[Senate Hearing 117-490]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-490
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
MAY 12, 2021--WASHINGTON, DC
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
49-554 PDF WASHINGTON : 2022
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
PATRICK LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama, Vice
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California Chairman
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
JACK REED, Rhode Island SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JON TESTER, Montana LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon ROY BLUNT, Missouri
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JERRY MORAN, Kansas
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West
JOE MANCHIN, III, West Virginia Virginia
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JOHN KENNEDY, Louisiana
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico CINDY HYDE-SMITH, Mississippi
MIKE BRAUN, Indiana
BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
MARCO RUBIO, Florida
Charles E. Kieffer, Staff Director
Shannon H. Hines, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy...................... 1
Prepared Statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Richard C. Shelby........................... 3
Statement of Hon. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice.......................................... 6
Prepared Statement........................................... 8
Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 11
Prepared Statement........................................... 13
Introduction............................................. 13
The Current Threat Landscape............................. 13
Addressing Domestic Violent Extremism.................... 14
Expanding Our Partnerships............................... 15
Conclusion............................................... 16
Department of Justice Approach to Combatting Domestic Violent
Extremism...................................................... 16
Federal Prosecution of Domestic Violent Extremism................ 19
Domestic Violent Extremism Within Law Enforcement................ 20
Federal Prosecution of Domestic Violent Extremist Criminal
Activity....................................................... 22
Commission on Information Literacy............................... 24
Protecting Constitutional Rights During Criminal Investigations.. 25
Social Media and Self-Radicalization............................. 27
Studying Domestic Radicalization................................. 28
Violent Crime in Chicago......................................... 29
Domestic Violent Extremist Access to Weaponry.................... 31
Domestic Violent Extremist Links to International Terrorist
Groups......................................................... 34
Misinformation Driving Domestic Violent Extremism................ 38
Additional Committee Questions................................... 41
Questions Submitted to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland....... 41
Questions Submitted by:
Chairman Patrick Leahy................................... 41
Senator Brian Schatz..................................... 44
Senator Joe Manchin, III................................. 45
Senator Susan M. Collins................................. 48
Senator Roy Blunt........................................ 49
Senator John Hoeven...................................... 50
Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith................................. 51
Questions Submitted to Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas........... 52
Questions Submitted by:
Chairman Patrick Leahy................................... 52
Senator Brian Schatz..................................... 54
Senator Joe Manchin, III................................. 55
Senator Richard C. Shelby................................ 59
Senator Roy Blunt........................................ 63
Senator John Hoeven...................................... 64
Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith................................. 68
Senator Mike Braun....................................... 69
Senator Bill Hagerty..................................... 69
Conclusion of Hearing............................................ 73
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AMERICA
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 2021
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:08 a.m. in room SH-216, Hart Senate
Office Building, Hon. Patrick Leahy (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Leahy, Durbin, Reed, Shaheen, Coons,
Murphy, Van Hollen, Shelby, Collins, Murkowski, Hoeven,
Kennedy, Braun, and Hagerty.
opening statement of chairman patrick leahy
Chairman Leahy. Good morning. Good morning, everybody.
Appreciate being here, all of you. This is somewhat an unusual
way to meet, and I would mention this to our two distinguished
witnesses. It is a little bit more difficult to keep the
distances we want, but I think it is important for the
Appropriations Committee to have this meeting.
The January 6th images--all of us remember that--of
insurrectionists flying Confederate flags as they stormed the
U.S. Capitol are stark reminders that domestic violence
extremism in America is hardly a new threat. The Nation's
history has been marred by the violent deadly acts of
extremists pushing a range of hateful white supremacist
ideologies.
From the Ku Klux Klan to Timothy McVeigh, we have witnessed
and we have suffered through as a people extremists killing
innocent people in the name of usually morally, always morally
bankrupt causes.
The violence on January 6th was simply the latest chapter
in this long history of domestic extremism in America. Attacks
and plots by domestic extremists are at historic highs, the
majority of them being planned by those in the far right
espousing White supremacist and related ideologies.
In 2020 alone, White nationalists and like-minded
extremists conducted 66 percent of terrorist plots and attacks
in the United States. It appears we are facing a class of
criminals who feel more emboldened than ever, and in asking
why, we cannot ignore a simple fact.
Over the last 4 years, extremists who were once relegated
to the fringes of our society, uniformly condemned by our
Nation's leaders, both parties, suddenly felt they had support
at the highest level of the United States Government, and
indeed in the Oval Office.
We had a President who, instead of simply condemning the
violence in Charlottesville, where a woman was killed during a
White nationalist rally, said to the Nation, ``There are very
fine people on both sides.'' When asked if he denounced White
supremacy during an election debate, doing so without
equivocation, he told the right-wing Proud Boys, ``Stand back
and stand by.'' He urged the crowd to fight like hell moments
before they did just that, storming the U.S. Capitol.
We cannot strike a match near gas and then act surprised
when it catches fire. We need moral clarity in leadership in
these troubled times. I am hopeful this Administration, the two
witnesses before us, can bring that to the difficult task
before them.
I believe it is critical for us to confront domestic
violent extremism in all forms. As Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, I am firmly committed to doing just
that. But let us not ignore the plain fact repeatedly asserted
by the Department of Homeland Security, FBI Director Wray, and
others, that White supremacists and extremists are the most
persistent and lethal threat in the homeland.
Now violent extremism in any form is wrong, but drawing
false equivalence between this form of violent extremism and
others only detracts from our shared goal of focusing our
resources on the greatest threat we face as Americans. We have
to confront this threat to the American way. That means
protecting the constitutional right and civil liberties that
define our way of life.
In the wake of September 11th, we let our deep wounds
occasionally blind us to the rights and liberties we sacrificed
in the name of security. I steadfastly defended those liberties
and rights then, even when it was highly unpopular to do so. I
will not hesitate to do so again now.
If we secure our Nation at the expense of our precious
liberties, then we could hardly claim victory at all. We expect
to see the President's budget by the end of May. It is my
understanding the President will seek significant resources to
address the threat of domestic extremism.
So let us come together, not as Republicans or Democrats,
but as Americans to confront this threat to our society. I am
under no illusion that we are going to eliminate the threat of
domestic violent extremism overnight. I am hopeful if we work
together, again both parties, we can force it into retreat.
I think we should be able to also do what we have done in
the past: show the world that America is capable of confronting
its greatest challenges while living up to its highest ideals.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Patrick Leahy
The January 6th images of insurrectionists flying confederate flags
as they stormed the U.S. Capitol are stark reminders that domestic
violent extremism in America is hardly a new threat. Our nation's
history has been marred by the violent, deadly acts of extremists
pushing a range of hateful white supremacist ideologies. From the Ku
Klux Klan to Timothy McVeigh, we have witnessed--and suffered through--
extremists killing innocent people in the name of their morally
bankrupt causes. The violence on January 6th was simply the latest
chapter in this long history of domestic extremism in America.
But the threat we face today is uniquely dangerous. Attacks and
plots by domestic extremists are at historic highs, with the majority
of them being planned by those on the far right espousing white
supremacist and related ideologies. In 2020 alone, white nationalists
and like-minded extremists conducted 67% of terrorist plots and attacks
in the United States. We cannot deny we are facing a class of criminals
who feel more emboldened than ever.
In asking why, we cannot ignore a simple fact. Over the last four
years, extremists who were once relegated to the fringes of our society
and uniformly condemned by our nation's leaders suddenly felt they had
support at the highest levels of the United States government--indeed,
from within the Oval Office itself. We had a President who instead of
simply condemning the violence in Charlottesville where a woman was
killed during a white nationalist rally, he said to a nation there were
``very fine people on both sides.'' When asked to denounce white
supremacy during an election debate, instead of doing so without
equivocation, he told the right-wing Proud Boys to ``stand back and
stand by.'' And he urged the crowd to ``fight like hell'' moments
before they did just that, storming the Capitol. You cannot strike a
match near gas and act surprised when it catches fire.
We need moral clarity and leadership in these troubled times, and I
am hopeful that this Administration and the two witnesses before us can
bring that to the difficult task before them.
Now, I believe it is critical for us to confront domestic violent
extremism in all its forms. And as Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, I am firmly committed to doing just that. But
let's not ignore the plain fact--as repeatedly asserted by the
Department of Homeland Security, FBI Director Wray, and others--that
white supremacist extremists are the ``most persistent and lethal
threat in the homeland.'' Violent extremism in any form is wrong;
however, drawing false equivalence between this form of violent
extremism and others only detracts from our shared goal of focusing our
resources on the greatest threats we face as Americans.
But we must confront this threat the American way. That means
protecting the constitutional rights and civil liberties that define
our way of life. In the wake of September 11th, we let our deep wounds
occasionally blind us to the rights and liberties we sacrificed in the
name of security. I steadfastly defended those liberties and rights
then, even when it was highly unpopular to do so. I won't hesitate to
do so again now. If we secure our nation at the expense of our precious
liberties, then we can hardly claim victory at all.
We expect to receive the President's budget by the end of May. It
is my understanding that the President will seek significant resources
to address the threat of domestic extremism. So let us come together--
not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans--and confront this
existential threat to our society. I am under no illusions that we will
eliminate the threat of domestic violent extremism. But I am hopeful
that, if we work together, we can force it into retreat. Let us show
the world that America is capable of confronting its greatest
challenges while living up to its highest ideals.
Chairman Leahy. We are joined by the Vice Chairman of the
committee, Senator Shelby, and I will yield to him.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD C. SHELBY
Senator Shelby. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling
today's hearing.
I also want to welcome our distinguished witnesses to the
committee.
Mr. Chairman, the Rule of Law, the very foundation upon
which America was built, is paramount to our future as
Americans and the future of our democracy. Selective
enforcement of our Nation's laws erodes that foundation.
Today, we have before the committee two of our Nation's top
law enforcement officials, the two individuals most directly
responsible for faithfully and fairly upholding the Rule of
Law, the Attorney General and the Secretary.
You both know, as we do, that our country cannot afford to
pick and choose the laws we enforce and yet we watch that
happen every day. Domestic violent extremists threaten the Rule
of Law but so, too, does turning a blind eye to the flood of
illegal immigration at our southern border.
I'll address each of these issues in turn from this
perspective. First, violent extremism is a very serious topic.
Unfortunately, many of my Democratic colleagues have sought to
make it about politics and race. They would have the American
people believe that all domestic violent extremists are far
right-wing White supremacists and that all Republicans are
complicit in their actions. Of course both are false.
I believe the overwhelming majority of Americans watched
the events of January 6th with shock and horror. I also believe
that just as many watched the endless string of riots in cities
across America last summer with the same emotions. They saw
Antifa thugs beat and intimidate innocent people. They saw
violent anarchists burn police cars and precincts and attack
law enforcement officers. They also saw far-left extremists
hijack Seattle and destroy the livelihoods of so many small
business owners there. Yes, and they saw Black Lives Matter
activists trash cities and loot businesses from coast to coast
night after night.
None of these actions is excusable, not those of January
6th and not those of last summer. They're all wrong. They all
violate the Rule of Law. Yet in the face of this utter contempt
for the Rule of Law, so many have chosen to stand idly by
excusing one while condemning another. Such rationalization of
inappropriate and even illegal behavior, I think, is dangerous
and I believe the American people see right through it.
Moreover, it's dangerous for our leaders and law enforcement to
focus on one threat to our Nation while ignoring the other.
Such behavior raises questions as to whether justice is still
blind and whether the Rule of Law still has meaning and force
in America.
Let me be clear. This isn't about taking up for one side or
the other or about advocating for the enforcement of one law
over another. I believe the vast majority of the American
people believe in the Rule of Law and they see it under attack.
I also believe that they want to see anyone who transgresses it
to be held to account, regardless of race, political dogma, or
other motivation.
FBI Director Christopher Wray recently testified before the
Senate Judiciary Committee and he said, ``We at the FBI don't
tend to think of violent extremism in terms of right, left.
That's not a spectrum that we look at.'' I wonder if that will
be clear to those who watch today's hearing. I hope so. I hope
we hear from each of our witnesses about their efforts to
combat domestic violent extremism, no matter where it falls on
the political spectrum.
I also hope that we will hear that there is a uniform
approach to enforcing all the laws that are on the books. That
includes our immigration laws. Illegal immigration has long
plagued this country. It undermines American sovereignty and
makes a mockery of our immigration laws.
The failure to secure our border has for decades has
allowed the cartels, the drug smugglers, and human traffickers
to continue their practices largely unabated.
The Trump Administration made a strong commitment to border
security and achieved significant gains in restoring the Rule
of Law along the southern border. Yet President Biden, in one
of his first acts in office, halted construction of the border
wall that was ongoing and announced plans to unwind the
immigration policies put in place by our previous
Administration. Sections of border wall literally lay on the
ground next to gaping holes in the existing barrier system.
Gapes in the wall that need repair remain wide open and require
Border Patrol officers to stand guard while they're needed in
other hot spots along the border. Essential technologies, such
as sensors and cameras embedded in the border wall, system,
have not been activated. All of this while record numbers of
individuals pour across the southern border.
The impact of these actions is not theoretical or abstract.
Our border officials and facilities are over-whelmed. Tens of
thousands, yes, tens of thousands of migrant children are in
U.S. custody as we speak.
This Administration has restored catch and release, setting
thousands of illegal crossers free in cities and towns across
America without consequence for breaking the law, and
inexplicably amid the ongoing crisis, the Justice Department
recently rescinded restrictions on Federal funding for
sanctuary cities which themselves embody contempt for the Rule
of Law. This action can have no other effect than further
fueling the crisis by enticing those who seek to come here
illegally. More parents in desperate circumstances in Central
American countries will pay human smugglers to drop their
children off at the border because the prospect and promise of
sanctuary just got brighter.
The ultimate source of laws in America, the Constitution,
provides Congress with the power of the purse. Congress over
the past few years has provided billions of dollars to the
Department of Homeland Security for further construction of a
border wall system which includes functional gates and
essential technology. Yet this Administration has blatantly
ignored the will of the people to secure the border as
expressed in duly-enacted laws.
I believe that the Rule of Law must be restored for the
good of this country. It must govern whether we are talking
about domestic violent extremism or illegal immigration. It
cannot come down in full force on one group of bad actors while
giving a pass to the others and officials tasked with enforcing
it cannot pick and choose which laws they will follow based on
political considerations. If those things happen, the Rule of
Law will lose its meaning and its force in America and we as a
nation will be in serious, serious trouble.
I hope that our witnesses today, two of our top law
enforcement officials in this country, will make a serious and
credible effort to restore the American people's faith in the
Rule of Law, and I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the question
and answer period.
Thank you for the hearing.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
Before I introduce the witnesses, this hearing is a hybrid
hearing. We have some members attending virtually and some in
person. I thank the two witnesses for being here in person. We
will have 5-minute question rounds when we get to the
questions. Members will be called upon in order of their
seniority in the Full Committee. If they are not available at
the time they are called upon, we will go to the next person in
seniority. If they rejoin the committee later, we will try to
put them back in order. I would ask the Senators to mute
themselves when not speaking. For those joining virtually, I
would ask you to not log out of the meeting before asking your
questions. If you need to step away, just turn off your
cameras.
I am glad to see the two witnesses are here and I know you
have had to juggle your schedule to make it possible. I am glad
to have the Attorney General with us today. I have known him
for years. I have followed his career ever since he led the
prosecution of Timothy McVeigh after the bombing of the Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City 26 years ago. The Attorney
General brings with him a heightened understanding of the
threat domestic violent extremism brings to our Nation just
from the deaths that resulted from that.
I want to welcome Secretary Mayorkas to the panel. We have
known each other for a long time. We look forward to hearing
from you, Mr. Secretary, about the work the Department of
Homeland Security is doing on this important issue. We will
take your opening statement.
I did note--for the committee, before you came in, I raised
a question with Secretary Mayorkas. I am concerned about the
number of attacks, cyber attacks, most recently on the oil
pipeline. I think we are going to want to have a briefing for
members at some point. What are we doing to increase security
in these companies? To what extent should it be the
responsibility of the companies if hundreds of millions of
dollars are being stolen? Can they take it as a way of doing
business, and just pass the cost on to the consumers, when they
fail to put in the kind of security, cybersecurity, that they
should have in the first place?
But I will yield now for the opening statement of Attorney
General Garland. Would you please start? And then Secretary
Mayorkas.
STATEMENT OF HON. MERRICK B. GARLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Hon. Garland. Good morning, Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman
Shelby, and distinguished members of the committee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
Department of Justice, and it's nice to see you here, Secretary
Mayorkas.
Combating domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism
has long been a core part of the Justice Department's mission.
Immediately upon its founding more than a 150 years ago, the
Department pursued White supremacists who sought to deny newly-
freed slaves their rights under the Constitution, including the
right to vote. Members of the first incarnation of the Ku Klux
Klan attacked and murdered Black people, assassinated Black
political leaders, drove Black farmers off their land, and
burned their houses and their churches. The Department poured
its resources into combating the Klan, successfully prosecuting
hundreds of Klansmen.
Twenty-six years ago in 1995, the perpetrators of the
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal Building sought to spark a
revolution that would topple the Federal Government. One
hundred sixty-eight people died, including 19 children.
Hundreds of others were seriously injured.
The efforts to successfully prosecute the perpetrators,
which I supervised, required unprecedented interagency
cooperation at all levels of Government and a major commitment
of the Department's resources and personnel.
Unfortunately, the horror of domestic violent extremism is
still with us. Indeed, the FBI (Federal Bureau of
Investigation) assessed that 2019 was the deadliest year for
violent domestic extremism since 1995. In March of this year,
the intelligence community in a report drafted by DHS
(Department of Homeland Security), the FBI, and the National
Counter-terrorism Center, under the auspices of the Director of
National Intelligence, assessed that domestic violent
extremists pose an elevated threat in 2021. In the FBI's view,
the top domestic violent extremist threat we face comes from
racially or ethically motivated violent extremists,
specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the
White race.
Many communities have experienced this horror over the past
several years. In El Paso, 23 people, most of whom are Latino,
were gunned down while shopping at a Walmart. In Pittsburgh, 11
Jewish worshippers were shot and killed at their synagogue. In
Charleston, a White supremacist shot and killed nine Black men
and women who were praying at their church. And many acts of
hate-fueled violence don't make the national news but they
still terrorize entire communities.
The FBI has also highlighted a recent increase in attacks
perpetrated by those that categorize this as anti-government or
anti-authority violent extremists. The Unabomber, whom I
investigated and prosecuted in the mid-1990s, is by some
measures the most high-profile example of the latter.
As with the Ku Klux Klan, Oklahoma City, and Unabomber
investigations, the Justice Department is once again engaged in
a complex nationwide resource-intensive investigation: the
investigation of the heinous attack on the U.S. Capitol on
January 6th.
In just under a 130 days, the Justice Department has made
more than 430 arrests. The prosecution efforts, which are being
led by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia, remain ongoing.
In all of our efforts to combat domestic violent extremism
and domestic terrorism, the Justice Department is guided by our
commitment to protecting civil liberties. In our country,
espousing an extremist ideology is not a crime nor is
expressing hateful views or associating with hateful groups,
but when someone tries to promote or impose an ideology through
acts of violence, those acts can be the most dangerous crimes
we confront as a society.
Regardless of the motivating ideology, we will use every
appropriate tool at our disposal to deter and disrupt such
criminal acts and to bring their perpetrators to justice. My
written statement for the record describes those efforts in
detail.
In the past year, the Justice Department has shifted
significant resources to focus on this area. The President's
discretionary budget request for fiscal year 2022 seeks over
$100 million in additional funds to address the rising threat
of domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. It
includes additional funding for the FBI, the U.S. Attorney's
Offices, the Marshall Services, and other components.
The Department is equally committed to fighting violence
and terrorism that is directed or inspired by foreign actors,
but I recognize that is not the topic of today's hearing.
As to both, we will pursue justice in a manner that honors
the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.
Thank you for inviting me to testify at this important
hearing, and thank you for your support in ensuring that we
have the resources necessary to carry out this vital mission.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Merrick B. Garland
Good morning Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman Shelby, and
distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on behalf of the Department of Justice.
Combatting domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism has
long been a core part of the Justice Department's mission. Immediately
upon its founding 150 years ago, the Department pursued white
supremacists who sought to deny newly freed slaves their rights under
the Constitution, including the right to vote. Members of the first
incarnation of the Ku Klux Klan attacked and murdered Black people,
assassinated Black political leaders, drove Black farmers off their
land, and burned their houses and churches. The Department put its
energies into combatting the Klan, successfully prosecuting hundreds of
Klansmen.
Twenty-six years ago, Timothy McVeigh bombed the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building in Oklahoma City, killing 168 people, including 19
children. Hundreds of others were seriously injured. Last month, I
travelled to Oklahoma to speak at the annual memorial ceremony. My trip
brought back vivid memories of what I saw when I first arrived on the
scene 26 years ago to lead the Justice Department's prosecution: It
looked like a war zone. The front of the Murrah Building, which had
housed a children's center, was gone. The parking lot across the street
still held cars that had been flattened by the blast. And an army of
first responders, from across Oklahoma and across the nation, was
crawling over the wreckage, sifting through the rubble for survivors
and the dead.
We promised then that we would find the perpetrators, that we would
bring them to justice, and that we would do so in a way that honored
the Constitution. The effort required unprecedented interagency
cooperation at all levels of government, careful management of the
evidence, and scrupulous adherence to the Constitution and the law. It
also required a major commitment of the Department's resources and
personnel to see that justice was done.
Investigators conducted 28,000 interviews, collected nearly 3.5
tons of evidence, and searched through more than one billion pieces of
information. Juries ultimately convicted both McVeigh and his co-
conspirator, Terry Nichols.
The horror of domestic violent extremism is still with us. Indeed,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assesses that ``2019 was the
deadliest year for domestic violent extremism'' since 1995. \1\ And in
March, the Intelligence Community (IC), in a report drafted by the
Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the National
Counterterrorism Center under the auspices of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, assessed that domestic violent
extremists ``pose an elevated threat'' in 2021. \2\ The IC assessed
that ``racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists and militia
violent extremists present the most lethal [domestic violent extremist]
threats.'' \3\ In the FBI's view, the top domestic violent extremist
threat we face comes from ``racially or ethnically motivated violent
extremists, specifically those who advocate for the superiority of the
white race.'' \4\ The IC assessed that the militia violent extremist
threat also ``increased last year and that it will almost certainly
continue to be elevated throughout 2021.'' \5\
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\1\ Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Statement Before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/
worldwide-threats-to-the- homeland-092420.
\2\ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Domestic
Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021 (March 1, 2021),
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/
UnclassSummaryofDVEAssessment- 17MAR21.pdf [hereinafter IC Report].
\3\ Id.
\4\ Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee (March 2, 2021),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/oversight-of-the-federal-bureau-of-
investigation-the-january- 6-insurrection-domestic-terrorism-and-other-
threats.
\5\ IC Report.
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Many communities have experienced the horror inflicted by this
threat over the past several years. In El Paso, 23 people, most of whom
were Latino, were gunned down while shopping at a Walmart. In
Pittsburgh, eleven Jewish worshippers were shot and killed at their
synagogue. In Charleston, nine Black men and women were shot and killed
while praying at their church.
We have also seen the burning and bombing of places of worship
throughout the country, as well as other acts of hate-fueled violence
that are less likely to make national news but that still terrorize
entire communities. In addition to the threat of racially or ethnically
motivated violent extremism--and sometimes in conjunction with it--the
FBI has highlighted a recent increase in attacks perpetrated by those
it categorizes as ``Anti-Government or Anti-Authority Violent
Extremists.'' \6\ The Unabomber, whom I also investigated and
prosecuted in the mid-1990s, is perhaps by some measures the most high-
profile example of the latter, although (as is not infrequently the
case) his writings and ideology defy straightforward classification.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Jill Sanborn, Executive Assistant Director National Security
Branch, FBI, Statement Before the House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies 3 (Apr.
29, 2021), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP19/20210429/112510/
HHRG-117-AP19-Wstate-SanbornJ-20210429.pdf.
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And as with the Oklahoma City and Unabomber investigations, the
Justice Department is once again engaged in a complex and resource-
intensive investigation--one of the largest in our history--the
investigation of the heinous attack on the United States Capitol on
January 6th.
While much has changed at the Department of Justice since my last
tour of duty, the professionalism, commitment, and dedication of the
Department's workforce have remained constant. Every day, Department
employees enforce and uphold the rule of law. Many risk their own
safety to protect the American public from violent crime or other
threats, including those perpetrated by domestic violent extremists.
Unfortunately, as the attack on the U.S. Capitol underscores, there is
still much work to do.
At the Justice Department, we are committed to using every
appropriate tool at our disposal to deter, disrupt, and punish acts of
domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. This whole-of-
Department commitment includes the FBI, the Department's other law
enforcement agencies, the U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the National
Security Division, the Civil Rights Division, the Criminal Division,
the Tax Division, our grant-making offices, and our other components:
--The FBI is the lead federal law enforcement agency for
investigating and preventing acts of domestic and international
terrorism. As part of the FBI's efforts to counter terrorism
and violent extremism, the FBI has established nearly 200 Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) across its 56 field offices
nationwide. The JTTFs combine specialists from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities into a single team
that can pursue leads, gather evidence, make arrests, and
quickly respond to terrorist threats and incidents.
--The Department prosecutes violent extremism and terrorism by
drawing on the capabilities and expertise of our 94 U.S.
Attorneys' Offices, the National Security Division, the Civil
Rights Division, the Criminal Division, and other attorneys
across the Department. Each U.S. Attorney's Office has an Anti-
Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) to coordinate federal, state,
local, Tribal, and territorial law enforcement efforts in its
district.
--Through the ATACs and JTTFs, the Department promotes information
sharing among federal, state, local, Tribal and territorial law
enforcement entities. This information sharing is critical
because local law enforcement officers may be the first to
identify individuals planning violent extremist and terrorist
acts in their communities. Close cooperation with private-
sector partners also provides an essential avenue for detecting
specific threats that may develop. Just as important, we depend
on private citizens to report threats they see around them.
--Through our grant-making components, the Department has funding
available to address domestic violent extremism and domestic
terrorism. The Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)
administers an anti-terrorism program that provides technical
assistance and training to state, local, Tribal, and
territorial law enforcement partners. In addition, BJA supports
the investigation and prosecution of cold case homicide
investigations and prosecutions in which the race of the victim
may have been a factor under the Emmett Till Unsolved Civil
Rights Crime Act and provides funding to law enforcement for
outreach, education, investigation, and prosecution of hate
crimes.
--The Department's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS) also funds efforts aimed at preventing domestic violent
extremism and domestic terrorism. The COPS Office is including
combatting hate crimes and domestic extremism as an area of
special consideration in the 2021 Community Policing
Development (CPD) Microgrants Program solicitation. CPD
Microgrants Program funds are used to develop the capacity of
law enforcement to implement community policing strategies.
