?
STATEMENT OF THE HON. RENA BITTER, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLOMBIA,
A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF
MINISTER-COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE (CONSULAR AFFAIRS)
Ms. Bitter. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you
today and grateful to President Biden and Secretary Blinken for
the trust they have placed in me.
It is with no small measure of humility that I approach the
responsibility before me, if confirmed. I believe there is no
part of the Department of State more directly responsible for
the security and well-being of Americans at home and abroad
than the Bureau of Consular Affairs.
In fact, diplomats have been serving their fellow citizens
abroad in consular missions since before the Constitution was
written.
These are the oldest and most vital functions of the
Department of State. Consular work is not glamorous and it can
often be heartbreaking. But colleagues in the bureau do not do
this work for recognition. They are the truest of public
servants, working under sometimes very difficult conditions on
behalf of the American people.
For a recent example, the men and women of the Bureau of
Consular Affairs led the repatriation of nearly 100,000
Americans at the beginning of the pandemic, often risking their
own health and safety.
The Senate recognized this effort with Senate Resolution
567 commending the department for its efforts on behalf of our
fellow citizens.
I would also like to add my thanks to the Bureau for all it
does on behalf of the American people, much of which takes
place below their notice.
If confirmed, it would be the honor of a lifetime to lead
this extraordinary team. I have had many jobs and many proud
moments during the span of my 27-year career, but the proudest
have revolved around Consular Services.
In Amman, my team issued the very first Special Immigrant
Visas for Iraqi translators at the start of that program in
2006. I understand on a very personal level the U.S.
Government's commitment to the men and women who serve beside
us.
Another proud moment was more recent as ambassador when I
received a letter from two grieving New England families whose
newlywed children were tragically killed while on their
honeymoon in Laos.
The families wrote to thank me for the compassionate
support they received from our embassy team during their time
of immeasurable grief. They enclosed their children's joint
obituary from their hometown paper, in which the families
thanked our consular officer by name.
As I said, the work can often be heartbreaking, but it is
vital and never more so than now. President Biden promised to
craft a foreign policy for the middle class. A strong healthy
Bureau of Consular Affairs will be critical to this effort.
But the global pandemic has taken a toll on the bureau. I
know the department is very grateful to Congress for its
support for consular services over the last several months.
I am aware that the bureau has had to make some difficult
decisions due to pandemic-related constraints on space and
resources. More difficult decisions lie ahead. But prior to the
pandemic, international visitors contributed more than $260
billion to the U.S. economy and directly supported millions of
jobs, and we must get back there again.
If confirmed, my top priority will be that we do, to see
that the bureau is able to meet the need for consular services
even in this constrained resource environment and with the
continued uncertainty of the global pandemic.
A related priority, if confirmed, I will work with
department stakeholders and our partners in Congress to develop
a more resilient funding model so the bureau will always have a
stable platform from which to carry out its mission.
Finally, I believe the Bureau of Consular Affairs has no
more important partner than Congress. The Department of State
is charged with representing the interests of U.S. citizens
around the world with reminding foreign governments that the
United States has no higher priority than the welfare of its
citizens, and with ensuring that our foreign policy reflects
that goal.
I believe executing these responsibilities are at the heart
of the mission that the president and secretary have entrusted
me with and to which I am prepared to dedicate all my energy.
If confirmed, I will advocate for your constituents. On a
personal note, I would like to thank my family and my family of
friends, who have put up with long absences over the course of
my career, and then generously welcomed me home as if I had
never been gone. Many of them are here today or watching.
When I last had the honor to appear before this committee,
my nephew, Josh, was among them sitting behind me. He died in
December, and today, as every day, we mourn his absence.
But I think he would be pleased to know that our love for
him would be memorialized in the Congressional Record, and I
thank the committee for indulging me in doing so.
With that, I thank you and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bitter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rena Bitter
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, I am honored to appear before you today and grateful to
President Biden and Secretary Blinken for the trust they have placed in
me. It is with no small measure of humility that I approach the
responsibility before me if confirmed. I believe there is no part of
the Department of State more directly responsible for the security and
well-being of Americans at home and abroad than the Bureau of Consular
Affairs. In fact, diplomats have been serving their fellow citizens
abroad in consular missions since before the constitution was written.
These are the oldest and most vital functions of the Department of
State.
Consular work is not glamorous and can often be heartbreaking. But
colleagues in the Bureau do not do this work for recognition. They are
the truest of public servants, working under sometimes very difficult
conditions on behalf of the American people. For a recent example, the
men and women of the Bureau of Consular Affairs led the repatriation of
100,000 Americans at the beginning of the pandemic, often risking their
own health and safety. The Senate recognized this effort with Senate
Resolution 567, commending the Department for its efforts on behalf of
our fellow citizens. I, too, would like to add my thanks to the Bureau
for all it does on behalf of the American people, much of which takes
place well below their notice. If confirmed, it would be the honor of a
lifetime to lead this extraordinary team.
I have had many jobs and many proud moments during the span of my
27-year career. But the proudest have revolved around Consular
services. In Amman my team issued the first Special Immigrant Visas for
Iraqi translators at the very start of that program in 2006. I
understand on a very personal level the U.S. Government's commitment to
the men and women who serve beside us. More recently, as Ambassador, I
received a letter from two grieving New England families whose newlywed
children were tragically killed while on their honeymoon in Laos. The
families thanked me for the compassionate support they received from
our Embassy during their time of immeasurable grief, and they enclosed
their children's joint obituary from their hometown paper, in which
they thanked our consular officer by name. As I said, the work can be
heartbreaking.
But its vital and never more so than now. President Biden promised
to craft a foreign policy for the middle class -- a strong, healthy
Bureau of Consular Affairs will be critical to this effort. But the
global pandemic has taken a toll on the Bureau. I know the Department
is grateful to Congress for its support for Consular Services over the
last several months. I am aware that the Bureau has had to make some
difficult decisions due to pandemic-related constraints on space and
resources. More difficult decisions lie ahead. But prior to the
pandemic international visitors contributed more than $260b to the U.S.
economy and directly supported millions of jobs. We must get back there
again. If confirmed, my top priority will be to ensure that we do--that
the Bureau is able to meet the need for Consular services, even in this
constrained resource environment and with the continued uncertainty of
the global pandemic.
A related priority--If confirmed I will work with Department
stakeholders and our partners in Congress to develop a more resilient
funding model so the Bureau will always have a stable platform from
which to carry out its mission.
Finally, I believe that Bureau has no more important partner than
Congress. The Department of State is charged with representing the
interests of U.S. citizens around the world, reminding foreign
governments that the United States has no higher priority than the
welfare of its citizens, and ensuring that our foreign policy reflects
that goal. I believe executing that responsibility is at the heart of
the mission that the president and secretary have entrusted me with,
and one to which I am prepared to dedicate all my energy. If confirmed,
I will advocate for your constituents.
On a personal note, I would like to thank my family and my family
of friends who have put up with long absences over the course of my
career, then generously welcomed me home as if I'd never been gone.
Many of them are here today or watching. When I last had the honor to
appear before this committee, my nephew Josh was among them, sitting
behind me. He died in December and today, as every day, we mourn his
absence. I think he would be pleased to know that our love for him
would be reflected in the congressional record and I thank the
committee for indulging me to do so.
I welcome your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador, and our sympathies to
you and your family for the loss of your nephew.
Ms. Medina, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MONICA P. MEDINA, OF MARYLAND, NOMINATED TO BE AN
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS)
Ms. Medina. I want to begin by thanking Senator Markey.
Make sure my microphone is on. There. Can you hear me now?
Thank you, Chairman Menendez. I want to begin by thanking
Senator Markey for that very kind introduction and for decades
of friendship.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today
as the president's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for
the Bureau of Oceans, International, Environmental, and
Scientific Affairs, or OES.
I am deeply honored to be nominated by President Biden and
for the trust that he and Secretary Blinken have placed in me.
I am also thrilled to have the chance to serve my country
again.
I would like to begin by thanking my family. I am eternally
grateful to my husband, Ron, and our grown children, Hannah,
Michael, and Daniel, for their constant support and
encouragement as I pursued a career in environmental
conservation, even when it took me far from home.
I also must thank my mother, Jeanne, a retired middle
school teacher, who, through her passion for elephants and
other wildlife, taught me the importance of biodiversity to
life on Earth.
If confirmed, I am eager to consult, engage, and
collaborate with members of this committee and to build on your
great work on ocean conservation, ending wildlife trafficking
and illegal fishing, stemming the rise of future pandemics,
fighting plastic pollution, and other OES issues of interest to
you.
I would not be here today if it were not for the
opportunity the U.S. Army gave me to attend Georgetown
University on an Army ROTC scholarship at a time when there
were not many women who received them.
Both my parents were teachers, and I could not have
afforded a private university like Georgetown otherwise, and my
dream was for a career in government and law.
I could not have imagined then that my scholarship would
lead me to where I sit today, that I would serve twice in the
Pentagon, once in uniform, work in positions of responsibility
on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee staff, at
the Department of Justice, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the Department of Commerce twice, and now,
with your approval, at the State Department.
OES is at the forefront of our responses to the global
challenge of the present and also the global challenge of the
future. Clearly, our nation must continue to work to defeat
COVID-19 globally and better prepare for and prevent future
pandemics.
Likewise, there is no greater long-term threat to our
safety and security than climate change. I look forward to
supporting the administration's work on both these fundamental
threats to our health, security, and prosperity.
I would, additionally, raise three areas of particular
concern to me. My decades of experience attending and
representing the U.S. at international meetings leads me to
believe that there will be increasing global tensions over
limited natural resources.
If confirmed, I would dedicate special attention to the
following.
First, the loss of biodiversity is a crisis and it is often
overlooked. But there is great bipartisan work being done here
in Congress to conserve species globally and to assist
countries in Africa, Asia, and the Americas in their efforts to
do the same.
I greatly admire the International Conservation Caucus'
efforts to work collaboratively with legislative counterparts
from around the world to ensure that we do not lose elephants
or rhinos or tigers or penguins or pangolins to extinction.
Second, the ocean needs our attention. There is too much
tension, damage, and lawless behavior in the seas due to deep
disagreements over a plethora of hot-button issues, such as
excessive maritime claims, illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing, the dramatic changes and rapid development in the
polar regions, and the disregard by bad actors of global
shipping, safety, and security rules as well as pervasive
plastic pollution and ocean chemistry changes.
I am very impressed by the work of the Ocean Caucus on
these issues, and if confirmed, implementing the recently
passed Save Our Seas 2.0 Act will be a priority of mine.
Finally, given the rapid growth and competition in space
exploration and commercialization, space policy is at a key
inflection point.
A new space race could escalate global tensions among
superpowers and create problems for future generations if we do
not work to ensure today that space actors are complying with
their obligations under international law and space activities
are pursued in a manner that is safe, responsible, and
sustainable.
All of these issues also merit special attention by OES, in
my view, because they are central to addressing our nation's
strategic competition with China. Moreover, each of these
challenges must be handled in a way that ensures the equitable
inclusion of diverse stakeholders and the private sector in our
solutions.
In tackling these and other challenges, I want to assure
the committee that I will work every day on behalf of the
American people with the goal of ensuring that our efforts
around the world support Americans at home and make their lives
better.
Thank you for considering me for this position, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Medina follows:]
Prepared Statement of Monica P. Medina
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, it is a tremendous honor to appear before you today as the
President's nominee for Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, or OES.
I am deeply honored to be nominated by President Biden, and for the
trust he and Secretary Blinken have placed in me. I am also thrilled to
have the chance to serve my country again.
I would like to begin by thanking my family. I am eternally
grateful to my husband Ron, and our children, Hannah, Michael and
Daniel, for their constant support and encouragement as I pursued a
career in environmental conservation even when it took me far from
home. I also must thank my mother, Jeanne, a retired middle school
teacher, who through her passion for elephants and other wildlife,
taught me the importance of biodiversity to life on Earth.
If confirmed, I am eager to engage, consult, and collaborate with
members of this committee and to build on your great work on ocean
conservation, ending wildlife trafficking and illegal fishing, stemming
the rise of future pandemics, fighting plastic pollution, and other OES
issues of interest to you.
I would not be here today if it were not for the opportunity the
U.S. Army gave me to attend Georgetown University on an R.O.T.C.
scholarship at a time when there were not many women who received them.
Both my parents were teachers and I could not have afforded a private
university like Georgetown otherwise--and my dream was for a career in
government and law. I could not have imagined then that my scholarship
would lead me to where I sit today--that I would meet my husband,
attend Ivy League law schools, serve twice in the Pentagon, work in
positions of responsibility on the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee staff, at the Department of Justice, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration in the Department of Commerce twice, and
now, with your approval, at the State Department.
OES is at the forefront of our responses to the global challenge of
the present and the global challenge of the future. Clearly, our nation
must continue to work to defeat COVID-19 globally and better prepare
for and prevent future pandemics. Likewise, there is no greater long-
term threat to our safety and security than climate change. I look
forward to supporting the administration's work on both of these
fundamental threats to our health, security and prosperity.
I would additionally raise three areas of particular concern to me,
and ones that, if confirmed, I would dedicate special attention to:
The loss of biodiversity globally is a crisis and it is often
overlooked. But there is great bi-partisan work being done here
in Congress to conserve species globally and to assist
countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas in their efforts to
do the same. I greatly admire the International Conservation
Caucus' efforts to work collaboratively with legislative
counterparts from around the world to ensure we don't lose
elephants or rhinos or tigers or penguins or pangolins to
extinction.
The ocean also needs our attention. There is too much tension,
damage and lawless behavior in the seas due to deep
disagreements over a plethora of hot button issues such as
excessive maritime claims, illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing, the dramatic changes and rapid development in the
polar regions, and disregard by bad actors of global shipping
safety and security rules, as well as pervasive plastic
pollution and ocean chemistry changes. I am very impressed by
the work of the Ocean Caucus on these issues. If confirmed,
implementing the recently passed Save Our Seas 2.0 Act will be
a priority of mine.
Finally, given the rapid growth and competition in space
exploration and commercialization, space policy is at a key
inflection point. A new space race could escalate global
tensions among superpowers and create problems for future
generations if we don't work to ensure today that space actors
are complying with their obligations under international law
and space activities are pursued in a safe, responsible, and
sustainable manner.
All these issues also merit special attention by OES, in my view,
because they are central to addressing our nation's strategic
competition with China. Moreover, each of these challenges must be
handled in a way that recognizes the disparity between developed and
developing nations, and ensures the equitable inclusion of diverse
stakeholders and the private sector in our solutions. In tackling these
and other challenges, I want to assure the committee that I will work
every day on behalf of the American people, with the goal of ensuring
that our efforts around the world support Americans at home and make
their lives better. Diplomacy, cooperation, and compassion for our
fellow residents of the planet we call home have never been more
important.
Thank you again for considering me for this position, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Knapper?
STATEMENT OF MARC EVANS KNAPPER, OF CALIFORNIA, A CAREER MEMBER
OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR,
NOMINATED TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM
Mr. Knapper. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, distinguished members of this committee, for the
opportunity today to appear before you. I am honored in the
faith that President Biden and Secretary Blinken have placed in
me.
I also want to express my deep love and gratitude to my
wife, Suzuko, and our son, Alex, for their support and their
sacrifice. They have repeatedly changed homes and schools and
have been distant from family and friends so that we could
serve the United States overseas. Without them, as well as my
parents, Jay and Yolanda Saltsman, I would not be here today.
The United States-Vietnam relationship has undergone a
profound transformation since the normalization of diplomatic
relations 26 years ago, and my own family history tracks the
arc of our relationship with Vietnam.
My late father, Marine Colonel Roger Knapper, was a
decorated Vietnam combat veteran who often recounted difficult
memories from his time at war. Yet, he also talked many times
of his earnest wish to return to Vietnam and see that beautiful
country at peace and thriving.
This wish was fulfilled three times during my previous
service at our embassy in Hanoi, and although he will not make
it back for a fourth visit, we will always be grateful for the
efforts and sacrifices he and millions of other Americans have
made during our long journey with Vietnam.
Our two countries have moved from a history of conflict to
a comprehensive partnership that spans political, security,
economic, and people-to-people ties.
If confirmed, I will work to continue developing the U.S.-
Vietnam relationship across a wide range of shared interests in
four key areas.
First, security. Our two countries have significantly
expanded our security cooperation, including through U.S.
support to strengthen Vietnam's maritime capabilities.
The U.S. and Vietnam share an interest in upholding
international law and resisting China's provocative behavior in
the South China Sea and Mekong region, and, if confirmed, I
will make every effort to deepen our cooperation in this area.
Second, trade and investment. Bilateral trade with Vietnam
has grown significantly, increasing from nearly nothing in 1995
to more than $90 billion in 2020, benefiting American
manufacturers, farmers, and ranchers as well as consumers.
But despite this growth, challenges remain, and if
confirmed, I will advocate for a level playing field for U.S.
companies and investors, including by urging Vietnam to
maintain equitable market access for U.S. digital services and
agricultural products.
Third, war legacy and humanitarian issues. If confirmed,
providing the fullest possible accounting for U.S. personnel
missing from the Vietnam War era will be my solemn duty.
Furthermore, for decades, Vietnam has provided critical
assistance to those efforts and we are grateful.
Since 1993, the U.S. has also contributed more than $160
million to mitigate lingering threats posed by unexploded
ordnance, and together with Vietnam, we have successfully
completed the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang,
and in 2019, we broke ground on another project to remediate
dioxin at the Bien Hoa airbase.
Our cooperation on these issues as well as providing $125
million since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, supporting over
a million persons with disabilities regardless of the cause,
has been an important foundation for our bilateral
relationship.
Fourth, and finally, people-to-people ties. The bonds
between the American and Vietnamese people are strong and
growing.
Prior to the pandemic, nearly 700,000 Americans traveled to
Vietnam annually, including more than 1,200 American students,
and here in the U.S., we welcome 30,000 Vietnamese students
each year. These people-to-people ties are an important bridge
between our two countries.
All that said, our thriving relationship is not without its
challenges. We remain deeply concerned about Vietnam's human
rights record, in particular, reports of the troubling trend of
harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust convictions,
and harsh sentences of journalists and activists.
If confirmed, I will press the government of Vietnam to
respect the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful
assembly, and religion and belief.
Only when we see significant progress on human rights can
our two countries' partnership reach its full potential, and as
always, my number-one priority will be protecting the safety
and welfare of all United States citizens in Vietnam and I will
also make the safety and welfare of Mission Vietnam personnel a
top priority.
The thriving U.S.-Vietnam partnership is a result of the
courage, goodwill, and painstaking work of dedicated people in
both countries who believed in the possibility of peace and
reconciliation between two former enemies.
Our overarching goal remains to advance American interests
and support the development of a strong, prosperous, and
independent Vietnam that contributes to international security
and respects human rights and the rule of law.
Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Knapper follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc E. Knapper
Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished
members of this committee for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I am honored in the faith that President Biden and Secretary
Blinken have placed in me.
I also want to express my deep love and gratitude to my wife,
Suzuko, and our son, Alex, for their support and their sacrifice. They
have repeatedly changed homes and schools and been distant from family
and friends so that we could serve the United States overseas. Without
them, as well as my parents Jay and Yolanda Saltsman, I would not be
here today.
The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has undergone a profound
transformation since the normalization of diplomatic relations 26 years
ago. My own family history tracks the arc of the United States'
relationship with Vietnam. My late father, Marine Colonel Roger
Knapper, was a decorated Vietnam combat veteran, who often recounted
difficult memories from his time at war. Yet, he also talked many times
of his earnest wish to return to Vietnam and see that beautiful country
at peace and thriving. This wish was fulfilled three times during my
previous service at our Embassy in Hanoi. Although he will not make it
back for a fourth visit, we will always be grateful for the efforts and
sacrifices he and millions of other Americans have made during our long
journey with Vietnam.
Our two countries have moved from a history of conflict to a
Comprehensive Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and
people-to-people ties. If confirmed, I will work to continue developing
the U.S.-Vietnam relationship across a wide range of shared interests
in four key areas.
First, security. Our two countries have significantly expanded
security cooperation, including through U.S. support to strengthen
Vietnam's maritime capabilities. Last year, Vietnam welcomed the USS
Theodore Roosevelt, the second U.S. aircraft carrier to visit since we
established diplomatic relations. The United States and Vietnam share
an interest in upholding international law and resisting provocative
behavior in the South China Sea and Mekong region, and if confirmed I
will make every effort deepen our cooperation in this area.
Second, trade and investment. Bilateral trade with Vietnam has
grown significantly, increasing from nearly nothing in 1995 to more
than $90 billion in 2020, benefiting American manufacturers, farmers
and ranchers, and consumers. Despite the growth, challenges remain. If
confirmed, I will advocate for a level playing field for U.S. companies
and investors, including by urging Vietnam to maintain equitable market
access for U.S. digital services and agricultural products.
Third, war legacy and humanitarian issues. Providing the fullest
possible accounting for U.S. personnel missing from the Vietnam War era
remains our most solemn duty. For decades, Vietnam has provided
critical assistance to those efforts. Since 1993, the United States has
contributed more than $160 million to mitigate lingering threats posed
by unexploded ordnance. Together with Vietnam, we successfully
completed the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang in 2018,
and in 2019 we broke ground on the 10-year dioxin remediation project
at the Bien Hoa airbase area. We have provided more than $125 million
since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, directly and indirectly
supporting over a million persons with disabilities, regardless of the
cause. Our cooperation on these issues continues to build a foundation
of trust to expand our relationship.
Fourth, people-to-people ties. The bonds between the American and
Vietnamese people are strong and growing. Prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, nearly 700,000 Americans traveled to Vietnam annually,
including more than 1,200 American students. Here in the United States,
we welcome 30,000 Vietnamese students each year. On the occasion of the
25th anniversary of U.S.-Vietnam relations last year, we signed an
agreement to bring Peace Corps volunteers for the first time ever, a
significant and symbolic milestone.
Our thriving relationship is not without its challenges. We remain
deeply concerned about Vietnam's human rights record, in particular
reports of the troubling trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful
arrests, unjust convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and
activists. If confirmed, I will press the Government of Vietnam to
respect the freedoms of expression, association, peaceful assembly, and
religion or belief. Only when we see significant progress on human
rights can our partnership reach its fullest potential.
As always, my number one priority will be protecting the safety and
welfare of all United States citizens in Vietnam. I will also make the
safety and welfare of Mission personnel a top priority.
The thriving U.S.-Vietnam partnership is the result of the courage,
goodwill, and painstaking work of dedicated people in both countries,
who believed in the possibility of peace and reconciliation between two
former enemies. Our overarching goal remains to advance American
interests and support the development of a strong, prosperous, and
independent Vietnam that contributes to international security, and
respects human rights and the rule of law.
Thank you for considering my nomination. I look forward to your
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will start a round of five-minute questions, and before
I start my own line of questions, I have some overarching
questions for the committee.
First, I have a few questions that speak to the importance
that this committee places on responsiveness by all officials
in the executive branch and that we expect and will be seeking
from all of you.
So I would like to ask each of you to provide a simple yes
or no answer to the following questions.
Do you agree to appear before this committee and make
officials from your office available to the committee and
designated staff when invited?
Ms. Bitter. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Knapper. Yes.
Ms. Medina. Yes. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. Do you commit to keep the
committee fully and currently informed about the activities
under your purview?
Ms. Medina. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Mr. Knapper. Yes.
Ms. Bitter. Yes.
The Chairman. Do you commit to engaging in meaningful
consultation when policies are being developed, not just
providing notification after the fact?
Ms. Bitter. Yes.
Ms. Medina. Yes.
Mr. Knapper. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
The Chairman. And finally, do you commit to promptly
responding to requests for briefings and information requested
by the committee and its designated staff?
Ms. Bitter. Yes.
Ms. Medina. Yes.
Mr. Knapper. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Bitter, let me ask you, there is a lot of issues
under what will be your portfolio. From the question of COVID
vaccines for American citizens abroad, which will not be only
within the responsibility of the Bureau of Consular Affairs but
I cannot imagine that you will not be engaged in it, what do
you think are the primary challenges for CA and the department,
more broadly, on administering such a vaccine program in the
face of a global pandemic for American citizens abroad?
Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator, I am aware of the concern
that members of Congress have and also this issue, I know, is
of great concern to many Americans. You know, the way that the
department has approached this is that it has worked in the
interagency to try to make sure that vaccines are available to
countries who have yet to acquire them.
And then within the department, we have tried to make
available consular information to Americans abroad to ensure
that they are aware of how they can get access to vaccines
where they are available and make sure that they have
information about local medical providers in healthcare, and
that is the general form of consular services to those abroad.
And if there are particular needs, of course, the embassies
abroad are always prepared to address consular services and
whatever needs American citizens have.
The department has not typically provided medical care to
private citizens. So I think there would be many challenges
attendant upon that, not least of which would simply be the
issues involved in just administering the vaccines. It would be
quite challenging.
The Chairman. I hope we will think about--and I understand
that the department has not been involved in delivering health
care services to citizens abroad, but in the global pandemic, I
hope we will think about how we help an American citizen living
abroad, maybe because of work or some other reason, to find
access to a vaccine, because when a country has its own
vaccination program, of course, it is focused on its own
citizens and so that leaves an American citizen in limbo,
potentially.
So I hope we will give a little thought to how we can
create a greater connection for American citizens abroad in
that context.
Let me turn to the question of passports. As you may know,
an artifact of the COVID crisis is the department remains
considerably backed up on passport processing at the National
Passport Center.
I was listening to several of our colleagues on the
committee and my own experience back in New Jersey of citizens
for months who have applied for their passport and cannot get a
response and, of course, with the opening of the world and the
surge in demand, there is a greater demand.
Do you have a sense--I know you are not there, but in your
briefings do you have a sense of the current backlog and what
is your thoughts about working to clear it up?
Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator.
I am very aware of this issue and I know it is very
important to you and to your constituents. It is important to
the department as well, and just I share your concern about the
length of time that it is currently taking, and the department
takes very seriously its responsibility in this area.
It is a very visible part of the work that the department
does and it is important to get secure and efficiently issued
visa--passports, rather, out to American citizens as quickly as
possible.
You know, like many organizations, the bureau and its
partners have been faced with ramping up in a situation where
COVID restrictions are lifting more slowly than demand is
rising. So it is a pretty fast-moving situation.
The department is reviewing each passport agency according
to the science and deciding when they can fully reopen. So it
is an evolving situation.
I know, again, that this is something of great concern to
you and I would be very happy to work with my colleagues in
Congressional Affairs to make sure that members and your staff
can get up to the minute briefings and the most recent
information.
But right now, I think it is taking, between the passport
office and its partners, up to 18 weeks for passports that are
not expedited to be processed.
The Chairman. Yeah. Well, I will say that briefings are
great. Actions are more important. What we really need is some
type of surge capacity for a period of time to deal with the
backlog.
I do not think that we can--many Americans, it is not just
a question of travel for leisure, but it is travel for business
again. It is travel to see family members who they may not have
seen for well over a year and a half, two years, because of
COVID. So it is about a family reunification issue as well.
I will tell the secretary as well, but I really urge you
all to think about a surge capacity for a period of time to get
us into a more reasonable period of time in which people have
to wait.
Finally, not because there are not many more issues, but I
appreciate the important work the department does to vet visas
to assure there is no fraud and abuse.
But I can tell you I have a regular stream of complaints
about the department's transparency and communication and
sometimes its agility and responsiveness when it comes to
processing visas for non-American family of U.S. citizens to
visit the United States, student visas and work and business
visas.
I am interested in your thoughts about where and how we can
improve the visa application and processing system so that
applicants, even if they are turned down, face an open,
transparent, and rapid process that speaks to our best values
as a nation.
I cannot tell you how many times--I know that an applicant
has to overcome the hurdle of showing that they have roots in
their country, that they are likely to return, that they are
not likely to stay in the United States. I am very familiar
with the immigration law in that respect. So that is a hurdle
they must meet.
But I cannot tell you how many times I have had individuals
who have properties in their country, businesses in their
country, deep family ties in their country, and no reasonable
expectation that they would stay in the United states, and many
of them feel they get arbitrarily and capriciously just
rejected.
So there is the feeling, you know, we want people in the
world to think of the United States as a place that is
welcoming and follows rules of law.
Yet, they feel that they have not had, so to speak, their
day in court. I understand the incredible crush on consular
officers. But we have to think of how we can process in a
better way.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator. I would not be telling the
truth if I had not said to you that I have not heard those
comments as well. I have. And I think they speak to issues of
respect and issues of making sure that our consular officers
are able to have what are sometimes quite quick interactions in
a respectful and clear way. It can be a very challenging job.
But I am very conscious of the fact and we all are, in the
department, and I know the Bureau of Consular Affairs is as
well, that these officers are often the first or sometimes the
only Americans that these host country nationals will meet, and
it is enormously important that that interaction does reflect
our values and does reflect the best that we have to offer.
So I take your point, and I share it and I share your
concern, and if confirmed it would be my goal to make sure that
every consular officer in every embassy and every interaction
that they have with host country nationals reflects the
diplomats that they are and reflects the best values of
America.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to associate myself with the remarks
regarding a surge to get caught up on the visas and passports.
Certainly, one of the great freedoms Americans have is the
freedom to travel and also to welcome their non-American family
members here to the United States and it is important we get
caught up on that, as we go forward.
I want to focus, however, on another area that the chairman
and I are working together on and that is global health. We are
here where we are on the pandemic and we are really focused on
vaccines today, and that is important. It is very important.
I think the only way we are going to get past this is a
good vaccine program not only in the United States but around
the world.
But, more importantly, I think we need to look to the
future, and I think one of the most important things that this
committee can do is to work on a protocol for the future and
establishing protocols and infrastructure that will get all of
the countries pulling the wagon together to address a global
pandemic.
That did not happen this time. We all know that. There were
major flaws, major holes in various countries attempted to get
through this.
And so the chairman and I have been working on global
health policy and a global health bill, and I hope, Ms. Medina,
that you will familiarize yourself with that and commit to
helping us get in place an infrastructure protocol for dealing
with these things when they happen immediately.
There is no substitute for being able to address the
challenge immediately, and that is primarily what our
legislation is designed to do.
We all know, and the stories are legion, as far as the
failures right at the beginning of this pandemic that caused no
end of problems for the world, including the number of deaths.
And so I would like to hear your thoughts on that.
Ms. Medina. Senator Risch, thank you very much for that
question. And as you know, when we discussed it in your office
and with your staff, there is no higher priority for the Bureau
of Oceans, Environment, and Science than dealing with the
current crisis and preventing and preparing for future crises,
and I look forward to working with you, if confirmed, to try
and build up, bulk up, the ability of the bureau to be that
repository of expertise and to prepare the U.S. for what is
likely to be additional challenges like the one we faced in the
future.
And I look forward to working with you on your legislation
and to hearing your thoughts, if confirmed, about how we could
do that together.
Senator Risch. Well, thanks. And I will tell you that we
all know the United States Government is big, it is complex, it
has got many agencies, and there is an important function that
Congress can play and, hopefully, we will play with legislation
that the chairman and I have been working on as far as
resolving who is in charge and who makes those decisions
because, again, sometimes you get people of equal stature in
the Government making conflicting decisions, and somebody has
got to straighten that out, and this legislation attempts to
address that and, hopefully, will address that.
In addition to that, of course, it is the same thing
internationally, and that is establishing some type of
structure internationally where these kind of questions can be
answered and answered clearly.
We had a lot of gray areas particularly during the early
parts of the pandemic, and these, in the best interest of the
American people, in the best interest of the world, need to be
straightened out and that responsibility is right here with the
Foreign Relations Committee.
So we are attempting to discharge that responsibility. We
will, certainly, look to you for your assistance and help, and
we believe that the State Department is the appropriate place
as a clearinghouse for making these kind of decisions.
And, again, I fully appreciate that we are focused on
vaccine right now. But it is really important that we walk and
chew gum at the same time and prepare for the next pandemic.
So with that, my time is up. Thank you.
Senator Cardin [presiding]. I understand we have Senator
Booker by WebEx who is next.
[Pause.]
Senator Cardin. I understand he is not available. We will
go to Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you to my colleagues and
congratulation to the nominees for your appointments. I have
questions. I have a million questions for all of you. But in
five minutes, I am going to ask questions of Mr. Smith and Mr.
Knapper.
Mr. Smith, Virginia is the home for training of security
professionals who work not only for the State Department in the
capacity center that you referenced in your opening statement
at Fort Pickett in Blackstone, Virginia, but also the Marine
security guards that protect our embassies around the world are
trained at a wonderful facility at Quantico.
I have worked very hard as a member of this committee over
the nine years I have served on it to advance the security
training of our State Department professionals.
The siting of the training center at Fort Pickett was
something I was very involved in in the early part of my time
on the committee.
It has come a long way and I think there is even more that
can be done there, and I would hope at some point, should you
be confirmed, to possibly visit with you so we could assess
together its current status and what more might be done to
enhance the security training of State Department personnel.
Mr. Smith. If confirmed, Senator, I look forward to that,
and thank you for your support.
Senator Kaine. Right. Thank you so much.
And, Mr. Knapper, with respect to Vietnam, I traveled on a
bipartisan CODEL to Vietnam in April of 2019. It was a
tremendous visit, and we found so much interest in deeper
partnerships with the United States on military cooperation.
There was appreciation for the U.S. role, led by Senator
Leahy for decades now, to work on cleanup of dioxins and other
contaminants at military bases in Vietnam, and the warm welcome
we received from Vietnamese officials and the Vietnamese public
was very heartwarming.
But of the number of concerns I have about Vietnam, one
that is most significant is the deplorable absence of press
freedom. The organizations that rank countries in the world for
press freedom put Vietnam very low on the list of recent
ranking. Had them 175th out of 180.
One of the things that seemed pretty vibrant in 2019 was,
while the press was being cracked down on, there was still a
pretty vibrant and open internet culture. But that has also
been significantly constrained in the last two years.
What can the United States do? What would you do as
ambassador, should you be confirmed, to try to promote broader
notions of press and freedom and freedom of speech in Vietnam?
Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator, and thank you to you
and your colleagues for the great support that Congress has
provided our bilateral relationship over the years.
As for press freedoms and other freedoms in Vietnam, I
fully agree. We have serious, serious concerns. This is
something that, if confirmed, I will make a focus of mine.
I think one way we can seek to improve the situation is
just to never miss an opportunity to raise with senior
Vietnamese officials our deep concerns and to underline the
point that our relationship will never reach its full potential
unless we are able to see improvements in some of these areas,
whether it is freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom
of assembly.
As you noted, the internet is increasingly a contested area
for these basic freedoms and, you know, among the messages we
can deliver to the Government of Vietnam is that they have
signed on to a number of international treaties in which they
have committed to support universal rights, such as those of
freedom and assembly.
And so I think a point we can strongly make is that should
Vietnam seek to earn its place in the international community
as a leader it is going to have to abide by some of the
commitments it has made internationally.
Senator Kaine. The last thing I will say about the U.S.-
Vietnam relationship is one of the powerful, I think,
attraction of the U.S. relationship to the Vietnamese people:
Their deep concern about China and the historic animosity that
they have had because of Chinese incursions into Vietnam.
Shortly before our visit, there were massive protests all
around Vietnam that were a little bit unusual, street protests,
and they were fomented by the Communist Party leadership of
Vietnam prepping to do sort of a sweetheart deal where China
and Chinese companies would be able to come into an economic
zone without really any competition from anyone else.
And it was notable to see that the Vietnamese Government
wanted to do it, that the Vietnamese people took to the streets
to stop them from doing it, and that at least in some temporary
way it caused the Communist Party leadership of Vietnam to step
back.
There is a deep desire for deeper relationship with the
United States to be a counterpoint to a China that has been so
often an aggressor against Vietnam, and that is important for
us to know and it is important for us to contemplate as we seek
to build a deeper relationship with Vietnam.
I look forward to working with all of you should you be
confirmed. Very high qualified panel.
Thank you. I yield back.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
Senator Hagerty?
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Senator Cardin, and
congratulations to each of you for being nominated today.
I take particular interest in one of our nominees. That is
Ambassador-to-be Marc Knapper.
Marc, I am delighted to see that Suzuko and Alex have
joined you today. I would say this--that I am certain Colonel
Roger Knapper is smiling today, too. I am sure he takes a great
deal of pride in your career.
It has been my great honor to have served with you for the
past four years working with you, and I also take a great deal
of pride in the fact that you are sitting here today.
I am also very optimistic. I think that you will be
confirmed and I think that you are going to work with a great
team--my former DCM, Joe Young, Dan Kritenbrink, I think, at
EAP. We are going to be very well represented in an area that
presents great strategic challenges for America today.
So I am very, very pleased to see you here. You know,
America is challenged in the South China Sea like never before.
The world is challenged in the South China Sea like never
before, because of the claims that China continues to maintain,
I think, without foundation to sovereignty over much of that
region.
You have had unique experience, Marc. You have had
experience in Japan. You have had experience in Hanoi. You have
had experience dealing with India on the India desk, with China
and Mongolia, and, certainly, you did a wonderful job as DCM
and charge d'affaires in South Korea.
You understand this region. I see great opportunity between
Vietnam and the United States from an economic standpoint that
has been manifest. We have seen great trajectory there. I think
economic ties support strategic ties.
But what I would really like to talk about for a moment is
the strategic opportunity that Vietnam presents for the United
States, for our Quad partners, and for the safety and security
of that region. I would love to get your thoughts on the role
that you would play and help lead as our Ambassador to Vietnam.
Mr. Knapper. Thank you very much, Senator, and thank you
very much for your kind words about my family.
I mean, you are absolutely right. Right now, I think our
shared view with Vietnam is that there is no greater challenge
we face right now than that of China, China's aggressive and
provocative behavior, particularly some of its sweeping and
unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, what it is
doing along the Mekong River, damming and releasing water,
causing deep, deep problems for 66 million people who live
along that river and rely upon it for their livelihoods.
If confirmed, Senator, I will make a priority deepening our
strategic relationship with Vietnam. Right now, we have what we
call a comprehensive partnership. We hope to raise it to a
strategic partnership, and I will take steps to do that by
strengthening even further our security relationship with
Vietnam.
This is something that you mentioned, Ambassador
Kritenbrink. He did a great job over three years in bringing us
to the next level.
I would like to take us further. I think deepening our
economic partnership by opening the market there further to
American agricultural goods, digital services.
As you said, strengthening our trade and economic ties can
only benefit our strategic sort of interactions and our
strategic sort of interdependence. And so this, if confirmed,
will be a priority of mine, as well as deepening our people-to-
people ties.
The shoulders upon which all of our efforts with Vietnam
stand are the ties between our two peoples, whether it is young
people going back and forth, students studying in each other's
countries. And so that will also be, sir, a priority of mine,
if confirmed.
Senator Hagerty. Well, thank you very much. I look forward
to working with you along all of those lines and know that you
have a strong ally in the United States Senate, only with me
but with the members of this committee, in achieving these
goals.
Could I turn to you, Ambassador Bitter?
There is an area, again related to China, which is a deep
concern of mine. I am certain that you are aware of this
concern, and that is overseas students coming from China that
pose a security threat to the nation.
I would just like to ask you in very specific terms if you
are familiar with the Executive Order 10043. That executive
order suspends the entry of certain students and researchers
from the People's Republic of China.
Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. And if you are confirmed, do you agree to
notify me and this committee if there are any changes made to
that executive order?
Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. And in the meantime, do you agree to
uphold the tenets of that executive order?
Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I
appreciate it.
I yield back.
