[Senate Hearing 118-103]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 118-103
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2024
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 26, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-434 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire MARCO RUBIO, Florida
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MITT ROMNEY, Utah
CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut PETE RICKETTS, Nebraska
TIM KAINE, Virginia RAND PAUL, Kentucky
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon TODD YOUNG, Indiana
CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BRIAN SCHATZ, Hawaii TED CRUZ, Texas
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland BILL HAGERTY, Tennessee
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois TIM SCOTT, South Carolina
Damian Murphy, Staff Director
Christopher M. Socha, Republican Staff Director
John Dutton, Chief Clerk
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator From New Jersey.............. 1
Risch, Hon. James E., U.S. Senator From Idaho.................... 3
Power, Hon. Samantha, Administrator, United States Agency for
International Development, Washington, DC...................... 4
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Robert Menendez................................................ 39
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
James E. Risch................................................. 53
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Benjamin L. Cardin............................................. 101
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Marco Rubio.................................................... 105
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions Submitted by Senator
Bill Hagerty................................................... 120
WSJ Article, ``Solar and Wind Force Poverty on Africa,'' Dated
October 24, 2021, by President Museveni........................ 130
Letter From USAID Providing Two Corrections for the Record for
Ms. Samantha Power, Dated April 28, 2023....................... 132
(iii)
REVIEW OF THE FISCAL YEAR 2024
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
----------
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 2023
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez, chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez [presiding], Cardin, Shaheen,
Coons, Kaine, Booker, Van Hollen, Duckworth, Risch, Paul, Cruz,
and Hagerty.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee will come to order.
Administrator Power, thank you for joining us.
As we meet today, horrific violence continues to unfold in
Khartoum. Hundreds are dead. Thousands have been wounded. The
staff of humanitarian aid organizations had been assaulted and
killed, a reminder of the dangers our diplomats, humanitarian,
and development workers at USAID face as they carry out their
mission every day.
I am sure I speak for all of us when I say how relieved I
was to hear about the successful evacuation of our officials
from Sudan, but I agree with Administration officials we cannot
and must not abandon the Sudanese people nor will insecurity
deter us from our work in other parts of the continent and
other places in the world.
Russia's war in Ukraine is driving up food, fertilizer, and
energy costs all over the globe. Forty-eight million people in
West Africa are experiencing food insecurity.
Climate change is fueling record floods around the world
from Pakistan to Nigeria and extreme droughts in Brazil and
Central Asia.
Additionally, the threat of state-sponsored death squads,
criminal gangs, and sexual violence is driving millions and
millions of people to flee their homes, creating a growing
migration crisis across continents and hemispheres.
Administrator Power, do you think we are prepared? Because
while your budget request is an improvement compared to past
years, given the challenges and risks we face right now and the
shocks and stresses we will face in the future, I am concerned
that this budget is not ambitious enough.
Successful U.S. foreign policy requires a balance between
the three ``Ds'' of defense, diplomacy, and development.
Development is effectively the ounce of prevention for the
pound of cure we see in places like Sudan right now.
It cannot be an afterthought for the United States and it
certainly is not an afterthought in Beijing. China is
outspending us and outflanking us when it comes to
international development and development diplomacy.
I would argue American international development is driven
by a desire to support people seeking to improve their own
lives, to help build strong societal and governance structures
that facilitate sustainable economic growth.
That stands in stark contrast to China's development
approach, which amounts to foreign infrastructure investments,
which I think is fair to say does not come from the goodness of
Xi Jinping's heart. Rather, it is a tool Beijing uses
effectively to influence and shape the direction of nations
around the globe.
Their efforts ignore workers' rights, destroy the
environment, saddle local communities seeking critical
infrastructure projects with faulty bridges and roads.
We need to up our game to be responsive to the types of
infrastructure projects so many nations need. We can build the
world's best hospitals, the smoothest roads, the most efficient
power grids, but when the United States invests in local
infrastructure, we also have to make sure that the host
communities know what we are doing, that they know the United
States model of development and investment brings needed,
trusted, and sustainable partnerships for growth.
I also think that when democratic nations try to do the
right thing, USAID needs to be able to move quickly. We must be
agile and ready to support those democracies facing economic
hardship.
I would like to hear your thoughts on whether USAID has
what it needs to show that democracies can deliver for their
people because oftentimes USAID moves slower than molasses.
Case in point--the humanitarian crisis for Armenians in
Nagorno-Karabakh is only getting worse. Where are we? Why are
we not airlifting humanitarian supplies to those Armenians
facing Baku's blockade?
We need to respond to events quickly and we also need to
address root causes. I think you would agree with me that
international development must be about more than sending tents
to people impacted by an earthquake or hurricane.
It has to be about making strategic investments that
address the needs of people on the ground, about strengthening
the systems and institutions countries need to be resilient in
the future, about creating good-paying local jobs and about
supporting the peace and prosperity people need to raise a
family rather than be forced to flee their homeland.
Administrator Power, I look forward to hearing your
testimony, updating us on your progress since the last year.
With that, let me turn to the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. RISCH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM IDAHO
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A year ago we had
this same hearing, as we do every year--the budget hearing--and
Ms. Power, I want to quote you as we start this hearing.
You said last year, ``The work we do abroad matters to
Americans here at home. It makes us safer, it makes us more
prosperous, and it engenders goodwill that strengthens
alliances and global cooperation.''
Well said. Americans support that proposition, but it must
be done well and it must be done right, and in that regard
there are problems with this budget and I want to talk about
them briefly. We will drill down as the hearing goes on.
For example, the budget correctly identifies China's
predatory and coercive activities as a major threat to the
U.S., our allies, and our interests. Again, well said. It even
includes a number of so-called outcompete China initiatives
that I might be willing to support, but the decision to request
this as mandatory funding without legally required offsets
demonstrates a lack of seriousness, I believe, and an inability
to make tough budget decisions.
Also, by example, the Administration's climate and energy
policies are self-defeating and misaligned with outcompeting
China proposition. By rejecting low-carbon energy options like
natural gas and clinging to only green-only approach, the
Administration will not outcompete China and it will not reduce
carbon.
Why do I say that? Instead, it will push developing
countries toward even more Chinese investment in high-carbon
cheaper energy while simultaneously creating markets for solar
panels built, as we know, on the backs of Uighur slave labor in
China.
This is not an appropriate use of U.S. taxpayer dollars. As
administrator, you lead a world-class team of humanitarians
working to address the highest levels of conflict and
displacement in recorded history.
Unfortunately, existing humanitarian crises are not going
away and in places like Sudan are only getting more dangerous,
as we all know.
Remarkably, with this budget, the Administration wants to
reduce humanitarian assistance while increasing contributions
to a nontransparent green climate fund to $1.6 billion. This
makes no sense.
Regarding Ukraine, the Administration has spoken at length
about its unwavering commitment to the Ukrainian people. Yet,
this budget requests--the budget request you have in front of
us pretends that the war is not happening and requests no
funds. We need an explanation of this.
Turning to the West Bank and Gaza, the Administration
restarted Palestinian assistance 2 years ago, yet we have seen
even higher levels of violence. Palestinians are identifying
with terror groups to promote their interests more and the
Palestinian Authority's abhorrent pay-for-slay policy continues
unabated.
Why is the Administration asking for an additional $250
million? Whose interests will be advanced by this money?
Certainly not America's interest and certainly not our ally,
Israel.
I am also compelled to point out the irony of requesting
funds to empower women globally--it is certainly a laudable
goal--but at the same time requesting flexibility to provide
assistance to the Taliban--to the Taliban. Did we learn nothing
during the 20 years we spent in Afghanistan? The Taliban
certainly do not have the same values that we do.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not raise once again
the need to make sure that the U.S. follows the ``do no harm
principle'' in response to complex emergencies such as South
Sudan and Ethiopia.
We all know these are tough, but we still await the conduct
of assistance reviews and investigations into humanitarian aid
diversions. We need strong oversight on assistance and these
issues need our view.
There are a lot of areas in which we can and should work
together. For example, I am eager to help ensure USAID has a
workforce that is fit for purpose and fully capable of meeting
today's complex development challenges. This applies not only
to the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, where needs are
particularly acute, but also at overseas missions, particularly
in Africa.
On balance, this budget appears to me to be written to
pursue domestic progressive goals rather than meet crucial
needs overseas. This imbalance makes it really difficult to
support.
It is clear we have got a very steep hill to climb when it
comes to aligning priorities and resources. I hope we can get
to a resolution on these and come together. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Risch.
With that, let us turn to our witness with us. To testify
on the Administration's proposed fiscal year 2024 budget for
USAID is the agency's administrator, Samantha Power.
Obviously, just in the opening statements you heard a
plethora of challenges both for the agency and the world and
the challenges the agency faces and grows in complexity each
and every year.
You and the dedicated workforce at USAID have extremely
difficult jobs to do. We are grateful for your efforts.
With that, we will turn to you for your testimony. Your
full statement will be included in the record, without
objection. We would ask you to summarize it in about 5 minutes
or so, so that we can have members engage in a conversation.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SAMANTHA POWER, ADMINISTRATOR,
UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Power. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Ranking Member Risch. Thanks to all of you who have joined here
today and those who will join us subsequently.
As you each noted in your opening statements, the outbreak
of discriminate violence in Sudan has upended hope for the
democratic transition that millions of Sudanese risked their
lives for.
It has already claimed hundreds of lives and injured
thousands more, but the challenges Sudan faces, it is fair to
say, I think are emblematic of a wider story that each of you
have alluded to that is unfolding in many parts of the world.
After decades of development gains that laid the foundation
for an era of relative peace, stability, and prosperity, those
gains are now at serious risk. During our lifetimes, the United
States has helped accelerate tremendous progress in reducing
extreme poverty, in fighting disease and addressing hunger, and
getting kids and girls especially to school, fueling
democracies' rise.
Now many of these trends have moved in reverse. The
pandemic decimated health systems, leading to a resurgence in
diseases from measles to tuberculosis. It also battered many
nations' finances after a decade of heavy borrowing and more
recently rising inflation exacerbated by Putin's war.
Sixty percent of the world's poorest countries are
currently at or near debt distress--60 percent--and natural
disasters, as you noted, are increasing in frequency and
intensity, leading to a sharp rise in humanitarian needs.
The upshot of it all is stark. For the first time since the
1950s, human life expectancy globally is on the decline while
extreme poverty is on the rise. At the same time, democracies
everywhere are under attack.
Our rivals are using transnational corruption, digital
repression, disinformation, and in Ukraine, of course, actual
artillery and missile fire to undermine freedom, to elevate
autocrats, and to curry favor.
It is a daunting list of challenges and I know some
question whether the United States should be taking on these
challenges through our development investments while others
wonder whether the scope of the challenges at this stage is
simply too great to be able to make a meaningful difference.
The fact is our national security hinges on this work.
Deprivation and indignity abroad, as we well know, can fuel
resource competition, political fragility, and extremism that
endangers us here at home and Americans all around the world.
Disease outbreaks can cross oceans and recessions in
foreign markets can threaten our own economic growth, and if we
do not lead efforts to take on these challenges it is fair to
say the People's Republic of China and Putin are ready to step
in whether through opaque loans on unfavorable terms or with
mercenaries in tow.
An international order that values democracy and human
rights and that respects international borders is not a given.
Indeed, authoritarian actors are challenging and aiming to
reshape it as we sit here.
We have to invest in the stable and humane world that we
need. USAID is truly privileged to have a leading role in
tackling the most significant challenges of our time in close
coordination with our interagency partners advancing diplomacy
and defense, and we are grateful to the American people and to
you for giving us the resources to make a major difference.
That said, we know that to drive progress on the scale that
we need, on the scale this array of challenges that you have
alluded to demands, we have to bring in other donor countries.
We have to bring in the private sector at scale. We have to
work with multilateral institutions and harness them in pursuit
of our objectives. We have to work with foundations and local
organizations in our partner countries.
USAID has laid out a new reform agenda aimed at delivering
progress beyond our development programs, beyond the resources
that this Congress allocates to us where we are using our
expertise, our convening power, our advocacy, our hustle to
draw in others, to leverage more resources, to spark
innovation, and to inspire broader movements for change.
The Biden-Harris administration's FY2024 request of $32
billion for USAID's fully and partially managed accounts will
allow us to make more of that transformative impact.
Alongside our partners, we will invest in countries
experiencing democratic openings, helping them show, as the
chairman said, that democracy delivers tangible results for
citizens.
We will work with nations to attract private sector
investment and drive broadly shared economic growth. We will
support countries that are rebuilding their decimated health
systems and we will meet growing humanitarian needs not just
with emergency assistance, but with long-term investments in
resilience and, crucially, we will invest in our workforce to
carry out this ambitious agenda.
Since 2019, our operating expense funds have increased at
half the rate that our programming has grown, giving us more to
do with fewer people and resources, but this budget will help
us invest in the people and systems that we need to power an
agency that is nimble and that is responsive.
We know that with the United States leading the way the
world can drive meaningful progress against our toughest
challenges because we have decades of gains in global health,
in education, and in prosperity to prove it. It is on us now to
resume that progress.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Power follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ms. Samantha Power
Thank you Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch, and other
distinguished members of the Committee.
The challenge the world faces today is clear: The decades of
development gains that have laid the foundation for an era of relative
peace, stability, and prosperity are at serious risk.
During our lifetimes, the United States has helped accelerate
tremendous progress in reducing extreme poverty, fighting disease,
addressing hunger, getting kids in school, and fueling democracy's
rise.
But now, many of these trends have moved into reverse. The pandemic
decimated health systems, leading to a resurgence in diseases from
measles to tuberculosis. It also battered many nation's finances. After
a decade of heavy borrowing and more recently rising inflation--
exacerbated by Putin's war--60 percent of the world's poorest countries
are at or near debt distress. And natural disasters are increasing in
frequency and intensity, leading to a sharp rise in humanitarian needs.
The upshot of it all is stark: For the first time in decades, human
life expectancy is on the decline--while extreme poverty is on the
rise.
At the same time, democracies everywhere are under attack. Our
rivals are using transnational corruption, digital repression,
disinformation--and in Ukraine, actual artillery fire--to undermine
freedom, elevate autocrats, and curry favor.
It's a daunting list of challenges. And I know some question
whether the United States should be taking on these challenges through
our development investments, or whether the scope of the challenges is
too great to make a meaningful difference.
But the fact is our national security hinges on this work.
Deprivation and indignity abroad can fuel resource competition,
political fragility, and extremism that endangers us here at home.
Disease outbreaks can cross oceans, and recessions in foreign markets
can threaten our own economic growth.
And if we don't lead efforts to take on these challenges, the
People's Republic of China and Putin are ready to step in, whether
through opaque loans on unfavorable terms, or with mercenaries in tow.
An international order that values democracy and human rights and
respects international borders is not a given. Indeed, authoritarian
actors are challenging and aiming to reshape it. We have to invest in
the stable and humane world we need.
USAID is privileged to have a leading role in tackling the most
significant challenges of our time, in close coordination with our
interagency partners advancing diplomacy and defense. And we are
grateful to the American people--and to you--for giving us the
resources to make a major difference.
That said, we know that to drive progress on the scale we need, we
have to bring other donor countries, the private sector, multilateral
institutions, foundations, and local organizations in our partner
countries along with us.
So USAID has set a new reform agenda aimed at delivering progress
beyond our development programs--using our expertise, convening power,
and advocacy to draw in others, leverage more resources, spark
innovation, and inspire broader movements for change.
The Biden-Harris administration's FY 2024 request of $32 billion
for USAID's fully- and partially-managed accounts will allow us to make
more of that transformative impact.
Alongside our partners, we'll invest in countries experiencing
democratic openings, helping them show that democracy delivers tangible
results for citizens. We'll work with nations to attract private sector
investment and drive broadly shared economic growth. We'll support
countries that are rebuilding their decimated health systems. And we'll
meet growing humanitarian needs not just with emergency assistance, but
long-term investments in resilience.
And, crucially, we'll invest in our workforce to carry out this
ambitious agenda. Since 2019, our operating expense funds have
increased at half the rate that our programming has grown--giving us
more to do with fewer people and resources. But this budget will help
us invest in the people and systems we need to power an Agency that is
nimble and responsive.
We know that, with the United States leading the way, the world can
drive meaningful progress against our toughest challenges--because we
have decades of gains in global health, education, and prosperity to
prove it. It's on us, now, to resume that progress.
A few months ago, President George W. Bush posed a question.
``What's the role of a great country in the world? Is it to look
inward? Is it to think about how to solve big problems?'' As he said,
``We all decided to work together to solve big problems.'' Let's
continue that legacy.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. We will start a round of 5-minute
questions.
The Administration has sent over an ambitious mandatory
spending proposal to outcompete China with line items for the
compacts of free association, hard infrastructure spending,
equity for the Development Finance Corporation, and the Indo-
Pacific strategy. What is USAID's role in the outcompete China
proposal?
Ms. Power. Well, we already are making great use of the
countering Chinese influence fund. It gives us flexibility to
do everything from support an open internet to supporting right
to information laws that are being used increasingly around the
world to actually publish for the first time these opaque
contracts that charge these inordinate fees on infrastructure
investments.
Those contracts, as you know, are famously concealed often
from the publics in the countries in which this debt is being
incurred.
I think the entire USAID model stands in contrast, as you
noted, I think at the beginning in helping countries work
toward----
The Chairman. What I am trying to find out, Administrator,
what specific--I gather the broad strokes.
Ms. Power. Yes.
The Chairman. Is there a specific component of the
outcompete China that has been delegated to your agency?
Ms. Power. Well, I think--there are a number of sub-
components, let us say, of the outcompete China approach. There
is the request that Senator Risch alluded to with additional
funding to really amp up what that looks like.
At present, what USAID does is we are often the ground game
for the Development Finance Corporation in identifying, for
example, the Dominican Republic, a country you and I know--both
know well where tenders are--can be put out in a manner that
requires open and transparent competition in a manner that
would almost necessarily benefit U.S. companies.
That has happened in a major port in the Dominican
Republic. We are opening a new mission finally in Fiji starting
in September. That is part of the Pacific Islands amp up that
is occurring as part of the outcompete China program, and happy
to get you specifics within the mandatory funding proposal.
The Chairman. I would very much appreciate seeing that.
Turning to Sudan, are you making provisions for the safety
and security of all USAID employees including local employees?
Ms. Power. We are working around the clock in pursuit of
that objective in a very challenging set of circumstances. Six
USAID staff were evacuated as part of the evacuation that you
mentioned at the outset, four Americans and two third country
nationals from Pakistan. They arrived in Washington 2 days ago.
We spoke yesterday to our Sudanese staff. We still have 29
Sudanese staff who are in Sudan, 27 of whom are in Khartoum and
are basically in--most of whom in neighborhoods that are--that
are incredibly hard to move around in.
We are helping them secure onward destinations in terms of
our USAID mission, for example, in Egypt or in Ethiopia so that
if they want to leave the country they will have someplace to
work.
We have given them advance payments, salary increases,
those kinds of things, but to be honest, Mr. Chairman, it is
extremely difficult to access banks right now because even
banking employees cannot get to the bank.
It just underscores, again, the irresponsibility and
recklessness of the leader of the SAF and the RSF in pursuing
this conflict, but we will not rest unless and until our people
are safe.
The Chairman. Please keep the committee abreast of where
you are at in evacuating USAID employees, assuming they want to
leave and I assume that under the present circumstances the
majority of them would want to leave.
Ms. Power. That is the impression we have for sure.
The Chairman. Last year in our hearing with your budget, I
raised my concerns about violence Armenians are facing in
Nagorno-Karabakh.
I appreciate--I see $40 million in the budget requesting
assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia, funds for
Armenia in part to assist with recovery from the humanitarian
impact from recent Azerbaijani assaults on Nagorno-Karabakh.
I am concerned that these funds will be split among a
number of assistance priorities and that the assistance will
not reach vulnerable Armenian populations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
How much of this assistance would go towards meeting the
needs of vulnerable communities in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
as they recover from Azerbaijani aggression?
Ms. Power. I do not have that figure off the top of my head
and I think everything is very fluid there, especially in light
of developments this week.
The Chairman. All right. Would you get that to the
committee, please? I would like to----
Ms. Power. As soon as we have it, but again, these are
decisions that are made on a weekly basis on the basis of----
The Chairman. Well, there must be some concept out of $40
million for what you expect to use----
Ms. Power. Well, we have conducted two assessment missions
to the region to look at the needs specifically in Nagorno-
Karabakh.
The Chairman. When you get the assessment, I would like to
see the assessment.
Ms. Power. Okay.
The Chairman. Particularly how you are going to help be
able to achieve delivering humanitarian assistance in the
Lachin corridor.
Lastly, I published a comprehensive plan for securing our
borders and managing migration and refugees in the Americas, a
plan recognizing the fact that most migrants and refugees on
the move in our hemisphere are not seeking to come to our
border.
There is 20 million people who are displaced in the
Southern Hemisphere already throughout countries, some
refugees, some seeking asylum. Others are economic refugees.
The bottom line is they are all over the hemisphere.
Now, unless we work with those countries to create pathways
of stability, there will be 20 million people on the march and
what we are facing at the southern border now will be minor in
comparison to what we can.
It seems to me that we have to come with an approach that
understands it is a hemispheric challenge, not just simply a
southern border challenge.
When the United Nations Commission for Refugees ultimately
says that 20 percent of the world's refugee problems is in the
Western Hemisphere, they only spend 8 percent of their funds on
it.
When Colombia takes in nearly 2 million Venezuelans,
something has got to give, and the list goes on and on. Now, I
know that USAID under your leadership has started to move in a
direction to support the integration of displaced populations,
but we have to do more to address the migration and refugee
crisis not only from Ukraine and Syria, but also in our own
hemisphere.
What can be done to significantly scale up USAID funding
for integration initiatives in the hemisphere and can I get
your commitment to work with me in the appropriations process
to encourage the establishment of a $300 million integration
fund so that we can work towards making sure that we do not
have 20 million people on the march?
Ms. Power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say that I think the President is broadly
aligned with the view that you have laid out and we are surging
our support as best we can for integration efforts including
the really incredible effort made by Colombia to integrate more
than 2 million migrants.
Those efforts at integration have a direct effect on, as
you said, who comes to the border, who seeks to go further
north, and just give you one example, Venezuelan arrivals to
the U.S. border nearly doubled after Colombia actually cut off
the TPS registration deadline back in May of last year.
We see that also displacement increased--inside the
hemisphere is increasing at a rate 17 times that which the rate
to the border is increasing, which is extraordinary when you
think about this--how substantial those flows are writ large.
We already do work with the Colombians on TPS and in trying
to provide support in the communities that are housing
Venezuelans who have come in, but we would be very interested
in talking to you about what more we can do for countries all
along the route north.
The Chairman. This is a question of stability in the
hemisphere, stability for the countries that have shown their
willingness to accept refugees, and stability at the southern
border of the United States. It should be a no-brainer.
Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On April 6 this year, your agency notified this committee
of the discovery of widespread diversion of U.S. branded food
aid in Tigray.
The war in northern Ethiopia featured severely restricted
humanitarian access, we understand, and looting of humanitarian
warehouses. Since the initial notification from USAID, our
committee has not been briefed on the diversion of U.S. food
aid in Tigray despite requests.
While I understand the acute situation in Sudan has
captured attention within USAID, we should be able to do
multiple things at the same time.
I am sure you know that in our oversight capacity we are
deeply troubled when these kinds of things happen and our
constituents are even more deeply troubled, and for those that
have reservations about all this stuff, this gives ammunition.
Can you give us an update on the diversion of the U.S. food
aid in Ethiopia?
Ms. Power. Thank you. I absolutely share your outrage and
that of your constituents at what looks to be fairly
substantial diversion of assistance meant for what were people
in Tigray who were facing famine conditions.
We have dispatched our deputy assistant administrator for
humanitarian affairs to the region and he and a team is
actively looking into what happened and we do have some
preliminary indications of, effectively, collusion between
parties on both sides actually of the conflict.
Senator Risch. Is that team still there or are they back
here?
Ms. Power. Our deputy assistant administrator, I believe,
is back, but the team on the ground working out of our mission
in Ethiopia is still uncovering this and we have engaged the
Ethiopian Government as well as the Tigrayan authorities.
It looks--there is plenty more to be said when we have the
actual facts in a right position, I think, to convey to you,
but it looks as though this is something that started in the
wake of the cessation of hostilities so a more recent instance
of collusion.
We have retrieved much of the assistance that was out on
open markets, but there is no question, again, that this is
outrageous and above all, the people in Tigray are the ones to
have suffered because they will not have received access to
food in the course of distributions because of this criminal
network that was established, again, it looks like somewhere
between November and February of this year.
Senator Risch. We are looking forward to that and I got to
tell you, there is going to be a lot of pressure from this
committee to see what you are going to do about this because
this--just saying, well, this happened and we are concerned.
Ms. Power. I could not agree more and----
Senator Risch. We got to have a plan going forward that is
much more reliable than what we have got here.
Ms. Power. I want to stress how unusual the circumstance
was, but not unique and so your concerns are very well-founded,
but it really was, again, the denial of access for our disaster
response team that deprived us of the safeguards and the
oversight that we normally have.
We did have third-party monitors and others we were relying
upon, but, obviously, we have to look at what amounts to a
system failure if, in fact, again, this was allowed to happen
at scale.
We know we owe you ample not only accounting for what has
happened, but also some institution of additional safeguards
that will give you the assurance that you need in light of all
of the resources that we are expending globally to try to meet
food needs.
Senator Risch. Let me turn for a minute to the Palestinian
question. You heard my opening statement. I am really
distressed by the fact that we are bumping up money in this
area.
Look, we have been at this for decades and we keep trying
to pound a round peg into a square hole. We keep doing the same
thing. We keep getting the same results. What is the situation
with this in what I think is a very significant increase in
this area in the budget?
Ms. Power. Well, I think that, again, while it is--there is
no question that development assistance or humanitarian
assistance has not brought peace to this region, I think the
individuals who are affected by this programming have felt the
impact of this programming over the years and whether that is
those who access education through State Department funding who
would otherwise not have access to schools, whether those who
access clean water and, again, some of the sanitation
programming we are trying to do would have cross-line benefit
as well.
Civil society programming is about holding also the
Palestinian Authority to account and for there to be more
pressure from the outside to improve governance, which I know
is something that has concerned you.
Even career skills training for young people--every one of
the 10,000 youth that receive those career skills training has
the opportunity potentially to find a career that they would
not otherwise have found, which means potentially being less
attracted to the path of extremism, which, of course, there are
always people there willing to be--trying to exploit a sense of
deprivation or grievance.
Senator Risch. Well, Samantha, I do not disagree with what
you have said about the money doing some good. The problem I
have got is this is not our responsibility. This is not the
responsibility of the American people.
Certainly, we do our best to try to get people up on their
feet and going, but when you get a situation like this that is
not only gone on for decades, it has gone on for generations,
and we do the same thing over and over and over again. They do
the same thing over and over again, and I am just disgusted
with it and through with it, to be honest with you, and yet
here there is another $250 million going into it. It is just--I
have real difficulty with this. Real difficulties. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Administrator Power, welcome. I want to
associate myself with the chairman's comments. We are glad to
see your budget is moving in the right direction.
I do not believe there is enough being requested to meet
the needs that are out there. I know I am joined by other
members of our committee. Senator Coons raises this issue
frequently in his role on the Appropriations Committee on the
challenges that he has on the allocation of the funds.