--The Department is also improving the state of research and analysis
in this area. For nearly a decade, the Department's National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) has administered a domestic violent
extremism and domestic terrorism research program. Last year,
NIJ published Understanding Domestic Radicalization and
Terrorism: A National Issue Within a Global Context, a review
of the most up-to date research and an analysis that
highlighted areas where more work is needed. In FY 2021, NIJ
will fund research that focuses on the radicalization process,
reintegration of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related
offenses, and terrorism prevention programs. The President's FY
2022 discretionary request includes a $4 million increase for
NIJ to further research on the root causes of radicalization.
--The Justice Department must also confront the distinct challenges
federal prisons face. The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) guards
against the spread of violent extremist ideologies within
federal prisons through a variety of management controls, task
force collaboration, and staff training. Appreciating the
evolving nature of the threat, BOP is currently undertaking a
review of its risk-assessment tools, placing renewed focus on
available programming, and formulating proposals for increased
staffing and other resources.
--The United States Marshals Service (USMS) also contributes in
critical ways to these efforts. As part of its judicial
security mission, USMS conducts threat investigations and, in
appropriate cases, provides protective details for the federal
judiciary against violent extremist and terrorist threats. The
USMS Investigative Operations Division and Special Operations
Group work to support USMS's fugitive apprehension mission.
--Another key component within the Department is the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), which
investigates violations of the federal firearms laws,
investigates the origin and cause of explosions, and provides
support for explosives, fire, canine, and response operations
through its National Center for Explosives Training and
Research. Together with the FBI, ATF jointly manages the
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, the interagency
organization that analyzes all terrorist improvised explosive
devices of interest to the United States.
--The Department's efforts include supporting an interagency, whole-
of-government approach to these threats. Department of Justice
personnel collaborate on this mission on a daily basis with the
Department of Homeland Security--working closely on everything
from aviation and border security, to sharing intelligence on
emerging threats, to training and engagement with state, local,
Tribal, and territorial law enforcement.
--Finally, the Department also coordinates the Domestic Terrorism
Executive Committee (DTEC), a group that provides a forum for
information sharing among federal agencies at a leadership
level. The DTEC was originally established following the
Oklahoma City bombing, and its mission and role remain
important today.
Although this general structure within the Department has long been
in place, we are now reassessing our existing activities and
authorities to ensure that we have the right posture to confront the
threat of domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism, are
devoting appropriate resources to the task, and are nimble enough to
make any changes that may be necessary to bolster our efforts and adapt
as the threat evolves. This includes dedicating more resources as
needed; ensuring that we are sharing as much information as we can with
federal, state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners; deepening
collaboration with foreign partners to explore any links to the
international counterparts of domestic violent extremists; sharing
information as appropriate with technology companies to help them
address the spread of domestic violent extremist activity online; and
ensuring that we have sufficient training at the federal, state, and
local levels. Collaboration within the Department and with our
colleagues in federal government, the private sector, our foreign
partners, and civil society is critical to our approach.
The Department of Justice recently issued guidance to all federal
prosecutors emphasizing the need for coordination and consistency in
prosecutions involving domestic violent extremism and imposing new
requirements for identifying and tracking such matters. That guidance
and other efforts will strengthen coordination within the Department.
We have also been actively engaged with our partners at DHS, in the IC,
and throughout relevant parts of the federal government, in a 100-day
interagency assessment of our whole-of-government efforts to counter
domestic terrorism, as called for by President Biden.
In the past year, the Justice Department has shifted significant
discretionary resources to focus on this area. The President's
discretionary request for FY 2022 seeks to provide over $100 million in
additional funds to address the rising threat of domestic violent
extremism and domestic terrorism, including funding for the FBI, the
U.S. Attorneys' Offices, the U.S. Marshals Service, and other
components of the Department.
The Department's strong commitment and resolve in this effort has
been evident in the unprecedented speed and scale of our response to
the January 6th attack on the Capitol. The violence we witnessed that
day was an intolerable assault not only on the Capitol building and the
brave law enforcement personnel who sought to protect it, but also on a
fundamental aspect of our democracy--the peaceful transfer of power.
In response to that attack, the Department has undertaken an
extraordinary effort to hold accountable those who engaged in criminal
acts that day. In just under 130 days, the Department has made more
than 430 arrests, and that number continues to grow. The FBI's
investigations span almost the entire country. The prosecution efforts,
which are being led by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of
Columbia, remain ongoing.
The Justice Department has also focused on countering federal hate
crimes. To address the recent rise in hate crimes and hate incidents--
particularly the disturbing trend in violence against members of the
Asian American and Pacific Islander community since the start of the
pandemic--my first directive as Attorney General was to launch an
accelerated review of the ways in which the Department can enhance its
efforts to deter and combat such crimes. Hate crimes have no place in
our society, and the Department, led by our Civil Rights Division, is
committed to prosecuting those who commit them.
In all our efforts to combat these domestic threats, the Justice
Department is guided by our commitment to protecting civil liberties.
In our country, espousing an extremist ideology is not a crime. Nor is
expressing hateful views or associating with hateful groups.
But when someone tries to promote or impose an ideology through
acts of violence, those acts can be among the most dangerous crimes we
confront as a society. My experience in Oklahoma City has seared that
point into my mind. Regardless of the motivating ideology, we will use
every appropriate tool at our disposal to deter and disrupt such acts
and to bring their perpetrators to justice.
The Department of Justice is deeply committed to combatting
domestic violent extremism and domestic terrorism. We are equally
committed to fighting violence and terrorism that is directed or
inspired by foreign actors--but I recognize that is not the focus of
this hearing. As to both, we will pursue justice in a manner that
honors the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.
Thank you for inviting me to testify at this important hearing. And
thank you for your partnership with the Justice Department in ensuring
that we have the resources we need to carry out this vital mission.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Attorney General.
Secretary Mayorkas, glad to have you here. Please go ahead,
sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALEJANDRO N. MAYORKAS, SECRETARY,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Hon. Mayorkas. Good morning, Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman
Shelby, and distinguished members of the committee. I am
honored to appear before you today. Attorney General Garland.
Every day, the Department of Homeland Secretary's more than
240,000 dedicated public servants work tirelessly to keep our
communities safe and secure. Today, I will highlight the work
our Department is undertaking to combat the most significant
and immediate terrorism-related threat to our homeland, which
is the threat posed by domestic violent extremism.
The terrorism-related threats we face as a nation have
significantly evolved since the Department's creation in the
wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The threat
landscape is now more complex, more dynamic, and more
diversified.
Today, racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists
are the most likely to conduct mass casualty attacks against
civilians and anti-government or anti-authority violent
extremists, specifically militia violent extremists, are the
most likely to target law enforcement, government personnel,
and government facilities.
The threats posed by domestic violent extremism are often
fueled by false narratives, conspiracy theories, and extremist
rhetoric spread throughout social media and other online
platforms. Further, domestic violent extremists who act alone
continue to pose significant detection and disruption
challenges because of their capacity for independent
radicalization to violence, their ability to mobilize
discreetly, and their access to weapons. As a result, the
Department is redoubling its efforts to detect and disrupt all
forms of foreign and domestic terrorism and targeted violence
while safeguarding privacy protections, civil rights, and civil
liberties.
The Department is taking a new approach to addressing
domestic violent extremism, both internally and externally. In
January, DHS released the National Terrorism Advisory System or
NTAS Bulletin highlighting the threat posed by domestic violent
extremists. It was the first NTAS issued in over a year and
also the first solely focused on a domestic threat.
In addition, this year I designated for the first time
domestic violent extremism as a national priority area within
the Department's Homeland Security Grant Program. This means
that State and urban areas across the Nation will spend at
least $77 million to prevent, prepare for, protect against, and
respond to acts of domestic violent extremism.
The Department is currently expanding its analytic focus to
more comprehensively review how extremists exploit and leverage
social media and other online platforms and how online
activities are linked to real-world violence. We are also
enhancing our ability to analyze, produce, and disseminate
products that address the full range of terrorism and targeted
violence. We recently established a dedicated Domestic
Terrorism Branch within our Office of Intelligence and Analysis
to ensure the Department develops the expertise necessary to
combat this threat using sound, timely intelligence.
One of the Department's most important missions is to
provide actionable intelligence to the broadest audience at the
lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is
working closely with its partners to augment its intelligence
and information capabilities to inform public safety and
security planning efforts across the country.
In the coming months, the Department will increase training
options and other support to help identify individuals at risk
of radicalization.
Among my top priorities is to ensure that our personnel can
perform their critical missions, that they feel safe and secure
at work, and that the fabric of our Department is not
penetrated by hate or violent extremism. In light of this
commitment, I announced last month an internal review to
address potential threats related to domestic violent extremism
within DHS and ensure we are not compromised in our ability to
protect our country.
As I have said before, the Department of Homeland Security
is fundamentally a department of partnerships. Our success
depends on the strength of these partnerships as we cannot
accomplish our mission alone.
DHS will remain focused on strengthening its partnerships
across every level of government, the private sector, and the
diverse communities we serve to enhance together our collective
prevention capabilities nationwide.
We recently established a new Center for Prevention
Programs and Partnerships, or CP3, to improve the Department's
ability to combat terrorism and targeted violence by leveraging
behavioral threat assessment and management tools capable of
identifying early risk factors that can lead to violence in
communities across the country. Individuals who may be
radicalizing or have radicalized to violence typically exhibit
behaviors that are recognizable to many but are best understood
by those closest to them, such as friends, family, and
classmates. CP3 will help build local prevention frameworks to
provide communities with the tools they need to combat
terrorism and targeted violence consistent with privacy
protections, civil rights and civil liberties, and our laws.
Further, the Department will continue working closely with
its partners to build greater public awareness of and
resilience to disinformation.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for your continued support of our Department. I look
forward to working closely with this committee and with other
members of Congress on our shared priorities and I look forward
to answering your questions.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alejandro N. Mayorkas
introduction
Chairman Leahy, Vice Chairman Shelby, and distinguished Members of
the Committee,
Thank you very much for the opportunity to join you here today for
this important and timely hearing. Every day, the Department of
Homeland Security confronts grave challenges, both seen and unseen,
that threaten to harm our communities and our way of life. Since the
Department was created in the wake of the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, terrorist threats to our Nation have evolved and
diversified. DHS remains committed to preventing, detecting, and
disrupting all forms of foreign and domestic terrorism and targeted
violence, consistent with privacy protections, civil rights and civil
liberties, and other laws.
the current threat landscape
Foreign terrorist organizations still seek to attack the United
States and we remain vigilant in addressing that threat. While doing
so, we recognize that the most significant and immediate terrorism-
related threat currently facing our Nation is domestic violent
extremism.
Domestic violent extremists pose a grave threat to our homeland.
They are individuals or groups based and operating primarily within the
United States or its territories who seek to further political or
social goals through acts dangerous to human life that are in violation
of criminal law. These extremists are distinguished from foreign
terrorists and homegrown violent extremists in that they are not
receiving direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or
other foreign power, although foreign actors may amplify or attempt to
show support for certain threats. Domestic violent extremists can fit
within one or multiple categories of ideological motivation or
grievances aligned with a broad range of groups or movements. They
often exploit popular social media platforms, smaller websites with
targeted audiences, and encrypted chat applications to recruit new
adherents to violent causes, plan and rally support for in-person
violent or otherwise criminal actions, and disseminate materials that
contribute to radicalization and mobilization to violence.
Domestic violent extremists who are motivated by a range of
ideologies and galvanized by recent political and societal events in
our country pose an elevated threat to our country, as stated in the
recent joint report drafted by DHS, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center--under the
auspices of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence--
entitled, Domestic Violent Extremism Poses Heightened Threat in 2021.
Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs) and Anti-
Government or Anti-Authority Violent Extremists, specifically Militia
Violent Extremists (MVEs), present the most lethal domestic violent
extremism threats, with RMVEs most likely to conduct mass-casualty
attacks against civilians and MVEs most likely to target law
enforcement, government personnel, and government facilities.
Let me be clear: the mere advocacy of political or social
positions, political activism, and use of strong rhetoric is
constitutionally-protected speech and does not constitute domestic
violent extremism. DHS's efforts to combat domestic violent extremism
focus on preventing acts of violence.
The danger and lethality of the threat posed by domestic violent
extremism is evidenced by the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S.
Capitol and other recent attacks across our country, including against
government buildings, federal personnel, and communities of color.
Addressing this type of violence therefore requires a whole-of-society
approach. Domestic violent extremists who act alone continue to pose
significant detection and disruption challenges because of their
capacity for independent radicalization to violence, their ability to
mobilize discreetly, and their access to weapons.
addressing domestic violent extremism
Enhancing our collective ability to prevent all forms of terrorism
and targeted violence is a top priority for the Biden-Harris
Administration and for DHS specifically. We must make it harder to
carry out an attack and we must reduce the potential for loss of life
by preventing radicalization and mobilization to violence. The federal
government cannot do this alone. As a result, I have directed DHS to
embrace a whole-of-society approach to combatting domestic terrorism
and targeted violence by building trust, partnerships, and
collaboration across every level of government, the private sector,
non-governmental organizations, and the communities we serve. We can
only combat domestic terrorism and targeted violence if we work
together.
In January, we designated a senior official to organize, plan, and
oversee the Department's operational coordination and response to all
terrorism-related threats, including those posed by domestic violent
extremists. That same month, DHS released a National Terrorism Advisory
System (NTAS) Bulletin highlighting the threat posed by domestic
violent extremists. It was the first NTAS issued in over a year and
also the first NTAS to focus solely on a domestic threat. Further, I
designated domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority Area''
within the Department's Homeland Security Grant Program for the first
time.
This means that in Fiscal Year 2021, state, local, tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) governments will spend at least $77 million to
prevent, protect against, and respond to domestic violent extremism.
Objective and timely intelligence is the foundation for so much of
what we do. That is why DHS's Office of Intelligence & Analysis (I&A)
is enhancing its ability to analyze, produce, and disseminate products
that address the full spectrum of terrorism and targeted violence. We
have established a dedicated domestic terrorism branch within I&A to
ensure we develop the expertise necessary to combat this threat by
using sound, timely intelligence. I&A will also continue leveraging the
National Network of Fusion Centers and our more than 120 deployed
intelligence professionals who collect and analyze threat information
alongside SLTT and private sector partners to increase timely
information-sharing in accordance with applicable law and DHS privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties policies.
One of the Department's most important missions is to provide
actionable intelligence to the broadest audience at the lowest
classification level possible. As a result, DHS is redoubling its
efforts to augment its intelligence and information-sharing
capabilities in collaboration with SLTT and private sector partners.
This includes publishing and disseminating intelligence bulletins that
provide our partners with greater insight into evolving threats, and
situational awareness notifications that inform public safety and
security planning efforts to prevent violence.
More than 240,000 dedicated DHS employees carry out our
Department's mission to safeguard the American people, our homeland,
and our values every day. It is among my top priorities to ensure our
personnel feel safe and secure at work, and the fabric of our
Department is not penetrated by hateful acts or violent extremism. In
light of the dynamic threat environment and my commitment to protecting
our workforce and the people we serve, I announced last month an
internal review to address potential threats related to domestic
violent extremism within DHS. As we work to safeguard our Nation, we
must be vigilant in our efforts to identify and combat domestic violent
extremism within both the broader community and our own organization.
This review will help ensure that domestic violent extremism does not
compromise our ability to keep our communities safe and secure.
We also are increasing our efforts to more comprehensively assess
how domestic violent extremists exploit and leverage social media and
other online platforms, and how those online activities are linked to
real-world violence. I have directed our experts to enhance the
Department's ability to assess and respond to the risk of violence
posed by those who are inspired by domestic violent extremist
narratives. DHS is also executing a Department-wide effort to ensure
operational coordination and establish common standards and processes
so that we are able to fully integrate information in the public domain
into our aggregate threat analysis in a manner consistent with the law.
In the coming months, the Department will increase training options
and other support to help identify individuals at risk of radicalizing
to violence. DHS's Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Secret
Service, and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers will provide
training to SLTT law enforcement partners on topics such as the use of
crisis intervention teams and multidisciplinary threat assessment and
management teams to prevent terrorism and targeted violence. I&A's
National Threat Evaluation and Reporting program will also continue
providing our partners with training and enhanced information sharing
capabilities through the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting
Initiative and other behavioral threat assessment training, which is
designed to assist in the identification and evaluation of potential
threats.
expanding our partnerships
As I have said before, the Department of Homeland Security is
fundamentally a department of partnerships. DHS will remain focused on
strengthening its partnerships with the communities we serve to enhance
our targeted violence and terrorism prevention capabilities nationwide.
A core component of this effort is empowering our partners to identify
and build resilience to the false and harmful narratives that can
incite violence and are often spread through social media and other
online platforms.
We have increased our collaboration with the FBI, Intelligence
Community, and Department of State to more comprehensively understand
and assess the extent of operational collaboration between violent
extremists in the United States and those operating in other parts of
the world. This increased collaboration will improve our watchlisting
process, screening and vetting protocols, and travel pattern analyses
to detect and assess travel by known or suspected terrorists.
The Department is also working closely with industry partners,
academia, and faith-based and non-governmental organizations to better
understand online narratives associated with domestic terrorism and
targeted violence, including to solicit input on how best to address
this threat. We are working with technology companies to help inform
their development of voluntary, innovative approaches to identify and
mitigate violent extremist content under their terms of service and
community standards, and to identify effective ways to share
generalized threat information, consistent with the law, privacy
protections, and civil rights and civil liberties. We are also working
to build greater public awareness and resilience to disinformation by
developing, evaluating, and sharing digital media literacy tools and
critical thinking resources.
Preventing potential violence requires DHS to work closely with
every local community across our country. That is why we are engaged in
multiple, complimentary efforts to raise public awareness about both
the indicators of terrorism and how to report related activities. We
are updating existing programs like the ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' campaign and Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting
(SAR) Initiative to ensure they are appropriately designed and
implemented in a dynamic threat environment.
We are also elevating our main effort to prevent domestic terrorism
and targeted violence through community partnerships. The new Center
for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, or CP3, will replace the
Office for Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention, while ensuring
our prevention efforts are grounded in an approach to violence
prevention that leverages behavioral threat assessment and management
tools and addresses early-risk factors that can lead to radicalization
to violence. CP3 will continue to expand financial, educational, and
technical assistance to SLTT partners to build local prevention
frameworks tailored to each community's unique needs and challenges.
These frameworks will provide concerned community members and
organizations with the tools they need to help individuals who may be
radicalizing, or have radicalized, to violence as these individuals
typically exhibit behaviors that are recognizable to many, but are best
understood by those closest to them, such as classmates, friends, and
family.
The Department's CP3 will work closely with federal partners such
as the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services to drive
a whole-of-society approach to building trusted partnerships across all
levels of government, the private sector, non-governmental
organizations, and the communities we serve. In the coming months, CP3
will also launch a nationwide public outreach campaign designed to
provide practical information on how to participate in local prevention
efforts. This campaign will be similar to DHS's Blue Campaign, which
has successfully raised public awareness about and driven action toward
combatting human trafficking.
conclusion
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and for
this Committee's continued support of our Department. I look forward to
continuing to work closely with you and other Members of Congress to
keep our communities safe and secure.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. Thank you.
We are going to try to stay on schedule because I know we
have votes coming up. Secretary Mayorkas, you talked about this
internal review. We have to detect and respond to domestic
violence extremism within the Department of Homeland Security.
That sends chills down my spine that we have to even be doing
that.
Will you commit to making the results of that review
available to Congress and the American public?
Hon. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I certainly will. It is
vitally important that our Department reflects the Nation that
we seek to achieve, protect, and keep secure.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Attorney General Garland, I mentioned earlier you were the
lead prosecutor in the Oklahoma City bombing case. In some ways
I feel like that was yesterday, but I am sure even more so to
you. You had a pretty unique perspective into our country's
efforts to counter domestic violent extremism.
When you commemorated the 26th Anniversary of the Oklahoma
City bombing last month, you noted that ``the terror we faced
then is still with us.'' It appears to me that the threat has
evolved in part because of violent extremist groups.
So my question to you, Attorney General: how will the
Justice Department adapt its approach at combating domestic
violent extremism to address how the threat has evolved over
the past few years?
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE APPROACH TO COMBATTING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Hon. Garland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and that is an
excellent question. That's what we've been working on for
several months and which is something that the Department has
been working on over the years.
That threat has changed. There are a lot of different
factors that have made it change, but, of course, the most
significant is the ability to communicate over the Internet at
high speed and to be able to communicate in secret through
encrypted and other channels.
In the days of Oklahoma City, the co-conspirators had to
meet together and it took a considerable amount of time. In
addition, the degree of lethal weaponry available now is
substantially higher than it was then. Then it took 2,000
pounds of ammonium nitrate to bring down that building. It
would take considerably less of modern explosives to do the
same. So that threat is considerably with respect to its risk
of lethality higher than it ever was.
We are using all the lessons that were learned over the
past decades, including those involved in fighting foreign
terrorists in the United States. We have a much more robust
intelligence situation than we had then. We have much more
joint sharing of information between state and local agencies
and the Federal Government. The FBI has joint task forces
across the country of about a hundred or so covering every
field office and many more.
The U.S. Attorney's Offices likewise have joint anti-
terrorism task forces that work with State and local law
enforcement sharing information all the time, and we're giving
out considerable amounts of grants to help the State and local
and territorial and Tribal law enforcement to up their game in
recognizing these kind of threats, as well.
Chairman Leahy. I am going to give you a question which you
can then answer if you want for the record. Think seriously on
this.
What more do your Departments need from Congress, and
particularly this committee, to root our violent extremism so
we are not faced with this discussion again 26 years from now?
I would hope you would be very specific in answering that
question and answer it directly. You know, we hear so much
about domestic violent extremism in all its manifestations. I
think it is safe to say that your Departments are committed to
fighting extremism in whatever form it exists.
We have to start with some common facts. In October of last
year, the Department of Homeland Security concluded that white
supremacist extremists remain the most persistent and lethal
threat in the homeland. That was what the Department of
Homeland Security said during the last Administration.
So let me ask first Secretary Mayorkas. Is it still your
assessment that White supremacist extremists are the most
lethal threat we face in the homeland today?
Hon. Mayorkas. Mr. Chairman, I do believe that the
intelligence reflects the fact that indeed that is the case,
and I very much appreciate your question with respect to the
resources that we could utilize to enhance our efforts to
combat domestic violent extremism and three lines of work come
immediately to mind.
Of course, as I mentioned earlier, we have created a branch
to focus exclusively on this particular threat stream and that
branch can use additional resources so that we have the
analytic capabilities to best assess the threat and provide
information to our State, local, Tribal, and territorial
partners to equip and empower them to address it in their
communities.
Chairman Leahy. But you do agree with your predecessors
that White supremacist extremists remain the most persistent
lethal threat in the homeland?
Hon. Mayorkas. I do believe they do at this time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. And, Attorney General Garland, do you
agree?
Hon. Garland. I do, and that's the most recent assessment
of the FBI.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you. I will have further questions
which I will submit for the record. Again, I thank you both for
being here.
I yield to the Vice Chairman.
Senator Shelby. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's my understanding that the latest operational
statistics provided by DHS that this year in the Rio Grande
Valley sector alone, more than 19,000 persons apprehended by
the Border Patrol were released into the interior of the
country without a court date to adjudicate their illegal entry.
Even under the Obama Administration's catch and release policy,
illegal crossers were given a notice to appear before a judge.
My question to both of you is this. What is the plan for
these 19,000 illegal immigrants and how are you planning to
track them once they've been let into the country, and are you
in essence conceding that these people will be allowed to stay
in the country indefinitely? In other words, what's going on
here? Mr. Attorney General, I'll start with you.
Hon. Garland. Well, the specific program you're talking
about, I'm going to have to defer to the Secretary of DHS.
I know that the Secretary is trying to prioritize his
enforcement efforts. The resources are limited and the most
important thing is to remove those who are a danger to national
security and a danger to the public safety, and I understand
those to be his enforcement priorities.
Senator Shelby. Okay. Mr. Attorney General, Federal law
defines domestic terrorism as a violation of the criminal laws
of the U.S. or any State that appears intended to intimidate or
coerce. As I said in my opening statement, that was the case
with the events of January 6th and the individuals who
committed those acts should be punished to the fullest extent
of the law. I believe that.
At the same time, sir, I'm trying to understand the
difference between those acts and the ones perpetuated last
summer by groups like Antifa and others that rioted,
vandalized, and, frankly, terrorized cities, like Portland,
Minneapolis, and Washington, DC, all in an effort to deliver,
as they say, a message.
My question is this. Sir, what is the actual difference
between these acts, besides the groups carrying them out, and
if there is not one, how can you assure this committee and the
American people that the Department of Justice under your
leadership is pursuing all who commit such acts with equal
vigor?
In other words, you're not selectively prosecuting but
you're going after all lawbreakers?
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Hon. Garland. Senator, as I said in my opening statement
and as you said in your statement, the role of the Justice
Department is to investigate and prosecute violations of the
criminal law, regardless of ideology.
Your quotation from Director Wray is one I would join
myself that we don't care what the ideology is. Violations of
law are pursued and are prosecuted.
I think it is fair to say that in my career as a judge and
in law enforcement, I have not seen a more dangerous threat to
democracy than the invasion of the Capitol. This was an attempt
by some, and I want to be very careful to not ascribe it to all
because every case is individually decided, but there was an
attempt to interfere with the fundamental passing element of
our democracy, the peaceful transfer of power, and there has to
be a hierarchy of things that we prioritize. This would be the
one we prioritize because it is the most dangerous threat to
our democracy.
But that does not mean that we don't focus on other threats
and that we don't focus on other crimes. We do, and we don't
care about the ideology behind them.
Senator Shelby. Is rioting and pilfering and all of this in
our cities where it breaks the law, is that subject to
prosecution?
Hon. Garland. Of course. Anything that breaks the law----
Senator Shelby. Just like any other breaking----
Hon. Garland. Anything that breaks the law is subject to
prosecution, may not be subject to Federal prosecution. There
has to be a Federal crime involved, but if it breaks the law,
of course it's subject to prosecution.
Senator Shelby. A lot of it could be subject to Federal
prosecution.
Hon. Garland. It could, yes, absolutely, it could, and the
Justice Department looks for where there are violations of
Federal crimes.
Senator Shelby. Mr. Secretary, in the past 5 years Congress
has directly provided the Department of Homeland Security with
billions of dollars for the construction of a border wall and
we know where it is today.
I think it's an affront to this committee and to a lot of
us for Congress and to Congress's power of the purse, but,
worse, it makes the work of our dedicated Border Patrol agents
more difficult and more dangerous on what's been going on
there.
I think these agents must stand constant guard by
incomplete sections of the border wall which now serves as
funnels for illegal immigrants, human trafficking, and drug
smuggling. You know, I think the dynamics there are straining
the resources of our Border Patrol under your leadership.