The Chairman. [presiding]. Thank you.
Senator Cardin?
Senator Cardin. Well, first, let me thank all four of our
nominees for their service to our country and our willingness
to continue to serve our nation. We thank you. We thank your
families. We know that this is very much a family commitment.
Ambassador Bitter, I would like to start with you. I just
want to concur with Senator Menendez's comments in regards to
the passport issues. And as Senator Menendez said, you are not
responsible for the current backlog. Eighteen weeks is
unacceptable. Unacceptable.
We have constituents who, in good faith, have made travel
plans, expecting that if they requested a passport document
that it would be done in a matter of a few months, not four
months.
And some are suffering now extreme economic hardships as
well as personal hardships not being able to get those
documents and they do not fall into the narrow definition of a
life's emergency that would require more immediate action.
We are also concerned that some have requested passport
support months ago, may not even be at the front of the line in
regards to people who are now requesting help. And again, we
recognize that you are not responsible for the current
circumstances.
I thought Senator Menendez made an excellent point about
the need for surge. I would like to get your commitment that
this will receive your priority, if confirmed, and that we
cannot allow an 18-week backlog in passport applications.
Ms. Bitter. Yes, Senator, you have my commitment. I share
your concern and it will be my top priority, if confirmed.
Senator Cardin. Thank you very much.
Mr. Knapper, I want to follow up on the questions that were
asked by Senator Kaine in regards to Vietnam. I have been to
Vietnam. Vietnam, certainly, is a much different country than
it was when we were at war with Vietnam.
We have made significant progress in improving our
relationship between our two countries. We were on the path
towards the Trans-Pacific Partnership on a good governance
section that was important to deal with the corruption in the
country and good governance.
Vietnam was making progress, I would suggest, on basic
human rights even though it is an authoritarian government, and
now we have seen a backsliding, as Senator Kaine said, on
freedom of the media.
I could also add the right of their citizens to peacefully
protest their government has been very much infringed upon. And
they have now changed their cyber laws in regards to comments
about history can be now challenged by the Government and
infringing upon the use of the internet.
These are trends that are very disturbing, and I would like
to drill down a little bit more about your strategies for
dealing with the human rights issues in Vietnam, and how you
will keep us informed and work with us as we look at the tools
that we have given the administration to advance human rights
and making sure that they are used fully in Vietnam.
Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator.
I think one area in which we have seen progress over the
past few years have been in the expansion of rights afforded to
women, minorities, people with disabilities, members of the
LGBT community, and I think one of the ways we were able to
secure and see these advances was thanks to sort of increased
cooperation with and assistance to the NGOs and activists
within Vietnam who work within these specific areas and with
these groups.
And so, if confirmed, I would seek to not only continue the
great work that the U.S. Government has done, not just with
activist groups and NGOs within Vietnam but also groups in the
United States--the Vietnamese-American community, for example--
to identify problematic areas, to try and identify potential
strategies and tactics, going forward, because this is
absolutely a priority area for me personally.
I worked on these issues 15 years ago when I previously
served in Vietnam, and it will continue to be an area of focus
for me and for Mission Vietnam. And you absolutely have my
commitment to work with you and your colleagues, sir, in the
Congress to look for opportunities and tools to further seek to
improve the situation there in Vietnam.
Thank you.
Senator Cardin. I would just add that it is very important
that our mission in Vietnam support the NGOs and civil society
groups that are working to advance these priorities so that our
embassy is always a home for those who have roles to improve
the governance in Vietnam and sometimes need the support of our
embassy.
And I see you are shaking your head yes and I will just put
your shaking of the head yes into the record.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
The Chairman. All right. I prefer an oral answer when I ask
you a question, but I do not want to interpret your headshaking
as a yes and then maybe you tell me later on it was a no. So--
--
Mr. Knapper. Well, it was actually a head nodding, Senator.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Okay.
I understand there are no other members.
Oh, I am sorry. Senator Van Hollen just walked in.
Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen: All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member Risch, and to all of you, congratulations on
your nomination.
And let me start, if I could, with you, Ambassador Bitter,
and I know Chairman Menendez asked you some questions about the
current backlog in passport processing.
You know, obviously, we have been through a very difficult
time with COVID. I recognize that, and the State Department has
had to deal with all of the pressures that that brings.
In our state office, we have gone from things like small
business access to PPP loans being the top priority and other
issues to now number one relates to getting passports, where my
understanding is we now have about a four-and-a-half-month
average backlog.
And the other big issue, of course, is as families now have
the opportunity to reunite and visit with friends, the issue of
visas for people coming just to visit family and friends in the
United States.
Can you talk about what we can do right now to address
these issues and what, if confirmed, you would do?
Ms. Bitter. Thank you, Senator.
I am very aware of these issues, and I should take this
opportunity, of course, to thank Congress for the support that
it has given to the bureau over the last several months.
As all of you know, the bureau is under tremendous
financial pressure since the start of the pandemic, and
Congress has been enormously responsive in filling some of
those gaps and allowing the bureau to continue to deliver
consular services.
But so I know that the bureau is very grateful and that it
will be continuing to engage with Congress on future budgets.
I just want to point out that these issues are not just
money related. So while the U.S. is experiencing a return to
what feels a little like normal, our posts overseas are still
working under some pandemic space constraints, which means that
they cannot offer the same number of appointments that they
used to because they cannot have the same number of people in
their waiting room.
So these restrictions are very important. They protect our
staff, they protect the customers, they protect the community,
but they do limit possibility to provide services.
And as a result, what has happened is my colleagues
overseas have had to make some difficult prioritization
decisions about how to use the space that is available to them.
If confirmed, this is very much job one. I recognize that
visas also impact your community with respect to small
businesses maybe relying on workers overseas that are unable to
get back, family reunification, all of those issues. Right now
it is a very difficult time.
Senator Van Hollen: Well, thank you for that statement. You
know, this is the area where our constituents most frequently
interact with the State Department, right, and so that is where
they are really feeling the presence or lack of responsiveness
and services.
So our office is working very closely with the team at the
State Department. We are grateful for the relationship we have.
But this is a big, big issue, the visa part but also just
getting a passport for U.S. citizens who is here.
Ms. Medina, thank you for your testimony, and I appreciate
your mentioning the issue of biodiversity, as you mentioned,
and we are seeing a disappearance of biodiversity at alarming
rates around the world and look forward to working with you on
those issues, going forward.
Mr. Smith, thank you for taking on this assignment. As you
well know, you know, Foreign Service officers go into the
Foreign Service to really get to know and interact with the
countries where they are serving.
And so while it is absolutely true that we have to provide
security, I hope, as you think this through, you will also find
ways to make sure that our Foreign Service officers overseas
can interact with the rest of the population. Otherwise, they
might as well just be in D.C.
In Kabul, we have, of course, a particularly immediate
situation, and I know you will be monitoring that very
carefully with respect to the situation there.
Finally, if I could, Mr. Knapper, congratulations on your
nomination to Vietnam. Lots of issues to cover.
But let me just ask you about one, because over the past
several years we have seen Vietnamese authorities increase
their scrutiny over Vietnamese citizens' activities on the
internet and social media, cracking down on any kind of free
expression, requiring U.S. and other internet-based companies
and social media companies to force them to comply with laws
that can crack down on people's speech or try to force them.
Can you just talk briefly about how we are dealing with
that situation?
Mr. Knapper. Well, thank you, Senator.
The one specific case right now that is attracting the most
attention, of course, is that of Facebook, and the Vietnamese
Government, in some instances, demanding that Facebook removed
certain posts that it finds offensive or contrary to political
order, so to speak.
And right now, the U.S. embassy in Hanoi, we are working
very closely with Facebook folks on the ground there as well as
the Vietnamese Government to try and find a way forward that,
again, preserves the space on Facebook and other social
networking sites to allow for free speech and to allow for the
free expression of political and other views, and also just
allowing an American company to be able to operate without a
threat of its data being cut off or throttled, is the term that
they use.
But, if confirmed, Senator, I will absolutely focus on this
as a human rights issue, but also as a press freedom issue.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen: I appreciate that. As you say, it is
really part of the larger, I think, growing challenge in
Vietnam with respect to human rights. But thank you all for
your testimony.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Some final questions.
Ambassador Smith, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, I
am deeply concerned about what seems to be an emerging threat
of directed energy attacks targeting U.S. personnel and our
ability to pivot and adequately protect them and their families
in the face of these attacks.
I hope that will be a major focus for you upon your
confirmation?
Mr. Smith. Yes, it will, Senator, and I look forward to
engaging as we progress on this issue.
The Chairman. Well, that is incredibly important to us
because, you know, we ask our people to do incredible work for
the United States. We put them, sometimes, in harm's way. We
need to do everything possible to protect them.
And this is something that seems to be challenging and
escaping us. So I hope this will become one of your highest
priorities upon taking office.
One of the most significant challenges I can see on the
horizon is the security at Embassy Kabul. What is your current
assessment--I know you are not there yet but from your
experience of our ability to ensure the safety and security of
the embassy compound?
And will you commit to keeping the committee updated on the
steps that Diplomatic Security has taken to ensure the safety
of U.S. personnel?
Mr. Smith. If confirmed, Senator, yes, I will commit to
that. Afghanistan will continue to garner a lot of attention,
particularly as U.S. forces continue to withdraw, and it is
going to be important for Diplomatic Security to remain very
much engaged both with our colleagues and contacts here and
also with the Afghan forces on the ground to see how they can
help to enhance our security operations.
The Chairman. Well, if you, when you get confirmed, I hope
you will give us an assessment of what is needed, if anything
is needed beyond what we have.
And also Port-au-Prince--we, obviously, have an ongoing
difficult situation in Port-au-Prince. I know you will pay
attention globally. But these are some hotspots that I think we
need to pay attention to.
Do you have any sense of that, our embassy at Port-au-
Prince?
Mr. Smith. Again, I agree with you that Port-au-Prince is
definitely a point of concern at this moment. I have not
received any additional briefings on the activities there
beyond what is in the open source.
But look forward, if confirmed, to focusing very, very
clearly and specifically on that activity as well.
The Chairman. Okay. We will look forward to hearing from
you once you are confirmed.
Mr. Knapper, finally, as you contemplate the possibilities
of taking the relationship that we have with Vietnam to the
next level and inaugurating a genuine strategic partnership, an
aspiration I certainly support, how will you balance our very
real shared strategic interests with Vietnam with our ongoing
human rights concern?
A couple years back we had the president of Vietnam here.
It was a very interesting exchange. First time in my 30 years
of doing foreign policy and sitting with foreign dignitaries
that he did not take any questions.
And it is not our process in the committee when we are
meeting with a head of state to allow them to ramble along and
eventually never take a question.
That was emblematic, in my mind, of what is going on in
Vietnam. What sort of linkages or conditioning do you think is
appropriate and constructive as we consider additional military
security, economic or diplomatic engagement, with Vietnam?
Mr. Knapper. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I think you really have nailed the challenge that we face.
It is, you know, how do we address our shared strategic
interests in the region with Vietnam while staying true to our
values regarding human rights, religious freedom, other areas.
And I think, if confirmed, I would like to build upon the
good progress we have made so far. We have been able to keep
that balance, I believe, between ensuring that our values
related to universal human rights are upheld and asserted in
our high-level conversations with the Vietnamese Government,
but at the same time recognizing that in Vietnam we have no
stronger or more vocal partner within ASEAN when it comes to
speaking out against the challenge that China poses in the
South China Sea and elsewhere in the region.
So as I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, I think there are
ways to point out to our Vietnamese Government and Communist
Party of Vietnam interlocutors that there will be limitations
to how much our relationship can grow under the circumstances
in which we have concerns about human rights and religious
freedom.
And I think we have to make clear that as we do consider
ways to expand the relationship that we will let them know that
there are potential breaks on progress that we will have to
consider.
The Chairman. All right.
Ms. Medina, I do not want you to think that I--you have no
object of my affection or interest. So but between your
statement--your answers with Senator Risch and Senator Markey's
incredible description of your history, I think you have
answered the issues I am concerned about.
So we look forward to working with you upon your
confirmation. Global health for myself and for the ranking
member is a critical issue, and while it may not seem in the
title of your position to be the focal point, it is a focal
point for this committee. So we will look forward to working
with you on that.
With no other member, as I understand it, either virtually
or present, to come before the committee, the record will
remain open until the close of business on Wednesday, July the
14th for questions.
I would urge the nominees if you get questions for the
record to answer them fully expeditiously so we can consider
your nominations at a business meeting.
And with the thanks of the committee for your willingness
to serve, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator James E. Risch
Risk Tolerance for Diplomats Abroad
Question. Diplomacy is an inherently dangerous business, and
effective diplomacy cannot be conducted without accepting some degree
of risk.
How do you think the culture should change at the State Department
to accommodate more risk management as opposed to risk
avoidance?
Answer. I agree that the Department must balance the essential need
to protect our people with the need to engage our partners around the
world to advance U.S. interests. Department leadership acknowledges
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is
committed to managing it appropriately. The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) goes to great lengths to facilitate our nation's
diplomacy in challenging places, including high-threat locations, and
welcomes further efforts, including with Congress, to ensure that the
Department is able to meet mission objectives while protecting our
personnel.
To quote Secretary Blinken, ``The safety and security of our
personnel abroad should not be politicized, nor should we assume
negligence if, and when, prudent, calculated risk decisions play out
with negative consequences.''
Question. How do you view your role in promoting that cultural
shift in the department? What specifically could you do as assistant
secretary--if confirmed--that would better enable our diplomats to get
outside our posts abroad and advance America's interests?
Answer. This is an issue that, if confirmed, I intend to examine
closely, in concert with senior Department leadership, especially with
regard to what the Department can do to further enable diplomacy in
High Threat/High Risk locations. Department leadership acknowledges
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is
committed to managing these risks appropriately. My experience has been
that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security goes to great lengths to
facilitate our nation's diplomacy in challenging places, including
high-threat locations, and welcomes further efforts, including with
Congress, to ensure that the Department is able to meet mission
objectives while protecting our personnel.
Talent Retention
Question. The Bureau for Diplomatic Security (DS) loses a lot of
mid-level officers at the senior-two and senior-three levels for many
reasons, but two frequent ones are lack of jobs at their level that
reflect interest/ability and lack of promotion opportunities due to the
limited number of positions available.
If confirmed, what can you do as Assistant Secretary to address the
loss of mid-level officers?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to working with senior
Department leadership to look at ways to retain existing staff and
expand opportunities for mid-level officers. We will continue to engage
with Global Talent Management to assess the availability of positions
at all levels and ensure that we provide all officers ample
opportunities to compete for promotion.
Question. What policies or internal measures can you pursue to help
address the loss of mid-level officers who leave due to the lack of
promotion potential?
Answer. DS recognizes that mid-level officers have expressed
concerns regarding assignments and the slow pace of promotions. In the
past we sought to address concerns by reclassifying some positions to
provide more opportunities for advancement. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with Global Talent Management's leadership to
explore additional ways to address these concerns.
Resources
Question. DS has multiple responsibilities that sometimes lead to a
competition for resources. How do you feel DS should prioritize
resources to the various missions?
Answer. The safety of our personnel and security of our information
and facilities are among the Department's highest priorities. Congress
has been very supportive to DS in providing the resources it has
requested. If confirmed, I intend to work with Department leadership
and this committee to prioritize resources to its various missions.
Key Personnel Skills
Question. The State Department faces a shortage of speakers of
critical languages. Many of our pool of qualified speakers have close
family ties to countries where the language is needed. Do you feel the
current DS system of issuing preclusions adequately mitigates CI
vulnerabilities that are identified during the background
investigation?
Answer. The State Department is committed to a diverse, skilled
workforce. Some assignment limitations are preclusions that reflect the
Department's inability to accredit diplomats to foreign countries of
which they are citizens or to foreign countries that consider them
citizens. In adjudicating security clearances, the Department utilizes
the whole person concept to determine whether facts and circumstances
indicate that eligibility is clearly consistent with the national
security interests of the United States. Any doubt is resolved in favor
of national security. Part of this process identifies potential CI
vulnerabilities and considers whether they are mitigated under the
National Security Adjudicative Guidelines. The Department is committed
to protecting its employees and national security information.
Programming
Question. Where does DS programming fit within the broader
Department of State and interagency security sector capacity building
structure and related planning processes?
Answer. Diplomatic Security is an important contributor to security
capacity building in partner nations around the globe. DS serves as the
primary implementer of the Department's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)
program, which provides selected foreign governments with
counterterrorism training, equipment, and technical assistance in
coordination with policy guidance and funding provided by the Bureau of
Counterterrorism. Regional Security Officers (RSOs) frequently work
with host country governments, local organizations, and other
diplomatic missions to provide advisory security opinions to schools,
hospitals, and similar institutions.
Question. What are DS's comparative advantages in the U.S.
Government's security sector capacity building framework and tool set?
Answer. Numerous U.S. Government agencies have resources and skills
that can contribute to assisting foreign development beneficial to the
national interest. While Diplomatic Security possess its own impressive
cadre of security professionals and world class training and assistance
programs, DS' greatest asset is in the organization's status as a
security and law enforcement agency and integral part of the Foreign
Service. DS personnel are trained investigators, cyber experts,
security engineers, analysts, and diplomats. That broad functionality
allows DS to soundly evaluate and deploy needed security and training
assistance, whether those efforts ultimately originate from within DS
or from another agency.
Question. How can DS better leverage these advantages to further
political goals?
Answer. Diplomatic Security should continue its role as the lead
law enforcement representative on an embassy's Country Team. A Regional
Security Officer's ability to advise a Chief of Mission on both
diplomatic and security consequences assures that U.S. foreign policy
goals are examined from both a political and security dimension.
Havana Syndrome
Question. Between late 2016 and May 2018, the State Department
found that certain Embassy Havana community members suffered a series
of unexplained injuries, including hearing loss and cognitive issues.
Many other U.S. Government officials in other countries have
experienced similar incidents.
If confirmed, will you commit to continuing the investigation into
the circumstances surrounding the sonic attacks?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue to prioritize the
application of DS' technical and investigative talent to support the
investigation to identify the source and cause of these unexplained
health incidents. I look forward to working with Congress on this very
important issue.
Question. Will you seek to ensure the safety and security of U.S.
diplomatic personnel in Havana and other posts where personnel were
injured?
Answer. There is no higher priority for the Department or for me
than the safety and security of our personnel and this certainly
includes mitigating against unexplained health incidents. I know that
this issue is a top priority for Secretary Blinken. If confirmed I will
work closely with the interagency to fully apply DS technical and
investigation resources to ensure that our efforts to determine cause
and attribution remain a priority.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work constructively with
other government agencies on finding the cause of the attacks as well
as on how best to support those U.S. Government employees who have been
injured?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue coordinating with
multiple agencies to identify the source and cause of these reported
injuries. In addition, I intend to focus on ways to strengthen the
already robust mitigation efforts that are taking place to further
enhance the safety and security of all USG personnel and family members
overseas under our security responsibility.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to regularly sharing new
information, including updates on any live investigations, to Congress?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work through the Bureau of Legislative
Affairs to ensure that Congress promptly has the information it needs
to perform its Constitutional obligations, consistent with obligations
involving interagency information and existing practices for the
protection of law enforcement activities.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Risk Management
Question. Some former State Department officials, Members of
Congress, and other stakeholders have expressed concern with what they
view as a growing level of risk intolerance at U.S. missions abroad,
especially at high-risk posts, which they maintain inhibits U.S.
diplomats from effectively fulfilling their mandates. I am considering
a hearing on this topic in my subcommittee.
What is your view on the State Department's current diplomatic
security risk management approach? In your view, how, if at
all, should the current approach be adjusted more towards risk
tolerance or, alternatively, more towards mitigating risks
facing U.S. diplomats and other personnel under Chief of
Mission Authority?
Answer. I agree that the Department must balance the essential need
to protect our people with the need to engage our partners around the
world to advance U.S. interests. Department leadership acknowledges
that our national security mission entails diverse types of risk and is
committed to managing it appropriately. The Bureau of Diplomatic
Security (DS) goes to great lengths to facilitate our nation's
diplomacy in challenging places, including high-threat locations, and
welcomes further efforts, including with Congress, to ensure that the
Department is able to meet mission objectives while protecting our
personnel.
To quote Secretary Blinken, ``The safety and security of our
personnel abroad should not be politicized, nor should we assume
negligence if, and when, prudent, calculated risk decisions play out
with negative consequences.''
Question. What is your view of the Accountability Review Board
(ARB) process? Do you believe the ARB process is excessively tilted
toward finding someone to blame in the case of a security incident, or
alternatively, does action need to be taken to ensure accountability?
What kinds of adjustments, if any, would you suggest Congress make to
the ARB process?
Answer. The Department recognizes that the advancement of foreign
policy inherently involves diverse types of risk, and that taking
considered risks can be essential to advancing U.S. interests. If
confirmed, I would welcome working with Congress to look at ways to
improve the ARB process.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Gentry O. Smith by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. Since 2016, U.S. personnel posted to the Embassy in
Havana, Cuba have reported a common set of symptoms now referred to as
``Havana Syndrome.'' Since then, these symptoms have been reported in
many other countries hosting U.S. diplomats, including China and
Russia. These often debilitating injuries present a major risk to U.S.
diplomatic personnel there.
What is your assessment of the risks present to U.S. diplomatic
personnel assigned to Havana?
Answer. If confirmed, I will closely assess the situation in
coordination with Department of State stakeholders and interagency
partners.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Last year's travel restrictions and the resulting loss of
visa fee revenue negatively impacted Consular Affairs' finances. Now,
as vaccinations rates climb and more people seek to travel, demand for
passports and visas are rapidly increasing, leading to significant
delays in processing times for passports and visas. Some of these
delays take extra months. If confirmed, what is your plan to reduce
lengthy passport processing times?
Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction
of service backlogs impacting both our domestic passport agencies and
our overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our domestic passport service
standards were up to three weeks for expedited applications, and up to
eight weeks for routine applications. It is my goal to return to these
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity.
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.
Question. It appears that the Biden administration is not currently
prioritizing visas for seasonal workers and other business-related
needs. How are you going to better balance the needs of our small and
medium-sized businesses, who often rely on seasonal workers to survive?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to sustain the long-
standing program of temporary workers coming to the United States,
which is vital to maintaining supply chains for food and other critical
items. In addition, I will seek to continue existing policies to waive
the in-person interview requirement for certain first-time H-2
applicants and those renewing within 48 months. These provisions will
continue to permit the processing of many H-2 applications without the
need for an in-person appearance, which creates efficiencies in
processing while still adhering to COVID health protocols.
Question. Upon a determination by the Secretary of State that the
detention of a United States national abroad is unlawful or wrongful,
how will you work to efficiently transfer such cases from the Bureau of
Consular Affairs to the Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs?
Answer. The Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) works closely with the
Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Hostage Affairs (S/SPEHA)
and other Department offices to implement the Robert Levinson Hostage
Recovery and Hostage-Taking Accountability Act. CA works hand in hand
with S/SPEHA, the relevant regional bureau, post, and the Department's
Office of the Legal Adviser to develop recommendations on individual
cases. When a detention is determined to be wrongful, the transfer of
the case to S/SPEHA is a smooth and efficient process. If confirmed, I
pledge to help facilitate continued close collaboration.
Question. How do you plan to ensure that all families with
relatives held abroad are given timely access to information?
Answer. The U.S. Department of State has no greater responsibility
than the protection of U.S. citizens overseas. Some of our most
vulnerable U.S. citizens abroad are those who are arrested or detained
in a foreign country. Consular officers stand ready to provide all
appropriate consular services in cases where U.S. citizens are detained
and arrested abroad. We will continue to work with local authorities to
ensure our embassies or consulates are notified of a U.S. citizen
arrest, and our consular officers will seek access to the citizen
without delay. Consistent with the decision of the detained citizen and
in line with the Privacy Act, consular officers provide status updates
to family members as soon as possible. I pledge, if confirmed, that CA
will continue to prioritize service to these U.S. citizens including
providing as much information as possible to their families.
Question. What steps will you take to improve the Bureau of
Consular of Affairs with regards to United States nationals held
abroad?
Answer. With all detentions, consular officers seek prompt access
to ensure detained U.S. citizen prisoners are:
receiving adequate food and necessary medical care;
not being mistreated;
able to access legal counsel;
having communications facilitated with their families consistent
with their preferences under the Privacy Act, and
receiving all substantive and procedural protections under local
law and fair trial guarantees consistent with international
obligations, including human rights law.
If confirmed, I will seek to ensure individuals have access to any
medication or medical attention they may need and highlight our
concerns to local authorities, that officers also assist with the
transfer of funds from family and friends in the United States to pay
for attorneys' fees, food, and medicine while incarcerated, and that
they raise concerns and protests regarding credible allegations of
mistreatment. In cases where potential indications of a wrongful
detention exist, I will ensure CA consults with S/SPEHA and other
relevant Department offices on whether a wrongful detention
determination by the Secretary as called for under the Levinson Act
might be appropriate.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Tim Kaine
Question. State Department statistics released this month show
fewer children are being successfully returned to the U.S. following
parental abduction than before--See https://bit.ly/3nExd6J
The percentage of children returned to the U.S. as share of all
reported outgoing abductions has steadily dropped from 2011 to 2020.)
While recognizing that not all returns to the U.S. are for cases that
happened in previous years, we are nonetheless concerned by the
apparent decreases in proportion of children returned to the U.S.
To what do you attribute this decline?
Answer. Each child's case, and each country, is unique. If
confirmed, I will ensure the Bureau of Consular Affairs continues to
assist parents seeking the return of their abducted children and to
engage with countries to promote procedures to achieve better outcomes
for children and families in child abduction cases. I will direct our
focus to those countries cited for demonstrating a ``pattern of
noncompliance'' in our Annual Report to Congress on International Child
Abduction, and those countries that are not party to the Hague
Abduction Convention, as these are the countries from which it may be
the most challenging to resolve cases.
In referring to the data publicly shared by the Department, I am
also encouraged to observe that from 2010 to 2019, there was more than
a 50 percent drop in the number of international parental child
abductions reported to the Department. If confirmed, I will ensure the
Bureau of Consular Affairs continues its robust efforts in
collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to prevent these
abductions from occurring in the first place.
Question. What would you do as Assistant Secretary to more
forcefully and effectively advocate for the return of abducted children
to the U.S.?
Answer. Consular Affairs has no more important role than the
protection of U.S. citizens abroad, especially children wrongly removed
or retained abroad by a parent from their U.S. homes. If confirmed, I
will prioritize our engagement on international parental child
abductions with both our Hague Convention partners and non-partner
countries, with special focus on the 11 countries cited for
demonstrating a ``pattern of noncompliance'' in our 2021 Annual Report
to Congress on International Child Abduction. I will ensure we use
every effective means to get these countries to work with the United
States to quickly resolve these cases and help parents bring their
abducted children home.
Question. If confirmed, would you support efforts to routinely
inform parents applying for passports for minor children about the
potential for international child abduction?
Answer. If confirmed, I will maintain the Bureau of Consular
Affairs' priority focus on the prevention of international parental
child abduction. All recipients of a U.S. passport currently receive a
flyer advising them of the risks of international parental child
abduction and providing contact information for the Office of
Children's Issues. I am also encouraged that close to 55,000 children
are actively enrolled in the Children's Passport Issuance Alert
program, and I will continue the Department's work to strengthen this
important child abduction prevention program.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has placed an incredible strain on
the State Department's ability to process visas. This is, in part, due
to the need to protect the safety and health of our diplomats in
countries where the pandemic is still uncontrolled. However, as
countries increase the vaccination of their citizens and the spread of
the pandemic decreases, the U.S. should resume regular consular
services in many countries.
If confirmed, how do you plan to address the consular services
backlog?
Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction
of service backlogs at both our domestic passport agencies and our
overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our domestic passport service
standards were up to three weeks for expedited applications, and up to
eight weeks for routine applications. It is my goal to return to these
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity.
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.
Question. One consequence of the shutdown of consular services in
most embassies has been the practice of referring citizens in one
country to have their interviews conducted in another country. For
example, ordinary Cubans have had to travel to Guyana.
In your opinion, what message does it send to ordinary Cubans when
they have to travel to Guyana to process their visas, but the
Cuban baseball team was able to get visas in Havana to play a
game in the U.S. earlier this year?
Answer. I am sympathetic to the financial and other difficulties
Cuban citizens face in applying for visas and recognize there are
humanitarian reasons that individuals may want to seek an appointment
with the consular section in Havana. The U.S. Embassy suspended routine
visa services following the ordered departure of non-emergency
personnel in September 2017. The consular section must also comply with
Cuban COVID-19 restrictions. Embassy Havana continues to provide
emergency assistance to U.S. citizens in Cuba, and to provide limited
non-immigrant visa services including for medical emergencies and
official and diplomatic travelers. I am hopeful future conditions may
permit a reevaluation of what services can be provided by the Embassy.
Question. During the Trump administration, the State Department
decided to allow Americans born in Jerusalem to list ``Israel'' as
their place of birth in their passports. This is a policy and is
reflective of U.S. law that recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel.
If confirmed, do you commit to upholding this policy decision?
Answer. If confirmed, I have no plans to seek to change the
Department's current policy regarding the place of birth listed on U.S.
passports for U.S. citizens born in Jerusalem.
Question. The Visa Waiver program is an initiative that allows
citizens of participating counties to travel to the U.S. for 90 days
without a Visa. Many of the participating countries are among our
strongest allies and partners, such as the United Kingdom, Ireland,
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. For several years, the State Department
has worked to include Israel in the Visa Waiver program.
If confirmed, do you commit to working with Israel on these
efforts?
Answer. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with
the Secretary of State, may designate countries for participation in
the Visa Waiver Program when and if the country meets established
statutory and policy criteria. I commit to continuing the efforts to
work with Israel on its progress to qualify for designation into the
program.
Question. In 2014 the Obama administration agreed to afford multi-
entry, non-immigrant visas (B1/B2) with ten years' validity to
qualified PRC nationals. Now that two subsequent administrations have
determined that the PRC is a strategic competitor, and have sought to
calibrate U.S. policy accordingly, it is time to revisit the risks
associated with visa policy.
If confirmed, do you commit to evaluate the security risks of
providing multi-entry visas of such long duration to PRC
nationals, particularly Chinese Communist Party members and
military personnel?
Answer. Yes, I will work with the administration and the Department
to evaluate all security risks posed by the People's Republic of China.
We maintain robust vetting of all non-immigrant visa applications,
including for B1/B2 visas, under our longstanding Security Advisory
Opinion process. In addition, the Department and its partners
continuously vet all visa holders and may revoke a visa at any time if
we identify potential security concerns. Currently, B1, B2, and B1/B2
non-immigrant visas are limited to one-month, single-entry for members
of the Chinese Communist Party, as well as their spouses and unmarried
children under the age of 21. This change went into effect in December
2020 and is being applied at all visa units worldwide. We will continue
to assess how to update and adapt visa vetting processing to best
address threats to U.S. national security. Presidential Proclamation
10043, which went into effect on June 1, 2020, has also suspended the
entry of PRC students and researchers with ties to China's Military-
Civil Fusion.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Hon. Rena Bitter by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. COVID-19 has wreaked havoc on the State Department's
ability to meet passport and visa demand. Right now, wait times for a
new U.S. passport are 18 weeks for routine services and 12 weeks for
expedited services.
Relatedly, many U.S. embassies and consulates around the world are
still only processing non-immigrant visas in emergency situations. For
those that are issuing visas, the estimated wait time to receive an
interview appointment can range from a couple of weeks for a student
visa to months for a tourist visa.
As you can imagine, I have received a great deal of correspondence
from constituents who are exasperated for themselves and family members
as they seek to travel around the world.
What plans do you have in mind to address these severe backlogs?
What do you intend to do on Day 1 to help get Consular Affairs
back on track?
Answer. If confirmed, my number one priority will be the reduction
of service backlogs impacting both our domestic passport agencies and
our overseas posts. Prior to COVID-19, our passport service standards
were two to three weeks for expedited applications, and six to eight
weeks for regular applications. It is my goal to return to these
timelines as quickly as possible, not only through the use of overtime
and increased hiring, but also by exploring how we might utilize
Department staff to surge domestic passport processing capacity.
Addressing visa backlogs overseas will require solutions tailored to
the unique needs of each post, but I will devote myself and the CA team
to identifying and implementing these solutions as quickly as possible.
Question. Through nearly two decades of U.S. assistance programming
in Afghanistan, the United States has funded, through cooperative
agreements and grants, multiple programs on human rights, democracy
assistance, support for independent media, and the empowerment of women
and marginalized groups.
Thousands of Afghan nationals directly implemented U.S.-funded
civilian aid and development programs across the country, alongside
U.S. and international personnel. They demonstrated a commitment and
dedication to this important work for their country despite the fact
that the association with the United States placed their lives at risk.
I visited Afghanistan in 2018, and have seen firsthand the
dedication and sacrifice that Afghan nationals have given to support
our efforts. These brave men and women are now under threat as the
Taliban has stated in no uncertain terms that it plans to target those
who helped the United States as translators, interpreters, and in other
ways over the years. Many of these nationals have applied for Special
Issuance Visas to come to the United States with their families, but
the backlog for processing their applications runs into the thousands.
What is your plan for addressing this backlog and potentially
saving the lives of thousands of Afghans who helped us in our
war efforts over the past two decades?
Answer. I take seriously our commitment to the Afghan men and women
who have assumed enormous risks to support our military and civilian
personnel. I am very cognizant of the threats they face and fully agree
that assisting them is a top priority. The Department has increased
resources and undertaken steps to streamline the process at every
application stage. If confirmed, I will ensure my team completes
processing of SIV applications to the fullest extent possible. We will
also keep working with Congress to identify where we can make the SIV
application process more efficient and adjust requirements that do not
impact national security.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator James E. Risch
Question. The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed serious gaps in U.S.
international pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response efforts,
including the failure of the Department of State--over multiple
administrations--to prioritize global health policy and diplomatic
engagement beyond the PEPFAR program. What is your plan to improve
State Department leadership on global health security?
Answer. The COVID-19 pandemic demonstrates how global health
security is essential to U.S. national and economic security. The State
Department is strongly positioned to lead the global effort to beat
COVID-19 and increase the global capacity to prevent, detect, and
respond to future outbreaks, and the Secretary has appointed a
Coordinator who reports directly to him to work across the Department
and with other agencies to elevate global health policy in the
Department's diplomatic efforts. If confirmed, I will immediately look
closely at the bureau's structure and resources and come back to you to
discuss this issue further, with a view to working with the committee
as it considers how to strengthen health security at the Department. If
confirmed, I am committed to work with Coordinator Gayle Smith of the
Secretary's Office of Global COVID-19 Response and Health Security,
other offices across the interagency, and with partners to improve
global health security capabilities, as well as to increase
transparency and accountability. This includes modernizing and
strengthening international institutions including the World Health
Organization, and International Health Regulations.
Question. Do you agree that the Department needs to play a more
active role in the interagency on global health security, including by
ensuring foreign policy and program coherence among the U.S. agencies
implementing global health programs overseas (CDC and USAID) as well as
with other international partners?
Answer. Yes. The Department is playing an active and robust role on
global health security within the interagency process. But the Bureau
needs to build up greater capacity to deal with this and other health
crises in the future. If confirmed, I am committed to working with
Coordinator Gayle Smith of the Secretary's Office of Global COVID-19
Response and Health Security on these issues, as well as other offices
in the Department and across the interagency. The Biden-Harris
administration recognizes that COVID-19 and health security are global
challenges that require global responses, and I will engage with
international partners and allies on this important issue. The United
States will continue to engage multilaterally to respond to and recover
from COVID-19 as well as to prepare for, detect, and rapidly respond to
emerging biological threats.
Question. Is there currently a review process within the United
States Government for approving or disapproving life sciences or
biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose
dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and
toxins? What role, if any, does the Department of State play in this
review process? Within the Department of State, what role does OES play
in this process?
Answer. Because I am not currently an employee of the State
Department, and I understand that much of this work is outside the
purview of OES, I have not taken a hard look at this process. It is my
understanding that there are a variety of review processes that may
apply to international life science collaboration, depending on the
nature of that collaboration and the pathogens or other materials
involved. These include reviews undertaken by agencies before funding
certain types of research deemed to pose particular risks, and, where
applicable, export licensing and visa vetting. The Department of State
is in general not involved in the decisions of funding agencies to
support specific research activities. I understand that much of this
work is outside of the purview of OES. If confirmed, I will work
colleagues in other bureaus at the State Department and across the
interagency to learn more about these issues, and will work with you to
assist any committee oversight over such activities.
Question. If such a process exists, what type of evidentiary
information must be included to determine whether such research
collaboration is appropriate?
Answer. Because I am not yet in the Department, I have not looked
into this question or been specifically briefed on it. I have been
advised that the types of information required depend on the nature of
the research collaboration and the pathogens or other materials
involved. However, it is my understanding that they would typically
include the pathogens, if any, to be worked with, the nature of the
activity, the identities of the individuals involved, and the purposes
for which the activity would be conducted. Information regarding the
location of the work and the applicable biosafety standards may also be
required. If confirmed, I will look further into this issue and will
work with you and your staff on it.
Question. What steps has the Department of State taken to act on or
implement the recommendations of the following guidance documents?
Please be specific with respect to each document listed below:
United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual
Use Research of Concern, available at https://bit.ly/2YYcFvs
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework
for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research:
Strategies foR Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research
Information (2007), available at https://bit.ly/3AfOqGZ
Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review
Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight
(P3CO) (2017), available at https://bit.ly/3u2cMSt
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Framework for Guiding
Funding Decisions About Proposed Research Involving Enhanced
Potential Pandemic Pathogens (2017), available at https://
bit.ly/3CmAQ5o
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Recommendations
for the Evaluation and Oversight of Proposed Gain-of-Function
Research (2016), https://bit.ly/3zkTRTQ.
Answer. As I understand it, these policy documents primarily
provide guidance for other Federal agencies considering funding of
certain types of research or work with potential pandemic pathogens. I
am advised that the Department of State does not fund such research.
However, the Department of State has been involved in actively
promoting the development and adoption of such oversight systems
abroad, including through presentations and discussions at
international meetings. If confirmed, I will look further into how
these documents are being used and implemented by agencies with such
research funding and will work with you and your staff to understand
how each is being implemented.
Question. As we discussed when we met last month, the Columbia
River Treaty remains an important issue to myself and the rest of the
northwest delegation. This treaty has been in the process of being
renegotiated for years and will determine energy production and costs
as well as water flows. If confirmed, you will lead the bureau
responsible for overseeing some of the technical inputs that
negotiators will consider.
Answer. The Columbia River is the lifeblood of the region. I am
generally familiar with the complicated issues regarding this key
shared resource from my time at NOAA. If confirmed, I will give a close
look into the whole range of negotiating issues as they stand now and
determine how OES can best provide greater support to the U.S.
negotiating team. Canada and the United States have a shared interest
in building back the regional economy and being good stewards of the
region's water resources.
Question. If confirmed, will you make Columbia River Treaty
negotiations a priority?
Answer. I understand the importance of reaching agreement with
Canada on the modernization of the Columbia River Treaty regime. Canada
and the United States have a shared interest in building back the
regional economy and being good stewards of the region's water
resources. If confirmed, I will look into the whole range of
negotiating issues and determine how OES can best support the U.S.
negotiating team.
Question. What was the total amount of appropriations in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2019 used by the Department of State on global climate change
programs? From which accounts did the funding come? Please provide
specific details about all global climate change programs funded,
including the objectives, results, and amounts of FY 2019
appropriations spent. If confirmed, how would you adjust this spending,
if at all?