Let me start with the proposal that is coming out of the
House Republicans, that as I understand it would mean about a
45 percent cut in the foreign aid budget. What impact would
that have on your ability to carry out your mission,
recognizing that you said you are looking for partnerships? Can
you sustain a 45 percent cut and America still be able to
maintain its international presence?
Ms. Power. Where to start? I think I testified last week
and the number that was floating around was a 22 percent cut
and so that was 13 million children who would not receive
vaccinations with a 22 percent cut. Presuming one would double
that, that would be 26 million kids without vaccinations.
I think, again, at the same time that we see these
proposals for these really substantial cuts, we see very strong
demand signals up here from both parties, rightly, for the
United States to be out there competing with the PRC,
supporting democracy, fighting corruption, securing stable
investment climates for American companies, showing, again, the
contrast between the U.S. approach, pursuing an open free
internet, supporting civil society on the one hand, again, in
contrast with the more extractive approach that the PRC has
taken in its development objectives.
In terms of humanitarian assistance, you have 230 million
people facing acute food insecurity right now. If you were to
cut half of what we did this year--the United States is the
leading humanitarian donor in Afghanistan and Somalia, in
Ethiopia--if you imagine what Ukraine would look like without
the support that we have been providing, Putin could win the
war without having to fire a bullet if the Ukrainian Government
collapsed.
Senator Cardin. I am sure you could go on and on and on.
Ms. Power. I could.
Senator Cardin. I knew the answer to the question,
obviously. We have traveled to many places in the world and we
visit with the USAID people and they all are in need of
additional resources in order to match the activities that are
occurring in China globally as well as the needs that are out
there to promote American national security.
We recognize that would devastate your program. I want to
raise one issue where I am disappointed you are not seeking
more funds and that is in localization. When you look at the
success of PEPFAR, it is not only dealing with HIV/AIDS.
It is also local capacity to develop a health care
infrastructure that can deal with pandemics or other types of
challenges. You have a goal of 25 percent on local aid by, I
think, 2025. When you look at the direct appropriations of your
budget, it is actually a cut of close to 50 percent.
You have other areas for local partnerships that could make
up for some of those funds. Tell me how this budget will allow
you to reach your goal of 25 percent.
Ms. Power. Well, let me just acknowledge the degree of
difficulty in meeting that goal. We in the last year have
increased foreign assistance to local partners from what looks
like it was around 7 percent to probably 10\1/2\ percent and
that is with a concerted push that not only includes dedicated
resources like Centroamerica Local, but also intensifying staff
attention because to partner with a local organization, given
the complexity of compliance requirements in working to be good
stewards of taxpayer resources requires much more staff, focus,
left-sy and right-sy with the local organization.
I would look both at the budget request for our seriousness
of purpose here, but also at the efforts we are making to
reduce bureaucratic burdens on staff, and if you could look as
well at our operating expense requests as we seek to increase
the number of Foreign Service officers, civil service officers,
and Foreign Service nationals who will help us actually work
with those local organizations so they can compete with much
larger established groups.
Senator Cardin. I appreciate that, and I hope that you
would keep us informed. We want you to meet that 25 percent
goal, so we are interested in helping you.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
Senator Cardin. One last question, if I might. We talked
about Sudan. Let me talk about Haiti for one moment.
We know the chaos of--I should not say chaos--the safety
issues in Haiti itself. Are we able to provide humanitarian
help to the people of Haiti, considering the challenges we have
with safety in the country itself?
Ms. Power. We are providing humanitarian assistance, but
access to neighborhoods that even a year ago was relatively
smooth is now severely impeded and there is no substitute,
again, for marrying access and assistance.
We have substantial assistance. The UN is issuing its
largest appeal since the earthquake in terms of humanitarian
needs, but whole parts of Port-au-Prince, neighborhoods you
have probably visited, I visited, are now off limits for
humanitarian actors because of the prevalence of the gangs.
Again, humanitarian without security inevitably is going to
limit access and it is only the Haitian people who suffer.
Senator Cardin. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Paul.
Senator Paul. Ms. Power, did USAID fund coronavirus
research in Wuhan, China?
Ms. Power. We did not fund gain of function research, as
you know.
Senator Paul. That is not the question. The question is did
you fund coronavirus research in Wuhan, China.
Ms. Power. Before my time, there was the PREDICT program
with which you are familiar, which ended in China in 2019.
Senator Paul. This is a $200 million program and the GAO
has also identified that some of these grants went directly to
the Wuhan Institute of Virology where there is a suspicion that
the lab leak began that began the pandemic.
Has USAID awarded funds to the Academy of Military Medical
Sciences in China?
Ms. Power. Not to my knowledge, but I would have to get
back----
Senator Paul. I think the answer is once again, yes. GAO
has found that there have been sub awards of NIH money probably
as well as USAID money that went to the Academy of not just
Medical Research, Military Medical Research in China.
Now, part of the unknowns here is we cannot get the records
to look at this. I have been asking for months and months for
records. In September of last year, I wrote, Ms. Power, USAID a
request asking for records from the PREDICT program.
These are not classified. These are simply records of
scientific research and we want to read the grants to find out
what they were doing and whether the research was dangerous or
not.
The response I got from your agency was USAID will not be
providing any documents at this time. They are just unwilling
to give documents on a scientific grant proposal. We are paying
for it. They are asking for $745 million more in money and we
get no response.
Two weeks ago, the Ranking Member Risch, myself, and 25
other Republican senators, unfortunately, so far signed a
letter once again. Still no response. We are not asking for
classified information. We are not asking for anything unusual.
Twenty million people died around the world. You are
supposed to be an agency that cares about the death of people
around the world.
We talk about starvation and famine, and 20 million people
died from a virus and you will not give us the basic
information about what grants you are funding around the world
and who you are funding.
Should we be funding the Academy of Military Medical
Research in China? They are now off limits, but did we fund
them and who was making the decision?
You know who ran the PREDICT program? UC Davis. Have you
had any conversations with UC Davis about research in China and
whether it was advisable?
Ms. Power. Again, to set the record straight, first of all,
the PREDICT program ended in 2019. We have people----
Senator Paul. Yet, it goes on in other forums in other
names.
Ms. Power. That is certainly not USAID programming.
Senator Paul. Well, you have a program called emergency
pandemic threats program still, do you not?
Ms. Power. If I could just finish in response to the first
set of allegations. We have provided hundreds and hundreds of
pages of documents related to the PREDICT program for the very
reason that you say, because we are----
Senator Paul. Not to us.
Ms. Power. We are, again, as I know you had an exchange
with Secretary Blinken as well, consistent with long-standing
practice----
Senator Paul. Not going to give them to us.
Ms. Power. --we have been responsive to the committees of
jurisdiction including this----
Senator Paul. Not going to--you have been consistent in not
giving us any information, but what you are saying is----
Ms. Power. That is not true. We have provided hundreds of
pages in response to the chair and ranking.
Senator Paul. To who? To whom?
Ms. Power. To the Senate Homeland Security and Government
Affairs Committee, for example. We have had extensive
engagement with this committee.
Senator Paul. We have been requesting this and gotten none
of it. I am on that committee as well.
The thing is, is what we get from you and from the State
Department at-large is that if Senator Menendez signs it, you
will give it documents.
Until then, you will give us nothing and we have gotten
nothing, zero. You said will not be providing any documents. I
now have 25 senators have sent you a letter and you all are not
responding. We do not----
Ms. Power. Well, we certainly respond----
Senator Paul. We want to see the scientific grants. We give
you the money. The taxpayers give you the money. We deserve to
know where the money went, whether it happened.
Look, you are right. It ended in 2019. When did the virus
come about? In about 2019. Some of the research proposals that
came about in 2018 were Wuhan Institute of Virology asking for
money to create a virus with a furin cleavage site in it.
Coronavirus, a SARS-like virus with a furin cleavage site, that
is exactly what COVID turned out to be.
They wanted money to create such a virus. We want to know
are there other research proposals that you either granted or
denied that were on the same veins of creating viruses that
could have become COVID-19. We cannot tell because you will not
give us the information.
Ms. Power. Again, we--consistent with longstanding
practice, we are providing extensive documentation. We have a
whole team of people who do nothing----
Senator Paul. That is just not true. That is just not true.
Ms. Power. --other than look back at PREDICT.
Senator Paul. That is not true.
Ms. Power. It is factually accurate.
Senator Paul. That is not true.
Ms. Power. It is. It is accurate.
Senator Paul. Everything we have asked we have not gotten.
I have not seen one document on the PREDICT program.
Ms. Power. I understand that. Again, consistent with common
practice across the Administration----
Senator Paul. Consistent that you are not going to give it
to any senator who has asked.
Ms. Power. No. No. No. We are providing all of the kinds of
documentation that you are describing.
Senator Paul. You are not. You are being dishonest.
Ms. Power. We are. No, I am not. I am absolutely not.
Senator Paul. We have not gotten one scrap of paper from
you. Not one scrap of paper.
Ms. Power. Again, with the committees of jurisdiction we
are providing all of the paperwork that have been requested by
the chair and the ranking member.
Senator Paul. You are not. I am on the other committee. I
am the ranking member on the other committee and I have not
seen a scrap of paper from that committee either.
Ms. Power. Well, that is----
Senator Paul. See, here is what the American people----
Ms. Power. I can tell you what is happening. Actually, I
cannot tell you what is happening at the committee.
Senator Paul. The American people think this, that because
you will not respond and because you respond with a nonresponse
that you have something to hide. I do not know if you have
anything to hide or not.
I want to see every grant proposal that had to do with
coronaviruses that went to China from the U.S. Government, from
all facets of the U.S. Government, and every bit of the Biden
administration is stonewalling us and will not give us the
information. It makes us think and it makes us suspicious that
you are hiding something.
It was not even you. This was the previous Administration.
We go back two or three administrations. We just want to see
the information and yet you sit there and you say we will do
something--we are doing something, which is absolutely the
opposite of the truth. You are not being honest.
The Chairman. Senator Coons.
Senator Coons. Thank you, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member
Risch, and thank you, Administrator Power, for your testimony
today.
Know that we are following closely developments in Sudan
and care deeply about the security and safety of the
development professionals who are there and about the
restoration, hopefully, of stability and of your mission, going
forward.
Administrator? Hi. If I could, I would like to continue a
conversation we were having at the State and Foreign Operations
Appropriations Subcommittee hearing recently about resiliency
and about how we can and should work together to address food
security and food resiliency.
The Feed the Future program, now expanded from 12 to 20
countries, is a critical part of the long-term strategy of this
Administration and previous administrations to invest in
systems transformation and resiliency.
Chairman Menendez, in his opening remarks, talked about the
critical need to invest in systems transformation. I would be
interested in hearing more from you about what you think Feed
the Future is doing or could do to be more effective at systems
transformation.
In the last year, partly through supplementals, we invested
a huge amount in humanitarian relief. In this year's budget
request, you request a modest increase in humanitarian relief
and there is a significant need for long-term systems
transformation.
I would love to focus for a moment on Feed the Future and
where you see it going and how we might work together to
strengthen it as an agriculture transformation program.
I would also welcome any advice you have or input, because
this is the Farm Bill year, on the challenges and opportunities
you have as an agency in administering Food for Peace, one of
the critical Title II programs in the Farm Bill. Thank you.
Ms. Power. Thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Let me just actually echo something that Ranking Member
Risch said at the beginning, which is a friendly amendment to
what you have said, which is that actually compared to the
$11.9 billion in humanitarian assistance we provided this year,
this coming year, even though the needs, as we know from Sudan,
from the earthquake in Syria and Turkey, the needs are going up
and up and up, sixth straight season--failed rainy season in
the Horn of Africa. We are actually coming in with a base
request, right, which even if properly funded----
Senator Coons. Yes.
Ms. Power. --would be only half of what we had last year,
despite the needs being up probably like close to 30 percent
and we do not even know what Sudan holds in store for us.
On Feed the Future, specifically, which is a great, great
program and a great question, we have been operating with
multiple lines of effort. Part of the idea is to ensure that we
have the research into heat resistant, drought resistant, pest
resistant seeds, the kind of cutting-edge research that
American farmers are drawing from.
Sometimes actually the research out of Feed the Future labs
can benefit American farmers because the discoveries can happen
anywhere on the earth, and then getting those discoveries,
those innovations, into the bloodstream of the places in which
we have Feed the Future programs. Most of those are in sub-
Saharan Africa. We increased the number of target countries
this year.
To be honest, Senator, we were able to match the selection
of new target countries in Feed the Future with additional
resources by virtue of the Ukraine supplementals and the
recognition that Putin's war was having a catastrophic effect
on farmers in Africa and beyond because of fertilizer prices,
fuel prices, and the like.
Senator Coons. This is an area of particular interest to
me, especially given recent indications the Russians are once
again threatening to not extend the grain deal, given the way
we have seen destabilization, steady increases in the costs of
inputs like fertilizer and fuel, and the real risk that there
will be broad scale hunger.
Let me briefly reference two other things since we are
almost out of time. One is the Global Fragility Act, as you
know, a law that Senator Graham and I worked on hard over a
number of years, signed into law by the previous
Administration, now more than 3 years in effect.
I am following closely and very interested in its actual
implementation, in particular in global West Africa and in
Mozambique. Rob Jenkins from the Conflict Prevention and
Stabilization Bureau led a very capable and engaged team from
USAID in a conversation I had yesterday with State, DoD, AID,
about sort of where are we really going in implementation.
I want to know that I can count on your active engagement
and support for this not just as a new funding stream, but as a
new approach to bringing development, defense, and diplomacy
into common alignment in areas that are genuinely fragile. Is
that your view of this law and its path forward?
Ms. Power. It absolutely is and I think has already had the
desired approach. I know we have not moved out with
implementation as quickly as you would have liked or
circumstances on the ground would certainly have benefited
from.
I think we now have all the agencies of the U.S. Government
aligned and, frankly, the list of countries that have been
chosen are those that would not otherwise necessarily generate
a lot of high-level governmental attention.
Those countries have been neglected over the years in terms
of interagency focus and push and the GFA provides a framework
to ensure that does not happen, including in Papua New Guinea,
which is--also overlaps with our broader effort to invest in
the Pacific Islands in new ways.
Senator Coons. Thank you.
One last question, if I might, about economic growth. We
have also discussed this. At a time when the debt burden, as
you mentioned in your opening testimony, for so many countries
in the Global South, so many developing countries has become
overwhelming and so many countries are asking for our help with
economic growth assistance, where does USAID fit into the
challenge of providing critical resources, advice, support for
economic growth and where could we help by providing you more
tools and more capacity for that engagement with our
development partners?
Ms. Power. Well, I am sure, Senator, you know the
statistic, but I have to repeat it because it is so staggering,
that African countries will spend $70 billion in debt servicing
payments in 2023. That is more than the entire total of
development aid that will flow to those countries.
I think USAID has a critical role. We are the ground game
for American foreign policy. Our teams on the ground have
economists, have the technical expertise, can find the
implementing partners that could offer, again, the kind of
technical counsel needed to go into these debt restructuring
talks with private creditors as well as with the PRC who are
the largest public holder of debt.
As you know, we are a very earmarked agency. Many of the--
all of the earmarks are very worthy in areas that you and I
both care an awful lot about and that the American people want
to see us active in.
The result of that is that while everybody would be for, I
think, USAID stepping into this role when these countries are
facing such debt crisis, recognizing that debt impedes
education, health, governance, every other sector that we work
in, the very limited amount of discretionary funding that USAID
has on offer means that that kind of work gets crowded out,
again, by these very----
Senator Coons. Thank you. Thank you, Administrator. I look
forward to working with you to deliver the kind of flexibility
that you believe the agency both needs and deserves in order to
accomplish these complex goals in coordination with this
committee.
Senator Shaheen [presiding]. Thank you, Administrator
Power. Senator Menendez was called to another hearing so I will
continue.
Last week at the Appropriations Committee budget hearing, I
talked about a recent trip that I made to Latin America and we
discussed some of the work that USAID is doing in the region to
counter efforts by the PRC and China.
Part of our trip was specifically to assess what the PRC is
doing in Latin America, and just to follow up on Senator
Cardin's question about what the impact of the cuts that are
being proposed by the House majority would have on USAID's
ability to counter Chinese investments in Latin America, can
you talk specifically about what the impact of that might be in
a region where we have a lot of work to do at the outset to
catch up with the kind of investments that China has been
making?
Ms. Power. Well, let me give you a couple examples, and
thank you for your trip to the region and for engaging on this.
I would say one of the demand signals that we have heard
from Congress across both parties is why are we not doing more
in the Caribbean, given the acute development needs, given the
income inequality, and given the PRC investments that are being
made.
USAID is working with many up here to substantially
increase our work with Caribbean countries who face these big
development barriers. That would be impossible.
If we are talking about cutting back from what we are doing
now, never mind not meeting the President's budget request, but
actually going back to earlier levels, that kind of work would
not be possible. We would not even be present in the way we
need to be, to be competing.
I think also a lot of the countries in the region are
suffering, and this affects Americans who work and travel in
the region as well, cyber-attacks and intellectual property
theft and crimes of that nature. We are working with many of
the countries in the region to help them strengthen their
cybersecurity safeguards.
Then we talk a lot about the two different governance
models--the democratic transparent civil society empowerment
model on the one hand and then a more top-down authoritarian or
autocratic model.
A lot of the work that we do in the hemisphere is about
strengthening democracy and the trend lines are not good at
all.
Whether it is supporting countries that are moving out on
anti-corruption reforms, for example, the Dominican Republic,
and trying to ensure that there is a dividend on democratic
reform or whether it is supporting independent media, civil
society, and others who are holding governments that are
backsliding accountable, a lot of that work would fall away in
the face of those cuts.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Ms. Power. I think I gave you the poll as well that PRC's
standing is falling and has fallen substantially in just the
last few years in the hemisphere. To miss a moment of
opportunity and to actually dial back rather than dial up
against that backdrop would be a travesty.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I hope that message will
be heard.
One of the countries where there is that internal battle
going on between autocracy and democracy is the country of
Georgia where it is very clear that the people of Georgia want
to look west to Europe. They want a democracy.
Senator Risch and I were there in 2012 to observe the
elections when Georgian Dream took over in that country and
what we have seen is the Government of Georgia move
increasingly towards autocracy.
One of the defining opportunities will be the upcoming
elections in 2024 and we will have a critical role in
supporting those elections and hopefully encouraging an
election observer mission.
Can you talk about how important that will be and whether
USAID is proposing to be engaged in a long-term election
observation mission to support Georgia?
Ms. Power. I do not have the specifics yet of what that
program is going to look like, but I wholeheartedly agree with
you that the attacks on civil society, some of the laws that
have been introduced of late, extremely troubling.
On the other hand, the pushback shows the strength of civil
society and the citizen power in Georgia to chart its own
course or to fulfill its own democratic aspirations.
I think, to your point, we broadly need to be targeting
resources toward election integrity, knowing that this is the
next real opportunity for the citizens to be heard from and I
think that in all likelihood will include short-term
observation and long-term at the same time. You need both.
Senator Shaheen. I think this committee would be very
supportive of that and I would hope that if you need additional
funding in order to engage in that kind of a long-term mission
that you will let the committee know so that we can ensure that
those funds are available.
My final question has to do with girls' education because,
as we know, in countries around the world, girls, particularly
when they get to the secondary education level, are much more
likely to be out of school than boys for a variety of reasons,
particularly in conflict countries.
Can you talk about why it is important for us to ensure
that adolescent girls have access to education and we have a
global strategy to empower adolescent girls to address barriers
that girls face? Can you talk about USAID's engagement on
updating that plan?
Ms. Power. Thank you. Again, wholeheartedly embrace the
premise. Would just say our investments in basic education
alongside our commitment to double our gender attribution
funding this year or programs that have gender components, I
think, create a great opportunity because we are looking across
all of our programming across all sectors to look to see where
we can make sure that women and girls are, again, a particular
area of focus or a kind of design feature of our programming,
recognizing how many more barriers they have to continuing
education, particularly, as you say, at the adolescent level.
I can get back to you on when that strategy will be
revised. Just please know that I and our gender coordinator,
Jamille Bigio, who I think you know, are looking to work across
our education portfolio to make sure that in the wake of COVID,
especially where so many girls have been left behind, that we
are going out of our way to try to bring girls back to school
and help ensure that the development environment that includes
not only education programming, but, more broadly, barriers in
health, barriers in governance, social norms, et cetera, what
those things are as well as part of that ecosystem can be a
major factor in holding them back, so thinking about it more
comprehensively.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. For
the benefit of anybody who may be watching, I think the
important thing to remind everyone of is that when we empower
women and girls in societies, we have more stable societies,
they can give back more consistently to their communities and
to their families and to their countries than men do, and so
this is a very important foreign policy initiative that we need
to stay focused on.
Thank you, Administrator.
Senator Kaine.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thanks to the
administrator for all your good work.
I want to follow up just really on two items. One, to
Senator Paul's point, just to give it some context, nothing is
more frustrating than to be a U.S. senator and to request
information about a committee that you sit on and to not be
given the information, and I had that experience in the
previous Administration--making multiple requests for
information and then would not get anything.
I will give the ranking member, who was then chair at that
time, some thanks because he would eventually go to bat for me
so I could get information I needed, but it should not require
that.
You talked about, you are trying to respond, and I know the
requests from 535 members can be voluminous, but you are trying
to respond consistent with previous practice. Let me ask about
that practice.
Is there anything within the USAID budget that is not
within the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee?
Ms. Power. No.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Any questions about USAID projects,
funding, et cetera, are all within the ambit of the SFRC? There
may be overlapping jurisdictions.
There occasionally are, but I do not think there is
anything within the SFRC space that is not within the
jurisdiction--I am sorry, within the USAID space that is not
within our jurisdiction. Is that your understanding?
Ms. Power. Yes.
Senator Kaine. Okay. Then the second thing is consistent
with previous practice, different administrations have been
different on this practice. Does a records request from a
committee member have to be sort of validated by the chair of
the committee for you to believe that you have an obligation to
respond?
Ms. Power. I can check with our general counsel, but my
understanding is that the chair and ranking, when requests from
the committee of jurisdiction come in, then we are absolutely
responsive and, again, have been responsive on COVID origins
and on the PREDICT program from the----
Senator Kaine. I may want to follow up on that. Because if
a request from a committee member who is voting on the USAID
budget, who is considering an authorizing bill, if that is not
enough and if there needs to be a sign-off by the chair and
ranking, that really disempowers committee members. I am not
saying that about this committee, but it could be the--I
certainly know other committees requiring the sign-off of both
the chair and the ranking would lead to a high level of
inequality in terms of who is able to get information about the
jobs that they do.
I may want to follow up on what that practice is, but I
hope we may assist Senator Paul in getting answers to the
questions that he has posed, particularly given your statement
that the programs he is asking about terminated in 2019, it
would seem like. Members should get that information and there
should not be a reluctance to produce it.
Second, be a problem solver with me because you have such a
breadth of experience and I am thinking about your UN role in
addition to your USAID role.
I was in Latin America recently as well and visiting
nations that have some really strong ties to the U.S. like
Ecuador in the past 6 months--Ecuador, Chile, growing ties.
Uruguay, strong ties. Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Panama.
You are under some restrictions that we put on you about
the degree to which USAID can provide support in nations once
they pass a certain income threshold, and that is not your
restriction--that is Congress' restriction.
What we hear from some of these nations is, hey, we are the
ones doing things right and the fact that we may have passed an
income restriction does not mean they are not impacted areas
that are either incredibly isolated or where the poverty is
intense, and when we pass an income level and then suddenly
USAID cannot be a partner, it is not like China says, oh, your
median income is so high that we will not partner with you.
I know this is not your challenge. It is ours, but what can
we do to partner better with the nations of the Americas that
are doing things right, but that may in doing things right have
exceeded some of the limitations that then put restraints on
the services that USAID can offer?
Ms. Power. Thank you.
Well, first of all, again, in a resource-constrained
environment every day, regardless of the restrictions, we would
be making choices and some of those choices would be on
vulnerability grounds.
As you said, there are countries that are doing very well,
but communities, for example, in Panama, look at the Darien Gap
and the communities along the path that so many are taking
north.
I was just in Panama as part of a U.S. delegation
negotiating around some border enforcement questions and this
was the very question posed to me by the Panamanian leadership
to me and my colleagues, which is you want us to do integration
along lines of what the chairman and I were talking about
earlier of migrants who are passing through, but we do not have
the additional resources to do that.
It is politically a contentious issue, at the very least,
even if it ends up being an economically beneficial one over
time. What about helping us in this part of Panama even if your
mission closed X number of years ago, and we do some
programming through regional programming if there is some
cross-border impact.
Of course, more flexibility is only to the good for any
Administration trying to be nimble in a world of complex
challenges. At the same time, we do have to look at other major
players in the development space.
For example, I think the evolution conversation about
multilateral development bank reform really speaks to your
question because that is about looking at places that either
countries where the World Bank would itself not be able to
operate generally because it had also achieved a certain income
status and yet maybe actually putting out a share of emissions
that are contributing to the ravaging of Caribbean countries
that are low-income countries.
There are global public goods that we have an interest in
advancing or protecting and that might require also investments
and so that is part of the conversation about the MDB I take
really seriously.
Senator Coons and I have talked about this an awful lot,
but our role at USAID is being vice chair of the DFC board and
there, again, it is a mix because we want the DFC to do much
more in poor countries and developing countries and be able to
absorb more risk to operating in those kinds of difficult
environments.
At the same time we want the DFC, particularly as we talk
about infrastructure projects and big investments like that, to
be operating in places maybe where, again, there might be some
temptation to foreclose their involvement.
I think the more expansive, the more flexible, and then
leaving it to the judgment about how then to make really hard
choices about where you would dedicate your resources because
the more flexibilities we have the more competition there will
be, of course, for those resources.
Senator Kaine. Right. Tough, tough challenges. I am over my
time. I yield back. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Van Hollen.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Administrator, great to see you. I understand that
the Chairman and Senator Coons have raised some of the issues
surrounding Sudan.
I am really glad to see that our folks at the State
Department, including the USAID contingent in Sudan, have been
successfully evacuated. I look forward to working with you on
next steps, going forward.
Senator Coons and I took a trip there back in May 2021 and
it was a time of hope, but it is also time that you could see
what is playing out now. All the ingredients were there and I
do think we have to look back to see what we might have done
differently in the meantime. Obviously, much of it beyond our
control.
Let me turn to the issue of infrastructure. I have been a
supporter of the President's announcement at the G-7 on the
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.
I think that that is a really important element of our
overseas strategy including countering China's efforts to
export its authoritarian model in many countries through
infrastructure projects.
Now, we have a lot to offer and USAID provides all sorts of
important programs--health care, education, things that I think
are vital and also can win the hearts and minds of people
around the world.
I also think that we need to be competing in areas of
infrastructure because this is the primary tool that China uses
to try to export its influence.
I see in the budget you also have $4 billion over 5 years
in mandatory funding to, ``create a new international
infrastructure fund which will outcompete China by providing a
credible, reliable alternative to PRC options and make game
changing investments in the Indo-Pacific to strengthen partner
economies.''
Having just returned from a trip to that region with
Senator Merkley, including stops in Vietnam and Indonesia, I
think this is really important.
Can you talk a little bit about the relationship between
this program you are discussing this budget and the President's
Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment?
Ms. Power. One would want to almost go country-by-country
to talk about the different ways that USAID would plug in.
One of the aspects of USAID's governance work that we do--
and I had an exchange with Senator Coons as well about our
desire to do more in the realm of economic development, of
economic governance in these countries--but where USAID's sort
of niche is against a backdrop, again, of huge resources coming
in to do the infrastructure investments themselves, whether
from the MDBs or from the DFC or from whomever, but our niche
is on standards.