Mr. Secretary, what is your plan, if you have one, to
relieve Border Patrol agents from guarding gaps that remain in
the wall due to this Administration's refusal to finish
construction that was near completion and abruptly halted in
January, and are you planning to turn on the gates in complete
sections of the border wall that's finished so your agents can
safely patrol the other areas of responsibility? In other
words, what's going on there?
Hon. Mayorkas. Vice Chairman Shelby, we are dedicated to
securing our border. That is one of our most significant
priorities, and we have a multifaceted approach to that
critical mission.
Let me say, if I can, for just one moment. You mentioned
traffickers and human smuggling organizations. We are very
focused on combating their efforts to cause damage in our
country and, in fact, just over the past few weeks, we launched
Operation Sentinel to increase our resources and dedication of
efforts to combat human smugglers and traffickers in every way
possible.
The border is most secure when we take a multifaceted
approach where we not only rely exclusively on the physical
barrier but we have physical barriers, the use of technology,
and a focus on innovation to make sure that we're harnessing
the most recent technological innovations to secure our border
and, of course, the brave men and women of the United States
Border Patrol.
It's that multifaceted approach that delivers the greatest
security to our border.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
And we will turn to Senator Durbin, who is also the Chair
of the Senate Judiciary Committee and is deeply involved in
these issues.
Senator Durbin. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Attorney General, you've identified the dilemma of
democracy where we state unequivocally you can believe what you
care to believe. That's your right in this country, this free
country, but when you take action in pursuance of your beliefs,
the new have to take a critical eye toward that action to
determine whether or not it has broken the law and endangers
the rights of others.
During the January 6th insurrection, New York Police
Department Officer Thomas Webster has been charged with
assaulting a DC Metropolitan Police Department officer during
the attack. Body camera footage shows Webster attacking the
Metropolitan Police Department officer with a metal flag pole,
tackling him and trying to rip off his face shield and gas
mask.
This raises a question which is painful to consider but we
have to consider it and that is whether or not in the ranks of
law enforcement, either at the Federal level or State and local
level, there are those who would use their political beliefs in
a manner which is inconsistent with your earlier statement.
What are your thoughts about how we can deal with this?
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM WITHIN LAW ENFORCEMENT
Hon. Garland. Well, you put your finger on the most
difficult problem we have, which is balancing First Amendment,
free association, free speech rights, with protection of our
communities against criminal acts.
Within the Justice Department itself, we are beginning our
own review of our procedures. Over the last couple of weeks,
we've been discussing how to go about this. Deputy Attorney
General has met with the heads of all of our law enforcement
agencies to determine how we can carefully vet our own
employees, again always being mindful of First Amendment and
free associational rights, but at the same time being careful
that we don't have people in our ranks who would commit
criminal acts or who are not able to carry on their duties. So
that's one set of things, looking within ourselves.
The second are we have with respect to our Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, we have a vetting procedure, like we have for our
own agents, with respect to careful backgrounds, but with
respect to law enforcement of the local and State level, this
would require using some of our grant money for the purpose of
incentivizing anti-domestic extremist training of people so
that law enforcement is aware of what to look for and of how to
go about the kind of training necessary to make sure that
people who are involved in it are excluded from the ranks.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas, Senator Shelby raised a question
earlier about 19,000 people who were caught and released by
your agency at the southern border, and I want to give you a
chance to respond to that, and would you also comment on the
chart that says there are thousands of migrant children in U.S.
custody, so that the record can be clear as to whether that is
accurate?
Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you, Senator Durbin.
As I mentioned earlier, our priorities to secure the border
in a time of pandemic, we are employing the Department of
Health and Human Services, specifically the Center for Disease
Control's Title 42 authority, to expel families and single
adults.
We made a decision because the President and this
Administration is dedicated not only to a safe and orderly
immigration system but one that is humane, as well, to not
expel children.
Families who are not able to be expelled are placed in
immigration proceedings pursuant to the law.
Senator Durbin. Does that mean they have a court date?
Hon. Mayorkas. That is indeed the case. They do have a
court date and if we are not able to identify a court date at
the time that they are apprehended in a Customs and Border
Protection facility, a Border Patrol station, they are issued a
Notice to Appear at an Immigration and Customs Enforcement
facility.
With respect to the photograph that I have trouble seeing
but I do again discern what it is, we have focused our efforts
on ensuring that children are moved as quickly as possible from
a Border Patrol station to a shelter and care of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). I have repeatedly stated
that a Border Patrol station is no place for a child.
We have made dramatic improvement in the movement of those
unaccompanied children to the Department of Health and Human
Services. We've reduced the time in Border Patrol custody from
a height of a 133 hours on average on March 28th to an average
below 30 hours as I sit here and testify today, and those
facilities are far better than a Border Patrol station and we
are likewise reducing the time that a child spends in an HHS
facility, so that we can unite that child with a parent, legal
guardian, or family relative, qualified foster here in the
United States.
Senator Durbin. But you do not forcibly remove children
from their families, do you?
Hon. Mayorkas. We absolutely do not continue the cruel and
extraordinarily inhumane policy of the past.
Senator Durbin. And you do make every effort to establish
reunification possibility?
Hon. Mayorkas. We are dedicated to that. We are very proud
of the fact that we reunited four families last week, and I
want to acknowledge that that is only the beginning, Senator.
Senator Durbin. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Attorney General, welcome. I commend you and the
Department of Justice for seeking to identify and prosecute
those responsible for the terrible riots and attack on our
Capitol on January 6th.
As the Chairman mentioned, starting last summer, our
country also experienced attacks threatening other significant
government institutions, such as a courthouse, police stations.
That occurred in Minneapolis and what we in Maine call the
other Portland.
You have made very clear that the ideological outlook of
the individuals committing these alleged crimes is not
important to the Department of Justice, but what resources has
the Department dedicated to identifying and prosecuting the
individuals responsible for the violent acts last summer that
were aimed at institutions like courthouses and police
stations?
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
Hon. Garland. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
As you might expect, I know more about the resources we're
putting into January 6th because most of those resources have
been put in on my watch during the time I've been here. I
wasn't the Attorney General nor in the Department of Justice in
the summer. So I'm not completely familiar with the resources
that were put in during that period.
But the U.S. Attorney's Offices in both the other Portland
and in Minneapolis are continuing to work those cases as is the
FBI field offices in both of those cases, and I have not heard
any suggestion that insufficient resources are available for
those continuing prosecutions.
Senator Collins. If you could get back to me with more
specifics on that, I'd really appreciate it.
Hon. Garland. I'll ask my staff to contact yours. Thank
you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Mayorkas, first of all, let me say that I very
much appreciate the work of the Department of Homeland Security
and I personally learned a lot from a recent trip, my second,
to the border, to Texas, where I went with Border Patrol agents
on a midnight tour of the Rio Grande, and across the river we
could see the bright lights of the Mexican cartels and hear
them taunting the border agents as they were controlling
completely the flow of migrants across the river.
I know that you visited the Donna facility in Texas last
week. When I was there, the conditions were dire. This looks
great compared to what I saw. What I saw were children in pens,
on floors, with no spaces between them, with just mylar
blankets, and those conditions were truly dire.
We are, however, despite the improvements that you're
working hard to make, we're seeing decades-high numbers of
encounters at the border, and I asked the Border Patrol agents
and also the migrants through a translator why the migrants
were coming now, and they pointed to changes in policies that
have been made by the Biden Administration, particularly with
regard to the migrant protection protocols, and one woman, very
young women with a young child told me that she was here to
escape the violence and because President Biden told her to
come.
You had said that we will build the legal processes for
migrants to come to the U.S. when they are qualified to do so
under the laws that Congress passed and that is exactly right.
So how can we now reform or amend our practices and our
laws to end the various incentives that spur this flood of
illegal migration which has led to very vulnerable people being
exploited by smugglers, human traffickers, the cartels? What
should we do now?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you very much. I have a
three-part answer, but before I provide the three-part answer,
let me say two important things, if I may.
First of all, I want to articulate my extraordinary pride
in working alongside and supporting the men and women of the
United States Border Patrol. Truly, their efforts are heroic.
Secondly, the Donna facility I visited twice, once in March
and once last week, and the change in the conditions there is
extraordinary and that is because of the men and women of the
Border Patrol as well as the men and women throughout the
Department of Homeland Security who have dedicated their
resources and talents to the effort.
It's really a three-part solution. It is investing in the
countries of origin, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and
tackling the root causes that cause the regular migration, that
caused loving parents to actually send their children alone and
sometimes in the hands of human smugglers to traverse Mexico to
reach our southern border.
Secondly, it's to construct lawful pathways so that
individuals, such as those loving parents, don't feel they have
to rely on those irregular and dangerous pathways, but a safe
and orderly process when they qualify under United States law
for them to travel here safely.
And third, Senator, is immigration reform. There is
unanimity that our current immigration system is broken. We
have bills pending before Congress and it is time for that
reform to be enacted.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
I agree with that last comment. Several members here are
also members of the Judiciary Committee and a few years ago, we
spent months putting together a comprehensive immigration bill.
It passed the U.S. Senate in a bipartisan 65 or 63 vote,
Republicans and Democrats for it. The then Speaker of the
House, even though there were votes that would have passed it,
refused to bring it up because it would have violated a rule
that he considered sacred, the Dennis Hastert Rule. I think
they call it something different now that former Speaker
Hastert went to prison.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Attorney General, welcome. Mr. Secretary, welcome. You have
described misinformation and disinformation as fueling a great
deal of this violent extremism activity. In your view, would a
commission to provide information literacy tools that people
can use to make sounder judgments about what they're seeing on
social media and this would apply to all communities, but
there's a particular concern with veterans and service members,
would such a commission be useful, Mr. General, please?
COMMISSION ON INFORMATION LITERACY
Hon. Garland. I think all forms of civics education that
help provide education about misinformation that lead to
radicalization or misinformation in general would be helpful.
Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator Reed, I would welcome the
opportunity to learn the specifics. We're eager to have
additional resources and additional vehicles to address
misinformation and disinformation.
I should say that our Department is partnering with the
Department of Education to develop a program in the K through
12 arena and so to amplify that effort, we would welcome the
opportunity to study the commission of which you speak.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Secretary, we have also seen increasing evidence that
Russia is using this type of misinformation and disinformation
to support and amplify a message of violence that we saw in
Charlottesville and the killing of George Floyd designed to
disunite this country, inflame racial tensions, and to
undermine in many respects our democracy.
A recent joint assessment indicates that they're using the
January 6th assault on the Capitol in such a manner to amplify
narratives in furtherance of their policy which is to disrupt
and disunite and to indeed destroy, if they could, our
democracy.
So are you concerned about this nexus between Russia and
these domestic terrorists?
Hon. Mayorkas. Very much so, Senator. We are intensely
focused on the information with respect to Russia's effort to
sow discord and disunity in our country and, of course, we are
bringing an all of government effort to respond to that, and I
would welcome the opportunity to brief you in a more
appropriate forum to address the information we have in that
regard.
Senator Reed. In this forum, can you give an indication of
what you think the best way might be to do that?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, some of the actions that we have
taken certainly are public. We have imposed sanctions. We have
attributed to Russia publicly the actions that we have learned
they have committed. Those are two examples that I certainly
can speak of in a public forum.
Senator Reed. Thank you. One of my impressions from being
on the Armed Services Committee is that there is a disconnect
between our defense-related intelligence services, the
Cybercom, NAS, CIA, et cetera, many because of constitutional
issues of the inability of these agencies to operate in the
United States.
Has that left a seam in which it's being exploited and are
we making efforts to sort of close that seam constitutionally?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, you are correct in addressing the
fact that some authorities are domestic in nature, others are
not. The issue of seams, of course, is a longstanding one. We
are very, very focused on closing any seams that remain or any
residual of past issues. We're very, very focused on and
developing resources to address that.
Senator Reed. Well, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Attorney General,
if there are legislative initiatives that are required to close
these seams or to disrupt the flow of disinformation, please
forward those to not just this committee but to other
committees that have jurisdiction and interest, and thank you
all for your service, gentlemen.
Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Senator Shelby, Senator Leahy, oh, he's
back now. I'm sorry.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Secretary, welcome, and thank you
for all you do.
Attorney General Garland, I would like to ask a question
regarding the ongoing investigations following the events of
January 6th. A couple weeks ago, the FBI executed a search
warrant on a couple living in Homer, Alaska, related to the
investigation surrounding the events of January 6th. The search
warrant was unsealed just last week.
We had opportunity to take a look at it. We now understand
that the wife was or has been identified as a person that the
FBI believes may have been connected to the laptop of Speaker
Pelosi based on a picture and at least two tips. The couple in
Homer adamantly assert that this is a case of mistaken
identity. Certainly a lot of back and forth going on as to
whether or not that is the case, but understanding that this
investigation is ongoing, how are the Department of Justice and
Homeland Security working with the FBI and others to ensure
that while we have a thorough investigation that is ongoing,
that it respects the constitutional rights of all Alaskans in
this case but all Americans?
But part of this is just to ensure that public trust in law
enforcement is maintained during the course of this
investigation. There's a lot of discussion about how long is it
going to take until this investigation is concluded.
You have a small town in a state with a small population
and there's a lot of discussion about the merits of this going
forward. So if you can address that, please?
PROTECTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS DURING CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
Hon. Garland. I think this is a central question for all of
law enforcement to always be careful to balance. Balance isn't
even the right word. The right word is to pursue law
enforcement objectives consistent with the statutes of the
United States and the Constitution. This is exactly what we
endeavored to do in Oklahoma City, facing enormous number of
deaths and injuries, but we took care at each step to make sure
that the law was followed.
We are doing the same with respect to the January 6th
investigation. The U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of
Columbia is the lead force on the prosecution side and the FBI
on the law enforcement side. Both are subject to ongoing
supervision by the National Security Division in the Justice
Department, by the Deputy Attorney General, and myself.
So we take your point completely. I know I can't talk, as
you obviously recognize, about a particular case, but we look
carefully and we will revise our perceptions as new facts
arise.
I can't tell you how long this will take. This is only at
this point around a 130, I guess a 145 days or so. It's
relatively short in the lifetime of an investigation,
particularly one that has required such a large number of
separate investigations in different places as far-flung as
Alaska, and the huge amount of data to be examined in video
that's been made available.
So the investigation is not over and we will pursue each
lead till we're confident that we have reached the end.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you for that.
Mr. Secretary, a lot of focus this week in the news about
the shutdown of the Colonial pipeline due to the series of
cyber attacks.
When you think about what we are discussing here in this
committee right now, you've got the issues of immigration,
you've got violent extremism, and certainly cyber in the news
today. How is DHS balancing all of these very significant but
clearly competing priorities, and if you can quickly describe
how DHS is working with the Department of Energy and FERC, the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, to help the industry
counter these attacks to ensure that our critical energy
infrastructure is secure?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you very much. Intensely
proud of the men and women of the Department of Homeland
Security in addressing the urgent threats that we face across
the homeland security enterprise.
You correctly note cybersecurity as one of those urgent
threats and just last week, I spoke to the chamber of Commerce
and thousands of people across the country, representatives of
small businesses, about ransomware, the very type of attack
that Colonial Pipeline has experienced and that has galvanized
correctly our attention.
More than $350 million in losses that are attributable to
ransomware just this year and over a 300 percent increase over
the last year.
We have the capability to address and the dedication to
address border security, cybersecurity threats, the security of
our homeland in all dimensions. We are working at the direction
of the President in an all of government way to address the
cybersecurity threat that Colonial Pipeline suffered and that
other businesses and institutions across our country are
vulnerable to.
We are looking at the Jones Act and the need to exercise
our waiver authority to ensure that fuel carried by vessels can
actually reach the impacted areas. We're working very closely
with the Department of Transportation, the Department of
Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, all across the
government, including the Department of Defense and its
logistics agency, to bring all of the resources and
capabilities to bear to ensure the well-being of the American
people and those impacted in the regions within Colonial
Pipeline's jurisdiction.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, Senator Murkowski.
We will take a 5-minute break now and then come back.
[Recess.]
Chairman Leahy. Who is next? Senator Shaheen? Where is she?
Let us see. Senator Shaheen is not here. So we will go to
Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our two distinguished witnesses. You are the
right leaders for this difficult moment, and I am grateful for
your service and for the agencies which you lead.
Two weeks ago, Senator Sasse and I held a hearing of the
Subcommittee on Privacy and Technology where we focused on the
role that social media platforms' algorithms play in amplifying
misinformation and extremist content.
Secretary Mayorkas, you note in your testimony that you're
increasing your Department's efforts to assess how domestic
extremists are leveraging social media and other online
platforms. Can you tell us more about those efforts?
Hon. Mayorkas. Thank you very much, Senator.
The challenge really is, number one, the anonymity with
which people are able to navigate through social media and
really exploit the medium for improper and unlawful purposes,
and two, the speed with which they can do so, and so what we
are doing is dedicating analysts to understanding the
narratives that are being communicated on the social media
platforms and identifying linkages between those narratives and
indicators of intention to commit violent acts.
Right now we are doing that through the human resource, not
yet leveraging algorithms, but we are, of course, planning
different methodologies as we proceed in this endeavor.
Senator Coons. Attorney General Garland, you and other
leaders, in fact Chris Wray at the FBI has also spoken about
self-radicalization, and I assume that what that really means
is folks who are largely sitting at home and consuming hours
and hours of extremist content through YouTube and Facebook and
other social media platforms.
Would you agree that if platforms have algorithms that are
actually designed to hold the attention of viewers and to
engage them by delivering more and more extremist content to
people who start going down these so-called rabbit holes then
they perhaps unintentionally are fueling some of this problem
and we should take some actions to help address that challenge?
SOCIAL MEDIA AND SELF-RADICALIZATION
Hon. Garland. Well, I agree with Secretary Mayorkas that
what's happening on our social media platforms certainly can
lead to self-radicalization. The precise mechanism, I'm no
expert on and I wouldn't want to pretend to be, but self-
radicalization does--we've seen it most dangerously with
respect to those who are influenced by Jihadist websites, who
watch those websites over and over again and become persuaded
and then self-radicalize, and this accelerates very quickly.
Somebody can go from a circumstance where no one around
them thinks that they are likely to be a violent extremist to
one who then acts out. And I think that this is the way in
modern society people get disinformation is through the
Internet.
Senator Coons. And I notice an increase in budgetary
requests in both of your Departments to fund grant programs
that build State and local capacity and to increase funding for
U.S. Attorney's Offices.
Will any of that go towards further research on this exact
point and will any of that go to help focus on what the mental
health issues are that might make people more vulnerable to
recruitment or radicalization and what the local initiatives
might be that could help tamp down or deter radicalization?
Hon. Mayorkas. If I may----
Senator Coons. Secretary Mayorkas.
Hon. Mayorkas. If I may take that, Senator coons, a few
efforts, if I may. Number one, we help resource centers of
excellence to conduct research in precisely the area that you
have identified. We have grant programs to equip and enable
local communities to conduct research and also to develop
programs that are in fact focused on mental health issues and a
holistic approach to the challenge that we face.
That is precisely one of the reasons why we actually
changed the office's name to become the Center for Prevention
Programs and Partnerships. It's about prevention, first and
foremost, which does include mental health efforts, and
partnership, working with our State, local, Tribal, territorial
partners to equip them in the communities to develop these
programs, to develop educational efforts as well as response
and resilience programs.
Senator Coons. Thank you. Anything you wanted to add?
STUDYING DOMESTIC RADICALIZATION
Hon. Garland. Yes, and the same for us. So the National
Institute of Justice did a study on just this topic,
understanding domestic radicalization and terrorism, which came
out last year, which I mentioned in my written statements. We
have $4 million in our budget request for them to continue and
to do further analysis of root causes of radicalization.
Senator Coons. Well, thank you. Thank you both. Thank you
for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I've read that police officers have
encounters every year with about 60 million Americans and in 10
million of those encounters, the person has an encounter with
the copy is arrested, and in 2 million of those encounters, the
police officer either has to use force or threaten to use
force.
Now every case is different and needs to be investigated
when force is used or threatened to be used. We had a very
unfortunate event happen, as you know, in Columbus, Ohio, last
month. A police officer, who happens to be White, shot a young
woman who happened to be an African American and she, at least
according to the video, was about to stab another young woman
who happened to be African American.
All we had at the time was this video. We had nothing else,
nothing else, and I think it's still being investigated. Put
this up for me right quick. We have an NBA, a National
Basketball Association athlete immediately after this happened
put out an Instagram post identifying the police officer.
Here's his face, and this is what the NBA player said. ``You're
next.''
Do you think that contributes to domestic violence in
America?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, I can't comment on a particular
case that is under investigation nor can I comment on a case
when I don't know all of the facts and I hope you do understand
that.
I served 12 years as a Federal prosecutor----
Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Hon. Mayorkas [continuing]. And I understand----
Senator Kennedy. Let me put it another way. I understand
you----
Hon. Mayorkas. Please, if you would frame it more
generally, perhaps----
Senator Kennedy. Sure. Would you have sent out an Instagram
like this?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, I think you know the answer to that
question.
Senator Kennedy. Is it no? It the answer no?
Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, and I'd like to, if I can,
amplify something very important that my colleague, the
Attorney General, articulated.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Before you do, if you could, before
you do, my time is so limited, and I want to ask the General a
question because I'm going to run out of time, and then if it's
okay, Mr. Secretary, I'll come back to you.
Hon. Mayorkas. I'd welcome that.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, sir.
General, I appreciate all your efforts.
Hon. Garland. Thank you.
Senator Kennedy. I think it's fair to say that Chicago has
become unfortunately the world's largest outdoor shooting
range.
What's the Department of Justice doing to help remedy this
problem in Chicago?
VIOLENT CRIME IN CHICAGO
Hon. Garland. Well, violent crime has been a priority of
the Justice Department since I was last in the Department. That
may have been the first time the Department actually created an
anti-violent crime initiative, which has now over the years had
different names.
We are going to put a large amount of money into grants
with respect to violent crimes, gang violence, BJA, Bureau of
Justice Assistance, grants. We spent $8.6 billion in fiscal
year 2021 on violent crime, both on prevention----
Senator Kennedy. What about Chicago?
Hon. Garland. Yeah. On the specifics of Chicago, I don't
know, but we will provide the resources that the city needs to
assist it in its efforts against violent crime. I don't know
specifically, although having been born and raised in Chicago,
I'm at least as concerned as you are about violent crime in
that city.
Senator Kennedy. Yeah. So you're giving them money?
Hon. Garland. We're giving them money and we have law
enforcement. We have a United States Attorney's Office. We have
the FBI. We have the DEA. We have ATF. We have the U.S.
Marshals. All are focused on many different areas, but one of
which is violent crime and, in particular, gang violence.
Senator Kennedy. Okay. Let me get back to the Secretary. I
think he had something he wanted to say.
Hon. Mayorkas. Oh, thank you so much for the opportunity.
Senator Kennedy. Yes, sir.
Hon. Mayorkas. We take great pride in the fact that as a
Department we have statutorily created the Offices of Privacy
and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, and it is very, very
important constitutionally, as a matter of constitutional law,
that we both protect and safeguard individuals' right of speech
and right of assembly, yet we address with all our law
enforcement capabilities those who really predicate acts of
violence on false narratives and dangerous ideologies, and it's
the acts of violence that we are focused upon, but I wanted to
draw a clear line which is not always easy to draw, but we're
very focused on it because it speaks to the principles and
values that guide everything that we do.
Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you very much.
Senator Murphy.
Senator Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good to see you both. Secretary Mayorkas, we look forward
to seeing you before the subcommittee later this year to talk
about the Department's budget request. Thank you both for your
service to protect the country.
I have two questions, three if I have time. The first is
with respect to comments that you both made regarding the
access that domestic extremist groups have to weapons and bomb-
making materials.
I would note the incredibly disturbing story of the 13
individuals in Michigan, who were very far along in a plot to
kidnap and try for treason the Governor of Michigan, had in
their possession upwards of 70 firearms, an arsenal that
included many AR-15-style rifles, ghost guns, guns that are
designed by their nature to be untraceable, and 2,000 rounds of
ammunition.
I'll direct this to you, Attorney General Garland, because
you are undergoing right now a review about the ways in which
we can make sure that firearms are traceable for law
enforcement purposes.
You volunteered this in your testimony, as I think
Secretary Mayorkas did. What are your concerns regarding the
ability of these groups to arm themselves with significant
weaponry and weaponry that increasingly is very difficult, if
not impossible, to trace?
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACCESS TO WEAPONRY
Hon. Garland. So I appreciate your picking up on the point
that I was making and I think the increased availability of
extraordinarily lethal weaponry is what makes domestic violent
extremism and domestic terrorism such a serious priority for
the Justice Department and DHS and of concern to the country.
We are putting a significant amount of money into our
investigations of domestic violent extremism terrorist groups.
We have a budget request of $1.6 billion for ATF for the work
that it does on this and another request for $401 million for
State and local grants.
On the specific question you asked about traceability, we
have just issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect
to ghost guns, which, as you point out, do not have serial
numbers but equally important because they are sold as kits,
it's not necessarily clear that they were subject to background
checks when they were sold.
So under the rule, they would both be subject to background
checks and the manufacturers would be required to put serial
numbers on them and a licensed firearms dealer who comes in to
possession of one without a serial number would be required to
put one on it.
Senator Murphy. I will remind the committee on this general
topic that right now, individuals that are on what we would
commonly refer to as the Terrorist Watch List are able to buy
weapons in gun stores today. They are not automatically added
to the list of those that are prohibited to purchase weapons.
It's inconceivable to me that at least on that topic we
cannot find common ground.
Turning to the question of the border, Secretary Mayorkas,
Senator Shelby raised the question of border security at a
hearing about domestic violence, domestic extremism, and I
wanted to sort of ask you to give an assessment of the risk of
terrorists entering this country through the southern border.
It's important to remember that undocumented immigrants in
this country have a lower arrest rate than U.S. citizens and
from what I can understand, there's fairly scant evidence that
international extremist groups are using the southwest border
as a mechanism to bring their members into the country.
What evidence do we have that the southwest border is being
used by international extremist groups or domestic extremist
groups to try to bring individuals into this country to do harm
to American citizens?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we don't have any evidence that
suggests that the threat on the border with respect to foreign
terrorists is any greater today than it was last year, the year
prior, or the years over the past decade.
The fact of the matter is that we are vigilant in guarding
against foreign terrorist influences through all avenues, not
just, of course, our land borders, but air and maritime. That
is what we do, and, fortunately, we have extraordinary
capabilities to address it.
Senator Murphy. Great. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and by early agreement, Senator
Braun.
Senator Braun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So in listening to the tone and direction of the
conversation today that idea of hierarchy and priority between
domestic terrorism and threats from afar, to me, it is easy to
get into a false equivalency there.