Answer. The Department of State used $13,500,000 of FY 2019
Economic Support Funds on global climate change programs. These
programs protect the environment while promoting economic growth and
enhancing sustainable landscapes, clean energy, and adaptation. In
FY19, allocated funds went to the following programs:
SilvaCarbon--U.S. Forest Service
Climate Fellows--U.S. Forest Service
Clean and Advanced Technology for Sustainable Landscapes--U.S.
Department of Energy
Caribbean Natural Infrastructure Partnership for Resilience--U.S.
Forest Service
Offset National Emissions through Sustainable Landscapes--U.S.
Aviation Industry Groups
Carbon Accounting and Reporting for Wetlands--Environmental
Protection Agency
Avoiding Deforestation through a Commodities Jurisdiction
Approach--Competitively Awarded Program
Private Investment for Enhanced Resilience--Competitively Awarded
Program
Clean Energy Ministerial--U.S. Department of Energy
Question. In your March 31, 2020, opinion piece in the Washington
Post, you wrote about the environmental ``unexpected bright side'' of
the pandemic and point out the economic tradeoffs of doing with less.
How will you measure and report on economic and social tradeoffs of
climate programs at the State Department?
Answer. The pandemic has been an immense tragedy. It is clear that
it and the climate crisis impact our economies and societies in complex
and challenging ways. It is imperative that we learn from this
experience and use that knowledge to build back better. If confirmed, I
hope to work within the E family, and with the Department and the
interagency, to address these issues holistically.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Authorities
Question. The position of Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs has not been
held by a Senate-confirmed official since 2014.
Secretary Blinken has noted that the State Department likely
requires additional hiring authorities to bring in more
personnel to address emerging, complex foreign policy
challenges that fall within the remit of OES, including climate
change, global health, and technology. Do you share this view?
Could you elaborate on the kinds of skill sets you think need
to be added to the Bureau's work?
Answer. Yes, I agree. The Bureau has in its purview two of the
major crises facing our country and the world today-climate and health-
and they are likely to be difficult challenges for the foreseeable
future, requiring more resources for the Bureau. OES needs the right
mix of people, fresh and diverse perspectives, and people who
understand how to apply the latest scientific understanding and
technologies to these problems.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Monica P. Medina by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with our allies and
partners in the region to counter the Chinese Communist Party's illegal
territorial claims?
Answer. This matter is an important problem, and if I am confirmed,
it will be a priority for me. I have been to China and Japan with the
Secretary of Defense, and I understand the issue well. The United
States can and should push back on the PRC's coercive behavior,
unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, and disregard for the
marine environment. Countering the PRC's tactics requires a government-
wide effort that leads with diplomacy, development, and economic
engagement. Secretary Blinken recently affirmed in his statement on the
5th anniversary of the Arbitral Ruling on the South China Sea that
freedom of the seas is an enduring interest of all nations and is vital
to global peace and prosperity. If confirmed, I will look forward to
working with our ASEAN partners along with other partners and allies
including Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan, New
Zealand, and the European Union to preserve the rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific region including the East and South China Seas.
Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to work with other
federal agencies and international partners to crack down on illegal,
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices in the South China
Sea?
Answer. Ending IUU fishing is a top priority of mine because of the
detrimental food security impacts it has in the regions where it is
occurring, as well as because of the human rights and environmental
harms it is causing. Nowhere is this security and environmental
challenge more urgent than in the South China Sea. When I worked for
Secretary Panetta at the Department of Defense, I witnessed the growing
tensions in this region and the national security concerns it creates
first-hand.
I understand that the State Department and OES work with
interagency partners to monitor and address IUU fishing by PRC vessels,
support capacity building for coastal states threatened by it, and
implement multilateral fisheries enforcement and management schemes.
OES and its interagency partners also engage directly with the PRC on
broader fisheries conservation and management issues to push for
Being's responsible oversight of its fleet. I understand the State
Department and other agencies have also done work with Southeast Asian
coastal States to strengthen fisheries law enforcement and maritime
domain awareness in the region. If confirmed, I look forward to
continuing the Department's leading role in the recently formed
Maritime SAFE Act Interagency IUU Fishing Working Group, where we are
working with our interagency partners, as well as with key
stakeholders, to coordinate and strengthen U.S. efforts to combat IUU
fishing wherever it occurs. It is imperative, in my view, that we step
up our efforts in international fora and at international meetings to
confront China on its aggressive actions that undermine the rule of law
on the seas.
Question. Is there currently a review process within the United
States Government for approving or disapproving life sciences or
biological research collaboration with other countries that could pose
dual-use concerns, including research on pathogens, viruses, and
toxins? What role, if any, does the Department of State play in this
review process? Within the Department of State, what role does OES play
in this process?
Answer. Because I am not currently an employee of the State
Department, and I understand that much of this work is outside the
purview of OES, I have not yet taken a hard look at this process. It is
my understanding that there are a variety of review processes that may
apply to international life science collaboration, depending on the
nature of that collaboration and the pathogens or other materials
involved. These include reviews undertaken by agencies before funding
certain types of research deemed to pose particular risks, and, where
applicable, export licensing and visa vetting. The Department of State
is in general not involved in the decisions of funding agencies to
support specific research activities. I understand that much of this
work is outside of the purview of OES. If confirmed, I will work
colleagues in other bureaus at the State Department and across the
interagency to learn more about these issues, and will work with you to
assist any committee oversight over such activities.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with our
allies and partners in Africa and Latin America to combat Chinese
illegal fishing?
Answer. Department's continued close work with the U.S. Coast
Guard, NOAA, and other agencies and partner governments around the
world to strengthen the rules and improve enforcement processes and
capabilities for international fisheries. The Bureau plays a role in 16
bilateral cooperative fisheries law enforcement agreements between the
U.S. Coast Guard and partner countries in the Pacific and West Africa,
and I fully support its efforts to pursue additional agreements
throughout the world, including in Latin America and Africa. These
agreements allow for the United States to assist coastal and flag
States to enforce their domestic laws, strengthening and supporting
development of partner nations' capabilities. In addition, I understand
that the Maritime SAFE Act IUU Fishing Working Group has recently
determined that a number of regions in Africa and Latin America are
``priority regions,'' as described by the Act. OES will continue to
collaborate with its interagency partners through that Working Group to
determine the best approaches to strengthening the capabilities of
countries in those regions to address IUU fishing individually and
through regional cooperation.
Question. If confirmed, what actions will you take to work with
other agencies in investigating the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic?
Answer. Like many, I very much want to know the origins of COVID-
19. It is imperative that we learn what caused this tragedy and act to
do everything we can to prevent it from happening again. President
Biden recently requested a deeper review of the origins of COVID-19 by
the U.S. intelligence community, with support from the National Labs
and other agencies of the U.S. Government. As part of this review,
President Biden has asked for investigation into all areas that may be
relevant. I look forward to the results of this report and, if
confirmed, identifying next steps for follow-up and assisting in
whatever capacity I can. Additionally, the World Health Organization
(WHO) is currently working on developing Phase 2 of its study of the
origins of COVID-19, including in China.
Question. If confirmed, and absent passage of my bill, what actions
will you take to combat the deplorable action of finning sharks in
foreign nations?
Answer. Shark populations are declining globally and in my view we
need to do more to conserve them. The United States, through the
Department of State and the NOAA National Marine Fisheries Service, has
spearheaded a series of agreed shark finning prohibitions in RFMOs in
both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The United States works through
RFMOs to strengthen enforcement of current fishing prohibitions--and
strengthen the measures themselves when needed--as part of our work to
support the conservation and sustainable management of key shark
species. If confirmed, I will press for continued and expanded U.S.
leadership in these and other international organizations to ensure the
sustainability of these vital species, as well as continuing to work
with other countries to develop and enforce national conservation and
management measures, including species-specific data collection
programs for sharks.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. As you contemplate the possibilities of taking this
relationship to the next level and inaugurating a genuine strategic
partnership what is your vision of what such a partnership should look
like and encompass?
Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
I am confident that the positive momentum in our relationship will
continue. The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose
and a common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We
seek to deepen our cooperation that spans our close collaboration on
war legacy and humanitarian issues to regional security and shared
prosperity. We also seek to deepen cooperation on climate change,
pandemic disease, wildlife and drug trafficking, maritime security, and
transnational crime..
Our interests include maintaining the peace and stability that has
allowed regional and bilateral trade to flourish over the last quarter
century.
If confirmed, I commit to consulting closely with Congress as the
administration considers next steps in the relationship.
Question. If confirmed, how will you balance our very real shared
strategic interests with Vietnam with our on-going human rights
concerns? What sort of linkages or conditioning do you think is
appropriate and constructive as we consider additional military-
security, economic or diplomatic engagement with Vietnam?
Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose and a
common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We must
continue to build on the progress in the bilateral relationship, but as
the Biden-Harris administration has committed to putting human rights
back at the center of American foreign policy, we must also bring all
the tools of our diplomacy to defend human rights, including freedom of
expression, and religion or belief. If confirmed, I will continue to
press Vietnam to improve its implementation of human rights obligations
and commitments.
Question. As Beijing continues to pursue its aggressive and
expansionist tactics in the South China Sea, where are the
opportunities--and necessity--for greater US-Vietnam maritime
partnership?
Answer. We will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of its
maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better monitor
its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea.
In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to
Vietnam through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
program two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving
in in Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in
Vietnam's fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security
capabilities. The United States has also transferred to Vietnam 24
Metal Shark patrol boats and six Scan Eagle UAV, as part of our effort
to work with Vietnam to make it better able to protect its sovereignty
and rights in the South China Sea. Through the State Department's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program, we are developing
four training facilities for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing
U.S. Coast Guard personnel to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard
and DFIRES Fisheries Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law
enforcement skills to ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities
forces are modern, resilient, and capable. If confirmed, I will
continue to seek opportunities for maritime capacity building.
Vietnam sent its first cadet to the U.S. Air Force Academy in
August 2020, and we are hopeful to have more Vietnamese cadets attend
U.S. service academies in the coming years.
Question. How and where can the United States work with Vietnam to
assure continued ASEAN centrality as a strategic counterweight and to
develop functional problem-solving regional architecture?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to deepening
our engagement with ASEAN as part of reinvigorating our multilateral
partnerships. ASEAN plays a central role in the U.S. vision of a free
and open Indo-Pacific. Secretary of State Blinken has publicly
reaffirmed the United States' steadfast support for ASEAN centrality
and to expanding our work together.
Vietnam, as Chair of ASEAN in 2020, helped the organization respond
to the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and we applauded them for
their leadership.
We will continue to seek opportunities to partner with Vietnam and
other ASEAN partners to advance U.S. priorities and interests on
pressing regional issues. This extends beyond our meetings with ASEAN
to ASEAN-related fora such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional
Forum, and Mekong-U.S. Partnership. As part of the non-traditional
security pillar of this partnership, the Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement is developing a program to combat
Transnational Organized Crime in the region, building Vietnam's
capacity to investigate and prosecute crime in cooperation with its
neighbors.
We will also continue our work to build the capacity of the ASEAN
Secretariat on political, economic, and socio-cultural issues, and
broader efforts to develop human capital and support the next
generation of ASEAN leaders, including through capacity building
seminars at the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI)
Academy at Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV).
Question. What would be your priorities--resilience, zero-carbon
energy resources--to work with Vietnam on climate change?
Answer. The 2020s will be the decade for climate action, and no
region of the world has a more pivotal role in realizing the global
goal of net-zero emissions by 2050 than the economies in the Indo-
Pacific region. We will continue to work with Indo-Pacific countries to
increase regional ambition, implement 2030 targets and net-zero goals,
enhance the impact of climate financing, and increase adaptation and
resiliency through regional frameworks such as the Quad as well as
bilateral engagements.
I was pleased that Vietnam was invited to the Leaders' Summit on
Climate and appreciated hearing from President Nguyen Xuan Phuc about
the challenges Vietnam faces from climate change. Vietnam is
increasingly vulnerable to the threats associated with climate change,
evidenced by record floods that caused horrible devastation last year.
Vietnam is also a significant greenhouse gas emitter.
If confirmed, I will prioritize elevating climate change in my
discussions with Vietnamese Government and business leaders and urging
Vietnam to transition to a cleaner energy environment and to commit to
setting a net-zero emissions date.
Question. Cyber and Human Rights: in recent years Vietnam has
cracked down on numerous bloggers and journalists, and adopted
troubling new laws and regulations, that have closed down freedom of
expression in cyberspace. How and where can we work with Vietnam to
assure that civil society actors and journalists have space and freedom
to operate in the cyber realm--and to convince Vietnam that China's
model of digital authoritarianism is contrary to Vietnam's interests.
Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online and offline.
The trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust
convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and activists for
exercising their human rights is deeply troubling.
If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to
respect freedom of expression, both offline and online, and engage with
social media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
internet.
Question. Fulbright Vietnam University: The establishment of FVU,
with congressional support, has been a really success story for the
bilateral relationship in recent years. Where do you see opportunities
for FVU to continue to grow and contribute to Vietnam's development?
For example, is there a role for FVU to serve as a hub for cyber-
security education and training for Vietnam and for the region?
Answer. Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) is an incredible symbol
of the strength of our partnership with the people of Vietnam and
Southeast Asia. It is the first private, independent, non-profit
Vietnamese university, and is based on American higher education
traditions of open inquiry, research, and critical analysis.
The U.S. Government has helped FUV develop into a center of
academic independence that models core principles, including academic
freedom, meritocracy, transparency, and equal access. FUV has brought
world-class university standards to Vietnam and helped unlock
tremendous potential in Vietnam's education sector.
We are proud to partner with FUV to create the YSEALI Academy at
FUV, which offers executive-level capacity-building seminars for entry-
to mid-level professionals from ASEAN countries and Timor-Leste around
the themes of technology and innovation, public policy, and
entrepreneurship.
If confirmed, I look forward to exploring all possible avenues to
use FUV as a platform, including for cybersecurity training and
educational programs on the Mekong Delta, for increased engagement with
the Vietnamese people and with leaders across Southeast Asia.
Question. Even though we are many decades from the end of the war,
legacy issues including cleaning up of UXO and addressing the use of
Agent Orange continue to be important to both the Vietnamese and
American people. What priorities would you have in addressing these or
other war legacy issues, if confirmed?
Answer. Addressing humanitarian and war legacy issues is a
foundational element of the strong relationship between the United
States and Vietnam. Providing the fullest possible accounting for U.S.
personnel missing from the Vietnam War era remains our most solemn
duty. I acknowledge the Senate's longstanding support of U.S.
initiatives in this regard.
Since 1993, the United States has contributed more than $160
million to conventional weapons destruction (CWD) efforts to clear
unexploded ordnance (UXO), risk education, victims' assistance, and
capacity building. The U.S.-funded UXO clearance program targets high-
priority sites in the most UXO-contaminated provinces of central
Vietnam: Quang Tri, Quang Binh, and Tha Thien Hue. Our progress with
UXO authorities in these areas is a prime example of how provincial
level success can be replicated at the national level going forward. If
confirmed, I will advocate for these successes to be adopted at the
national level for effective implementation of U.S. taxpayer funding,
and to make real progress for the people of Vietnam.
Separately, the United States and Vietnam successfully completed
the remediation of dioxin contamination in Danang in 2018, and in 2019
we broke ground on the 10-year dioxin remediation project at the Bien
Hoa airbase area. The United States has provided more than $125 million
since 1989 in humanitarian assistance, directly and indirectly
supporting over a million persons with disabilities, regardless of the
cause.
Our cooperation on these issues continues to build a foundation of
trust to expand our relationship and, if confirmed, I will prioritize
deepening our cooperation in these efforts.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator James E. Risch
Question. What should our main goals for the Indo-Pacific region be
in the short-term, medium-term, and long-term?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration is committed to advancing a
free and open Indo-Pacific region. To achieve this, I will work to
revitalize ties with our allies and partners, advance inclusive
economic policies that support all Americans, and promote democratic
resilience and respect for human rights. I will invest in capabilities
and work with allies and partners, including in regional organizations,
to defend the international rules-based order, its foundational values,
and international law. I will also work closely with Congress and
partners in the region to address pressing challenges, including the
threat posed by the DPRK nuclear program, transnational crime, recovery
from COVID-19, and climate change.
Question. What are realistic goals for the U.S.-Vietnam strategic
partnership in the next decade? Please be specific.
Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
I am confident that the positive momentum in our relationship will
continue. The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose
and a common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Over
the next decade, we seek to deepen our cooperation that spans our close
collaboration on war legacy and humanitarian issues to regional
security and shared prosperity. We also seek to deepen cooperation on
climate change, pandemic disease, wildlife and drug trafficking,
maritime security, and transnational crime..
Our interests include maintaining the peace and stability that has
allowed regional and bilateral trade to flourish over the last quarter
century..
Question. If confirmed, what are the three main things you will
seek to accomplish in your first 100 days as U.S. Ambassador to
Vietnam?
Answer. The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has undergone a profound
transformation since normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995, and
our ties are thriving. President Biden's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance noted that the United States will deepen our
partnership with Vietnam to advance shared objectives. I look forward
to leading those efforts.
If confirmed, I will seek to deepen our security ties with the
conclusion of a General Security of Military Information Agreement with
Vietnam, which would enhance information sharing and expand defense
trade. I will also press Vietnam to take bold steps to commit to a
cleaner energy future, using the November COP 26 Conference in Glasgow
as a catalyst for action. Finally, I will seek to expand on the
progress that ethnic and religious minorities, the disabled, and
LGBTQI+ citizens in Vietnam have made, but will express serious concern
to Vietnam's leadership to underscore our commitment to supporting
universal human rights--and stress that improvements in this area can
only strengthen our overall relationship.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to continuing economic
cooperation with Vietnam on cultivating liquefied natural gas in
addition to other renewable resources? In light of recent policy
changes by the Biden administration, what tools will you have at your
disposal to advance such energy cooperation with Vietnam?
Answer. Vietnam is projected to be one of the fastest growing
energy demand markets in the region. The State Department is committed
to supporting Vietnam's economic aspirations, energy security and
sustainable development, and to support U.S. companies seeking
opportunities to invest and trade in this dynamic market.
At the same time, the United States is committed to working with
key partners around the world, like Vietnam, to encourage them to
select policies, measures, and investments that direct their economic
growth toward a climate-aligned pathway. Those decisions will be
critical to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and a global net
zero future by 2050. The science is unequivocal: we have no
alternative. We must keep the Earth's warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius to
avoid catastrophe. To get there, the science says the world needs to
get to a state of net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by around
mid-century.
As we head further into the 2020s, we must grow more discerning of
the future role for natural gas in achieving the world's climate goals.
If we are to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, the world must be
especially judicious about new gas infrastructure. That said, Vietnam
has an opportunity to eliminate coal projects and continue the
impressive growth of solar and wind power over the past two years.
If confirmed, I will work with U.S. companies and U.S. agencies to
plan their energy investments in a way that ensures access to cleaner
and affordable energy and advances our climate goals.
Question. What else do you think the U.S. should provide to Vietnam
in terms of security assistance, especially with respect to South China
Sea issues?
Answer. We will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of its
maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better monitor
its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea.
In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to
Vietnam through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
program two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving
in in Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in
Vietnam's fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security
capabilities. The United States has also transferred to Vietnam 24
Metal Shark patrol boats and six Scan Eagle UAV, as part of our effort
to work with Vietnam to make it better able to protect its sovereignty
and rights in the South China Sea. Through the State Department's
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement program, we are developing
four training facilities for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing
U.S. Coast Guard personnel to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard
and DFIRES Fisheries Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law
enforcement skills to ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities
forces are modern, resilient, and capable. If confirmed, I will
continue to seek opportunities for maritime capacity building.
Vietnam sent its first cadet to the U.S. Air Force Academy in
August 2020, and we are hopeful to have more Vietnamese cadets attend
U.S. service academies in the coming years. We are also providing
Vietnam with T-6 trainers, so that Vietnam's future Air Force pilots
will learn on state-of the art, American-model aircraft.
Question. What are your views on Vietnam's use of a maritime
militia in the South China Sea? What are your views on the new unit
Vietnam just stood up in this maritime militia?
Answer. The United States supports maritime law enforcement within
the bounds of international law and has consistently opposed the threat
or use of force to settle maritime and territorial disputes.
The United States opposes the use of coercion and intimidation by
any claimant seeking to assert its maritime claims in the South China
Sea and calls for all states to ensure that all of its maritime forces
and other vessels act in accordance with international law, avoid
provocative behavior, and behave in a professional manner.
Question. Apart from maritime cooperation, what do you see as the
major opportunities for growth in the U.S.-Vietnam security
relationship?
Answer. Our defense relationship has become one of the strongest
pillars of the overall relationship. While much of our current or
future planned security assistance to Vietnam aims to enhance the
country's ability to enforce international maritime law and police its
EEZ, we hope to expand upon peacekeeping efforts, search-and-rescue
abilities, humanitarian/disaster relief capacity, military medicine,
and the development of Vietnam's Coast Guard and Air Force.
Question. What challenges does Vietnam's reliance on Russian
defense technology and weapons present to the growth of the U.S.-
Vietnam security relationship?
Answer. Vietnam is working to diversify defense partners and
suppliers, and is evaluating and exploring future procurement
opportunities with the United States. In this context, the United
States is focusing support on strengthening maritime law enforcement
and domain awareness capabilities, peacekeeping efforts, search-and-
rescue abilities, humanitarian/disaster relief capacity, military
medicine, and the development of Vietnam's Coast Guard and Air Force.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your top three priorities for
working with Vietnam on Mekong issues?
Answer. The United States has long been a presence in the Mekong
subregion and has long been a partner of Vietnam. The Mekong subregion
matters to America. Not only is the subregion home to Vietnam, one of
the fastest growing economies in the world, it is also home to a
growing and incredibly dynamic population. Helping the subregion's
economy thrive and innovate, including by ensuring opportunities for
marginalized populations and helping talented young people realize
their full potential, benefits us all and also helps fulfill President
Biden's foreign policy for the middle class. The subregion is also the
front line for strategic competition with PRC, and we want to ensure
the Mekong states are secure, independent, and prosperous. Vietnam
supports our efforts through the Mekong-U.S. Partnership to ensure the
subregion is prosperous, resilient, and that the people of the region
enjoy good governance and security.
If confirmed, I will prioritize support of a sustainable Mekong
basin development plan, work with Vietnam on its efforts to combat
climate change, and press for greater economic connectivity across the
sub-region.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with Congress on
matters related to the financial sustainability of Fulbright University
Vietnam?
Answer. Fulbright University Vietnam (FUV) is an incredible symbol
of the strength of our partnership with the people of Vietnam and
Southeast Asia. It is the first private, independent, non-profit
Vietnamese university, and is based on American higher education
traditions of open inquiry, research, and critical analysis.
The U.S. Government has helped FUV develop into a center of
academic independence that models core principles, including academic
freedom, meritocracy, transparency, and equal access. FUV has brought
world-class university standards to Vietnam and helped unlock
tremendous potential in Vietnam's education sector..
If confirmed, I will work with Congress to continue our work to
help FUV continue to flourish and achieve financial sustainability.
Question. Vietnam has signed and ratified the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and was among the original 50
states parties to the treaty when it entered into force on January 22,
2021. Will you commit to raising U.S. concerns about TPNW with
counterparts in Vietnam?
Answer. Yes, as appropriate. While the United States understands
and shares the desire to advance nuclear disarmament goals, we do not
support the TPNW. The TPNW is incompatible with U.S. extended
deterrence relationships that are still necessary for international
peace and security and may reinforce divisions that hinder the
international community's ability to work together to address pressing
proliferation and security challenges. The U.S. position on this issue
has spanned administrations. Seeking to ban nuclear weapons through a
treaty that does not include any State Parties that possess nuclear
weapons will not reduce nuclear arsenals.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to raise with the
Vietnamese Government its alleged use of extraterritorial tactics
against dissidents and others? For example: Vietnam's hacking of its
own dissidents' accounts overseas; the alleged abduction of a
Vietnamese oil executive from Berlin; and the alleged abduction of a
Radio Free Asia journalist from Bangkok?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by report of such tactics against
individuals for exercising their fundamental human rights. These
activities run counter to Vietnam's international human rights
obligations and commitments. If confirmed, I commit to engage with the
Government of Vietnam to underscore our strong objection to these
tactics and ensure Vietnam adheres to its international human rights
commitments.
Question. According to Freedom House's Freedom of the Net report,
internet freedom in Vietnam dropped to an all-time low in 2020. What
will you do to ensure that the internet in Vietnam remains free and
open?
Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online and offline.
The trend of harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust
convictions, and harsh sentences of journalists and activists for
exercising their human rights is deeply troubling.
If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to
respect freedom of expression, including online, and engage with social
media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
internet.
Question. In the State Department's 2021 Trafficking in Persons
Report, Vietnam was identified as a Tier 2 Watch List country for the
third consecutive year. Because Vietnam was listed for three years on
the Watch List, it was subject to a downgrade to Tier 3, but was
provided a waiver for its general efforts to eliminate trafficking. It
is clear the Vietnamese Government must improve its protection,
prevention, and prosecutorial efforts in this coming reporting period
in order to improve its ranking. How will you work with the host
government to address these issues if you are confirmed as Ambassador?
Answer. In recent years, the Vietnamese Government has demonstrated
significant efforts by providing trafficking victims the affirmative
right to legal representation, increasing TIP funding for law
enforcement and victim support, passing new legislation that better
protects workers migrating overseas and prohibits brokerage fees for
overseas migrant workers, continuing large-scale awareness campaigns in
communities vulnerable to trafficking, and training law enforcement
officials.
Significant challenges remain, however, including insufficient
victim screening, cumbersome and ineffective victim identification and
assistance procedures, limited interagency coordination, and the need
to better address predatory recruitment practices that charge workers
seeking overseas employment higher fees than the law allows.
If confirmed, I will encourage the Government of Vietnam to
vigorously prosecute all forms of trafficking and convict and punish
traffickers, especially in cases involving forced labor or complicit
officials. I will also encourage the Government to expand victim
screening amongst vulnerable groups such as migrant workers,
individuals in commercial sex, and child laborers, and improve victim
identification and referral mechanisms.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Report on International
Religious Freedom, Vietnam was depicted as a country which is not
particularly tolerant of religious freedoms. In one example, Vietnam
continues to enforce a Law on Belief and Religion (LBR), which requires
religious groups to register with the State and allows government
entities to harass unregistered groups. What is your assessment of this
particular issue and, if confirmed, how will you work with the
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom to bolster
religious freedom in-country?
Answer. Vietnam's Law on Belief and Religion, while imperfect and
inconsistent with international standards, reduces registration times
and grants legal status to some religious groups. Some groups who
remain unregistered in remote areas continue to face harassment from
local authorities.
The United States remains concerned that the law maintains
significant government control over religious practices and exacerbates
uneven implementation of the law at the subnational level. The State
Department's annual international religious freedom report to Congress
detailed these concerns, and if confirmed, I will continue to raise
them with Hanoi.
If confirmed, I will also continue to work closely with the
Ambassador-at-Large to emphasize the importance of religious freedom
with Vietnam's leaders, including cases of individuals harassed or
imprisoned for their beliefs.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Vietnam was identified as continuing to undermine fundamental human
rights like speech, assembly, press, religion, and association. If
confirmed, what steps will you take to address these instances with the
Vietnamese Government?
Answer. I am very concerned about the human rights situation in
Vietnam and committed to pushing for improvements. Despite progress in
some areas, the trend of escalating harassment, unjust arrests and
convictions, and increasingly harsh sentences of journalists and
activists for peacefully exercising their right to express their
opinions is deeply troubling. Vietnam is an important partner in the
Indo-Pacific region, but that partnership can only reach its fullest
potential if the Vietnamese Government improves its human rights
record.
If confirmed, I will work with the Government of Vietnam to improve
its implementation of its human rights obligations and commitments. I
will urge the Government of Vietnam to ensure law enforcement and the
judicial system effectively and fairly enforce existing constitutional
guarantees and laws protecting human rights, including freedom of
religion or belief. I will continue to raise our concerns with the
Government of Vietnam, including during the annual U.S.-Vietnam Human
Rights Dialogue, and call on Vietnam to respect and protect human
rights and fundamental freedoms, consistent with its international
obligations and commitments.
Question. In the State Department's 2020 Human Rights Report,
Vietnam was identified as continuing to undermine fundamental human
rights like speech, assembly, press, religion, and association. If
confirmed, how will you direct your embassy to work with civil society
organizations to improve the human rights situation on the ground in
Vietnam?
Answer. If confirmed, I will encourage my team to continue its
longstanding work with civil society organizations who are trying to
make space for positive progress in Vietnam. I will also continue the
strong engagement with human rights and civil society organizations in
the United States, including the Vietnamese-American community and
local human rights NGOs in Vietnam, as previous Ambassadors have done.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Cybersecurity
Question. Over the past several years, Vietnamese authorities have
increased their scrutiny over Vietnamese citizens' activities on the
Internet and in social media. Vietnam's new cybersecurity law, which
went into effect in recent months, criminalizes the ``distortion of
history, denial of revolutionary achievements, undermining national
solidarity, taking advantage of cybersecurity protection activities to
violate national security, national interests or sovereignty, or
disrupt public order.'' What has been the impact of measures such as
these on Vietnamese citizens' online activities?
Answer. I am concerned about the shrinking environment for the
exercise of freedoms of expression and association online. The trend of
harassment, arbitrary or unlawful arrests, unjust convictions, and
harsh sentences of journalists and activists for exercising their
rights, both offline and online, is deeply troubling.
If confirmed, I will advocate with the Government of Vietnam to
respect freedom of expression, including online, and engage with social
media companies to promote approaches that preserve freedom of
expression online and an open, interoperable, reliable, and secure
Internet.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted to Marc Evans Knapper by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. If confirmed, how will you support the Vietnamese
Government's efforts to counter the Chinese claims in the South China
Sea?
Answer. The U.S. position on the South China Sea is principled and
longstanding. In keeping with its global policy, the United States does
not take a position on the territorial disputes over land features
among the many South China Sea claimants, while at the same time taking
a strong principled position on compliance with the international law
of the sea. Like Vietnam, the United States has a national interest in
upholding international law, including freedom of navigation and
overflight, and opposing the use of coercion to resolve disputes.
The United States will continue to support Vietnam's enhancement of
its maritime security and law enforcement capabilities to better
monitor its maritime domain and resist coercion in the South China Sea.
In 2017 and 2020, the U.S. Government officially transferred to Vietnam
through the State Department's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program
two 378-foot Hamilton-class cutters, with the second arriving in in
Vietnam earlier this summer. These vessels are the largest in Vietnam's
fleet and significantly enhance Vietnam's maritime security
capabilities. Through the State Department's International Narcotics
and Law Enforcement program, we are developing four training facilities
for Vietnam's Coast Guard. We are bringing U.S. Coast Guard personnel
to Vietnam to train Vietnamese Coast Guard and DFIRES Fisheries
Enforcement counterparts on key maritime law enforcement skills to
ensure that maritime law enforcement capabilities forces are modern,
resilient, and capable.
If confirmed, I will continue to support the development of a
strong and independent Vietnam through its maritime capacity building,
and will remain united in our support for peaceful resolution of
disputes, including through international dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Question. Since the Vietnam War, the United States and Vietnam have
repaired their relationship. Vietnam is now a key strategic partner in
the Indo-Pacific. However, it is my sincere belief that that that
relationship cannot reach its full potential unless Vietnam commits to
respecting the human rights of its people. For example, in April,
journalist Tran Thi Tuyet Dieu was sentenced to eight years in prison
for reporting news on Vietnamese political figures. If confirmed, what
steps will you take to press for the release of Dieu and other
Vietnamese people who are unjustly targeted by Vietnamese security
services?
Answer. I am deeply concerned by the convictions of individuals for
exercising their freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. These
convictions run counter to Vietnam's international human rights
obligations and commitments. Vietnam should ensure its laws and actions
are consistent with those obligations and commitments.
If confirmed, I will engage with activists, their family members,
and lawyers to determine the facts in specific cases and urge
authorities to release all persons detained for exercising their rights
in Vietnam.
I will stress, above all, the need to follow through on the
commitment that the Vietnamese Government has made to fundamentally
reform the laws under which activists have been targeted in the past,
to bring the country's laws into full compliance with its constitution
and with its international obligations.
Question. How will you promote U.S. cooperation with Vietnam, which
is important, while simultaneously encouraging Hanoi to embrace
meaningful political reforms and protect the basic rights of its
citizens?
Answer. Twenty-six years since the normalization of diplomatic
relations, the U.S.-Vietnam partnership has never been better. We have
moved from a history of conflict and division to a Comprehensive
Partnership that spans political, security, economic, and people-to-
people ties.
The United States and Vietnam have a common sense of purpose and a
common vision for a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. We must
continue to build on the progress in the bilateral relationship, but as
the Biden-Harris administration has committed to putting human rights
back at the center of American foreign policy, we must also bring all
the tools of our diplomacy to defend human rights, including freedom of
religion or belief. If confirmed, I will continue to press Vietnam to
improve its implementation of human rights obligations and commitments.
__________
NOMINATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in
Room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Shaheen, Coons,
Booker, Van Hollen, Risch, Johnson, and Young.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider four important nominations,
Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen, to be a Deputy Administrator for
Management and Resources at the Agency for International
Development, Dr. Karen Donfried to be Assistant Secretary of
State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs, Ambassador Mary
Catherine Phee to be Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, and Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky to be Assistant Secretary of
State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations.
Congratulations to the four of you on your nominations. We
appreciate your willingness to serve our country in these
capacities, as well as those members of your family, because we
recognize that this is a family sacrifice as well. So we thank
them as well.
Ms. Adams-Allen, your lifelong dedication to international
development and distinguished career of government service,
including as Deputy Assistant Administrator at the Latin
American Caribbean Bureau of the United States Agency for
International Development, I believe makes you eminently
qualified for this position.
If confirmed, your knowledge and experience as a
development professional and your distinguished tenure as the
President and CEO of the Inter-American Foundation will be
needed as you take the role of Deputy Administrator for
Management and Resources at USAID.
I am pleased to see that President Biden's budget aims to
restore the value and use of international development and
foreign assistance as part of the overall goal of achieving
U.S. foreign policy objectives. I know Administrator Power is
entirely committed to this vital task, and I appreciated her
testimony in the budget last week. I have no doubt you will
share that commitment.
Dr. Donfried, your nomination is a testament to the Biden
administration's efforts to rebuild the trans-Atlantic
relationship, which, I believe was significantly damaged during
the last administration. If confirmed, I believe your knowledge
and experience, including as Senior Director for European
Affairs at the National Security Council will serve you and the
country well, as the Biden administration works to advance a
renewed trans-Atlantic relationship.
It is imperative that this position be filled as soon as
possible as we need to see forward movement on critical issues
including those related to Russia, Turkey, Belarus, and our
support for Ukraine, among others. I look forward to hearing
from you about these and other issues.
Ambassador Phee, I am pleased to see you back before the
committee, the position you are nominated for to be the
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs comes at a
critical time for Africa, a Continent with enormous promise and
challenges. However, the impacts of the third wave of COVID-19
on top of political and security challenges could roll back
years of democratic progress and economic growth.
Indeed, the Biden administration faces a series of
challenges in Africa, from China and Russia, which continue to
pursue actions that are inimical to U.S. interest to conflict,
to instability, and a flawed electoral exercise in Ethiopia, to
a fragile transition in Sudan, which could be destabilizing to
the entire Horn of Africa.
These are just a few among the many challenges facing
Africa and U.S. interests there. In short, the challenges in
the region are pressing and vast, I know that you are well
equipped, based on your experience, to carry on and meet those
challenges, and trust that if confirmed you will do so with
skill and commitment.
Ms. Witkowsky, your knowledge and experience, including as
a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability and
Humanitarian Affairs will be critical, if you are confirmed, to
be the next Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations. Indeed, your commitment and expertise
with many of today's complex conflicts from Burma, Venezuela,
Ethiopia, the Sahel, Yemen, to Afghanistan will be needed as
CSO develops long-range, strategic policies and plans in order
to address ongoing conflicts, as well as to prevent future
ones. I will look forward to hearing from you about how you
will approach this task.
In closing, while the four of you have a series of
challenges ahead, I am confident that your commitment and
experience will serve you well, as you take on these new
responsibilities upon confirmation. I look forward to your
testimonies.
And now I turn to the ranking member for his opening
remarks.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you Mr. Chairman. And I certainly
embrace a number of the issues that are going to be facing
these people.
And thank you, each of you, for your willingness to serve,
and your families, because they always share the sacrifice.
I want to start with the nomination of Assistant Secretary
of State for European Eurasian Affairs. For starters, I am
concerned the administration has refused to use visa sanctions
to shut down the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, this is a continued
aggravation for us, and I would like to see that resolved.
Putin has boasted that its completion will be a victory for
Russian power. I would also note that any deal with the
Russians would be in violation of U.S. law. And I expect to
hear more from you on this topic, Dr. Donfried.
On Chinese maligned influence, Europe is a key partner, I
have been encouraged to see the increased U.S.-European
discussions on working together to combat China's actions.
In Georgia, I am increasingly worried by steps backward.
The past weeks more than 50 journalists were beaten. One of
them died from his injuries, and several judges were pushed
onto the Supreme Court in contravention of the April 19th
Agreement.
I know Senator Shaheen shares my concerns in that regard,
and we had a number of discussions on that. I hope you will
work to address the issues with Georgia's Government.
Ukraine remains a big focus on The Hill. We are
disappointed to see the administration refusal to send
additional help to Ukraine this spring in order that they might
defend from their belligerent neighbor. I hope you will address
this today.
On to the nomination of Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, the Biden administration has stated that Africa is a
priority, but it is unclear where Africa fits in that priority
list. First, I am troubled by the conflict and humanitarian
situation in Tigray, however, I am concerned that the U.S. is
so focused on the Tigray crisis, that it is ignoring the
significant challenges to peace, democracy that we face across
Ethiopia.
This is a complex challenge. I get that. I look forward to
hearing how we navigate Ethiopia's challenges, and the other
crises across the Horn of Africa, which is becoming more and
more of a focus and a crisis.
Aside from Ethiopia, I remain deeply concerned about the
lack of initiative the international community has shown,
including our European, French, and African partners, in
pushing for a resolution to the crisis in Cameroon, as well as
corruption challenges by the regimes in Zimbabwe and South
Sudan.
African countries are crucial partners in our fight to
combat malign Chinese influence. The United States remains the
top contributor of health and humanitarian assistance to
Africa, but we must do more to commit ourselves to building
strong economic and security partnerships with our African
allies.
Next we have the nomination of Assistant Secretary of State
for Conflict and Stabilization Operations. Like many, I am
concerned by this administration's response to the crisis
unfolding in Afghanistan. It is clear that the administration
had no plans in place to manage the withdrawal and provide for
the people that worked side by side with our troops.
President Biden publicly stated that his administration
was, ``Working closely with Congress to change the
authorization legislation in order to expedite the processing
of Afghan special immigrant visas.'' But I have yet to see such
outreach on the specific legislative fixes they are seeking.
Finally, we have the nomination of a Deputy Administrator
of the USAID for Management and Resources. U.S. foreign
assistance can help advance the national security, economic and
humanitarian interests of the United States, but it must be
thoughtfully targeted and designed to ensure the greatest
possible impact. The responsibility for aligning roughly two-
thirds of the U.S. foreign assistance budget, with the
strategic objectives of the United States overseas falls here.