It is on what the enabling environment actually is for
those investments to be made. It is on the transparency of
procurement, working with a country on a procurement law. If
you are going to do the big infrastructure, well, that is a
recipe for, potentially, some--could be a recipe in some of the
countries in which we work for some problematic pilfering by
various players.
Well, that cannot happen. This has to be--we have to be
stewards of taxpayer investments in infrastructure as well. I
think that our work with nongovernmental actors as well to
ensure, for example, environmental advocates, environmental
actors, institutions on the ground, to make sure that the
infrastructure investments we make are not extractive in their
nature, that they respect labor rights, that there is
accountability, again, for how these projects are conducted
that would, again, be in marked contrast with the way some of
those projects were done through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Senator Van Hollen. I appreciate that. Maybe--and I realize
that USAID only has a part of this overall.
Ms. Power. A small part, yes.
Senator Van Hollen. Maybe if someone could get back to me
just on the relationship between these two funds, what USAID's
portion is, that would be helpful for me. I appreciate the role
USAID plays in addressing exactly the kind of governance issues
you raised.
If I could quickly ask you about the request for ESF funds
for Syria--northeastern Syria. I understand USAID has a piece
of this, as well. I think that assistance has been very
important in an area that is vital.
Obviously, been impacted by earthquakes, but also by all
the other fighting going on. Could you talk briefly about that
money and its purpose?
Ms. Power. Great. Well, just to distinguish the
humanitarian assistance that we are also seeking the broad
humanitarian assistance budget of which a large share would go
to Syria and to Syrian refugees in Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon, and
elsewhere.
The ESF, I think, first of all, we do not do stabilization
work in regime-held territories. We are looking a lot at the
al-Hol challenge, which I know many up here are very interested
in.
You have about 18,000 of the people in that facility are
Syrian, but to simply--given the backgrounds of many of them,
also the--what actually has gone on in al-Hol, the question of
reintegration is very complicated.
Part of our request this year is also looking at not only
support for their reintegration into communities, but also the
communities to which they are returning to make sure that those
communities are seen to benefit because there is a lot of
stigma and desire not, in fact, to welcome people back.
I think, generally, we also still are looking at
accountability for atrocities, if there are stopgap ceasefires
on the ground, how to be nimble and coming in in support of
those ceasefires.
Ultimately, even though it feels very elusive right now,
still looking through our development resources to look at if
there is any way to support political resolution, more broadly.
Again, that feels very far afield at the moment.
Senator Van Hollen. Thank you.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Duckworth.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Administrator Power, for being here today.
We have no shortage of crises that we could talk about in
the world today from Ukraine to Sudan to Haiti, from migration
to public health and climate change.
I think the news media tends to focus relentlessly on a
response to these crises. They do pay significantly less
attention to the work of our government, USAID in particular,
to address the problems around the world before they become
crises.
I want to start by thanking you for your work in this
regard. In February, I led a CODEL to Jakarta to engage with
ASEAN as an institution and with Indonesia bilaterally. There I
saw firsthand the eagerness of our partners for more, not less,
U.S. engagement and more beyond just a military engagement.
Can you explain how this budget will help address the
continuing need to strengthen ties with allies and partners in
the Indo-Pacific region, particularly with the ASEAN nations,
in order to advance our Indo-Pacific objectives? In particular,
can you highlight some key projects happening in the region in
the global health environment space?
Ms. Power. Okay. I guess I would say a couple of things.
One of the main demand signals we are hearing from
countries in Southeast Asia--and this is true, really, across
the whole Indo-Pacific--but is around climate adaptation. I am
sure you heard that.
Indonesia is, of course--we are working very closely with
them on clean energy renewable projects on mitigation, on
lowering their emissions since they are a substantial emitter
of carbon.
Where they are really feeling the effects, and I myself was
just in Vietnam and it is very much the same way there in the
Mekong Delta region and beyond, but is--even rice farming now
becoming--the weather patterns becoming too unpredictable so
needing to do new skills training or provide new sources of
livelihoods to farmers and so forth.
I think this budget request and especially, again, our
desire to get more discretionary money to do economic
development, livelihood program, jobs programs, and so forth,
much of this--the economic needs are growing as the effects of
changing climate are ravaging particularly rural communities,
but not only the agricultural sector.
That is something we are looking for in this budget. We had
an exchange earlier about the mandatory request, which is very
substantial investments. You heard my exchange with Senator Van
Hollen in infrastructure.
In general, just being in a position to scale up when a
country like Indonesia really wants to elevate the partnership
or, for example, with Vietnam, we are celebrating 10 years of a
comprehensive partnership and very eager to elevate that to a
strategic partnership to be in a position to surge resources
commensurate to that appetite and that is what the mandatory
request seeks to put us in a position to do.
Maybe just on global health I can get back to you with
details across the ASEAN countries, but Indonesia really stands
out because USAID is making a heightened emphasis now or
putting much more focus on primary health investments and
Indonesia stands out more than most countries in the world for
actually moving from spending 10 percent of its health budget
on primary care to 25 percent.
We, our mission, but also working with the World Bank and
others who are the big spenders in the health sector in
Indonesia are looking to support that effort including through
health care worker training because so many health care
workers, mostly female, are unpaid or poorly paid.
This is a new area of emphasis for USAID. It is, obviously,
a crying need everywhere in the world, but we have been very
disease-based in focusing on TB, malaria, HIV/AIDS, all these
incredibly important diseases, even global health security and
pandemic prevention risks.
If you focus only on those threats and those villains and
we miss out on the primary health care foundation, that would
be a short-sighted investment indeed and Indonesia is one of
our key partners now in a new primary impact program. Indonesia
is one that has been chosen to partner with.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. In my remaining time I would
like to talk about access to clean drinking water. It is a
global driver of conflict, and in March of last year the Biden
administration pledged to provide $1.2 billion in support of a
U.S. global water strategy.
Can you go into some detail about how this budget addresses
that commitment in 2022 and how it will help meet the growing
need for consistent access to clean drinking water?
Ms. Power. Yes. I am really excited about this actually
because, again, with water scarcity becoming a growing
challenge and, indeed, there is a risk, I read the statistics,
in fact, just a few days ago that by 2025, two-thirds of the
world's population could face water scarcity.
I think you are going to see--you have a long-standing
interest in this. I do not hear a lot about it up here, but I
think that is on the verge of changing.
What we have asked for are $700 million to support 22
priority country plans and this is with an eye, again, to
reaching 22 million more people with safe water and 22 million
more people with safe sanitation because that is something that
is also lacking.
This is over, of course, a longer period of time, but I
think that U.S. leadership in this space, given the demand
signals that we are hearing, really can be pivotal also in
galvanizing resources from other donors. Thank you.
Senator Duckworth. Thank you. I am out of time, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Duckworth.
Senator Hagerty.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Administrator Power. I would like to talk about
the energy policies reflected in the budget that is being
proposed today.
To develop economically, developing countries need reliable
sources of energy. I would like to go to a specific example and
that is Uganda.
Uganda's President has said, ``Many developed nations are
pushing an accelerated transition to renewables on Africa. This
earns them praise in the U.S. and Europe, but leaves many
Africans with unreliable and expensive electricity.''
He goes on to say that, ``this stands to forestall Africa's
attempts to rise out of poverty, which require reliable energy.
African manufacturing will struggle to attract investment and,
therefore, to create jobs without consistent energy sources.
``Agriculture will suffer if the continent cannot use
natural gas to create synthetic fertilizer or to power
efficient freight transportation.''
Administrator Power, do you agree or disagree with Uganda's
President?
Ms. Power. Well, what I will say is that Power Africa, our
flagship energy program, as you probably know, has gotten
first-time electricity to about 165 million people in Africa.
We are very much on the same page in seeking
electrification, energy access, particularly for the poorest.
Renewables are a critical part of the solution. We are now----
Senator Hagerty. Let me go specifically to fossil fuels. Is
USAID opposed to financing fossil fuel development, as Uganda's
President is talking about?
Ms. Power. I would have to get back to you on our
engagements with President Museveni's ministers, but my
impression actually in Uganda is that we have gotten very loud
demand signals with regards to solar production and we do have
exceptions.
We have a preference for renewables because we do want to
see carbon reduced, but there are circumstances in which,
again, securing rapid access to clean energy in very low-income
countries requires more stable or additionality and----
Senator Hagerty. I believe that is exactly right. What I am
concerned about, Administrator, and I want to make this very
clear, is that the goals that are reflected in this budget,
particularly with respect to energy, are really missing the
mark and what it does--and I think Uganda's President
articulates this well--is that it puts green colonialism over
the real economic development needs of these countries.
You take Uganda, for example. Thirty percent of the
population lives on $1.77 a day. These countries have been
devastated by the pandemic. They are trying to climb out of a
true economic crisis. They have got crime that is rampant in
many of these nations.
They are trying to fulfill the most basic economic needs
and to do that they need to have consistent, stable, reliable,
and, frankly, affordable energy.
That is what the President of Uganda is getting at and he
is arguing that I think our policies, again, the policies
touted by America, rich European nations, that in many cases
discourage and will not support fossil fuel development are not
allowing him to move along, not allowing his nation and others
like it to move along a reliable progression.
Instead, what we are trying to do is leapfrog our way into
technologies that I think, perhaps, theologically or
ideologically, again, receive praise and plaudits here, but do
not fill the void--do not fill the need there in developing
countries like Uganda, and when we fail to do that, we create a
void and that void right now is being filled by China.
I think it was former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers who
just recently talked about his discussion with the leader of a
developing nation who said that when it is time to think about
economic development in his country, when China shows up, they
deliver an airport. When we show up, we deliver them a lecture.
My goal and my sincere hope is that we can get past the
ideological underpinnings that are reflected in this and look
at real pragmatic ways to deliver solid economic development,
reliable energy, affordable energy to these countries that
desperately need it.
Ms. Power. Senator, I just would love to respond. I have
made clear, again, that we support, for example, natural gas
programming in instances where it can create energy access
while not delaying plans toward clean energy because, again,
the collective carbon emissions even from developing countries
were all part of the solution when it comes to mitigation.
We are working with countries, but I do not know if you
have had a chance to travel to Uganda and engage directly,
again, with entrepreneurs or with farmers. Again, the idea that
USAID or with USAID staff, including our Ugandan staff--two-
thirds of our team in Uganda are in fact citizens of Uganda--
but the idea that we would be putting ideology and colonialism
over the development needs of the people in that country, a
country we have worked in, basically, since independence, I
just reject that premise and I think if you--and I would love
to travel with you if you would like to go and see up close the
demand signals that we get, again, from everything from
government officials to civil society organizations to farmers
to entrepreneurs who want to do clean energy partnerships.
This is not some imposed vision by Samantha Power or Joe
Biden or John Kerry. This is about actually working in
partnership with the communities that we have worked in for
decades.
Senator Hagerty. I will ask you to submit this piece for
the record. It is titled ``Solar and wind force poverty on
Africa'' and it is written by the President of Uganda.
I hope you will take a look at this, Administrator Power.
Again, he makes it very clear that he needs help today with
reliable and affordable energy, not some aspirational goals
that we are not supporting.
Ms. Power. I hope you will allow us to provide you as well
or maybe we can put in the record Uganda's own nationally
determined contribution to the Paris Agreement, which is its
plan for curbing emissions because that is actually the
government's plan irrespective of what President Museveni, who
says a lot of things, may have said in a particular speech. We
are working with him on the implementation of their plan.
Senator Hagerty. I hate to see us put carbon emission
reduction over the actual needs to fulfill the rising from
poverty that we are trying to accomplish here.
Ms. Power. I hope you will agree that USAID cares an awful
lot about helping lift people out of poverty and that we have
demonstrated that over many decades and----
Senator Hagerty. I want to ensure that we continue to do so
and that----
Ms. Power. We will continue to do----
Senator Hagerty. --that USAID's goals is to basically win
friends and bring about people into our fold as opposed to
pushing them into the arms of China, which seems to be
happening.
The Chairman. I want to assure both of you that the record
is replete with your views.
Senator Hagerty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Without objection, Senator Hagerty's request
shall be--document shall be included in the record.
[Editor's note.--The information referred to can be found in
the ``Additional Material Submitted for the Record'' section at
the end of this hearing.]
The Chairman. Senator Paul has come back. He has another
question and I am happy to recognize him at this time.
Senator Paul. Will you be testifying, Ms. Power, to
Homeland Security of your budget as you have done today to
USAID?
Ms. Power. No.
Senator Paul. You mentioned that the records that I have
requested from the PREDICT program is part of USAID concerning
coronavirus research, that you gave them to the committee of
jurisdiction.
You are not testifying before Homeland Security. You are
sitting here today before the Foreign Relations Committee. I
would wonder why the Foreign Relations Committee would not be
the committee of jurisdiction.
Ms. Power. Thank you. Senator Kaine made a similar point
and so let me just, I guess, clarify, but USAID has provided
hundreds of documents----
Senator Paul. To whom?
Ms. Power. --to both--to both SFRC and the Homeland
Security Government Affairs Committee.
Senator Paul. You are saying that all the documents that I
want from the PREDICT program you have already given to Senator
Menendez?
Ms. Power. I cannot--I know you are asking for a range of
things. There are some that we are not----
Senator Paul. Senator Menendez, are you aware of having
documents on the coronavirus research that I am interested in?
The Chairman. I am happy to let you ask questions of the
witness. I do not intend to be put under this process.
Senator Paul. No, I do not mean to be critical. I just----
The Chairman. No, I am going to respond to you in my own--
--
Senator Paul. Yes. I do not think he does because I have
been requesting this and if his staff does have all this
information you would think somebody would be forthcoming with
saying, oh, we have already got all this.
I do not think what you are saying is honest and so my
question is you say you have given it to Senate Foreign
Relations and you say you have also given it to Homeland
Security. To whom with those committees have you given this
information?
Ms. Power. I have not personally handed over the
information.
Senator Paul. Somebody gave it. Did they give it to----
Ms. Power. We will absolutely get back to your staff to
ascertain exactly where the documents are.
Senator Paul. The reason I need to know is we need to ask
them did you give that to the Chairman of this committee--did
you give it to the Chairman of Homeland Security?
You do not know if the correspondence was with the Chairman
or if it was with someone else. I would presume it would have
to be through the Chairman.
Ms. Power. What I know is that we have provided hundreds of
documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Paul. I am not worried about----
Ms. Power. I apologize for not saying that earlier and
mentioning only the other committee.
Senator Paul. My question is not just about hundreds of
documents. My question is about coronavirus research that USAID
has funded in China.
Ms. Power. Oh, sorry. Yes. I mean, on the PREDICT program
specifically. I do not mean the documents in the abstract. Yes.
Senator Paul. On the PREDICT program. On the PREDICT
program, but specifically on coronavirus research either
granted or denied. Some of the most important information we
have is actually a DARPA grant where Wuhan Institute of
Virology asked for money to create a virus that looks like what
COVID became. We did not fund it, but it shows that they were
already interested in creating a virus similar to what COVID-19
is.
We want to know did the PREDICT program give grant
proposals for the creation of viruses that were similar to
COVID-19 or that might have become COVID-19 and we also want to
know if you denied any of these programs.
It is important to us to know if they were asking for other
money from you to do research that could have become COVID-19,
but what I have gotten from you is not an answer.
You are saying, oh, somebody else has all this information,
and we will pursue it, but then you will be gone and then in 6
months' time we will come back and say, well, we asked the
Chairman of this committee and that committee. They do not have
it.
The thing is, is it makes us all suspicious. You will not
give it to me. Oh, you are going to give it to somebody else.
You are going to give it to a Democrat Chairman, but not to
someone from the minority party. This is all very unfortunate
and it makes us concerned about the transparency of your
Administration.
The Chairman. Senator Paul, if I may.
First of all, it is not the question of a Democratic
Chairman. The question is if the procedures historically have
been that upon requests or when documents are provided, they
are provided to the Chair of the committee regardless of who
the Chair is at any given time. When Senator Risch was the
Chair, it would have been the same thing.
However, since you first raised this earlier today, my
staff informs me that USAID has in fact provided a number of
documents related to your area of interest on COVID and I am
happy to work to facilitate a review of those documents with
you.
My understanding is at a staff level we have been
discussing with Senator Risch's staff how to make those
available to you. There are likely thousands of documents and
we are working to set up a system so that can be viewed
electronically in camera, which we believe is a workable set of
circumstances. I am happy to follow up and make sure that we
come to a conclusion on that.
Senator Paul. Thank you very much.
The only problem with not being able to actually hold the
documents, print them out, and write on the documents is it is
very limiting, as you know, for me to sit in your office and
read them.
None of these are classified. If there is anything in there
that reveals some spy's name somewhere, which I do not know how
that would be in a science grant, we can redact it.
The Chairman. I am not suggesting that you have to read it.
I am sure that we could have your staff read them on your
behalf and give you an executive summary, but we will work to
see if we can come up to an accommodation.
The question here is a more precedent setting one and it
has not been the role of the committee that when the Chair and/
or ranking member request documents to then just hand those
documents over to members of the committee.
It has always been that it has been kept in a process that
then can be reviewed when the Chair and/or ranking member
decide to do so. It is a bigger question than your specific
interests.
Senator Paul. It has also taken this exchange for me to
even discover you have some of the documents. I still do not
know if you have all of them that we requested.
The Chairman. I do not know that I have all of them that
you want. I have no idea of the universe, the totality of the
universe.
Whatever we have been given we are happy to--now that we--I
know that we have been given documents, we are happy to find a
way for you to review them and see if that, hopefully,
satisfies your curiosity.
Senator Cruz.
Senator Cruz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator Power, welcome. Good to see you again.
It is no secret that I have been deeply concerned with the
direction of the Biden administration's foreign policy and you
and I have had many discussions in this area.
I would hope, though, that we both agree that, first, USAID
has a valuable role to play regarding development assistance
and, second, that USAID's mission should remain separate from
controversial debates that often divide other parts of the
State Department.
One of the controversies has been the Biden
administration's deliberate, systemic, and reckless appeasement
of terrorist groups everywhere from the Western Hemisphere to
the Middle East.
From day one, the Administration has removed the terrorist
designation and provided resources to Iranian-linked terrorist
groups around Israel's border, including pouring money into
Hamas-controlled territory.
In the Western Hemisphere, they did the same thing with the
revolutionary armed forces of Colombia, the FARC, which
provided enormous and dangerous momentum to anti-American
movements across the hemisphere.
Now, we can disagree about the wisdom of those decisions,
but I would have hoped we would have agreed that USAID should
not be entangled in these deeply divisive decisions.
I guess what I would ask--let us start by talking about
Colombia and the FARC. Why is it that USAID actively
participated and supported the revocation of the terrorist and
narcotics-related designation of the FARC?
Ms. Power. I would have to get back to you. I am not aware
of the process and deliberations that you are talking about.
Senator Cruz. Okay. Well, let me help you on that. On
January 24, 2022, there was a decision memo in USAID. The
USAID, the subject, has request for concurrence to modify USAID
programming following revocation of the terrorist and
narcotics-related designations of the FARC.
You signed that memo. You approved that shift. The memo
explicitly embraces modifying USAID programming to enhance our
support in light of the revocation of terrorist and narcotics-
related designation of the FARC. Why is USAID getting in the
middle of that?
Ms. Power. Well, let me say what we are in the middle of in
Colombia. We are in the middle of trying to support the peace
process, the peace process that culminated in a peace, but the
implementation of a peace, and we have worked for decades in
the most underdeveloped areas from which the FARC recruited
over so many years in agriculture, in livelihood support, and
transitioning people away from growing things that are not in
anybody's interest for them to be growing.
I apologize for not being able to recall this particular
piece of paper that you are describing, especially if my
signature is on it. I will get back to you on that.
On the general thrust of our programming on the ground in
Colombia, we do work in trying to ensure that soldiers who have
gone back to their communities have an alternative source of
livelihood so they do not pick up guns again.
I suspect that that is in general the logic of the
adjustment to be able to do that.
Senator Cruz. I will say the Biden administration's
decision to embrace the FARC was a huge blow to Ivan Duque's
government, which was pro-America, which was a strong ally, and
the pattern we have seen from the Biden administration is they
actively undermine strong allies, particularly in Latin
America, and the result is--congratulations to the Biden
administration--they pushed and ended up getting the first
Marxist President in power in Colombia who is explicitly anti-
American, Gustavo Petro.
By the way, Biden has managed to do the same thing in
Brazil. Over and over again, the Biden administration is
hurting U.S. national security interest because ideology is a
higher priority.
Let us shift to another part of the world, the Middle East,
the Gaza Strip. USAID pours resources into the Gaza Strip and
usually USAID lists its grants for public scrutiny and
disclosure.
Last year a mysterious $10 million grant appeared on the
website. It was for $10 million, it had no recipient, and it
was listed as going to the West Bank.
After my office began investigating what this, was your
office let us know that every detail of that was wrong, that
the millions were actually not sent to the West Bank. They were
sent to the Gaza Strip.
The amount was wrong. It was $5 million and not $10
million, and that the organization should have been listed, but
it is an organization that only works in the Gaza Strip so if
it had been listed it would have been obvious that it was going
to the Gaza Strip and the public designation was wrong.
Did you launch an investigation as to why that public
disclosure was so wildly wrong, every aspect of it was less
than forthcoming and accurate about what USAID was doing in the
Gaza Strip?
Ms. Power. I will, going forward, look into those
discrepancies. That is unusual.
Something like that has not been brought to my attention
before, something that goes out publicly claiming one thing
about a grant recipient when something else entirely is true. I
will absolutely look into it. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. I appreciate the follow-up--the results of
your investigation.
Ms. Power. Thank you.
Senator Cruz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Just a couple of final questions,
Madam Administrator.
Do you have any effort to get other countries in the world
that are like-minded, share our values, in which we can join
together in an effort to create a force multiplier in our
development assistance globally?
I think about what China does and I think about if many of
our friends in Western Europe, Canada, Korea, and elsewhere
were to engage in development assistance in a coordinated
fashion, we would have a force multiplier that would equal to
or surpass. Is that something that is at all being thought
about in your operation?
Ms. Power. It is our daily--obsession is probably too
strong, but if we cannot multilateralize what we do, we cannot
keep up, not only with the PRC, but with the needs in the
communities in which we work.
We have MOUs that we have signed just in the last few years
with Japan, with the Republic of Korea. I just did a kind of
sub-MOU last week or the week before with the United Kingdom on
education specifically about how we leverage what we are doing
in order to get the UK, which is cutting back assistance in so
many sectors, but to get them at least to hold steady or
potentially to increase in that sector.
I know Ukraine is not really the focus of your question,
but I do think it is noteworthy that a country like Norway has
committed 1.7 percent of its GDP to Ukraine-funding and that is
everything from humanitarian assistance to core development
funding in terms of governance institutions.
I can get you a rundown of where we are capitalizing on
this. We just launched a partnership with Ireland, which has
provided $50 million on ready-to-use therapeutic feeding to
prevent wasting in children.
The Chairman. I would appreciate seeing that.
Ms. Power. That is country of a tiny population, but that
is stepping up again in a specific sector. I think what is----
The Chairman. I would appreciate seeing it because--and I
appreciate some of the examples. In my mind, the question is
more of a holistic coordinated approach versus a series of one-
offs.
Can we ultimately engage in a joint compact in which we can
leverage our collective assistance in a way that we will do the
good that we seek to do on the USAID like create a force
multiplier?
Ms. Power. Yes. What I would say is the OECD and the DAC--
there is a Development Assistance Committee that is exactly, I
think, what you are describing.
Every country has its own politics just as we do and its
own members of parliament, let us say, who have their own
specific development agenda maybe or a specific line of effort
that they want to see pursued.
What the DAC does is, I think, finds synergies, but I think
fundamentally we so far have found it more productive to work
bilaterally and particularly in the field because that is where
we identify where the greatest needs are or where we can
reinforce----
The Chairman. I will follow up with you.
Ms. Power. Okay. That was a great question.
The Chairman. I recently traveled to South Africa where the
United States is doing some incredible development and
humanitarian work, but my sense is that despite our success and
people's perception still seems to be that China is the better
partner for growth. This is bigger than just branding and
slapping flags and logos on boxes, books, and plaques. This is
about having a comprehensive strategic community outreach plan
that reaches the masses.
What is USAID doing to ensure the general populations of
beneficiary communities not only see USAID's presence, but feel
and understand how they benefit from USAID's work?
Ms. Power. Well, as you know, we are very attentive to
branding, but I agree with you that slapping a logo on a
shelter that has been built or a school that has been built is
not the same as communications.
Look, I think we are--as part of our new policy framework,
which we put out about 6 weeks ago, we have for the first time
a dedicated reform effort on communications because I think it
is not only the PRC's large loans and the infrastructure that
has yielded and that is the backdrop for our assistance and
where our grants because there is--China does nine to one loan
to grant. We do nine to one grant to loan as a government in
foreign assistance.
It is also in the disinformation environment we operate in.
I think, frankly, we have a long way to go in knowing how to
project what we are actually doing in communities over the
noise of false claims about what USAID or what the U.S.
Government as a whole is doing.
We are not terribly well-resourced in this domain. I think
we did over the decades get used to the programs kind of--and
the projects speaking for themselves, the impacts speaking for
themselves. Anybody who has been touched by a USAID program,
certainly, in my experience has never forgotten it.
We are operating in a very different information ecosystem
now and I think you are absolutely right that between
disinformation and PRC kind of large infrastructure investments
we have our work cut out for us.
The Chairman. We would love to work with you to either
resource and/or help. The American people are very generous
with their money, but would like, at the end of the day that
the beneficiaries say the United States of America did this for
me and having that, I think, is a critical part of the ability
to continue to find the support in Congress for that.
If we can make that correlation, which I believe exists,
but does not necessarily get realized by the beneficiaries, I
think it would have--as part of our overall public diplomacy,
it would be an important factor. We would like to work with you
on that.
I want to turn to food insecurity for a moment. Due to
limited USAID resources, the World Food Programme is cutting
food rations in refugee camps worldwide. Meanwhile, food
insecurity is continuing to rise while people flee from
violence in places like the Sahel, Sudan, Burma. Devastating
choices are being made whose consequences will be borne by the
world's most vulnerable people.
How is USAID weighing and planning to deal with these
competing food assistance needs to respond in differing
contexts equitably and effectively?
Ms. Power. Let me just say it is an impossible task. There
is no other way around it. We, this year, will literally be
debating where rations get cut all together, where they get cut
in half.
With the outbreak of violence in Sudan, you are both
horrified and heartbroken for the people of Sudan and then you
immediately think as well of all the people in other countries
like the Horn of Africa, Somalia, who, because of these new
needs, those resources inevitably will be scaled back.
The only answer--we can brief you on what our methodology
is. It is a very sophisticated methodology which takes UN
appeals, including from the WFP, as a baseline and then looks
at issues of access and--but again, vulnerability and the
greatest need is the driver.
Fundamentally, we are going to reach far fewer people with
far less this year because last year through the Ukraine
supplementals, you all were generous enough and farsighted
enough to write those supplementals in the broadest terms,
allowing us flexibility to use the humanitarian assistance in
those supplementals in countries that were affected by Putin's
war in Ukraine.
Because the Horn of Africa and Somalia gets 95 percent of
its wheat from Ukraine and Russia, for example, we were able
then to draw on those supplemental resources. This year is just
going to be excruciating.
The Chairman. Well, we would love to see the--how you come
to those decisions. Do you think we are treating food
beneficiaries equally in the Global South as we are elsewhere?