I'm going to use my reason for discussion of the visit I
made down to the border a little over a month ago and I think
also it's kind of tricky when you generalize on something like
January 6th with all of us acknowledge as being a horrific
occurrence here in the Capitol.
I want to cite a couple things that really stood out when I
was there and this would be kind of the rule of numbers being
something that we should be most concerned about.
A 150,000 illegal crossings in March, just saw it on the
tube today, a 178,000 in April, 14,000 of whom would have been
unaccompanied minors. When I was down there, that was the part
that looked most tragic from a humanity point of view, but the
thing that caught me more than anything and it sticks in my
mind like it was yesterday, we get down to the border at the
Rio Grande and, of course, nothing was happening as we arrived
and then the heckling that floated across the river from
smugglers and coyotes. I asked what were they saying--``We're
going to keep doing it regardless of what you try to do to stop
it.''
Now that might be an idle threat, other than I think it's
arrived now close to $1.5 to $2 billion business where you've
got a logistics enterprise in the country, and I think the
tragic thing is so much of it is about people trying to escape
a life that forces them on that journey.
Here's the point that stuck in my mind and this wasn't in
the RGV, it was in the Del Rio District, and this was the
Border Patrol telling me everything I'm telling you, that 54
different nationalities crossed the border in the 3 months
prior to our visit.
Now questions of do we have more threat of terrorists from
afar that come across or I don't even think it makes sense
domestic folks or people on domestic terrorism crossing the
border, I guess I wouldn't rule that out, but just by that
volume, it would seem to me that we need to be more worried
about what could happen again, based upon 9/11, then maybe
something that happened here on January 6th, horrific, but
might have been more to do with lack of security and having a
place that was easy to breach and not saying that that was the
reason that we shouldn't look at all angles.
I just wonder because I also heard you say, and my question
is going to be for you, Secretary Mayorkas, multifaceted. I
agree with we need to do something. I heard you say earlier
about addressing the smugglers, the coyotes, the operation that
is benefiting from it, but here is what the Border Patrol told
us, as well.
The two most effective things by far, this is the Border
Patrol, would have been the wall in high traffic places now
that has gaps in it and maybe just out of politics we're
refusing to complete it to make it easy for them. They say that
was number one.
Number two was a stay in Mexico policy because at least we
don't have what we've got now and at the Donna facility that I
witnessed, it was worse than it had ever been and now we've
spread that out among other locations maybe to take that kind
of bad look away.
Two questions. It was working. We were at a 45-year low.
Will you try to complete the border wall, even if you don't do
any more where you've got gaps in it, gates not working, and
will you try to reinstitute the stay in Mexico policy at least
until we get this thing down to a manageable level and that's
not trying to spread out all the people that come across the
border currently, 150-178, is it 200,000 in May? Just would
love to know what you're intending to do.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, thank you. There's a lot packed in
there. So I'm going to try to be concise.
We are indeed focused on smugglers and traffickers, as I
mentioned earlier. That has been a many-years problem. We do in
fact take a multifaceted approach to securing our border. I
remember my conversation with Senator McCain about the fact
that we need to use physical borders, technology, and
personnel.
The border is very dynamic. It is changing, and when we
speak of physical barriers, the ability to be mobile is
critically important.
I think there's something very important to articulate in
response to your point about the foreign threats and the
domestic threats. The foreign threats persist. It's not as
though they have disappeared, but the threat landscape is
always evolving.
We have collectively, the Attorney General and I and our
partners across the Federal Government enterprise, have our eye
on the foreign threat as well as the domestic threat. We don't
take our eye off one and focus on the other.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Hon. Mayorkas. We are reviewing the gaps in the gates and
seeing what is the best response to achieve our security while
upholding our values and principles as a country.
Senator Braun. What about the stay in Mexico policy, just
very quickly, because I know we're out of time?
Hon. Mayorkas. That is not something that we as an
Administration have continued.
Senator Braun. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. And thank you.
We are going to have votes soon.
Senator Shaheen, you are next.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you to both of you for being here today and for your
testimony.
I want to go back to the domestic extremist versus national
organizations and one of the concerns that I have, which I'm
sure you share, is the one that Senator Reed referenced about
the connections between some of our domestic violent extremist
organizations and international terrorist groups.
There's been reporting of Americans involved with those
right-wing extremist groups in the U.S. communicating online
and sometimes traveling overseas for training with other
extremist groups and not just in Russia, although we know of at
least one leader of the base who has resettled to St.
Petersburg, Russia.
So can you talk about the extent to which you're seeing an
increase or if you are seeing an increase in those connections
and what we're doing to try and address that? For either of
you.
DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMIST LINKS TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS
Hon. Garland. Yes, Senator. Well, you are right to be
concerned. I can't give a sense of the magnitude of the
problem, but I do think that we have to worry about
interactions between domestic violent extremists, particularly
racially motivated and ethnically motivated ones, where there
are similar groups, particularly in Europe, with similar
ideological bends, sharing information, and we have the benefit
in that respect of being able to coordinate with our national
intelligence partners and the Director of National Intelligence
is very seized with this problem.
The seam that was talked about before in one of the other
questions is one that we have worked very hard to eliminate
where there is a foreign aspect of the risk and our
intelligence agency partners whose eyes are abroad are being
very cooperative in that respect.
But we are looking at this problem and it is very much on
our mind.
Hon. Mayorkas. If I could add one point, Senator, if I may,
the Attorney General and I participated in a multi-nation
ministerial and, of course, the issue of violent extremism was
uppermost in our minds and it's something that we share with
our partners and are working very closely together with them to
address.
Senator Shaheen. One of the potential sources--this is not
specifically on domestic terrorism, but one of the potential
sources of international terrorist activity are the detainee
camps that have resulted from the crisis in Syria and Iraq with
ISIS and there are now tens of thousands of people in those
detainee camps that are really serving as a incubator for
further terrorist activity.
I, along with my colleagues on the Armed Services
Committee, put in language in, I believe, 2 years ago to create
a detainee coordinator to work with not only our Government but
other governments that were the home of some of those detainees
who have been in custody as the result of the military
activities in Syria and Iraq, and no one has yet been appointed
to that position.
I don't know if either of you were aware that that had even
passed and exists, but it seems to me that that would be an
opportunity for us as we're thinking about future international
terrorist activities to begin to have a way to address what's
happening in those detainee camps and to try and get some of
those foreign detainees repatriated into the countries where
they came from.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, that's something certainly we'll
commit to looking into. I'm not expert in that area. I will
stay in the area where I am expert, in the refugee camps with
individuals who have fled persecution by reason of their
membership in particular social groups, we are aware of
influences potentially in those camps and, of course, we modify
our screening and vetting of those individuals accordingly and
that's based on the expertise and qualifications of our refugee
officers.
But I will look at the issue of the detainee coordinator
and follow up. We look forward to following up with you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that. I just have
one final question and that is, I'm a little troubled by the
suggestion of some at the hearing that this is a question of
should we focus on the southern border and illegal immigration
or should we focus on domestic violent extremism, and I'm sure
you both would agree that we've got to do both and that none of
us want to see more illegal immigration any more than we want
to see domestic terrorists increase.
But, Secretary Mayorkas, do you think that statements made
by public officials claiming that the 2020 presidential
election was stolen or the result of fraud increased the threat
of violence by domestic extremists? Have we seen that as we're
pursuing--also for the Attorney General--as we're pursuing the
cases against those people involved on January 6th? Has that
been something that we've heard from the defendants?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, first, yes, we can do both. We can
secure our border and we can effectively combat the rise of
domestic violent extremism and I want to make sure that we draw
a clear line between those two. Even though we can address
both, those are two very, very different challenges.
Senator, false narratives, the spread of false narratives
are used to fuel extremist ideologies and we are focused on the
connection between extremist ideologies and the threat or
intention to commit acts of violence.
Senator Shaheen. And is there any evidence that elected
officials' statements have contributed to that?
Hon. Mayorkas. We do see in the narratives that we have
studied the fact that false narratives attributed to public
officials gained traction in social media.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. Senator Hoeven.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was recently down at the border with fellow Senators.
Actually Senator Shaheen and I toured the border together a
number of years back when we chaired and were ranking member on
DHS Appropriations Subcommittee. So I've been down there before
previously, as well.
When I talk to the Border Patrol agents, they tell me they
need barriers, technology, and people to address the situation.
Do you agree with that?
Hon. Mayorkas. I do, Senator, and it's something I've
spoken of in this hearing.
Senator Hoeven. So then what about continuing completion of
the wall, particularly where it's already been contracted for
construction? That's something they said they want and need to
control the border.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, not all physical barriers are the
same and one of the things that we've learned in our multiyear
study of the border is the fact that the challenges at the
border are quite dynamic not only because of variables in
topography but variables month to month and sometimes year to
year with respect to the movement of people and the
methodologies they employ.
Senator Hoeven. Would you agree with me when you talk to
your Border Patrol agents, they tell you they need barriers,
physical barriers, technology, and people?
Right now the situation where there are almost 180,000
migrants coming across the border illegally just in the month
of April, that'd be almost two million annualized, almost
18,000 unaccompanied minors. They're saying they don't have
time to do their job securing the border because they need the
three things I just mentioned: barriers, technology, and
people.
Do you agree with the professionals down there that say
they need those things or disagree with them and are you
getting them those things?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, if I can just complete the thought
that I was about to complete, if I may, that I remember when I
was the Deputy Secretary and we were analyzing the utility and
effectiveness of fixed towers and then we said, you know what,
we can actually move more effectively from fixed towers to
mobile towers because of the dynamism of which I spoke a minute
ago.
I have spoken with the Border Patrol. I've been down to the
border multiple times and on each visit spoken with the men and
women who secure our border and one will discern different
approaches and different opinions with respect to the
challenges of the border.
It is ultimately my responsibility to pursue those
instruments and tools that I consider most effective in the
service of American people.
Senator Hoeven. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. I only
have 5 minutes for questions. So I'm trying to get my questions
in.
So towers are technology. I asked you about a barrier, and
the Border Patrol says they need all three and so, yes, whether
you have mobile or fixed tower, that's technology.
I'm asking you barriers, technology, and people, and on the
people question, if you don't change the protocols, the third
safe country and the remain in Mexico, how are you going to--
your people down there are overwhelmed. They're overwhelmed,
these professionals.
How are they going to be able to do their job so that they
can handle what's going on on the southern border? I live on
the northern border. People from the northern border are at
about the normal staffing level because they're going down to
help on the southern border.
What are you doing to get on top of the flow so that we
cannot only manage our southern border but I'm also asking for
your help on the northern border to get our people back and get
staffed at the level on the northern border?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we are vigilant in securing all of
the borders and all of the avenues. We have a three-part plan
or I should say three pillars to our plan.
One is to address the root causes and to deter individuals
from seeking the dangerous and perilous journey by addressing
the reasons why they feel forced to flee the countries in which
they live and in which they want to raise their children.
We are also building legal pathways so that there are
avenues of relief under the laws that the United States
Congress has passed and they don't feel compelled by dint of
the tragic circumstances in their countries of origin to take
the perilous journey.
And lastly is our dedication and commitment and our
prioritization of achieving immigration reform because we are
all in agreement, regardless of party, that the current
immigration system is fundamentally broken.
Senator Hoeven. But your metric, based on what you're doing
right now, is that in April almost 180,000 migrants crossed
illegally and it doesn't seem to be slowing down. It seems to
be increasing.
So again back to doing what the professionals are asking
for, I asked you that question. I didn't get an answer in terms
of specifics. I guess it's also now affecting the northern
border.
Are you willing to help us with the issues on the northern
border? That's a simple yes or no.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, the answer is yes, and the
Department of Homeland Security's obligation is to secure all
of our borders and the challenge of migration is not----
Senator Hoeven. Would you say that's happening now, based
on what's going on at the border? Do you feel----
Hon. Mayorkas. I do.
Senator Hoeven [continuing]. That's a secure border?
Hon. Mayorkas. Yes, Senator, I do, and let me just say that
the challenge of migration is not a new phenomenon in 2021. We
experienced a tremendous surge in migration in 2019, in 2016,
in 2014, and many years prior.
Senator Hoeven. How does it compare to last year with the
policies that were in place last year?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, the surge in migration is greater
this year thus far than we observed and experienced in 2020.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Hoeven. And----
Hon. Mayorkas. 2020 was less than what it was----
Senator Hoeven [continuing]. Are you willing to----
Hon. Mayorkas [continuing]. In 2019.
Senator Hoeven [continuing]. Make changes to the current
policy to address that?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, yes, I am, and I will----
Senator Hoeven. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary Garland----
Chairman Leahy. I try to be flexible but a vote has started
and the Senator is over his time. We have one more Senator.
Senator Hoeven. All right, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Leahy. If he could be heard, then the witnesses
will be able to go on.
Senator Hoeven. I'll submit my other questions for the
record.
Chairman Leahy. All right. And I would urge that his
questions as submitted be answered.
Senator Hoeven. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you.
Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both
of you for your service and for your testimony today.
Both of you referenced in your testimony the March
intelligence community report on domestic violent extremism
poses heightened threat and both of you and your Departments
had input into that report.
The very first finding in the executive summary of that
report includes the following statement: ``Newer socio-
political developments, such as narratives of fraud, in the
recent general election, and the emboldening impact of the
violent breach of the U.S. Capitol will almost certainly spur
some domestic violent extremists to try to engage in violence
this year.''
Mr. Attorney General, do you agree with that finding?
MISINFORMATION DRIVING DOMESTIC VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Hon. Garland. I do. That's a finding of all three of the
entities that wrote the report and of the intelligence
community as a whole.
Senator Van Hollen. And, Mr. Secretary, do you concur?
Hon. Mayorkas. I do, as well, Senator.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, Senator Shaheen raised this
issue, and I really don't think we can just gloss over it. It's
not just a question of a lie about the elections. It's not only
a question of deception. That's bad enough.
As this intelligence community report points out, it can
have lethal consequences. In fact, they predict that it will
almost certainly spur some domestic violent extremists.
Gentlemen, yesterday on the Floor of the House,
Congresswoman Liz Cheney said the following, and I'm quoting,
``Today we face a threat America has never seen before. A
former president who provoked a violent attack on this Capitol
in an effort to steal the election has resumed his aggressive
effort to convince Americans that the election was stolen from
him. He risks inciting further violence.''
Do you agree with that statement, which is consistent with
the finding in the intelligence community report?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, let me say this, that false
narratives create a lack of confidence in our democratic
institutions and sometimes worse and those false narratives can
lead people who are predisposed to violence to commit acts of
violence against our institutions and tragically we saw that on
January 6th.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Mr. Attorney General, you're doing the investigations into
what happened here at the Capitol on January 6th, and is it a
fact that many of the people that you've talked to and are
pursuing have said they were inspired to commit the violence
because of President Trump's claims that the election was
stolen? Isn't that a fact?
Hon. Garland. Because this is an ongoing investigation, the
Department's longstanding principle is to not talk about what
we've learned in the investigation, other than through the
filings that we make in the court.
We have in each of the cases of arrests and also search
warrants reproduced some elements of what people have told us
and I think that's the place to look, but I don't think it's an
appropriate thing for me as supervising those prosecutions to
make in the comments outside of court record.
Senator Van Hollen. Well, much of this is in the public
domain. I'm not asking you for the internal findings of your
investigation at this point in time.
I understood the response to Senator Shaheen's question and
certainly this intelligence community report indicates that
those kind of false narratives have dangerous consequences, is
that not true?
Hon. Mayorkas. Most certainly, and it's something that
we're very focused on addressing. False narratives, as I
mentioned, create strands of dialogue that we see propagated on
social media and then we see those strands picked up on and we
are detecting connectivity between those strands and an
intention to commit violent acts and that is what we are
focused on.
Senator Van Hollen. Mr. Attorney General.
Hon. Garland. So if you put it at that level of generality
rather than the specific questions about people being
investigated in a particular circumstance, it is right as the
intelligence community has reported that particularly those who
end up committing acts of domestic violence get ideas from the
Internet and from statements and where there are false
narratives and false statements, those are the kind of things
that can, depending upon the person in the end who acts out,
lead to violence.
Senator Van Hollen. Look, I disagree with Congresswoman Liz
Cheney on a lot of things, but I think everybody needs to stand
with her regardless of political party when she stands up to
talk about the truth and what she is saying in her Floor
remarks squares fully with the finding from this intelligence
community report that both your Departments participated in.
The report is not ambiguous here. It says these kind of
false narratives will almost certainly spur domestic extremists
to try to engage in violence this year.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would just encourage all of our
colleagues to recognize that words matter. I mean, people have
a First Amendment right and they can say what they want, but
they should also recognize the very dangerous consequences of
the false narratives that continue to be peddled around this
place and coming from the former president.
Thank you.
Chairman Leahy. Thank you, and I thank all the witnesses
that were here today and our committee members who are here.
We will keep the hearing record open for a week. If
Senators have written questions to submit, please do so by 5
p.m. next Wednesday, May 19th.
We have two more Full Committee hearings scheduled in the
coming months. The next will be on May 25th on Global
Leadership and the State Department Budget with Secretary of
State Antony Blinken, the other Full Committee hearing will be
in mid-June with Defense Secretary Austin and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs Milley.
As I said, I gaveled closed, but as a courtesy to Senator
Hagerty, who just came in, the vote has started, but we will
limit it to the 5 minutes.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Chairman Leahy. I appreciate
that.
Secretary Mayorkas, welcome. I just checked your
Department's website this morning and according to the data on
your website, 92 percent of the people--of the illegal aliens
that ICE deported have been convicted or charged with crimes
here, 92 percent. Yet the ICE deportations under your
Administration have plummeted dramatically.
Now we know the surge is occurring at the border. We know
many more people are arriving here illegally. Yet the
deportations have gone down. That means that we have more
criminals being deposited into our Nation every day.
I want to talk with you about the resources that we've
committed to this problem and how law-abiding Americans can
feel more comfortable knowing that this increase in criminal
elements is occurring in their communities. It's occurring in
my State of Tennessee.
Isn't it correct that you're choosing not to deport these
people, that ICE is not deporting these people and increasing
the risk to American citizens?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, that is actually not correct, and
if I may, I served for 12 years as a Federal prosecutor and
some of those years I was privileged to have our current
Attorney General in the Department of Justice Headquarters here
in Washington, DC.
The criminal justice system is based on qualitative
outcomes, not quantitative, and we are focused on the greatest
threats to public safety because we do not have limited
resources and so our focus is on three priorities: national
security, public safety, and border security. And we're
delivering consequences, as well we should, to most effectively
serve those priorities. It's qualitative, not quantitative.
Senator Hagerty. From the quantitative perspective, what
we've seen is a massive drop in deportations. Last year between
10 and 20,000 deportations per month, under your Administration
that number's dropped to 2,500-3,000 per month. You've got
2,500 agents, 2,500 ICE agents. They're down to deporting one
criminal per month versus five per month last year.
Hon. Mayorkas. And----
Senator Hagerty. Have the number of criminals dropped that
much?
Hon. Mayorkas. I didn't mean to interrupt. Senator, let me
put this in context because there is one data point that we
shouldn't take off the table and neglect to consider, which is
the fact that for a good deal of the year thus far and
certainly with respect to the fiscal year, our agents, our
brave men and women on the frontlines were addressing the
COVID-19 pandemic and for a period of that time, they were not
fully deployed for reasons that we can all agree upon.
And so we have to remember to consider that and the
constrains on our facilities and our resources in a time of
extraordinary pandemic, but be that as it may, the fundamental
point is key that it's qualitative, and I would rather as an
individual supervising law enforcement and as a former
Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting crimes, I would
rather dedicate resources to an individual who poses the
greatest public safety threat and the apprehension and removal
of which may take a greater amount of time and a greater amount
of resources than someone who has been here for 25 years, who
has not committed an offense, and yet can swallow up resources
that we can best otherwise use.
Senator Hagerty. I'm talking about the people that have
committed crimes and been charged with crimes. Last year during
the pandemic, you mentioned the pandemic as an excuse, last
year even during the pandemic, we were deporting 6,000 per
month. Now those numbers have dropped to less than half of
that.
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, we have, if I may, we have defined
our public safety, national security and border security
threats to most effectively address them and combat them so
that our consequence regime is brought to bear on the greatest
threats that we confront.
Senator Hagerty. So we see a dramatic decrease in the
number of criminals being deported as a result.
Secretary, isn't it true that you've received more funding
from this committee on a bipartisan basis for your Criminal
Alien Program, more funding than you had last year?
Hon. Mayorkas. I believe that is correct.
Senator Hagerty. That is correct. Isn't it true that you
got more funding for Fugitive Operations than you had last
year?
Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, as well, Senator.
Senator Hagerty. And isn't it true that you've got capacity
to house between 18 and 20,000 deportation prospects that is
going unused right now?
Hon. Mayorkas. That is correct, as well.
Senator Hagerty. How is it then that with more resources,
you're accomplishing such fewer number of deportations? How is
it that the results could have plummeted so much with more
money from this Appropriations Committee?
Hon. Mayorkas. Senator, if I may repeat an answer I
provided, which is our focus is on quality, not quantity, and
sometimes achieving qualitative results can consume
considerable resources.
Senator Hagerty. Well, I think going beyond axe murderers
to people that have committed other grave crimes should be your
focus, as well, to utilize this capacity and utilize the funds
we've provided you more effectively.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
Chairman Leahy. The Senator----
Senator Hagerty. Thank you.
Chairman Leahy [continuing]. From Tennessee, who was not
here for all of the hearing, but we reopened the hearing to
enable him to have his 5 minutes and he will be able to submit
questions.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to
the hearing:]
Questions Submitted to Attorney General Merrick B. Garland
Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Leahy
Question. What more does the Department of Justice need from
Congress-and in particular, the Appropriations Committee-to root out
violent extremism? Please be specific about what particular Justice
Department programs, accounts, and initiatives require additional
resources from Congress in order to comprehensively address the threat
of domestic violent extremism.
Answer. Combating the threat of domestic terrorism and domestic
violent extremism is a core priority of the Justice Department. The
President's request for FY 2022 seeks an additional $101 million for
the Justice Department to address the rising threat of domestic
terrorism, while protecting civil rights and civil liberties. This
requested increase includes:
--$45 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for
domestic terrorism investigations.
--$40 million for the U.S. Attorneys to manage increasing domestic
terrorism caseloads.
--$12 million for additional response capabilities at the U.S.
Marshals Service.
--$4 million to the National Institute of Justice to support research
on domestic terrorism threats.
Question. When FBI Director Wray came before the Senate Judiciary
Committee in March of this year, I asked him about the role that white
supremacist extremists played in the January 6th attack on our Capitol.
He noted that racially-motivated extremists, specifically those
advocating for white supremacy, represent the largest subsection of
racially-motivated extremism cases investigated by FBI. Now that over
two months have passed since that hearing, and you've had to time to
step into your new role, I would like to ask you about the prosecutions
pursued by your Department related to the January 6th Capitol attack.
Approximately how many rioters charged in connection with the
January 6th attack are affiliated with extremist groups? Of those
groups, how many would you classify as racially-motivated and, more
specifically, those advocating white supremacist ideologies?
Answer. As of June 22, 2021, the FBI has arrested more than 490
individuals on charges related to the events of January 6, 2021. These
investigations are ongoing, and we continue to review information,
including video footage, photos, and other tips and information, to
identify and hold accountable those who violated the law.
Several of the individuals arrested to date for involvement of the
Capitol attack self- identify with various organizations as described
in the charging documents. Additionally, as has been stated in publicly
available court documents, the Department of Justice has charged a
number of defendants involved in the attack on the U.S. Capitol with
conspiracy charges.
In order to protect the integrity of all investigations, as a
general practice, the Department does not comment on the details of
particular ongoing investigations beyond the charging and other public
documents, and does not comment on the existence or status of any
potential investigative matter.
Question. There is no criminal offense expressly prohibiting
``domestic terrorism.'' In what ways, if any, has that impacted the
Justice Department's ability to investigate and prosecute these cases
against the January 6th rioters?
Answer. The Department has long used existing criminal laws to
successfully disrupt and prosecute domestic terrorists. The Department
has brought a wide range of charges against those involved in the
January 6 attack, including assaulting federal officers, destruction of
government property, conspiracy, civil disorder and obstruction of
official proceedings.
We are currently considering whether there are any gaps in our
capabilities that should, consistent with the civil rights and civil
liberties of the American people, be addressed through legislation. If
we determine that new authorities are needed to address the threat, we
will advise the Congress and would welcome working with you on these
issues.
Question. After the attack on the Capitol on January 6th, what is
the Department of Justice doing to improve intelligence sharing and
communications with its federal, state, and local law enforcement
partners?
Answer. Earlier this month, I announced the release of the Biden
Administration's National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism,
which is designed to coordinate and provide a principled path for the
federal government's efforts to counter the heightened domestic
terrorism threat, using all available tools. The strategy makes clear
that Department of Justice and the federal government more broadly are
committed to enhancing the government's domestic terrorism research and
analysis.
The FBI is increasing the domestic terrorism threat information it
provides to our state, local, Tribal, and territorial partners;
enhancing training provided to these important partners; continuing to
work closely with those partners in our Joint Terrorism Task Forces
across the country on enhancing critical information sharing.
We are also reinvigorating the Department's Domestic Terrorism
Executive Committee, an interagency group that Attorney General Janet
Reno established in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing.
In addition, for nearly a decade, the Department's National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) has administered a domestic violent
extremism and domestic terrorism research program. In FY 2021, NIJ will
fund research that focuses on the radicalization process, reintegration
of offenders incarcerated for terrorism-related offenses, and terrorism
prevention programs. The President's FY 2022 Budget request includes a
$4 million increase for NIJ to further research on the root causes of
radicalization.
Question. Lieutenant General Honore was tasked by House leadership
to conduct an after-action review of the Capitol attack on January 6th
and provide recommendations to improve security of the Capitol. One of
the suggestions in his report was the establishment of a ``quick-
reaction force'' to rapidly respond to any future events.
Will the Justice Department participate in this type of task force?
Should it have dedicated funding from Congress? Or would DHS be better
positioned to participate in a law enforcement-based task force that is
activated when called upon, were the Department provided resources to
do so?
Answer. The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security have a
range of authorities and resources available to them to enforce the law
and support other law enforcement entities. The Justice Department is
committed to working with Congress regarding its ongoing reviews of the
events of January 6th and identifying areas for improvement and greater
cooperation in law enforcement responses.
As the Department of Justice Inspector General announced on January
15, 2021, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has initiated a
comprehensive review to examine the role and activity of the Department
and its components in preparing for and responding to the events at the
U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The review will be coordinated with
reviews also being conducted by the Offices of Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of the Interior. The Department of Justice OIG review will
include examining information relevant to the January 6th events that
was available to the Department in advance of January 6th; the extent
to which such information was shared by the Department with the U.S.