I am eager to hear about the modernization of USAID's
workforce, and operations to stretch the aid dollars further so
we can save lives and advance U.S. interests. We have a lot to
cover today.
I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
Okay. So we will turn to our nominees. All of your
statements will be included in the record without objection.
We will start with Ms. Adams-Allen, and move down the aisle
as I introduce you.
So the floor is yours, Ms. Adams-Allen.
STATEMENT OF PALOMA ADAMS-ALLEN OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
NOMINATED TO BE A DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR OF THE UNITED STATES
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES)
Ms. Adams-Allen. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the
committee, it is an honor to appear before you today as
President Biden's nominee to be Deputy Administrator for
Management and Resources of the United States Agency for
International Development.
I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power
for their trust in me. I am grateful for the opportunity to
return to USAID, an agency dear to my heart, at a moment when
its leadership and development expertise are so urgently
needed.
I am here today before you because of the love and support
of so many. My mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who
instilled in me a deep sense of fairness and justice; my
father, Llewelyn Adams, who I credit for my strong Jamaican
work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen, still the best human I
know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose creativity and
empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended family,
friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank
you all.
My international development and diplomacy experience
started early, informed by the duality of my upbringing:
summers spent in the relative wealth and safety of my mother's
community in the United States, and the school year spent in
the beauty and vulnerability of my father's home country in
Jamaica. It was in the jarring journey back and forth between
these worlds that I settled on what I wanted to do with my
life: pay forward the incredible privilege I have as an
American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in
communities like the one that helped raise me.
This early decision informed my 20-plus years working in
the foreign assistance arena, primarily Latin America and the
Caribbean. During a decade in policy and programming roles at
the Organization of American States, I saw the potential of
multilateralism to calm tensions between neighboring countries,
and mobilize regional support for humanitarian crises like the
2010 earthquake.
But it has been my experience in the federal government,
serving in leadership and management positions at USAID, and
now as Head of the Inter-American Foundation, where I have been
able to effect the change I dreamed of as a child. During a
decade of public service, I have had the honor of investing in
and learning from young people bravely building peace in El
Salvador; smallholder farmers in Colombia selling their coffee
to global corporations, and proud grandmothers in Haiti
financing businesses through their savings and loans
associations.
Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to
successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward
resources, create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and
advance reforms designed to enhance the impact and
sustainability of development investments.
And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and
respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in U.S. foreign
assistance. If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to
effectively oversee USAID's management and resources needs.
As the U.S. Government's lead the global development
agency, USAID needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-
evolving set of geopolitical challenges and crises, and to do
so with the management and oversight commensurate with the
responsibilities given to it by the American people through the
Congress.
If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to
further maximize its development impact, by [1] better aligning
strategy and resources to deliver results; and [2] expanding
the Agency's partner base to include more nontraditional U.S.
and local implementing partners with strong in-country
knowledge, expertise, and a commitment to sustainability.
In order to maximize impact, we must support and invest in
USAID's greatest strength, its people. If confirmed, my focus
will be on making sure the Agency has a staff equipped with the
right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture, one that
recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on
USAID, and embraces the values of diversity, equity, and
inclusion.
And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing
USAID's ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of
emerging opportunities as conditions change on the ground.
There are multiple layers to this goal, but perhaps most
important is building on prior efforts to enhance the Agency's
procurement capabilities so that it programs resources in a
faster, more responsive manner.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Adams-Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paloma Adams-Allen
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, members of the committee,
it is an honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee
to be Deputy Administrator for Management and Resources of the United
States Agency for International Development.
I would like to thank the President and Administrator Power for
their trust in me. I'm grateful for the opportunity to return to USAID,
an Agency dear to my heart, at a moment when its leadership and
development expertise are so urgently needed.
I am here before you today because of the love and support of so
many--my mother, Emilie Adams, a proud Minnesotan who instilled in me a
deep sense of fairness and justice; my father, Llewelyn Adams, who I
credit for my strong Jamaican work ethic; my husband, Travis Allen,
still the best human I know; my daughters, Priya and Emilie, whose
creativity and empathy inspire me every day; and a network of extended
family, friends, colleagues, and neighbors spanning the globe. Thank
you all.
My international development and diplomacy experience started
early, informed by the duality of my upbringing: summers spent in the
relative wealth and safety of my mother's community in the United
States, and the school year spent in the riotous beauty and
vulnerability of my father's home country of Jamaica. It was in the
jarring journey back and forth between these worlds that I settled on
what I wanted to do with my life: pay forward the incredible privilege
I have as an American, by working to fuel hope and opportunity in
communities like the one that helped raise me.
This early decision informed my 20+ years working in the foreign
assistance arena, primarily focused on Latin America and the Caribbean.
During a decade in policy and programming roles at the Organization of
American States, I saw the potential of multilateralism to calm
tensions between neighboring countries and mobilize regional support
for humanitarian crises like the 2010 Haiti earthquake. But it has been
my experience in the federal government, serving in
leadership and management positions at USAID and now as head of the
Inter-American Foundation, where I have been able to affect the change
I dreamed of as a child. During a decade of public service, I have had
the honor of investing in and learning from young people bravely
building peace in El Salvador; small holder farmers in Colombia selling
their coffee to global retailers; and proud grandmothers in Haiti
financing micro and small businesses through their savings and loans
associations.
Throughout my career, I have demonstrated an ability to
successfully manage complex operations, effectively steward resources,
create and lead diverse purpose-driven teams, and advance reforms
designed to enhance the impact and sustainability of development
investments. And I have done so in a bipartisan manner, recognizing and
respecting Congress' role as an equal partner in US foreign assistance.
If confirmed, I will draw upon this experience to effectively oversee
USAID's management and resources needs.
As the U.S. Government's lead global development agency, USAID
needs to be nimble enough to respond to an ever-evolving set of
geopolitical challenges and crises--and to do so with the management
and oversight commensurate with the responsibilities given to it by the
American people through the Congress.
If confirmed, my top priority will be positioning USAID to further
maximize its development impact, by (1) better aligning strategy and
resources to deliver results; and (2) expanding the Agency's partner
base to include more non-traditional U.S. implementing partners and
local organizations, with strong in-country knowledge, expertise, and a
commitment to sustainability.
In order to maximize our impact, we must support and invest in
USAID's greatest strength and resource: its people. If confirmed, my
focus will be on making sure the Agency has enough staff, equipped with
the right tools, and bolstered by a supportive culture--one that
recognizes and responds to the outsized demands placed on USAID, and
embraces the values of diversity, equity, and inclusion.
And finally, if confirmed, I will prioritize enhancing USAID's
ability to rapidly respond and take advantage of emerging opportunities
as conditions change on the ground. There are multiple layers to this
goal, but perhaps most important is building on prior efforts to
enhance the
Agency's procurement capabilities--so that it programs resources in
a faster, more responsive manner.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today,
and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Donfried?
STATEMENT OF DR. KAREN DONFRIED OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE (EUROPEAN
AFFAIRS AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS)
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch,
members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to
appear before you today.
I have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this
committee, dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work
on Europe at the Congressional Research Service. If confirmed,
it would be a pleasure to work with you from the State
Department on issues I care passionately about and on which the
United States is and shall remain a force for good.
It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve
under Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Eurasian Affairs. If confirmed, I will work
enthusiastically to serve the American people, and advance the
interests of the United States, to reinvigorate our alliances
and partnerships, to strengthen democracy in Europe and
Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face around the
world.
My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will
come from my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah,
and our son, Michael. They are an endless source of love and
inspiration. Although born in New York City, I spent my early
childhood in Heidelberg, where my father, a theologian, did his
doctoral work, and my mother worked as a nurse at U.S. Army
Headquarters.
That experience gave me the gift of speaking German
fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades later, to
complete a Master's degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a
fellow American studying abroad. Trans-Atlantic relations have
been an integral part of my life story.
Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush
administration as a member of the State Department's Policy
Planning Staff, and in the Obama administration both as the
National Intelligence Officer for Europe, and as the Senior
Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council.
For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund
of the United States.
If confirmed, I will have the responsibility, and the honor
and joy of leading EUR, covering 50 countries, with 79 posts
and 12,000 hard-working, dedicated public servants. I will
treat each and every one of them with the care and respect they
deserve, as well as work energetically to recruit and develop
more diverse talent for the Bureau.
President Biden defines his number one job as ensuring that
America's foreign policy benefits the American people and the
American middle class. I am eager to support him in achieving
this goal, including by revitalizing our alliances and
partnerships. The strength of America's alliances is one of our
greatest assets. Whether we are confronting the COVID-19
pandemic, economic or social inequality, climate change,
corruption, threats to energy security, an aggressive Russia,
an increasingly assertive China, cyber threats, or
technological competition, the United States is most effective
when we cooperate with our allies.
Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners.
Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of
destabilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of
mutual interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and
partners must work together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to
undermine democracies and democratic institutions.
We must confront Russian aggression against its neighbors
by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus.
And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in
Russia. The Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such
as Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing.
Additionally, we must work with our allies to counter an
assertive China in the political, diplomatic, economic,
military, and technological domains. How we manage our
relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of the
21st century.
We must work to preserve the free and open rules-based
order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in
the wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the
most compelling examples of the United States exercising
enlightened leadership.
But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to
meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that
while we applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have
made in improving defense investments, we need to do more. The
common threats we face demand it.
Allies share values and interests, but we will not always
agree. To manage those differences requires trust; if
confirmed, I will work to deepen that trust to achieve policy
successes that advance U.S. interests. If confirmed, I will
seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and this committee to
ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American people.
I look forward to your questions. And thank you for your
consideration.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Donfried follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Karen E. Donfried
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
have long valued my bipartisan collaboration with this committee,
dating back to 1991, when I began a decade of work on Europe at the
Congressional Research Service. If confirmed, it would be a pleasure to
work with you from the State Department on issues I care passionately
about and on which the United States is and shall remain a force for
good.
It is an honor to be nominated by President Biden to serve under
Secretary Blinken as the Assistant Secretary of State for European and
Eurasian Affairs (EUR). If confirmed, I will work enthusiastically to
serve the American people and advance the interests of the United
States, to reinvigorate our alliances and partnerships, to strengthen
democracy in Europe and Eurasia, and to address the challenges we face
around the world.
My greatest support, if confirmed for this position, will come from
my husband, Alan Untereiner, our daughter, Hannah, and our son,
Michael. They are an endless source of love and inspiration. Although
born in New York City, I spent my early childhood in Heidelberg, where
my father, a theologian, did his doctoral work and my mother worked as
a nurse at U.S. Army Headquarters. That experience gave me the gift of
speaking German fluently, which, in turn, allowed me, two decades
later, to complete a Masters degree in Munich, where I met Alan, a
fellow American studying abroad. Transatlantic relations have been an
integral part of my life story.
Professionally, I served in the George W. Bush administration as a
Member of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and in the Obama
administration both as the National Intelligence Officer for Europe and
as the Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security
Council. For the past seven years, I have led the German Marshall Fund
of the United States .
If confirmed, I will have the responsibility--and the honor and
joy--of leading EUR, covering 50 countries, with 79 posts and 12,000
hard-working, dedicated public servants. I will treat each and every
one of them with the care and respect they deserve, as well as work
energetically to recruit and develop more diverse talent for the
bureau.
President Biden defines his number one job as ensuring that
America's foreign policy benefits the American people and the American
middle class. I am eager to support him in achieving this goal,
including by revitalizing our alliances and partnerships. The strength
of America's alliances is one of our greatest assets. Whether we are
confronting the COVID-19 pandemic, economic or social inequality,
climate change, corruption, threats to energy security, an aggressive
Russia, an increasingly assertive China, cyber threats, or
technological competition, the United States is most effective when we
cooperate with our allies.
Europe is home to many of our closest allies and partners.
Together, we must stand firm against Russia's broad range of
destabilizing actions while recognizing there are areas of mutual
interest on which we might cooperate. Allies and partners must work
together to blunt the Kremlin's attempts to undermine democracies and
democratic institutions. We must confront Russian aggression against
its neighbors by standing with the people of Ukraine, Georgia, and
Belarus. And we must stand up for universal human rights, including in
Russia; the Kremlin's persecution of political opponents, such as
Aleksey Navalny, remains deeply disturbing Additionally, we must work
with our allies to counter an assertive China in the political,
diplomatic, economic, military, and technological domains. How we
manage our relationship with China is the biggest geopolitical test of
the 21st century.
Most importantly, we must work to preserve the free and open rules-
based order we built together with our allies seven decades ago in the
wake of World War II. The Marshall Plan remains one of the most
compelling examples of the United States exercising enlightened
leadership. But 2021 is not 1947. We must modernize our alliances to
meet new challenges. Secretary Blinken has made clear that while we
applaud the significant progress many NATO allies have made in
improving defense investments, we need to do more. The common threats
we face demand it.
Allies share values and interests, but we will not always agree. To
manage those differences requires trust. If confirmed, I will work to
deepen the trust our partners in Europe have in the United States so we
can achieve policy successes that advance U.S. interests.
If confirmed, I will seek to deepen cooperation between EUR and
this committee to ensure that our diplomacy delivers for the American
people. I look forward to your questions and thank you for your
consideration.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Phee?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARY CATHERINE PHEE OF ILLINOIS, A CAREER
MEMBER OF THE SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-
COUNSELOR, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
[AFRICAN AFFAIRS] AND A MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE
AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION
Ambassador Phee. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Risch,
distinguished members of the committee; I am honored to be
President Biden's nominee for the post of Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs, and grateful to the President and
to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.
I began my career as a public servant in these halls in the
office of Senator Pat Moynihan. Senator Moynihan kept only two
documents on his desk: the U.S. Constitution, and the U.N.
Charter. He inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and
taught me an abiding respect for this institution, and this
committee.
My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the
United Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced
to the talent and generosity of the African people. Kenyan
politics were also my first exposure to the enduring challenges
of governance, security, and sustainable development. Applying
U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such challenges has been the
dominant theme of my career.
I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of
the growing political, economic and cultural power of the
diverse countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State
Department to translate this recognition into respectful
partnerships that advance our shared interests, values, and
aspirations.
If confirmed, I will work to support President Biden's
agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our engagement
with African Governments, institutions such as the African
Union, and critically, African publics.
To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has
charged us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system
to meet the challenges of our interconnected world. Africans
agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for
their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the
Sudanese people in demanding a civilian-led government is
another extraordinary example.
Across the Continent we will reinvigorate our focus on
human rights, accountability, and good governance. President
Biden has declared the fight against corruption, especially the
theft of public assets for private gain, to be a core national
security interest.
We see a direct correlation between African Governments
that are authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict,
displacement, and migration. Many are contending with an active
threat from the Islamic State, and other violent extremists
like al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Diverse societies struggle to uphold inclusive and
equitable power-sharing arrangements, and collaboration with
regional and international partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic,
development and security assistance can play a critical role to
support peace and security.
This imperative is driving our current intensive effort to
urge all parties to the conflict in Ethiopia to implement an
immediate and unconditional ceasefire to put a halt to
atrocities against civilians.
Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in
the Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of
thousands, and reckless exploitation threatens the rainforest
in the Congo Basin, and the Continent's biological diversity.
It is in our mutual interests to work together on environmental
sustainability.
Africa is the fastest-growing and the youngest continent.
By 2050, one in four persons in the world will be African.
Workforce development and job creation will be necessary to tap
the ambitions of the youth bulge. We are committed to expanding
two-way trade and investment, and
to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental
Free Trade Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector
offers innovative American options for green energy, and
digital economies, as well as a commitment to social
responsibility.
All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating
human toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous
tradition of investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified
by the landmark PEPFAR program, the White House has just
announced the donation of 25 million COVID-19 vaccines for
Africa. The Development Finance Corporation is also investing
in vaccine production in South Africa and Senegal.
Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the
challenges in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and
affirmative U.S. policy agenda that enlists African partners in
building free-market democracies that offer liberty and
prosperity and realize the Continent's full potential.
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, with the Strategic
Competition Act, you have given us our marching orders and new
tools. If confirmed, I commit that U.S. embassies in Sub-
Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to
the international rules-based order.
Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a
champion of the people of the State Department's Africa Bureau,
to unleash their full potential with a vigorous commitment to
diversity and inclusion, and to cultivate the special esprit de
corps that has traditionally defined the Bureau. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Phee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Mary Catherine Phee
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member, distinguished members of
the committee, I am honored to be President Biden's nominee for the
post of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and grateful
to the President and to Secretary Blinken for their confidence.
I began my career as a public servant here in the office of Senator
Pat Moynihan. To guide his work, Senator Moynihan kept only two
documents on his desk: the U.S. constitution and the U.N. Charter. He
inspired my career in the Foreign Service, and taught me an abiding
respect for this institution, and this committee.
My career in foreign policy began in Nairobi, Kenya, at the United
Nations Environment Program. In Kenya I was introduced to the talent
and generosity of the African people, and the beauty and richness of
the African landscape. Kenyan politics were also my first exposure to
the enduring challenges of governance, security and sustainable
development. Applying U.S. diplomacy to effectively meet such
challenges has been the dominant theme of my career.
I thank this committee for its bipartisan recognition of the
growing political, economic and cultural power of the diverse countries
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is up to the State Department to translate
this recognition into respectful partnerships that advance our shared
interests, values and aspirations. If confirmed, I will work to support
President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity and quality of our
engagement with African Governments, institutions such as the African
Union, and, critically, African publics.
To stand up to the threat of autocracy, the President has charged
us with demonstrating that democracy is the best system to meet the
challenges of our interconnected world. We know that the majority of
Africans agree and are raising their voices to set new destinies for
their countries, as we see in Nigeria. The bravery of the Sudanese
people in demanding a civilian-led government is another extraordinary
example. Across the continent we will reinvigorate our focus on human
rights, accountability, and good governance. President Biden has
declared the fight against corruption, especially the theft of public
assets for private gain, to be a core national security interest.
We see a direct correlation between African Governments that are
authoritarian and the incidence of internal conflict, displacement, and
migration. Many are contending with an active threat from the Islamic
State and other violent extremists like al-Shabaab in Somalia. Diverse
societies struggle to uphold inclusive and equitable power-sharing
arrangements. In collaboration with regional and international
partners, tailored U.S. diplomatic, development and security assistance
can play a critical role to support peace and security. This imperative
is driving our current intensive effort to urge all parties to the
conflict in Ethiopia to implement an immediate and unconditional
ceasefire that puts a halt to atrocities against civilians, to permit
the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to restore stability
through political dialogue.
Climate change also threatens stability. Desertification in the
Sahel disrupts farming and has displaced hundreds of thousands, and
reckless exploitation threatens the world's second largest rainforest
in the Congo Basin and the continent's wonderland of biological
diversity. It is in our mutual interests to work together on
environmental sustainability.
Africa is the fastest growing and the youngest continent. By 2050,
one in four persons in the world will be African. Workforce development
and job creation will be necessary to tap the ambitions of the youth
bulge. We are committed to expanding two-way trade and investment and
to advancing the regional goals of the African Continental Free Trade
Area. Among other strengths, the U.S. private sector offers innovative
American options for green energy and digital economies, as well as a
commitment to social responsibility.
All these priorities are now threatened by the devastating human
toll of COVID-19. Consistent with America's generous tradition of
investment in Africa's health systems, exemplified by the landmark
PEPFAR program, the White House has just announced the donation of 25
million COVID-19 vaccines for Africa. Earlier the President committed
the United States to providing 500 million Pfizer vaccine doses to
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, for distribution by COVAX to 92 low- and
lower middle-income countries and economies, and the African Union. The
Development Finance Corporation is also investing in vaccine production
in South Africa and Senegal. This pandemic highlights how our fates are
intertwined.
Mindful of the challenges at home and humble about the challenges
in Africa, our best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy
agenda that enlists African partners in building free market
democracies that offer liberty and prosperity and realize the
continent's full potential. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Minority Member,
with the Strategic Competition Act you have given us our marching
orders and new tools. If confirmed I commit that U.S. embassies in sub-
Saharan Africa will act to confront the Chinese challenge to the
international rules-based order.
Finally, and not least, if confirmed I promise to be a champion of
the people of the State Department's Africa bureau, to unleash their
full potential with a vigorous commitment to diversity and inclusion
and to cultivate the special esprit d'corps that has traditionally
defined the bureau.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Witkowsky?
STATEMENT OF ANNE A. WITKOWSKY, NOMINATED TO BE AN ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE (CONFLICT AND STABILIZATION OPERATIONS), AND
TO BE COORDINATOR FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Witkowsky. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and distinguished members of the committee. It is an
honor to appear before you today as President Biden's nominee
to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations, and Coordinator for Reconstruction
and Stabilization.
I am deeply grateful to President Biden and to Secretary
Blinken for the confidence they have placed in me for this
nomination.
I am joined here today by my husband, John, and our son
Jack, with our daughter Elizabeth watching remotely. I want to
underscore how much their love and support means to me, as well
as that of my mother, sister, and all family members.
Growing up in the Midwest, I am grateful my parents modeled
for me the values of public service. My father served in the
Army Corps of Engineers in World War II, and as the first
Chairman of the Illinois State Board of Education, while my
mother volunteered for many civic organizations.
I have by now had the opportunity to serve in the Executive
Branch across four administrations; within the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, and on the White House
National Security Council staff. While I have held positions
outside government as well, there has been no greater privilege
than to serve alongside the talented and dedicated men and
women in the national security community, in the civil service,
foreign service, the military services, law enforcement and
intelligence.
Throughout, I have learned the critical importance of
effectively using all U.S. national security tools, including
diplomacy, development and defense to support U.S. policy
priorities and advance U.S. interests and values.
From my experience pursuing conventional arms control in
Europe at the end of the Cold War, to advancing
counterterrorism policies and programs in the post-9/11 period,
to supporting the Department of Defense response to the Ebola
outbreak in West Africa, I have learned that the U.S.
Government is most effective when integrating our policies,
programs, and activities to work at common purpose. That is a
key lesson I intend to bring to my position as Assistant
Secretary, if confirmed.
The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, or
CSO, has a vital role to play in developing and carrying out
U.S. conflict prevention and stabilization policy and programs,
working in close cooperation with USAID and the Department of
Defense. Preventing conflict is hard, and outcomes can be tough
to measure. Yet, when we do not address instability at the
front end, too often we find ourselves having to address it in
different, more costly ways at the back end.
The strategic environment for the CSO mission is growing
more challenging. The number and duration of violent conflicts
is increasing. Democracy is backsliding for the 15th straight
year, and authoritarianism is on the rise. We see territory
controlled by governments being reduced, as non-state armed
actors gain ground.
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on populations
globally. The displacement of people is at a recorded high;
climate change, corruption, gender inequality, and the rapid
spread of disinformation pose additional underlying challenges.
Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on
strengthening the Bureau's contributions to the U.S.
Government's effectiveness in meeting these challenges.
Policies and best practices should be regularly adapted,
drawing from lessons learned. We will deepen and renew U.S.
partnerships on these issues, bilaterally and with multilateral
organizations, to advance common objectives. And we must work
collaboratively with civil society.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the
Members of this committee, including those who have been
instrumental in providing new tools to break the costly cycle
of conflict. Among those tools are the Global Fragility Act of
2019, and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention
Act of 2018, as well as the Women, Peace and Security Act of
2017, all bipartisan legislation.
CSO will exercise leadership, working with other State
Department bureaus and interagency partners, to advance their
implementation, together with the 2018 Stabilization Assistance
Review.
And as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work
of CSO can reinforce support for democratic values and human
rights at the heart of our foreign policy. That work must be
anchored in understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine
democracies and exploit instability, and the geostrategic
challenge of China's ambitions.
Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong
workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity,
equity, and inclusion.
Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO
Bureau, to advance American interests and values toward a more
peaceful and safer world.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Witkowsky follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anne A. Witkowsky
Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and
distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to appear before
you today as President Biden's nominee to serve as Assistant Secretary
of State for Conflict and Stabilization Operations and Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization. I am deeply grateful to President
Biden and to Secretary Blinken for the confidence they have placed in
me for this nomination.
I am joined here today by my husband, John and our son Jack, with
our daughter Elizabeth watching remotely. I want to underscore how much
their love and support means to me, as well as that of all my family
members. Growing up in the Midwest, I am grateful my parents modeled
for me the values of public service. My father served in the Army Corps
of Engineers in World War II and as the first chairman of the Illinois
State Board of Education, while my mother volunteered for many civic
organizations.
I have by now had the opportunity to serve in the Executive Branch
across four administrations, within the Department of Defense, the
Department of State, and on the White House National Security Council
staff. While I have held positions outside government as well, there
has been no greater privilege than to serve alongside the talented and
dedicated men and women in the national security community, in the
civil service, foreign service, the military services, law enforcement
and intelligence.
Throughout, I have learned the critical importance of effectively
using all U.S. national security tools--including diplomacy,
development and defense--to support U.S. policy priorities and advance
U.S. interests and values. From my experience pursuing conventional
arms control in Europe at the end of the Cold War, to advancing
counterterrorism policies and programs in the post 9/11 period, to
supporting the Department of Defense response to the Ebola outbreak in
West Africa, I have learned that the U.S. Government is most effective
when integrating our policies, programs, and activities to work at
common purpose. That is a key lesson I intend to bring to my position
as Assistant Secretary, if confirmed.
The Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (or CSO) has a
vital role to play in developing and carrying out U.S. conflict
prevention and stabilization policies and programs, working in close
cooperation with USAID and the Department of Defense. Preventing
violent conflict is hard, and outcomes can be tough to measure. Yet,
when we do not address instability at the front end, too often we find
ourselves having to address it in different, more costly ways at the
back end.
The strategic environment for the CSO mission is growing more
challenging. The number and duration of violent conflicts is
increasing. Democracy is backsliding for the 15th straight year, and
authoritarianism is on the rise. We see territory controlled by
governments being reduced, as non-state armed actors gain ground. The
COVID-19 pandemic has taken a toll on populations globally. The
displacement of people is at a recorded high. Climate change,
corruption, gender inequality, and the rapid spread of disinformation
pose additional underlying challenges.
Therefore, if confirmed, I will place priority on strengthening the
Bureau's contributions to the U.S. Government's effectiveness in
meeting these challenges. Policies and best practices should be
regularly adapted, drawing from lessons learned. We will deepen, and
renew, U.S. partnerships on these issues, bilaterally and with
multilateral organizations, to advance common objectives. And we must
work collaboratively with civil society.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the members of
this committee, including those who have been instrumental in providing
new tools to break the costly cycle of conflict. Among those tools are
the Global Fragility Act of 2019 and the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, as well as the Women, Peace and
Security Act of 2017, all bipartisan legislation. CSO will exercise
leadership, working with other State Department Bureaus and interagency
partners, to advance their implementation, together with the 2018
Stabilization Assistance Review.
And, as I consider our plans, we will identify how the work of CSO
can reinforce support for democratic values and human rights at the
heart of our foreign policy. That work must be anchored in
understanding how Russia's malign efforts undermine democracies and
exploit instability, and the geostrategic challenge of China's
ambitions.
Finally, I will be dedicated in full to building a strong
workforce, one that is committed to advancing diversity, equity, and
inclusion.
Thank you again for this opportunity to lead the CSO Bureau, to
advance American interests and values toward a more peaceful and safer
world. I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you all very much. So first
I have a series of questions on behalf of the committee as a
whole, and a simple yes or no to the question by each of you,
is what we request. These are questions that speak to the
importance that this committee places on responsiveness of all
officials in the executive branch and that we expect and will
be seeking from you.
So with a simple yes or no answer: Do you agree to appear
before this committee and make officials from your office
available to the committee and designated staff when invited?
Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
Dr. Donfried. Yes.
The Chairman. Ambassador?
Ambassador Phee. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Do you commit to keeping the committee fully and currently
informed about the activities under your purview?
Ambassador Phee. Yes.
Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
Dr. Donfried. Yes.
The Chairman. Did I hear a yes from you, Doctor?
Dr. Donfried. Yes.
The Chairman. Okay.
Do you commit to engaging in meaningful consultation while
policies are being developed? Not just providing notification
after the fact?
Ambassador Phee. Yes.
Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
Dr. Donfried. Yes.
The Chairman. And do you commit to promptly responding to
request for briefings and information requested by the
committee and its designated staff?
Ambassador Phee. Yes.
Ms. Adams-Allen. Yes.
Ms. Witkowsky. Yes.
Dr. Donfried. Yes.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you, all.
So we will start a round a five-minute questions. I will
start with myself. There is a lot of room, a lot of waterfront
to cover here with all four of you. So it will be difficult.
But let me start by focusing with you, Dr. Donfried, on a
series of issues that I am very much concerned about. Section
231 of CAATSA is a provision that imposes sanctions on entities
that conduct significant transactions with the Russian defense
and intelligence sectors. I help write that law. Do you agree
to section 231 of CAATSA has prevented significant funding from
going to the Russian defense and intelligence sectors? And do
you support its full implementation?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, it is such an honor to
appear before the committee, and I will turn to your question,
but I do not want to let this opportunity pass to thank you for
your support of GMF. And as you were giving your opening
comments earlier, I had a flashback to 2019 when you delivered
an important keynote speech about the importance of trans-
Atlantic relations on GMF stage in Brussels. And I just want to
thank you for not only your leadership of this committee, but
also being such an important public voice on these issues.
You mentioned your role on CAATSA, and I would absolutely
agree with you that that legislation has been important in
pushing back against Russian influence and countering its
malign activities. And if confirmed, I would, indeed, commit to
the full implementation of CAATSA.
The Chairman. Very good. Do you commit to regularly
engaging with me in efforts to ensure its full implementation?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez? If confirmed, I would look
forward to working closely with you on its full implementation.
The Chairman. Now what do you think about CAATSA sanctions
on Turkey unless Ankara gets rid of its Russian S-400 system?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I would say that we have
to keep sanctions on Turkey for as long as it has the S-400s.
The Chairman. All right. So, let me turn to a few other
things. The administration has yet to impose congressionally
mandated sanctions in response to the attempted murder of anti-
corruption activist, Alexei Navalny, as required under the
Chemical and Biological Weapons Act. These sanctions were due
on June the 2nd. I will note that they were pending since the
past administration and neither have yet acted on it.
If confirmed, will you commit to briefing us on why the
administration continues to ignore the law?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I find Russia's use of
chemical weapons chilling and shocking. And if confirmed, I
will follow the law and I will stand up to Russia's reckless
and aggressive behavior. And I will look forward to the
opportunity to consult with you in so doing.
The Chairman. Thank you. Now let me turn to the Eastern
Mediterranean. This is an increasingly important, I think, part
of the world, we passed the Eastern Mediterranean Security and
Partnership Act, which I think enhanced our relationships with
critical countries in the region: Greece, Cyprus, Israel, to
mention some, and creating a new paradigm in the Eastern
Mediterranean in both energy and security.
But we wake up today to see a statement by President
Erdogan of Turkey with reference to Cyprus saying that peace
talks on the future of ethnically-divided Cyprus can take place
only between two states, only between two states.
Now this is in violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 550 that called upon members to not recognize the
Government in the North, that calls for Varosha to come under
U.N. administration, and that considers any attempt to resettle
Varosha by other than its inhabitants, to be inadmissible.
And it further violates the U.N. Resolution 789, that
called for a significant reduction in foreign troops, that
calls for U.N. peacekeepers to be deployed to Varosha, and
called for a recommitment to the peace process.
Erdogan is violating all of the U.N. Security Council
Resolutions. He is in the north of Cyprus today instigating,
and creating a challenge to a country that is part of the
European Union. Now I will say that over several
administrations, we have been rather passive, from my view,
about this engagement. And all we see is Erdogan encroaching in
the exclusive economic zone of not only Cyprus, seeking to do
so with Greece.
It has played, in my view, a nefarious role in a variety of
things in the region. And unless we take an assertive role and
push back, we are going to find ourselves with a significant
challenge.
Now I would like to hear from you, if you were to be
confirmed, what role you would take, what position you would
take as it relates to these issues?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, thank you for your
engagement on the Eastern Med. It has made a real difference.
And I have been following the breaking news from Cyprus as I
entered this hearing room, and this latest announcement by the
Turkish Cypriot leader and by Turkish President Erdogan about
the Turkish Cypriots taking control over parts of Varosha is
exactly part of the narrative you are talking about.
This is a move that is clearly inconsistent with U.N.
Security Council Resolutions. I do not know if the U.S.
Government has yet issued a statement about this, but I am
certain this action will be condemned, and these actions are
provocative, they are destabilizing for the region, and they
are an impediment to any settlement for Cyprus, that will be on
the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.
And if I were to be confirmed, I would want to work closely
with you on this. In this particular case of Varosha I think
that we need to refer the situation to the U.N. Security
Council. We need to encourage the international community to
give a strong response to this action. We also need to work to
deescalate tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and I do
appreciate your engagement on this.
The Chairman. So I have your commitment that if you are
confirmed, this will be one of your priorities in your
portfolio?
Dr. Donfried. Yes, Chairman, it would.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I certainly
want to associate myself with those remarks regarding Erdogan
and his actions throughout the globe.
Ms. Donfried, I want to start with our relationship with
our friends in Europe, and particularly as it relates to both
of ours and Europe's relationship with China. One of the ways,
as we push back on the Chinese challenge, is it is going to
take a real partners to do that. No country is going to be able
to do it alone. If we put our population, Europe's population
together, we are still only about a third of what the Chinese
population is.
Because we have common and shared values with our European
allies, it is the most natural alliance there is to push back
against China. I authored a report on this, and I think others
have given speeches on it, and also done reports on it. What
are your thoughts on how we can work together with Europe to
push back on the challenges we are going to get from China?
Dr. Donfried. Ranking Member Risch, thank you for that
question. I have read your November 2020 Report and I would
commend it. The comprehensiveness and breadth of the view you
took on how the United States can work more closely with Europe
on these key challenges in the relationship with China, I think
in many ways is path-breaking.
And I would commit to you that I would look forward to
working with you on how we flesh out what you called a concrete
agenda for trans-Atlantic cooperation on China. I think there
is no better moment for us to be doing this because I think
Europe understands today much more than it has over the past
decade, the challenge China poses.
And when President Biden made the trip to Europe just last
month, at the G7, at the NATO Summit, at the U.S.-EU Summit, we
saw this commitment on the part of our allies to work with us
on the agenda. I think that we can put U.S. diplomatic muscle
to good effect here. Thank you.
Senator Risch. Well, I appreciate that. And I think we have
all got to commit ourselves to getting China to comply with
international norms, and rule of law, and enforcement of rule
of law. And if we do not, it is going to be a long 21st century
for all of us if we do not, if we do not do that.
Let us turn to Georgia for a minute. I and other members of
this committee, have been disappointed in what has been
happening in Georgia. Senator Shaheen and I were there when
they had their elections in October of 2012, which we thought
was a new dawn, and a new beginning. And after that we have
been regularly disappointed as to what happens there.
And they come to Washington, D.C., all the time, the
different parties, and each of them try to engage us and get us
to take sides in their political maneuvering, which every
country does. And we keep telling them that they have got to
resolve this themselves. We are not going to take sides in
this.
But they are not making much progress. You get to a point
where you wonder whether or not it is time to just reevaluate
where you are with this. What are your thoughts Georgia?
Dr. Donfried. Thank you, Ranking Member Risch. And I am
grateful to you and Senator Shaheen for that trip that you
made. And I also would point to the CODEL that Senator Shaheen
and Senator Portman took to Georgia quite recently, and I think
that broad bipartisan engagement is critical in the
relationship.
If confirmed, I would continue to push for the full and
prompt implementation of the agreement that was signed on April
19, and urge all parties in Georgia to support that agreement.
And I cannot underscore enough how important electoral reform
and judicial reform is for Georgia. As you well know, Georgia
has made substantial strides to strengthen its democracy, but
it has much more distance to travel, and I will press for them
to cover that distance.
At the same time, I would reaffirm U.S. support for
Georgia's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and continue
to support for Georgia's integration in the Euro-Atlantic
community, which is tied to the strength of Georgia's
democracy. And I would look forward to working with you on
these issues.
Senator Risch. Well, thank you. I certainly appreciate
those thoughts.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Coons?
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch. And thank you to our nominees today. And particularly to
your families who have supported you in your careers in Foreign
Service, so far.
Dr. Donfried, if I might? I want to associate myself with
the concerns raised by the chairman about Turkey's nefarious
role, both in Cyprus and in the region, and my concerns about
that. We will have a hearing about Turkey, I believe tomorrow,
where we will explore that more thoroughly. And the ranking
member raised concerns about China that I might well have just
echoed, but I would like to ask you specifically about the path
forward in U.S.-German relations.
President Biden just welcomed Chancellor Merkel to the
White House. We have long enjoyed a close and positive
relationship. There are upcoming elections. I think Germany is
one of the central powers in all of Europe. One of our core
allies, one of the most important nations in the world in terms
of sharing our values and an economy built on advanced
manufacturing.
What do you see as the future of U.S.-German relations, and
how does our work with them in Europe, around collective
security, and in the rest of the world, in terms of pushing
back on China, have positive and negative aspects? How do you
intend to navigate all this?
Dr. Donfried. Senator Coons, thank you very much for that
question. And I remember being at a site event at the Munich
Security Conference with you in Germany.
Senator Coons. Mm-hmm.
Dr. Donfried. And I am mindful of how very knowledgeable
you are about these issues as well. As you know, Germany is a
critical partner and ally of the United States. It is, of
course, the largest and wealthiest member of the European
Union. And we just saw Chancellor Merkel visit President Biden
last week, where the discussion based on the press conference,
seemed to cover many of the issues you just referred to.
There is an election in Germany on September 26th, so as we
saw last week, in many ways, this was a farewell visit by
Angela Merkel as Chancellor after 16 years in office. So we are
all expecting change in this relationship. It may well be that
her party, the center-right party, maintains the chancellery,
but the coalition is likely to look different.
And that will matter for German policy, particularly with
regard to countries like China and Russia, where if you had the
Greens in coalition, I think you would see a greater
sensitivity to the human rights violations that we see those
countries make. So I think it is an exciting moment for the
relationship with Germany. While on the one hand we can
celebrate what has been, I think there will be opportunities
for the U.S. Government to forge and deepen cooperation on
issues like China. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you. And I am looking forward,
hopefully, to participating in the Munich Security Conference
again with the leadership of this committee and many other
colleagues.
Ambassador Phee, if I might? Great to see you again, since
we last visited in Juba in 2017. Congratulations on your
nomination.
There is so much to discuss across the Continent. Let me
just bear down on a few things quickly, if I might. Since my
visit to Ethiopia a few months ago, on behalf of our President,
the situation in Tigray, and the U.S. bilateral relationship
with Ethiopia, has deteriorated significantly.
Could you just, briefly, outline your plans to make
progress in opening up humanitarian relief, making progress
towards a ceasefire and then, God willing, peace and some
reconciliation in Tigray? And what do you think might be the
path towards accountability for those who have committed human
rights violations, and for possibly rebuilding the U.S.-
Ethiopia relationship on the other side of this, if possible?
Ambassador Phee. Thank you, Senator. And it is an honor and
a privilege for me to see you again, in this environment.
I want to thank you and other members of the committee,
including Ranking Member Risch who introduced a resolution on
Ethiopia, for the efforts you have made to make clear, U.S.
concerns about the situation that has resulted from the
conflict in Tigray.
Your efforts have been instrumental in making sure that all
parties to the conflict understand that the United States
urgently seeks an immediate end to hostilities, unconditional
humanitarian access, accountability for atrocities, and a new
course to achieve the political and economic reforms sought by
the Ethiopian people.