Ms. Power. Could you elaborate on the question?
The Chairman. Yes. I mean, are we treating those in the
Global South the same that we are treating elsewhere as we deal
with the question of how--who do we feed and how do we succeed
at feeding them?
Ms. Power. We mainly operate in the Global South so I am
not sure--do you mean across countries within the Global South?
The Chairman. Right.
Ms. Power. I think, again, the primary first factor is this
question of vulnerability and so if you are in what is called
IPC 5, facing almost famine levels of food insecurity, that is
going to be our first port of call, but not if access is
obstructed or if we have a government who is an unwilling
partner in providing that assistance.
If I understand your question, again, it is need based, but
that is only part of the answer because we cannot meet all
needs.
The Chairman. Are we treating the Global South the same we
are treating Ukraine?
Ms. Power. Oh, that is what you mean. Okay. Sorry. I did
not hear your reference to Ukraine. Well, I think the Congress
has, again, provided very, very substantial resources to deal
with Ukraine because of the massive carnage and the massive
geopolitical stakes of that conflict.
If you are asking per capita if a Ukrainian refugee is
receiving more in Europe than a South Sudanese refugee in
Uganda, the answer is yes, they are receiving more in Europe.
Again, my objective would be to see everybody properly
sheltered, properly cared for, properly schooled when they
become a refugee and we are grateful, again, to Europe both for
providing substantial assistance in Ukraine and----
The Chairman. When we have just to----
Ms. Power. Yes.
The Chairman. --just to put a fine point on it, so when we
have millions--we talk about the millions of refugees that have
fled Ukraine and, of course, we should respond to that and be
as helpful as we can, but we have had nearly 5 million
Venezuelans flee Venezuela.
Ms. Power. We have provided $1.8 billion in humanitarian
assistance to Venezuelans who have fled, thanks to you all.
The Chairman. I would look at that in comparison to what we
have done with Ukraine and what would that number be.
Ms. Power. Okay.
The Chairman. Okay. Democracy and governance--final
question. You recently wrote in Foreign Affairs that we have
to, ``look at our all-economic programming that respects
democratic norms as a form of democratic assistance.''
Economic assistance, certainly, is popular with governments
and it can help us move the needle on some things like labor
protections and good governance, but it makes a very small
percentage of USAID's programming.
How are we--I am increasingly concerned that USAID moves
away from its democracy, human rights, and governance part of
its mission and when I hear economic assistance is going to be
the essence of how we are looking at democracy assistance and I
see such a small percentage of USAID's programming, we are not
going to do much on democracy, human rights, and rule of law.
Tell me why I am wrong because I see you shaking your head.
Ms. Power. Yes. I would love to have a longer conversation
with you, a deep dive on our expanded democracy assistance
programming. It is everything from greater protections from--
and insurance for journalists who are--and civil society
organizations that are coming under attack to greater
transparency in extractive industries to the need, again, to
fund programming that can bring about a digital and open
internet in countries that are backsliding and moving in the
wrong direction.
It is election assistance and so much of the assistance
that we know well from decades of seeing democracy assistance.
What is new is the recognition that when there is a reform
or the application of the recognition that when there is a
reform opening in a country where a leader is doing hard
things, bucking the anti-democratic trends globally, we are
trying to see in our very slender sort of discretionary program
area whether there is some way, for example, to create a
private sector partnership where farmers will see low interest
loans with a local bank more readily available, where--when a
leader like the President of Zambia is doing away with a
defamation law, but the economic headwinds are intense is there
a little plus-up in our programming there in food security,
given the fertilizer shortage, that we can mobilize.
Again, our core democracy programming remains broadly
familiar, but the fact that we are not doing economic
development programming despite being a development agency at
scale in the way that I firmly believe we should be means that
we have to go looking into preexisting pots, like an
agricultural pot, or maybe there would be a vaccine delivery
that could occur in a high profile way with a leader, again,
who is doing hard things in the political domain.
The point here is it goes well beyond what USAID is doing.
It can also be about high level visits. It can be about it
encouraging tourism to places where, again, pro-democratic
things are happening.
I think if you look back over the last 20 years of
democratic backsliding or 17 years of democratic backsliding, I
think we can all agree we paid insufficient attention to those
reform openings that occurred and if we can now do a better job
flooding the zone and trying to be responsive to the needs of
civil society or leaders who are doing hard things, I think
then we have a better chance of supporting them, implementing
their reform agenda.
The Chairman. Yes. The slide in democratic backsliding is
particularly relevant in the Western Hemisphere in our own
front yard.
Ms. Power. Sadly, it is relevant globally, but yes.
The Chairman. Whereas one time there was only one country
in the hemisphere that was totally a totalitarian dictatorship,
which is Cuba. Now you have Venezuela, you have Nicaragua, you
have Cuba continuing, and you have others moving in the wrong
direction.
When I see people like President Lasso of Ecuador, who is
fully committed to a democratic agenda, aligned with American
values, aligned with American issues, it seems to me that
countries like that need to have the aid of the United States
so that when you follow those values and you share them and you
actually not just say it, but you implement them, that then
there is a response by the United States that sends a message
not only to that government that you are doing the right thing
where you partner, but sends a message to others in the
hemisphere that when you act in a way that is in pursuit of
democracy, rule of law, and human rights there is a benefit.
I just think that there is a disconnect between that
reality and--the desire for achieving that and the reality of
what we do. If it is a question of resources, we should talk
about it because we are badly beaten in the Western Hemisphere,
I can tell you that right now.
I just finished a four-country tour in the recess. Before
that, I was down there again. We are badly beaten in the
Western Hemisphere and our allies are under siege and we do not
seem to be able to be nimble enough to deal in ways to help our
allies and send a message within the hemisphere that when you
are aligned with us in terms of values and you execute on them,
we are there. More for maybe a longer conversation than this
hearing.
The record for this hearing will remain open until the
close of business on Friday, April 28, 2023. Please ensure that
questions for the record are submitted no later than next
Wednesday. Senator Risch, thank you.
Administrator Power, with the thanks of the committee for
your testimony this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Robert Menendez
Question. United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said
last week that the humanitarian situation in Sudan was ``already
precarious and is now catastrophic.''
What is the plan for humanitarian operations and the provision of
aid to the Sudanese people in the current circumstances?
What steps are you taking to raise resources, especially from the
Gulf, to respond to the growing humanitarian need in Sudan?
How are we supporting the Sudanese organizations that are trying to
provide assistance in the midst of the current chaos?
Answer. On April 23, USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) to lead the U.S. Government's response to the humanitarian
crisis in Sudan. USAID has worked with partners to use existing
programs and resources to pivot emergency programming, and is now
working with partners to identify where additional resources are needed
both in Sudan and in neighboring countries. Additionally, USAID is
working closely with our colleagues at the Department of State and the
UN to advocate for increased humanitarian access and the scaling up of
humanitarian operations in Sudan, including by exploring overland
routes and air bridges from neighboring countries and within Sudan to
facilitate the safe passage of goods and personnel. USAID is also
asking government entities in Sudan and its neighboring countries to
decrease bureaucratic barriers that limit relief organizations' ability
to respond to this crisis at scale--for example, by expediting customs
procedures, issuing visa waivers for aid workers, and waiving
requirements issued by the Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
to fast-track humanitarian activities.
USAID continues to engage with international donors, including
those from the Gulf, to provide additional contributions to the Sudan
response and to coordinate joint advocacy on humanitarian access in
both bilateral and multilateral fora.
USAID's long-standing humanitarian partners with strong national
networks in health, nutrition, protection, agriculture, and water,
sanitation, and hygiene are operating with limited capacity and using
dwindling prepositioned supplies in pockets of Gedaref, Blue Nile,
White Nile, South and West Kordofans, Khartoum, and the Greater Darfur
region. Since April 15, they have relied significantly on national
staff to continue life-saving activities. USAID's Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) is also supporting more than 37 Sudanese
implementing partners as subrecipients through the USAID-funded Rapid
Response Fund implemented by the International Organization for
Migration and existing USAID awards with international non-governmental
organizations. USAID also provides annual contributions to the United
Nations Development Program-managed Sudan Humanitarian Fund, which can
disburse emergency allocations to support multi-sectoral interventions
across the country through national non-governmental organizations.
Question. The Senate takes its oversight responsibilities very
seriously, and I am grateful to USAID for keeping the Committee well
informed about the numerous layers of protection we have on the direct
budget support USAID is providing the Government of Ukraine.
What are the accountability mechanisms that USAID is implementing
to help protect taxpayer dollars while helping Ukraine endure Russia's
brutality?
Answer. USAID prioritizes oversight of and accountability for U.S.
taxpayer dollars. USAID has an unprecedented level of oversight and
accountability mechanisms built into our assistance to Ukraine. The
following accountability mechanisms are in place to ensure oversight of
Direct Budget Support (DBS), development, and humanitarian assistance.
direct budget support oversight
USAID currently delivers DBS to Ukraine through the World Bank
Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE)
mechanism, which reimburses the Government of Ukraine (GOU) for
expenses incurred in pre-approved expenditure categories. Funding is
only disbursed to the GOU following verification of expenses by the
Ministry of Finance and World Bank, which minimizes risk of diversion.
In addition to a reimbursement-only approach, the PEACE mechanism
provides for accountability and transparency through monitoring,
reporting, and audit requirements. The World Bank provides USAID with
verification reports, Implementation Status and Results reports,
progress reports, and other reporting.
The World Bank anticipates that two project audits will be
completed for the PEACE mechanism, and the Bank is required to provide
USAID with those auditors' reports. In addition, the World Bank
prepares an annual single audit report covering all World Bank cash-
based trust funds. The World Bank is supplementing these audits with
several ``Agreed Upon Procedures'' reviews conducted by Pricewaterhouse
Coopers (PwC).
USAID contracted an independent third-party monitor, Deloitte, to
review financial controls and procedures utilized by the GOU to track
and oversee U.S. funds being used for DBS. Deloitte's experts are
reviewing the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance's existing monitoring,
transparency, verification and reporting systems and procedures,
identifying and strengthening responses to gaps, and supporting
reporting on DBS tranches. Deloitte is conducting three tiers of spot
checks to trace payments from the U.S. Government (USG) through the
World Bank to the GOU's Single Treasury Account (Tier 1), then to
recipient governmental organizations and institutions (Tier 2), and
ultimately down to individual beneficiaries (Tier 3).
In addition, USAID is in the process of establishing a contract
with a separate auditing firm to conduct an independent, third-party
audit of DBS payments, to supplement and complement other audits and
procedures. USAID is not planning for Deloitte to be the independent
auditor since they assist the GOU in identifying gaps and strengthening
Ukraine's systems, including those which involve the DBS transaction.
USAID expects to award this contract no earlier than September 2023.
USAID has also entered into an interagency agreement with the U.S.
Government Accountability Office's (GAO) Center for Audit Excellence to
build the capacity of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine to effectively
and accurately monitor, audit, and report on U.S. budget assistance.
The GOU will conduct its own audit of direct budget support funds.
In addition to these measures, USAID has identified several
existing GOU hotline systems established at Ministries, audit
institutions, and for specific purposes (e.g., pensions) that can
collect information on the potential misuse of DBS funding. The World
Bank has its own grievance mechanism hotline, and the Inspector
Generals for USAID, the Department of State, and the Department of
Defense, have created a whistleblower hotline available in English and
Ukrainian.
development assistance oversight
USAID has several layers of oversight processes to ensure that
taxpayer funds are accounted for while providing development
assistance. This includes mission-level monitoring by staff at USAID's
Mission in Ukraine, oversight by our implementing partner staff, and
third-party monitoring of select activities.
All 42 USAID programs continue to operate through the work of
nearly 1,400 implementing partner staff. Despite the ongoing war, USAID
continues to implement standard oversight, monitoring, and
accountability procedures in line with Agency directives. Requirements
for monitoring, accountability, and oversight of USG funds and USG-
funded equipment are included in all contracts and grants. Our
implementing partner staff are vital to these efforts--of nearly 1,400
implementing partner staff from USAID's Ukraine Mission programs, over
1,000 remain in Ukraine.
Mission staff continue to fulfill their activity management and
monitoring responsibilities. They do this through in-person or virtual
meetings with implementing partners and program beneficiaries and by
reviewing reports, deliverables, photos, videos, and work plans to
ensure activities are on track. To the extent possible they also
conduct site visits.
Project monitoring by individual staff is augmented through Mission
processes and support. The overarching guiding procedures for
monitoring and oversight include the Mission-wide Performance
Management Plan, which is regularly updated and reviewed, and annual
Portfolio Reviews, which examine each activity. Annual performance
reporting through the Performance Plan and Report assesses the level of
achievement of indicators and targets by activity/implementing
mechanism. Quarterly financial reviews of all activities ensure that
funding is tracked and allocated within legal and policy requirements.
The Mission also uses Geographic Information Systems and draws upon a
$16 million Ukraine Monitoring and Learning Support Contract (2020-
2025) to enhance the effective monitoring of programs and learning from
experience. Through this mechanism, USAID has trained 22 third-party
monitors, who began to conduct monitoring visits for select activities
across 8 oblasts in April.
USAID engagement with Ukrainian Government counterparts and civil
society organizations increases visibility on assistance delivery and
impact. Almost all Mission activities undergo a third-party evaluation.
Activity-specific accountability includes the role of the
Contracting/Agreement Officer's Representative to ensure compliance
with monitoring and evaluation procedures and policy. This is
supplemented by the Mission's overarching monitoring and evaluation
team. Every activity has a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan with specific
indicators and quantifiable targets. Work plans, regular reporting, and
Risk Assessment and Management Plans are all required.
Finally, the Mission in Ukraine has established an internal
Accountability Unit to ensure that all USAID programs are implemented
in accordance with USAID's rules and regulations, ensure audit
management is carried out efficiently and effectively, and that any
audit findings are addressed and resolved in a timely and appropriate
manner. The Unit meets monthly and is chaired by the Ukraine Mission's
Office of Financial Management Controller.
humanitarian assistance oversight
In order to implement humanitarian assistance, the USAID's Bureau
for Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Assistance Response Team,
currently composed of humanitarian experts based in Rzeszow, Poland,
and Kyiv, is augmented by a Response Management Team in Washington and
supported by additional Monitoring and Evaluation and Risk Management
specialists.
USAID has developed a risk management framework to deliver timely
and principled humanitarian assistance at scale in high-risk
environments around the world. This approach seeks to ensure compliance
with all policies, regulations, and laws in order to lead and
coordinate an effective, accountable response to meet priority
humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations in Ukraine. USAID has
safeguards against diversion, waste, fraud, abuse, and other fiduciary
risks in Ukraine consistent with its approach in other high-risk
environments. Safeguards include award-specific risk assessment and
management plans, established internal controls, safety and security
plans for staff movements and transport of cash and program materials,
and numerous reporting requirements. USAID requires partners operating
in Ukraine to assess and manage the risk involved in their work before
receiving funding. At application stage, all partners--public
international organizations and nongovernmental organizations--are
required to submit a Risk Assessment and Management Plan, which
outlines internal controls related to mitigating and managing the risks
associated with the potential misuse of USG resources and additional
safeguards to ensure the provision of U.S. foreign assistance does not
result in a violation of applicable sanctions. USAID requires our
partners to have a context-specific approach to risk management in
Ukraine, which acknowledges the severe restraints to access and
monitoring of activities, the USG sanctions in place against the
Government of Russia, and the heightened exposure to risk commensurate
with the scale of the response.
USAID centrally tracks and follows up on the reports which partners
submit to Agency and/or the OIG regarding diversion, fraud, waste,
abuse, and sexual exploitation and abuse. Staff continually assess such
incidents to ensure that USAID assistance is reaching those for whom it
is intended, and that implementing partners have effective mitigation
measures in place to help safeguard against similar incidents.
USAID utilizes direct monitoring, third-party monitoring, and
implementing partners' own monitoring and reporting, and continuously
assesses and mitigates risks related to the delivery of humanitarian
assistance in Ukraine. Despite a limited footprint in Kyiv, USAID
conducts direct oversight of humanitarian assistance award activities
with the approval of the U.S. Embassy's Ukraine Regional Security
Officer. USAID also uses third-party monitoring in Ukraine to mitigate
access limitations and independently monitor our humanitarian
assistance partners' activities. Direct monitoring and third-party
monitoring complement monitoring by implementing partners to provide
greater oversight, accountability, and visibility into the efficacy of
USAID programming.
usaid's office of inspector general (oig) oversight
USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) provides independent
oversight of all USAID programs, personnel, and operations. The OIG
Acting Deputy (performing the duties of the Inspector General) Nicole
Ambarella recently testified to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
that ``providing timely, impactful, and independent oversight of
USAID's Ukraine response is [her] office's top priority.''
USAID OIG has been assigned two designated positions for their
criminal investigators at Embassy Kyiv, which will greatly enhance
their ability to investigate allegations concerning misuse of funds in
Ukraine. In total, OIG has more than 60 staff supporting its Ukraine
portfolio and over 22 planned and ongoing oversight projects. This work
will provide oversight over USAID's major programs, objectives, and
funding in Ukraine, including direct budget support, humanitarian
assistance, agriculture resilience, energy security, and anti-
corruption efforts. The OIG also operates a hotline to provide a
confidential, reliable means to report allegations of fraud, waste, and
abuse of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. In January 2023, the OIG published
a joint hotline poster with the State Department and Department of
Defense, with information in both English and Ukrainian, encouraging
the timely and transparent reporting of corruption and abuse.
Further, the OIG has been working closely with its oversight
counterparts at bilateral and multilateral organizations to ensure that
it has the access, relationships, and sources necessary to conduct its
comprehensive work to safeguard U.S. assistance in Ukraine. We defer to
the OIG's congressional affairs office to respond to specific questions
regarding its past, completed, and ongoing work.
Question. Russia's war has caused significant damage and
destruction to Ukraine's critical infrastructure.
How is USAID working to mobilize the private sector to prepare bids
on reconstruction projects?
If U.S. partners are disinterested in these efforts, what are the
risks of state-owned industries from China taking the lead on the task
of rebuilding Ukraine?
Answer. USAID is working in collaboration with the broader U.S.
Government (USG) interagency (the National Security Council, Department
of State, Department of Commerce, the U.S. International Development
Finance Corporation (DFC), and others) to mobilize the private sector
to invest in Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction. For example, USAID
is supporting this year's flagship Ukraine Recovery Conference in
London, UK on June 21 by encouraging our private sector partners to
sign a business compact for responsible and ethical investing in
Ukraine's priority sectors. To unlock further foreign direct
investment, we are working with the USG interagency to ensure that
Ukraine continues making progress in its anti-corruption efforts in
critical sectors such as the judiciary and energy, which are priorities
to improve the business investment climate for U.S. companies
considering investing in Ukraine. USAID, in collaboration with the
American Chamber of Commerce of Ukraine, released a business climate
report on April 13, 2023, surveying over 130 U.S. and Ukrainian
companies. The report recommended priority reforms the Government of
Ukraine should undertake to spur private sector investment, such as
developing a more coherent foreign direct investment policy,
strengthening a national level investment promotion agency, and
continuing anti-corruption reforms. Finally, we are ensuring that the
supplemental appropriations for Ukraine's economic support are
implemented quickly and efficiently including looking to find ways that
USG assistance can support Ukraine's export infrastructure and economic
recovery needs.
There is a risk that Chinese companies will participate in
Ukraine's reconstruction. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has
authority to direct its companies to invest even at a negative return
on investment in aims to further its influence in a key region. USAID
and the USG interagency have raised repeatedly and will continue to
raise with the Government of Ukraine the risks and costs associated
with Chinese companies, and the need to consider the full life cycle of
a project before choosing a Chinese bidder. Unlike in the PRC, the USG
cannot direct its companies to invest in Ukraine; U.S. companies will
do their own assessment of the risks and business climate in Ukraine.
For that reason, USAID continues to engage at the most senior levels
within the Government of Ukraine to underscore the important linkages
between Ukraine's reconstruction and anti-corruption and transparency
reforms.
Question. How is USAID engaging with Ukrainian authorities to
ensure the equitable distribution of reconstruction efforts across
Ukraine and avoid neglecting any regions or populations?
Answer. USAID is actively collaborating with the interagency,
international community, and the Government of Ukraine to coordinate
development assistance and plan future investments to facilitate the
massive task of rebuilding Ukraine and its economy after the war. Our
Mission in Kyiv has close and regular contact with national,
provincial, and municipal Ukrainian Government representatives. The
Government of Ukraine actively seeks out USAID's engagement and input
in its planning for recovery and reconstruction.
USAID is encouraging Ukrainian authorities to include the
participation of local civil society in the recovery conversation to
ensure reconstruction processes are implemented with an inclusive lens.
USAID envisions a decentralized, reform-based recovery for Ukraine and
will engage multiple stakeholders at all levels, including civil
society and the private sector. Transparency and the ability of civil
society and the private sector to hold the Government of Ukraine
accountable, fight corruption, and monitor progress on reforms will
support a sustainable and resilient recovery for Ukraine.
USAID's participation in international forums, including this
year's 2023 Ukraine Recovery Conference in London and the prior year's
Lugano Conference, are critical to helping Ukrainian authorities start
preparing for resilient and inclusive reconstruction by emphasizing the
need for reforms, transparency, and accountability mechanisms to ensure
efficient use of funds, build public trust, and get communities and
citizens on board with the recovery process.
Question. The State Department is in process of standing up a
Bureau of Global Health Security and Diplomacy. Adm. Power announced
the new Global Health Emergency Management Systems Response--an
incident response management system for emerging health threats, based
on lessons learned from humanitarian emergencies. It will be a rapid
surge response with prevention, detection and response to emergency
health threats/pandemic response.
How do you see this new initiative coordinating with efforts of the
proposed State Department Bureau of Global Health Security and
Diplomacy? How will State and USAID ensure there is clear
communication, collaboration and avoid duplication?
Answer. The Global Health Emergency Management System (GHEMS),
which Administrator Power announced on April 20, refers to a set of
internal USAID Bureau for Global Health (USAID/GH) business processes
for standardizing and managing the Bureau's operational responses to
health emergencies. GHEMS provides consistency in planning, staffing,
implementation and learning to ensure that technical expertise within
USAID/GH is coordinated for swift and efficient responses to outbreak
and non-outbreak health emergencies. As the internal USAID/GH focal
point for response to a specific health emergency, an activated GHEM
Team would strengthen and streamline engagement with the State
Department (as well as all of our interagency partners), providing a
clear node for communication and collaboration around specific
emergency issues, thereby, avoiding duplication and ensuring that
decisions are made transparently and collaboratively.
Question. USAID has struggled to fill vacancies and staff in the
Global Health Bureau both in Washington, DC as well as overseas. I
expect the Government Accountability Office to issue a report I
requested to examine this issue in the coming weeks. I hope that your
staff will respond to the draft in a timely manner; agency comments are
due May 5.
How is USAID planning to staff these initiatives given what I
understand are already existing vacancies?
Answer. The Agency submitted a response to the GAO Draft audit
report (report titled USAID: Management Improvements Needed to Better
Meet Global Health Mission) on May 2, in advance of the deadline.
USAID's response welcomed and agreed with the report and noted an
eagerness to take action on each of the six audit recommendations, the
first of which recommends that ``the USAID Administrator ensure that
the Assistant Administrator for Global Health develop and implement a
workforce plan for the Bureau.'' USAID will ensure that the plan
developed in response to the recommendation communicates the Bureau's
optimal mix of direct hire and non-direct hire staff, as well as senior
leaders; outlines key actions to better align our staffing with our
mission, priorities, and funding; and articulates how we plan to
address persistent vacancies in civil service (CS) positions and the
underrepresentation of certain racial or ethnic groups in our
workforce.
Even before implementation of this recommendation, the Bureau is
pleased to report that great progress has been made in reducing the
number of CS Operating Expense (OE) funded position vacancies in the
Bureau. Currently, 126 out of the GH Bureau's allocated 136 CS
permanent positions are filled. Hiring actions are underway for filling
the 10 vacancies. This is a great improvement over the more than double
the number of vacancies reported by the Bureau just 1 year ago.
Similarly, the Bureau has also made great strides in reducing the
number of vacancies in program funded CS positions (relying on specific
legal authorities to use HIV/AIDS funding to hire CS positions in the
GH Bureau's Office of HIV/AIDS). Currently 100 out of 134 GH Bureau's
CS HIV program funded positions are filled. Although that means that 34
positions are currently vacant, all 34 positions are currently actively
under recruitment and this represents a significant reduction over the
number of vacancies just 1 year ago.
Question. The President has prioritized a Diversity, Equity,
Inclusion, and Accessibility Initiative and repeatedly voiced his
commitment to DEIA as have you. However, data from USAID continues to
reflect significant racial, ethnic and gender disparities, especially
at senior and mid-management levels.
Can you provide concrete examples of how you have created visible
impact, changes at senior and mid-level management?
Answer.
DEIA has been integrated into the governance and decision-
making of the Agency with the creation of the DEIA Office in
early 2022 and through the development of an Agency-wide
Leadership Philosophy that reflects principles and priorities
of DEIA for all leaders at USAID, and a DEIA Statement to
display the Agency's commitments to DEIA and expectations of
the workforce. USAID is also actively working to update
automated directive systems (ADS) and policies to incorporate
DEIA into Agency missions and goals.
In FY 2022, 48 percent of Civil Service (CS) employees and
34 percent of Foreign Service (FS) employees identified as
racial or ethnic minorities.
USAID redesigned the FS promotion process beginning in 2019
and continuing into 2021. The 2021 FS Promotion Report found
that the 5-year average promotion rate was 20 percent for both
promotion eligible white employees and promotion eligible
employees who identified as a racial or ethnic minority.
We have made some progress since 2020:
We have more women reaching the senior levels of the Civil
and Foreign Service. The combined percentage of women in
senior level Civil and Foreign Service at USAID increased
from 40.3 percent in 2015 to 48.7 percent as of the end of
fiscal year 2022. Similarly, the percentage of women in
mid-level CS and FS increased from 53.2 percent to 56.8
percent as of the end of fiscal year 2022.
Trends for racial and ethnic minorities were similar in
the senior level CS and FS. Asians increased from 2.9
percent to 6.2 percent, Hispanics/Latinos increased from
3.9 percent to 4.1 percent, and other racial and ethnic
minorities declined from 0.5 percent to 0 percent.
Similarly, the percentage of African Americans/Blacks
remained consistent at the senior levels (11 percent in
2015 and 11 percent in 2022).
USAID tripled the number of participants in the
International Career Advancement Program (https://lnks.gd/l/
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJidWxsZXRpbl9
saW5rX2lkIjoxMDYsInVyaSI6ImJwMjpjbGljayIsInVybCI6Imh0dHBz
Oi8vd3d3LmljYXBhc3Blbi5vcmcvP3V0bV9tZWRpdW09ZW1ha
WwmdXRtX3NvdXJjZT1nb3ZkZWxpdmVyeSIsImJ1bGxldGluX2lkIjoi
MjAyMzA0MjguNzU5NDY4MzEifQ.1PvHj4XzSmdNor-mDTR9WG
UZy5qfX4lLocUMEE4_70I/s/2141424411/br/167256632609-l), a
professional development and leadership program for mid-career
professionals in international affairs in the U.S. managed by
USAID's Office of Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM),
from six staff participants to 20 in 3 years.