Capitol Police and other federal, state, and local agencies; and the
role of Department personnel in responding to the events at the
Capitol. The OIG also will assess whether there are any weaknesses in
Department protocols, policies, or procedures that adversely affected
the Department's ability to prepare effectively for and respond to the
events at the Capitol on January 6th.
In addition, the Department of Justice is considering whether there
are any gaps in our capabilities that should, consistent with our needs
and shared values, be addressed through legislation. If we determine
that new authorities are needed to address the threat, we will advise
the Congress and would welcome working with you on these issues.
Question. With the prevalence of militia, white supremacist, and
other far-right extremist activities, we increasingly see that
extremists motivated by hate are using high-powered firearms in their
attacks.
What more can the Justice Department do to keep firearms out of the
hands of violent extremists?
Answer. Combating the threat of domestic terrorism and domestic
violent extremism is a core priority of the Justice Department. And a
key element of our fight against domestic violent extremism involves
preventing firearms from falling into the wrong hands.
Alongside the $1.5 billion that the Justice Department is seeking
for our counterterrorism efforts, our FY 2022 budget request includes a
total of nearly $1.6 billion in base funding for the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), an increase of $70 million or
nearly 5% over FY 2021, to support the Agency's work to fight violent
crime and oversee the safe sale, storage, and ownership of firearms. A
portion of this increase would both expand ATF's Crime Gun Intelligence
through the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBN)
and would nearly double ATF's capacity to investigate theft from
Federal Firearms Licensees (FFLs). Every firearm stolen from an FFL
poses a threat to community safety, as well as to our law enforcement
partners.
In addition, the Department's budget request would allow us to
continue the critical work of the FBI's National Instant Criminal
Background Check System (NICS) to prevent prohibited persons from
unlawfully acquiring firearms. And it would enable the Office of
Justice Programs to distribute more than $1 billion in grants to
support local, State, and Tribal law enforcement agencies in their
efforts to improve criminal history record information and ensure
effective nationwide implementation of background check systems.
The Justice Department is also undertaking a comprehensive new
study of firearm trafficking that will help agents, prosecutors, and
policymakers tackle criminal gun trafficking enterprises. And the
Department recently announced a proposed rule to curb the proliferation
of untraceable ghost guns that are increasingly recovered from crime
scenes and often assembled from kits that are sold without background
checks. The rule will not fully solve the problem, but it will help
prevent some guns from ending up in the wrong hands and help law
enforcement apprehend criminals who use them.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
Question. Deradicalization and diversion programs can prevent
domestic violent extremism from happening in the first place. Are there
programs or initiatives at the Justice Department that have been
effective in identifying at-risk individuals and steering them away
from domestic violent extremism? Are there efforts to prevent
radicalization in prisons, or among justice-involved people broadly?
Answer. The Justice Department is dedicated to countering domestic
violent extremist and domestic and foreign terrorist threats in all
their forms, consistent with our values and the protection of civil
rights and civil liberties. On June 15, I announced the release of the
Biden Administration's National Strategy for Countering Domestic
Terrorism, which is designed to coordinate and provide a principled
path for the federal government's efforts to counter the heightened
domestic terrorism threat, using all available tools.
Many of the Department's components are engaged in efforts aimed at
preventing and deterring domestic terrorism. For instance, the
Department's grant-making and research-based work can help us
understand and counter these threats. The Department's National
Institute of Justice (NIJ) will fund research that focuses on the
radicalization process, reintegration of offenders incarcerated for
terrorism- related offenses, and terrorism prevention programs. And the
President's FY 2022 Budget request seeks a $4 million increase for NIJ
to further research on the root causes of radicalization.
Working with local communities and local law enforcement,
disruption and early engagement programs in our U.S. Attorney's Offices
provide options for intervention and counseling where an individual is
radicalizing to violence but federal prosecution is inappropriate or
unavailable. These interventions may draw on the resources of federal
law enforcement, local law enforcement, mental health professionals,
schools, and community-based groups.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) guards against the spread of violent
extremist ideologies within federal prisons through a variety of
management controls, task force collaboration, and staff training.
Appreciating the evolving nature of the threat, BOP is currently
undertaking a review of its risk-assessment tools, placing renewed
focus on available programming, and formulating proposals for increased
staffing and other resources. BOP is committed to ensuring that its
approach remains effective and grounded in research.
Question. The Justice Department should work to reduce domestic
extremist radicalization among people leaving prisons. Individuals who
were radicalized prior to prison or radicalized in prison should return
to their communities with reentry support aimed at preventing further
radicalization. Does the Federal Bureau of Prisons have programs in
federal prisons, as well as reentry programs, that target people who
are or were radicalized toward domestic extremism? And if not, do I
have your commitment that this will be a priority for the Justice
Department?
Answer. If history is any indication, we should be concerned about
this problem, and I am fully committed to addressing it. The Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) is currently undertaking a full review that is aimed at
developing a more robust understanding of risk factors and will make
recommendations about more targeted programming to counter
radicalization in U.S. prisons, including reentry programming. In
addition, the Department's FY 2022 budget request seeks additional
resources to support research on the root causes of domestic
radicalization, which would help inform BOP's evaluation of additional
programs on specific treatment interventions.
Question. Prison rape continues to be a problem in our country.
Will you make Prison Rape Elimination Act enforcement a priority for
the Justice Department? I also introduced bipartisan legislation with
Senator Cornyn--the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act--to make
sexual abuse services more available in prisons and jails. Do I have
your commitment to work with us on that bill?
Answer. Yes. The Justice Department strongly supports the goals of
the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act, which would establish a
national hotline for sexual abuse victims and abuse settings.
Preventing, detecting, and responding to the scourge of prison rape
remains a priority of the Justice Department. The Department continues
to work hard to ensure the full implementation of Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA) through our PREA Management Office, including by
overseeing audits, administering a robust grant program, and providing
training and technical assistance to support PREA implementation
efforts in State, local, and Tribal correctional agencies across the
country.
In addition, as a reflection of the Department's support for and
commitment to the Sexual Abuse Services in Detention Act, in FY 2021,
the Department is funding a strategic planning process to determine how
best to create and implement a national service line for incarcerated
victims of sexual abuse so that state, local, and tribal correctional
agencies can respond effectively to the needs of victims and achieve
and maintain compliance with the related PREA standards. The Department
anticipates this work will help advance the successful implementing a
national service line for incarcerated victims.
Question. Will you support domestic extremism prevention efforts
through the Justice Department's state and local law enforcement
grants, community-oriented policing grants, or victims of crime grants?
Answer. A variety of the Justice Department's grant programs are
available to help counter domestic violent extremism and domestic
terrorism. For instance, the Department's Bureau of Justice Assistance
administers an anti-terrorism program that provides technical
assistance and training to state, local, Tribal, and territorial law
enforcement partners. The Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) has also started prioritizing grants to local law
enforcement agencies committed to community-based approaches to
combating racially motivated violence and domestic terrorism. Domestic
violent extremism prevention efforts are also an allowable use of funds
under the Byrne/JAG formula grant program.
Question. The Justice Department's budget proposal includes funding
for research on domestic terrorism threats. In addition to looking at
the causes of domestic extremist radicalization, this research should
also evaluate effective deradicalization efforts. Do I have your
commitment that the Justice Department will support deradicalization
research--such as research on effective domestic terrorism prevention
and diversion programs? Will you also support research on resiliency
efforts--such as programs that help to maintain social cohesion in
communities following domestic terrorist attacks?
Answer. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has funded research
that explores the dynamics surrounding deradicalization and
disengagement. Much of that research focuses on how law enforcement can
use semantics and language in online arenas to identify potentially
radicalized content and speech. NIJ-funded evaluation research has not
yet identified programs that are effective at steering individuals away
from domestic violent extremism (DVE), and none of these evaluations
were of DOJ-sponsored programs. Nevertheless, this research has
produced guidelines and handbooks on what a successful extremism
prevention program might look like, based on the lessons learned from
the research. NIJ has funded ongoing research, assessing the needs of
extremist offenders as they reenter communities across the U.S. This
research is being carried out in conjunction with probation and parole
offices across the U.S., as well as the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin, III
Question. Like many of my colleagues on the Committee, I am aware
of a number of my constituents who took it upon themselves to
participate in the events that occurred on January 6th here at the
Capitol complex. While private West Virginian citizens engaged in the
insurrection, our state also saw two public servants, one a former
state delegate and the other a former town councilman, charged due to
their actions. Fortunately, both men no longer serve in their
respective posts. I believe, as many of my colleagues do, that we need
individuals serving in public office that respect the rule of law and
our institutions, not those that actively seeking to disrupt our
governmental functions and duties. Unfortunately, it feels like now, 4
months removed from that tragic day, the only time the public hears of
arrests being made or charges being brought against people is when it
involves higher profile individuals like the two elected leaders from
my state. I feel like it is imperative that the public have access to
the most up to date information so they can best be informed about how
our government is dealing with the aftermath of the insurrection. While
I am appreciative of the efforts that the Department of Justice has
made in making the public aware of those individuals who have
participated in the January 6th insurrection through their website
currently, I am concerned that the information is available is not as
comprehensive as it could be.
Does the Department of Justice plan to make any alterations to
their current online database of Capitol Breach Cases?
Answer. The Justice Department provides the public with frequent
updates about new charges and updates to pending criminal actions in
connection with the events of January 6, 2021. For each charged case
involving the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia posts publicly available
information on a searchable webpage (https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/
capitol-breach-cases). While laws and regulations, court orders,
Department policies, and our professional obligations limit our ability
to provide some information concerning the events of January 6th, each
posting includes the name of the defendant, the charges filed, links to
any court-filed documents, an updated case status, and a notation of
when the entry was last updated.
The FBI also maintains a database of individuals for about whom it
seeks information in connection with violent acts committed on January
6, 2021. That chart is available at https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/capitol-
violence.
Question. While I understand that arrests and ultimate charging of
individuals is ongoing, does the DOJ anticipate releasing a
comprehensive report examining and studying the events of January 6th
and the actions being taken by DOJ?
Answer. On January 15, 2021, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office
of the Inspector General (OIG) announced that it was initiating a
comprehensive review to examine the role and activity of DOJ and its
components in preparing for and responding to the events at the U.S.
Capitol on January 6, 2021. The DOJ OIG will coordinate its review with
reviews also being conducted by the Offices of Inspector General of the
Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of the Interior.
The DOJ OIG review will include examining information relevant to
the January 6th events that was available to DOJ and its components in
advance of January 6; the extent to which such information was shared
by DOJ and its components with the U.S. Capitol Police and other
federal, state, and local agencies; and the role of DOJ personnel in
responding to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. The DOJ
OIG also will assess whether there are any weaknesses in DOJ protocols,
policies, or procedures that adversely affected the ability of DOJ or
its components to prepare effectively for and respond to the events at
the U.S. Capitol on January 6th. If circumstances warrant, the DOJ OIG
will consider examining other issues that may arise during the review.
Question. The behavior we witnessed on January 6th in the U.S.
Capitol was un-American. The individuals that participated in this
insurrection--including those from my own state--should be prosecuted
to the fullest extent of the law. It is time now to move forward as one
nation to focus on helping Americans suffering from the pandemic. Now
more than ever, it is on each of us to seek unity over division and put
partisanship aside for the good of our country. Bipartisanship and
compromise are not always easy, but they are essential. The issues
facing our democracy today are not insurmountable if we choose to
tackle them together. We all must commit to restoring decency and
civility to our politics and being that shining city upon a hill whose
beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere. That is what
American people deserve and the world expects. As members of Congress,
we have a responsibility to be the example for our constituents and for
the American people. This Administration, and this President, has the
same responsibility.
What can we all do to show Americans that we can work together,
even if we strongly disagree on some issues?
Answer. The Department of Justice works tirelessly to keep
Americans safe from violent crime, including international and domestic
terrorism, no matter the underlying ideology. By holding accountable
those who commit federal crimes, while protecting individuals' civil
liberties, the Department can help deter such behavior and promote
peaceful, civil discourse as a means of resolving disputes.
Question. Intelligence reports prior to the January 6th riot warned
Capitol Police that supporters of President Trump were actively
promoting violence and targeting Congress itself. The Department of
Homeland Security specifically notified Capitol Police that they had
identified a map of the Capitol's tunnel system in online messages
between ``Stop the Steal'' supporters, and the FBI field office in
Norfolk also warned the Capitol Police. However, the Capitol Police
Inspector General also found a lack of consensus among key official
about whether these reports indicated specific known threats. Facebook
employs more than 15,000 content moderators across the globe, and other
platforms like Twitter and Google have their own teams of moderators
that enforce their policies and take down illegal or offensive content
on their sites. My bipartisan bill with Senator Cornyn would require
these companies to proactively flag major crimes, including drug
trafficking and terrorism, to law enforcement.
Did any of these companies proactively reach out to law enforcement
with reports of illegal activity?
Answer. The FBI works with the private sector to share information
and better prepare them to detect illegal conduct on their sites and
platforms. We encourage companies to share information for the FBI to
investigate; and conversely, the FBI may share information, as
appropriate, with the private sector. In order to protect the integrity
of ongoing investigations, the FBI is not in a position to provide
further details at this time regarding information that may have been
received from social media companies prior to the January 6th attacks.
Question. What more could social media companies have done to alert
law enforcement prior to the January 6th riots?
Answer. The FBI welcomes tips and information to support its
federal law enforcement efforts, be it from social media companies or
the general public. As I have noted previously, I am struck by the
frequency with which a critical tip or lead in an investigation comes
from law enforcement partners or from a member of the public. The FBI
reports that roughly 50 percent of our cases originate from tips and
leads from law enforcement or private sector partners and private
citizens, who identify potential threats and report them to the FBI or
our partners.
Question. Do you believe that we need to update Section 230 to
address illegal activity, including how groups like ``Stop the Steal''
can use these platforms for illegal activities?
Answer. The scope of immunity for communications services providers
under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act raises important
questions of law and policy, and I know that you and other Members of
the Committee have ideas about how the statute should be amended. I
look forward to talking with you and others about those ideas.
Question. As you both know it's impossible to prepare or respond to
a threat without as much reliable information as possible, and we
certainly saw what happens when threat information isn't handled
effectively on January 6th. This brings up a larger issue that I've
grown more concerned about during my time on the Cyber Subcommittee for
Armed Services. Which is how potential threats, both physical and
cyber, are shared within the federal government.
In your positions so far, do you feel both your departments have
been sufficiently receiving and relaying threat information with each
of the other federal departments, and are you aware if that information
can then be shared with a specific private industry partner if we
identify a specific threat toward them?
Answer. The Department of Justice supports continuous information
sharing within the government and with the private sector, whether the
threat is national security, cybersecurity, or criminal in nature.
In the cybersecurity context in particular, the partnerships
between the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and their
component agencies, are critical. For instance, coordination between
the FBI and DHS's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
occurs daily and is critical in helping the private sector protect
itself from cyber attacks. Both agencies work with each other and with
private sector partners to share information about threats, investigate
attacks, and provide mitigation in the event of a cyber incident. Among
other things, the Department of Justice participates in the Cyber
Response Group that is hosted by the National Security Council and that
facilitates information sharing across agencies.
The Department of Justice also encourages strong partnerships with
private industry. In 2020, FBI Cyber Division representatives were a
part of approximately 450 external engagements and provided briefings
to approximately 1,700 private sector and non-federal law enforcement
individuals. The FBI also regularly disseminates information and
reporting to help inform the private sector and the public about what
the FBI is seeing in its cyber investigations.
Question. In your own opinions how do we increase the coordination
within the federal government to respond more quickly and in a
uniformed way no matter the threat?
Answer. The Department of Justice is continually looking at ways to
increase coordination and information sharing within the federal
government to respond more quickly and in a uniform way no matter the
threat. In order to meet this priority and facilitate such ongoing
coordination, the Department, through the FBI, established the National
Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) in 2008 to address this
evolving cyber challenge. Through the coordination, collaboration, and
sharing that occurs at the NCIJTF, members across the U.S. Government
work to place cyber criminals behind bars and to remove them from the
nation's networks.
In addition, earlier this year, the Justice Department established
a dedicated Ransomware and Digital Extortion Task Force to combat the
growing number of ransomware and digital extortion attacks. The Task
Force's focus is on tackling this threat strategically by cooperating
with domestic and foreign partners as well as private sector partners
to combat this significant criminal threat. The Task Force prioritizes
the disruption, investigation, and prosecution of ransomware and
digital extortion activity by tracking and dismantling the development
and deployment of malware, identifying the cybercriminals responsible,
and holding those individuals accountable for their crimes. And earlier
this month, the Department announced that the Task Force coordinated
our efforts to seize 63.7 bitcoins--currently valued at approximately
$2.3 million--in proceeds paid to individuals in the group known as
Darkside, which had targeted Colonial Pipeline.
The President's FY 2022 budget requests a total of $1.1 billion to
enhance cybersecurity and fight cybercrime, including by addressing
data breach issues. This request would be the largest increase in cyber
resources for the Justice Department in more than a decade and includes
more than $150 million in cyber program enhancements to help us to meet
these threats by drawing upon partnerships across all levels of
government and with private sector partners to identify actors and
their supporting infrastructure; arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate
them; seize their ill-gotten assets; and require them to pay
restitution to their victims.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan M. Collins
During the May 12, 2021 hearing, I commended you and the Department
of Justice for seeking to identify and prosecute the individuals
responsible for the events of January 6, 2021. I also asked you about
the Department of Justice resources being committed to identify and
prosecute the individuals responsible for the violence last summer that
was aimed at government institutions like courthouses and police
stations, including in Minneapolis, MN and Portland, OR. You agreed to
provide me with additional information on this topic. To assist in that
effort, I have the following questions:
Question. What resources has the Department of Justice dedicated to
identifying and prosecuting the individuals who were involved in this
violent activity?
Answer. The Justice Department has dedicated substantial
investigative and prosecutorial resources from components across the
Department and in dozens of jurisdictions nationwide to bring charges
in numerous cases in connection with violence during the summer and
fall of 2020 that was aimed at government institutions. In particular,
the Department's Justice Management Division advises that Investigative
resources totaling more than $48 million, including thousands of DOJ
personnel, have been deployed from the Department's law enforcement
components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the
United States Marshals Service (USMS), the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), and the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
The Justice Department has and will continue to aggressively pursue
those who engage in violent criminal activity such as the destruction
of property and violent assaults on law enforcement. The Department is
committed to working with Congress regarding its ongoing reviews of
these events and identifying areas for improvement and greater
cooperation in law enforcement responses.
Question. What is the status of the Department of Justice's efforts
to identify and prosecute these individuals?
Answer. Justice Department investigations and cases to identify and
prosecute individuals in connection with violence aimed at government
institutions during the summer and fall of 2020 are ongoing. The
Department continues to review information and hold accountable those
who violated the law.
In order to protect the integrity of all investigations, as a
general practice, the Department does not comment on the details of
particular investigations beyond the charging and other public
documents, and does not comment on the existence or status of any
potential investigative matter.
Question. How many Department of Justice personnel are involved in
those efforts, and how has that number changed over time?
Answer. The Department's Justice Management Division advises that
thousands of Justice Department personnel from the FBI, USMS, BOP, ATF,
and DEA across more than three dozen jurisdictions nationwide have been
involved in efforts to investigate and prosecute violence during the
summer and fall of 2020 that was aimed at government institutions. In
addition, prosecutors U.S. Attorneys' Offices across the country and
attorneys from the Criminal Division and the National Security Division
have been involved in these efforts.
Question. Has the Department of Justice's approach to investigating
and prosecuting crimes associated with this violent activity changed in
any way since last summer? If so, please describe the nature of those
changes and identify the date(s) on which those changes were made.
Information responsive to this question includes, but is not limited
to, any changes in staffing levels, resource allocations, and/or
guidance regarding charges, dismissals, and/or plea bargains.
Answer. I am not aware of any Departmental guidance that has been
issued since I became Attorney General on March 11, 2021 addressing the
Justice Department's approach to investigations and prosecutions
stemming from violence that occurred during the summer and fall of
2020.
On January 29, 2021, on the subject of the Justice Department's
general charging and sentencing policy, the Department rescinded a
directive entitled Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10,
2017) and reinstated the guidance articulated in Department Policy on
Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010) to ensure that decisions about
charging, plea agreements, and advocacy at sentencing are based on the
merits of each case and reflect an individualized assessment of
relevant facts.
In addition, as I testified before the Committee last month, the
Department issued guidance to all federal prosecutors on March 8, 2021
emphasizing the need for coordination and consistency in prosecutions
involving domestic violent extremism and imposing new requirements for
identifying and tracking such matters.
Question. How has the Department of Justice worked to support state
and local law enforcement agencies in connection with their efforts to
identify and prosecute the individuals responsible for this violent
activity?
Answer. The Justice Department has provided investigative and
prosecutorial support to State and local law enforcement partners
through the Department's law enforcement components, U.S. Attorneys'
offices, litigating components, and grant programs administered by the
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), the Office of
Justice Programs (OJP), and the Office of Victims of Crime (OVC). Among
other critical programs, Project Safe Neighborhood remains the Justice
Department's unified violent crime reduction initiative within each of
our federal districts.
This critical support to State and local law enforcement partners
will expand under the Department's recently announced Comprehensive
Strategy for Reducing Violent Crime. The Department has directed each
United States Attorneys' Office to work with its State, local, Tribal,
and community partners to establish an immediate plan to address spikes
in violent crime that are typically seen during the summer. In
particular, the FBI will make available cutting-edge analytical
resources to support state and local law enforcement efforts to
identify the most violent and dangerous threats and deploy agents to
assist with enforcement operations targeting these entities. The ATF
will embed with local homicide units and expand the availability of its
National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBN) Correlation
Center. And the United States Marshals Service, in coordination with
State and local authorities, will conduct fugitive sweeps throughout
the country focused on individuals subject to state or local warrants
for violent crimes.
The President's FY 2022 budget requests a total of $9.4 billion for
the Justice Department to address violent crime across the country,
including grants totaling more than $1 billion to support State and
local partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. Operation Legend was a violent crime interdiction
initiative to fight the sudden surge in violent crime (narcotics and
firearms-related offenses, homicide, rape, and theft) last summer in 9
cities across the country. It began in Kansas City, MO, following the
death of 4-year-old LeGend Taliferro, who survived open-heart surgery
only to later die by bullets fired into the apartment where he was
sleeping. While Operation LeGend was meant to be targeted to a specific
time period, I believe we must stay focused on violent crime
interdiction initiatives. In 2020, there were almost 700 homicides in
Missouri, and of those homicides, there were 250 in St. Louis and over
150 in Kansas City. Violent crime should have no place in Missourians'
expectations for their everyday lives. Do you plan to reassign any
agents in the FBI or in the U.S. Attorney's Office from their work in
violent crime? How will you ensure that violent crime prevention and
prosecution remain a priority for the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)?
Answer. I share your concern about the increase in violent crime in
Missouri and across the country. As I testified before the Committee,
protecting our communities from the recent increase in major violent
crimes is among the most pressing challenges facing the Department of
Justice and a top Justice Department priority. The Department's
recently announced violent crime reduction strategy harnesses all our
relevant components to that end, including the Department's U.S.
Attorneys' offices, litigating divisions (including the Criminal
Division), law enforcement agencies, and grantmaking offices. The FY
2022 budget request includes $9.4 billion, an increase of more than 8%
above the 2021 enacted level, to support both the Justice Department's
law enforcement resources and State and local law enforcement agencies
in their efforts to achieve safer communities.
Question. Your budget calls for a $12 million program increase for
the U.S. Marshals Service to support additional response capabilities.
I support more resources to the Marshals, particularly to establish a
regional fugitive task force that covers Missouri, Kansas, and the
surrounding area. Currently, no fugitive task force covers Missouri,
and my state relies on locally recruited task forces between the major
metro areas to catch fugitives. While I value those efforts, there are
over 10,000 fugitives, and the support of a regional task force is
necessary to take down fugitives and minimize their criminal activity.
Would you commit to establishing a regional fugitive task force that
covers Missouri and the surrounding area even while DOJ pursues your
goals for domestic terrorism?
Answer. The United States Marshals Service (USMS) is working to
increase the size and effectiveness of its regional and district-based
fugitive apprehension task forces to reduce violent crime across the
nation. The President's FY 2022 budget request seeks program increases
for the USMS totaling $173.2 million, which will, among other things,
enable the USMS to scale up efforts to work with State and local
partners to more rapidly and safely arrest violent fugitives. The USMS
is currently developing a comprehensive expansion plan to ensure the
coverage of regional task force networks across all 94 federal judicial
districts, including those in Missouri.
Question. I have worked across the aisle with my colleagues to
address data breach issues. The ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline,
a Georgia-based pipeline operator, is a stark reminder that breaches in
data security can constitute a major national security threat. A
thoughtful threat assessment demands that DOJ focus on cybersecurity
and the impact that data breaches have on the average citizen. Will you
commit to dedicating the resources needed to maintain or reinforce
DOJ's response to cyber intrusions by criminal actors? What tools do
you think DOJ needs to better attribute and pursue persistent threat
actors?
Answer. As I testified before the Committee, protecting our
national security requires countering cyber threats from foreign and
domestic actors--whether nation states, terrorists, or criminals--who
seek to conduct espionage, invade our privacy, steal our intellectual
property, damage our critical financial and physical infrastructure, or
extort ransom payments.
These threats are grave and escalating. That is why the Justice
Department established a dedicated Ransomware and Digital Extortion
Task Force to combat the growing number of ransomware and digital
extortion attacks. Our focus is on tackling this threat strategically
by cooperating with domestic and foreign partners as well as private
sector partners to combat this significant criminal threat. The Task
Force prioritizes the disruption, investigation, and prosecution of
ransomware and digital extortion activity by tracking and dismantling
the development and deployment of malware, identifying the
cybercriminals responsible, and holding those individuals accountable
for their crimes. And earlier this month, the Department announced that
the Task Force coordinated our efforts to seize 63.7 bitcoins--
currently valued at approximately $2.3 million--in proceeds paid to
individuals in the group known as Darkside, which had targeted Colonial
Pipeline.
The President's FY 2022 discretionary budget requests a total of
$1.1 billion to enhance cybersecurity and fight cybercrime, including
by addressing data breach issues. This request would be the largest
increase in cyber resources for the Justice Department in more than a
decade and includes more than $150 million in cyber program
enhancements to help us to meet these threats by drawing upon
partnerships across all levels of government and with private sector
partners to identify actors and their supporting infrastructure;
arrest, prosecute, and incarcerate them; seize their ill-gotten assets;
and require them to pay restitution to their victims.
We look forward to working with Congress to support law
enforcement's efforts to better identify and pursue these threat
actors, and on ways to give the Department greater visibility into
ransomware incidents and data breaches.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
Questions. What is the Department of Justice's role in addressing
drug trafficking and human trafficking, particularly along the southern
border? What is the Department of Justice witnessing when it comes to
drug trafficking at our southern border? What is the Department of
Justice witnessing when it comes to human trafficking at our southern
border? When it comes to the crisis at our southern border, as Border
Patrol agents work diligently to address the humanitarian needs present
with the high flow of migrants and are unable to devote the entirety of
their time to securing the border, what challenges does that present to
our national security?