And if confirmed, I am committed to using all available
tools in partnership with this committee to achieve those
critical objectives, and to working with you to help Ethiopia
get back on track.
The Prime Minister started his premiership with a positive
direction, with important rhetoric that was responsive to the
desire of the Ethiopian people for economic and political
reforms.
That initial positive start has gone badly off track, and
it is in our interest to work across the political spectrum in
Ethiopia to get it back on track, both for the immediate
concern for the civilians who are suffering, but also so that
Ethiopia can regain its leadership role in the Horn. Thank you.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador.
Mr. Chairman, could I continue, or should I have a number
of additional questions? I did not know if you were doing a
second round or not.
The Chairman. Did you say you have a hundred additional
questions?
Senator Coons. A few.
The Chairman. Oh, a few.
Senator Coons. A very few.
The Chairman. Because I have at least a hundred.
Senator Coons. Maybe two.
The Chairman. Actually, happy to let you go on.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
forbearance.
If I might, Ms. Witkowsky; the Global Fragility Act is a, I
think, promising new tool. There are many areas of fragility,
Ambassador Phee and I might have gone on at greater length if
we had the opportunity about the Sahel, and about Mozambique,
and other places where there are significant conflicts.
The CSO Bureau has an important role to play in the
implementation of the Global Fragility Act that Senator Graham
and I wrote and was signed into law last December. And it tries
to come up with strategies that will prevent instability. Can
you just briefly share your vision for how you will employ this
new tool?
Ms. Witkowsky. Senator Coons, thank you very much. And
thank you so much for your leadership on this important issue,
and for providing the opportunity of this new tool to the U.S.
Government, to move forward on the complex and difficult
challenges of addressing fragility.
The Global Fragility Act maps an important new way of doing
business on fragility, with its ten-year commitments, its
emphasis on solutions being locally led, and its requirements
for tighter integration among bureaus, agencies, the field, and
Washington.
If confirmed, I see that CSO will play a leadership role in
the day-to-day implementation, of the Global Fragility Act
implementation, one of coordination, and working with all
relevant agencies who are participating in moving forward to
implement the Act and supporting our embassies, working with
civil society. And that process will amass to the higher-level
process that you have mandated under the Steering Committee in
the Act.
I look forward to drawing in my many years of leading large
agency and interagency efforts to move forward successfully
with its implementation. And I can assure you that implementing
the Global Fidelity Act will be a high priority for me.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Ms. Witkowsky.
My last question for Ms. Adams-Allen; you have been
involved in the Inter-American Foundation. Ambassador Phee will
be on the Board of the Africa Development Foundation, both of
them relatively small, agile responsive. One of my real
concerns is about increasing localization and flexibility of
our assistance programs.
I just visited Guatemala, and had a chance to visit a
shelter for trafficked children, a site that I know Samantha
Power, the Administrator, also visited. I am really concerned
about the lack of credible partners for us to work with in a
number of the countries, in Central America, and in other
places in the world.
What is your strategy for increasing the localization of
assistance programs so that we are not solely reliant on
government partners? And what would you think about piloting
that in Central America, where I think we are genuinely
constrained in terms of the quality of the government partners
we have available to do robust development projects with?
Ms. Adams-Allen. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
could not agree more about the need to localize U.S. foreign
assistance and make sure that it is sustainable and it is
really locally owned. As you mentioned, this is precisely what
The American Foundation does, and it is my contention that
there are actually numerous potential local partners across the
world.
But I know particularly in Central America that USAID could
tap into a pipeline of existing, vetted, tested local partners
who are working on issues of livelihoods, crime prevention,
peace building, and governance in the affected communities.
In terms of a strategy, you know, if confirmed, I think it
will be important for USAID to build on existing efforts, not
only looking at the model of the USADF, OIF, but also building
on the new Partner's Initiative and the Local Works program
that they have been testing at USAID.
I think it is going to be crucial to streamline the
procurement processes at USAID so that small local
organizations can have access to partnership potentials with
USAID.
Third, I think it is going to be crucial to strengthen the
capabilities within USAID, in particular, the technical staff,
and the contracting staff who are the ones we are going to need
to support local organizations.
Senator Coons. Thank you very much. Thank you to the panel.
Thank you for your forbearance, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen?
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Risch. Congratulations to all of you on your nominations.
Dr. Donfried, it is good to see you, it was good to catch
up with you a little bit the other day. You know, one of the
key responsibilities I think of this portfolio you have will be
to work with our European partners to counter China's use of
unfair economic policies, and trade policies, to establish a
set of agreed-upon rules of the road. And I know that it is
going to be part of what you are focused on.
I want to also associate myself with the comments the
chairman made regarding CAATSA, and the importance of fully
enforcing CAATSA, and making sure that, you know, Turkey
continues to see those sanctions applied because of the
purchase of the S-400s.
I heard in your response to Chairman Menendez, a reference
to Erdogan's, President Erdogan's visit to Cyprus today, which
of course is the anniversary of the illegal Turkish invasion of
Cyprus. And he is taking some very provocative steps, including
talking about resettling parts of the Varosha, which would be a
gross violation of numerous United Nations Security
Resolutions, and U.S. policy statements with respect to not
changing the status quo, except for through a negotiated
settlement.
Senator Menendez and I, and Senator Rubio, and others, sent
a letter to the President Biden last week on this issue. It has
now come to pass. So in addition to just making strong
statements condemning the action, I think it is important that
we work with our European allies in the EU to look at other
sanctions that can be imposed for the violation of law here,
rule of law.
President Biden has sort of recentered U.S. policy on rule
of law. So do you agree that it is important to stand firm,
together with our partners in the EU, on this violation?
Dr. Donfried. Senator Van Hollen, thank you for taking the
time last week to meet with me. I appreciated that. And to your
question, yes, I do agree we should work closely with the
European Union, with our European allies on how we pushed back
against this. I think we will be stronger for doing so.
And I also look forward to working closely with you and
with the chairman, if confirmed, on these critical issues
around stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. We are going to be
having a hearing. I know that the chairman has organized a
hearing tomorrow on Turkey specifically. So I will have a
greater chance to talk about that. But we just see this series
of very provocative moves in Cyprus, in the Eastern
Mediterranean, also walking away from the parameters of a
bizonal Federation that had defined the talks for peace in
Cyprus.
Ambassador Phee, if I could? You have a huge portfolio. I
look forward to working with you on all the issues including
trying to really increase U.S. investment in Africa. My
question relates specifically to Sudan. Senator Coons and I
visited Sudan, I think back in May now, and Sudan, of course,
is one of those countries where in a world where we see
retrenchment, and people moving in the wrong direction, i.e.
issues of democracy and rule of law, Sudan is a bright spot.
And I know you agree that we should do everything we can to
support their transition from dictatorship to democracy. At the
end of June, Prime Minister Hamdok gave a very important
speech. And one of the things he focused on was the importance,
the urgent importance of consolidating the military, which
consists, as you know, of various militia, including the RSF,
under a unified command, and that command be under civilian
control.
The U.S. continues to have a law in place based on the
Bashir Government coup decades ago that limits our ability to
engage with the armed forces through security systems.
Would you agree that we should look at ways of changing
that? Given the fact that we now have seen a peaceful
revolution and where the United States could play, I think, a
constructive role, carefully, but a constructive role in
helping Sudan, integrate and consolidate its military under
unified command under civilian control?
Ambassador Phee. Senator, it is an honor and pleasure to
see you again. And I thank you for your leadership of the
Africa Subcommittee. And I thank you for your efforts, such as
the recent trip that you took with Senator Coons.
You have perfectly captured, I think, this critical moment
in the Sudanese transition. The Senate has already played such
a vital role in supporting the transition by giving us the
tools, helping to dismantle. As you note, some of the
architecture that was put in place during the Bashir regime.
And if confirmed, I absolutely commit to review the important
option you have suggested here today, about how we might work
more effectively with the security forces.
In tandem with the Prime Minister's announcement, there
were also statements made by the military leadership about the
importance of working together. So there are real opportunities
for us to continue to support this very critical transition,
which will have such a transformative impact on the Continent.
Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, thank you. I look forward to
working with you. And while it has taken a long time, I know
AID is finally finalizing its $700 million commitment. So the
committee looks forward to working with you as that moves
forward as well.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. All right. There are presently no other
members seeking recognition. But there is one member on their
way here, so I have a few extra questions, so I am just going
to pursue them now.
Let me go back to you, Dr. Donfried. You have a very large
universe to cover. Earlier this year the Biden administration
recognized the Armenian genocide. Do you support the
administration's decision to recognize the Armenian genocide?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I do. And I would like to
thank you for your leadership on that issue. You have been a
long-time champion of the U.S. Government officially
recognizing the Armenian genocide. And I think it puts the
United States in a very good place to be on the right side of
history on this issue.
The Chairman. There is another issue in the region that is
a little more complicated--well, that it took a long time for
us to recognize the genocide, but I am glad. And I give credit
to President Biden for doing so.
But given Azerbaijan's aggression last August in Nagorno-
Karabakh war, the administration continued the use of waivers
for Section 907 restrictions. I have to be honest with you, and
based on the declared meaning of Section 907 as I read it I am
not quite sure--it was quite a stretch, to go ahead and waive.
What are your views on that?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, if I am confirmed, I would
look forward to working closely with you on that issue, of the
waivers for that assistance to Azerbaijan. I think it is
critical that we make sure that any support we are giving to
Azerbaijan is not in any way affecting the balance of power
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that we are committed to
resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Chairman. No, I appreciate that. The Azerbaijanis are
now interfering in the physical territory of Armenia, and a
border issue. And it just seems to me they will continue to be
aggressive unless they have a clear message that it is not
acceptable.
I understand that you have had the chance to review the
Ukraine Security Partnership Act. Do you support the
legislation which would give increased security assistance to
the country?
Dr. Donfried. I am grateful for the broad and bipartisan
support there is on this committee for U.S. support for
Ukraine. And I would read with great interest, the Act, which
has many interesting and important ideas captured in it. And if
confirmed, I would very much look forward to working with you
on how we can increase our support for Ukraine.
The Chairman. Finally, last week the British Government
proposed halting all prosecution of British soldiers and
militants involved in three decades of conflict in Northern
Ireland, which sparked an angry response from victims'
families, and politicians in Belfast and Dublin. The Stormont
House Agreement provides a framework to deal with legacy issues
from the troubles. Do you support the implementation of the
Stormont House Agreement as a way to deal with legacy issues?
Dr. Donfried. Chairman Menendez, I mentioned earlier that I
spent 10 years at the Congressional Research Service, and one
of the issues, I spent a great deal of time on then, was
Northern Ireland. And it was a bright time because actually we
saw the peace process move forward, and that Stormont House
Agreement, or the Good Friday Agreement, I think has to be the
basis for U.S. policy toward the Island of Ireland to maintain
peace there. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ambassador Phee, let me ask you. The situation in Tigray
and across Ethiopia is rather bleak. The Ethiopian Government's
unilateral cease fire does not appear to be getting much
traction, and worryingly, it appears to me that we may be
entering a new phase of the conflict characterized by the
mobilization of ethnic militia, and even more mass atrocities.
What more can the United States do to get the parties, to
reach a negotiated ceasefire? If you were to be confirmed, what
advice would you be giving?
Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, thank you for raising
this very disturbing issue, which poses such a threat to the
civilians of Ethiopia, and to this stability of the Horn. If
confirmed, I would enthusiastically endorse the efforts of our
Special Envoy, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, who is working right
now to mobilize the support of partner nations in Africa, of
the partner nations in the Gulf who are engaged in Ethiopia,
our partners in Europe, and our partners in the United Nations.
This problem requires all of us pulling together to help
Ethiopia stop the current fighting, to stop the spread that you
have correctly identified as a genuine threat, and to work on a
national dialogue, to address the political and economic
performance that are so desperately needed.
The Chairman. Yeah. And I think we have to look at, if the
type of atrocities that are being reported are such, I think we
have to look about what other consequences for such atrocities.
If we look away then, you know, at the end of the day, others
in other parts of the world will do it.
Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, I fully agree with that
sentiment. We have, as you know, a longstanding and
multifaceted partnership with Ethiopia, and there are options
for us to act in that direction if it becomes necessary. And if
confirmed, I would commit to pursuing those options to make
clear, just as you have said, that this kind of action is
unacceptable.
The Chairman. Let me turn to the situation of the Sahel,
which continues to be deeply concerning, with violence in the
region fueling what U.N. agencies deemed the world's ``fastest-
growing displacement crisis''. As you may know, I am the lead
sponsor of S615, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
Program Act, which calls for a whole-of-government strategy for
the Sahel.
Do I have your commitment, if you are confirmed, to develop
a strategic approach to the Sahel?
Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, you absolutely do. If
confirmed, I would address the concerns that are outlined in
your legislation, and I would do our best to pull together all
the elements of the U.S. Government capability to help support
a better outcome in the Sahel.
The Chairman. Thank you. Now, Sudan's civilian-led
transition to democracy is in a critical phase of the
transitional government led by Prime Minister Hamdok, has
initiated laudable reforms over the last two years, but there
are several intractable problems that need to be addressed.
What in your view are the major obstacles to democratic
transition and stability in Sudan?
Ambassador Phee. Chairman Menendez, in my view, the main
obstacle to the transition in Sudan is helping the military
understand that there is a new way of governance in the
country, and that it is time for the civilians to remain at the
forefront. That is the most important challenge we face, and it
is incumbent upon us to do all we can to help them realize that
transition.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Risch?
Senator Risch. Briefly. Ambassador Phee, I wanted to talk
about this one detail that Senator Van Hollen mentioned. And it
prodded me into thinking about it some more. And that is,
regarding the $700 million that has been provided for Sudan as
a result of the legal peace settlement, what are your thoughts
on how the U.S. should use that amount?
Ambassador Phee. Ranking Member Risch, I understand that we
should use that money exactly for the purposes for which you
appropriated it, which is to help consolidate support for the
transition to help provide economic sustainability in Sudan, so
that there is popular support for this transition to continue.
I understand there is frustration in the pace of disbursement,
and if confirmed, I would undertake to immediately look at that
issue.
Senator Risch. Yeah. Frustration would be an
understatement. The mechanics that are in place, are you
familiar with those or?
Ambassador Phee. No, sir. I am not as familiar as I should
be.
Senator Risch. I might do that as an additional question
for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well thank you.
Senator Risch. I do not want our other two nominees to
think I have no affection for your work. I do. And I will be
submitting a series of questions for the record. For that fact,
there will be a series of questions to all of the nominees from
me, and I am sure from other members.
The Chairman. I would urge you to answer them fully and
expeditiously so that the committee can consider your
nominations at a business meeting.
With no other members before the committee, this hearing
will be adjourned. The record will remain open until the close
of business tomorrow, which, questions for the record will be
submitted.
And with thanks to the committee, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator Robert Menendez
Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI)
Question. Last July, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report depicting extensive demographic data demonstrating the
serious challenges the Agency faces when it comes to building a diverse
workforce. The GAO concluded ``mixed progress'' in the Agency's efforts
to increase diversity, and presented a number of troubling findings,
including numerous barriers to promotion for racial and ethnic
minorities in early- or mid-career Civil Service positions.
Will you commit to prioritizing actions to address these problems?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to prioritizing actions to
address these problems.
Question. Please describe what actions you believe USAID should
prioritize to realize and advance the goals of USAID's Diversity,
Equity, and Inclusion initiative?
Answer. Ensuring USAID remains the world's leading development
agency requires the Agency center the principles of diversity, equity,
and inclusion in everything it does--reflecting them in its people,
it's workplace culture, policies and practices, and funding and program
approaches. If confirmed, I will make diversity, equity, and inclusion
foundational priorities for both our mission around the world and how
we support and invest in our workforce. The report you referenced, for
example, presented data demonstrating that ``promotion outcomes at
USAID were generally lower for racial and ethnic minorities than for
whites in early to mid career.'' If confirmed, I will engage staff
across the agency to understand the challenges facing them as they seek
to advance in their USAID careers, solicit their advice on how to
create more internal ladders and equitable opportunities for
professional development and promotion, and treat these issues with the
urgency they demand. I understand that one of Administrator Power's
first acts at the Agency was to approve the new DEI Strategy, affirming
her commitment to integrate diversity, equity, and inclusion throughout
the Agency's work with a workforce that reflects the diversity of our
country. If confirmed, I commit to implementing this Strategy,
including by ensuring that staff's perspectives and experiences are
reflected in USAID's plans for recruiting, retaining, and investing in
a workforce that reflects the rich diversity of our country.
Question. That same GAO report indicated significant understaffing
in USAID's Office of Civil Rights and Diversity, a deficiency that
reduces USAID's capacity to respond effectively to allegations of
discrimination, identify potential barriers to equal employment
opportunity, and submit required reports on diversity and inclusion
efforts.
Will you commit to ensuring that this Office is adequately staffed
and empowered to responsibly execute its mission?
Answer. Answer: Yes, if confirmed, I will immediately review
staffing and resource needs for USAID's Office of Civil Rights and
Diversity (OCRD) and commit to enhancing its ability to deliver its
mandate. I understand the Agency increased OCRD's operating budget from
less than $400,000 in FY 2017 to $2,723,000 in FY 2021, exclusive of
salaries and benefits, while doubling OCRD's staff allocation from 13
to 25 in FY 2020. In addition, I understand that OCRD's Acting Director
has a regular channel through which to engage with USAID's senior
management to discuss EEO Program matters, should OCRD have additional
needs or seek additional resources in the future. If confirmed, I will
ensure that OCRD has the resources and the access needed to address
concerns about discrimination and to advance the Agency's diversity,
equity, and inclusion goals.
Question. How will you approach restoring expertise and recruiting
new talent?
Answer. Attracting and retaining purpose-driven development
professionals with deep technical expertise and broad programmatic and
management experience is key to the Agency delivering on its mission,
and doing so nimbly and effectively in increasingly complicated
settings. Rebuilding the Agency's workforce must include examining what
the practice of development will look like 10-15 years from now, and
identifying and recruiting talent to position the agency for the
future. If confirmed, I commit to leading a thoughtful, forward-looking
workforce planning effort.
Tapping into needed new talent demands that USAID expand its
recruitment pipelines beyond traditional sources, to include U.S.
community colleges, minority serving institutions, and professional
organizations. I understand that USAID is currently engaging and
recruiting diverse high-quality talent through targeted outreach and
recruitment events and expanded partnerships with organizations serving
underrepresented groups. If confirmed, I will focus on expanding the
Agency's external recruitment pipelines so as to bolster its staffing
overall, as well as prioritizing the retention and promotion of
underrepresented groups as part of a broader effort to fill gaps in
expertise by tapping into internal talent pools.
Question. USAID's greatest asset are the international development
and humanitarian experts on staff.
How will you establish a culture where the Agency's actions are
based on the insights and talents of its experts?
Answer. USAID cannot accomplish any of its national security and
development priorities without the top-notch development professionals
who everyday tackle global development and humanitarian challenges with
passion, integrity, and skill, so as to empower partners (communities,
governments, local and international organizations) as they build a
better world for all of us. I experienced this commitment and expertise
firsthand in my time at the Agency and now in my current role at the
Inter-American Foundation. Building a culture that draws on and
leverages the expertise and experience of development and humanitarian
professionals requires that leaders look to the experts and seek out
their input into and leadership on policy, programming, and operational
considerations.
Throughout my career, I have created and led diverse, purpose-
driven teams; fostered open, inclusive, and transparent workplaces; and
empowered staff by removing obstacles to growth and success, while
relying on their expertise and championing their creativity and know-
how. If confirmed, I will continue that approach and work to empower
USAID staff by always seeking their input, promoting their leadership,
and unlocking the support and resources they need to thrive.
Question. Workforce planning is essential to ensuring USAID has
expertise and capacities to successfully execute the Agency's wide
range of activities and achieve results that often require years of
work and engagement.
Will you commit to advising each Bureau in developing a workforce
plan for its programs and missions?
Answer. Yes. I agree that comprehensive workforce planning is
essential to ensuring that USAID has the expertise and capacities
required to address the increasing global needs and manage increasingly
complex programs in more than 100 countries. If confirmed, I commit to
working with USAID's office of Human Capital and Talent Management,
Bureaus, and Missions, to conduct comprehensive strategic workforce
planning that positions the Agency to meet the needs of the moment, as
well as adapt to future challenges and opportunities. This effort must
include analyzing the Agency's current workforce, identifying skills
gaps, anticipating future staffing and expertise needs, and developing
and implementing an Action Plan to secure and support the range of
expertise (policy, technical, operational, and management) needed to
ensure the Agency's continued success. I look forward to working with
you to support that strategy, if confirmed.
Question. What do you think USAID can do to improve FSNs' standing
within USAID and ensure these hardworking professionals are afforded
ample opportunities for professional growth, promotion, and recognition
for their work?
Answer. Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), which constitute nearly
half of USAID's global workforce, are an integral part of achieving the
Agency's mission. They are a critical link to cultivating and
maintaining trust and strong relationships with local communities,
which is the foundation for successful development and humanitarian
assistance. I understand that USAID is currently working on various
initiatives designed to enhance recognition for the value that FSNs
bring to the Agency, and to enhance morale among this critical part of
the workforce. Specifically, USAID is working to promote leadership
opportunities for FSNs at all levels; increase virtual FSN fellowship
programs; increase the number of senior-level FSN-13 positions; expand
professional development and training opportunities; and expand the use
of ladder positions within the FSN workforce to enhance career
development. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID leadership in
Washington and its overseas Missions to further advance initiatives
that will afford FSNs with opportunities for inclusion, professional
growth, promotion, and recognition for their contributions to the
Agency.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator James E. Risch
China and COVAX
Question. Global health is one of the largest parts of USAID's
annual budget and, in 2021, the agency received significant additional
resources to support U.S. international COVID-19 relief efforts.
Importantly, USAID also is responsible for managing U.S. engagement
with COVAX, the vaccines pillar of the WHO-supported Access to COVID-19
Tools (ACT). Unfortunately, while the United States has made $4 billion
(as well as 580 million vaccine doses) available to COVAX, China has
contributed nothing. Worse yet, China now stands to profit from a
pandemic that it unleashed upon the world through the sale of its
state-owned vaccines to COVAX.
If confirmed, how will you ensure U.S. contributions to COVAX will
not be used to underwrite or subsidize the purchase and
distribution of China's state-owned, substandard COVID-19
vaccines?
If confirmed, will you prioritize resources for bilateral, in-kind
contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to
COVAX? If not, why not?
Answer. I understand that funds from the generous $4 billion U.S.
contribution to Gavi in support of COVAX were not used to purchase
vaccines made by Chinese companies. These funds were allocated by Gavi
prior to the facility's decision to purchase Sinopharm and Sinovac
vaccines. I also understand that there are no further contributions of
U.S. funds to COVAX planned at this time. If confirmed, I will work to
ensure that the U.S. continues to signal concern about procurement of
lower-efficacy vaccines, and urges China to pick up its fair share of
the global burden on vaccine access rather than simply profiting off of
other donors' generosity.
I understand that the decision on when to use bilateral, in-kind
contributions of U.S. vaccines over financial contributions to COVAX
was based on multiple factors including global and domestic vaccine
supply variables. If confirmed, I will work with my interagency
colleagues to review the current facts, supply projections and needs in
order to continue to advance global COVID vaccine availability as fast
and safely as possible.
U.S. International Food Aid and Cargo Preference
Question. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has released a
memo which, among other things, directs the new OMB Made in America
Office to ``review how best to ensure agency compliance with cargo
preference requirements to maximize the utilization of U.S.-flag
vessels, in excess of any applicable statutory minimum, to the greatest
extent practicable.'' This is likely to increase pressure upon USAID to
exceed existing cargo preference requirements for food aid under the
Food for Peace Act, notwithstanding the fact that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) repeatedly has found that such requirements
significantly increase the cost of food aid while failing to advance
the statutory purpose of the Cargo Preference Act of 1954.
Do you agree that U.S. cargo preference requirements for food aid
have outlived their statutory purpose?
If confirmed, will you work with OMB to mitigate the deleterious
impact of U.S. cargo preference requirements on life-saving
food aid?
In your estimation, how would an increase of cargo preference
requirements impact USAID's budget and ability to meet historic
levels of need for food aid?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and the
interagency, including OMB, to make USAID's food assistance programming
as effective and efficient as possible. Each food assistance modality
(U.S. in-kind food, locally and regionally procured food, and cash-
based programming) is critical to USAID's ability to appropriately
respond to unprecedented global humanitarian needs. An increase in
cargo preference requirements would directly result in increased
transportation costs for food assistance programs, which would reduce
the amount of resources USAID can dedicate to purchasing agricultural
commodities to respond to historic levels of global hunger.
Material Support
Question. The United States has strict laws prohibiting the
provision of material support to designated foreign terrorist groups.
If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that USAID and its
implementing partners strictly adhere to all relevant material
support laws, regulations, policy directives, and vetting
requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to working with USAID staff and
partners to ensure compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
I understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring
safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an
independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to
supporting if I am confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, what measures will you seek to put in place
to ensure not only that all contracts and agreements contain the
required material support clauses, but also that adherence is closely
monitored and transparently reported to Congress by USAID?
Answer. I am committed to ensuring that USAID funding does not fall
into the wrong hands, whether it be terrorism, fraud, or waste. I
understand that USAID has numerous vetting tools and monitoring
safeguards, financial accountability mechanisms, as well as an
independent Office of Inspector General, whose work I am committed to
supporting if I am confirmed.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the
Department of Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department
of State to eliminate ambiguity and ensure that USAID's implementing
partners, including USAID's humanitarian assistance partners, have
clear guidance on what constitutes material support, how to identify
intentional and incidental breaches, and how to respond?
Answer. Understanding that USAID does not administer U.S. sanctions
programs, if confirmed, I do commit to working with the Department of
Justice, the Department of Treasury, and the Department of State to
ensure that all implementing partners, including those who support
humanitarian programs in some of the most challenging operating
environments in the world, have clear guidance about applicable
sanctions.
USAID Staffing
Question. Whether Foreign Service, Civil Service, Foreign Service
Limited, Foreign Service National, or other, USAID's most valuable
asset is its people. Unfortunately, with at least 22 different hiring
mechanisms and outdated assumptions about how specific missions,
bureaus, and offices should be supported, the agency is in desperate
need of a modernized strategic staffing plan that is flexible and
adaptive to today's challenges. The budget request includes an increase
for USAID's operating expenses and proposes to increase the number of
Foreign Service Limited positions, including for global health and
humanitarian assistance.
If confirmed, how will you approach modernizing USAID's arcane
staffing mechanisms?
Should an increase in resources for additional direct-hire
positions be paired with a decrease in the number of
contractors USAID retains using program funds? If not, why not?
If the requested increase for direct-hire positions is approved,
how will positions be prioritized? Should the recruitment,
hiring, and deployment of competent, field-based contracting
and agreement officers (COs and AOs) be a priority?
Answer. I understand that USAID is committed to strengthening its
global workforce to advance the Agency's mission and U.S. national
security priorities. In my experience, USAID has complex requirements
and needs to increase both the size and agility of the career workforce
while also improving non-career employment mechanisms.
As the administrator stated in her recent testimony before the
committee, USAID's staffing has not increased at the same rate as the
programmatic needs and requirements. With regard to USAID's Contracting
and Agreement Offices, she noted in her testimony that each USAID
acquisition and assistance officer has managed over $65 million
annually over the past four years: more than four times the workload of
their colleagues at the Department of Defense who manage an average of
approximately $15 million. I will work to rationalize non-career hiring
mechanisms and strategically grow the Civil Service and Foreign
Service, while building the overall cohesiveness of the Agency's
workforce. If confirmed, I look forward to updating you on the Agency's
progress in this area.
USAID Budget Allocations
Question. Section 653(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2413) requires that ``not later than thirty days after the
enactment of any law appropriating funds to carry out any provision of
this Act (other than section 451 or 637) or the Arms Export Control
Act, the President shall notify the Congress of each foreign country
and international organization to which the United States Government
intends to provide any portion of the funds under such law and of the
amount of funds under that law, by category of assistance, that the
United States Government intends to provide to each.'' Unfortunately,
delays in the appropriations process, the imposition of overlapping
spending directives, and other factors relating to the relationship
between OMB, the Department of State, USAID, and the Congress have
contributed to excessive delays in submission of the mandated 653(a)
Report. Moreover, it has become common practice for the relevant
agencies to consult only with the committees of Appropriations--rather
than with the authorizing committees responsible for oversight of the
Foreign Assistance Act--in finalizing such report.
In your view, what are the chief constraints to delivering the
653(a) report in a timely fashion? How can the process be
fixed?
If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Committees on
Foreign Relations in the Senate and Foreign Affairs in the
House on the development and execution of the 653(a) report in
an open and transparent manner?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to working in an open and
transparent manner with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee on the 653(a) report. As you note,
while Section 653(a) of the FAA requires that the report be submitted
within 30 days of enactment, I understand that has not been possible in
years past. If confirmed, I commit to working within the Agency and
with interagency stakeholders to improve the timelines for the
submission of the 653(a) report.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Paloma Adams-Allen by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
USAID Transformation
Question. The Trump administration had submitted proposals to
Congress under its Transformation initiative to make changes to the
Bureau for Management and create a Bureau for Policy, Resources, and
Planning (PRP). PRP would have combined the functions of the Bureau for
Policy, Planning and Learning and the Office of Budget and Resource
Management (among others). Congress did not approve such changes and
the Biden administration withdrew the proposed changes in May, 2021.
Prior to the withdrawal, some international stakeholders had
recommended that the Biden administration complete the proposed
changes, in particular realizing the PRP Bureau.
How do you respond to those who advocated for the completion of
USAID's organizational restructuring?
In your view, do additional structural changes need to be made to
USAID's central bureaus and/or independent offices? If so, what
challenges would those changes seek to address?
Answer. I understand that USAID successfully completed the majority
of its restructuring efforts, co-locating vital capabilities related to
humanitarian assistance; food security and water; and the Agency's
technical assistance to the field. I also understand that USAID's staff
were heavily involved in the prior organizational restructuring and so
any further changes need to be thoughtfully considered. If confirmed, I
will engage with the administrator, my co-deputy, and the Agency's
internal and external stakeholders, to assess the need for any further
change to USAID's organizational structure.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Karen Donfried by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Will you commit to providing vital humanitarian
assistance to the people Nagorno-Karabakh including supporting the
clearance of unexplored ordnance?
Answer. From the onset of last years fighting between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, the United States has worked
to meet urgent humanitarian assistance needs for vulnerable populations
fleeing the violence and the communities that host them. If confirmed,
I will support the provision of humanitarian assistance to areas
affected by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. I understand the Department
continues to work with other relevant agencies to evaluate the needs of
the region and explore opportunities to fund possible programs to clear
post-conflict unexploded ordnance in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
Question. I do not support the administrations decision to waive
sanctions on Nord Stream 2. I think it was a mistake that will only
bolster Russias position in Europe. The measures announced last week
when the German Chancellor visited Washington fall well short of what
is needed to support Ukraine right now.
What specific further measures do you think the U.S. should take to
bolster Ukrainian security and energy transit in the wake of
the administration's decision to waive sanctions on Nord Stream
2?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the administration's policy
of supporting Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial
integrity against Russian aggression in any form. I commit to providing
the assistance Ukraine requires to defend itself, including lethal
weapons, based on a U.S. and Ukrainian assessment of Ukraines defense
requirements. On energy security, I believe an extension to Ukraines
gas transit agreement with Russia will help to preserve gas transit
revenues for Ukraine and provide time for Ukraine to eliminate its
dependence on Russian gas and transit fees, as it has long sought to
do. Ukraine should also diversify its energy resources, with an
emphasis on clean and sustainable energy.
Question. The Belarusian opposition leader is in Washington this
week. The U.S. has yet to announce long overdue sectoral sanctions.
If confirmed, do you commit to advocate for the imposition of these
sanctions?
Answer. If confirmed, I commit to advocate for additional measures,
including sanctions, to apply continued pressure to the Lukashenka
regime to release all political prisoners and start a facilitated
dialogue, inclusive of the opposition and civil society, that will lead
to free and fair elections.
Question. Will you also commit to ensure that the administration
produces a new Executive Order on Belarus that would authorize new
sanctions?
Answer. In the May 28 White House statement following the forced
diversion of the RyanAir flight, the U.S. Government previewed the
Treasury Departments development of a new draft executive order
designed to increase pressure on the Lukashenka regime. If confirmed, I
will support these efforts.
Question. How does the Biden administration's public commitment to
counter corruption correspond with the U.S.-led effort to push for an
amendment to Bosnias election law, which could significantly strengthen
the positon of ethnic party leaders?
Answer. The administration has made clear that by countering
corruption and demonstrating the advantages of transparent and
accountable governance, we can secure a critical advantage for the
United States and other democracies. Efforts to strengthen democratic
processes and reduce corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) are
mutually reinforcing. If confirmed, I will work with others in the
administration to encourage reforms that address corruption and
implement relevant decisions of BiHs Constitutional Court and the
European Court of Human Rights. I will also support efforts to ensure
that BiHs electoral system meets international recommendations for
electoral integrity, including those made by the OSCEs Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Council of Europe.
Question. Does this not undercut U.S. efforts to counter patronage
and machine politics in the country?
Answer. Limited constitutional and election law reforms are
necessary to further BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path, a primary goal of
U.S. foreign policy for the Western Balkans. The United States welcomes
efforts among BiHs political and civic leaders to reach solutions that
will increase the integrity, transparency, fairness, and legitimacy of
BiHs democratic processes. If confirmed, I will work to bring all
actors to the table to forge compromise and local ownership of an
improved electoral system that represents and protects the rights of
all citizens of BiH.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Dr. Karen Donfried by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Which country or countries do you believe are the most
important to U.S. interests in Europe?
Answer. NATO is indispensable for the advancement of U.S. interests
in Europe and to our security. NATO, founded 72 years ago and
comprising 30 Allies, is a pillar of stability for the world and the
essential forum for Transatlantic security and political issues. The
United States is firmly committed to advancing NATO's founding values,
enshrined in the Washington Treaty, of democracy, individual liberty,
and the rule of law. The United States' commitment to Article 5 is
ironclad. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with all of
our NATO Allies and the Alliance's partners to safeguard our shared
interests in our challenging security environment. The European Union
is also a fundamental partner for the United States, as many issues on
which we coordinate, including economic security issues, climate
policy, and sanctions, among others, are EU competencies.
Question. Do you believe that the U.S. should err on the side of
undertaking diplomacy with the European Union, or should it focus its
diplomatic efforts bilaterally?
Answer. The United States and the European Union are natural
partners to write the rules of the road for the 21st century economy,
rules based on our shared democratic values and harnessing the power of
the largest economic relationship in the world. At the June 15 U.S.-EU
Summit, the leaders of the European Union and the United States renewed
our transatlantic partnership and committed to resolving long-standing
disputes in order to work together on common challenges. If confirmed,
I will endeavor to support that renewed partnership. The U.S.-EU
partnership does not supplant the need for bilateral diplomatic efforts
with member states and other likeminded countries. If confirmed, I will
pursue diplomacy with the EU and bilaterally to further U.S. policy
objectives.
Question. How do you believe relationship between the United States
and the European Union (EU) has changed since the United Kingdom
removed itself from that bloc? What challenges has the United Kingdom's
departure from the EU presented for American diplomacy?
Answer. The Biden administration has already worked in concert with
both the EU and the UK on sanctions actions targeting Russian officials
linked to the poisoning of Alexey Navalny and Chinese officials due to
human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The administration supports a strong
UK and a strong EU and welcomed the entry into force of the EU-UK Trade
and Cooperation Agreement and the Northern Ireland Protocol. The United
States has been unequivocal in its support for the Belfast/Good Friday
Agreement, which is an historic achievement that must be protected. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with both partners to address the
range of global challenges as the UK and the EU continue to adjust to
their new post-Brexit relationship. I support the renewed commitment to
the U.S.-EU partnership made by leaders at the June 15 U.S.-EU Summit.
The UK's post-Brexit foreign policy presents opportunities for even
closer cooperation on shared priorities. If confirmed, I look forward
to collaborating with the UK as it works with a broad range of partners
to carry out its Global Britain agenda, including global economic,
health, and climate priorities.
Question. In your opinion, what do you believe the United States
will gain from the deal that was recently struck between the United
States and Germany that will allow the NordStream 2 pipeline to go
forward?
Answer. The package announced on July 21 puts in place measures in
order to prevent the worst-case scenario--an operational Nord Stream 2
pipeline without any risk-reduction measures for Ukraine or other
countries that stand to be impacted by the pipeline. The measures
represent a significant commitment by Germany, supported by the United
States, to push back against the Kremlin's malign activities and to
advance a more secure and sustainable energy future for Ukraine and
other frontline NATO and EU countries. It also makes clear that the
United States will not allow the Kremlin to weaponize energy resources
against our allies and partners and commits Germany to take national
measures and pursue measures at the European Union-level to impose
costs on Russia should it attempt to use Nord Stream 2 or any other
pipeline to achieve aggressive political ends.
Question. Which nations do you believe the United States should
work most closely with to counter China's growing malign influence and
actions around the world? Which countries do you see as most aligned
with U.S. goals and values vis-a-vis China?
Answer. The United States must engage the People's Republic of
China (PRC) from a position of strength, which includes acting in close
cooperation with our Allies and partners across Europe and Eurasia.
There has been a convergence of views among the world's democracies on
PRC activities as evidenced by the outcomes of last month's G7, NATO,
and U.S.-EU summits. If confirmed, I would work with U.S. Allies and
partners to respond to the PRC's non-market practices, speak out
against Beijing's human rights abuses and forced labor practices, and
address the systemic challenges from the PRC to the rules-based
international order.
Question. What are your views on the recently agreed-upon EU-China
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment? Should the United States be
engaging with the European Parliament to stop its ratification?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to early consultations with
our EU and European partners on shared concerns about the People's
Republic of China (PRC), including through the recently relaunched
U.S.-EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council.
The European Parliament has conditioned any further action on the
Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) on the lifting of the PRC's
retaliatory sanctions. Ultimately, the onus will be on the PRC to
uphold its commitments on forced labor, state-owned enterprises, and
subsidies.
Question. Many European countries have pledged to keep unsafe
telecommunications companies out of their networks. What do you view as
the next priority areas for cooperation between the United States and
the. and EU?
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our engagement
with European allies and partners on secure development and deployment
of 5G networks, including through the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology
Council. The United States advocates for measures that exclude
untrusted vendors, in line with the Prague Proposals and the EU 5G
Toolbox. If confirmed, I will continue working with allies and partners
to support a diverse supply chain of trustworthy telecommunications
equipment and services. This includes support for open, interoperable
approaches like Open RAN (radio access network) technologies that
promise to increase vendor diversity and market competition and have
the potential to lower costs and improve security.
Question. To what extent do you believe that there is an emerging
Russia-China axis? Some suggest that the United States should try to
drive wedges between the two nations to destroy any emerging axis. Do
you agree with that analysis?
Answer. It is not surprising that Beijing and Moscow would seek to
deepen their ties, but we should not overestimate this alignment.
Russia and the PRC collaborate when it is mutually beneficial, but a
deep-seated lack of trust realistically limits their so-called
``strategic comprehensive partnership.'' Areas of friction between the
two suggest they may each have reasons to hedge against over reliance
and potentially slow their convergence for their own reasons. If
confirmed, I would work closely with European partners and Allies to
push back effectively against Russian and PRC actions that run contrary
to our values and the international standards of rule-based behavior.