In FY2023, USAID embarked on a Skills and Competencies
Reform to identify and celebrate the critical skills that drive
USAID's success today, while actively enhancing the skills
needed to address emerging challenges. DEIA is one of those
critical skills and competencies. During the initial phase of
this initiative, stakeholder groups looked across the existing
critical skills and competencies needed for the Critical
Elements and identified areas where language could be updated
to better capture the essence of the DEIA competencies. The
Agency is currently working to update Annual Evaluation Forms
to capture updated DEIA language.
HCTM's Office of Employee and Labor Relations kicked off a
year's worth of monthly trainings for Agency leaders on how to
better hold personnel, including our supervisors, accountable
for their behavior. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) similarly
bolstered their supervisory training resources and both offices
are working together to address specific incidents of
inappropriate behavior as they occur.
From the lens of the OCR Affirmative Employment Division,
impact is achieved through the annual MD-715 report to help
USAID become and remain a model EEO Program at all levels and
in all areas of the employment lifecycle.
In this report, there is a self-assessment checklist where
specific items are listed as required parts of manager/
supervisor's performance plan. If these items are not
included in the plan, we have to develop an action plan to
address that.
Barrier Analyses determine whether there are barriers that
exist to any particular group in getting into the Agency,
moving around the Agency, and generally enjoying the
benefits and privileges of employment at USAID. If a
Barrier Analysis shows that there is, for example, a trend
of certain types of complaints or unconscious biases, we
develop a plan to address those issues.
Since May 7, 2021, OCR's Disability Employment Division's
Reasonable Accommodation Program (OCR/DE/RA) has been actively
meeting with senior- and mid-level management domestically and
overseas to provide training and build awareness of the
Agency's ADS 111--Procedures for Providing Reasonable
Accommodation for Individuals with Disabilities. To date, 700
domestic and overseas management officials have received this
training. OCR/DE/RA continues to meet with senior- and mid-
level management to help them understand how to accommodate
their staff.
Question. There is also concern that individuals who have been
hired through mechanisms aimed at expanding diversity have not been
retained for differing reasons, including an unwelcome working
environment.
What steps have you taken with regards to retention?
Answer.
In support of the global workforce, USAID is working to
expand and strengthen leadership, learning, and professional
development opportunities; build on the successes of its Staff
Care Center (SCC) services that promote well-being, work-life
balance, and organizational resilience; and strengthen human
resources operations and systems. Underpinning all of our
efforts is a focus on diversity, equity, inclusion, and
accessibility (DEIA).
In October 2022, the Agency successfully launched the
inaugural DEIA survey to help USAID better understand our
workforce in order to better manage and meet their needs. The
survey had a 60 percent voluntary participation rate with a
full 70 percent of respondents having a favorable approval of
the Agency's DEIA efforts. The survey included data points on
expanded demographics and identity categories. This is also the
first DEIA survey to capture information across all hiring
mechanisms.
To improve the working conditions and culture for the
Foreign Service Officer (FSO) corps, under the leadership of
the Agency Counselor, USAID is looking at ways to:
expand professional development through better onboarding
of new officers and mission leaders, greater training,
coaching, and mentoring throughout a person's career;
streamline, standardize, and make more transparent the
assignments process;
enhance FSO performance management and address concerns
about promotions; and
reinforce expectations and accountability among FSO
leaders.
USAID is currently working on various initiatives designed
to enhance recognition for the value that Foreign Service
Nationals (FSNs) bring to the Agency, and to enhance morale
among this important part of the workforce. Specifically, USAID
is working to:
increase leadership opportunities for FSNs at all levels;
increase FSN Fellowship programs;
increase the number of senior-level FSN-13 positions;
expand professional development and training
opportunities; and
expand the use of ladder positions within the FSN
workforce.
In FY 2022, USAID established an Annual Performance Goal
(APG) to increase the hiring and retention of Persons with
Disabilities to make progress toward meeting government-wide
goals of 12 percent of our employees being Persons with
Disabilities and 2 percent being Persons with Targeted
Disabilities. We are currently at 6 percent of our goal of
employees being persons with disabilities.
To support the recruitment of Persons with Disabilities,
USAID has joined the Workforce Recruitment Program through
the Department of Labor (DOL) and prioritized the use and
awareness of the Schedule A and Disabled Veteran non-
competitive hiring mechanisms.
The Agency provides a suite of program offerings managed by
the Office of Human Capital and Talent Management (HCTM) to
provide employment opportunities, career experiences, and
multiple approaches for Veterans including the USAID Temporary
Employment Program, SkillBridge Program, Military Spouse
Employment, and Veteran Appointing Authorities to non-
competitively hire veterans.
To ensure that staff from non-direct hiring mechanisms are
afforded more equity in working conditions, USAID is
implementing paid parental leave and relocation expense
benefits for our U.S. Personal Services Contractors (USPSCs); a
new relocation expense benefit that will provide eligible
USPSCs a miscellaneous expense amount; and a pre- departure
subsistence reimbursement to offset relocation transfer costs.
USAID's Staff Care program, now in its 11th year, offers a
broad range of counseling, health and wellness programs,
assistance with day-to-day life responsibilities,
organizational and individual resilience support, and much
more.
During FY 2022, USAID employees and their family members
accessed Staff Care support services and educational
resources more than 25,000 times, a 21 percent increase
compared to FY 2021. Highlights include:
Conducting more than 3,500 counseling sessions;
Designing and delivering 26 customized
Organizational Resilience programs benefiting 2,000
employees;
Offering 82 Agency-wide webinars for 6,382
employees on a variety of health, wellness, and work-life
topics; and
Hosting three engaging wellness challenges, with
over 1,855 participants.
OCR's Affirmative Employment Division will be conducting
staff assistance visits across the Agency's footprint as a
measure within the annual Management Directive 715 (MD-715)
report. These visits will seek qualitative data from all hiring
mechanisms on their lived experiences within the Agency related
to the entire employee lifecycle, from recruitment to
separation. This data can be used to identify barriers or
conditions regarding retention and diversity and inclusion, and
provide insight that can help the Agency change appropriate
policies, practices, or procedures. While the MD-715 focuses on
U.S. Direct Hires, the data can be shared with M Bureau, DEIA,
HCTM, and other Agency stakeholders for further analysis,
regardless of staffing mechanism.
The FY 2022 gains and losses from USAID 2022 permanent (direct
hire) workforce show three potential triggers requiring further
analysis to determine if a barrier exists. The following triggers were
identified:
Black/African American males and females are exiting the
agency at a higher rate than the group gains.
Black/African American males are leaving the agency at a
rate of 10.60 percent in comparison to a 10.47 percent
entry rate, for a ^0.13 percent difference.
Black/African American females are exiting the agency at a
rate of 19.35 percent, in comparison to entering the agency
at a rate of 15.20 percent, for a ^4.15 percent difference.
Employees with targeted disabilities exited the agency more
than three times their entry rate of 1.35 percent, with an exit
rate of 5.17 percent, a difference of ^3.82 percent.
OCR's Disability Employment Division (OCR/DE) actively
partners with HCTM, the Employees with Disabilities Employee
Resource Group (EWD ERG), and other internal stakeholders to
provide training and awareness, participate in forums, Agency
work groups and other subject matter expert panels, to be a
resource within the Agency on the ADS 111--Procedures for
Providing Reasonable Accommodations to Individuals with
Disabilities, and to promote the hiring, retention, and
promotion of individuals with disabilities. Each October, OCR/
DE partners with the EWD ERG to promote and organize events for
National Disability Employment Awareness Month. USAID has
partnered with the Department of Labor's Office of Disability
Employment Policy and other internal and external resources to
provide quality events and training for all staff.
Question. Due to limited USAID's resources, World Food Program
(WFP) is cutting food rations in refugee camps worldwide. Meanwhile,
food insecurity is continuing to rise while people flee from violence
in places like the Sahel, Sudan, and Burma.
How is USAID weighing and planning competing food assistance needs
to respond in differing contexts, equitably and effectively?
Answer. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) is focused
on meeting emergency needs of populations who face the most life-
threatening conditions across the globe, and remains deeply committed
to providing lifesaving humanitarian assistance to populations affected
by the global food security crisis. The powerful, combined effects of
climate change, the COVID-19 post-pandemic effect, protracted complex
emergencies, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine will continue to create
elevated levels of emergency needs for years to come.
While USAID will continue to prioritize available resources for the
most acute emergencies and needs, significant resources are needed to
address unprecedented humanitarian needs worldwide. Humanitarian needs
are far outpacing global resources and we are facing difficult trade-
offs for concurrent emergencies. As a result, USAID continues to
advocate with other international donors to increase their
contributions to responses and elevate best practices in program
planning.
Thanks to the generous supplementals enacted by Congress, USAID
provided $5.8 billion to WFP in FY22 and remains its largest donor.
USAID has continued to robustly support WFP operations in FY23 and has
clearly communicated funding availability and constraints to WFP in
order to facilitate program planning. USAID continues to encourage WFP
to effectively prioritize its global programming and proactively manage
operational pipelines, including through finding efficiencies across
its emergency programming and prioritizing existing donor resources to
ensure that the needs of the most vulnerable are met.
USAID/BHA's internal budget allocation process emphasizes the
importance of addressing the most severe needs across the globe. It
includes quantitative comparisons of the scale and severity of needs
that inform internal budget allocation decisions. Our field teams work
diligently to assess the scale and severity of needs in their countries
and recommend response approaches that prioritize meeting the needs of
populations that are in most dire need of emergency assistance. The
Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) and reporting from the Famine
Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET) are critical forecasting and
analysis tools used to inform decision making by USAID, other
governments, and implementing partners when responding to acute food
insecurity. The IPC, a five-phase scale classifying food insecurity at
household and area levels, allows the humanitarian community to compare
the scale and severity of current and forecast food insecurity across
countries and time horizons.
Question. Are we are treating food beneficiaries equally in the
global south as we are elsewhere?
Answer. Yes, all USAID food assistance responses are designed to
meet the same nutritional requirements, wherever project participants
are in the world. USAID implementing partners design food assistance
rations to address assessed nutrition gaps, although the exact food
basket and commodities provided will vary based on cultural
appropriateness. The modality through which food assistance is
delivered may also vary depending on needs, market availability, and
access. USAID follows minimum humanitarian standards, such as the
Sphere Standards, in all of our responses. We also encourage our
partners to participate in the Interagency Standing Committee (IASC)
Cluster System to establish common standards for each response that are
adequate and culturally appropriate, striving to ensure that all
project beneficiaries have access to an equitable minimum level of
assistance.
Question. Which donors could be doing more to address global food
insecurity and what else can we do to convince them to contribute their
fair share?
Answer. The United States is working with donors to increase their
long-term food security programming in order to sustainably address
food insecurity and strengthen food systems that are more resilient.
For example, USAID and Ireland's international development programme,
Irish Aid, recently announced funding to build more sustainable food
systems to help fight global hunger and prevent the next food crisis in
sub-Saharan Africa. In a new co-partnership that invests more than $75
million in sub-Saharan Africa, USAID will work with Congress to provide
$38.6 million and Irish Aid will contribute at least $37 million to
support the transformation of food systems to become more climate
resilient, provide more nutritious food to the population, and support
sustainable economic growth, including increased income for farmers,
including female farmers.
Between 2012 and 2017, international humanitarian assistance grew
annually by more than 10 percent, but it has grown by just 2.6 percent
in the 4 years since then. While USG funding has played a pivotal role
in preventing famine to date in places like Somalia, the USG will not
be able to shoulder the funding burden alone in the absence of
significant funding from other donors. Significant global need
necessitates a broadened and deepened bench of international donor
support; however, that same high level of need also creates donor
fatigue and overstretch. Nonetheless, we are engaging the G7, the G20,
private-sector and multilateral organizations, and others, advocating
for substantial increases in emergency and long-term development
assistance targeting the most vulnerable countries already suffering
from high levels of food insecurity and malnutrition.
Question. I remain deeply concerned about the continued imbalance
between our support for development, democracy, and defense in Chad.
Why don't we have a direct hire Foreign Service officers in Chad to
oversee development assistance programming?
How much money are we providing to civil society organizations
working on democracy and human rights?
Answer. We are aware that Chad is of growing importance to U.S.
policy in the Sahel, and this is reflected by the increase in
development assistance (DA) to Chad from $1.5 million in FY 2021 to
$4.9 million in FY 2022. Even with this increase, a DA budget of this
size does not typically warrant a U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) Foreign
Service position. Further, USAID faces significant limitations in our
operating expense (OE) budget, which constrains our ability to place
USDHs everywhere we would like them. However, USAID's Africa Bureau is
currently examining its overall overseas footprint, and careful
consideration will be given to Chad in that analysis.
USAID supports civil society organizations working on democracy and
human rights through our Chad Civil Society Strengthening Activity
(CCSSA). The activity duration is 2019-2024 and a planned funding
amount of $8.5 million (subject to availability of funding). CCSSA
strengthens democratic culture in Chad in a number of ways including:
Increasing the capacity of civil society organizations and
media sector organizations to support and promote citizen
participation in governance at local and national levels.
Facilitating a better informed, engaged citizenry with
increased understanding of their civic rights and duties.
Improving the enabling environment for civil society and
media organizations through building the Government of Chad's
capacity to engage civil society.
Empowering civil society organizations and citizens to
recognize and combat mis- and dis-information.
Strengthening participation and empowerment of people with
disabilities in governance.
CCSSA's recent accomplishments include: supporting civil society
organizations to participate in the National Dialogues; supporting
several Chadian-led campaigns that help citizens know their civic
rights and organize collective action; and working with the Ministry of
Education's National Curriculum Center to update civic education
textbooks for primary and secondary schools and create guides for
teachers.
Question. A perennial staffing issue that USAID struggles with are
the constraints the Agency has to hire career professionals who are
directly employed by the Agency, versus having to hire personnel as
contractors using program dollars.
What are the constraints, and the proposals, the Agency would
pursue to make it easier for the Agency to hire personnel as staff as
opposed to hiring contractors?
1a. Constraint: Insufficient Operating Expenses (OE) over
many years has distorted the composition of USAID's workforce.
USAID's workforce now comprises 70 percent contracted staff and
30 percent U.S. direct hire (USDH) employees. More career USDH
employees are needed to manage inherently governmental
functions and other functions that are not appropriate for
contractor staff, to mitigate the labor-intensive and
administrative burdens generated by this severe staffing
imbalance, and to resolve equity challenges across staffing
mechanisms.
1b. Proposal: The OE account is authorized as the sole
account to fund USDH positions (i.e., Civil Service and Foreign
Service), with limited exceptions. As USAID's programmatic
funding levels have increased to address global challenges, the
Agency has not received a commensurate increase in the OE
level. As a result, USAID has resorted to predominantly relying
on a program-funded contracted workforce. USAID requests
congressional support for a more robust OE account to keep up
with increased funding on the programming side. If an increase
in the OE account is not possible, USAID requests the authority
to allow for greater flexibility in the use of USAID's program
funds to cover permanent staffing and administrative costs.
2a. Constraint: USAID faces ongoing challenges with hiring,
position management, retention, and professional development
for USAID's Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), our local staff.
This is because their employment agreements fall under Federal
Acquisition Regulations and other laws governing open
competition and federal contracts, which complicate these
efforts. FSNs make up over a third of USAID's total workforce
and 70 percent of our overseas workforce. Therefore, the
administrative burden placed on USAID's contracting staff who
must manage thousands of contracts for these staff members
reduces their bandwidth to focus on programmatic matters.
2b. Proposal: USAID requests its own Personal Service
Agreement (PSA) authority, which would allow the Agency to
enter into employment agreements with FSNs that would allow the
Agency to establish human resources policies and procedures
that align with those for USDH staff more easily than Personal
Services Contract (PSC) authority allows (PSCs are subject to
U.S. Government contracting processes).
3a. Constraint: USAID's crisis operations work currently
relies heavily on contractors, resulting in a workforce without
sufficient ability to perform certain inherently governmental
functions and that often experiences high vacancy rates.
3b. Proposal: In the FY 2024 budget, USAID requested
continuation of the Crisis Operations Staffing (COS) authority,
which Congress first provided in the FY 2023 Omnibus
Appropriation Bill. The COS authority would ensure that USAID
can continue to hire and retain diverse talent, at the right
time, in the right place, for the right duration to address
complex crises. This authority does not add new positions but
allows USAID to use existing program funds to do this hiring,
converting existing contract positions to temporary federal
employee positions.
Question. Rather than focusing solely on security assistance, the
United States can broaden its cooperation with Pakistan to include
supporting its energy transformation and agricultural innovation, as
well as building resilience capacities to adapt to changing global
climatic systems.
How does USAID currently view its relationship with Pakistan in
terms of bilateral assistance?
Answer. USAID has long maintained a collaborative relationship with
our Government of Pakistan counterparts. This relationship has a
stronger bilateral focus post-withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan. The relationship will continue to remain an important one
for USAID and the USG as we move forward on shared development
priorities, such as broad-based climate-resilient economic growth,
inclusive democratic governance and accountability, a healthy and
educated population, and recovery from the 2022 floods.
Energy is a key need for sustainable economic growth. The Pakistan
Government is strongly concerned about climate trends that have led to
increasing heat waves, glacial melt, flooding, and water insecurity in
Pakistan. It has set its own targets and asked USAID for help reaching
them. In Pakistan, carbon fuel for energy adds to the debt since it
must be purchased or imported, so renewable is a much better option. FY
2024 resources will support climate adaptation and mitigation,
particularly in clean energy development, a sector that shows promising
potential for U.S. investment in Pakistan. Success in this sector will
draw in the private sector and boost the energy supply. Clean energy is
not only more cost effective, it also does not add to Pakistan's
significant loan debt.
Regarding flood recovery, in 2022 alone, the United States provided
over $100 million to support immediate flood relief efforts, disaster
resilience, and food security needs, as well as financing for relief
logistics. We know that the needs of flood-affected communities go
beyond the one-time provision of emergency assistance. In Geneva this
January, the United States pledged an additional $100 million dollars
of recovery funding, bringing the U.S. Government's total contribution
to more than $200 million dollars.
The additional funding is helping to strengthen climate-smart
agriculture and food security systems; scale up essential health
services in flood-affected communities; and expedite a return to
learning among marginalized populations, particularly girls. It also
helps our Pakistani partners make critical investments in protection
and citizen-responsive governance, disease surveillance, economic
growth, clean energy, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure,
including drainage infrastructure.
Question. Where is the Administration in terms of fulfilling its
$200 million pledges for Pakistan's flood response and recovery?
Answer. In 2022, the United States provided more than $100 million
to support immediate flood relief efforts, disaster resilience, and
food security needs, as well as financing for relief logistics. In the
immediate aftermath of the flooding, USAID/BHA provided $80 million for
urgently needed food, nutrition, multipurpose cash, health, protection,
safe drinking water, improved sanitation and hygiene, and shelter
assistance.
Acknowledging that the needs of flood-affected communities go
beyond the one-time provision of emergency assistance, in Geneva this
January, the United States pledged an additional $103 million dollars
of recovery funding, bringing the U.S. Government's total contribution
to more than $203 million dollars since mid-August 2022.
The additional funding is helping to strengthen climate-smart
agriculture and food security systems; scale up essential health
services in flood-affected communities; and expedite a return to
learning among marginalized populations, particularly girls. It also
helps our Pakistani partners make critical investments in protection
and citizen-responsive governance, disease surveillance, economic
growth, clean energy, and reconstruction of damaged infrastructure,
including drainage infrastructure, and law enforcement facilities.
The total U.S. Government commitment to flood recovery to date is
greater than $200 million, of which $100 million was announced by
Deputy Administrator Coleman at the Pakistan Pledge Conference in
January.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. How has the United States worked with international
donors to ensure that Pakistan's most urgent needs are being met?
Answer. In the immediate aftermath of the floods, the Deputy Chief
of Mission for the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, Andrew Schofer,
coordinated monthly meetings at the Embassy with representatives of UN
agencies, international financial institutions, and other donor nations
on flood relief and recovery. USAID provided an early influx of $80
million in emergency humanitarian assistance for the floods in order to
play a leadership role to encourage other donors. Overall, the United
States has provided support to the flood response, food security,
nutrition assistance, disaster preparedness, and capacity building
efforts.
USAID Deputy Administrator Isobel Coleman communicated a message of
burden sharing in bilateral meetings with donor country counterparts
from Germany, the UK, and others during the January 9 International
Conference on Climate Resilient Pakistan in Geneva, from which more
than $9 billion in new grants and loans for flood relief and recovery
emerged. The Embassy also participated in the March 2023 International
Partner Support Group for Flood Recovery, hosted by the Pakistan
Minister of Economic Affairs.
Administrator Power's visits to the flood affected areas, and
meetings with the international community reinforced U.S. Government
(USG) priorities of a closely coordinated international response and
the importance of ensuring the financial burden is shared among donors
to respond to the unmet humanitarian and recovery needs. As a whole,
the USG is among the largest donors to the flood response in Pakistan,
having provided more than $200 million to date. In addition to the
humanitarian response funding, the USAID/Pakistan Mission has
reprogrammed resources to support food security and nutrition
programming, as well as ensuring funding to support the implementation
of effective climate-smart approaches that are acceptable and
beneficial to smallholder producers, including women.
The USG continues to advocate, in concert with like-minded donors
and UN agencies, for greater Government of Pakistan (GoP) support for
flood victims. These advocacy efforts have helped catalyze new
spending, such as the GoP's recent decision to increase coverage of the
Benazir Income Support Program (BISP)'s Nashonuma program--a GoP
initiative to provide conditional cash assistance and supplemental
nutritious foods to vulnerable women and children--in 80 flood-affected
districts. The change is expected to help BISP Nashonuma expand its
reach from the current 600,000 to approximately 1 million beneficiaries
over the coming months, according to the World Food Program. With the
growing concerns of acute malnutrition in the country, the concerted
efforts of the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Donald Blome has not only
prompted other donors, like Australia, to fund emergency nutrition
activities, but also helped prioritize nutrition amongst the highest
levels of the Pakistani authorities.
USAID will continue to monitor humanitarian conditions in Pakistan
and to work with the GoP and international partners to support critical
relief and recovery activities.
Question. Credible and transparent elections in December 2023 are
crucial for future peace and security in Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC).
What can USAID do, between now and the December election, to
increase the transparency and thereby the credibility of the DRC
electoral process?
Answer. USAID's programming is working to increase the transparency
of the electoral process. For example, through our Electoral Integrity
Activity, the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and
the International Republican Institute are working with the National
Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) and civil society to improve
elections administration, including by supporting civil society efforts
to engage with CENI. Additionally, national and international
monitoring of the electoral process is also critical to fostering a
more transparent and credible electoral process.
This programming has already played a key role in increasing CENI's
transparency. Following a challenging start to voter registration, CENI
took the advice of our implementer, IFES, to rework its operational
plan, publicize the changes, and publicly acknowledge the process's
shortcomings. Additionally, CENI allowed unimpeded access to the 450
USAID-supported domestic election observers to monitor the voter
registration process. CENI promptly accredited the domestic observation
mission and USAID staff as observers, allowing our partners to deploy
to one-in-three voter registration sites nationwide and collect
important information on the performance of the voter registration
system. USAID and our interagency partners are also engaging
diplomatically with CENI to encourage greater transparency.
There is still more work to be done to press for greater
transparency and this is, and will continue to be, a top priority of
our teams in Kinshasa and in Washington, as transparency is essential
to building the public confidence that will be required for DRC to hold
successful elections in December.
Question. What actions by CENI leadership would prompt us to
withdraw our support, and/or move forward with sanctions on CENI
leadership?
Answer. While there have been issues, we assess that CENI has the
capacity and will to professionally organize DRC's presidential,
legislative, and local elections in December in accordance with
internationally recognized norms and standards, and in conformity with
the DRC constitution and relevant legislation. However, we will
continue to update our assessment as key upcoming milestones are
reached, the redistricting and legislative seat allocation process,
candidate registration, and accreditation of domestic and international
observers for election day monitoring.
As USAID has done throughout the voter registration process, we
will closely monitor these milestones. USAID will also monitor the
conduct of the campaign period, as it is critical that candidates can
campaign without intimidation and that state resources are not used to
favor certain candidates over others. If circumstances were to warrant
it, a decision to withdraw support or otherwise change U.S. diplomatic
posture towards CENI would be taken in coordination with interagency
partners.
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator James E. Risch
Question. Management: Presence and Risk Management: As I've said
many times, effective diplomacy and development cannot be conducted
from behind the walls of an Embassy compound. Even as USAID operates in
some of the most dangerous places in the world, the agency needs to
take a forward leaning approach towards risk management so staff can
directly engage with local partners and beneficiaries while conducting
direct oversight of its programs and operations.
Do you believe that the Agency's current risk tolerance in medium-
to-high-threat posts is appropriately tailored? Do you believe that it
should be improved, and if so, how? What will you do to bring about
that improvement?
Answer. USAID applies an intentional risk management approach to
identify, evaluate, and mitigate critical risks to our programming and
core operations. USAID has a long history of operating in higher risk
environments and a wall of remembrance that honors our USAID colleagues
who have died or been killed as a part of their service.
USAID depends on the interagency to enable our Foreign Service
Officers to conduct site visits and work closely with local partners
and beneficiaries. At Post, USAID staff are under the security
authority of the Chief of Mission, who sets policies and guidelines for
our staff to conduct fieldwork. We work closely with Diplomatic
Security and their Regional Security Officers (RSO) to identify USAID's
field work requirements and inform their security support.
USAID has implemented measures to prepare our foreign service
officers for higher risk areas, and provide security advice and
assistance to our implementing partners. USAID has increased its
security training for new officers, and travels to our Missions to
provide tailored security training for the environment.
USAID continues to expand its security advisory support to our
implementing partners. This effort includes analyzing and sharing
security information, advising partners on their security plans, and
establishing a network of networks amongst the partners to keep them
safe.
USAID purposely participates in the National Security process and
coordinates with the interagency to communicate its needs and risk
tolerance. Additionally, USAID has staff assigned to Diplomatic
Security and liaisons between the Combatant Commands to ensure
effective security assistance planning and day-to-day support.
USAID is grateful for the support of our State and DoD colleagues
who have provided us security support as we strive to implement our
programs. We recognize the sacrifices of our State colleagues to assist
us, as demonstrated in the loss of life of local employed staff members
in Nigeria in May 2023 when a convoy advancing a USAID site visit was
attacked. USAID will continue to advocate for additional resources for
Diplomatic Security, where appropriate, to further enable our forward
leaning approach in high and medium risk areas.
The Agency utilizes an Enterprise Risk Management framework to both
identify, evaluate, mitigate and elevate critical risks to our
programming and core operations.
The Agency has successfully revised and integrated its Risk
Appetite Statement to support Missions, Bureaus and Independent Offices
in risk management, which includes understanding our tolerance for risk
in key areas and in developing tailored responses that are sensitive to
various country contexts and operating environments.
The risk appetite statement provides guidance on the programmatic,
operational, reputational, legal, information technology, security and
human capital concerns that may impact medium-to-high threat posts and
emphasizes an inclusive ``whole of mission'' approach to identifying
and mitigating threats. The risk appetite statement has been improved
to enable more direct engagement with local partners balanced with the
provision of training and oversight.
At the Country level, USAID deploys numerous program and activity
specific safeguards to manage risks and enable additional tailoring to
include pre-award surveys and risk assessments, representation and
certification requirements, special award conditions, partner vetting,
entity screening/restrictions and corruption reporting, financial and
accounting requirements. The Agency will continue to provide training
and resources to further hone this discipline.
Question. What lessons has USAID learned from its evacuations from
Afghanistan and Ukraine that may be applied in future circumstances in
which security conditions rapidly deteriorate, particularly with regard
to: early warning; staff evacuations, care and support (including
locally engaged staff and American implementing partners); and remote
monitoring and evaluation to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse?