Answer. Drug Trafficking. The Justice Department's role in
addressing drug trafficking is multi-dimensional and includes the
interdiction of drugs; the investigation and prosecution of a wide
variety of drug offenses; and the seizure of proceeds of the drug
trade. By prosecuting the leaders and members of drug trafficking
organizations at home and abroad, the Department strives to curtail the
availability of potentially deadly and harmful drugs that impact the
public health, public safety, and national security of the United
States. The Justice Department's FY 2022 budget request seeks a total
of $2.4 billion for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
including $690 million to support the fight against violent drug gangs
and cartels that continue to use the southwest border as an entry point
for bringing fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine into the United
States. DEA is currently coordinating and supporting operations to
combat transnational criminal organizations operating along our
southwest border that involve more than 35 federal and international
law enforcement partners as well as the Justice Department's drug
prosecutors from our U.S. Attorneys Offices, Criminal Division,
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), and High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Task Forces (HIDTA).
Human Trafficking & Smuggling. Transnational human trafficking and
smuggling networks pose serious criminal threats and pose a significant
risk to many innocent people who are trafficked or smuggled. Last
month, I announced the establishment of Joint Task Force Alpha, a joint
law enforcement effort that will marshal the investigative and
prosecutorial resources of the Department of Justice, in partnership
with DHS, to disrupt and dismantle human smuggling and trafficking
networks that pose national security threats, have links to
transnational organized crime, or exploit and endanger migrants. The
Joint Task Force brings Justice Department prosecutors from the
Criminal Division, U.S. Attorneys' Offices along the southwest border,
and the Civil Rights Division to investigate and prosecute those who
are criminally smuggling and trafficking individuals into the United
States. Together with DHS partners, the Task Force will engage and
utilize each of the Department's law enforcement components, including
from the FBI and DEA. In addition to the work of the Joint Task Force,
I have also directed the Office of Prosecutorial Development,
Assistance, and Training (OPDAT) and the International Criminal
Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), in coordination
with the State Department, to enhance the assistance provided to
counterparts in the Northern Triangle countries and Mexico to support
their efforts to prosecute trafficking and smuggling networks in their
own courts.
Protecting National Security. The Justice Department is committed
to protecting national security while also building a safe, orderly and
humane immigration system. The Justice Department supports the
Department of Homeland Security in its efforts to take appropriate
steps to fulfill those commitments, including effectively deploying its
existing resources and obtaining additional support and resources for
the border as needed to prioritize national security and public safety.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith
Question. One of the outcomes of the COVID pandemic has been a
desire from citizens and enforcement personnel to use more contactless
technologies. We understand that the TSA has yet to receive approval
from the FBI to deploy mobile biometric capture technologies that will
enable travelers to submit fingerprints to the TSA as part of their
application for PreCheck even though that was mandated three years ago
in the TSA Modernization Act. Law enforcement officials have stressed
they could use contactless technology at the roadside and in
investigations. When will the FBI be prepared to accept mobile
fingerprints from law enforcement and partner agencies like the TSA to
check criminal records?
Answer. The FBI advises that it does not currently accept
contactless fingerprints for non- criminal justice background check
purposes, such as the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Pre-Check Program, for two primary reasons.
First, the National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of
1998 (Compact) established the Compact Council (Council) which governs
the use of criminal history record information (CHRI) for non-criminal
justice purposes. The Compact, to which the federal government is a
party, requires that positive identification be established to receive
FBI CHRI for non-criminal justice purposes. Further, the Council has
purview over any biometric approved for positive identification
pertaining to the exchange of FBI CHRI for noncriminal justice
purposes. As in the past, the Council will consider any proposals and
supporting studies validating positive identification before
determining if the proposal is approved. Under current regulations, any
proposal approved by the Council must be published in the Federal
Register. Currently, ten rolled or ten flat fingerprints are the only
forms of positive identification that have been approved by the
Council. See 70 Fed. Reg. 36209. Therefore, to ensure positive
identification, any background check for non-criminal justice purposes
that obtains FBI CHRI must be conducted through the submission of ten
rolled or ten flat fingerprints to the FBI.
Second, the FBI advises that the technology has not reached the
necessary level of accuracy to be deemed sufficient for positive
identification purposes. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) is currently conducting studies pertaining to
contactless fingerprinting. The timetable will be based on NIST studies
pertaining to contactless fingerprinting. However, it may be some years
before the accuracy is sufficient to be utilized for purposes of
positive identification. Thus, the FBI cannot accept contactless
fingerprints unless approved by the Council as positive identification
for non-criminal justice purposes.
Question. What is the TSA doing to accelerate approval of mobile
biometric technologies through the FBI's advisory processes?
Answer. The TSA initiated conversations with the FBI regarding
mobile contactless fingerprint technology in October 2020. A working
group was established to discuss the efficacy of mobile contactless
fingerprint technology for the TSA PreCheck program. Members of the
working group include representatives from the FBI, TSA, other
Department of Homeland Security components, and NIST. As a result of
the working group's collaboration as well as the Council's purview over
any biometric approved as positive identification for non-criminal
justice purposes, the TSA requested the opportunity to present its
mobile contactless fingerprint initiative to the Council in May 2021 to
receive initial feedback. The FBI understands that TSA intends to
conduct a pilot project to further evaluate mobile contactless
fingerprint technology for the TSA PreCheck application. While the
Council did not provide any formal recommendations at the May 2021
meeting, once the studies are complete, the information may be
presented to the Council for consideration.
______
Questions Submitted to Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas
Questions Submitted by Chairman Patrick Leahy
In live testimony, you committed to making the results of your
internal review to prevent, detect, and respond to domestic violent
extremism within the Department of Homeland Security available to the
public. I appreciate that commitment.
Question. Can you specify the full range facts and factors that
prompted the internal review in the first place? When can we expect the
review to be completed?
Answer. The Intelligence Community assesses that domestic violent
extremists who are motivated by a range of ideologies and galvanized by
recent political and societal events in the United States continue to
pose one of the most significant terrorist-related threats to the
homeland. To ensure we can continue executing our critical mission with
honor and integrity, we will not tolerate hateful acts or violent
extremist activity within our Department. DHS will implement the
report's recommendations with urgency and will share the report with
Congress and the public once finalized.
Question. Can DHS commit to giving the Appropriations Committee a
briefing within the next 30 days about the status of this internal
review?
Answer. DHS is committed to transparency and will provide the
Appropriations Committee with the review's analysis and
recommendations.
Question. What more does the Department of Homeland Security need
from Congress--and, the Appropriations Committee--to root out violent
extremism? Please be specific about what DHS programs, accounts, and
initiatives require additional resources from Congress in order to
comprehensively address the threat of domestic violent extremism.
Answer. The Department is focused on increasing its partnerships
with local communities to provide them with enhanced tools and
resources to prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence. The
Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3) provides
financial, educational, and technical assistance to state and local
partners to empower them to lead and maintain prevention programs that
reduce the number of people susceptible to radicalization to violence
and that help individuals on a pathway to violence to disengage before
violence occurs.
Two specific programs at CP3 require additional resources from
Congress to comprehensively address the threat of domestic violent
extremism. First, CP3 seeks to expand its Regional Prevention
Coordinators (RPCs) to provide training and technical assistance to
jurisdictions across the country. RPCs convene and engage local
stakeholders, share information, provide trainings, host prevention-
related exercises, and provide support to grantees and stakeholders.
Currently, CP3 faces a limit on the number of RPCs it can hire and
deploy, and requests from state and local partners far exceed the
capacity of these limited number of RPCs. The result is limited
coverage across the United States for technical support for local
prevention efforts.
Technical assistance and engagement are not the only mechanisms CP3
uses to build local prevention frameworks. The Targeted Violence and
Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) Grant Program, managed by CP3 and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), invests in developing local
violence prevention frameworks. Financial assistance for this program
was doubled from $10 million in FY 2020 to $20 million in FY 2021.
Applications to the TVTP grant program continue to outpace the
increased amount of funds available. As such, CP3 continues to seek
greater funding to support this grant program.
In order for DHS to continue its long-term efforts to identify and
combat any potential DVE-related threats within the Department, it is
imperative that Congress prioritize and fully fund Trusted Workforce
2.0 initiatives and the modernization of DHS information technology
systems that directly support personnel background investigations and
continuous vetting.
In order to detect, deter, and mitigate insider threats, the DHS
Insider Threat Program (ITP) requires funding to expand protection and
monitoring capabilities across the DHS Operational Components'
Sensitive But Unclassified networks. The user activity monitoring tools
utilized by DHS ITP are vital to reducing the Department's exposure to
these threats and mitigating the risk of DVE within its ranks.
Question. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the National Security
Agency began indiscriminately collecting vast amounts of Americans'
internet and phone records, seriously encroaching on their civil
liberties and privacy. Eventually, Congress had to step in and reform
our surveillance laws to balance the need to protect our homeland and
the need to preserve our most precious rights and liberties. I was
concerned by recent reporting that DHS plans to ``expand its
relationships with companies that scour public data for intelligence.''
Reports also indicate this partnership with private third-party
entities would allow DHS to evade legal restrictions on the
government's surveillance of U.S. persons.
Please describe all plans to work or contract with third party
entities in order to collect data on or otherwise surveil Americans.
Answer. This response contains FOUO/Classified information and can
be provided under separate cover upon request.
Question. Please explain what efforts are being made to ensure that
all laws regarding government surveillance of U.S. persons are complied
with, and what safeguards are in place to ensure that Americans'
privacy and civil liberties are not infringed upon.
Answer. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Privacy
Office, and Office of the General Counsel regularly provide advice,
guidance, and oversight to ensure DHS programs, policies, and
operations--including those related to counterterrorism and DVE-
prevention activities--protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties. Further, DHS is committed to providing transparency and
engaging with key stakeholders, including the diverse communities it
serves, to inform its programs, policies, and operations.
DHS policy prohibits profiling, targeting, or discriminating
against any individual for exercising First Amendment rights. DHS
policy directs that ``DHS personnel shall not collect, maintain in DHS
systems, or use information protected by the First Amendment unless:
(a) an individual has expressly granted their consent for DHS to
collect, maintain and use that information; (b) maintaining the record
is expressly authorized by a Federal statute; or (c) that information
is relevant to a criminal, civil, or administrative activity relating
to a law DHS enforces or administers. In addition, DHS personnel should
not pursue by questioning, research or other means, information
relating to how an individual exercises [their] First Amendment rights
unless one or more of the same conditions applies.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Policy Statement 140-12, Information Regarding First Amendment
Protected Activities (May 2019).
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Question. Lieutenant General Honore was tasked by House leadership
to conduct an after-action review of the Capitol attack on January 6th
and provide recommendations to improve security of the Capitol. One of
the suggestions in his report was the establishment of a ``quick-
reaction force'' to rapidly respond to any future events.
Will the Department of Homeland Security participate in this type
of task force? Should it have dedicated funding from Congress? Or would
DHS be better positioned to participate in a law enforcement-based task
force that is activated when called upon, were the Department provided
resources to do so?
Answer. DHS is actively involved in several discussions to improve
the security of the U.S. Capitol and the wider National Capital Region
(NCR). This includes reviewing how we can best support our partners,
including the U.S. Capitol Police, when responding to short or no-
notice events in the NCR such as the January 6th attack. In those
conversations, we are considering numerous ways to improve efficiency
and communications, bolster intelligence and information sharing, and
evaluate the efficacy of immediate response capabilities.
DHS is working closely with the Metropolitan Washington Council of
Governments (MWCOG) on this issue. The MWCOG's Mutual Assistance
Operational Plan currently provides an effective structure to address
most NCR security incidents, using a fabric of mutual assistance
agreements with regional partners. When an incident exceeds state and
local response capability, DHS can offer limited law enforcement
support, including through the cross-designation and/or deputation of
federal law enforcement officers consistent with the Department's
applicable legal authorities and implementing policies.
Question. How does DHS define targeted violence and domestic
violent extremists? Is there a meaningful distinction between the DHS
definitions and those used by the Justice Department?
Answer. In recent technical drafting assistance, DHS proposed to
define targeted violence as ``a premeditated act of violence directed
at a specific individual, group, or location, regardless of motivation,
that violates the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or
subdivision of the United States.''
DHS defines a domestic violent extremist (DVE) as an individual
based and operating primarily within the United States or its
territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist
group or other foreign power who seeks to further political or social
goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence.
The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism,
use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent
tactics does not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally
protected. DVEs can fit within one or multiple categories of
ideological motivation and can span a broad range of groups or
movements.
DHS would be supportive of a process to develop Federal Government-
wide definitions of these terms and defers to the Department of Justice
on their current definitions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Brian Schatz
Question. The Department of Homeland Security plays an integral
role in preventing violent extremism. However, that has previously
focused on foreign threats, leaving domestic extremism prevention
efforts underfunded in comparison. How will the Department increase its
support for domestic extremism prevention efforts-for example, by
awarding Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grants to combat
domestic violent extremism?
Answer. The Department is redoubling its efforts to provide timely
and actionable intelligence and information to the broadest audience at
the lowest classification level possible. As a result, DHS is
augmenting its intelligence and information-sharing capabilities in
collaboration with other government agencies; state, local, tribal,
territorial, and campus law enforcement partners; and private sector
partners. This includes publishing and disseminating intelligence
bulletins that provide our partners with greater insight into evolving
threats, and situational awareness notifications that inform public
safety and security planning efforts to prevent terrorism and targeted
violence. We are also reviewing how we can better access and use
publicly available information to inform our analysis. DHS's Office of
Intelligence and Analysis has enhanced its ability to analyze, produce,
and disseminate products that address DVE threats, including violent
extremist narratives shared via social media and other online
platforms. Further, the Department is continuing to enhance the
financial, educational, and technical assistance it provides to local
communities to prevent radicalization to violence. This includes
ensuring equitable access to related grant programs.
Question. The Department of Homeland Security recently announced an
effort to monitor and analyze public social media posts to detect
extremist activity and prevent violent attacks. This builds on the
Department's previous collection of social media information of both
foreign and U.S. travelers. Please provide a detailed explanation of
this effort, including considerations of civil liberties protections
for monitored individuals.
Answer. DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) leverages
its longstanding open source collection capabilities to inform its
assessment of homeland security-related threats, consistent with
applicable law and in a manner that protects individuals' privacy,
civil rights, and civil liberties. All I&A collection activities are
conducted consistent with its Intelligence Oversight Guidelines and
subject to oversight by the DHS Privacy Office, Office for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties, and Office of the General Counsel. DHS
continuously reviews its activities to ensure they are lawful and in
alignment with best practice.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin, III
Recently, a cybersecurity attack forced the closure of the largest
fuel pipeline in the United States. Colonial Pipeline Company closed
its entire 5500-mile conduit carrying gasoline and other fuels from the
Gulf Coast to New York after it was the target of a ransomware attack
on its network. This is deeply troubling. I am glad that the White
House announced that it was forming an interagency task force in
response to the Colonial ransomware attack, but I couldn't help but
notice that the press briefing didn't even mention the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), which has oversight over pipeline
cybersecurity. This shouldn't be surprising, since a 2019 Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that only 6 staff at TSA were
responsible for reviewing the cybersecurity performed by approximately
2.5 million miles of pipeline and 3000 pipeline companies across the
U.S. These same weaknesses were documented by the Congressional
Research Service in 2012, and yet nothing has been done. So, I'll ask
the same question I asked this time last year.
Question. What percentage of the nearly 3000 pipeline companies are
complying with TSA's voluntary cybersecurity guidelines? How is TSA in
a position to evaluate compliance if they have never performed any
assessments?
Answer. TSA has developed and implemented a plan for reviewing
pipeline security plans and administering assessments of the most
critical pipeline owners and operators, as determined by the Pipeline
Relative Risk Ranking Tool (PRRRT). Of the 3,000 pipeline companies
nationwide, TSA conducts voluntary assessments with the top 100
critical pipeline owner and operators, which represent approximately 85
percent of all throughput.
TSA assesses that critical pipeline owner and operators' current
adherence to these measures is over 80 percent. TSA is conducting
assessments and providing guidance to owners and operators on how to
implement related recommended or necessary improvements.
In addition, TSA conducts Critical Facility Security Reviews, which
are on-site evaluations of the physical security of key critical
pipeline facilities. In addition to the assessment of newly listed
sites, TSA follows up with operators to evaluate the implementation
status of previous critical facility security recommendations.
Through the recent issuance of the Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity
Security Directive, the measures outlined in the aforementioned
Guidelines and additional Information Technology (IT) security
requirements are now required to be assessed and mitigated if any gaps
are identified.
Per the requirements of the Security Directive, TSA has received or
authorized extensions for all required cybersecurity vulnerability
self-assessments from applicable critical pipeline owner and operators.
Since 2001, TSA has engaged extensively with the pipeline industry,
including taking clear and specific actions to address the industry's
cybersecurity gaps and vulnerabilities. Prior to the issuance of the
May 28, 2021 Enhancing Pipeline Cybersecurity Security Directive, TSA
conducted security assessments of the pipeline industry, which continue
today. This approach lends itself to a very close review and evaluation
of pipeline cybersecurity standards and practices. These programs
include, but are not limited to, the Corporate Security Review,
Critical Facility Security Review, and Validated Architecture Design
Reviews (VADR). VADRs are conducted with the Department's Cybersecurity
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
To date, TSA has conducted over 730 assessments to assess physical
and cybersecurity measures of critical pipeline owner and operators,
including to ensure cybersecurity measures are compliant with TSA
Pipeline Security Guidelines, other standards identified through the
VADR review process, and other related best practices. TSA and CISA
continue to evaluate and improve their cybersecurity assessment
capabilities.
Question. I'll be even more blunt this year. If TSA can't do its
job, and it isn't even included in the interagency task force on this
issue, why is it even in charge of pipeline cybersecurity?
Answer. TSA has statutory authority over transportation security,
including over the pipeline sector under (49 U.S.C. Sec. 114 (d), (f)),
and the progress made to date to advance security in the pipeline
sector is noteworthy.
Since the passage of the TSA Modernization Act of 2018, TSA has
expanded the number of personnel dedicated to pipeline security and
collaborates closely with CISA on related work. TSA currently has 54
full-time employees supporting this mission and receives additional
support from other offices. The TSA team includes 20 Surface
Transportation Security Inspectors who serve on the field-based
Pipeline Security Assessment Team (PSAT). PSAT members are located
throughout the country, have received specialized training, and conduct
critically needed pipeline security assessments. A subset of these
members have received additional comprehensive cybersecurity training
in partnership with CISA and the Idaho National Laboratory to provide
long-term cybersecurity support to the sector.
In the immediate wake of the Colonial pipeline ransomware attack,
TSA took steps to further strengthen pipeline cybersecurity by issuing
a Security Directive on May 27, 2021 mandating that owners and
operators of critical hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines and
liquefied natural gas facilities report to CISA within 12 hours of any
cybersecurity incident. It further requires that owners and operators
of critical pipelines designate a Cybersecurity Coordinator that is
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to coordinate with TSA and CISA
in response to any incident. Finally, critical pipeline owners and
operators must review their current activities to assess cyber risk,
identify needed remediation measures, and establish a timeline for
achieving them. TSA continues to work closely with CISA on developing
additional cybersecurity mitigation measures.
These actions supplement TSA's efforts over the past two years to
improve pipeline security, and particularly pipeline cybersecurity,
despite challenges created by the COVID-19 pandemic. With an
appropriation of $8.4 million received in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020, and
support from pipeline cybersecurity experts at CISA and the Idaho
National Laboratory, TSA and CISA completed 51 in-depth cybersecurity
assessments in FY 2021. In FY 2021, Congress appropriated approximately
$4.5 million to TSA to continue cybersecurity assessments. TSA also
received about $3 million in support of surface-related cybersecurity
activities, such as additional cybersecurity assessment tools and
workshops. These are critically important investments that will help
ensure a stronger cybersecurity posture amongst our Nation's most
critical pipelines going forward.
TSA has addressed many of the issues raised in the GAO Report 19-
48: Actions Needed to Address Significant Weaknesses in TSA's Pipeline
Security Program Management (December 2018). Of GAO's 10
recommendations, seven have been closed. The open recommendation
regarding the Strategic Workforce Plan, was submitted to GAO for review
on June 26, 2021. Among other changes, TSA conducted extensive
coordination with the pipeline industry to update the criteria for the
identification of critical facilities, which was recently published as
Change 1 to the TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines. TSA is continuing to
work on the two remaining recommendations: (1) to incorporate
additional factors into TSA's PRRRT; and (2) to coordinate an external,
independent peer review of the PRRRT.
Question. While I understand the primary purpose of the hearing was
to discuss the events of January 6th, no discussion of domestic
extremism can take place without discussing the opioid epidemic. The
opioid epidemic has been devastating to many American communities,
especially in West Virginia, which has had to deal with the
consequences of the epidemic longer and more directly than nearly any
other state. China and India have been cited as the primary source
countries for illicitly produced fentanyl and carfentanil in the United
States. Companies based in these and other foreign countries take
advantage of weaknesses in international mail security standards to
break U.S. customs laws and regulations by shipping drugs directly
through the U.S. postal system. CBP, ICE, and DHS play critical roles
in seizing these illegal substances, and last year during the COVID-19
pandemic, their jobs were as important as ever. I'm supportive of these
efforts as they play a critical role in stopping the opioid crisis.
About how many opioids has TSA seized in the last year? Are there
any resources we can provide you with to assist in accurately
identifying and confiscating opioids?
Answer. TSA screening is designed to detect items and persons who
may pose a threat to transportation security and prevent them from
entering the transportation system. TSA Officers are trained to detect
prohibited items through computed tomography, x-ray, and other
screening technology. If evidence of narcotics trafficking is
discovered during screening processes, TSA reports the situation to on-
site local law enforcement to investigate any suspected violations of
federal, state, or laws. TSA has appropriate procedures in place for
contacting law enforcement if criminal activity is suspected during
passenger and/or baggage screening.
TSA is not always informed of the outcome of the referral to law
enforcement, including the amount or type of contraband, including
illegal opioids, discovered. However, a review of TSA's incident
database revealed two confirmed incidents within the past year during
which opioids were discovered during the screening process.
Question. Do you believe more can be done to prevent these drugs
from coming into our country? How can we empower DHS to do this?
Answer. The Biden-Harris Administration and DHS are prioritizing
combatting the opioid epidemic. Transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) play a major role in facilitating the entry of illicit drugs and
precursor chemicals into the United States, which further fuels this
epidemic. The Biden-Harris Administration has taken decisive action to
address this issue. On December 15, 2021, President Biden signed an
executive order establishing the U.S. Council on Transnational
Organized Crime, an interagency organization whose purpose is to ensure
that the U.S. Government effectively leverages all appropriate tools to
counter the threats posed by transnational organized crime (TOC). On
that date, the President also signed an executive order on imposing
sanctions on foreign persons involved in the global illicit drug trade.
Pursuant to that executive order, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control immediately announced the designation of 25 targets, including
10 individuals and 15 entities. The Treasury designation targets an
array of illicit actors involved in the international proliferation of
illicit drugs or their means of production. Five of these actors are
based in China and are engaged in either trafficking fentanyl or other
synthetic drugs to the United States or in the export of various
precursor chemicals essential to the production of fentanyl. Seven
targets designated are Mexican nationals, all of whom are directly or
indirectly linked to the trafficking of deadly drugs, including
fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine to the United States.
Additionally, Treasury designated all nine Mexican drug trafficking
organizations identified by the Drug Enforcement Administration as
having the greatest drug trafficking impact on the United States.
DHS, as the largest law enforcement organization in the Federal
Government, is uniquely positioned to lead whole-of-government efforts
to address TOC. In recent years, DHS has taken important steps to
optimize our counter-TOC activities. Through intelligence-based
operations, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) has interdicted record
amounts of cocaine and other drugs destined for the United States,
leading to the disruption and dismantlement of TCOs. U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has reported record fentanyl seizures at the
southwest border. Further, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) and CBP have interdicted major drug loads and built major cases
against TCOs, while adjusting to counter a new and dangerous drug
trend--the production and trafficking of opioids and other synthetic
narcotics. USCG, ICE, and CBP efforts are enhanced by the intelligence
provided by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the advanced
technological capabilities provided by the Department's Science and
Technology Directorate.
The Biden-Harris Administration's Statement on Drug Policy
Priorities sets forth six specific actions to reduce the supply of
illicit substances, including fentanyl, in the United States. These
actions, all of which bolster DHS's counternarcotics efforts include:
(1) working with key partners in the Western Hemisphere to address
production, trafficking, and public health facets of the illicit drug
problem; (2) exercising leadership in regional and multilateral forums
to advance and shape collective and comprehensive approaches; (3)
engaging with China, India, and other source countries to disrupt the
global flow of synthetic drugs and their precursor chemicals; (4)
strengthening the U.S. Government's capacity to comprehensively disrupt
the production and supply chain of synthetic drugs; (5) supporting
enforcement efforts through the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
(HIDTA) program to disrupt and dismantle domestic drug trafficking
networks; and (6) supporting multi-jurisdictional task forces and other
law enforcement efforts.
With the changing tactics of TCOs, we are continually adjusting our
enforcement activities to include not only the interdiction of illicit
narcotics, but also precursors that are used to make synthetic drugs
such as fentanyl.
In the context of the current TOC threat, however, DHS will
continue to optimize its capabilities in this mission area, including
by enhancing ICE's investigative capabilities, USCG and CBP's
enforcement capabilities, and the counter-TOC coordination
responsibilities of the Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans. The
criticality of the threat further requires that we devote renewed
attention to DHS's counter-TOC mission in several areas, including: (1)
operational planning and coordination; (2) adequacy of operational
force levels; (3) intelligence and information-sharing; (4) partner
nation capacity-building; (5) integration with state, local tribal, and
territorial partners; and (6) employment of advanced technologies. We
must also identify and employ new management and funding tools that
will enable our Department to remain sufficiently agile to address
evolving TOC-related threats.
DHS is assessing requirements in this area and looks forward to
working with Congress to ensure appropriate related resourcing.
Question. The behavior we witnessed on January 6, 2021 in the U.S.
Capitol was un-American. The individuals that participated in this
insurrection--including those from my own state--should fully be
prosecuted to the full extent of the law. It is time now to move
forward as one nation to focus on helping Americans suffering from the
pandemic. Now more than ever, it is on each of us to seek unity over
division and put partisanship aside for the good of our country.
Bipartisanship and compromise are not always easy, but they are
essential. The issues facing our democracy today are not insurmountable
if we choose to tackle them together. We all must commit to restoring
decency and civility to our politics and being that shining city upon a
hill whose beacon light guides freedom-loving people everywhere. That
is what American people deserve and the world expects. As members of
Congress, we have a responsibility to be the example for our
constituents and for the American people. This Administration, and this
President, has the same responsibility.