Question. It is likely that Russia has placed nuclear weapons in
Kaliningrad, and there is great concern that they may do the same in
occupied Crimea. How should the United States respond, if at all,
should Russia place nuclear weapons in Crimea? Would that action, in
your view, dramatically change the way that the United States looks at
Black Sea security?
Answer. The administration will continue to oppose Russia's
occupation and attempted annexation of Crimea, which is sovereign
Ukrainian territory. If Russia were to deploy nuclear weapons in
Crimea, it would represent a significant escalation of tensions not
just with Ukraine, but in the Black Sea region, and in Europe. If
confirmed, I will continue to work bilaterally and through NATO with
Ukraine and other partners and Allies in the Black Sea region and
across the entire Eastern Flank to improve their ability to deter and
defend against the full spectrum of Russian military threats.
Question. Russia has increased its provocations in the Black Sea
and is increasingly turning the region into a Russian lake. Do you
believe that the U.S. and NATO responses to Russia's actions and
growing militarization of Crimea have been adequate? If yes, why? If
no, what more would you like to see done to push back on Russia in the
Black Sea?
Answer. Russian provocations in the Black Sea and other parts of
Europe, including its military build-up and exercises, require robust
NATO deterrence and strong support for NATO partners. The United States
continues to work bilaterally and through NATO with our Allies, as well
as Ukraine, Georgia, and other NATO partners, to improve their ability
to deter and defend against threats to their security. Since Russia's
2014 invasion of Ukraine, NATO has implemented the most significant
reinforcement of its eastern flank in the post-Cold War era. In the
Black Sea region, these crucial deterrence activities include tailored
Forward Presence, a series of land, air, and maritime measures that
have increased NATO's presence and exercises and improved situational
awareness and readiness in Romania and Bulgaria. All of this is a
necessary and proportionate response to Russia's aggressive behavior.
If confirmed, I will work with our NATO Allies and partners to
modernize their militaries and enhance their capabilities in order to
enhance deterrence and defense in the Black Sea region.
Question. Does Turkey's behavior with regard to increasing ties
with Russia change how we and our allies think about future NATO
expansion and the evolution of the NATO Strategic Concept?
Answer. Turkish-Russian relations are transactional and fraught
with strategic rivalries. If confirmed I will urge Turkey not to retain
the Russian S-400 system it took delivery of in 2019 and remind Ankara
that any new major Russian purchase risks additional CAATSA sanctions.
Turkey is a critical ally, it has NATO's second-largest military, and
it is a key contributor to Allied missions. Ankara's support for
Ukraine's and Georgia's sovereignty, and Turkey's efforts to counter
Russia in Syria, the Caucasus, and Libya create significant pressure on
Turkey-Russia relations. If confirmed I will work to advance the U.S.
and Turkey's many shared interests while also being frank with Turkish
counterparts on areas of disagreement.
Question. Since undersea gas fields were discovered in the Eastern
Mediterranean some years ago, littoral nations have been developing
strategies to harvest and export it. Turkey and the Eastern
Mediterranean Gas Forum have emerged as competitors over the future
economic development of the zone.
How should the U.S. engage with parties to ensure that economic
development is executed in a safe, stable, and fair way?
Answer. The United States supports regional cooperation to bring
durable energy security to the region, create new markets, and provide
economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Biden
administration is committed to ensuring stability in the Eastern
Mediterranean. If confirmed, I commit to encouraging peaceful and
diplomatic resolutions to disagreements in the region.
Question. What are the challenges and threats we face surrounding
the issue?
Answer. Recent offshore gas discoveries in Israel, Egypt, and the
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) have redefined regional relationships, which
presents both challenges and opportunities. These new energy sources,
if managed well, can continue to improve economic and political
cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean while reducing reliance on
Russian and Iranian supplies. This gas would also serve as a useful
transition fuel as the region continues to reduce emissions and moves
to greater reliance on renewable resources. New routes and types of
fuel for European and Middle Eastern partners help to end dependence on
Russian gas. Turkey added more LNG to its energy mix in 2020, some of
it from the United States, in part to reduce its reliance on Russian
and Iranian pipeline gas.
Question. What are the security implications in the region?
Answer. Long unresolved maritime boundary disputes have led to
naval confrontations between littoral states. The United States
supports all efforts to reduce tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Resource development in the Eastern Mediterranean should promote
cooperation and provide a foundation for durable energy security and
economic prosperity throughout the region. The ``3+1'' format including
Greece, Israel, the ROC, plus the United States, and the East
Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), which Egypt hosts and in which the
United States is an observer, are venues to promote greater
cooperation, energy security, and economic prosperity. The United
States supports the EMGF as a technical platform.
Question. President Biden and his administration have repeatedly
made commitments to upholding universal rights at home and abroad. In
Turkey, authorities are abusing people's human rights and attacking
peaceful dissidents at an alarming rate.
How will you work to address human rights violations in Turkey?
Answer. President Biden's administration has elevated democracy,
human rights, and rule of law in our bilateral agenda with Turkey. If
confirmed, I will continue to publicly and privately urge Turkey to
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the rights to
freedom of expression, peaceful assembly, fair trials, and association,
which are important to any healthy democracy. If confirmed, I will
reinforce at the highest levels of the Turkish Government that
addressing democratic backsliding could positively impact our bilateral
relationship. I will also ensure a continued strong focus in our own
assistance on media freedom and freedom of expression and will work
with the EU and international partners to defend fundamental freedoms.
Question. How is Turkey's declining human rights record impacting
its relationship with the United States?
Answer. I share your concerns about the steps the Turkish
Government's has taken which have weakened the freedoms of expression,
association, fair trial, and peaceful assembly. Such moves erode the
foundations of democratic society, stifle growth, and undermine the
rights of Turkish citizens as guaranteed by their constitution. Turkey
is a key Ally and critical regional partner. It is in our shared
interest to keep Turkey anchored to the Transatlantic community. That
means effectively pressing and supporting Turkey to do more to bolster
rule of law, protect human rights, support fundamental freedoms, uphold
the rules-based international order, and stand united with the
Transatlantic community in addressing global challenges from Iran,
Russia, and the PRC.
Question. Do you believe that the United States should try to drive
a wedge between Russia and Turkey? If so, how should we undertake that
task?
Answer. Russia attempts to harmfully influence domestic processes
and drive wedges between the United States and its Allies, including
Turkey, using manipulative energy tactics, corrupt business deals, and
disinformation. Turkish-Russian relations are dynamic, transactional,
and frequently divided by strategic rivalries. For example, Russia and
Turkey are often on the opposite side of regional conflicts (e.g.,
Syria and Libya). At the same time, Turkey is heavily dependent upon
Russian energy supplies. Russian tourists, construction sector
projects, and agricultural purchases are important for the struggling
Turkish economy. If confirmed, I will work with Turkey to prevent
Russian influence from weakening a key NATO Ally or harming our
bilateral relationship with Ankara.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with the EU and its
member states to ensure that North Macedonia and Albania are given a
true and fair chance at admission to the EU?
Answer. The United States recognizes that a prolonged delay in
starting accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania will
have significant political consequences in both countries and could
severely set back recent reform progress in North Macedonia and the
entire Western Balkans. Both countries have enacted difficult and
essential reforms to meet conditions for opening negotiations and
deserve to advance on their accession paths. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the EU and its member states as part of our shared
political and financial commitment to the Western Balkan region.
Question. France and Bulgaria, for two different reasons, have
stymied efforts to open accession negotiations with Macedonia and
Albania. If confirmed, will you engage with France and Bulgaria on this
topic? If so, how?
Answer. Although the EU approved opening accession negotiations
with North Macedonia and Albania in March 2020, Bulgaria has blocked
the official start of negotiations since November due to its ongoing
dispute with North Macedonia. On June 10 in Paris, French President
Macron reaffirmed support for North Macedonia's EU accession without
delay. On May 21, the Portuguese EU Council Presidency presented to
both countries' leaderships a promising, creative resolution proposal,
to which the current Slovenian EU Presidency committed its continued
support. If confirmed, I will work with all countries involved to see
the EU hold the first Intergovernmental Conferences with North
Macedonia and Albania as soon as possible.
Question. How do you believe the United States should interact with
the EU as we work together to find a solution to the issues between
Kosovo and Serbia? Should the United States be in the lead on these
efforts? The EU?
Answer. From its inception, the United States has strongly
supported the EU-facilitated Dialogue to normalize Kosovo-Serbia
relations. If confirmed, I will closely coordinate with our EU partners
and engage both Kosovo and Serbia to advance the process. A
comprehensive normalization agreement remains the only way for Kosovo
and Serbia to unlock their EU futures. The United States believes
normalization should be centered on mutual recognition, as the best way
for these two neighbors to put this dispute behind them. Both parties
have re-engaged in the EU-facilitated talks--the most recent high-level
session took place on July 19 in Brussels--and both countries have
reiterated their commitments to normalizing their relations.
Question. Russia and China have voiced their shared belief that the
Office of the High Representative to Bosnia should be shut down in
2022, saying that Bosnia has achieved the progress necessary to have
such oversight removed. Do you agree that the Office of the High
Representative has outlived its usefulness? If yes, why? If no, what do
you believe should be the path forward for Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Answer. The United States remains steadfast in our support of the
Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH). The OHR plays a critical role in pressing for BiH's progress
towards reconciliation, consolidation of democratic institutions, and
further Euro-Atlantic integration. The conditions for closing the OHR
were clearly laid out in 2008 in the 5+2 Agenda with the support of the
Peace Implementation Council Steering Board, including Russia. These
conditions have not yet been achieved, and urgent reforms are still
necessary. Focus on the fulfillment of the 5+2, plus anti-corruption
initiatives, will advance BiH on its Euro-Atlantic path. If confirmed,
I will collaborate with incoming High Representative Christian Schmidt
on these priorities.
Question. Earlier this year, Senator Menendez and I passed the
Ukraine Security Partnership Act out of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. It aims to support Ukraine in its fight against Russian-
backed separatists in the east and push the country to continue
necessary reforms of its military and defense sectors. In the bill, we
propose placing conditions on Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding.
What is your view on Ukraine's historical response to
conditionality?
Answer. It is my belief that certain types of conditions on
assistance, such as those imposed by the IMF or Department of Defense,
can be powerful drivers for reform. The Department of Defense, in
consultation with the Department of State, has annually certified that
Ukraine has met the certification requirements described in Section
1237 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017
(c)(2). If confirmed, I will continue to work closely with the
Department of Defense and my colleagues in the Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs to ensure the conditions placed on future assistance
further advance Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration and military
transformation efforts.
Question. Do you believe that increasing conditionality on a
portion of military support for the country would provide incentive for
further reforms?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to advance our objectives of
ensuring Ukraine has the military capabilities it needs to defend
itself against ongoing Russian aggression, is systematically advancing
security sector reform priorities, and is taking full advantage of U.S.
assistance programs like IMET. I am committed to working with my
colleagues in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs to support a policy approach that most effectively achieves
these objectives.
Question. What do you believe are the areas that are most ripe for
reform in Ukraine?
Answer. Ukraine has made tremendous strides in its thirty years of
independence, and particularly since the 2014 Revolution of Dignity.
These gains have been made often with significant U.S. support. There
remains a real need to continue to make progress, and, if confirmed, I
will push for further progress on economic and rule of law reforms that
address corruption and strengthen the independence, transparency, and
integrity of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I will also work with
Ukraine to help hold accountable corrupt actors who stand in the way of
reforms or try to undermine Ukraine's efforts to ensure a bright,
prosperous, and secure future for all Ukrainians.
Question. China is increasingly making inroads in Ukraine, wooing
it with appealing business deals and the promise of vaccines. What
steps should the United States and its allies take to keep Ukraine
firmly rooted in the West and to keep Ukraine's valuable technological
know-how from falling into the wrong hands?
Answer. The United States is committed to ensuring that American
companies can operate on an even playing field in Ukraine, providing a
meaningful alternative to China's predatory approach as well as
promoting entrepreneurship and fair practices. If confirmed, I will
focus on supporting Ukraine's economic and corporate governance
reforms, countering the PRC's predatory business practices, and
leveraging U.S. assistance to ensure outcomes in line with U.S. and
Ukrainian national security interests.
Question. Ukraine continues to fight two wars: one with the Kremlin
and its various attempts to undermine Ukraine's freedom and
independence; and a second with its own demons, particularly the
entrenched corruption that has so often undermined Ukraine's democratic
transition and Euro-Atlantic ambitions.
Should the United States continue to condition certain types of
assistance on continued economic and anti-corruption reforms?
Should existing conditions for aid be expanded?
Answer. It is my belief that certain types of conditionality, such
as those imposed by the IMF for financial assistance to Ukraine, can be
powerful drivers for economic and anti-corruption reform. At this time,
I consider the conditions for continued IMF disbursement, if met by
Ukraine, an important motivator of crucial judicial and corporate
governance reform and protecting central bank independence. If
confirmed, I will continue to encourage Ukraine to address the concerns
of the IMF and the U.S. over backsliding on legislative action and
empowerment of anticorruption institutions.
Question. What further incentives does the United States, along
with our European partners, have to encourage Ukraine to complete its
land reform, decentralization, privatization of State-owned-
enterprises, and creation of an independent and responsive judiciary?
Answer. If confirmed I will continue to work in coordination with
our European partners, and directly with Ukraine, to support its chosen
Euro-Atlantic path, including by providing assistance and pushing for
progress on economic and rule of law reforms that strengthen the
independence and transparency of Ukraine's democratic institutions. I
welcome the judicial reform laws recently passed by Ukraine's
parliament with the strong backing of the President of Ukraine and have
been encouraged by Ukraine's willingness to challenge the influence of
corrupt oligarchs. For Ukraine to be a strong, secure, and democratic
state, it must tackle endemic corruption and ensure the protection of
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all Ukrainians.
Question. Since its independence, Georgia has made generally good
progress in instilling democracy and implementing market-based economic
reforms and has been a strong U.S. partner with ambitions to join the
EU and NATO. However, over the past few years, the country has suffered
democratic backsliding and oligarchic capture of the judiciary, media,
and the ruling political party.
What levers can be used to push Georgians, including and especially
the ruling party Georgian Dream, to reform Georgia's judiciary
and complete electoral reforms? Should we consider sanctions?
Answer. Much work remains to reverse backsliding and strengthen
democratic institutions and norms in Georgia. Deeper electoral and
judicial reforms, and the effective implementation of reforms, are
needed to level the playing field and introduce transparency,
independence, impartiality, and accountability. If confirmed, my team
and I will support Georgia in these efforts, employing diplomatic
engagement, exchanges, and assistance programs. We will also seek to
take lessons learned from across the region to advance important
reforms, which will strengthen Georgia's resilience to Russia's
aggression and ongoing occupation of 20 percent of Georgia's territory.
We will evaluate all available tools and forms of leverage to push
Georgia's governing party to complete these reforms inclusively and
transparently.
Question. Has the political and governance situation in Georgia
reached the point at which we should re-evaluate our relationship with
the country, including by conditioning certain aid to Georgia?
Answer. I share your concern about the current political tensions
and lack of progress on urgently needed reforms. It is in the U.S.
interest, however, to continue to support Georgia in becoming more
democratic, more capable of countering Russian and other malign
influence, more able to defend the rights of its citizens throughout
its internationally recognized territory (included that occupied by
Russia), and more economically prosperous. U.S. foreign assistance
programs are an integral part of furthering U.S strategic interests in
Georgia and any proposed conditionality should be approached with this
in mind. If confirmed, my team and I will evaluate all available tools
and forms of leverage, and I would welcome the opportunity to work
closely with you to advance U.S. interests in Georgia.
Question. The U.S. Embassy in Russia has been working under duress
for a number of years and is now facing extreme pressure due to
restrictions on the hiring of locally employed staff. The Russian
Embassy in Washington and the Russian Government in Moscow have not
proved terribly willing to work with the United States to make sure
that our embassy is fully staffed and able to continue operations.
What can be done to negotiate a solution with Russia and restore
our full embassy operations?
Answer. I am disappointed by the decision of the Russian Government
to impose restrictions on the U.S. mission to Russia. It is at times
like these that we need more open channels of communication between our
governments, including through our respective embassies. Locally
employed staff are key members of our workforce around the world. Their
contributions are important to our operations and to our bilateral
missions. If confirmed, I am committed to working to put our Mission on
better footing to advance on our vital national security priorities.
Question. What can be done to support our embassy until we reach a
solution, or if we cannot?
Answer. I look forward to working across the Department to identify
how we can best leverage resources--both financial and personnel--to
support Embassy Moscow. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring our
embassy colleagues receive the support needed to continue executing
core functions.
Question. What do you believe should be the role of sanctions in
the creation and execution of U.S. foreign policy? With respect to
Russia, how do you believe the sanctions imposed on that country since
2014 have affected the Russia's economic and foreign policy decision-
making?
Answer. Sanctions are a critical tool in both the formulation and
implementation of U.S. foreign policy, serving as a key deterrent to
Russia as well as conveying U.S. intent. U.S. sanctions on Russia,
especially those implemented in coordination with allies, send a clear
message: that the international community will not stand by while
Russia continues to violate international norms and laws. The sanctions
imposed since 2014 have deterred and deprived Russia of the resources
to carry out its aggressive and destabilizing activities around the
globe. The legislative tools that Congress has created are key to the
effective use of sanctions, and if confirmed, I will advocate to use
them to promote accountability and impose costs for Russia's harmful
activities.
Question. Given the wide range of Russian malign behavior, how can
the United States (including Congress) and Europe do a better job of
more clearly defining the conditions necessary for rolling back or
removing sanctions with respect to Russia?
Answer. Sanctions are designed to cause a change in behavior, and
the most useful sanctions are those with clearly defined intent. The
administration sent a clear message to Russia that its activities
against the United States would no longer be tolerated via the
sanctions imposed in its April 15 action, ``Imposing Costs for Harmful
Foreign Activities by the Russian Government'' including through the
issuance of Executive Order (E.O.) 14024. This EO is an important
complement to existing legislative sanctions tools, providing the
flexibility to target Russian entities engaged in hostile or
destabilizing activity around the globe. If confirmed, I will advocate
to use all these tools to push back against harmful behavior by Russia.
Question. Do you believe that the imposition of more sanctions on
Russia would accomplish U.S. policy goals? What are other measures
besides economic sanctions that could be effective tools with respect
to U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis Russia?
Answer. U.S. sanctions on Russia, especially those implemented in
coordination with allies, send a clear message: the international
community will not stand by while Russia continues to violate
international norms and laws. The sanctions imposed since 2014 have
imposed a measure of deterrence and diminished the resources to carry
out Russia's aggressive and destabilizing activities around the globe.
The administration has been clear that it will use every tool
available--including economic sanctions--to promote accountability and
impose costs on Russia for its continued acts of aggression.
Question. As relations between the U.S. and Russia have worsened,
the level of people-to-people contact has likewise diminished.
If confirmed, what outreach do you intend to undertake with to
everyday Russians, if any?
Answer. The Russian Government has intensified its crackdown on
civil society and independent media and is specifically targeting
programs promoting cultural and academic exchanges with Western
countries, including shutting down Bard College's 25-year-old joint
degree program with Russia's Smolny University. It is therefore even
more critical now for us to engage with everyday Russians and to share
our values and insights from the American experience in democracy. The
U.S. Embassy Russia has been able to adopt a wide range of new virtual
tools, hybrid engagements, and exchange programming for this purpose.
If confirmed, I am committed to continuing and finding new ways to
expand outreach to the Russian people.
Question. Are there new, more creative mechanisms (perhaps through
technology) that the United States can use to rebuild person-to-person
relationships between Americans and Russians?
Answer. I support the continued use of new technology and other
tools to facilitate person-to-person interaction between Americans and
Russians, who continue to be interested in engagement with the West
despite obstacles. In addition to the work the U.S. Embassy is already
doing with virtual and hybrid engagements, the U.S. Agency for Global
Media is exploring ways to enhance its ability to reach Russian
audiences, including through the Open Technology Fund, even if the
Kremlin forces Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to leave its physical
bureau in Russia. If confirmed, I am committed to strengthening civil
society partners and people to people engagements to foster mutual
understanding.
Question. The State Department just released the 2021 Trafficking
in Person's Report, which identified a troubling trend of backsliding
on trafficking prevention, prosecution, and protection efforts from a
number of Western European nations, including Norway, Switzerland,
Ireland, Portugal and more. It is clear that something must be done to
address this serious, ongoing issue to curb this scourge.
If confirmed, please outline what steps you would take in your
various bilateral relationships to address this problem.
Answer. Trafficking in persons is an appalling crime. If confirmed,
I will prioritize bilateral engagement across Europe and Eurasia to
press governments, including Ireland, Norway, Portugal, and
Switzerland, to address the concerns the Department has highlighted in
this year's Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, and to take concrete
action to combat trafficking. If confirmed, I will call out
shortcomings where they exist, and use the annual reports to assist
each government to identify priority areas for improvement and
encourage each to implement the TIP Report's recommended improvements.
Question. If confirmed, will you raise this issue with Foreign
Ministries at the first opportunity?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will raise this issue with foreign
ministries as combating human trafficking is a priority for the United
States and will also be a priority of mine.
Question. Anti-Semitism is on the rise globally, but especially
across Europe. If confirmed, what steps will you take alongside the
Office of the Special Envoy To Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism to
address this concerning and growing problem?
Answer. Anti-Semitism is abhorrent. If confirmed, I will prioritize
combating anti-Semitism in the region alongside the Office of the
Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism. If confirmed, I
intend to work with Congress and implement the following priorities:
securing Jewish communities; reporting, investigating, and prosecuting
hate crimes; countering anti-Semitism both on- and off-line; promoting
the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of
Antisemitism; building and strengthening coalitions across different
faith communities, civil society, and the private sector; and promoting
Holocaust education, remembrance, and commemoration, and combating
Holocaust distortion and denial.
Question. Across Europe, there are over 100 detained journalists
who were imprisoned for simply doing their jobs. In 2021, the Council
of Europe notes 6 journalists have been killed in Europe alone. These
statistics are staggering and require immediate attention and action
from the United States Government. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary,
how will you address this problem and assure our partners and allies
that we will not allow the abuse and imprisonment of journalists
anywhere in the world?
Answer. Promoting and defending independent media is key to an
informed citizenry and healthy democratic institutions and processes.
If confirmed, I will seek to deepen our engagement with partners in
Europe to address the challenges facing journalists in Europe and the
media globally. This includes working through regional organizations
including the Council of Europe. Additionally, I will support efforts
to promote accountability for those who commit abuses against
journalists through bilateral and multilateral diplomacy; public
messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and foreign assistance
programs, including rapid response resources that support journalists,
civil society activists, and human rights defenders under threat.
Question. The lack of meaningful progress regarding Cyprus on the
political front and the subsequent peacekeeping mission, United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is quite troubling.
Answer. The status quo is unacceptable. If confirmed, I will
continue to support a Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify
the island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation to benefit all Cypriots
and the wider region. The United States appreciates the U.N. Secretary-
General's efforts to restart political discussions on Cyprus. If
confirmed, I will encourage both sides to demonstrate the necessary
openness, flexibility, and compromise to find common ground to restart
formal talks. I believe UNFICYP continues to play an important role in
preventing a resurgence of fighting between the Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot communities, supervising ceasefire lines, maintaining a
buffer zone, and supporting the Secretary-General's Good Offices.
Question. Do you believe reaching a political settlement is
possible?
Answer. Yes. But ultimately, the responsibility for finding a
solution lies first and foremost with the Cypriots themselves.
Question. Turkish President Erdogan's recent behavior regarding
Varosha is unacceptable and a flagrant disregard of current
international norms and two U.N. Resolutions. If confirmed, what
actions would you take to address this issue and growing, illegal
Turkish activity in northern Cyprus?
Answer. The announcement by Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar and
Turkish President Erdogan on July 20 regarding the transfer of parts of
Varosha to Turkish Cypriot control was clearly inconsistent with U.N.
Security Council Resolutions 550 and 789, provocative, unacceptable,
and incompatible with their past commitments to engage constructively
in settlement talks. If confirmed, I will work to urge Turkish Cypriots
and Turkey to reverse their decision announced on July 20 and all steps
taken since October 2020, and work with the international community to
give a strong response to this action. I will also underscore the need
to avoid provocative unilateral actions that increase tensions on the
island and hinder efforts to resume Cyprus settlement talks in line
with U.N. Security Council resolutions.
Question. Do you see President Erdogan's calls for ``a two-state
solution'' in Cyprus as feasible?
Answer. A Cypriot-led comprehensive settlement to reunify the
island as a bizonal, bicommunal federation is the only path to lasting
peace and stability. This is the only framework with broad
international community support and approved by the U.N. Security
Council.
Question. Maintaining recent stability in Kosovo remains a
priority, but some Security Council members (including the United
States) have indicated a desire to downsize the mission. If confirmed,
would you support a strategic review of the United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)?
Answer. Although the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has operated in
Kosovo since its independence in 2008, it has long since fulfilled its
original purpose. U.N. engagement with Kosovo in a more appropriate
form that acknowledges and strengthens Kosovo's sovereignty could
provide an important support for continued development of democratic
institutions. If confirmed, I would continue to urge that the U.N.
Security Council consider better ways of helping Kosovo to realize its
full potential, which a strategic review could identify. It should be
noted that Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council,
unhelpfully insists on UNMIK remaining in its current incarnation. I
would also caution that change to the NATO security presence should be
conditions-based.
Question. Since the August 9th presidential election, Belarusians
have peacefully protested in unprecedented numbers to contest the
official results, which fraudulently awarded Alexander Lukashenka
another term. The Government has responded to these peaceful protests
with violence, initiating a campaign of disappearances, arrests,
torture, and violence against the protestors and journalists. Since the
protests began, the United States has increased its support of civil
society in Belarus. What more can the United States-through USAID and
along with our European allies-do to assist Belarusian advocates of
democracy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work energetically with
partners and Allies to keep pressure on the Lukashenka regime to end
repression, release all political prisoners and begin an inclusive
dialogue with the opposition (including the Coordination Council led by
Svyatlana Tsikhanouskaya) that leads to free and fair elections under
international observation. Specifically, I plan to continue efforts to
coordinate and strengthen economic sanctions, provide assistance and
support for civil society- including those working to support human
rights, free press, democracy, and Belarus' independence- and keep
pressure on the regime through all bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic channels.
Question. The International Monetary Fund is in the process of
sending around $1 billion to Belarus as part of its program to use
Special Drawing Rights to help the world's poorer countries emerge from
the coronavirus pandemic. In Belarus, this money will go right into
Lukashenka's pocket and will help keep him in power.
What can or should the United States do to make sure that these
monies are not given to Mr. Lukashenka?
Answer. It is my understanding that the United States retains the
right to refuse to purchase Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) from any
country that we choose, including those under U.S. sanction regimes. We
are working with Treasury to develop a strategy to engage our like-
minded allies to do the same. However, these countries will not
automatically be able to exchange their SDRs- which are reserve assets-
for hard currencies. Belarus would need to find a willing country to
provide them with hard currency in exchange for their SDRs. If
confirmed, I will continue working with our partners at the Department
of Treasury to increase transparency around SDR exchanges.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working to keep these
funds out of Lukashenka's hands?
Answer. Yes, I commit to using all tools at my disposal to prevent
the Belarusian authorities from exchanging their SDRs for hard
currency.
Question. How important is it that the United States and its
European allies take steps to make our own systems less friendly to
kleptocracy and less penetrable by dirty money?
Answer. The United States will continue to work with European
partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and
return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in
corruption; combat money-laundering; stem foreign bribery; and empower
and protect civil society and independent media. The United States
supports the work at the OSCE and Council of Europe to help
participating states implement more effective and transparent
anticorruption policies and mechanisms and ensure countries are
following through on their international anticorruption commitments. If
confirmed, I will also support the work of countering corruption in our
own system and continued use of sanctions related to the Global
Magnitsky Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by
President Biden on June 8, 2021, and others.
Question. Will the administration make a concerted push on anti-
corruption in the EU and its periphery with the dual purpose of
benefitting European citizens and making it more difficult for malign
actors like Russia and China to gain a foothold?
Answer. The United States remains committed to combatting
corruption not only in Europe, but across the globe. Fighting
corruption benefits citizens while also making it more difficult for
malign actors to exert their influence. If confirmed, I will continue
to work with governments across Europe and Eurasia to strengthen anti-
corruption efforts, and encourage these countries to work to fulfill
their obligations under the U.N. Convention against Corruption, and to
implement the recommendations of regional organizations, such as the
OSCE and the Council of Europe, to combat corruption. I will also
support the continued use of sanctions related to the Global Magnitsky
Act, Executive Order 14033 on the Western Balkans signed by President
Biden on June 8, 2021, and others to combat corruption in the region.
Question. The United States and France share several overlapping
priorities in Sub-Saharan Africa and work together on many fronts,
including fighting the terror threat in the Sahel. However, American
and French interests in the region do not always align, including with
regard to the ongoing conflict in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon.
If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to ensure
that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the
Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various
points of leverage and capability the United States and France
each bring to the table?
Answer. France has significant ties in the Sahel and West and
Central Africa, and is a steadfast partner in the fight against
terrorism. Our shared priorities include security, governance, economic
development, and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. If confirmed, I
will continue our deep cooperation in Africa with France. I will engage
the French on our priorities in West and Central Africa, encouraging
them to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural
influence toward long-term stability in these regions. I will work
within our interagency to support French efforts when mutually
beneficial.
Question. How can the United States better coordinate with France
to holistically address security threats and improve diplomatic
engagements in the Sahel and West and Central Africa from a holistic
perspective?
Answer. Both France and the United States share security,
governance, economic development, and recovery from the COVID-19
pandemic as priorities in the Sahel and West and Central Africa. These
priorities cannot be achieved independent of one another. If confirmed,
I will work strategically and tactically with the French to ensure that
our efforts are mutually supportive and reinforcing. I will encourage
the French to use their strong political, economic, security, and
cultural influence to promote the political, security, and democratic
reforms that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions,
and work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned
with ours.
Question. How can the United States better coordinate and
collaborate with the European Union, as well as individual European
Governments such as the U.K., to enhance policy consistency and advance
mutually-beneficial opportunities for trade, investment, development,
and security cooperation with the African Union, regional bodies,
African Governments, and private sector partners?
Answer. The EU and European Governments are crucial partners of the
United States to advance prosperity and security in Africa. On June 12,
President Biden and G7 leaders agreed to launch a global infrastructure
initiative called Build Back Better World that will mobilize private
sector capital in four areas of focus--climate, health and health
security, digital technology and gender equity and equality. The scope
of this initiative will include Africa, as well as Latin America, the
Caribbean and the Indo-Pacific. The June 15 U.S.-EU Summit Joint
Statement confirmed that the United States and the EU are committed to
peace and sustainable development in Africa, and plan to provide
support for a sustainable economic recovery from the pandemic. U.S.-EU
cooperation resulted in the U.N. Human Rights Council's July 13
decision to adopt an EU-led and U.S.-cosponsored resolution on the
Tigray region of Ethiopia, and to defeat hostile amendments. If
confirmed, I will work collaboratively with our European partners to
continue our cooperation.
Question. Russian malign activity in Africa is increasingly a
growing concern, particularly given credible reports of elections
interference across the continent and deployment of Russian
mercenaries, including through the Wagner Group in Northern Mozambique
and through nontransparent transfers of weapons and training via
Russian security sector support to the Touadera administration in the
Central African Republic (CAR). From your perspective, how can the
Bureau of European Affairs and the Bureau of African Affairs coordinate
to more effectively counter the malign activities and influence of
Russia in Africa generally and, more specifically, of Yevgeny Prigozhin
and affiliated mining and security companies (like the Wagner Group) in
Africa?
Answer. Russian harmful activity in Africa is a matter of grave and
growing concern. The use of proxies like Prigozhin's enterprise in the
Central African Republic and elsewhere is a particular threat to
stability, good governance, and human rights on the continent. I know
the Bureaus of European and Eurasian and African Affairs are already
working in close coordination on this issue, something I would seek to
continue and build upon if confirmed. I would also prioritize
collaboration with our European Allies and partners on this issue, as
they too are invested in the future of the African continent, directly
and via various U.N. programs. The UK and EU have already designated
Prigozhin for sanctions, a clear signal that they also take this threat
seriously.
Question. There are around 10,000 ISIS fighters housed at various
detention facilities around the world. This includes at least 2,000
foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
characterizes as ``hardcore foreign terrorist fighters.'' Many of these
FTFs are housed at Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps, like al
Hol in northeastern Syria. The al-Hol IDP camp has become fertile
ground for ISIS recruitment of vulnerable populations, posing a serious
risk to global security. Despite this risk, countries with foreign
terrorist fighters have failed to make any progress to date towards
repatriating their nationals.
Can you commit to using all tools at your disposal to press the
Europe and Eurasia region to repatriate nationals from camps
for ISIS fighters and affiliates in northeast Syria?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I intend to encourage countries to
repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria, including foreign
terrorist fighters and associated family members, and to prosecute
them, as appropriate. As I understand it, the Department holds that
repatriation--followed by appropriate prosecution in domestic courts of
law--is the best way to keep these fighters off the battlefield and
hold them accountable for their crimes. If confirmed, I will also
support repatriation of associated family members as a means to
rehabilitate and reintegrate individuals into their local communities,
as appropriate.
Question. How do you plan to engage with EUR countries to advance
repatriation efforts, which remains a critical to ensure the enduring
defeat of ISIS?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue our consistent
diplomatic outreach to European and Eurasian countries urging them to
repatriate their nationals from northeast Syria. I will collaborate
with the interagency in their work to support countries' efforts to
repatriate their nationals with logistical and planning assistance for
repatriations, including the use of U.S. Government assets to transport
foreign fighters and associated family members out of the region.
Question. United Nations humanitarian assistance program in Syria
relies on the border crossings from Turkey to deliver aid to millions
of Syrians. Although Russia held off from vetoing the renewal of the
last remaining border crossing, it will need to be renewed in December.
In the event all border crossings between Turkey and Syria close, what
alternatives do we have to get aid to the Syrian people? How could we
pressure the Assad regime and Russia to provide aid in our stead?
Answer. The United States led a successful diplomatic campaign to
overcome Russian opposition and renew the U.N. Security Council's
mandate authorizing cross-border humanitarian assistance from Turkey
into Syria. I continue to believe that cross-line assistance alone
cannot meet existing humanitarian needs, which is why extending the
cross-border mandate at Bab al-Hawa for another year was so important.
If confirmed, I will work with my colleagues in the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs to move forward on a political solution in line with
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 and continued engagement between
the United States, Russia, Turkey, and other key players in Syria.
Question. In your assessment, what are the top five most pressing
challenges the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to both the
United States and Europe?
Answer. The most pressing challenge posed by the PRC is its attempt
to undermine the rules-based international order, including the multi-
lateral U.N. system. If confirmed, I will stand up for democracy, human
rights, and human dignity in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet. I will
work to support Taiwan, a leading democracy and essential partner, in
keeping with U.S. commitments. I will make it a priority to support
efforts to ensure supply chains for critical supplies are secure and
free of forced labor. I will work with Allies and partners to defend
access to the global commons, including freedom of navigation under
international law. And finally, if confirmed, I will work with Congress
and Allies to confront Beijing's coercive economic practices, unfair
and illegal trade practices, and cyber theft.
Question. What are the areas that the United States and EU have the
most opportunity to work together on mutual challenges posed by the
PRC, and which areas still require regulatory reform (either U.S. or
EU) to better facilitate cooperation?
Answer. The United States and EU intend to closely consult and
cooperate on the challenges posed by China, including through the U.S.-
EU dialogue on China and the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. It
is important that the United States and EU work together to confront
Beijing on the ongoing genocide in Xinjiang and human rights abuses in
Tibet and Hong Kong, protect freedom of navigation in the East and
South China Seas, and ensure peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
If confirmed, I will work with the EU to promote an open, free, secure,
and reliable digital space and, along with likeminded partners around
the world, work to ensure the rules governing tomorrow's technology are
based in democratic values.
Question. How do you view Europe's attempts at strategic autonomy,
and what challenges does it pose to U.S. cooperation with Europe on
issues related to the PRC?
Answer. We welcome efforts of our Allies and partners to strengthen
their capacity and capabilities, but it is important that these efforts
be compatible with our alliances and contribute to Transatlantic
security. Together, the United States and its Allies and partners set
the global rules of the road, and we must continue to do so. If
confirmed, I will seek to resolve difficult issues with our European
Allies and partners while safeguarding U.S. interests and ensuring a
level playing field for U.S. companies. As Secretary Blinken has noted,
the United States will be much more effective in engaging the PRC when
we do so with our Allies and partners.
Question. The United Kingdom has previously joined U.S. freedom of
navigation operations in the South China Sea, and France recently
announced it would set up a coast guard network with the Pacific Island
nations to deter predatory and coercive behavior. What other
opportunities are there for the European countries to increase their
presence in the Indo-Pacific?
Answer. The Biden administration supports robust engagement by
European counterparts in the Indo-Pacific. Some European countries,
including Germany and the Netherlands, have published Indo-Pacific
strategies, and EU member states have tasked the European Commission
and European External Action Service to release an Indo-Pacific
strategy by September. The United States supports the UK's ``Indo-
Pacific Tilt'' to the region and its ongoing deployment of the UK-led
Aircraft Carrier Strike Group 21 which plans to transit through the
South China Sea. If confirmed, I plan to support ongoing efforts by the
EU and European counterparts to direct more diplomatic, military,
economic, and other resources to the region.
Question. In my China-Europe report published last fall, I discuss
the importance of overcoming barriers to U.S.-Europe technology
cooperation to counter Chinese technology supremacy, including working
through competing regulatory approaches on joint-R&D, data transfer,
and privacy shields. What steps do the U.S. and Europe each need to
take with respect to technology regulations, and what do you see as the
hardest obstacles to overcome in this area?
Answer. President Biden and his EU counterparts established the
U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council as a forum to demonstrate to the
world how democratic approaches to trade, technology, and innovation
can improve the lives of our citizens and counter authoritarian
influence in the digital realm. Discussions on an enhanced Privacy
Shield framework also underscore our shared commitment to privacy, data
protection, and the rule of law; our mutual recognition of the
importance of transatlantic data flows to our respective citizens,
economies, and societies; and our common interest in aligning against
the growing government surveillance ambitions of authoritarian states.
If confirmed, I will work to deepen cooperation in these important
areas.
Question. The latest EU strategy on China mentions ``the importance
of peace and stability across the Taiwan strait.'' What should the EU
do to better support Taiwan in light of an increasingly aggressive PRC?
Answer. Taiwan is a leading democracy, a critical U.S. security and
economic partner, and a key U.S. partner in addressing shared global
challenges. The United States continues to encourage European allies
and partners to engage and publicly support Taiwan. The U.S. commitment
to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and
stability across the Taiwan Strait and in the Indo-Pacific. If
confirmed, I will support the administration's efforts to support
Taiwan and encourage our European Allies and partners to do the same.
Question. My China-Europe report, published last fall, covers the
growing presence of PRC companies in building undersea cables. The
previous administration focused on this issue through its Clean Cable
initiative, and by providing financing for specific cable projects in
the Indo-Pacific. A PRC company--Huawei Marine (now called HMN
Technologies)--is currently constructing an undersea cable that
terminates in Marseilles, France. Please describe your understanding of
PRC activities in the undersea cable market and the implications and
risks for U.S. and allied interests. Do you commit to prioritizing this
area of technology if you are confirmed?