Answer. USAID continues to learn from the evacuations from
Afghanistan and Ukraine and has conducted an After Action Review (AAR)
after the Afghanistan evacuation which has further informed our
protocols. The Agency holds in the highest priority the safety and
security of staff, as well as the effective delivery of assistance. In
every location USAID responds, we work closely with individual Missions
and with the Department of State to anticipate security conditions,
respond in crisis situations, and learn from challenging experiences to
continue to adapt and improve Agency response to staff safety and care.
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, USAID has
repositioned and prioritized operational readiness. The Agency
established the USAID Critical Coordination Structure to bring together
the inputs of relevant Bureaus and Independent Offices, establishing
Task Forces as needed, and advancing Agency-level operational emergency
response strategies focused on the protection and safety of the USAID
workforce, facilities, and overseas management operations. The Agency
established the USAID Command Center as a 24/7 resource to monitor
significant activities, notify and support leadership and staff, and
coordinate with the Department of State's Operations Center and
Department of Homeland Security's National Operations Center. We
increased our collaboration with the Department of State and
established quantifiable standards for readiness, memorializing them in
the Joint Strategic Plan FY 2022-2026. We also drafted the Strategic
Action Plan for Operational Readiness FY 2022-2026, which establishes
an Agency-wide integrated approach to maintaining a comprehensive and
effective readiness posture consistent with the Federal Mission
Resilience Strategy.
Before a Crisis: While all USAID staff overseas are directly
accountable to the Chief of Mission, USAID has responsibility for our
workforce and must be operationally ready to assist our staff,
coordinate with our implementing partners, and support our interagency
colleagues during a crisis event. We developed the Mission Continuity
Plan Template to assist Missions in developing Agency-level crisis
response plans that account for USAID equities unique to the Missions'
operating conditions; equities which include the safety and security of
USAID's entire overseas workforce and our implementing partners.
USAID's Office of Security provides security training to support USAID
staff and the Missions, to include tailored training provided at our
Missions based on the security environment.
The Office of Security manages a personnel recovery program that is
based on providing advanced training to prepare staff for emergencies
and isolating events, and to teach and equip them with communication
devices, including satellite phones and personal locator beacons. We
developed a toolkit for Contracting Officers to expedite coordination
with implementing partners, devised new crisis response training for
Missions, created new training for domestic staff to better respond to
a crisis, and are finalizing a standard operating procedure for
Emergency and Crisis Management for Locally Employed Staff. USAID
provides additional support to staff whenever possible, including pre-
departure briefings and training, mental and emotional health services,
and assists in supporting both staff and their families during and
after critical incidents that impact their wellbeing.
USAID draws from the challenges that were faced and lessons learned
through Afghanistan, Ukraine, Sudan, and other evacuations to shape our
Staff Care Center offerings, which include training sessions on
resilience, stress management, and adapting to change. USAID develops
these training programs and other forms of support in close
coordination with the Department of State's Center for Excellence in
Foreign Affairs Resilience and Employee Consultation Services, who also
collaborate on a Resiliency Working Group that is building a
comprehensive strategy for promoting staff resilience and protecting
mental health.
USAID partners use their own individual security models. However,
USAID has regular communication with partners in our Posts, both
between individual partners and USAID's Contracting Officer's
Representative or Agreement Officer's Representative on day-to-day
coordination and oversight, and collectively on a regular basis between
Mission leadership and partners. This includes sharing security-related
information as appropriate. USAID provides safety and security support
to its implementing partners around the globe via the Partner Liaison
Security Office program at numerous high-threat posts and remotely
during emergencies through the Office of Security. Partners
implementing humanitarian and development relief operate independently
of the U.S. Government and are responsible for all of their risk
management decisions and for providing staff support related to their
operations.
During a Crisis: USAID coordinates with, and provides support to,
the Department of State where appropriate during an evacuation,
including by liaising between the Office of the Assistant Administrator
for the USAID Bureau for Management and the Office of the Under
Secretary for Management at State. Within USAID, the Bureau for
Management's Crisis Response Unit coordinates with the Regional Bureau,
the Mission, the Regional Support Mission and offices across the Agency
to coordinate an operational response focused on operational services
and the health and safety of personnel at post. The USAID Office of
Security has a liaison assigned to Diplomatic Security to ensure close
coordination and information sharing.
While each crisis has unique circumstances, USAID has learned from
prior experience to inform crisis response, including increased access
to Staff Care services, situation-specific training on safety and
security, augmented staff to ensure continuity of operations and
connectivity to the workforce and implementing partners, and liaison
staff to coordinate with the Department of State. For example, we
applied learning from previous evacuations when the crisis in Sudan
broke out in April 2023. Within hours, we had verified the location and
security situation of all USAID staff.
Post-Crisis: USAID uses multiple tools to conduct evaluation post-
crisis. The Agency maintains a repository of Lessons Learned Cables and
relevant After Action Reports to develop policies and procedures
related to a crisis. The Critical Coordination Structure then organizes
an Agency response to implement key lessons learned. USAID, through its
Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) conducts performance
evaluations, impact evaluations and response level evaluations for
specific global responses.
Remote monitoring and evaluation to prevent waste, fraud, and
abuse: USAID recognizes the importance of assessing risk and
integrating risk management into all of our foreign assistance. USAID
has found that when a crisis event occurs, implementing partners and
the host government often evacuate to common safe locations; therefore,
USAID seeks to position staff for continued coordination and oversight
directly with the partners. Development programs may pause temporarily
during the onset of the crisis event as the focus is on immediate needs
of staff. Though a crisis event may be ongoing, after implementing
partners or host governments reconstitute operations, USAID assesses
risks and may implement increased monitoring or control measures to
mitigate the increased risk. USAID is working closely with the
Department of State on application of the Secure Embassy Construction
and Counterterrorism Act of 2022 for temporary operating locations to
position staff in a safe location in close proximity to the crisis.
For humanitarian awards, USAID implements risk management practices
beginning at the application phase. We require humanitarian partners to
take appropriate and necessary steps to ensure that they are
demonstrating that they have assessed the risks of fraud, waste, abuse,
including mitigating the risk that the provision of U.S. foreign
assistance does not result in violating U.S. law. BHA's risk mitigation
approach includes a requirement for all Non-Governmental Organization
partners to submit risk assessment and management plans, specifying how
the organization plans to mitigate and manage the risks of potentially
misusing U.S. Government resources in their proposed activities/
modalities.
In addition, for any humanitarian partners operating in high-risk
environments, such as Afghanistan and Ukraine, BHA requires
humanitarian partners to submit additional risk mitigation measures
they will take to decrease present risks associated with complex
operating environments. This includes requiring them to detail the
measures they have in place to mitigate the risk of engaging in
transactions with or providing material support to sanctioned groups
and/or individuals, including policies for screening vendors,
contractors, and suppliers, money transfer service providers, as well
as measures to mitigate the risk of sanctioned group(s) and/or
individuals interfering with, or influencing beneficiary
identification, selection, and verification processes.
Finally, USAID's monitoring and evaluation has built on these
experiences to ensure effective prevention of waste, fraud, and abuse
in both crisis and steady-state contexts through external technical
guidance and internal monitoring site visit guidance. These documents
provide both BHA and implementing partners with monitoring, evaluation,
and reporting standards, templates, and best practices that aim in part
to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.
Question. Staffing: As I've stated in each of the past 3 years,
USAID's most valuable asset is its people. Unfortunately, with at least
22 different hiring mechanisms and outdated assumptions about how
specific missions, bureaus, and offices should be supported, the agency
is in desperate need of a modernized strategic staffing plan that is
flexible and adaptive to today's challenges.
Noting that the FY 2024 budget includes a request for an additional
230 direct hires, when will I see USAID's comprehensive strategic
staffing plan that aligns positions, skills, and resources across the
agency, transparently and effectively streamlines hiring mechanisms,
and reduces reliance upon program funds, costly institutional
contracts, and Participating Agency Service Agreements (PASAs) to meet
modern staffing needs?
Answer. The current request for 230 new positions includes 105 CS
and 125 FS positions. The Agency's Global Development Partnership
Initiative (GDPI) seeks to change our workforce composition by
increasing the number and percentage of direct hire, but specifically,
career employees, both Civil Service (CS) and Foreign Service (FS).
Currently, USAID's workforce is about \1/3\ U.S. contracted staff, \1/
3\ Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs), and \1/3\ U.S. direct hire staff
(both career and term-limited FS and CS). If GDPI were fully funded
alongside our term-limited direct hire authorities, USAID would be able
to shift this to about 22 percent U.S. contracted staff and 43 percent
U.S. direct hire staff while maintaining a similar level of FSNs.
Question. Will the request for an additional 230 direct hire
positions (105 civil service and 125 foreign service) be funded with OE
or program funds?
Answer. The request is for OE-funded positions.
Question. Will the proposed increase in direct-hire positions be
paired with a decrease in contractors? If not, why not?
Answer. The goal of GDPI is to increase the number and percentage
of career employees (both Civil Service and Foreign Service) and
accordingly decrease the number and percentage of non-career employees.
While the Agency will continue to need and utilize non-career staffing
mechanisms, an increase in career employee opportunities promotes DEIA,
increases institutional knowledge, and provides improved career paths
for our top talent. Under the current GDPI planning, USAID would reduce
the U.S. contracted staff from about 33 percent of our workforce
composition to about 22 percent.
Question. How will new direct hire positions be prioritized and
allocated?
Answer. For the CS, USAID is prioritizing management positions
including human resources (HR), administrative management, security,
legal, and contracting; gender and inclusive development; diversity,
equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA); global health security;
and humanitarian assistance. The Agency would also like to increase CS
staffing in climate and democracy. Approximately half of the increase
in FY 2022 for the CS was for fundamental staffing requirements that
have gone unfilled or that have been filled with short-term approaches.
This includes priority areas like contracting officers (including for
humanitarian assistance programming), as well as desk officers,
lawyers, and HR specialists.
FS priorities will be determined by our Overseas Workforce Planning
Model; currently identified priorities include Program Officers,
Contracting Officers, Health Officers, Democracy Officers, Executive
Officers and Humanitarian Assistance Officers.
Question. Travel: What is the agency's Temporary Duty (TDY) travel
budget?
Answer. The Agency does not develop a specific budget for Temporary
Duty (TDY) travel for the President's Budget Request, but instead
provides budget allocations to operating units that determine their
individual travel requirements. In FY 2022, the Agency obligated
approximately $29.7 million in Operating Expenses (OE) and $62.8
million in program funds for TDY travel. USAID estimates a slight
increase in these levels for FY 2024. Please note that TDY travel is
discretionary and excludes mandatory travel, such as post assignments
and permanent change of station (PCS), home leave, rest & recuperation
(R&R) and other mandatory entitlement travel.
Question. Is TDY travel from headquarters (whether overseas or
domestic) funded by OE, program funds, or both? If both, please provide
a breakdown by category and purpose.
Answer. TDY travel is funded by both OE and program funds,
depending on the account that funds the traveler's salaries and
benefits. Thus, with limited exceptions, the OE account funds travel
for OE-funded staff while program accounts cover travel for program-
funded staff.
TDY travel includes operational travel, site visits, conferences,
seminars, meetings, and retreats. Since the Agency's financial
management system cannot easily identify TDY travel solely from
headquarters, the information below includes all TDY travel (from
headquarters and missions).
OE and program obligations in FY 2022 for TDY travel are shown in
the table below.
Question. How many TDY coach class air travel waivers were granted
in FY 2022 and FY 2023, to date? Please break such waivers down by
category.
Answer. The following information is based on data in E2, the
Agency's travel system.
In FY 2022, USAID issued 165 TDY coach-class air-travel waivers.
The waivers include medical disability, travel in excess of 14 hours,
no space in coach, paid for by a non-federal source, and for safety and
security reasons.
In FY 2023 to date, USAID issued 248 coach-class air-travel
waivers. The waivers include medical disability, travel in excess of 14
hours, no space in coach, paid for by a non-federal source, and for
safety and security reasons.
Question. Have any blanket waivers for TDY coach class air travel
been issued? If so, how many, under what circumstances, and at what
cost?
Answer. USAID does not issue blanket waivers for TDY coach class
air travel.
Question. Global Health: Global Health Security: Of the $1.245
billion requested for Global Health Security, $745 million is for the
U.S. Agency for International Development and $500 million is for the
newly established Pandemic Fund, housed at the World Bank. The Global
Health Security and Pandemic Prevention, Preparedness, and Response
Act, enacted as part of the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act,
caps U.S. contributions to the Pandemic Fund at 33 percent.
What is the status of other donor contributions to the Pandemic
Fund? Is the $500 million U.S. contribution proposed in the budget
request realistic or aspirational?
Answer. As of April 26, 2023, the Pandemic Fund has received signed
Contribution Agreements totaling $1,664,970,000. This includes $450M
contributed by the United States Government.
The World Bank and WHO estimate that an additional $10.5 billion
per year will be needed from multilateral development banks to
strengthen pandemic preparedness and response capacities in low- and
middle-income countries. This is in addition to almost $20 billion per
year that low-and middle-income countries will also need to contribute
through domestic resources. President Biden's FY 2024 budget request
includes an additional $500 million for the Pandemic Fund, within the
GHP-STATE account, to help bridge this funding gap and catalyze
additional funding from partner governments and organizations.
With current and proposed Pandemic Fund contributions, the U.S.
Government will continue to consider the amounts of future
contributions by other donors over the course of the 5-year period
designated in the FY 2022 National Defense Authorization Act.
Question. To date, USAID has exercised dangerously poor oversight
of its partners engaged in research of pathogens of pandemic potential.
What safeguards have you put in place to ensure that the resources
in the FY 2024 budget request, as well as prior-year funding that has
yet to be obligated, are not directed toward partners that have
demonstrated poor compliance with U.S. requirements relating to
research of dual-use concern, data quality, data sharing, performance
standards, and fiscal controls?
Answer. First and foremost, USAID has never authorized or funded
Dual Use Research of Concern or Gain of Function Research nor is there
an intent to do so in the future. USAID takes biosafety and biosecurity
considerations very seriously. The Agency is working to continually
improve and refine how we survey the landscape of biothreats, examine
risks associated with activities, as well as design stringent
safeguards to address the full range of biosafety and biosecurity
concerns.
USAID implementing partners are required to comply with all
standard provisions included in their awards, including those related
to data submission, performance, fiscal responsibility, and others.
USAID ADS Chapters 302 and 303 contain a detailed description of USAID
and partners' roles and responsibilities related to the administration
and monitoring of contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements. As a
general matter, the USAID Agreement Officer's Representative performs
award oversight and management of assistance awards within the scope of
USAID's permitted substantial involvement. For sub-awards, the prime
implementing partner is required to flow down all requirements to sub-
awards, and to monitor compliance of its sub-awardees.
Question. Has USAID's Office of Acquisitions and Assistance
reviewed EcoHealth Alliance's compliance with all obligations, both in
body and in spirit, with U.S. requirements relating to data
transparency and fiscal and performance management?
Has EcoHealth Alliance been subject to suspension or debarment
proceedings? If not, why not?
Does EcoHealth Alliance continue to receive funding from USAID for
any purpose, whether as a prime, sub-, or sub-sub awardee? If so, where
and for what purposes?
Answer. In October 2021, USAID became aware of information raising
concerns about EcoHealth Alliance's work under an NIH award. In
addition, several members of Congress have requested that HHS and USAID
investigate and determine whether EcoHealth Alliance should be excluded
from receiving federal contracts and grants based on concerns related
to NIH work. USAID referred the information to USAID's Office of the
Inspector General and facilitated a conversation with interested
congressional parties.
As of April 26, 2023, EcoHealth Alliance is not under review for
suspension and debarment consideration by USAID's Compliance Division
within the Bureau for Management, Office of Management Policy, Budget,
and Performance, which coordinates its work with USAID's Office of
Acquisitions and Assistance. USAID Compliance recommends suspension and
debarment efforts on an on-going basis and those decisions are posted
in the System for Award Management (sam.gov) for suspensions, proposed
debarments (under the Federal Acquisition Regulation only) and
debarments. Matters leading up to these actions are pre-decisional and,
as such, are not shared beyond a need-to-know basis.
EcoHealth Alliance is currently the prime implementing partner for
the Conservation Works Activity in Liberia. Conservation Works employs
One Health strategies to conserve biodiversity and promote sustainable
economic growth throughout Liberia by improving protection of forest
resources and biodiversity and building conservation-compatible
economic opportunities for communities relying on those natural
resources. USAID does not have any other direct awards or sub-awards to
EcoHealth Alliance at this time.
Question. Sexual and Reproductive Health: Does the term ``sexual
and reproductive health'', as it relates to USAID assistance, programs,
and engagement in development forums, include access to ``safe and
legal'' abortion?
Answer. No, it does not. USAID does not fund abortions. We take
seriously all applicable laws and implement measures with Missions and
partners to ensure compliance with these requirements in their
programs.
Question. Can you confirm that all USAID grants and contracts,
including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for the
utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of account
and regardless of targeted health sector, include specific prohibitions
on the use of funds to perform or promote abortion, or lobby for or
against the legalization of abortion overseas?
Answer. Yes, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and
USAID's annual appropriations acts set forth a number of statutory
restrictions related to abortion, including the Helms, Leahy, Siljander
and Biden Amendments. These restrictions apply to all U.S. foreign
assistance funds, including through subawards and subcontracts, across
all sectors and partners, and have been in place for a number of
decades. USAID implements the abortion restrictions through mandatory
standard provisions included in our grants and contracts.
Question. Can you confirm the same for all USAID grants and
contracts, including all subgrants and subcontracts, that provide for
the utilization of U.S. foreign assistance resources, regardless of
account, to promote human rights and gender equality?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Is access to ``safe and legal'' abortion included among
the health, human rights, and/or gender equality initiatives that USAID
seeks to advance through utilization of U.S. foreign assistance
funding?
Answer. No, it is not. USAID does not fund abortions and takes
seriously the legislative restrictions and compliance measures related
to all applicable laws.
Question. Does USAID utilize U.S. foreign assistance funds,
regardless of account, to provide gender affirming surgery or therapy?
Answer. USAID does not fund gender affirming medical interventions,
which include surgeries and hormone therapy.
USAID, via the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR),
supports comprehensive HIV services for key populations or those at
increased risk for HIV due to structural barriers, including stigma and
discrimination in health settings and specific higher-risk behaviors,
irrespective of the epidemic type or local context. Transgender
individuals are one of these key populations, as defined by UNAIDS, and
are 34 times more likely to be living with HIV.
In select HIV programs, national authorities have elected to offer
gender-affirming hormone therapy as a strategy to increase the use of
HIV services. While not using PEPFAR funds for hormones, program
partners coordinate with and leverage other development partners and
governments to offer these services as a comprehensive package targeted
at high-risk transgender individuals. For example, in South Africa, the
National Department of Health procures hormones for use in clinics
supported by USAID partners. In India, clinics provide HIV services
through USAID support, but use other means to cover the cost of the
hormones, such as clients paying out of pocket. No U.S. foreign
assistance funding is used to provide hormone replacement therapy or
gender-affirming medical interventions.
USAID also strengthens mental health and psychosocial support
(MHPSS) services available to LGBTQI+ individuals and other
marginalized communities. This includes offering services and referrals
for LGBTQI+ mental health and gender-based violence support; developing
training materials for MHPSS providers working with these clients; and
developing resources for LGBTQI+ individuals to mitigate challenges
associated with violence, discrimination, stigma, and abuse.
Question. Malaria: The President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) has
undertaken a market shaping effort to bring a diversity of
manufacturers into the malaria commodity market to ensure a resilient
supply chain for the millions and millions of malaria commodities it
purchases each year.
What are the policy changes or priorities that PMI has identified
as critical to its effort to shape a healthy market for malaria
commodities?
Answer. The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) promotes a
healthy market for malaria products to ensure the sustained
availability of high quality, affordable life-saving products. PMI
defines a healthy market around four dimensions: (1) global capacity
(sufficient supply to meet demand), (2) affordability, (3) supply risk
(diversified supply base), and (4) product quality/appropriateness
(quality and innovation). To promote a healthy market, PMI works on all
of these critical priority areas. For example, PMI allocates demand
across multiple suppliers and manufacturing sites for a secure,
diversified supply base. In 2022, PMI procured malaria pharmaceuticals
from 12 suppliers with manufacturing sites in six countries. PMI also
supports new product introduction to bring innovative products to
market and make them affordable. Working with key partners--including
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Unitaid,
MedAccess, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation--PMI supported the
introduction of the first insecticide-treated net with two active
insecticides (dual AI nets) in areas with high insecticide resistance.
Our collective efforts brought the nets to market faster, reduced the
price of the net by half, and expanded production capacity three times
from the initial capacity.
Question. Is prioritizing manufacturers that invest in innovating
the next generation of malaria tools one of the criteria PMI has
identified is crucial to their market shaping initiative? If so, how is
PMI or its procuring partners ensuring that malaria innovators are
prioritized in the evaluation criteria?
Answer. PMI uses several approaches to support critical innovation
across its commodity portfolio. We fund multiple product development
partnerships that work with industry to ensure a healthy research and
development pipeline of innovative products including new drugs for
treatment and prevention of malaria and new insecticides. We also
include evaluation criteria in our tenders that award points for
manufacturers that are investing in innovation. Finally, we work to
reduce the development to market timeframe, as described above for dual
AI nets, to make innovative products available and affordable so they
reach more people more quickly.
Question. How does the market shaping initiative take into account
U.S. company suppliers versus supplier companies headquartered outside
of the United States?
Answer. PMI does not evaluate where a company is headquartered in
our tendering and evaluation process. PMI does, however, look at where
the product is manufactured to ensure a geographically diverse supply
base and promote supply chain resiliency. From 2022, PMI includes
evaluation criteria related to manufacturing in Africa to bring supply
closer to demand and ensure a responsive and resilient malaria supply
chain. This shift reflects that 95 percent of malaria cases and 96
percent of malaria deaths are in Africa, but manufacturing of quality
malaria commodities on the continent is currently negligible. Inclusion
of the evaluation criteria has increased our allocation to qualified
manufacturers in Africa and provides a demand signal to industry to
invest in expanding African-based manufacturing. Several current
suppliers are actively working on technology transfers or partnerships
with local manufacturers to strengthen their capacity.
Question. Food Aid and Food Security: The budget request ``reflects
the importance of in-kind agricultural commodities to humanitarian
response, but also acknowledges the opportunity to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. food assistance programs through
the reauthorization of the Food for Peace Act.''
What reforms are you seeking to make U.S. food aid more efficient
and effective? Please be specific.
Answer. At this time of record global hunger, the reauthorization
of the Farm Bill provides an opportunity for Congress and USAID to work
together to ensure the U.S. Government has the best tools at its
disposal to meet global need. USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian
Assistance (BHA) has identified several technical changes to the Title
II authorities which would increase the efficiency and effectiveness of
our Title II food assistance programs, without reducing the use of U.S.
commodities, to more efficiently feed those in need.
Provide Partners More Choice in Programming Without Reducing Use of
U.S. In-Kind Commodities
USAID's non-emergency Title II programs are designed to build
resilience in vulnerable communities, reducing communities' reliance on
food aid and potential need for humanitarian assistance in the long
term. This programming can include a broad range of critical activities
including natural resource management, disaster risk reduction, and
training. However, there is a cap on the amount of Title II funding
that can be used for these purposes, and this cap often requires
partners to program in-kind commodities even when different
interventions would create a more lasting impact on the resilience of a
specific community. USAID can build more sustainable outcomes with non-
emergency programs by allowing partners to design programs around the
needs of each community, whether that includes the provision of in-kind
commodities, resilience-building activities, or both over the course of
the program.
USAID analysis indicates that the cost per metric ton (MT) to
program U.S. in-kind commodities for non-emergency programs is
approximately twice as high as the cost to program them for emergency
programs. For the same price, shifting the commodities used for non-
emergency programs over to emergency programs would allow USAID to
potentially purchase more commodities and increase the number of people
receiving U.S. food assistance, while maximizing efficiency and
effectiveness of food assistance programming.
Proposal: Directly authorize the provision of assistance to
eligible organizations for non-emergency programs, while exempting non-
emergency programs from the 202(e) funding cap and removing the
directive to provide a minimum level of U.S. in-kind commodities for
such programs each year.
USAID would be authorized to provide assistance directly to
partners that is not subject to the 202(e) cap and would not be
required to provide a minimum of 1,875,000 metric tons each
fiscal year for non-emergency programming. The requirement to
spend not less than $365 million on non-emergency programming
would remain.
Simplify Overly Burdensome Accounting Requirements
Current law imposes a rigid and complicated accounting structure on
Food for Peace Act food assistance, which costs the Agency time and
resources that could be better spent on programming. The law also
requires the same of our partners, often requiring them to invest in
expensive, custom financial tracking software to comply.
Proposal: Eliminate cost categories for Title II, making the
authority similar to the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) and
Development Assistance (DA) authorities in the Foreign Assistance Act,
which do not specify separate cost categories.
USAID would rely on the ``necessary expense doctrine'' as it
does when programming IDA and DA funding, where a specific
appropriation can be used to pay any associated expense,
provided that it is necessary or incident to the achievement of
the underlying objectives of the appropriation; not prohibited
by law; and not otherwise provided for (i.e., not within the
scope of some other appropriation).
Include a floor of approximately 30 percent (based on prior
year average) of Title II funding to be spent on U.S. in-kind
commodities for emergency programming.
This change would reduce barriers to entry for new and local
partners who are interested in programming Title II assistance.
Consolidate Food Assistance Reporting Requirements
Current law requires a report on international food assistance
provided through the Food for Peace Act and another report on
international food assistance provided through the Foreign Assistance
Act. Each of these reports paints an incomplete picture of U.S. food
assistance programs, so USAID is proposing to consolidate them into a
single report.
Proposal: Consolidate the Emergency Food Security Program report
and the International Food Assistance Report into a single report
covering the breadth of food assistance funded by both IDA and Title
II.
The single, consolidated report would include all the
information currently captured by the two individual reports,
creating a more holistic view of USAID's food assistance
programming while still providing the same level of granular
detail.
Consolidating the two reports would also save 160 staff
hours and approximately $6,000 taxpayer dollars per year.
Streamline Monitoring and Evaluation of Programming
While USAID often has multiple food assistance funding streams in a
given country, current law only permits the Agency to use Food for
Peace Act funding to monitor Food for Peace Act food assistance
programs. BHA staff and partners carrying out these types of technical
assistance activities must either deal with the administrative burden
of allocating and accounting from different funding streams in the same
country to track expenses or they must enter into separate awards to
carry out these activities by funding stream. In either case the result
is inefficient, leads to delays in carrying out activities when funding
may not be readily available, and undermines the effectiveness of USAID
food assistance programming.
Proposal: Broaden the authorizations for 202(h) and 207(f) to allow
Title II funds authorized in these sections to support all BHA food
assistance programs, regardless of funding stream.
Congress has already provided the authority for Community
Development Funds (CDF) to be broadly used for Title II
purposes; however, there is no comparable authority to allow
Title II to be used for CDF, IDA, or ESF purposes. This change
would allow USAID to use Title II funds for food aid quality
and for monitoring, oversight, and evaluation purposes across
all food assistance programs.
We look forward to working with Congress ahead of the upcoming Farm
Bill reauthorization to maximize the ability of the legislation to
support USAID to more effectively respond to crises, build resilience
among communities, and improve stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Question. What are the current cost differentials between USAID's
existing food aid modalities, including: (1) food aid provided in the
form of ``market-based assistance,'' such as biometrically verified
electronic transfers and vouchers; (2) food aid commodities procured
locally or regionally; and (3) food aid commodities procured and
shipped from the United States?