What can we all do to show Americans that we can work together,
even if we strongly disagree on some issues?
Answer. DHS remains committed to ensuring the safety and security
of communities across our country, while safeguarding First Amendment-
protected activities, privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
The attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021 was a violent
assault on our democracy. Since January 2021, DHS has strengthened
intelligence analysis, information sharing, and operational
preparedness to help prevent acts of violence and keep our communities
safe.
DHS is prioritizing combating all forms of terrorism and targeted
violence, including through its efforts to support the first-ever
National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. Since January
2021, DHS has taken several steps in this regard, including:
--established a new domestic terrorism branch within I&A dedicated to
producing sound, timely intelligence needed to counter domestic
terrorism-related threats;
--launched the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships (CP3)
to provide communities with resources and tools to help prevent
individuals from radicalizing to violence;
--designated domestic violent extremism as a ``National Priority
Area'' within DHS's Homeland Security Grant Program for the
first time, resulting in at least $77 million being spent on
preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and responding
to related threats nationwide;
--provided $180 million in funding to support target hardening and
other physical security enhancements to non-profit
organizations at high risk of terrorist attack through DHS's
Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP);
--increased efforts to identify and evaluate mis- dis- and mal-
information (MDM), including false or misleading conspiracy
theories spread on social media and other online platforms,
that endorse violence; and,
--enhanced collaboration with public and private sector partners--
including U.S. critical infrastructure owners and operators--to
better protect our cyber and physical infrastructure and
increase nationwide cybersecurity resilience through CISA.
Further, DHS has renewed its commitment to share timely and
actionable information and intelligence to the broadest audience
possible, including through regular briefings for public and private
sector partners and National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) bulletins
to contextualize the threat environment for the public and provide
resources for how to stay safe. All of the Department's efforts to
combat all forms of terrorism and targeted violence are conducted in
ways that protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and
adhere to applicable laws.
Question. Intelligence reports prior to the January 6th riot warned
Capitol Police that supporters of President Trump were actively
promoting violence and targeting Congress itself. The Department of
Homeland Security specifically notified Capitol Police that they had
identified a map of the Capitol's tunnel system in online messages
between ``Stop the Steal'' supporters, and the FBI field office in
Norfolk also warned the Capitol Police. However, the Capitol Police
Inspector General also found a lack of consensus among key official
about whether these reports indicated specific known threats. Facebook
employs more than 15,000 content moderators across the globe, and other
platforms like Twitter and Google have their own teams of moderators
that enforce their policies and take down illegal or offensive content
on their sites. My bipartisan bill with Senator Cornyn would require
these companies to proactively flag major crimes, including drug
trafficking and terrorism, to law enforcement.
Did any of these companies proactively reach out to law enforcement
with reports of illegal activity?
Answer. DHS is continuing to work with technology companies to
develop innovative approaches to combat online incitement and
radicalization to violence and other criminal activity, while
maintaining a two-way dialogue and sharing materials related to
emerging, online narratives and mitigating the risk of radicalization
to violence.
Question. What more could social media companies have done to alert
law enforcement prior to the January 6th riots?
Answer. Combatting all forms of terrorism and targeted violence
requires a whole-of-society effort that includes collaboration with
social media and technology companies. DHS collaboration with these
companies includes (1) information sharing; (2) informing the work of
the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism; and (3) exploring how
to expand partnerships social media and other online platform to
lawfully share relevant information, while protecting privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties.
Question. Do you believe that we need to update Section 230 to
address illegal activity, including how groups like ``Stop the Steal''
can use these platforms for illegal activities?
Answer. We can and must take action to stop unlawful activity
online. Section 230 does not stop that from occurring. Separately, we
can and should continue the ongoing conversation as to whether and how
to update Section 230, consistent with the need to safeguard First
Amendment-protected activity.
Question. As you both know it's impossible to prepare or respond to
a threat without as much reliable information as possible, and we
certainly saw what happens when threat information isn't handled
effectively on January 6th. This brings up a larger issue that I've
grown more concerned about during my time on the Cyber Subcommittee for
Armed Services. Which is how potential threats, both physical and
cyber, are shared within the federal government.
In your positions so far, do you feel both your departments have
been sufficiently receiving and relaying threat information with each
of the other federal departments, and are you aware if that information
can then be shared with a specific private industry partner if we
identify a specific threat toward them?
Answer. DHS has renewed its commitment to share timely and
actionable information and intelligence to the broadest audience
possible, including through regular briefings for public and private
sector partners and NTAS bulletins to contextualize the threat
environment for the public and provide resources for how to stay safe.
All of the Department's efforts to combat all forms of terrorism and
targeted violence are conducted in ways that protect privacy, civil
rights, and civil liberties, and adhere to applicable laws.
DHS continues to strengthen the mechanisms it leverages to share
information and intelligence with key partners and the public.
Question. In your own opinions how do we increase the coordination
within the federal government to respond more quickly and in a
uniformed way no matter the threat?
Answer. To continue combatting the evolving threat environment
through increased federal coordination, DHS seeks to enhance
information and intelligence sharing capabilities and expand its
participation in the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTFs). JTTFs
investigate and respond to threats and incidents as they occur. DHS is
currently identifying priority locations for increased DHS
participation in JTTFs. To ensure that we are making contributions to
the JTTF in the most meaningful and uniformed way possible, the
Department recently developed and approved a new management directive
that facilitates organizational direction for how DHS will participate
and work within JTTFs. Further, DHS and the FBI are working to update a
Memorandum of Understanding to modernize our approaches to
investigating and mitigating emerging threat trends.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Richard C. Shelby
Secretary Mayorkas, in the last five fiscal years, Congress has, on
a bipartisan basis, directly provided the Department of Homeland
Security with billions of dollars for the construction of a border wall
system. That system is a critical border security tool, which helps our
Border Patrol agents safely and effectively maintain operational
control of our southern border. Since President Biden took office, your
Department has impounded these funds, in direct violation of federal
law. It is an affront to this Committee and to Congress's power of the
purse, but worse: it makes the work of our dedicated Border Patrol
agents more difficult and more dangerous.
Those agents must stand constant guard by incomplete sections of
border wall, which now serve as funnels for illegal immigration, human
trafficking, and drug smuggling. Gates that are not operational
compromise agents' ability to apprehend illegal traffic. And by not
allowing them to operationalize available technology and sensors
leaves, Border Patrol agents are left blind in trying to do their job.
These dynamics are straining resources across the southwest border.
Question. What is your plan to relieve Border Patrol agents from
guarding gaps that remain in the wall due to this administration's
refusal to finish construction that was near completion and abruptly
halted in January?
Answer. On June 11, 2021, DHS released its Border Wall Plan
Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10142 (the Plan).\2\ This Plan
outlines the Department's approach to the border barrier construction
projects, which include prioritizing the use of appropriated funds for
urgent life, safety, environmental, or other remediation requirements
resulting from previous border wall construction. On July 27, 2021 DHS
approved additional work in the Rio Grande Valley (RGV), San Diego and
El Centro Sectors needed to address life, safety, environmental, and
operational considerations. This work includes make safe activities on
paused construction, such as completing make safe and punch list items
in the RGV Sector, repairing and reinforcing a small gap in the border
barrier, powering secondary gates, and replacing drainage grates in the
San Diego Sector as well as completing a utility relocation project in
El Centro Sector to ensure power is fully restored to local
municipalities. These projects are reflective of the commitment of DHS
to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of communities along the
border, individuals encountered there, and our Border Patrol Agents who
patrol these areas. DHS continues to review other paused border barrier
projects presenting life, safety, environmental, or other remediation
needs consistent with the Border Wall Plan.
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\2\ https://www.dhs.gov/publication/department-homeland-security-
border-wall-plan-pursuant-presidential-proclamation-10142
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While completing the border security mission, the U.S. Border
Patrol (USBP) relies upon a combination of personnel, technology, and
infrastructure. This approach requires adaptability and flexibility in
a constantly changing work environment. As technology continues to
improve, the Border Patrol makes use of enhanced technology to augment
manpower and increase mission effectiveness. In the FY 2022 President's
Budget, CBP requested funding for border security technology, including
for Common Operating Picture, Small Unmanned Aircraft System, and Team
Awareness Kit, which integrates surveillance devices used by Border
Patrol and other CBP components. Agents will continue to use all
available tools to secure our border.
Question. When are you planning to turn on the gates in completed
sections of the border wall so your agents can safely and efficiently
patrol their areas of responsibility?
Answer. The DHS Border Wall Plan Pursuant to Presidential
Proclamation 10142 sets forth guiding principles for barrier system
construction. For instance, the Plan permits DHS to prioritize projects
for completion if they are needed to address life, safety,
environmental, or other remediation requirements. In addition, for
projects that do involve life, safety, environmental, or other
remediation requirements, prior to further construction, the Department
will undertake a thorough review and planning process. On July 27,
2021, DHS approved additional work in the RGV, San Diego, and El Centro
Sectors that is needed to address life, safety, environmental,
remediation, and operational considerations. This work includes
powering secondary gates in the San Diego Sector. DHS continues to
review other paused border barrier projects presenting life, safety,
environmental, or other remediation needs.
Question. At what point will you allow Border Patrol to install or
activate the border wall technology and sensors Congress funded to make
their incredibly difficult job more manageable?
Answer. As of June 23, 2021, approximately 50 miles of detection
technology has been installed, using funds appropriated by Congress in
FYs 2017 and 2018. DHS is working to develop a path forward for border
barrier projects consistent with the guiding principles outlined in
DHS's Border Wall Plan Pursuant to Presidential Proclamation 10142.
Prior to the installation of additional border system attributes, DHS
will undertake a thorough review and planning process as called for by
the Plan.
Question. Secretary Mayorkas, you are no doubt aware of the threat
posed by ``fake families'' presenting themselves at the border--that
is, single adults who cross the border illegally with children not
their own and claim to be family units in order to avoid detention or
deportation. These children are at the greatest risk of being victims
of human trafficking, or worse yet, victims of sex trafficking,
especially given recent reports about an increase in apprehensions of
convicted sex offenders crossing the border. In one area of Texas, for
example, the Border Patrol's arrest of sex offenders is reportedly up
2,500% this year.
Current statistics indicate that groups claiming to be family units
make up about one quarter of the apprehensions at the border. Under
your leadership, however, the Department has significantly reduced its
reliance on DNA testing as a means of determining whether children are
truly related to the adults that accompany them across the border.
Moreover, the Department recently announced that it will not collect
biometric data from those apprehended while crossing illegally or from
those looking to sponsor children crossing the border alone.
Why have you curtailed the Department's use of these extremely
important tools, which are ultimately intended to protect children?
Answer. Protecting children and others who are vulnerable remains a
top priority for DHS and its partners. The reduction in the use of DNA
testing is not a reflection of a change to that priority, but more an
indication of the evolution in the type of fraud being encountered at
the border. During FY 2020, CBP and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) referrals to ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)
for testing significantly decreased from the previous fiscal year. For
this reason, Rapid DNA testing has been utilized less frequently than
in prior years.
HSI initiated Rapid DNA testing in May 2019 as a pilot at two
locations. In July 2019, it was expanded to 10 locations along the
Southwest Border. Procedurally, HSI only conducted DNA testing based on
referrals from CBP or HHS. HSI administered Rapid DNA tests as an
investigative tool and with consent of the individuals. The suspected
fraudulent family remained in CBP custody pending the results of the
test. If the test resulted in a negative parent-child relationship
match, the case was turned over to HSI, and, in coordination with the
U.S. Attorney, considered for prosecution.
During FY 2019 and FY 2020, based on referrals from CBP and HHS,
HSI tested approximately 3,300 family units, with nearly 300 returning
negative parent-child relationship matches. Approximately 230 of these
cases were accepted for Federal prosecution. In FY 2021 (through
September 12, 2021), HSI conducted over 130 Rapid DNA tests, finding
only 12 instances negative for parentage, six of which have been
accepted for prosecution.
On September 12, 2021, HSI concluded the Rapid DNA program as the
number of CBP and HHS referrals, investigative leads, and overall
benefits of the program as an effective investigative tool declined. An
analysis of Rapid DNA testing revealed a steep reduction in negative
parent-child relationship matches and subsequent prosecutions over the
last year that, when combined with the relatively high cost of the
program, no longer support its continuance.
However, DHS continues to meet the need to identify fraudulent
families through a different process. As of September 12, 2021, USBP
started their own DNA testing program, using the United States Postal
Service to send and receive results and findings.
Question. Is it not important to ensure that we know that the
children crossing the border are in a safe and secure environment with
individuals that we are certain will not do them harm?
Answer. Protecting children and other vulnerable individuals is a
top priority for DHS. In accordance with the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), CBP screens all undocumented
unaccompanied children (UCs) for signs or indications of trafficking.
In September 2019, CBP implemented a revised screening form (CBP Form
93) to improve and assist in identifying UCs who may be victims of
trafficking. CBP also revised mandatory annual training for law
enforcement personnel.
When minors are encountered, their safety and security is always of
paramount importance to CBP. Consistent with the TVPRA, UCs from non-
contiguous countries are transferred to the custody of the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS). All minors (accompanied and
unaccompanied) are prioritized for processing and transferred out of
USBP custody as expeditiously as possible. Additionally, all minors in
USBP custody are afforded the amenities and treatment required by the
Flores Settlement Agreement, the CBP's National Standards on Transport,
Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS) policy, and the CBP Medical
Directive.
I understand from the latest operational statistics provided by DHS
that this year, in the Rio Grande Valley sector alone, more than 19,000
persons apprehended by the Border Patrol were released into the
interior of the country without a court date to adjudicate their
illegal entry. Instead, these illegal immigrants were requested to
report to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office at some
undetermined future date.
Even under the Obama Administration's catch and release policy,
illegal crossers were given a notice to appear before a federal judge.
Question. What is the plan for these 19,000 illegal immigrants?
Answer. CBP is releasing certain family units via an exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to relieve processing bottlenecks and to avoid
unsafe overcrowding of CBP facilities due to the large number of
individuals encountered in locations such as the RGV. Many of these
family units have been released from CBP custody without issuance of
charging documents, such as a Notice to Appear (NTA). When CBP
apprehends certain family units along the Southwest Border, the agency
releases them via prosecutorial discretion and they are issued a Form
G-56, Interview Notice, or Form I-385, Request to Report, and
instructed to report to an ICE field office at their final destination.
When those individuals report to an ICE field office, ICE will enter
their information into an ICE database, provide them with updated
reporting requirements, and, for those who qualify, enroll them into
ICE's Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program. Family units will report
to ICE field offices for issuance of appropriate charging documents if
they were released from CBP custody without one, thus beginning the
process of formal removal proceedings in accordance with Section 240 of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
ICE works hand-in-hand with interagency partners to identify
opportunities for process improvements, including to increase
operational efficiency, and improved communications and coordination.
Question. Do you know how many of these 19,000 illegal immigrants
have previously tried to enter the country illegally? Do you know
whether any of them have criminal records?
Answer. USBP conducts checks on subjects in custody prior to making
a processing disposition. Dispositions are made on a case-by-case
basis. Upon encounter at the border, CBP collects each migrant's
biographic and biometric information (fingerprints, photographs,
telephone numbers, and an address in the United States), creating a
record of apprehension, and runs their information against CBP
databases. When determining the appropriate processing pathway, agents
assess whether the noncitizen poses a threat to national security,
border security, or a public safety. From January through June 2021,
9.4 percent of family unit apprehensions by the U.S. Border Patrol were
repeat encounters with a previous encounter in the preceding 12 months
under Title 42 or Title 8 of the U.S. Code.
Question. If persons in this group of illegal immigrants do not
report to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office, as requested,
how does your Department track them to ensure they do not escape the
lawful immigration process?
Answer. Most of the individuals who are released at the border with
instructions to report to an ICE field office check in within their
reporting window. ICE has an online appointment system to facilitate
the scheduling of check-in appointments at ICE field offices around the
country. Community partners play an important role in helping
communicate to these individuals and their families the requirement to
report to ICE and ultimately the immigration court. Those who do not
report are subject to enforcement action by ICE based on current
enforcement priorities.
Question. Are you in essence conceding that these people will be
allowed to stay in the country indefinitely?
Answer. When individuals report to an ICE field office pursuant to
a Notice to Report, ICE will enter their information into an ICE
database, provide them with updated reporting requirements, and, for
those, who qualify, enroll them into ICE's ATD program. They will be
issued charging documents (i.e., a NTA) to initiate removal proceedings
in accordance with Section 240 of the INA. The noncitizen appears
before an immigration judge from the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) within the Department of Justice for their removal
proceedings. The immigration judge then determines if the noncitizen is
eligible to remain in the United States through a form of relief or
protection from removal or issues the noncitizen a final order of
removal, after which the noncitizen is subject to removal from the
United States.
Individuals who do not report to an ICE field office within their
reporting window are subject to enforcement action by ICE based on
current enforcement priorities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roy Blunt
Question. I am a longtime supporter of the Nonprofit Security Grant
and Urban Area Security Initiative (NPSG/UASI) programs, which provide
financial support to nonprofits at high risk of a terrorist attack,
such as religious and cultural centers, for physical security
enhancements. In late March, after an unprovoked attack on a Roman
Catholic abbey in Gower, MO, the nuns at the abbey expressed that they
had ``long desired more privacy and protection.'' In 2014, three people
were murdered in front of Overland Park's Jewish Community Center in
the Kansas City metro area. The perpetrator was motivated by a white
supremacist ideology. Recent news reports of his death are a reminder
of the suffering wrought by the attack. It is my understanding that
Missouri historically receives only a sliver of funding from the NPSG/
UASI programs. How would the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
use the money it requests and ensure that it appropriately allocates
resources from the NPSG/UASI programs to Missouri law enforcement
departments both large and small?
Answer. Law Enforcement departments are not eligible subrecipients
of the Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NSGP). In order to be eligible
to receive NSGP funds through the State Administrative Agencies (SAAs),
an organization must be exempt from taxation under section 501(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 based on meeting the description in
section under section 501(c)(3) of the Code. Law enforcement
departments are not nonprofit entities under section 501(c)(3) of the
code, as such they are not eligible NSGP subrecipients. See, e.g.,
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2021, Pub. L. No.
116-260. However, law enforcement departments are eligible
subrecipients of the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), as well as
the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program.
As required under sections 2003 and 2004 the Homeland Security Act
of 2002, as amended by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, the eligibility and allocations for the SHSP
and UASI program are informed by a relative risk methodology based on
threat, vulnerability, and consequence from terrorism. Under the FY
2021 SHSP program, the state of Missouri will be awarded $4,602,500.
Under the FY 2021 UASI program, the St. Louis, Missouri urban area will
be awarded $3,800,000. This funding is available for the implementation
of risk-driven, capabilities-based homeland security strategies to
address capability targets and to enhance regional preparedness and
capabilities in designated high-threat, high-density areas. For both
SHSP and UASI funding, all projects must have a nexus to terrorism
preparedness and align to closing capability gaps or sustaining
capabilities identified in the state's Threat and Hazard Identification
and Risk Assessment/Stakeholder Preparedness Review.
The SAA is the only eligible recipient of SHSP and UASI funds, and
they are required to pass-through at least 80 percent of SHSP and UASI
funding to local and tribal units of government, including law
enforcement entities. Additionally, at least 25 percent of SHSP and
UASI funding must be dedicated to law enforcement terrorism prevention
activities. In that vein, UASI funding would be appropriate for law
enforcement departments, regardless of size, in St. Louis, while SHSP
funding would be appropriate for law enforcement departments,
regardless of size, anywhere in the state outside of the St. Louis
area. While FEMA does not dictate how the SAAs must sub allocate their
SHSP and UASI funds, FEMA does require that the SAA establish and
consult with a Senior Advisory Committee (for SHSP funding) and an
Urban Area Working Group (for UASI funding) to ensure that funds are
sub allocated to areas within the state and urban area that best
address the regional and local threats and risk in preparing for and
responding to potential terrorist attacks. FEMA's Preparedness Grants
Manual \3\ outlines the composition and consultation requirements
between the SAA, Senior Advisory Committee, and Urban Area Working
Group.
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\3\ https://www.fema.gov/grants/preparedness/manual
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The state of Missouri also receives funding through the NSGP, which
is dedicated funding for nonprofit organizations to secure their
infrastructure against potential acts of terrorism. Similar to SHSP and
UASI, the SAA is the only eligible recipient, and passes through 100%
of NSGP funding to eligible nonprofit organizations that have been
approved for NSGP funding through a competitive review process. In FY
2021, Missouri will receive $320,400 in NSGP-Urban Area funds for
nonprofit organizations within the St. Louis area, and $1,304,263 in
NSGP-State funds for nonprofit organizations within Missouri that are
outside the St. Louis area.
Question. President Biden has ended many effective border policies,
such as suspending funding for the border wall, eliminating the Migrant
Protection Protocols, ending asylum agreements, and placing
restrictions on U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Following
these actions, have any agents within the relevant DHS components been
reassigned from their work at the border to other initiatives like
domestic terrorism? If so, which ones? Do you plan to reassign any
agents within the relevant DHS components currently working at the
border to efforts to combat domestic terrorism?
Answer. DHS personnel on the border have not been reassigned to
focus on non-border related mission areas.
Question. Your budget provides $131 million for domestic terrorism
prevention programs for research on the root causes of radicalization
and for enhanced community outreach. Program grantees under the now-
obsolete Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention Grant Program have
said they would promote collaboration between law enforcement and
mental health professionals, promote resilience, and pursue a number of
other measures in order to achieve the goal of addressing the root
causes of radicalization. Would DHS request that all $131 million go to
the newly established Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships
and Office of Intelligence & Analysis? How would DHS allocate the money
between the two new initiatives, if so? Has DHS identified any
effective evidence-based programs that measurably prevent domestic
terrorism, particularly in programs that involve mitigating the impact
of mental health problems on people who would be subject to the
program?
Answer. Currently, the $131 million budget for targeted violence
and terrorism prevention supports several DHS offices and components
supporting this mission. While CP3 and I&A have significant equities,
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Office for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties, Privacy Office, CISA, FEMA, and Secret Service,
among others, also meaningfully contribute to the prevention mission.
DHS would welcome the opportunity to work with your office and the
Committee to ensure that these resources are appropriately allocated,
including as it relates to supporting CP3's continued growth and
enhancing the Department's prevention mission.
CP3's violence prevention framework is informed by an evidence-
based public health model that recognizes that individuals on a pathway
to violence typically experience a variety of social and psychological
factors that increase their probability of engaging in terrorism
(``risk factors'') or decrease their probability of engaging in
terrorism (``protective factors''). By supporting local communities to
develop their own, locally informed prevention framework, these
communities can address risk factors, build protective factors, and
help prevent individuals from radicalizing to violence. These
frameworks build on and enhance existing local resources, and provide
the opportunity to develop new tools.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Hoeven
Question. As Secretary, what do you see as the Department's role in
helping to solve the ongoing crisis at the southern border?
Answer. DHS continues to use all relevant resources to secure the
southwest border, while building an immigration system that upholds our
nation's laws.
Question. How will the Department of Homeland Security tackle the
pressing issues that continue to drive migration and enrich human
traffickers?
Answer. DHS and other federal agencies, including the Department of
State, are coordinating a whole-of-government approach to regional
migration management. The Administration's root causes strategy
addresses the lack of economic opportunity and inequality, weak
governance and corruption, and violence and insecurity that compel
people to flee their homes. For DHS, this includes expanding the work
of the ICE Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit, partnering with
the interagency to strengthen economic security in the region, and
assisting in investigations to prosecute human smugglers.\4\ The
strategy aims to address urgent humanitarian needs in the Northern
Triangle, promote greater access to protection through legal pathways,
improve secure and humane border management through CBP capacity
building initiatives, provide support for returnees through ICE
Enforcement and Removal Operations, and enhance access to legal
pathways for migration through a temporary worker program.
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\4\ For contextual clarity, human trafficking involves exploiting
men, women, or children for the purposes of forced labor or commercial
sexual exploitation. Conversely, human smuggling involves the provision
of a service-typically, transportation or fraudulent documents-to an
individual who voluntarily seeks to gain illegal entry into a foreign
country.
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Question. Of the 178,622 persons that attempted to enter the U.S.
via the southwest border in April 2020, how many have remained in the
United States and how many have been returned to their home countries?
Answer. As of July 31, 2021, there have been 9,205 individuals
removed \5\ who previously had been apprehended by CBP \6\ after April
1, 2020.
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\5\ ICE Removals include non-citizens processed for Expedited
Removal (ER) or Voluntary Return (VR) that are turned over to ERO for
detention. Non-citizens processed for ER and not detained by ERO or VR
after June 1st, 2013 and not detained by ERO are primarily processed by
Border Patrol. CBP should be contacted for those statistics.
\6\ USBP data were received on 08/02/2021 and are through 07/31/
2021.
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Question. When it comes to the crisis at our southern border, as
Border Patrol agents work diligently to address the humanitarian needs
present with the high flow of migrants and are unable to devote the
entirety of their time to securing the border, what challenges does
that present to our national security?
Answer. Increased irregular migration at our southwest border can
present operational challenges. From a border security perspective,
transnational criminal organizations may capitalize on areas that have
reduced situational awareness and response capability due to the shift
in resources to assist with increased detention, transportation, and
processing requirements.
To assist USBP with these increasing operational demands, in March
2021, OFO began deploying CBP officers from interior airports and
seaports to support the USBP with the rise of migrants encountered at
the southern border. Over 250 CBP officers were deployed for up to 60
days at USBP soft-sided facilities to assist with intake, custody,
processing, and safeguarding undocumented noncitizens.
In addition to the CBP officers that were temporarily detailed to
assist USBP, USBP agents from northern and coastal border sectors were
also deployed to the southern border to maintain a secure border and
provide humanitarian care for those in custody. Currently USBP has 445
agents temporarily detailed to assist with processing, transportation,
escort, and detention duties due to the unprecedented non-citizen
migrant surge.
Also, in March 2021, DHS activated the DHS Volunteer Force to
support USBP and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
address the needs of unaccompanied children arriving at the southwest
border. This support has increased the number of USBP agents available
for patrol and related border security and law enforcement operations.
Additionally, as traffic waxes and wanes by location, CBP utilizes
short term duty assignments that bring agents and officers from lower
traffic locations the areas of greatest need.
With funding appropriated by Congress, CBP recently created the
Border Patrol Processing Coordinator. The Border Patrol Processing
Coordinator position will focus solely on post-apprehension processing
tasks, which enables frontline agents to return to interdiction
postures more quickly. Additionally, Border Patrol Processing
Coordinators will be assisting with transport, hospital watch and other
non-law enforcement functions. CBP recently graduated the first five
classes of Border Patrol Processing Coordinators and is working to hire
and on-board additional Processing Coordinator staff as quickly as
possible, with two more classes set to graduate by the end of November.