Answer. As with 5G networks, the Biden administration views the
security of commercial undersea communications cables as a high
priority. The secure development and deployment of undersea cables and
related infrastructure in both developed and developing economies is of
critical concern to the United States. Countries and citizens need to
be able to trust that such equipment will not introduce risks that
threaten national security, personal privacy, or human rights. If
confirmed, I look forward to engaging on this topic with our European
allies and partners to promote open, interoperable, reliable, and
secure information and communications technology infrastructure.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to
Dr.Karen Donfried by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Support for Governance, Democracy, and Human Rights:
Supporting democracy, human rights, and good governance, which begins
with fighting corruption and must continue to be a priority of U.S.
policy.
What more can we do to further these efforts with our European
partners, especially on the battle against corruption?
Answer. The United States will continue to work with European
partners to combat corruption by supporting efforts to recover and
return stolen assets; deny safe haven to those who engage in
corruption; combat money-laundering; and stem foreign bribery. If
confirmed, I will support the OSCE's work to help participating States
create robust anti-money laundering regimes, a solid ethics
infrastructure, and sound financial and resource management.
Question. How can we better work within the OSCE to address these
issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I would also encourage the OSCE to take a
cross-dimensional approach to anticorruption that focuses on building
the capacity of law enforcement, strengthening legal frameworks, and
defending members of civil society and the media which expose
corruption.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. Somalia: As you are aware, the Trump administration ended
our troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has
dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.
If confirmed, what actions will you take to support a sustainable
political transition in Somalia?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to supporting Somali efforts
to complete a timely, peaceful, and transparent electoral process,
which is vital for the advancement of political reconciliation and
governance, security, and economic reforms. I am prepared to engage
with Somali leaders to ensure they follow through with their
commitments with respect to the electoral and government formation
processes. I also will coordinate closely with other international
partners to ensure consistent policies and messages, and to discourage
efforts that could exacerbate political tensions or disrupt a political
transition.
Question. In what specific areas should the United States focus
security assistance in Somalia going forward? Are there lessons learned
from long running security assistance programs that you believe could
be better applied?
Answer. The United States supports efforts to advance peace and
security in Somalia with a wide range of activities. If confirmed, I am
committed to reviewing State Department-administered security
assistance programs in Somalia to ensure they are effectively and
efficiently advancing our policy goals. If confirmed, I will prioritize
close coordination with regional and international partners in the
security sector, accountability of U.S. security assistance, and
mentorship and training of partnered forces.
Lessons learned applicable to Somalia include biometric enrollment
of Somalia National Army (SNA) forces receiving U.S. support, sustained
mentorship and training of SNA and African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) forces and the introduction of clear accountability procedures
for U.S. assistance when transferred to partners. With regard to
lessons learned on mentoring, U.S. security assistance monitoring has
identified that the SNA-Danab program improved by recruiting for clan
appropriate battalions, increasing the recruitment of women, and
ensuring the Federal Government of Somalia and its Member States agree
to both support SNA-Danab. Over time, the results have demonstrated
increased unit cohesion and pride, successful joint operations with the
AU Mission in Somalia Forces, and lower instances of desertion.
Somalia
Question. As you are aware, the Trump administration ended our
troop presence in the country and the Biden administration has
dramatically reduced the pace of counter-terrorism operations there.
If confirmed, how will you work to better manage the sometimes of
unhelpful engagement of outside actors in Somalia, including
neighboring states and countries from the Middle East like
Turkey, the UAE, and Qatar? If confirmed, how do you plan to
engage the Bureau of Near East Affairs on issues relate to the
Horn of Africa and the Red Sea Corridor?
Answer. The United States has close and constructive relations with
many of the external actors engaged in Somalia, including the Gulf
states, Turkey, and some of Somalia's neighbors. If confirmed, I would
collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs to employ U.S.
influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to engage
strategically to promote long-term security and stability in Somalia
specifically and the Horn of Africa more broadly.
Nigeria
Question. Poor governance and leadership have prevented Nigeria
from reaching its full potential. Endemic corruption remains a
challenge. There is little accountability for extrajudicial killings by
security forces. ISIS West Africa Province remains a potent force in
the northeast, and, intercommunal violence and banditry plague various
parts of the country.
If confirmed, how will you engage with the Nigerian Government on
these challenges?
Answer. The United States has a strong and enduring relationship
with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy and economy.? Nigeria's
stability and economic growth can advance our mutual prosperity as well
as that of West Africa and the broader continent. If confirmed, I will
continue to raise the profile of our engagement with Nigerian leaders
to advance our national security priorities and strengthen our
collaboration to address security, economic, and governance challenges.
Working with other State Department bureaus and U.S. Government
agencies, I will support our investments in training Nigerian security
forces to build their effectiveness in fighting common threats and
serving the Nigerian people, increase accountability for military or
police personnel who commit human rights violations and abuses, and
strengthen security forces coordination. Working across the U.S.
interagency and in partnership with Nigeria's new Ambassador to the
United States as well as civil society stakeholders and the Nigerian
diaspora, I will undertake a holistic approach to our bilateral
relationship that emphasizes shared values and candid dialogue. Through
the annual Bi-National Commission and in other bilateral and
multilateral meetings and fora, I will engage actively with Nigerian
leaders within and beyond government to champion the strengthening of
democratic institutions, diversification of its economy, and pursuit of
important reforms.
Question. Do you commit to working with the committee to develop a
coherent framework in which to provide security assistance before
moving forward with additional arms sales and security assistance
programs in Nigeria?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I commit to working with the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee to actively reinforce the importance of
civilian protection, and respect for human rights in all elements of
our security assistance to Nigeria. I will urge the Nigerian Government
to hold security force elements accountable for human rights abuses and
violations. To help Nigeria reduce the risk of civilian harm, I will
support a combination of legal training and advising to provide
stronger underpinnings for the Nigerian military and police to address
systematic human rights concerns, develop a professional process for
military justice and police accountability, and develop more
disciplined security forces.
Arms sales and security assistance programs in Nigeria help bring
about incremental institutional reform. I will seek to combine military
and law enforcement capability sales with comprehensive training and
maintenance programs. Our goal, which the Nigerian Government supports,
is greater professionalism of Nigerian security services. Recent
improvements demonstrate that Nigeria is a willing security partner,
making needed investments and security sector institutional reforms
that will bring lasting results in combatting a variety of security
challenges.
Question. If confirmed, what new, innovative approaches will you
recommend that administration take to mitigate conflict, stop human
rights abuses, counterbalance Russian influence, and help the people of
CAR achieve a stable democracy?
Answer. The United States supports CAR's efforts to develop strong
institutions and strengthen the rule of law through capacity building
and technical assistance. If confirmed, I will work to increase
coordination within the Department of State, across the U.S.
Government, and with likeminded partners such as the European Union and
France to ensure our efforts are aligned and mutually supportive to
strengthen the CAR Government's ability to mitigate conflict, stop
human rights abuses and violations, hold those responsible for such
actions accountable, and help the country achieve a stable democracy
that does not require the support of dubious external actors.
Specifically, to counterbalance Russia's influence, I will pursue
opportunities to stand up to negative Russian behavior.
Question. As the U.S. engages to strengthen accountability,
security, and inclusiveness, will you commit to supporting processes
and institutions, rather than a specific individual or leader?
Answer. Yes. Across administrations, the United States has worked
to advance democracy and human rights in the DRC, prevent conflict, and
promote economic development. If confirmed, I will work with the DRC
Government and our civil society partners, as well as our partners in
the region and at the United Nations, to promote political, economic,
and security reforms.
The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed,
I will urge DRC leaders to heed the calls of the Congolese people for
reforms. I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of
undertaking the legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary
for free and fair elections in 2023, including reform of the
Independent National Electoral Commission. I will also work with our
partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the
country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt
actors with all tools at our disposal.
Question. What actions should the administration be taking right
now to help support a credible presidential election in 2023, and what
specific steps do you plan to take if confirmed to support credible
elections?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early
imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical
preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including
reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be
credible, those elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently
and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines.
I will also continue to work with this committee on issues related to
the 2023 elections. Appreciating your longstanding interest in this
issue, I will work with you to ensure we take your views on board in
advance, and that we have the appropriate resources in place to help
our Congolese partners with this important task.
Zimbabwe
Question. U.S. policy regarding Zimbabwe has been largely
consistent across recent administrations, including the rigorous
implementation of ZDERA and other sanctions. Yet the Zimbabwean
Government of today is no less authoritarian and corrupt than it was
under former president Robert Mugabe.
If confirmed, how will you approach U.S.-Zimbabwe relations?
Answer. I share the committee's deep concern over the Government of
Zimbabwe's authoritarian and corrupt practices, including the targeting
of opposition political figures, journalists, and members of civil
society through harassment, arrests, and detentions. I appreciate the
willingness of this committee to publicly call out repression by the
Zimbabwe Government. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S.
Embassy in Harare issue condemnations when appropriate and publicly
voice our support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak
out against government corruption and abuses.
The United States supports democratic governance programs that
improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and
enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the
Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes.
But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will
work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and
likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the situation in
Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the
Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human
rights. If confirmed, I will also work with our interagency partners to
mobilize our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those
individuals who are currently active in corruption and human rights
abuses.
Question. Is it time to rethink our Zimbabwe policy, in your view?
Answer. We should continually examine our policy towards Zimbabwe
to ensure that it is timely and effective. The United States currently
employs a blend of programs and strategies in Zimbabwe to strengthen
democratic institutions, promote equitable economic growth, boost
public health, and improve food security for the benefit of the
Zimbabwean people. If confirmed, I will review these programs and
strategies.
If confirmed, I will be guided by the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act in our efforts to press the Government of
Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles, basic freedoms, and human
rights, and to support those citizens who seek to build an open and
accountable system. I also will work with this committee, likeminded
partners, and subject matter experts within civil society to examine
ways to ensure that our policy towards Zimbabwe is relevant and
effective.
Question. What new measures should the U.S. pursue in advancing
democracy and human rights in Uganda?
Answer. This year's flawed elections in Uganda underscored the
continuing deterioration of both Uganda's democracy and respect and
support for human rights and freedoms. Helping the Ugandan people
reverse this trend will take new ideas and increased engagement with
Ugandan leaders and the country's beleaguered civil society. If
confirmed, I will assess what more the United States can do to promote
democracy, human rights, and accountability in Uganda and seek to
develop options for advancing these goals and objectives.
Question. Given democratic and human rights deficits in Uganda,
what will you recommend if confirmed, relative to continued cooperation
with the Museveni regime on regional security matters?
Answer. Uganda plays an important role in supporting regional
security and counterterrorism efforts in Somalia and elsewhere in the
region. During deployments, Ugandan units have been among the most
capable and professional in regional missions. The conduct of specific
Ugandan troops at home, however, is of concern. If confirmed, I will
ensure that U.S. policy in Uganda appropriately reflects the centrality
of democracy and respect for human rights called for by President
Biden. In addition to working with the African Union (AU), the United
Nations (U.N.), and the Government of Uganda to ensure that personnel
are properly vetted, follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect
human rights, I support working with the AU and the U.N. to identify
potential new troop contributors that would reduce AMISOM's reliance on
forces that may be implicated in human rights abuses. There is also a
need to engage the AU and the U.N. in a timely and credible process to
identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be implicated
in human rights abuses.
Question. How serious is the new leadership in Tanzania about
pursuing genuine political reform?
Answer. President Hassan has taken some encouraging steps in the
early days of her administration. These include significant revisions
to Tanzania's approach on COVID-19, reengagement with the international
community, and overtures to the business community suggesting greater
openness to foreign investment. Her initial outreach to opposition
political parties and civil society organizations was welcome but needs
to be accompanied by significant democratic and human rights reforms.
The arrest of leading opposition politicians on July 20 was gravely
concerning. If confirmed, I will prioritize U.S. engagement in Tanzania
to encourage rule of law, good governance, political pluralism, and
people's freedom to exercise their rights without fear of harassment.
Question. What steps will you take if confirmed to incentivize the
new Tanzanian leadership to repair the damage of the Magufuli era, both
in terms of political reform at home, and Tanzania-U.S. bilateral
relations?
Answer. The new Tanzanian leadership has been much more receptive
to engagement with both Embassy Dar es Salaam and senior Department of
State officials. Such engagement has already contributed to the Hassan
administration's increasingly positive steps with regard to its COVID-
19 policy. If confirmed, I would work with Embassy leadership to
continue to highlight to the Tanzanian Government the additional,
potential benefits of closer cooperation with the United States,
including renewed support for the country's development and economic
recovery efforts. At the same time, I would underscore the democratic
and economic reforms that would be required on the part of the
Tanzanian Government in order to attain such support and repair in full
the Tanzania-U.S. bilateral relationship.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator James E. Risch
Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, what specific actions will you take to meet the
administration's stated goal of prioritizing Africa?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to engage respectfully with African
partners to meet global challenges--including security, global health,
climate change, freedom and democracy, and mutual prosperity. You would
see greater attention to our relationships with African states and
publics, with regional institutions like the African Union, and with
the African bloc in international organizations.
If confirmed, I look forward to participating in an interagency
policy process as the Biden-Harris administration develops a fresh U.S.
strategy for Africa that enumerates our national interests in Africa
and develops operational actions to advance them, guided by the
priorities of this committee. Responding to President Biden's
direction, I would highlight the role of democracy and human rights and
add a new emphasis on anti-corruption. Without good governance, African
states will not be well-positioned to expand peace and security and
manage the threats posed by terrorism and migration. I will ensure that
we work with our African partners to mitigate and adapt to climate
change. I will support programs that promote two-way trade and
investment to create opportunities for African youth that benefit
workers there and here. In line with this committee's direction, I will
work to advance an affirmative agenda rooted in our values and our
longstanding investments in development, security and people to prevail
in the strategic competition with China. In this effort, we will seek
to expand our partnership with Europe and other likeminded nations to
reinforce our collective impact.
I will also capitalize on our soft power--engaging with youth,
encouraging education opportunities, and engaging the diaspora.
Finally, I will join the U.S. Government campaign to help Africa
mitigate the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Question. What changes in U.S. posture toward Africa are needed to
demonstrate to our African partners that ``Africa is a priority''?
Answer. We need to expand the quantity and quality of our
engagement across the Continent. As Secretary Blinken noted in his
January 19 testimony before this committee, senior-level engagement on
a consistent basis will be one important way to demonstrate our
commitment. Showing up and showing respect is important. Consistent
with our values, we must champion leaders seeking positive change and
hold others to account. This approach means reinvigorating our focus on
human rights, transparency and accountability, and the fight against
corruption which are essential for stability and economic growth.
Expanding trade and investment, tackling climate change, and responding
to COVID-19 are all shared priorities between the United States and
African nations. If confirmed, I will support diplomacy that translates
this rhetoric into action.
Question. What specific policies and strategies will you pursue to
ensure that you and the Bureau of African Affairs are meeting what
you've indicated as ``President Biden's agenda to expand the quantity
and quality of our engagement with African Governments, institutions .
. . [and] African publics''? What changes, if any, are needed within
the Bureau of African Affairs to ensure they are best prepared to carry
out this vision?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 hearing before
this committee, the United States has engaged African countries as
partners in pursuing our shared interests and values--including
security, global health, climate change, freedom and democracy, and
shared prosperity. Expanded senior-level engagement on a consistent
basis will be one important way to demonstrate our commitment. If
confirmed, I will actively support engagement through senior-level
visits to Africa, increased consultations with the African Union and
African regional organizations, initiatives and economic opportunities
to harness the innovation and energy of Africa's youth, university
partnerships and training opportunities, and active engagement with the
African diaspora here in the United States, to name a few. If
confirmed, I will closely review the Africa Bureau's organization,
management, staffing, and budget to align our resources to support
execution of this vision.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that
ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa are filled by qualified,
experience nominees in a timely manner?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Secretary
Blinken to ensure that ambassadorial positions in Sub-Saharan Africa
are filled by qualified, experienced nominees in a timely manner.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, will you commit to work with Secretary Blinken to ensure that
first-time career ambassadorial nominees will not be the first choice
when identifying nominees for high-profile and strategic U.S. missions
in Sub-Saharan Africa?
Answer. The Department of State has a robust process for choosing
Chiefs of Mission. If confirmed, I am committed to working with the
Secretary and other Department leadership to ensure that we identify
highly qualified individuals for every one of these positions in the
Bureau of African Affairs.
Question. Under your leadership as Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, if confirmed, what actions will you pursue to ensure
that hard to fill posts in Sub-Saharan Africa are sufficiently and
consistently staffed?
Answer. I recognize that the Africa Bureau is chronically
understaffed, both in numbers of assigned positions and vacancies in
those positions. If confirmed, I will personally prioritize personnel
and allocate additional resources to support that effort. I am
committed to an inclusive workplace and will build on the Bureau's
progress to date in implementing management reforms designed to support
diversity in recruitment, hiring, and retention.
Other actions I intend to pursue include reviewing staffing levels
across the continent with the goal of aligning staffing to our most
pressing national interests; exploring options for enhancing incentives
for service at hardship posts; and attending to morale and
reinvigorating the sense of public service that attracts professionals
devoted to making a difference for the United States in Africa.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, how will you ensure that the Bureau of African Affairs has the
requisite capacity, including sufficient number of trained contract
officers and staff, to ensure that it can implement, monitor, and
conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will start by reviewing existing capacity
within the Bureau of African Affairs in order to identify any necessary
increases in resources necessary to appropriately implement, monitor,
and conduct appropriate oversight of TSCTP and other programs. I will
work with the leadership of the Department of State to secure required
support. I also commit to working with the committee toward our shared
goal of improving the effectiveness, transparency, and oversight of
TSCTP.
The Africa Bureau has already made a number of changes to respond
to the OIG's recommendations. These include, but are not limited to,
establishing a TSCTP secretariat to facilitate coordination and
implementing best practices around procurement, management, and
oversight of AF-funded TSCTP programs. If confirmed, I will review the
TSCTP and consult with the committee to ensure we have the appropriate
resources, authorities, flexibility, and management controls in place
to meet shared objectives for this important program.
Question. How can the Department of State, in coordination with
other relevant departments and agencies, support our African partners
to manage the activities and impacts better of armed groups on
populations, economies and governance?
Answer. Tailored U.S. diplomatic, development, and human rights-
sensitive security assistance can play a critical role to support peace
and security. While security cooperation is necessary, it is not
sufficient to address the drivers of violence and extremism.
Sustainable gains--whether governance, security, or economic--require a
holistic approach across our government and in coordination with
African and other partners.
If confirmed, I plan to work closely with the Department of
Defense, USAID, other U.S. Government agencies, and our allies and
partners to support African efforts to reduce the activities of armed
groups and support policies and programs that build democratic
governance structures that respect human rights and deliver liberty and
prosperity.
Question. How can the Department of State better address the cross-
border movement of armed groups, including through the development and
execution of regional approaches?
Answer. Armed groups and illicit traffickers exploit weak border
controls and inadequate surveillance but also often benefit from
assistance or indifference from border communities that often are
underserved by governance, administration, security, and economic
opportunities offered by regional and national governments. Addressing
cross-border movement of armed groups requires holistic approaches and
regional cooperation and information-sharing. Working with partners to
build professional, capable, and accountable security and intelligence
services to monitor and secure often vast and porous borders must
complement rather than replace efforts to provide stability and
economic opportunities to vulnerable communities along borders. The
Department of State and our embassies across Africa are committed to
leverage our influence and diplomatic engagements to promote cross-
border collaboration, exercises, information sharing, and coordination
among security sector and civilian entities from neighboring and
regional states to develop improved cross-border protocols,
relationships, and operational effectiveness. Programmatically, the
Africa Bureau is reinvigorating the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism
Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for East Africa
Counterterrorism (PREACT) in part to strategically identify resources
and expertise to address these issues and support regional and sub-
regional efforts in West and East Africa to increase border management
and security.
Question. What are your views on the role trade and investment
could and should play in building stronger ties between the United
States and the African continent? How should U.S.-Africa trade and
investment initiatives factor into the U.S. global strategy to counter
China in Africa?
Answer. We need to do more to boost trade and investment. We want
to be partners in creating responsible and sustainable trade and
investment that secures good livelihoods for both Africans and
Americans. If confirmed, I will advocate for U.S. companies that
provide the world class products, technology, and services that
Africans seek to grow their economies. I commit to working with
interagency partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government
to support this effort and meet the challenges posed by China. The
positive economic contributions to Africa that U.S. companies bring--
robust training, capital, and high labor and environmental standards--
are our best way to compete with strategic competitors such as China.
Question. How can the U.S. Government better promote African
countries as destinations for U.S. private sector foreign investment?
How can the U.S. improve access for African firms seeking to do
business here? How can we best engage the U.S. African diaspora?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken noted in his January 19 testimony to
this committee, the United States, using our economic diplomacy and the
tools of the DFC, USAID, MCC and Treasury, will work with the U.S.
private sector, African Governments, and international financial
institutions to increase trade and investment in Africa and promote
U.S. business. If confirmed, I will ensure our Embassy Deal Teams in
Africa prioritize trade and investment opportunities, as well as
business climate reforms that can provide a strong foundation for
economic growth more generally. I will make full use of all U.S.
Government tools, including through Prosper Africa, to bring
opportunities to the attention of the private sector.
If confirmed, I will make full use of USAID's programs to help
African firms utilize the preferential access provided by the Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act. Likewise, I want to ensure we are making
full use of the SelectUSA program at the Department of Commerce to
promote the United States as an investment destination for African
investors. I agree that we need to work robustly to tap the dynamic
African diaspora in the United States as a partner in promoting greater
two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa. If
confirmed, I will promote active outreach to diaspora organizations as
a vital piece of our engagement.
Question. How can the U.S. Government most effectively support
efforts to improve the enabling environment for competitive foreign
investment by U.S. firms in Africa? What types of partnerships work
best, and how can the U.S. best incentivize reforms and other actions
necessary to foster economic opportunity and expand two-way trade and
investment with the African continent?
Answer. The Prosper Africa initiative can play an important role in
ensuring effective coordination of U.S. Government assistance to
improve investment and business climates toward the overall goal of
expanding trade and investment. U.S. Government programming needs to be
targeted at areas where there is strong host country will to reform. I
believe there is potential to do more in partnership with our private
sector, particularly in the technology area, to incentivize governments
to implement needed reforms, given our firms generally have a clear
sense of what needs to be done. Successful partnerships require clear
goals and expectations.
I noted in my testimony the importance of greater efforts on
governance, human rights, and anti-corruption. I see these areas as
vital components of work to build sound, prosperous economies, and to
attract needed investment. If confirmed, I will also support our soft
power efforts-engaging with youth and encouraging educational
opportunities, that amplify our good governance messaging.
Question. Do you agree that countries like Zimbabwe, South Sudan,
and Somalia are unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper
Africa?
Answer. I agree that Zimbabwe, South Sudan, and Somalia are
currently unsuited for strategic investments under Prosper Africa. I
also believe we should support U.S. businesses and investors across
Africa wherever possible when they see opportunities for increased
trade and investment.
Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, will reinforcing democratic institutions and norms in Africa
be a priority?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, I will prioritize reinforcing democratic institutions
and norms in Africa.
Question. If confirmed, will you commit to ensuring that messaging
from the Bureau of African Affairs and its embassies and leadership
consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values and interests, including
the need to respect democratic institutions and norms, advance human
and political rights, and enhance citizen responsive governance?
Answer. Yes, if confirmed as Assistant Secretary I commit to
ensuring that messaging from the Bureau of African Affairs and its
embassies and leadership consistently reinforce U.S. democratic values
and interests.
Question. If confirmed, how will you engage our French partners to
ensure that we employ a mutually-beneficial partnership across the
Sahel and West and Central Africa that reflects the various points of
leverage and capability the United States and France each bring to the
table?
Answer. Given its colonial history, France has significant ties in
the Sahel and West and Central Africa and concerns about the direct
threats posed to Europe from migration and terrorism. Our shared
priorities include promoting improved security, governance, economic
development, and recovery from COVID-19. France has been a steadfast
partner in the fight against Islamic State-Western Sahara (IS-WS) and
Al Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQIM). If confirmed, in line with President
Biden's direction to revitalize partnerships with key allies, I will
act to sustain and build on the historic strong coordination between
the United States and France, aligning our respective comparative
advantages to holistically address the security and governance
challenges across the region.
Question. How can the U.S. better coordinate with France in Africa
to holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic
engagements, particularly in the Sahel and West and Central Africa,
from a holistic perspective?
Answer. Both France and the United States share security,
governance, and economic development as priorities in the Sahel and
West and Central Africa. These priorities cannot be achieved
independent of one another. If confirmed, I will encourage the French
to use their strong political, economic, security, and cultural
influence toward African political, security, and democratic reforms
that are the best path to long-term stability in these regions, and
work with our interagency to support French objectives when aligned
with ours. The United States and France regularly coordinate on issues
of mutual concern and, if confirmed, I commit to working with France
and our other allies and partners in Europe, including the EU, to
holistically address the security threats and improve diplomatic
engagement across the continent. Specifically, I see continued areas
for improved coordination with our French partners in the Sahel and
towards resolving the crisis Cameroon. As your report on U.S- European
cooperation noted, the significant demographic and economic shifts
underway across the African continent requires a strong transatlantic
alliance, in coordination with our African partners, to collaborate on
countering malign influence, and promoting the growth of healthier,
more stable, democratic societies that share our values and interests.
Question. Political and ethnic tensions and violence in Burundi
have contributed to instability, human rights abuses, and humanitarian
crises in central Africa's Great Lakes region for decades. On June 9,
2020, the Government of Burundi announced that sitting President Pierre
Nkurunziza (age 55) died suddenly of ``cardiac arrest,'' two and a half
months before he was expected to step down following general elections
on May 20, 2020. Nkurunziza's elected successor, CNDD-FDD party head
Evariste Ndayishimiye, was inaugurated in late August, after the
constitutional court upheld his victory with 68% of the vote in the May
2020 elections.
How optimistic are you about deepening ties with the new Burundian
administration under President Ndayishimiye?
Answer. If confirmed, I will need to assess the approach of
President Ndayishimiye's administration and will review Burundi's
progress.
Question. Do you feel that upgrading Burundi's ranking in the State
Department's 2021 Trafficking In Persons Report from Tier 3 to Tier 2
Watch List was warranted based on an objective assessment of progress
made in Burundi on TIP issues?
Answer. I understand that Burundi's 2021 Trafficking in Persons
ranking as Tier 2 Watch List is based on the Burundian Government's
overall increasing effort to counter trafficking in persons. This
effort included increasing investigations and prosecutions of suspected
trafficking offenses, convicting traffickers, and referring victims to
assistance. The Government also developed and implemented the country's
first-ever national data collection system on law enforcement's efforts
to combat human trafficking and trained officials on its use. If
confirmed, I will commit to working with Burundi to ensure it continues
to prioritize countering trafficking in persons.
Question. What additional tools does the United States have at its
disposal to encourage a peaceful and enduring resolution to the
Anglophone conflict in Cameroon?
Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone
regions of Cameroon. Secretary Blinken's decision to restrict the visas
of individuals responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon is a
concrete example of options the Department of State can exercise to
push for peace and dialogue. If confirmed, my focus would be to
continue urging all parties to end violence and to engage in an
inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make clear U.S.
support for the Swiss Government's effort to advance mediation between
the Government and separatist armed group leaders and encourage the
Government to take concrete steps to move this effort forward. I will
also review the different tools we have to hold human rights violators
accountable, including sanctions, and continue the practice of
reviewing security assistance on a case-by-case basis. I will continue
to pursue engagement with France, other likeminded partners, and U.N.
Security Council member states to find ways to promote a peaceful
resolution of the ongoing violence.
Question. How can the United States more effectively encourage
France to use its significant leverage in Cameroon to encourage the
Government to engage in meaningful dialogue and end the conflict?
Answer. The United States and France share an interest in stability
and prosperity in Sub-Saharan Africa and meet regularly to discuss how
to advance those priorities, including the critical effort to press the
parties in Cameroon to pursue an inclusive and constructive path toward
peace and stability. Secretary Blinken regularly consults with his
counterpart French Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian. If confirmed, I
will support ongoing U.S. engagement with France, a key partner in
Cameroon, as well as with the UK, the EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany
and other allies, to align our efforts in support of dialogue to
resolve the Anglophone conflict.
Question. How is the Department mobilizing other partners to assist
Cameroon to find peace and justice, and how do you plan to lead such an
effort once in-country?
Answer. The United States regularly engages allies and U.N.
Security Council member states at the highest level regarding the need
to resolve the Anglophone conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to
strongly engage with France, which is key in this process, the UK, the
EU, Canada, Switzerland, Germany and other key allies both bilaterally
and in multilateral fora to find ways to work together to achieve
tangible progress towards peace.
If confirmed, I will also make clear U.S. support for the Swiss
Government's efforts to advance mediation between the Government and
separatist armed group leaders and encourage the Government to take
concrete steps to move this effort forward. The Department of State can
support the likeminded countries' effort to support the Swiss Process
through coordinated actions and messaging. The process of working with
our allies and NGO partners is a regular on-going effort, which I will
continue with focus and vigor.
Question. What is your perspective on the performance of the
Tshisekedi administration to date?
Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of
building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi
took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the
freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily
detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-
level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that
merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility.
The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed,
I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the
legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and
fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National
Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be
inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in
accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders
to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining
sector and security apparatus.
Question. Is it your assessment that the Tshisekedi administration
is in a position to continue to advance reforms, including in the areas
of anti-corruption and in the security and mining sectors?
Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's and the
Government's goal of building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since
President Tshisekedi took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has
contributed to the freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or
arbitrarily detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the
highest-level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps
that merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility. The recent
inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an historic new chapter
in the country's political history. If confirmed, I will work with our
partners in the DRC to counter pervasive corruption that undermines the
country's institutions and will pursue accountability for corrupt
actors with all tools at our disposal. I will also urge DRC leaders to
heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining sector
and security apparatus.
The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to
stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence,
including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and
human rights abuses and violations to account. If confirmed, I will
urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with the U.N.
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in support of
the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians, reduce
intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.
Question. In your view, how can the United States continue to
support democratic reforms in the DRC, including by enhancing prospects
for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2023?
Answer. If confirmed, I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early
imperative of undertaking the legal, financial, and technical
preparations necessary for free and fair elections in 2023, including
reform of the Independent National Electoral Commission. To be
credible, the 2023 elections must be inclusive, conducted transparently
and impartially, and held in accordance with constitutional deadlines.
Knowing of your longstanding interest in this issue, I will work with
you to ensure we take your views on board in advance, and that we have
the appropriate resources in place to help our Congolese partners with
this important task.
Question. If confirmed, how will you work with Congress and USAID
to ensure the $700 million is programmed efficiently and effectively to
support Sudan's ongoing transition?
Answer. If confirmed, I will stress the importance of timely
consultations with Congress by the Africa Bureau and our USAID
colleagues on the utilization and effective programming of these
appropriated funds. I will also ensure we consult closely with Sudan's
civilian led transitional government to ensure these new resources will
assist the Government to meet the urgent needs of the Sudanese people
at this moment in the transition, and to support efforts related to
human rights and accountability, conflict mitigation, and democracy and
governance, especially in support of marginalized communities long shut
out from having a voice in determining Sudan's future.
Question. If confirmed, do you commit to work with Congress to
ensure the $700 million is programmed appropriately?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I am committed to working with Congress
on the programming of these funds, working closely with USAID to ensure
that funds are used appropriately and effectively in support of Sudan's
transition.
Question. Given that the United States is a significant stakeholder
in ensuring that South Sudan achieves sustainable peace and
development, what diplomatic investments would you make as Secretary of
State bilaterally, regionally, and with multi-lateral institutions?
Answer. Expedited progress on the integration of security forces,
anti-corruption, transitional justice, and a permanent constitutional
process leading to post-transitional elections is key to achieving
sustainable peace and development in South Sudan. If confirmed, I will
make clear to South Sudan's leaders our serious concerns about delays
in implementation of commitments in these areas and look for
opportunities to increase pressure on those officials responsible for
such delays. I would also invigorate the use of all available
diplomatic and development tools to provide support to South Sudanese
civil society and non-governmental organizations seeking positive
change. Additionally, I would consult with regional and international
partners to review critically and comprehensively our current approach
towards South Sudan. I intend to collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to
the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield to ensure that the United Nations
Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has the necessary resources and mandate
to support accelerated implementation of South Sudan's peace process.
Finally, I would continue to prioritize diplomatic efforts to press
South Sudan's leaders to do more to facilitate the unhindered delivery
of humanitarian assistance to the people of South Sudan, to ensure the
safety of humanitarian workers in the country, and to hold accountable
those responsible for growing violence against humanitarian
organizations.
Question. What is your perspective on the ongoing U.S. assistance
review, announced in 2018, for South Sudan? If confirmed, how would you
support a timely conclusion to the assistance review and enable action
on its findings?
Answer. I understand the Biden-Harris administration continues to
evaluate the findings of the assistance review in South Sudan conducted
under the last administration to ensure that programs are being
implemented efficiently and are consistent with our objectives. If
confirmed, I would work to continue this process and ensure that
programs are strategic, effective and have adequate oversight. The
United States Government continues to work to maximize the impact of
our humanitarian assistance in South Sudan and mitigate risks of
diversion or obstruction of aid or perpetuation of kleptocratic
governance.
Question. How would you take a fresh look at U.S. policy in the
Horn of Africa as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs?
Answer. A stable and prosperous Horn of Africa is critical to U.S.
economic and security interests. The external actors who are most
engaged in the Horn are U.S. partners in the Persian Gulf. If
confirmed, I will collaborate with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
to employ U.S. influence and leverage to encourage our Gulf partners to
engage strategically to foster peace and security in the Horn--a shared
goal. I will also consult with the Special Envoy for the Horn of
Africa, Ambassador Jeff Feltman, to review our policy, especially our
engagement with regional and international partners, to hone a coherent
and integrated U.S. approach.
Question. There is broad consensus that U.S. policy toward Somalia
needs reconsideration. What is your perspective on U.S. policy toward
Somaliland? Do you think the U.S. has missed an important opportunity
over the last several years to support and engage more fully with a
more stable and democratic entity at the behest of Mogadishu?
Answer. The United States recognizes a single Somalia, which
includes Somaliland. The United States has maintained a positive
relationship with the authorities in Hargeisa and has encouraged the
Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland to cooperate on issues of
mutual interest and to engage in constructive dialogue on questions
related to Somaliland's status. If confirmed, I am committed to
reviewing U.S. engagement with Somaliland to ensure it effectively
advances U.S. interests, including with respect to our relationship
with Mogadishu.
Question. From your perspective, what tools (including those
currently underutilized) does the United States have at its disposal
that are underutilized to encourage democratic and economic reforms in
Zimbabwe?
Answer. I share the committee's deep concern over the human rights
abuses, economic mismanagement, and kleptocratic behavior that we
continue to see in Zimbabwe. I appreciate this committee's condemnation
of the Government of Zimbabwe's abuse of human rights and repression of
its people. The Department of State, Africa Bureau, and U.S. Embassy in
Harare regularly issue similar condemnations and publicly voice our
support for the courageous Zimbabwean women and men who speak out
against government corruption and abuses.
The United States supports democratic governance programs that
improve electoral processes, refine citizen advocacy strategies, and
enhance public accountability measures. We provide support to those the
Zimbabwean Government singles out for abuse, and we impose targeted
sanctions to promote accountability for corrupt actors and those who
abuse human rights and undermine democratic processes.
But we should continue to look at all options. If confirmed, I will
work with this committee, civil society, regional neighbors, and
likeminded partners to shine a brighter light on the situation in
Zimbabwe so that, together, we can increase the pressure on the
Government of Zimbabwe to respect democratic principles and human
rights. If confirmed, I will work with our interagency partners to use
our sanctions programs to promote accountability for those individuals
who are currently active in corruption and human rights abuses.
Question. An area of considerable debate has been the value of
reincorporating political party programming into the portfolio of U.S.
democracy assistance to Zimbabwe. Do you commit to reviewing the
Department of State's posture on political party support in Zimbabwe?
Answer. Since the 2018 election, the Government of Zimbabwe has
systematically weakened the opposition through manipulated court
rulings, harassment and incarceration of key figures, and thinly veiled
actions to install pliant political figures in parliament.
If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the Department of State's
posture on political party support in Zimbabwe.
Question. What is your assessment of the appropriateness of Nigeria
for this designation?
Answer. The Department is reviewing this designation as part of the
annual process. That process is underway, and the Department will
consider all available information. I take this issue very seriously
and do not wish to prejudge the process or the Secretary's decision.
Question. What is your assessment of the drivers of conflict in
Nigeria? How do the drivers of conflict in Nigeria differ across
geographical regions?
Answer. Nigeria faces growing insecurity on multiple fronts,
including kidnapping and banditry in the North West, insurgency from
the Islamic State in West Africa (ISIS-WA) and Boko Haram in the North
East, communal violence including herder-farmer conflict in various
regions, attacks by Biafran separatists in the South East, and piracy
in the Gulf of Guinea. The drivers of conflict are numerous and
overlapping, and also vary across regions. Experts have cited the
proliferation of small arms, increasing competition over land and water
resources, lack of accountability and access to justice, as well as
politics, ethnicity, and religion among contributing factors.
Ineffective state security responses, poor governance and service
delivery, endemic corruption, and lack of economic opportunity also
create conditions that are ripe for conflict.
The United States is partnering with Nigeria to build more
effective and accountable security forces to better respond to the
country's security challenges and protect civilians. The U.S.
Government also helps Nigerians prevent and mitigate conflict through
our diplomacy, police and justice reform programs, peacebuilding
programs, early warning and early response programs, dialogue efforts,
and development programs.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. How can the United States support a peaceful resolution
of Cameroon's Anglophone conflict?
Answer. I share your concerns about the ongoing violence in
Cameroon and the conflict in the Anglophone region. If confirmed, my
focus would be to continue urging all parties to end violence and to
engage in an inclusive dialogue without preconditions. I would make
clear U.S. support for the Swiss Government's efforts to advance
mediation between the Government and separatist armed group leaders and
encourage the Government to take concrete steps to move this effort
forward. I will also review the different tools we have to hold human
rights violators accountable, including sanctions. I will continue to
pursue engagement with France, key allies, and U.N. Security Council
member states, to find ways to promote a peaceful resolution of the
ongoing violence.
Question. How can the United States balance support for the
counterterrorism campaign in the north with efforts to promote a
peaceful resolution of the Anglophone conflict?
Answer. Cameroon has long played a crucial role in regional
stability. With the protracted crisis in the Central African Republic,
instability in Nigeria, the terrorist threat posed by Boko Haram and
ISIS-West Africa, and increasing incidents of piracy in the Gulf of
Guinea, Cameroon's role as a partner in securing and maintaining
stability in the region is even more important. Since 2018, the
Department has significantly reduced security assistance because the
Government of Cameroon had not taken appropriate action to investigate
credible allegations of gross violations of human rights by its
security forces and hold the perpetrators accountable. If confirmed, I
commit to continuing the practice of reviewing security assistance on a
case-by-case basis to ensure the assistance the United States provides
aligns with U.S. interests, including promotion of respect for human
rights. I will also ensure the Department vets potential recipients of
security assistance, consistent with the Leahy laws, and does not
provide assistance to Cameroonian security force units where there is
credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of
human rights.
Question. Would you advocate the use of sanctions on Cameroonian
officials and others responsible for hindering a resolution of the
Anglophone conflict?