What are the key drivers of those cost differentials?
Answer. The exact cost differentials between different food aid
modalities vary widely based on the unique response context, including
the type of commodities provided as food aid; the geographic location
and its proximity to ports; and, to a certain extent, the efficiencies
gained when USAID implementing partners are able to provide food aid at
scale. In general, when sufficient quantity and quality of commodities
are available in local markets, buying locally--whether through
individual cash and voucher assistance or humanitarian organization's
local procurement--often saves money over U.S.-based or other
international procurement of the same or similar commodities.
However, there are many exceptions to these broad trends,
including, for example, instances in which the local food prices remain
very high compared to the international market price or the U.S., or
instances where the types of food that cash or vouchers are intended to
purchase are relatively more expensive than the non-perishable bulk
staples usually provided in large in-kind food assistance programs.
For market-based food commodities, the key drivers of price
differentials include A) local market conditions and prices, and B)
financial service provider fees. The types of food that the cash and
vouchers are intended to purchase will also factor into the per-unit
price of cash or voucher assistance.
For in-kind food commodities, the key drivers of price
differentials are A) the price of the food commodity in the country
where it is procured, B) the price of transporting that food commodity
to the country where it will be distributed, and C) the cost of
warehousing and physically distributing the commodities in-country.
Procurement and contracting economies of scale often factor heavily
into these drivers; procuring larger quantities of food at a single
time will often result in lower per-unit prices.
Illustratively, in 2022 in Burkina Faso, USAID implementing
partners could provide a 60 percent ration using food commodities
procured and shipped from the U.S. for $14.80 per person per month. An
equivalent cash ration for a household to purchase food in local
markets costs $13.46 per person per month--a 9 percent savings. In
South Sudan, USAID partners could provide a 50 percent ration for
$21.19 per person per month using food commodities procured and shipped
from the U.S. or $20.41 per person per month using regionally-procured
commodities--a 4 percent savings over food commodities procured and
shipped from the U.S. An equivalent cash ration for household food
purchased in local markets in South Sudan cost $17.80 per person per
month--a 16 percent savings compared to food commodities procured and
shipped from the U.S. It is worth noting that USAID intentionally
programs U.S. purchased commodities where they represent a good value--
cost differences between local purchase, regional procurement, and food
commodities procured and shipped from the U.S. could be significantly
higher in different contexts, demonstrating the value of utilizing
flexible food assistance options.
Cost-efficiency is only one of several important factors that USAID
uses to determine which type of food assistance is optimal for a given
response context. Other components include the availability of food in
markets, local market functionality, the operational feasibility of a
specific modality, the specific objective that USAID is trying to
achieve with the food assistance program, beneficiary preference, and
any assessed protection risk factors associated with certain modalities
of food assistance. USAID uses the USG Modality Decision Tool (https://
www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-05/USG_MDT_Final_2017.pdf) to
guide this process.
Question. What is the current cost differential between U.S.-
flagged and foreign-flagged ocean transport vessels carrying U.S. food
aid commodities overseas?
Answer. USAID relies on two types of ships to transport U.S. food
aid commodities overseas: liner vessels, which are appropriate for
packaged food, and bulk vessels, which are appropriate for bulk grains
or other commodities. Based on USAID's FY 2022 packaged and bulk
procurements, U.S.-flagged Ocean liner vessel rates were approximately
25 percent higher than foreign-flagged ocean liner vessel rates. U.S.-
flagged Ocean bulk vessel rates were approximately 48 percent higher
than foreign-flagged ocean bulk vessel rates.
Question. To your knowledge, how many U.S.-flagged ocean transport
vessels carrying U.S. food aid overseas remain in the U.S. commercial
fleet? By whom are they owned?
Answer. Today, there are only four bulk vessels in the U.S.-flag
fleet, three of which are owned by a single company, Liberty Maritime.
We understand that a primary limiting factor to increasing bulk
vessel availability is the statutory 3-year waiting period for joining
the cargo preference program. The Maritime Administration has also
raised concerns about the impact of the waiting period on the supply of
vessels in the fleet, including in a recent GAO report, ``Actions
Needed to Enhance Cargo Preference Oversight.''
Question. In FY2021, how many Ocean Transportation Requests for
Proposal (RFPs) were issued by USAID? FY 2022? FY 2023, to date?
Of those RFPs, how many received bids from more than one U.S.-
flagged carrier? How many received no bids from U.S.-flagged carriers?
Answer. In accordance with the 1954 Cargo Preference statute, USAID
performed the following Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA) Food
Aid freight procurements/shipments by Vessel Type: Bulker (Bulk) and
Liner vessels.
Under the Bulk Vessel category, during the 3-year period FY 2021
through 2023, the following number of freight solicitations with total
corresponding commodity volumes (per metric ton/MT) were recorded:
Fiscal Year 2021
19 Solicitations
Total Tonnage: 1,295,020 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 399,210 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 895,810 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. Flag offer:
714,110 MT
**** Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty
Maritime Corporation and United Ocean Services. Due to a lack of U.S.
flag bulk capacity, when a U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is
awarded. No USAID bulk freight solicitation received more than one U.S.
flag carrier offer.
Fiscal Year 2022
19 Solicitations
Total Tonnage: 1,454,350 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 541,270 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 913,080 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer:
800,610 MT
****Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty
Maritime Corporation. Due to a lack of U.S. flag bulk capacity, when a
U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is awarded. No USAID bulk freight
solicitation received more than one U.S. flag carrier offer.
Fiscal Year 2023
Released 6 Solicitations (YTD)
Total Tonnage: 638,970 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 228,370 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 410,600 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer:
254,600 MT
****Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: Liberty
Maritime Corporation. Due to a lack of U.S. flag bulk capacity, when a
U.S. flag bulk offer is submitted it is awarded. No USAID bulk freight
solicitation received more than one U.S. flag carrier offer.
Under the Liner Vessel category, during the 3-year period FY 2021
through 2023 the following number of freight solicitations with total
corresponding commodity volumes (per metric ton/MT) were recorded:
Fiscal Year 2021
19 Solicitations
Total Tonnage: 438,156 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 250,638 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 187,517 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 1,915
MT
Fiscal Year 2022
20 Solicitations
Total Tonnage: 371,746 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 197,712 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 174,034 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 0 MT
Fiscal Year 2023
Released 11 Solicitations (YTD)
Total Tonnage: 201,909 MT
U.S. Flag Carriers (P1) awarded: 91,034 MT
Foreign Flag (P3) awarded: 110,875 MT
Cargo Volumes that did not receive a U.S. flag offer: 20,967
MT
**** Note, the U.S. flag carrier offers received/awarded: over the
3-year period Maersk Lines LTD. was the primary U.S. Liner carrier and
often sole U.S. flag carrier. USAID receives limited U.S. Flag (P2)
offers from APL/CMA and periodically from Hapag Lloyd. Liner offers are
received sporadically from U.S. flag Break/Bulk carriers for limited
destinations, those carriers are U.S. Ocean and Schuyler Lines. During
FY 2023 (YTD), USAID only received offers from more than one U.S. flag
carrier on 2 of the 11 freight solicitations issued.
Question. What is the average length of time required to program
each of the existing U.S. food aid modalities, including: (1) food aid
provided in the form of ``market-based assistance,'' such as
biometrically verified electronic transfers and vouchers; (2) food aid
commodities procured locally or regionally; and (3) food aid
commodities procured in and shipped from the United States?
Answer. USAID does not currently track the speed of program
implementation by modality across the entire food assistance portfolio
of multiple countries. For market-based assistance through electronic
transfers and vouchers, the length of time required to program depends
significantly on whether a humanitarian organization has pre-
established contracts with service providers or vendors. With
agreements in place with banks, mobile money providers, or other local
financial institutions, cash transfers can potentially be distributed
immediately after humanitarian organizations are able to establish a
list of eligible recipients. Card-based cash/voucher operations will
take longer, as will operations using paper vouchers. If agreements
have to be developed with new service providers and/or voucher vendors,
this may take several weeks before distributions can commence.
Food assistance commodities procured locally or regionally may be
available within days of an emergency depending significantly on the
emergency's proximity to the nearest prepositioning warehouse and
whether any commodity shipments in transit can be re-routed. The World
Food Program (WFP) maintains a stock of prepositioned food in regional
warehouses and, in select countries, may preposition food in advance of
anticipated shocks, which can be deployed in the early days of a
response. New procurement still requires a tendering process that will
typically take a couple of weeks, but availability for distribution
varies widely depending on where the commodities are coming from.
A similar prepositioning dynamic applies to U.S. in-kind,
prepositioned commodities. For new commodity procurement in the U.S.,
the time between issuing a procurement solicitation and its arrival in-
country would average approximately 18-22 weeks.
Question. The recently reauthorized Global Food Security Act
provides a framework to help food insecure populations move across the
full continuum of U.S. food assistance--from emergency food aid to
agriculture-led economic growth.
How is USAID linking these two initiatives? How and where is that
reflected in the budget?
Answer. Strategically coordinating humanitarian and development
assistance is crucial for building resilience and linking immediate
needs with longer-term systems, growth, and sustainability. To do this,
USAID is creating stronger linkages between our humanitarian assistance
and peacebuilding initiatives through our long-term development work.
We bring together experts from across these areas to work together to
identify common problems, design responses; learn and adapt to
increasing challenges. USAID highlights the necessity of coordinated
investments across humanitarian and development assistance not only in
the Global Food Security Strategy (GFSS), which is a requirement of the
Global Food Security Act, but also in USAID's 2012 Policy on Building
Resilience to Recurrent Crisis and BHA's Strategic Framework for Early
Recovery, Risk Reduction, and Resilience (ER4).
By transitioning food-insecure populations from emergency
assistance that focuses on sustaining them during periods of acute
shortage, to longer-term efforts that re-establishes livelihoods and
builds resilience to future shocks, USAID reduces the likelihood of
future humanitarian assistance needs. For more than a decade, USAID,
led by the Bureau for Resilience and Food Security (RFS) and the Bureau
for Humanitarian Assistance (BHA), has worked across Bureaus to
prioritize support and investment to strengthen resilience to recurrent
and protracted crises and advance progress.
Since 2012, USAID has selected 15 Resilience Focus Countries that
prioritized for support and investment to build resilience to recurrent
and protracted crises and advance progress: Burkina Faso, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Kenya, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda,
and Zimbabwe. All of these countries are also GFSS target or aligned
countries. Each country has a subnational resilience focus zone where
USAID concentrates planning and programming across humanitarian,
development, and peace resources.
For Resilience Focus Countries, RFS collaborates closely with BHA
on transitioning affected populations from needing food assistance to
providing food for themselves through restored livelihoods, so that
resilience approaches and programming can then set the stage for long-
term agriculture-led growth and more resilient livelihoods. This
includes coordination on the selection and design of Resilience Food
Security Activities (RFSAs), multiyear programs designed to address
chronic food and nutrition insecurity. RFSAs often serve as a
foundational layer of programming that facilitate multi-sectoral and
market-based development investments by RFS, Missions, and other
development actors that intentionally leverage and integrate with BHA
programming to maximize long-term resilience outcomes.
For example, the Nawiri RFSAs in Kenya aim to sustainably reduce
levels of persistent acute malnutrition in Kenya's arid and semi-arid
lands (ASALs) prone to cyclical food insecurity. In addition, in South
Sudan, we are graduating farmers impacted by ongoing conflict and
record flooding from multiyear BHA humanitarian emergency programming
to resilient agriculture programming that strengthens market systems.
We are integrating psychosocial support throughout this transition and
coordinating with and through community groups to ensure local voices
are front and center.
Over the last few years, approximately 25 percent (about $250
million) of RFS's annual budget for Feed the Future has supported
programming in the resilience focus zones of USAID's Resilience Focus
countries. These resources are complemented by approximately $300
million in resilience programming annually from BHA that are
concentrated in the resilience focus zones of USAID's Resilience Focus
countries.
USAID also addresses these issues at an organizational level. Last
year, USAID published the Programming Considerations on Humanitarian
Development Peace Coherence Note, after extensive consultation with
partners, which provides a set of HDP principles and examples of HDP
coherence in action. USAID is currently developing best practices and
peer learning opportunities both internally and with partners to
further HDP coherence.
Question. Localization: Domestic Resource Mobilization (DRM): With
demands upon U.S. foreign assistance and other donor support on the
rise, it is more important than ever that developing countries commit
to raising and investing more of their own domestic resources to
improve the health, education, and economic well-being of their people.
Domestic resource mobilization (DMR) is vital to long-term self-
reliance and accelerating country transitions from aid to broader forms
of partnership with the United States.
What is USAID doing to build the capacity of partner countries to
mobilize domestic resources in a manner that enhances self-reliance and
reduces long-term dependence upon U.S. foreign assistance?
Answer. USAID provides technical assistance in domestic resource
mobilization (DRM) in approximately 20 countries, both at the national
and subnational level, and commits approximately $20.5 million to such
technical assistance annually. This assistance includes helping
countries to improve legislation and level the playing field for
citizens and domestic and foreign businesses. USAID's support also
includes helping governments institute the processes and systems that
ensure revenues are collected at low cost to the government and without
undue burdens to the economy. This assistance is complemented by
USAID's support to the management of public finances to ensure
resources are allocated effectively, spent as planned, and generate
value for money. USAID is also actively working to convene other donors
and multilateral organizations to increase available support and
promote policy coherence in this area, including as a founding member
and co-chair of the Addis Tax Initiative.
Question. How is the agency connecting its DMR work with its
localization efforts?
Answer. Effective DRM reform requires the buy-in and the political
will of local actors, including host governments, civil society
organizations, citizens, and businesses. USAID's DRM interventions are
therefore co-designed with local counterparts and designed to reflect
local demand and plans for reforms, as well as existing development
objective agreements with host governments. USAID's DRM activities
necessarily include components aimed at developing local capacity for
DRM analysis and supporting the advocacy efforts of local civil society
organizations. In its current local governance activity in Senegal, for
example, USAID worked to involve citizens in over 40 communities in
assessing what property was available to be taxed and in decisions
about future spending. USAID noted increased revenue opportunities in
communities where mayors committed to agreed upon spending priorities.
For example, the commune of Bagadadji in Senegal, which had struggled
to mobilize resources, was able to increase tax collections from $221
to $6000 (a multiple of 27, or 2700 percent) after USAID partnered with
the mayor to engage residents in revenue and spending decisions. The
commune leveraged these funds to build classrooms and complete bridge
repairs. Where local capacity permits, USAID has deployed agreements to
finance reforms undertaken by local actors.
Question. Do you have the necessary tools and resources for USAID's
DRM work to be successful?
Answer. USAID continues to develop the skills of its staff to
undertake DRM activities and to incorporate DRM interventions in
support of other sectors. USAID provides a 4-day ``Domestic Resource
Mobilization'' course, in which staff learn about the design and
implementation of government revenue systems, national and subnational
DRM trends and issues, as well as DRM programming choices and
experiences. USAID also provides technical guides such as the Tax
Policy Reform Primer. These resources are yielding results at the
country level. For example, with USAID support between 2014 and 2018,
the government of the Philippines netted an extra $6.2 billion in tax
revenues and was able to raise infrastructure spending as percent of
GDP by 1.6 percentage points. More recently, the Philippine Department
of Budget Management repurposed funds of similar magnitude for the
COVID-19 response.
Question. Definitions & Indicators: The definition of ``local
partner'' under the Administration's ``localization'' initiative has
opened a lively debate. Chapter 303 of USAID's Automated Directives
System (ADS) references both ``Local Entities'' and ``Locally
Established Partners (LEPs),'' which raises questions about just how
``local'' an organization needs to be in order to be counted toward the
``localization'' targets. The proposal to track an even looser
indicator--i.e., a grantees' SAM number--could further muddy the waters
by allowing virtually any organization that says they are registered
and headquartered locally to count towards the 25 percent localization
target.
How will USAID make the determination that an entity is truly
``local'' in order to meet its targets?
Answer. USAID uses a multi-prong formula to determine whether a
partner is ``local'' for purposes of the direct local funding
indicator, for which USAID has a target of 25 percent. Specifically, we
classify partners as ``local'' if:
1. The identified ``country of incorporation'' in the Federal System
for Award Management (SAM) matches the ``physical country'' in
SAM and the ``place of performance--country'' in USAID's Global
Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS); and
2. The physical country is classified as a developing country.
For obligations to partners that are not registered in SAM or who
are utilizing a generic Unique Entity Identifier (UEI), a partner
obligation is alternatively classified as ``local'' if:
1. The identified ``vendor country'' in GLAAS (pulled from USAID's
financial system, Phoenix) matches their ``place of performance
country'' in GLAAS; and
2. The ``vendor country'' is classified as a developing country.
We selected these methodologies recognizing that the concept of
what it means to be ``local'' is complex and often contextually
nuanced. And that any effort to define it specifically will ultimately
be imperfect. So we know that our indicator is a proxy for local
partnership. Our goal was to come up with as good a proxy as possible,
while minimizing the reporting burden on staff and local partners and
using centrally reported, automated systems to the maximum extent
possible. Using these systems also allows us to easily track progress
compared to previous years, and on a real-time basis going forward.
We are committed to transparency around our Direct Local Funding
data. Because there are a number of ways to measure funding to local
actors, it's important to be clear about what we're counting. So when
we release our progress report, we will also be publishing our complete
dataset that codes awards as local, regional, and not local in order to
enable independent analysis of the Agency's Direct Local Funding data.
Question. Transparency: How does USAID plan to publicly share data
on the objectives and progress toward meeting Administrator Power's
localization goals?
Answer. USAID uses two targets to track our progress on
localization. First, by FY 2025, USAID will channel a quarter of its
funding directly to local partners and second, by 2030, at least half
of USAID programs will enable local actors to exercise leadership over
priority setting, activity design, implementation, and defining and
measuring results.
The first localization progress report, Moving toward a Model of
Locally Led Development: Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Localization Progress
Report (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/FY 2022
Localization Progress Report-June-12-23_vFINAL_1.pdf), was released on
June 12, 2023. It documents USAID's recent progress toward these goals
and outlines the efforts we are making, as an Agency, to further these
objectives. In issuing this progress report, USAID is holding itself
accountable for implementing its commitment to a model of more
inclusive, locally led development and humanitarian assistance.
The report highlights initial signs of progress. Notably, in FY
2022, direct funding to local partners--organizations, firms, and
individuals based in the countries in which we work--reached nearly
$1.6 billion, or 10.2 percent of attributable obligations. This is the
highest level and percent of direct local funding in at least a decade,
and, in dollar terms, a 66 percent increase from last year. We also
provided $199 million in government-to-government assistance and
another $57 million to partners working regionally. The report explores
these data in more detail by sector, Bureau, region, and country. To be
maximally transparent, we also published, alongside the report, the
underlying data (https://www.usaid.gov/localization/measurement) for
the analysis presented (with partner names redacted, as necessary, in
alignment with redactions implemented in other public datasets).
The Progress Report also outlines the new indicator USAID will use
to track progress on the equally important goal of shifting power and
enabling more local leadership of USAID-funded programming. We will
report initial data for this indicator in our FY 2023 localization
report.
Question. Is USAID planning to make country-level data publicly
available on both its 25 percent and its 50 percent indicators? If not,
why not?
Answer. USAID released its first progress report on localization on
June 12, 2023 ``Moving Toward a Model of Locally Led Development: FY
2022 Localization Progress Report (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/
files/2023-06/FY 2022 Localization Progress Report-June-12-
23_vFINAL_1.pdf).''
The report includes disaggregated country-level data on FY22 direct
funding to local partners, for which the agency has a target of
reaching 25 percent by 2025. Alongside the report, we also published
our complete dataset (https://www.usaid.gov/localization/measurement)
that underlies the analysis. We will first report data on the new
Locally Led Programs indicator, for which USAID's target is 50 percent
by 2030, in the FY23 progress report.
Question. Foreign Aid Transparency: When, if ever, will USAID make
available information on contractors and subgrantees on the foreign
assistance dashboard, www.foreignassistance.gov?
Answer. ForeignAssistance.gov publishes contractors under the field
``implementing partners.'' This information can be found in the Data
Query as well as on the ``By Country'' and ``By Agency'' pages.
ForeignAssistance.gov does not publish subgrantees. There are currently
no plans to make subgrantees available as that data is maintained by
the prime recipients.
Question. How does USAID track and report information on Negotiated
Indirect Cost Rate Agreements (NICRA)?
Answer. USAID's Negotiated Indirect Cost Agreements are maintained
in contract files in our Agency Secure Image and Storage Tracking
(ASIST) System. Implementing partners with NICRAs are required to
undergo annual audits to ensure that they fully comply with U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and applicable Cost
Accounting Standards (CAS). The indirect cost rates within NICRAs are
reviewed and renegotiated regularly, based on annual audits, to reflect
actual costs incurred in previous accounting periods and ensure rates
moving forward continue to reflect estimated future indirect costs.
Annually, NICRAs are updated and related documents are maintained in
the respective contract files in the ASIST System. USAID does not
report on NICRAs.
Question. What is the average NICRA rate for USAID's implementing
partners working in the humanitarian space, including for international
organization, international non-governmental organizations, local non-
governmental organization, and contractors? Please note that this
response, if deemed procurement sensitive, may be shared in a Committee
Confidential manner.
Answer. Organizations determine how they will recover their costs,
either directly or indirectly, and may elect to use one or multiple
indirect cost rates. These cost recovery decisions and the associated
indirect cost rates are all captured in NICRAs. As a result of the
variability, there is no direct comparability of indirect cost rates
between organizations and relatedly no average NICRA rate for USAID's
implementing partners. The indirect cost rates within NICRAs must be
considered within the context of their associated bases of application.
For example, a ``lower'' 5 percent rate applied to a base of
application (e.g., total direct costs) of $1 million will total $50,000
whereas a ``higher'' rate of 35 percent applied to a smaller base of
application (e.g., total direct labor costs) of $140,000 will total
$49,000. The 5 percent and 35 percent rates are not comparable as they
are applied to different bases of application and may not recover the
same costs.
To compare costs between organizations, USAID evaluates the total
proposed price to the USG for the same scope of work or program
delivery. The proportion of an implementing partner's budget that is
direct vs. indirect reflects how the organization has elected to
categorize and recover its costs; an organization with a higher
proportion of indirect costs may still be less expensive overall. To
ensure best value to the USG and good stewardship of taxpayer dollars,
USAID's contracting and agreement officers ensure the correct usage of
an organization's NICRA and consider what total benefits will be gained
at what total cost when reviewing proposal budgets. Federal regulations
governing cost accounting standards and NICRAs can be found in 48 CFR
(FAR) part 30, 31.2, 42.707, and Chapter 99 for acquisition and in 2
CFR 200, in particular Subpart E, for assistance.
Question. USAID recently updated its Agency-Wide Learning Agenda to
comply with the Evidence Act and to reflect the Administration's
priorities.
How are you implementing this agenda, and how is your leadership
team using lessons learned in your past programs and projects to adjust
current and future programs?
Answer. USAID's Agency Learning Agenda, covering Fiscal Year 2022
to 2026, articulates USAID's priorities for learning and evidence to
inform Agency decision-making. It advances learning and improvement in
achieving priorities articulated in USAID's Policy Framework by working
with operating units to channel resources towards Agency priority
questions in their Performance Management Plans, evaluations, and
learning efforts. USAID uses the Agency Learning Agenda to guide and
link learning initiatives across USAID's partners, communities of
practice, and working groups, and to coordinate sharing and use of
available evidence. Most recently at the end of the first year of
implementing the agenda, USAID hosted a month-long series of events
under the theme, ``Agency Learning and Evidence Month,'' to champion
the use of evidence in programming and elevate evidence-building and
use as a priority for the Agency. Throughout the month of April, USAID
staff participated in over 35 events, with 19 sessions open to the
public, tied to each of the nine Agency Learning Agenda questions,
reaching more than 2,459 unique attendees from 115 countries and over
150 organizations.
USAID evaluations and research fill knowledge gaps prioritized by
the nine Agency Learning Agenda questions, and lessons are shared
across USAID in a variety of ways for staff to use in adjusting current
and future programs. Lessons learned are used by Agency leaders to
inform budget, policy, and management decisions, and by program
managers to adjust the way in which projects deliver assistance for the
greatest impact. For example, evidence of the efficacy of different
types of mosquito netting used to prevent malaria allows project
managers to fund distribution of the most effective equipment. Evidence
generated through USAID evaluations are also used to inform and improve
host country government policies and practices. For example, a recent
evaluation of a USAID activity found that enhancing accountability and
transparency can increase taxpayers' willingness to pay taxes, thereby
improving local revenue collection. As a result, the host country
increased revenues by changing the way they used projections and
accounting information, and by updating financial procedures.
Question. Under the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act
(FATAA), USAID is required to make its evaluations public within 90
days of their completion.
How many evaluations has USAID made public by posting to the
Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) in FY 2022 and FY 2023, to
date?
Do you have plans to upgrade the DEC so that it is more user-
friendly and conducive toward public access to its information?
Answer. USAID made 701 evaluations available to the public on the
Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) in fiscal year 2022 and has
made 271 evaluations available to the public so far in fiscal year
2023, for a total of 972 evaluations from this time period. The
evaluations are available for viewing through the DEC website at
https://dec.usaid.gov/dec/content/search.aspx.
USAID is planning to replace the DEC to make it more user-friendly
and conducive toward public access to its information through the
Consolidated Digital Repository (CDR) project. The CDR will consolidate
both DEC and the Development Data Library (DDL). The project is
expected to kick off in FY 2024 Q1 with a Minimum Viable Product (MVP)
implemented to replace the DEC in FY 2024 Q4.
Question. Energy: You stated in your hearing that: ``We
support...natural gas programming in instances where it can create
energy access while not delaying plans toward clean energy because
again the collective carbon emissions even from developing countries,
we are all part of the solution when it comes to mitigation.''
Please provide a list and description of all natural gas projects
that USAID has supported or is supporting now since January 1, 2022.
Answer. Please see the table below.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Is your statement that USAID will only support natural
gas programs if it does not delay plans toward clean energy the
official U.S. policy of the Biden administration? If so, please provide
us with documentation where that is laid out or otherwise stated.
Answer. It is Administration policy not to provide U.S. Government
financing to unabated natural gas projects, consistent with Executive
Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. This
policy has exceptions in rare cases when there is compelling national
security, geostrategic, or development/energy access benefits and no
viable lower carbon alternatives accomplish the same goals. This policy
has informed USAID's program implementation.
Question. In USAID programming on energy, how do you weigh net
emissions reductions versus the energy needs of a partner countries? To
say it another way: if a country puts forward a request or proposal for
working on natural gas with the United States because of its energy
needs, but USAID finds that the project would not result in a net
reduction of emissions, do you in most cases decide not to fund the
project?
Answer. USAID seeks to support our partner countries' energy sector
development objectives across energy security, economic development,
and decarbonization goals. If a partner seeks assistance that would
increase natural gas generation, we assess whether there are credible
alternatives to supporting natural gas that would also meet our mutual
objectives per U.S. Government guidance. In cases where we find no
credible alternatives, and the country is of geostrategic interest to
the United States or is conflict affected, a small island developing
state, or eligible for International Development Association funding,
we may elect to move forward with supporting the natural gas project
under U.S. Government guidelines. Net emissions considerations are a
factor, but not the only factor in making determinations.
Question. What is USAID's definition of ``clean energy''?