The first five classes are currently working across the southwest
border.
Question. I represent a state that shares its northern border with
Canada. Recently, I met with sheriffs and local law enforcement in our
state's northern counties who are assisting Customs and Border
Protection because of personnel shortages in part due to resources
being shifted to the southern border.
As Secretary, what are you doing to address this crisis and ensure
your agents and officers are well-staffed at our country's borders,
including at the northern border?
Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best
address mission requirements across the United States within the
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other
lesser affected areas.
Question. When do you anticipate being able to send agents and
officers back to the northern border so that the northern border is
sufficiently staffed?
Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best
address mission requirements across the United States within the
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other
lesser affected areas.
Question. How will the Department ensure that the northern border
has the personnel it needs?
Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best
address mission requirements across the United States within the
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other
lesser affected areas. Further, with the use of recruitment incentives,
CBP has closed, or is closing, the staffing gaps in many of its
critical POEs and several its remote northern border POEs.
Question. Do you believe that the northern border currently has the
personnel it needs?
Answer. CBP continually evaluates conditions on the ground. When
conditions change, CBP reevaluates its personnel posture to best
address mission requirements across the United States within the
resources provided to perform its missions. As the threat to one area
or sector increases, CBP adjusts resources accordingly from other
lesser affected areas. Further, with the use of recruitment incentives,
CBP has closed, or is closing, the staffing gaps in many of its
critical POEs and several its remote northern border POEs.
Question. Not only is the northern border experiencing staffing
shortages, but the northern border also faces technological shortages.
What is the Department's plan to ensure that there is adequate
technology available to secure our northern border?
Answer. CBP continues to work to ensure the latest technology is
available on the northern border, especially as gaps in functionality
are identified and new technology emerges. In those cases, additional
funding may be warranted to close such capability discrepancies.
CBP continuously assesses the threat to border security to allocate
vital resources to higher risk areas. Complexities associated with
patrolling the northern border align with traditional border
enforcement challenges--including inadequate technology to support
operations. The agency would like to meet all operational requirements
with adequate technological assets to address the operational need. In
the interim, we will continue to mitigate the greatest risk areas
through the deployment of available resources. In the President's FY
2022 Budget, CBP requested funding for border security technology,
including the Common Operating Picture, Small Unmanned Aircraft System,
and the Team Awareness Kit, which integrates surveillance devices used
by Border Patrol and other CBP components. Agents will continue to use
all available tools to protect the American people.
At the POEs, CBP is actively planning to refresh legacy systems and
applications, replacing current technology with new major system
software and hardware at both northern and southern border locations.
CBP needs to refresh aging technology for privately-owned vehicle lanes
and Free and Secure Trade (FAST) cargo lanes, including license plate
readers (LPRs), laser trigger systems, cameras, radio frequency
identification (RFID) document readers, lane computers, touch screens,
dynamic signage, processing software, non-intrusive inspection (NII)
systems, and other infrastructure to enable the timely movement of
trade and travelers.
Specifically, the existing applications CBP officers use to
interview travelers seeking admission at the U.S. POEs have been
replaced at most pedestrian locations with new, streamlined software;
software and hardware for vehicle crossings is being finalized for
pilot testing. Further, the I-94 process required for some travelers
has also been modernized, including transitioning to paperless
operations in many cases. CBP is making advances in cargo screening
technology, and work is underway integrating both immigration and cargo
data information to present pertinent crossing data to CBP officers in
the most timely and useful format possible.
CBP continues to work with the General Services Administration and
the Office of Management and Budget on its annual five-year plan for
Land Port of Entry Modernization, promoting security, travel, and
trade. The plan is based on CBP's operational priorities and should
include plans to complete the modernization of pre-9/11 POEs along the
northern border.
The President's FY 2022 Budget includes $32 million to fund up to
six NII systems for cargo processing on the northern border at the
Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New York, and Gordie Howe International Bridge
in Detroit, Michigan. CBP continues progressing through the acquisition
decision process for the emerging NII Integration Program.
To increase scanning rates, CBP will implement a drive-through NII
Concept of Operations (CONOP) in pre-primary inspection, where
feasible. The CONOP requires system integration to securely and quickly
transmit NII data to the CBP network. The NII-Integration Program will
effectively integrate NII systems with other CBP trade and travel
operations technology and tools, and secure data transmission to the
CBP network. These improvements increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of CBP's inspection process at POEs.
Planned activities include continued deployment of large-scale (LS)
NII systems, including 12 replacement systems located at rail border
crossings on the northern border (six systems) and southern border (six
systems), and initiating deployment and integration of drive-through LS
NII systems at Southwest border LPOEs with a goal of increasing vehicle
scanning, while enhancing facilitation of trade and travel.
CBP's Air and Marine Operations (AMO) provides air and maritime
technology capabilities from airborne platforms as well as land-based
air and maritime domain sensors. AMO is actively exploring technologies
to reduce gaps in coverage and capabilities from a localized capability
to a persistent wide-area surveillance footprint. Through strong
congressional support over the past two years, CBP has acquired and
deployed 11 new H-125 Light Enforcement Helicopters to northern border
air branches. In addition, CBP has completed the deployment of four
Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft to the Bellingham and Great Lakes Air
Branches. Both modern platforms are equipped with sensor and
communications systems to provide greater domain awareness across the
northern approaches to the United States.
Question. Do you believe that the northern border currently has the
technology it needs? If not, how will the Department ensure that the
northern border has the technology it needs?
Answer. CBP has invested significant resources to advance national
security while facilitating lawful trade and travel along our northern
border. Technology is an invaluable force multiplier that enhances our
situational awareness and improves our ability to detect, deter, and
respond to all kinds of threats. CBP embraces technology to efficiently
screen both people and cargo to secure our borders. Deployment of
emerging technology applications, mobile screening capabilities, and
innovative enhancements to lane structures have significantly expedited
the screening process for both goods and people. However, much of the
infrastructure on the northern border is nearing or beyond its
designated life cycle and lacks the structural or technological
capacity to fully maximize these innovations. The Department must
continue to support infrastructure and lane technology enhancements as
well as maintenance, repair, and modernization to ensure it is
operating at the required capacity.
The CBP and USBP Innovation Teams currently have three Autonomous
Surveillance Towers deployed across Montana and New York under a
developmental work program focused on maturing a tower-based system
capable of operation in the remote, cold weather environments
encountered along the Northern Border. Like the southwest border
variant, this system autonomously monitors the border area and alerts
agents and officers to potential illicit activity.
AMO acknowledges there are surveillance, detection, and tracking
gaps in the current sensor suites AMO can access. AMO is working with
the DHS Science and Technology to identify the gaps, develop a plan to
reduce the gaps, and acquire existing and new technologies to address
these breaches in surveillance coverage.
In the President's FY 2022 Budget, CBP requested funding for border
security technology, including the Common Operating Picture, Small
Unmanned Aircraft System, and the Team Awareness Kit, which integrates
surveillance devices used by Border Patrol and other CBP components.
Additionally, CBP requested funding for the Border Enforcement
Coordination Network, which modernizes IT systems that support the
planning, detection, classification, and analysis of illegal border
activity. Agents and officers will continue to use all available tools
to protect the American people. Additionally, the President's FY 2022
Budget includes $32 million to fund up to six NII systems for cargo
processing on the northern border at the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New
York, and Gordie Howe International Bridge in Detroit, Michigan.
Question. Many areas along the northern border, including in North
Dakota, are in remote areas, where installing sensors and cameras would
be beneficial to securing the border and assisting Border Patrol in
monitoring our northern border. One of the challenges I have heard
about is the lack of reliable broadband access in these remote areas
that make live footage of the border impossible.
Is this something you are aware of?
Answer. Communications and sensor connectivity remain priority
areas for CBP and the CBP Innovation Team. Environments with little
communication capability or facilities with bandwidth constraints
require a communication network that can integrate with various sensors
to improve operational awareness, officer safety, and resource
allocation decision-making processes.
The CBP and USBP Innovation Teams are actively pursuing cutting-
edge technology to enable data connectivity through low- and high-
bandwidth satellite communications, tethered small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems with LTE cellular nodes, and hybrid communication
infrastructures that combine different communications modalities
forming an integrated network in austere and remote border
environments. These capabilities can extend the communication range and
capacity of frontline personnel both in the field and at CBP
facilities, and support sensor and technology connectivity to monitor
vast border areas.
To provide analysis of Air Domain Awareness on the northern border,
CBP AMO is characterizing existing/emerging Air Domain Awareness
technologies through the Northern Border Test Bed established by Domain
Awareness Standards and Analysis. This provides analysis building
seamless coverage along the border region out to 20 nautical miles from
500-8,000 feet above ground level to detect low altitude and slow-
moving threats.
Question. How can Congress work with the Department to address this
challenge?
Answer. CBP appreciates continued support from Congress and seeks
its support of the requests put forward in the FY 2022 Presidential
Budget.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Cindy Hyde-Smith
Question. One of the outcomes of the COVID pandemic has been a
desire from citizens and enforcement personnel to use more contactless
technologies. We understand that the TSA has yet to receive approval
from the FBI to deploy mobile biometric capture technologies that will
enable travelers to submit fingerprints to the TSA as part of their
application for PreCheck even though that was mandated three years ago
in the TSA Modernization Act. Law enforcement officials have stressed
they could use contactless technology at the roadside and in
investigations. When will the FBI be prepared to accept mobile
fingerprints from law enforcement and partner agencies like the TSA to
check criminal records?
Answer. TSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) have met
regularly since October 2020 to determine how to advance mobile phone-
based contactless fingerprint capture technology. While the FBI and
NIST support TSA's efforts to evaluate contactless fingerprint capture
technology, they estimate it will be at least two years until mobile
phone-based contactless technology has sufficiently advanced to meet
the required level of accuracy (determined by the ability to accurately
match mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint to existing contact
fingerprints that make up the FBI's criminal history database). This
timeline is largely based on the gap between the quality of the
existing mobile-phone based fingerprint capture technology and the
quality of traditional, contact fingerprint capture technology. Until
this quality gap is closed, the FBI and NIST will not accept lower
quality fingerprints for use in criminal history records checks. In
addition, the FBI has raised significant concerns about remote
fingerprint capture, as this will negatively impact fingerprint quality
and accuracy.
While the FBI has the authority to determine when it will accept
remote, mobile phone-based contactless fingerprints when used for law
enforcement purposes, TSA and other agencies conducting criminal
history records check for non-criminal justice purposes must receive
approval from the Compact Council before using contactless
fingerprints. The Compact Council, which was created as part of the
National Crime Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 and includes
state law enforcement representatives, establishes policy, in
partnership with the FBI, on Federal/State cooperation on use of
criminal history information, including biometrics. See 34 U.S.C.
Sec. 40316. As TSA is using the fingerprints for non-criminal justice
purposes, contactless fingerprints must be approved by the Compact
Council as well as the FBI.
Question. What is the TSA doing to accelerate approval of mobile
biometric technologies through the FBI's advisory processes?
Answer. TSA, supported by the FBI and NIST, is working to sponsor a
pilot with the current TSA PreCheck enrollment provider to collect
data and test the accuracy of mobile phone-based contactless
fingerprint technology. Participants in this pilot would submit
fingerprints using both a contactless mobile phone device and the
traditional contact fingerprints method, both under the oversight of a
contracted enrollment agent. The FBI and NIST will evaluate the quality
and matching accuracy of these contactless fingerprints.
Beyond the technology requirements and FBI approval of that
technology, TSA must also receive approval from the Compact Council, to
capture mobile phone-based contactless fingerprints ``remotely'' and
not during an in-person enrollment. The Compact Council is the entity
responsible for overseeing the sharing of state criminal history record
information for noncriminal justice purposes, which includes TSA
PreCheck. On May 12, 2021, TSA provided the Compact Council, a
presentation on its planned mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint
pilot and long-term use case to allow individuals to remotely enroll in
TSA PreCheck using contactless fingerprint capture technology. The
Compact Council was supportive of TSA's proposed pilot, as they see
broader use for mobile phone-based contactless fingerprint capture, but
expressed significant concerns with allowing individuals to provide
fingerprints remotely without in-person oversight by an approved agent.
The FBI has expressed similar concerns regarding capturing fingerprints
remotely without in-person oversight by an approved agent.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Braun
In your testimony you note that the department will be analyzing
social media information to identify potential sources of domestic
extremism.
Question. What protections are you implementing at DHS to ensure
that the constitutional rights, including our fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure are protected?
Answer. All I&A intelligence activities are conducted in accordance
with Intelligence Oversight guidelines approved by the Attorney
General. I&A collection requirements are vetted by our Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties, Office of the General Counsel, Privacy
Office, and Intelligence Oversight Officer. Further, I&A continuously
reviews its procedures and guidelines to ensure they align with best
practices and are consistent with applicable laws. I&A also ensures its
personnel receive relevant training, including on how to safeguard
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.
Question. Just two weeks ago, the White House rejected a DHS
proposal to collect social media information of foreign migrants when
processing immigration forms.
What is the justification for reviewing the social media activity
of American citizens, but not foreign nationals trying to enter our
country?
Answer. I&A is authorized to collect information overtly or from
publicly available sources per Executive Order 12333. I&A can and does
engage in open source collection activities involving both U.S. and
foreign nationals. I&A's collection and reporting of threats occurs
when I&A personnel have reasonable belief that the collection and
reporting furthers one of I&A's enumerated missions.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. Do you agree with me that the United States of America is
the most exceptional nation in the history of the world?
Answer. Our country's values make America exceptional.
Question. What percentage of migrants that have arrived at our
southern border during the Biden Administration have been required to
remain in Mexico pending adjudication of their immigration claims?
Answer. There have been no new enrollments in the Migrant
Protection protocols (MPP) since its suspension on January 21, 2021.
MPP was terminated on June 1, 2021 via memorandum. CBP continued to
process at land ports of entry (POE) those individuals previously
enrolled in MPP who had pending cases before EOIR as part of an
established MPP Wind Down Plan. Those migrants found not eligible for
return to the United States through the established MPP Wind Down Plan
were processed under Title 8 or Title 42 authorities, as appropriate.
Processing under the MPP Wind Down was suspended on August 21, 2021
when the Federal Government was enjoined by the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas from implementing or enforcing the June
1, 2021 memorandum terminating MPP. The Federal Government was further
ordered to ``enforce and implement MPP in good faith until such time as
it has lawfully been rescinded in compliance with the APA.''
Question. How many migrants encountered by CBP or ICE during the
Biden Administration--which does not include those who have evaded law
enforcement--have been released into the United States with the
instruction to return for a hearing sometime in the future?
Answer. From January 20, 2021 through July 31, 2021, CBP issued
146,751 NTAs/Orders of Recognizance (OR). As noted above, the NTA
initiates removal proceedings before an immigration judge. CBP's
website provides data regarding the issuance of Notices to Appear/
Orders of Recognizance and I-385s (Notices to Report) by month.\7\
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\7\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/custody-and-transfer-
statistics.
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Question. Have any migrants have been released without a specific
instruction to return for a hearing?
Answer. From January 20, 2021, through July 31, 2021 CBP issued
67,997 (NTRs (Form I-385). The NTR instructs the migrant to report to a
local ICE field office when they arrive at their destination to be
placed into proceedings. When they report to a field office, the
migrant receives an NTA that places them into removal proceedings and
provides instructions regarding how to report for an immigration
proceeding hearing.
Question. What percentage of migrants currently enrolled in
Alternatives to Detention are you actively tracking day-to-day?
Answer. As of June 21, 2021, there were 104,373 active participants
enrolled in the ATD program.
Question. According to your Department's website, in fiscal year
2020, 92 percent of illegal aliens deported by ICE were convicted of or
charged with crimes. However, under the Biden administration, ICE
deportations have plummeted by approximately 60 percent--in fact, the
lowest one-month deportation total on record occurred last month--while
apprehensions at the border are at an all-time high. Based on fiscal
year 2020 data, it is self-evident that many the illegal aliens your
department is choosing not to deport have been convicted of or charged
with crimes. How does it benefit the law-abiding American public to
allow thousands of criminal aliens every month--who are already here
illegally--to remain in American communities?
Answer. The Department's primary responsibility is to keep the
homeland and the American people safe while ensuring DHS policies are
consistent with American values and U.S. immigration laws and
regulations. In this vein, on January 20, 2021, then Acting Secretary
Pekoske issued a memorandum entitled, Review of and Interim Revision to
Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal Policies and Priorities,
which, established interim civil immigration enforcement priorities. On
February 18, 2021, ICE Acting Director Johnson issued interim guidance
entitled, Interim Guidance: Civil Immigration Enforcement and Removal
Priorities, in support of the interim civil immigration enforcement and
removal priorities in accordance with the DHS memorandum. This interim
guidance, which applies to all civil immigration enforcement and
removal actions, directs ICE to focus its limited enforcement and
removal resources on cases presumed to be national security, border
security, or public safety priorities. By focusing its limited law
enforcement resources on these priorities, ICE can ensure its arrests
and removals are consistent with its important national security and
public safety mission, thus protecting and ensuring the safety of U.S.
communities.
Question. Given that ICE arrests have dropped by approximately 60
percent during the Biden Administration, for which types of criminal
charges or convictions is ICE no longer arresting illegal immigrants
under the Biden Administration, despite having done so under the
previous administration?
Answer. The Department's enforcement priorities do not prohibit the
arrest, detention, and removal of any noncitizen. Instead, ICE officers
and agents are expected to exercise their discretion on a case-by-case
basis to focus the Department's limited resources on the apprehension
and removal of noncitizens who pose a threat to our national security,
border security, and public safety.
Question. How many migrants have been admitted into the interior of
the United States during the Biden Administration who would not have
been admitted under Title 42 pandemic prevention policies that were in
effect when the Biden administration began?
Answer. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has excepted
unaccompanied children from this authority. This does not represent a
significant operational change as the previous administration was
enjoined from expelling unaccompanied children under PJES v. Wolf. The
Biden Administration is still expelling under Title 42 all amenable
single adults and family units across the Southwest Border.
Recent policy changes in the Mexican State of Tamaulipas have
significantly complicated efforts to utilize Title 42 in South Texas,
which experiences the highest levels of irregular migrant encounters
along the Southwest Border. Specifically, officials in Tamaulipas do
not accept Title 42 expulsions of family units with children aged six
or younger DHS has started daily lateral flights, transporting Northern
Triangle family units from the RGV to both San Diego and El Paso, in
order to expel them where Mexican officials have reception capacity;
and additional flights to the interior of Mexico and Guatemala to
effectuate these expulsions.
Question. Under the Biden Administration, what percentage of
migrants claiming to be family units received DNA tests to confirm
those claims? Of those who have received DNA tests, what percentage
were actual family units?
Answer. Since January 20, 2021, approximately 91 percent of the
family units tested by ICE were positive for parentage. A total of 134
family units were tested across 10 individual sites with 122 family
units testing positive for parentage (all members in family were
related by parentage DNA), and 12 family units testing negative for
parentage (the accompanying child was not related to parent/s by
parentage DNA, although they may have a different type of family
relationship such as a sibling, grandparent, aunt/uncle, or cousin).
Note that DNA testing is only used when there is reason to question
parentage.
There were 312,341 family unit/family group encounters along the
Southwest Border between January 20, 2021 and July 31, 2021. Encounters
include USBP Apprehensions and Expulsions and Office of Field
Operations Inadmissible Noncitizens and Expulsions.
Question. Please provide the number of minors of each age 14-17
encountered by CBP, by age, and the number of single adults of each age
18-21 encountered by CBP, by age, during the Biden administration.
Answer. This response contains FOUO/Classified information and can
be provided under separate cover upon request.
Question. Is the situation on the border an emergency?
Answer. After inheriting a broken and dismantled immigration
system, since January 2021 DHS has effectively managed an historically
high numbers of noncitizens seeking to enter the United States and
interdicted more drugs and disrupted more smuggling operations than
ever before. We have been able to manage increased encounters because
of prudent planning and execution, and the talent and unwavering
dedication of the DHS workforce and our state, local, and community
partners. To continue addressing this challenge successfully, we need
the partnership of Congress, state and local officials, NGOs, and
communities. We are operating within a fundamentally broken immigration
system that only Congress can fix.
Question. Should President Biden issue an emergency declaration for
the southwest border pursuant to the Stafford Act given that the Biden
Administration is deploying Federal Emergency Management Agency
personnel there to respond to the ongoing crisis?
Answer. DHS continuously reviews the situation at the Southwest
Border as we respond to current conditions. Alongside our interagency
partners, DHS is focused on building a safe, orderly, and humane
immigration system that upholds our nation's laws and keeps our borders
secure and well managed.
Question. Would an emergency declaration pursuant to the Stafford
Act harm your efforts to respond to the crisis at the southwest border?
Answer. DHS is leveraging all relevant resources to appropriately
address the situation on the southwest border.
Question. Do you plan to reinstate any of the policies implemented
by the previous administration that alleviated the 2019 border crisis?
If so, which policies do you plan to reinstate?
Answer. DHS constantly reviews current and past practices to apply
lessons from previous efforts to better accomplish our mission.
President Biden has laid out a comprehensive strategy to ensure a safe,
orderly, and humane process.
Question. Are the migrants being released into the interior of the
United States pending adjudication of their immigration proceedings
being granted permits to work in the U.S.? If not, how do they support
themselves in the interior of the United States for the months or years
while they await their immigration proceeding?
Answer. Employment authorization adjudications are made on a case-
by-case basis. Individuals released from the border and placed into
removal proceedings are generally not immediately eligible for
employment authorization on that basis. Individuals may become eligible
to request employment authorization at a later date based on the
individual circumstances of their case.
Question. According to the latest data from your Department, in
April 2021, CBP had the most border encounters of any month in the last
20 years. In response, are you planning to request, hire, or deploy
more CBP or other border security or immigration-enforcement personnel
in order to ensure that core CBP functions--such as its capacity to
screen and prevent sex trafficking, contraband and drug trafficking,
and human trafficking--are not compromised as personnel surge to
process asylum claims?
Answer. CBP is working diligently to fill critical frontline
positions. CBP's ability to hire agents and officers has never been
stronger. With critical resources and support from Congress, CBP has
enhanced its hiring system and built the capability to provide
dedicated support to applicants throughout every step of the process.
The new hiring system recruits qualified candidates as efficiently as
possible. CBP will continue to use its resources to build on this
momentum and ensure that our workforce can keep pace with an
increasingly demanding mission.
In March 2021, OFO began deploying CBP officers from interior
airports and seaports to support the USBP with the rise of migrants
encountered at the southern border. Over 250 CBP officers were deployed
for up to 60 days at USBP soft-sided facilities to assist with intake,
custody, processing, and safeguarding undocumented noncitizens. These
deployments did not compromise operations at the interior airports or
seaports.
In addition to the CBP officers that were temporarily detailed to
assist USBP, USBP agents from northern border stations were also
deployed to the southern border to maintain a secure border and provide
humanitarian care for those in custody. These deployments did not
compromise operations at the interior airports, seaports, or northern
border.
Also, in March 2021, DHS activated the DHS Volunteer Force to
support USBP and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to
address the needs of unaccompanied children arriving at the southwest
border. This support has increased the number of USBP agents available
for patrol and related border security and law enforcement operations.
Additionally, as traffic waxes and wanes by location, CBP utilizes
short term duty assignments that bring agents and officers from lower
traffic locations to areas of greatest need.
With funding appropriated by Congress, CBP recently created the
position of Border Patrol Processing Coordinator. The Border Patrol
Processing Coordinator position will focus solely on post-apprehension
processing tasks, which enables frontline agents to return to
interdiction postures more quickly. Additionally, Border Patrol
Processing Coordinators assist with transport, hospital watch and other
non-law enforcement functions. CBP recently graduated the first two
classes of Border Patrol Processing Coordinators and is working to hire
and on-board additional Processing Coordinator staff as quickly as
possible, with two more classes set to graduate by the end of November.
The first five classes are currently working across the southwest
border.
Question. I have heard from law enforcement officials in Tennessee
that the number of fentanyl-related deaths and incidents is on the rise
in recent months, which results from China working with drug cartels to
ship more fentanyl across our southwest border, leading to more
American deaths. How do you plan to combat this deadly practice?
Answer. CBP collaborates with both domestic and foreign
investigative and intelligence partners to strategically target key
transnational criminal organizations that procure, produce, and traffic
fentanyl and/or heroin.
CBP's National Targeting Center hosts liaisons from key agencies
and international partners to actively share critical information.
Agencies represented include ICE Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) Diversion
Control Division, U.S. Coast Guard, TSA, Department of State's Bureau
of Consular Affairs, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, New York
Police Department, Border 5, (Australian Department of Home Affairs,
Canada Border Services Agency, New Zealand Customs Service, and the
United Kingdom Border Force), Mexican Customs, French Customs, and the
national police from Brazil, France, Germany, and Spain.
CBP partners with HSI at the national and field level, which is
critical in driving investigations, collecting intelligence, and
disrupting TCO efforts through real time communication and information
sharing.
CBP liaison placement at DEA's Special Operations Division enables
CBP's direct case coordination, operations support, and deconfliction.
Through this liaison arrangement, CBP also supports DEA's
Pharmaceutical, Chemical and Internet Section on both domestic and
foreign investigations involving cyber trafficking organizations,
precursor chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.
Through collaboration and information sharing, CBP exploits
communications, logistic capabilities, and financial transactions to
illuminate criminal networks. This critical identification of criminal
entities enables investigative partners to obtain warrants for
electronic interceptions, orchestrate significant seizures, make
arrests, and present findings for prosecution and ultimately dismantle
these networks.
CBP seeks opportunities to work collaboratively with the Government
of Mexico (GOM) and other international partners to intercept fentanyl
and prevent its production.
CBP leverages its global operations, including Preclearance, Joint
Security and Immigration Advisory Programs, Police Liaisons, Container
Security and Secure Freight initiatives, and CBP attaches at U.S.
embassies. CBP's international footprint and layered resources allow
the agency to mitigate nefarious activities beyond U.S. borders and
operationalize multiple data streams to disrupt and dismantle criminal
networks.
Question. In terms of how to stop drug cartels from shipping more
fentanyl across our southwest border, isn't the obvious answer securing
that southwest border and preventing persons from moving across it?
Answer. CBP uses all available resources to secure the border.
CBP leverages a layered enforcement approach at and between POEs to
detect and intercept fentanyl crossing our borders. CBP Office of Field
Operations uses intelligence, targeting, officers, canine detection,
and non-intrusive technology to screen and intercept fentanyl
shipments. Through June 2021, fentanyl seizures by weight were 93
percent higher than the FY 2020 total across southwest border POEs.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Chairman Leahy. On behalf of myself and Senator Shelby, we
thank the witnesses. Thank you for this hearing.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:16 p.m., Wednesday, May 12, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
[all]