Answer. On June 7, 2021, Secretary Blinken announced that the
United States was taking steps to impose visa restrictions on certain
individuals who are believed to be responsible for, or complicit in,
undermining the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Anglophone
regions of Cameroon. I understand the Department of State continues to
work on expanding visa restrictions on individuals on both sides of the
conflict. Secretary Blinken's decision to implement a visa restrictions
policy on some of those responsible for undermining peace in Cameroon
is the first of many possible approaches the Department of State can
take to push for peace and dialogue. It has encouraged both the UK and
the EU to look at utilizing their new sanctions laws. It is yet another
sign of the commitment to back up words with actions. If confirmed, I
will consider all the tools at our disposal aimed at promoting a
peaceful resolution of the ongoing violence which has resulted in much
suffering and threatens to become even more critical day by day.
Question. According to the U.N., nearly 5.2 million of the Tigray
region's 5.7 million people are in need of emergency food assistance,
and more than 2 million have been displaced by violence. U.N.
humanitarian agencies have scaled up to meet the needs of civilians in
Tigray, distributing food aid to more than 1.4 million people and
working to reach people with shelter, clean water, hygiene supplies,
and other critical relief items and services. The U.N. is also working
to identify and provide support to survivors of gender-based violence,
which has been widespread during the conflict. Unfortunately, the U.N.
and its partners are only able to help a fraction of the people in need
because parties to the conflict-largely the Ethiopian and Eritrean
militaries-continue to block humanitarian access to large parts of the
region.
How is the administration working to address this issue?
Answer. Intensified conflict in western Tigray and the expansion of
conflict into the neighboring Afar region has effectively blocked
overland access for humanitarian supplies. In light of these recent
developments, the Biden-Harris administration has prioritized the
establishment of direct talks between the Ethiopian Government and the
Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) with the aim of achieving a
negotiated ceasefire. Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Jeffrey
Feltman is working in close coordination with international partners to
create the necessary conditions for such talks to occur. Ending
hostilities is an essential component of ensuring that sufficient
humanitarian supplies can reach the Tigray region. In addition, the
Biden-Harris administration has taken a number of steps to press all
parties to provide unhindered humanitarian access. On May 23, we put in
place a visa restriction policy under Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act for any current or former Ethiopian or
Eritrean Government officials, members of the security forces, or other
individuals-to include Amhara regional and irregular forces and members
of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF)-responsible for, or
complicit in undermining resolution of the crisis in Tigray. This
includes those who have conducted wrongful violence or other abuses
against people in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, as well as those who
have hindered access of humanitarian assistance to those in the region.
If confirmed, I would carefully review the option of implementing
additional sanctions against those who are preventing access to
humanitarian assistance. It will also be important to continue to
encourage our likeminded partners to support such targeted sanctions.
Question. What leverage or pressure points do we have with the
Ethiopian Government that can be brought to bear to ensure that the
U.N. and other humanitarian actors are able to access vulnerable
communities?
Answer. Sustained diplomatic engagement with all parties to the
conflict is essential to press for unhindered humanitarian access. If
confirmed, I would work closely with our Ambassador, Special Envoy
Feltman, and international partners to continue to make clear to the
Ethiopian Government its responsibility in this regard and the impact
of interference with humanitarian assistance on our bilateral
relationship. The Biden-Harris administration has already ended most
non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance programming
to Ethiopia. The Department of State has established a visa restriction
policy including on those who have hindered humanitarian access to
those in the Tigray region. If confirmed, I would carefully review the
option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are
preventing access to humanitarian assistance.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Hon. Mary Catherine Phee by Senator Cory A. Booker
Question. What next-level plans and programs does the United States
Government have prepared to increase pressure on those who are
responsible for perpetuating violence and instability in the region?
Answer. In addition to the visa restriction policy under Section
212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act announced by
Secretary Blinken on May 23 with regard to the issuance of visas for
any current or former Ethiopian or Eritrean Government officials,
members of the security forces, or other individuals-to include Amhara
regional and irregular forces and members of the Tigray People's
Liberation Front (TPLF)-responsible for, or complicit in, undermining
resolution of the crisis in Tigray, the Biden-Harris administration has
ended most non-humanitarian U.S. development and security assistance
programming to Ethiopia. If confirmed, I would carefully review the
option of implementing additional sanctions against those who are
undermining resolution of the conflict, who are engaging in human
rights abuses, violations, or atrocities, or who are preventing access
to humanitarian assistance. These could include Global Magnitsky
designations under E.O. 13818 and a new Executive Order (E.O.)
establishing a Tigray-specific sanctions regime. It will also be
important to continue to encourage our likeminded partners to support
such targeted sanctions. The goal of these measures is to increase
pressure on all the parties to the conflict to agree to an immediate
negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights abuses and
violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray region.
Question. What measures does the State Department intend to take to
hold Prime Minister Abiy accountable for ignoring, misleading, and
deflecting the international community while civilians were facing
grave human rights abuses?
Answer. In concert with international partners, the Biden-Harris
administration has consistently called out human rights abuses
committed by all parties to the conflict, including the Ethiopian
Government, and stressed the need for accountability. Because of
concern about human rights violations, abuses, and atrocities, the
Biden-Harris administration has suspended most non-humanitarian U.S.
development and security assistance to Ethiopia and established a visa
restriction policy. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing the feasibility
of additional measures, such as imposition of targeted Global Magnitsky
sanctions and a new Executive Order establishing a Tigray-specific
sanctions regime. At the United Nations, the United States played a
leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security Council on
July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press for
additional action by the Security Council. The United States also
worked with partners on the U.N. Human Rights Council to successfully
arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution
that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights
Commission, and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes.
Additionally, the Department of State is exploring support for
additional documentation and associated accountability and transitional
justice options that could be used to address atrocities and other
abuses that have been and continue to be committed by parties to the
conflict in Tigray. If confirmed, I am committed to employing U.S.
leverage and influence to hold all parties to the conflict to account.
Question. What are our like-minded partners in Europe and elsewhere
doing to help address these concerns?
Answer. I understand that the Department of State is working in
close coordination with the G7 and other like-minded partners to
increase pressure on all parties to the conflict to agree to an
immediate negotiated cessation of hostilities, an end to human rights
abuses and violations, and unhindered humanitarian access to the Tigray
region.
The Department of State is also collaborating with international
partners in an effort to open communication among the parties to the
conflict with the goal of achieving an immediate negotiated ceasefire.
Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and other State
Department officials coordinate closely with an Ethiopia contact group
of like-minded international partners. Special Envoy Feltman is
actively engaging with influential counties such as the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Kenya, and Sudan. At the United Nations, the United States
played a leading role in arranging an open meeting of the Security
Council on July 2 on the situation in Tigray and is continuing to press
for additional action by the Security Council. The United States also
worked with partners on the U.N. Human Rights Council to successfully
arrange for the adoption of a Tigray-specific human rights resolution
that calls for ongoing joint investigations by the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission
and mandates reporting on their progress and outcomes. If confirmed, I
commit to sustaining these intensive efforts to work with like-minded
partners.
Question. What is the Biden administration's policy position on
Somalia? What role should the United States play in helping to address
armed conflict, terrorism, and political crisis in the country? What
changes, if any, would you seek to State Department-administered
security assistance programs in Somalia?
Answer. The Biden-Harris administration supports efforts to advance
peace and security in Somalia by countering the threat from al Shabaab
and ISIS-Somalia operating in the country. This effort addresses the
drivers of instability by promoting democratic governance and market-
oriented economic reforms that are necessary for lasting stability. It
is imperative that the United States continue to coordinate closely
with the Somalis and international partners, such as the United
Nations, the African Union, Somalia's neighbors, the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Gulf states, to tackle the country's
considerable security and political challenges. If confirmed, I am
committed to reviewing State Department-administered security
assistance in Somalia to ensure these programs are effectively and
efficiently advancing our policy goals.
Question. Two of the largest troop contributing countries to
AMISOM, Ethiopia and Uganda, are credibly accused of committing serious
human rights violations at home. Has the time come to seek a new
configuration and/or new partners for AMISOM?
Answer. Somalia continues to require regional and international
support to mitigate the threats from al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia and
address the drivers of instability. While AMISOM has played an
important role during the past 10 years in liberating territory from
al-Shabaab and stabilizing parts of Somalia, reconfiguring the mission
(1) to better respond to the terrorist threats and (2) to transfer
increasing security responsibility to Somalia's security forces must be
a priority during upcoming negotiations for a new mandate in 2022. I
agree that troubling new developments in the region should also be
considered in upcoming negotiations. If confirmed, I commit to working
with the African Union, the United Nations, and individual AMISOM troop
contributing countries to ensure that personnel are properly vetted,
follow the rules of armed conflict, and respect human rights. There is
a need to engage the AU and the U.N. in a timely and credible process
to identify and remove potential troop contributors that may be
implicated in human rights abuses.
Question. Would we not be better off with partners that will not
use the threat of pulling their troops from AMISOM as leverage for
getting the United States and others to refrain from taking a hard
stance on corruption and human rights abuses in their home countries?
Answer. AMISOM troop contributing countries (TCCs) participate in
the mission because it serves their interests to mitigate the threat
from al-Shabaab to their own countries. I am not aware of a serious
threat to withdraw troops from Somalia, despite occasional resistance
to U.S. efforts to combat corruption and human rights abuses in TCC
capitals.
Ethiopia/Sudan Border Dispute
Question. A long simmering border dispute between Sudan and
Ethiopia in the al-Fashaga region of Sudan appears on the brink of
turning hot. The United Arab Emirates had, for a time, taken the lead
on mediating this dispute, but their role is no longer clear.
Who is currently leading the mediation effort in this long-running
dispute?
Answer. I share your concern about the risk of escalating tension
between Sudan and Ethiopia generated by a military buildup and recent
violence along the border of Ethiopia and Sudan in the al-Fashaga area.
My understanding is that the UAE initiative is currently inactive. If
confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy for the Horn of
Africa Ambassador Feltman and U.S. embassies in Addis Ababa and
Khartoum to encourage both governments to engage in constructive
dialogue to deescalate tensions as part of a U.S. Horn strategy to
address the interlinked political, security, and humanitarian crises in
the region. I will also engage international and regional partners,
including the UAE, to explore ways to persuade the two parties to agree
to a mutually acceptable resolution.
Question. What is the Department doing to alleviate the pressure on
this potential hot spot?
Answer. The Department of State continues to engage the two parties
to press for a de-escalation of tensions and to call for no further
violence. If confirmed, I will join the efforts of Special Envoy for
the Horn of Africa Ambassador Feltman and the U.S. embassies in Addis
Ababa and Khartoum to press the two parties to find a mutually
acceptable resolution in coordination with international and regional
partners.
Question. How confident are you in President Tshisekedi's
commitment to advance reforms in the mining sector, state security
apparatus, and election process?
Answer. The United States supports President Tshisekedi's goal of
building a more peaceful and prosperous DRC. Since President Tshisekedi
took office in 2019, the U.S.-DRC partnership has contributed to the
freeing of individuals who have been unlawfully or arbitrarily
detained; establishment of an anti-trafficking agency; the highest-
level corruption conviction in DRC history; and related steps that
merited the reinstatement of DRC's AGOA eligibility.
The recent inauguration of a new cabinet in the DRC opened an
historic new chapter in the country's political history. If confirmed,
I will emphasize to DRC leaders the early imperative of undertaking the
legal, financial, and technical preparations necessary for free and
fair elections in 2023, including reform of the Independent National
Electoral Commission. To be credible, those elections must be
inclusive, conducted transparently and impartially, and held in
accordance with constitutional deadlines. I will also urge DRC leaders
to heed the calls of the Congolese people for reforms in the mining
sector and security apparatus.
Question. The DRC holds over 51 percent of the global cobalt
reserves and produces nearly 70 percent of the total cobalt feedstock
globally. Underpinned by huge demand for from the battery sector,
competition for control over global cobalt feedstock supply chains has
intensified in recent years. What is the Department of State doing to
support more responsible trade missions and U.S. commercial delegations
to the DRC and to assist the DRC's efforts to improve the transparency
of its minerals trade, including strong support for implementation of
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), beneficial
ownership transparency, and the formalization of the artisanal mining
sector?
Answer. The United States is working with the DRC Government to
bolster economic opportunities for all Congolese, including by
establishing conditions that attract American companies to the DRC,
expand trade, advance gender equality and women's entrepreneurship, and
encourage business climate reforms to promote inclusive development.
The reinstatement of the DRC's AGOA eligibility on January 1, 2021,
affirmed the Tshisekedi Government's positive progress on reform, and
bolstered our effort to expand U.S.-DRC commercial ties to benefit
workers in both countries.
The United States supports responsible minerals sourcing and
trading and works closely with the private sector to support conflict-
free minerals supply chains, emphasizing compliance with section 1502
of the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act. The Public-Private Alliance for Responsible
Minerals (PPA), forged by the Department of State, USAID, and the
Department of Labor and inclusive of U.S. companies and civil society
organizations, seeks to improve due diligence and develop the
governance systems needed for ethical supply chains of critical
minerals in the DRC and Great Lakes region. PPA programming also aims
to increase transparency and monitoring of child labor in artisanal
mining in the DRC's cobalt supply chain while building government
capacity to do the same.
The United States has been one of the strongest supporters of the
EITI since its founding in 2003. In addition to providing financial
support, as well as capacity building to improve EITI's financial
management and operational effectiveness, the Department of State
serves on the EITI International Board. In a related initiative, the
Department of State is supporting improvements to the governance of the
DRC's mining royalties with a Fiscal Transparent Innovation Fund grant
to the Carter Center.
Finally, the Critical Minerals Security Initiative provides the
Department of State with a new tool to engage U.S. companies operating
in the critical materials and minerals supply chain in countries such
as the DRC. If confirmed, I commit to supporting and expanding these
efforts to promote responsible minerals sourcing and trade.
Question. What are the prospects for regional military operations
and the imposition of martial law in eastern DRC to address the
security and humanitarian crisis in the region?
Answer. The United States remains deeply concerned about continued
violence, humanitarian crises, and allegations of human rights abuses
and violations in eastern DRC. The expanding role of ISIS-DRC and other
armed groups in conducting horrific acts against civilians is of
particular concern. To tackle these challenges, the United States has
called for an end to the violence, justice and accountability for those
responsible, the professionalization of state security services, and
inclusion of local communities and the U.N. Organization Stabilization
Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in peace and reconciliation efforts.
The United States supports the Congolese Government's efforts to
stabilize eastern DRC by addressing the drivers of escalating violence,
including holding those in the military responsible for corruption and
human rights abuses and violations to account. We have reiterated this
message since the Government imposed a ``state of siege'' in two
provinces in eastern DRC most affected by the conflict. If confirmed, I
will urge the Congolese Government to continue to work with MONUSCO in
support of the peacekeeping mission's efforts to protect civilians,
reduce intercommunal tensions, and strengthen state institutions.
We welcome President Tshisekedi's diplomatic outreach to the DRC's
neighbors. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic solutions and cross-
border cooperation. As appropriate, I will share the U.S. view that any
potential regional military cooperation must be conducted in a
transparent manner in coordination with the DRC Government and MONUSCO.
Question. What changes, if any, would you seek to the U.N.
peacekeeping operation in DRC, MONUSCO?
Answer. The U.N. plays a critical role in the stabilization of the
DRC, particularly in eastern DRC, where armed group violence remains
widespread. The MONUSCO mandate, last renewed in December 2020,
prioritizes tasks to protect civilians, support stabilization efforts,
and strengthen state institutions. MONUSCO has transitioned out of the
Kasai provinces due to favorable gains in security and is scheduled to
transition out of Tanganyika province by mid-2022 as part of a
responsible, conditions-based transition to allow for more resources to
focus on North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri provinces.
The Department of State continues to promote reforms to support the
offensive operations mandate of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB),
including through the addition of new units and improved operational
capabilities. If confirmed, I will collaborate with U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield to encourage MONUSCO to
improve its ability to protect civilians, conduct effective quick-
reaction operations, and build state capacity in support of sustainable
peace in this restive region.
Question. What is the Department doing in response to the
Government of Nigeria's growing levels of intolerance for universal
human rights and freedoms?
Answer. President Biden has charged us with restoring democracy and
human rights to the forefront of U.S. diplomacy. Advocacy for human
rights and fundamental freedoms is foundational to our relationship
with Nigeria, Africa's largest democracy. The United States is engaging
Nigeria's Government at the highest levels to urge Nigerian leaders to
uphold their country's constitution and our shared democratic
principles. The Department of State spoke clearly when Nigeria recently
suspended Twitter operations. If confirmed, I commit to engaging
directly about these foundational rights.
The Department of State also supports programs to strengthen the
capacity of government institutions and civil society to promote
respect for human rights. Of note, the Department of State supported
the demands of Nigerian civil society who successfully pressed for the
establishment of judicial panels of inquiry in 28 Nigerian states to
examine allegations of human rights violations and abuses by Nigeria's
now-defunct Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) and the Nigerian Police
Force.
Question. What efforts does the Department have underway and in the
planning process to assist journalists and protesters in Nigeria to
exercise their rights to freedom of association and freedom of
expression?
Answer. The Department of State is committed to partnering with
Nigerian journalists and civil society activists who, despite facing
many hardships and risks, are highly active and well-established, and
in many respects serve as a model for the continent. The Department of
State employs a range of foreign policy tools to promote media freedom,
including public messaging; sanctions and visa restrictions; and
foreign assistance programming. In addition to multi-donor-funded
initiatives like the Lifeline Fund for Embattled CSOs, the Department
of State has established emergency mechanisms to respond to specific
needs of journalists in crisis. If confirmed, I will prioritize support
for and engagement with journalists and civil society.
Question. What impacts have reported abuses by Nigerian security
forces had on U.S.-Nigeria military relations?
Answer. Nigeria faces multiple drivers of instability: a terrorist
threat from ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram, entrenched insurgencies,
banditry, pastoralist/farmer conflict, ethnic divisions, piracy in the
Gulf of Guinea, a rising separatist movement in the South, and
widespread criminality. In contending with these challenges, Nigerian
security forces have committed incidents of human rights violations and
abuses. In response, the U.S. Government has limited--in line with our
laws and policies--the provision of certain military training and
capabilities that could otherwise be useful to Nigeria in combatting
these security challenges. To address the parallel priorities of
security and human rights, the Biden-Harris administration is committed
to engaging with the Nigerian Government and security services to
support the institutional reforms and improved professionalism that
will promote conduct that respects human rights. In seeking U.S.
military sales that include mandatory training and maintenance
programs, the Nigerian Government has shown a commitment to the
investments and security sector institutional reforms that will enable
the expansion of U.S.-Nigeria military relations and the improvement of
Nigerian security capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work with the Nigerian Government to actively
promote the professionalization of their security forces to reinforce
the importance of civilian protection and respect for human rights. I
will urge the Nigerian Government to hold security force elements
accountable for human rights abuses and violations.
Question. To what extent does China's engagement in Africa threaten
U.S. interests? How should the United States respond?
Answer. As Secretary Blinken has said, there are adversarial,
competitive, and cooperative aspects of our relationship with China,
and this dynamic applies to our respective partnerships in Africa. Our
best asset will be a dynamic and affirmative U.S. policy agenda that
enlists African partners in building free market democracies that offer
liberty and prosperity and realize the continent's full potential.
Africans and Americans alike support democracy, the rule of law,
open competition, and human rights. This robust foundation will help us
achieve a mutually beneficial relationship.
If confirmed, I commit to working with Congress and interagency
partners to mobilize all the tools of the U.S. Government to boost
socially responsible and climate-friendly trade and investment that
secures good livelihoods for both African and American workers.
Following the President's lead, I will liaise with the EU, the G-7 and
other likeminded partners to engage African partners in the struggle to
uphold the international rules-based order, in line with the guidelines
in the Strategic Competition Act.
Question. Are there any areas where cooperation with China might
advance U.S. goals?
Answer. Where cooperation might advance U.S. goals, such as efforts
to promote peace and stability, we will consider collaboration. If
confirmed, I am committed to working with you to ensure American values
and interests prevail.
Question. What is the administration's approach to supporting
COVID-19 responses in Africa?
Answer. Recognizing the devastating human loss and the debilitating
second-order economic impacts of COVID-19, the Biden-Harris
administration has committed to providing and supporting the rollout of
COVID-19 vaccines across Africa. This commitment includes activities
that will support public health and case management interventions to
stop transmissions and mitigate the impacts of the pandemic across
Africa. In May, President Biden committed to sharing 80 million COVID-
19 doses from the U.S. supply with the world. In total 25 million of
these doses are being shared with Africa and distribution has been
coordinated closely with the African Union and COVAX. Of this
allotment, more than one million doses have thus far been donated to
Africa, with Djibouti being the first African country to receive
vaccine doses on July 17. The President subsequently committed the
United States to provide 500 million doses of Pfizer vaccine to Gavi
for distribution via COVAX to 92 low- and lower-middle-income economies
as defined by Gavi's COVAX Advance Market Commitment (AMC), and to the
African Union. Almost half of the COVAX AMC countries are in Africa.
The Biden-Harris administration is also supporting the expansion of
vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa. The U.S. International
Development Finance Corporation (DFC), with international partners,
announced on June 30 a financing package for Aspen, Africa's largest
manufacturer of pharmaceuticals located in South Africa, to increase
production capacity for COVID-19 vaccines, and on July 9 U.S. announced
its commitment to support Fondation Institut Pasteur de Dakar (IPD) to
boost vaccine production in Senegal.
Finally, since the start of the pandemic, the Department of State
and U.S. Agency for International Development have provided roughly
$541 million in health, humanitarian, and economic support assistance
to more than 40 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Biden-Harris
administration will also provide additional foreign assistance under
the American Rescue Plan Act to Sub-Saharan Africa to support COVID-19
vaccine preparedness and delivery activities to ensure `shots in the
arms' of African people. In addition, this funding will support public
health efforts, strengthen case management, and interventions to stop
and help mitigate the pandemic's effects on economic growth, food
security, education, democracy, and women and girls.
Question. The Biden administration just announced that it was
sending 25 million vaccines to three African countries--Burkina Faso,
Djibouti, and Ethiopia. In your view, what are the key challenges to
more effective vaccine distribution?
Answer. Over the last two decades, the U.S. Government invested
roughly $100 billion in Africa's public health infrastructure. The
result is strong systems that allowed partner countries to prepare for
and respond rapidly to COVID-19. Rapid and equitable distribution of
novel COVID-19 vaccines, however, is a complex operational challenge
with legal, regulatory, logistics and cold chain considerations. Thanks
to Congressionally-appropriated funding from the American Rescue Plan
Act, the U.S. Government is supporting vaccine preparedness in Sub-
Saharan Africa, working with international partners and COVAX to
provide technical assistance, logistics support, build cold chain
capacity, and enhance vaccine absorptive capacity. To date, U.S.-
supplied vaccines have been successfully donated to four African
countries, and COVAX has delivered vaccines to over 40 sub-Saharan
African countries. As in the United States, vaccine hesitancy in Africa
remains a concern. To respond, the United States partners every day
with national and local African health ministries and services, as well
as international and NGO partners, in support of messaging campaigns to
address vaccine hesitancy in African populations as well as to confront
COVID-19 vaccine mis- and disinformation.
__________
Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky by Senator Robert Menendez
Stabilization Priorities:
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when
assessing whether the United States should engage more closely in
conflict-affected countries and regions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue CSO's efforts to incorporate
data, evidence, and quantitative and qualitative methods into policy-
making and prioritization when assessing whether the United States
should engage more closely in conflict-affected countries and regions.
CSO's analytical tools, such as the Instability Monitoring and Analysis
Platform (IMAP), provide global data analytics on state fragility,
instability, and conflict. CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate
change, the COVID-19 pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses,
and democratic backsliding to understand how these factors impact
conflict risk and how targeted interventions might mitigate these
trends.
Question. With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or
regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of
occurring where you believe the United States should consider
dedicating more resources and attention?
Answer. Several countries, such as those laid out in this year's
report to Congress pursuant to the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities
Prevention Act of 2018, including Ethiopia and Burma, warrant increased
attention and action, and it will be critical to monitor and address
the broader, regional impact of the situations in these countries.
CSO Role in Preventing Conflict and Promoting Stability
Question. In addition to the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency
for International Development, and other federal agencies, the State
Department's regional bureaus, Office of Foreign Assistance, and Chiefs
of Mission are responsible for elements of the U.S. Government's
efforts to prevent conflict and promote stability abroad.
With this in mind, if confirmed, in what areas do you anticipate
directing the CSO Bureau to play a leading role in these
efforts, including through the work of CSO stabilization
advisors in the field?
Answer. If confirmed, and in support of the Under Secretary for
Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, I will direct CSO to
continue its leading role in coordinating the U.S. Government's efforts
to implement the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of
2018, 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review, and Global Fragility Act
(2019) while integrating and advancing the Women, Peace, and Security
Act (2017) as a cross-cutting priority. CSO informs key U.S.
strategies, policies, and programs on conflict prevention and
stabilization by combining quantitative data analytics with the
qualitative expertise of its stabilization advisors, particularly in
peace process support, security sector stabilization, and strategic
prevention. Deployed CSO stabilization advisors provide technical
conflict and stabilization expertise to DOD Geographic Combatant
Commands and to U.S. embassies in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle
East, and the Western Hemisphere.
Question. Similarly, where is the Bureau better positioned to play
a complementary role in efforts led by other agencies and State
Department bureaus?
Answer. Given its unique conflict expertise and advanced analytics
tools, CSO complements other U.S. Government efforts to prevent
conflict and promote stability by deploying Stabilization Advisors,
harnessing data analytics, and leading, informing, and implementing
policy and programs on conflict prevention and stabilization. If
confirmed, I will continue CSO's close coordination with other State
Department bureaus and other agencies, including the J Family Bureaus,
the Office of Foreign Assistance, USAID's Bureau of Conflict Prevention
and Stabilization (CPS), the Department of Defense Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense, and the Department of Treasury.
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Many analysts have expressed
concern regarding the potential impacts of COVID-19 on fragile states.
Question. How would you prioritize addressing COVID-19-related
challenges in the context of the many risk factors capable of
exacerbating violence and instability in fragile states?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure CSO continues to consider the
impact of COVID-19 as a risk factor for instability and the interacting
effects of COVID-19 and other drivers of conflict. CSO is currently
monitoring the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on countries
experiencing fragility, including through disruptions to remittances
and tourism revenues and the general capacity of states' ability to
deliver medical and other services to their citizens. CSO is also
monitoring state repression through exploiting lockdowns, delays in
elections, and other warning signs of democratic backsliding. I will
ensure this work continues, and I will work across the department and
interagency to investigate how targeted outreach and programming may
mitigate COVID-19-related challenges.
Leveraging CSO Data Analytics: Former CSO officials have identified
a need to ensure that CSO data analytics tools are utilized by other
State Department officials and bureaus in policy and programming
decisions.
Question. Please share your understanding of how the State
Department is currently leveraging CSO's analytics tools, such as its
Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform? If confirmed, how, if at
all, would you work to ensure these tools are used more widely?
Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that CSO's analytics
capabilities and tools continue to be incorporated into all aspects of
CSO's work, including support for the Global Fragility Act (GFA), the
Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, and the
Women, Peace, and Security Act. Since October 2019, CSO's analytics
products have been requested and utilized by more than 50 State
Department bureaus and embassies. CSO's Instability Monitoring and
Analysis Platform (IMAP) provides all State Department employees and
select interagency partners with global data analytics on state
fragility, instability, and conflict, supporting the administration's
policy to make evidence-based decisions guided by the best available
data. I am eager to work with Congress to ensure that robust analytics
continue to play a key role in CSO's work and to expanding
opportunities for analytics to improve policies and programs at all
levels.
CSO's Role in Atrocity Prevention
Question. What is CSO's role in interagency efforts related to
atrocity prevention? And, what are the specific activities CSO has
engaged in related to atrocity prevention?
Answer. CSO supports the National Security Council process to
coordinate interagency implementation of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and
Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Elie Wiesel Act) and serves as the
Secretariat of the White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force.
In collaboration with other bureaus and agencies, CSO provides atrocity
risk assessments for countries of concern and develops atrocity risk
response plans targeted at likely pathways or scenarios to atrocities.
CSO produces a classified quarterly Early Warning Assessment that
identifies countries at risk of large-scale and deliberate civilian
killings, a key indicator of potential atrocity. This assessment is one
of three primary risk lists the Task Force uses to guide and prioritize
its efforts. CSO funds a small amount of atrocity prevention
programming, complementing efforts of other bureaus and agencies. To
fulfill the Elie Wiesel Act's mandatory training requirements, CSO
worked closely with stakeholders to develop the Department's first
virtual atrocity prevention training that has trained over 2,700
Department personnel since its launch in February, 2020.
Role of Women in Conflict Stabilization
Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, will you direct the CSO
Bureau to continue implementing the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and
Security and elements of the Global Fragility Strategy focused on
encouraging the meaningful participation of women in processes
connected to peace and security?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support CSO's robust Women, Peace, and
Security (WPS) efforts. CSO works closely with the Secretary's Office
of Global Women's Issues, among others, to ensure that conflict-
sensitive gender analyses, data on gender-based violence, and
meaningful consultations with local women and girls will inform the
development, implementation, and monitoring of GFA implementation
efforts. CSO developed a new Gender Analysis of Conflict Tool to guide
more nuanced assessments of how gender norms drive both men and women
towards violence or peace.
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Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Anne A. Witkowsky by Senator James E. Risch
Mission and Mandate
Question. In your view, what is the Bureau for Conflict and
Stabilization Operations' mandate? Is CSO principally charged with
policy formulation, program implementation, both, or none of the above?
If confirmed, how would you work with the relevant regional and
functional bureaus within the Department of State and with the
relevant regional and functional bureaus at USAID to clarify
roles and responsibilities, ensure unity of effort, and reduce
duplication and waste?
Answer. CSO's mandate is to anticipate, prevent, and respond to
conflict that undermines U.S. national interests. CSO is charged with
both policy formulation and program implementation. Among CSO's highest
policy priorities are coordinating interagency implementation of the
Global Fragility Act (2019), the 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review,
and Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018.
It is my understanding that CSO coordinates closely with other
bureaus and agencies, and I am committed to ensuring unity of effort
and preventing duplication, particularly among State, USAID and the
Department of Defense. If confirmed, I will reinforce current
coordination efforts to implement policy priorities.
Global Fragility Act
Question. In your view, what role should CSO play in country
selection, strategy design, and program implementation under the Global
Fragility Act?
Answer. If confirmed, I pledge to work closely with my colleagues
in the White House, across the U.S. interagency in Washington and the
field, and with multilateral partners and civil society, to ensure full
implementation of the Global Fragility Act (GFA), including country
selection, strategy design, and program implementation. CSO's expertise
and coordination role will be critical to innovative implementation of
the GFA and will advance ongoing learning, monitoring, and adaptive
management to inform policy and programming decisions.
Question. Does CSO have the authority to act as arbiter of disputes
between the relevant Federal departments and agencies charged with
implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S. embassies in
selected partner countries?
Answer. CSO does not currently have formal authority to act as
arbiter of disputes among the relevant Federal departments and agencies
charged with implementing the Global Fragility Act, to include U.S.
embassies in selected partner countries. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the White House, across the U.S. interagency including
embassies and missions in the field, and with multilateral partners and
civil society to implement fully the Global Fragility Act. I will work
to enhance CSO's coordinating role and build consensus among all
involved.
Data, Analytics, and Early Warning
Question. The White House-led Atrocity Early Warning Task Force
(the Task Force) was designed to serve as a focal point for the
relevant Federal departments and agencies, policy makers, and civil
society working to identify and address the early warning signs of
atrocities.
If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that existing and
future data analytics and forecasting tools developed and
managed by CSO are relevant and readily available for use
within the Department, and by overseas missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO commits and advocates
for the necessary resources to keep its data analytics tools and
capabilities freely available to support the Department and its
overseas missions. My understanding is that all State Department
employees and select interagency partners are able to freely access
CSO's Instability Monitoring and Analysis Platform (IMAP) which
includes global data analytics on conflict and instability, forecasting
tools, and past reports and products. I look forward to engaging with
you further on evidence-based policy making.
Question. What is the task force's role in identifying security
priorities and regional policy?
Answer. The Atrocity Early Warning Task Force (AEWTF) coordinates a
whole-of-government approach to strengthen the U.S. Government's
ability to forecast, prevent, and respond to atrocities. To inform
security and regional policy development, the Task Force conducts
global atrocity risk forecasting, using both quantitative and
qualitative methods, and shares early warning signs with policy
decision-makers. The Task Force has worked closely with relevant
regional directorates to conduct atrocity risk assessments and produce
corresponding atrocity risk response plans for at-risk countries. The
AEWTF is a functional Interagency Policy Committee, for which close and
ongoing partnership with regional directorates and policy processes is
critical. If confirmed, I will support CSO's role in atrocity
prevention, which President Biden reaffirmed as a core moral obligation
and national security priority for the United States.
Question. How does the task force define success?
Answer. My understanding is that the Atrocity Early Warning Task
Force defines success as early warning leading to early action. This
process includes early identification and communication of atrocity
risk, development of atrocity risk assessments and response plans for
countries at-risk, and securing long-term attention through integration
of atrocity prevention in existing regional policy processes.
Question. What efforts can the task force undertake to amplify
public messaging on signs of atrocities and/or other conflict
indicators?
Answer. Pursuant to recommendations engendered by the Elie Wiesel
Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018, the Atrocity Early
Warning Task Force has progressed on improving public messaging through
civil society, Hill, and public engagements. The 2021 congressional
report - released by Secretary Blinken - sent a clear signal that the
U.S. Government will publicly call out atrocities that have occurred or
are ongoing - a strong risk factor for further atrocities. These
efforts can be useful to shed light on, and raise the costs for,
perpetrators of potential or ongoing atrocities, but their use must be
weighed carefully according to context. If confirmed, I will evaluate
where CSO should recommend the Task Force amplify its public messaging.
Question. If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations (CSO) remains engaged in the Department's
efforts to address the on-going crisis in Afghanistan through peace
process support, atrocity prevention, and stabilization initiatives.
CSO will continue to provide technical support to the U.S. Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation (SRAR) and others
involved in the negotiations. CSO will continue to participate in the
interagency processes to mitigate atrocity risks facing women and
minorities via planning discussions, recommendations for short- and
long-term civilian protection, and atrocity risk analysis.
Question. If confirmed, how would the Bureau of Conflict and
Stabilization Operations address the on-going crisis in Tigray?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO contributes to
Department efforts to address the on-going crisis in Tigray by urging
Ethiopians to come together to confront growing divisions. CSO
currently supports efforts to promote a negotiated ceasefire and
inclusive political dialogue to end the conflict in Tigray. CSO stands
ready to support preparations to assist Ethiopians to advance post-
election dialogue and national reconciliation in Ethiopia.
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Responses to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
to Ms. Anne A, Witkowsky by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Ethiopia
Question. As the second most populous country in the African
continent and given its recent transition toward democracy in 2018 with
the election of Prime Minister Abiy. With the recent June 21 general
election and allegations of irregularities in the voting process,
conflict and violence are expected to increase. The political violence
has proven to have devastating impacts on the country, from disrupting
Ethiopia's response to the COVID pandemic to the famine in the Tigray
region which is reported to have spawned the most severe hunger crisis
the world has seen in more than a decade. CSO's mission includes both
conflict-resolution as well as crisis mitigation in regions determined
to be vital to American interests.
Does the current conflict in Ethiopia pose a threat to American
interests and if so, in what ways?
Answer. Yes. A secure, stable, peaceful, and developing Horn of
Africa is critical to U.S. economic and security interests. Conflict
and instability in Ethiopia adversely affect the entire Horn of Africa
region. The United States has a strong interest in supporting democracy
and human rights overseas, and the current conflict undermines these
efforts. For that reason, the Biden-Harris administration has urged all
parties to end the hostilities, pursue a negotiated ceasefire and
inclusive political solution, and hold accountable all those
responsible for human rights violations and abuses.
Question. What steps could CSO take to ensure a fair and verifiable
election to help secure democracy in Ethiopia and prevent further loss
of life in the region? Is there a role for the bureau in such a
situation?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that CSO continues to join
Department leadership in supporting Ethiopians who exercised their
right to vote on June 21. The Department is calling for the September 6
elections to be free and fair. The September 6 elections will cover
several areas that did not participate in the June elections due to
logistical and security challenges. While elections alone are not a
sufficient marker of democracy or true political reform, these
elections are part of a democratic political process that should
involve dialogue, cooperation, and compromise among all Ethiopians on
the future of their country.
Burma
Question. On February 1, 2021, the military of Burma launched a
military coup d'etat, endangering their nascent democracy by detaining
State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, President Win Myint, and other
members of parliament. The situation has been further escalated by
gross human rights violations, including the ongoing ethnic cleansing
of the Rohingya people. The coup has also sought to create ``media
blackouts'' in the region, preventing information from leaving and
entering Burma during a political and public health crisis. Senior
generals of the Tatmadaw have been sanctioned by the United States
Government for perpetrating gross human rights violations and are
subject to ongoing investigations into their conduct by the
International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.
What steps besides sanctions and investigations could the U.S.
Government and its subsidiaries, such as the CSO, be taking to
bring about an end to the military coup in Burma, especially
considering that, as of today, the coup leaders remain in power
and are continuing to persecute the Burmese people and foreign
nationals, such as journalists, in what can only be described
as authoritarianism in its most severe form?
Answer. The United States has led the international community's
immediate and forceful response to the military coup in Burma. The
United States has galvanized allies and partners to take concrete
action and urge the regime to end violence, release all those unjustly
detained, and restore Burma's path to democracy. I understand that such
efforts include diplomatic outreach to ASEAN members, Japan, the
Republic of Korea, and other countries in the region. The
administration has worked with international partners to deny the
regime access to hundreds of millions of dollars in resources in
international financial institutions, and pushed for an arms embargo as
well as restrictions on exports of dual use technology. The Department
continues to urge all countries to use all available levers to restrict
the junta's access to financial institutions. If confirmed, I will work
diligently to ensure that CSO continues to add value to State
Department efforts to support the people of Burma.
Stabilization Priorities
Question. With many countries in conflicts to keep a close eye on
around the world, it is important to assess how the US will engage in
specific regions.
If confirmed, what criteria would you utilize when assessing
whether the United States should engage more in conflict-
affected countries and regions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to strengthen CSO's
analytical capacities to incorporate data, evidence, and quantitative
and qualitative methods into policy-making and priority setting as the
Department assesses its engagement in conflict-affected countries and
regions. CSO's analytical tools provide the State Department and
interagency partners with a basis for decision making on state
fragility, instability, and conflict. I understand that among other
factors, CSO is monitoring the impacts of climate change, the COVID-19
pandemic, gender inequality, human rights abuses, and democratic
backsliding, to understand how these factors impact conflict risk, how
targeted intervention might mitigate these trends, and what adjustments
might be recommended for policy focus and attention.
Question. With these criteria in mind, are there any countries or
regions where conflict is either already evident or at risk of
occurring where you believe the United States should consider
dedicating more resources and attention?
Answer. It will be critical to monitor and address the broader,
regional impact of the situations in those countries laid out in this
year's Elie Wiesel Act report to Congress, including Ethiopia and
Burma. If confirmed I will ensure CSO provides full analysis of
conflict criteria as the Department determines its engagement in
countries or regions where conflict is already evident or at risk of
occurring.
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