Answer. Clean energy programs may encompass a variety of climate
mitigation activities and are fully inclusive of renewable energy
technologies and their enabling environments. Clean energy programs
reduce and/or avoid greenhouse gas (GHG) and other climate-warming
emissions while increasing access to affordable, modern energy
services, providing economic opportunity and energy independence,
reducing extreme poverty, and/or promoting opportunities for U.S.
businesses. Clean energy programs help countries achieve their national
climate mitigation goals, and support developing countries to develop
and implement low-emission development strategies that further partner
countries' domestic priorities and international commitments. Clean
energy practices include, but are not limited to: decarbonization
strategies; renewable energy; renewable energy technology supply chain
resiliency; end-use efficiency and electrification; energy storage;
grid modernization, low-carbon transportation and industry programs;
green hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, and nuclear; GHG accounting
and inventory systems; evaluating economic and development benefits of
clean energy, enabling environment and energy sector reforms necessary
to support sustainable investments and energy systems; waste to energy;
enhanced transmission, distribution, and operating systems; and
renewable energy generation grid integration. Per U.S. Government
guidance, expenditures on oil and natural gas are only allowed in
instances where they address the emissions intensity of existing
equipment or infrastructure, such as carbon capture, utilization and
storage (CCUS) or work on short-lived climate pollutants.
Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come
from Africa?
Answer. According to the most recent data available from Climate
Watch, as of 2020, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 7.6 percent of
current global emissions. This calculation includes emissions from
Land-use Change and Forestry and all other major emissions sectors and
includes all major greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous
oxide and fluorinated gases).
Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come
from Latin America?
Answer. According to the most recent data available from Climate
Watch, as of 2020, the Latin America and Caribbean Region contributed
8.2 percent of the total global greenhouse gas emissions. This
calculation includes emissions from Land-use Change and Forestry and
all other major emissions sectors and includes all major greenhouse
gases (carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and fluorinated gases)
Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come
from South and Central Asia, other than India?
Answer. USAID works in a number of countries across both South and
Central Asia. Many of these countries are still working on energy
security and have identified energy transition as a key priority of
their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National
Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Many of the countries are members of the
Global Methane Pledge and are working to limit greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions from land-use and land-use change. Based on the most current
estimates from Global Climate Watch (https://www.climatewatchdata.org/
), there were 49.76 Gt of CO2e emissions in 2019. GHG emissions for
South and Central Asia where USAID works, excluding India, in the same
year totaled 1.44 Gt of CO2e, as summarized in the table below. This
would represent approximately 2.9 percent of global emissions.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question. Of all current global emissions, what percentage come
from Southeast Asia?
Answer. USAID works in a number of countries in Southeast Asia.
Many of these countries are still working on energy security and have
identified energy transition as a key priority of their Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs).
Many of the countries are members of the Global Methane Pledge and are
working to limit emissions from land-use and land-use change. Based on
the most current estimates from Global Climate Watch (https://
www.climatewatchdata.org/), there were 49.76 Gt of CO2e emissions in
2019. GHG emissions for Southeast Asian countries where USAID works
totaled 3.43 Gt of CO2e, as summarized in the table below. This would
represent approximately 6.9 percent of global emissions.
Question. Are there any earmarks or other statutory requirements
that prevent USAID from supporting programming related to natural gas
and nuclear energy? If so, please list them out in full.
Answer. The Clean Energy Directive definition adopted by the
Department of State and USAID prohibits the use of Clean Energy
Directive funding for natural gas assistance programming. Nuclear
energy support is allowed under the definition. Natural gas work that
is supported with funding outside of the clean energy earmark must be
approved under the Administration's international energy assistance
guidance. It is Administration policy not to provide U.S. Government
financing to unabated natural gas projects, consistent with Executive
Order 14008 on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad. This
policy has exceptions in rare cases when there are compelling national
security, geostrategic, or development/energy access benefits and no
viable lower carbon alternatives accomplish the same goals.
Question. AFRICA: U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit: The Biden
administration committed $55 billion in investments in Africa over the
next 3 years during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit (ALS), ``working
closely with Congress.''
How is this $55 billion investment reflected in the FY24 budget
request?
Answer. The President announced $55 billion for Africa at the
second U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in December 2022. This funding level
consisted of funding from many U.S. Government agencies, including
State and USAID, over three fiscal years (FY 2021 through FY 2023) for
North and sub-Saharan Africa. The FY 2024 Request total was not
included in the $55 billion total announcement.
The FY24 budget request supports sustained U.S. commitment to
Africa thru investments in sectoral areas such as Democracy, Human
Rights, and Governance (DRG), climate, security, health care, youth,
and education to address shared priorities with African nations. It
also supports the new African Democratic and Political Transition
Initiative (ADAPT) and Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA). The
Request continues funding for Prosper Africa, Power Africa, and the
Young Africa Leaders Initiative (YALI).
Question. I understand that the $55 billion figure is largely made
up of prior year funds. How will USAID message to African governments,
who have high hopes for a large influx of new U.S. investment, that
this commitment is actually just a continuation of regular programming?
Answer. The Vision Statement for the U.S.-Africa Partnership
affirmed ``commitment to reinforce long standing areas of cooperation
and expand our partnership to better meet the shared challenges and
opportunities.'' Sustained cooperation is a joint priority and we will
continue to enhance existing partnerships in sectors such as health,
agriculture, and education. The U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit also
emphasized that this investment is not just a continuation of regular
programming; we are shifting our approaches to reflect greater
cooperation and advance shared goals across a number of sectors such as
expanded trade and investment, climate adaptation and resilience, and
digital transformation. Our support will also help countries address
emerging issues through innovative approaches.
Question. The African Democratic and Political Transitions (ADAPT)
program was announced during the ALS, to ``support emerging democratic
governments and civil society at critical moments.''
What criteria will be used to determine ``critical moments''?
Answer. A signature initiative of the Administration, President
Biden announced Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) in December
2022. DTA--referred to last year by the colloquial placeholder
``Digital Africa''--aims to expand digital access and literacy and
strengthen digital enabling environments across the continent. DTA aims
to facilitate over $450 million in financing, private investment, and
donor funding for Africa in line with the African Union's Digital
Transformation Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
Africa. DTA will support increased economic opportunity and improved e-
government service delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient
African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.
Question. How will ADAPT be managed and implemented to ensure funds
can be released quickly in order to enable a timely response to
opportunities in critical moments?
Answer. The National Security Council is currently leading
interagency discussions on the management and implementation of ADAPT,
which USAID is engaging in. The discussions have prioritized rapid
availability of funds to maximize ADAPT's responsiveness to the needs
of fluid situations surrounding transition. USAID and the interagency
plan to utilize all available mechanisms to ensure these goals are met.
Question. I understand that $25 million of FY22 funds and $25
million of FY23 funds will be combined with the $25 million FY24
request to make up the initial $75 million investment in ADAPT. Where
was the $50 million from FY22 and FY23 taken from to make it available
for ADAPT?
Answer. The funding allocations for FY 2022 and FY 2023 are still
being finalized, and additional funding will be sought from the FY 2024
and FY 2025 budgets, subject to the availability of funds.
Question. The FY24 request includes $50 million for an initiative
announced at ALS called Digital Transformation in Africa. This follows
a FY23 $20 million request for Digital Africa.
Can you please provide more information on the new program Digital
Transformation in Africa?
Answer. A signature initiative of the Administration, President
Biden announced Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) in December
2022. DTA--referred to last year by the colloquial placeholder
``Digital Africa''--aims to expand digital access and literacy and
strengthen digital enabling environments across the continent. DTA aims
to facilitate over $450 million in financing, private investment, and
donor funding for Africa in line with the African Union's Digital
Transformation Strategy and the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan
Africa. DTA will support increased economic opportunity and improved e-
government service delivery by fostering an inclusive and resilient
African digital ecosystem, led by African communities and built on an
open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet.
Question. Prosper Africa: Prosper Africa brings together 17 U.S.
Government departments and agencies to foster two-way trade and
investment between the U.S. and Africa, with a secretariat led by
USAID. The FY24 request includes $100 million for Prosper Africa. This
follows a $100m FY23 request, $77 million FY22 request and a $75
million FY21 request.
What are the concrete accomplishments of Prosper Africa to date?
Answer. Prosper Africa established a continent-wide deal
facilitation platform with a pipeline of nearly 500 deals valued at
over $25 billion; launched robust continental services, including
networks of African suppliers and U.S. buyers, and a catalytic
investment facility, which are expected to boost African exports and
U.S. investment by $2 billion in the next 5 years; and helped mobilize
$1.5 billion of investment in climate, health, and sustainable
infrastructure via new partnerships between the U.S. pension community
and African counterparts.
Question. What will an additional $100 million investment help
Prosper Africa accomplish?
Answer. Prosper Africa used dedicated funding through USAID to
launch an innovative, continent-wide program with offices in North and
sub-Saharan Africa to de-risk transactions, scale opportunities, and
attract new firms to African markets. Prosper Africa is redoubling its
efforts by planning to invest $171 million that will increase U.S.
investment in Africa and African exports to the U.S. by $2 billion in
the next 5 years--a conservative estimate. The additional $100 million
in FY 2024 funds will enable Prosper Africa to dramatically increase
the number of supported transactions, broaden its geographic coverage,
bolster the activities and staff capacity of other U.S. Government
agencies, and create more opportunities to leverage private capital. In
Kenya alone, $5.3 million in Prosper Africa funds have leveraged more
than $265 million to date--a 50:1 return.
Question. Somalia: The largest request for Democracy, Human Rights
and Governance funding in Sub-Saharan Africa for FY24 is for Somalia
($33 million), a 73.7 percent increase over the FY23 request. The
security environment in Somalia, lack of political will for democratic
reforms, an inability to hold one-person-one-vote elections for 50
years and limited freedom of movement of Somali and implementing
partners makes democracy, human rights and governance programs
difficult to implement and expensive.
Question. What adjustments in strategy, as compared to the strategy
pursued from 2017-2022, will USAID pursue to ensure that investments of
significant democracy, human rights and governance funds in Somalia
achieve results?
Answer. In 2021, USAID developed a new country development
cooperation strategy (CDCS) to guide its development and humanitarian
investments in Somalia. The strategy focuses on two objectives: (1)
preventing and countering violent extremism; and (2) strengthening
capacity of individuals and households to prepare for and recover from
crises such as drought and reduce the humanitarian caseload over time.
USAID democracy, human rights, and governance (DRG) programs were
adapted to contribute to both objectives.
To advance these goals, USAID works to overcome the historical
marginalization that al-Shabaab manipulates to build support and that
makes households and communities more vulnerable to future climatic
shocks. To do this USAID seeks to bolster governance processes that are
more inclusive, particularly among traditionally marginalized groups
such as women and members of minority clans. USAID will use DRG funds
to launch a new local governance program in summer 2023 that will work
with local governments and citizens to make governance processes more
inclusive, effective, legitimate, and responsive to citizen needs.
Additionally, USAID will support these local governments to expand or
improve the delivery of basic services to marginalized communities.
Al-Shabaab uses real and perceived grievances among clans to gain
support, playing on feelings of marginalization and inequitable access
to power and resources. To mitigate this, USAID puts a heavy emphasis
on community-level reconciliation. In Somalia, USAID is using DRG funds
for stabilization programming and a new reconciliation activity that
works to build trust between communities.
USAID is also using DRG funding to advocate for the Federal
Government of Somalia (FGS) to advance technical reforms, develop
governance institutions, and advance national and state level
reconciliation. The 2-year election impasse from 2020-22 highlighted
the fundamental lack of trust between Federal Government and federal
member states.
Finally, in response to the unprecedented community uprisings
against al-Shabaab that began in June 2022, USAID has taken on a
leadership role in supporting the FGS efforts to establish and maintain
control of newly liberated communities, pivoting USAID's strategy to
support this opportunity. To stabilize these newly liberated areas,
USAID support helps establish initial governance structures, supports
reconciliation, works to increase communication between the local
government and community members in those villages most affected by
current security operations, and rehabilitates damaged community
infrastructure.
Question. Does the conduct of one-person-one-vote elections
continue to be the focus of USAID's democracy and governance programs
in Somalia? If yes, why. If no, what is the revised approach?
Answer. In 2022, USAID organized a series of workshops with the UN
and donors to reflect on the 2020-2021 electoral process. The UN and
donors agreed that roadblocks to a more inclusive, transparent, and
timely electoral process were political in nature. Looking forward to
the 2026 electoral cycle, all agreed that securing political agreement
from a more inclusive range of stakeholders on the electoral model must
precede further direct donor investments. However, together with other
donors, USAID is promoting political reconciliation between elites and
seeking broad-based consensus on a realistic and feasible electoral
model in line with prevailing security conditions.
These efforts have already re-established dialogue between the
federal and state governments and begun to yield agreements on power
sharing. These agreements will lay the foundation for finalizing the
constitution and moving Somalia towards universal suffrage elections in
the future. If the agreed-upon electoral model for 2026 falls short of
universal suffrage, USAID is committed to advocating for a model that
is maximally inclusive and representative and serves as the building
block towards future one-person-one-vote elections. In coordination
with State, USAID will continue to encourage regular and constructive
dialogue between the Federal Government and member states on the 2026
electoral cycle and is standing by to support a maximally inclusive and
representative process once agreement is reached. Somalia's President
has made reconciliation one of his priorities and thus far has focused
his administration on building political consensus on issues that have
previously been unresolved such as elections, the constitution, and
power and resource sharing between the Federal Government and federal
member states.
Question. Given the Biden administration's focus on counter-
terrorism efforts in Somalia, how is USAID supporting legitimate state
institutions to provide services and project control over territory
liberated from al-Shabaab?
Answer. Since August 2022, security operations against al-Shabaab
have liberated more than 100 towns and villages. In response, USAID has
taken a leadership role in supporting the Federal Government of
Somalia's (FGS) efforts to establish and maintain control of newly
liberated communities, pivoting USAID's strategy to support this
opportunity. Pivoting Mission funds and utilizing an additional $5
million from USAID's Complex Crisis Fund, USAID surged stabilization
support into these areas and is currently supporting 54 interventions.
These interventions have supported interim administrations to conduct
outreach to liberated communities, partnered with local governments to
repair community infrastructure damaged by al-Shabaab, and supported
the government to reconcile long-held clan grievances.
Recognizing that the development of legitimate governance
institutions that are capable of providing services requires a long-
term approach, USAID is working to expand education, health, economic
growth, local governance, and resilience programming to support these
newly liberated areas.
As part of our ongoing efforts, USAID will continue to promote
greater political, social, and economic integration between conflicting
groups, including those from historically marginalized communities, by
addressing unresolved grievances that drive communities towards al-
Shabaab. We will also leverage our programs focused on strengthening
Somalia's resilience to recurring shocks--whether climate, economic or
political, by aimings to address real and perceived economic injustices
that also contribute to violent extremism in the country.
Question. Nigeria: The FY24 request for Democracy, Human Rights,
and Governance funding for Nigeria ($25.5 million) is a 56.4 percent
increase over the FY23 request.
Does USAID regard support to elections in Nigeria as a cyclical or
continuous need?
Answer. USAID regards support to elections in Nigeria as a
continuous need. USAID's support is for the full spectrum of the
elections process, at state and national levels, in support of
Nigeria's democratic consolidation. USAID's elections assistance is
designed to build systems and processes over the long term so that the
outcome is viewed as free and fair; educate the public on their civic
rights to vote; help all Nigerians--including women--see a future
running for office; give voice to youth to feel seen and heard; and
assist people with disabilities to assert their rights under the law.
This work requires continuous engagement to achieve results, which is
why USAID partners with Nigerian Government agencies and civil society
on these issues to increase citizen political participation and promote
electoral reforms.
Question. What is the rationale for such a significant increase in
the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance budget for Nigeria, given
that national elections (approaching elections are typically the
rationale for an increased budget) were just held within the last 2
months?
Answer. USAID's Development Assistance request of $24.5 million in
DRG funding for FY 2024 reflects a broader request across USAID
Missions in Africa for increased funding for a range of DRG
programming. Election support is one component of a diverse DRG
portfolio in Nigeria. DRG activities also enhance civic voice and
accountability tools, increase accountability and effectiveness of
public institutions, and help prevent conflict. Increasing citizen
political participation and reforming electoral processes is an
important, but not the sole, element of USAID/Nigeria's continuous,
multi-faceted effort to strengthen accountable, inclusive, and
responsive governance. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country and
largest democracy, faces immense democratic governance and security
challenges. Working on issues across 36 states encompassing
approximately 90 million registered voters and characterized by a
growing youth population requires a significant increase in funding to
address critical needs such as anti-corruption efforts, drivers of
insecurity, and countering ISIS-WA influence.
Question. Cameroon: On January 1, 2021, the Senate passed
unanimously S.Res.684, regarding the conflict in Anglophone Cameroon,
calling for U.S. Government departments and agencies to undertake
several actions.
How has the Agency pressed the Government of Cameroon over the past
2 years to provide unfettered humanitarian access to vulnerable
populations in the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon?
Answer. Thank you for your concern. USAID remains deeply concerned
about the humanitarian situation in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest
regions and we continue to work with international and local partners
to provide life-saving assistance to vulnerable populations, despite
the challenges posed by ongoing violence. We continue to collaborate
closely with our Ambassador in Yaounde and other State Department
colleagues to press for progress in addressing access constraints and
bureaucratic impediments to aid delivery with the Government of
Cameroon, such as at the recent African Leaders Summit that President
Biden hosted in December 2022. Furthermore, we have engaged with the
UN, other donors, and appropriate local authorities on efforts that
support principled humanitarian response and access by humanitarian
actors, such as improving humanitarian civilian-military coordination.
USAID staff is happy to brief you further on this.
Question. Since 2021, how has USAID supported credible efforts to
address the root causes of the conflict and to achieve sustainable
peace and reconciliation in the Northwest and Southwest regions?
Answer. USAID supports diplomatic efforts deployed by the
Department of State and other international actors to reach a peaceful
resolution between the Government of Cameroon and Anglophone
separatists in the northwest and southwest regions of the country.
USAID is addressing immediate humanitarian needs in this region
through assistance focused on emergency food, health, and other
lifesaving support to vulnerable populations, such as internally
displaced persons.
USAID's new PARC-Cameroun activity, awarded in March 2022, works in
the far north of the country to strengthen the collective performance
of CSOs to address the underlying causes of insecurity and conflict.
PARC-Cameroun does this by advocating for citizen rights and service
provision, addressing the marginalization of women and youth, and
collectively responding to counter the restricted civic space for, and
stigmatization of, northern communities.
Question. In the past 2 years, in what ways has the Agency
supported humanitarian and development programming in Cameroon?
Answer. In the past 2 years, USAID has increased its work in
Cameroon through a number of new activities that address the
development challenges Cameroon faces, as well as responding to
humanitarian needs.
Our new activities include PARC-Cameroun in the far north, which
strengthens the collective performance of civil society organizations
(CSOs) to advocate for citizen rights and service provision, address
the marginalization of women and youth, and collectively respond to
counter the restricted civic space for, and stigmatization of, northern
communities.
USAID has supported Cameroon's development of its health sector as
a Global Health Security Agenda Intensive Support country. Cameroon
received funding to build its capacity to prevent, detect, and respond
to emerging infectious disease threats, which has helped the country
build systems to respond to the COVID 19 pandemic and prepare to
respond to Marburg if the recent outbreak of Marburg in Equatorial
Guinea spills over to Cameroon. Additionally, USAID continues to
implement robust PMI and PEPFAR activities in Cameroon, reaching
insecure areas throughout the country.
Cameroon is supported by the USAID/West Africa regional platform to
build the next generation of Cameroonian leaders and boost business
opportunities through the West Africa Trade Hub, Young African Leaders
Initiative, and Power Africa Off-Grid programs. Over the last 2 years,
USAID continued to provide humanitarian assistance to Cameroon as a
result of conflict and insecurity in the Anglophone region, the impact
of the Lake Chad Basin crisis in the Far North, and CAR refugees in
eastern Cameroon. In FY 2022, BHA increased its funding in Cameroon
from almost $45 million to more than $65 million, scaling up multi-
sectoral emergency and livelihood support for internally-displaced and
conflict-affected households, food and nutrition assistance to
refugees, and bolstering humanitarian logistics, analysis, and
coordination efforts across the country. Cameroon is also susceptible
to the effects of flooding during the rainy season, which last year had
devastating impacts in the Far North of Cameroon. In response, a
Declaration of Humanitarian Need was issued, and USAID's partners
provided food aid, shelter, and clean water and sanitation services for
flood-affected communities.
Question. In your role as the head of USAID, what actions have you
taken to ensure the crisis in the Anglophone regions is discussed in
international fora?
Answer. USAID is engaged with international and local partners to
alleviate the effect of the crisis on vulnerable populations by
providing assistance to those who are internally displaced. Our staff
in Cameroon regularly work with international partners including UN
agencies, other bilateral missions, and NGOs to advocate for access to
the areas to deliver both development and humanitarian assistance in
the Northwest and Southwest Anglophone regions. These discussions are
elevated with United Nations leadership in New York and Geneva as part
of our regular exchanges through key leaders of the Agency, as well as
the wider U.S. Government.
Question. How does the FY24 Budget request respond to the key U.S.
Government actions the Senate outlined in S.Res.684?
Answer. The FY 2024 Budget request maintaining our development
assistance levels and increasing our health programming in Cameroon.
USAID's efforts to start new activities that respond to the underlying
drivers of conflict in Cameroon are supported by a consistent budget
request from FY 2021 through FY 2024. Increasing the Health budget
request allows USAID's reach to expand, including areas affected by
conflict across Cameroon, and providing more necessary basic health
services to people experiencing conflict.
Additionally, USAID continues to provide humanitarian assistance to
Cameroon as a result of conflict and insecurity in the Anglophone
region, the impact of the Lake Chad Basin crisis in the Far North, and
CAR refugees in eastern Cameroon. In FY 2022, BHA increased its funding
in Cameroon from almost $45 million to more than $65 million, scaling
up multi-sectoral emergency and livelihood support.
Question. South Sudan: On December 9, 2021, the Senate passed
S.Res.380, reiterating U.S. support for the South Sudanese people and
calling for a review of our policy toward South Sudan.
Since 2021, how have you ensured that U.S. assistance adheres to
the principle of ``Do No Harm'' by pausing any funding, including
humanitarian aid, found to enrich any party of the Revitalized
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South
Sudan (R-ARCSS) or active spoilers to the agreement?
Answer. USAID takes seriously its role as a steward of the
resources of the American people. USAID places the highest priority on
ensuring our humanitarian assistance adheres to Do No Harm Principles
and effectively reaches millions of people in need, including in South
Sudan where approximately 7.8 million people (roughly 70 percent of the
population) are on the brink of starvation.
Within our humanitarian assistance programs, we require our
partners to have proper safeguards and risk mitigation systems in place
to ensure that humanitarian aid reaches those who need it most. For
example, we require partners to complete a comprehensive pre-award risk
assessment and have their own robust safety and security measures in
place, as well as to report any irregularities immediately. USAID
conducts continuous monitoring of our programs through both direct
monitoring and through use of a third-party monitor of our humanitarian
assistance programming. Furthermore, we maintain consistent
communication and oversight with our partners in an effort to ensure
U.S.-funded humanitarian assistance reaches intended beneficiaries, and
our programs remain flexible should we need to modify methods or
activities.
Question. How have you applied your leadership of the Agency to
ensure that all bureaus cooperate and work to support a comprehensive
review of USAID-administered assistance to South Sudan?
Answer. We have worked with stakeholders across the interagency and
within relevant bureaus at USAID--both in Washington and in South
Sudan--to ensure that assistance is aligned with U.S. strategic
interests and goals and that there is sound stewardship of taxpayer
funds. USAID participated in an Embassy-wide policy and program review
and conducted a mid-point review of its strategy for South Sudan. We
are happy to brief the committee further.
Furthermore, USAID has enhanced its due diligence for new awards.
In addition, USAID awards in South Sudan, as in other parts of the
world, continue to include substantial compliance provisions, both
required by law and enhanced through USAID-specific policies.
Question. What steps have you taken to complete the comprehensive
review of United States assistance programs to South Sudan, started in
2018 to ``ensure our assistance does not contribute to or prolong the
conflict, or facilitate predatory or corrupt behavior,'' and have its
findings publicized?
Answer. As part of the National Security Council-led review of U.S.
assistance programs in South Sudan, USAID undertook an analysis of U.S.
Government assistance flows to the private sector in South Sudan at
that time. As a result of this, USAID enhanced its due diligence for
new awards. In addition, USAID awards in South Sudan, as in other parts
of the world, continue to include substantial compliance provisions,
both required by law and enhanced through USAID-specific policies, to
ensure that the Agency is an effective steward of taxpayer funds.
Similarly, awards are monitored by USAID staff to ensure compliance
with award terms and conditions and to ensure the achievement of the
intended results. USAID/South Sudan staff are appropriately trained
for, and properly implement, robust award management and oversight
duties. USAID will continue to monitor the impact of our assistance
flows in South Sudan and will take corrective action when necessary.
We would be pleased to brief the Committee further.
Question. While a reduction in the budget request for South Sudan
is appropriate given the general failure of the parties in South Sudan
to make good on their commitments outlined in the Revitalized Agreement
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS), the dire
humanitarian situation faced by the South Sudanese people, and the
continuation of localized proxy conflicts, it is curious that the line
items for Conflict Mitigation and Stabilization, and Democracy, Human
Rights and Governance were reduced.
What is USAID, alongside the State Department, trying to achieve in
South Sudan? How does this budget request reflect those goals?
Answer. USAID is committed to supporting the South Sudanese
people's demands for an inclusive transition and a peaceful, stable
future and will work with Congress to best align appropriated funds. We
continue to work to mitigate and prevent sub-national violence, protect
human rights, better target U.S. assistance to communities in need,
protect and defend civic space for civil society, independent media,
and peaceful political voices, and hold the transitional government
accountable to its commitments.
Question. Sudan: What is the plan for USAID's American, third-
country national, and Sudanese implementing partners, who were left
behind following the recent evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum?
Answer. We remain very concerned about our staff and partners who
remain in Sudan. While many of USAID's implementing partner staff have
successfully been evacuated, we continue to monitor the situation with
the Interagency, communicate pathways available to partners, and
coordinate various avenues of evacuation including by providing
information for air and overland routes. Some staff chose to remain in
Sudan due to family, logistics challenges, or other personal
circumstances. We continue to work with our partners to confirm the
safety and accountability of partner staff, especially those that
remain in Sudan and stand ready to support them in partnership with our
colleagues at the Department of State.
Question. How will USAID continue to support a civilian transition?
Answer. USAID remains focused on building trust among Sudanese
stakeholders and driving a process of direct, sustained engagement with
a broad array of civilians--including marginalized groups and those
from Sudan's peripheries--to ensure that any future political process
can lead to a civilian government. The Sudanese people have not given
up, and neither have we. USAID continues to engage with a broad group
of civilians including youth, activists, human rights defenders,
women's groups, communities, resistance committees, and professional
associations who have heroically stepped-up amid the chaos to support
their fellow citizens. It is imperative that Sudanese civilians regain
control of their country, and they will have our full support to do so.
Question. MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA: Strategic Competition: In
the wake of the China-Saudi-Iran normalization agreement, China
continues to make inroads in the Middle East in an effort to displace
the United States as the partner of choice.
Do you agree that recent Chinese inroads in the Middle East run
contrary to U.S. national security objectives?
Answer. Yes. The PRC's foreign assistance policy, including
negative and inappropriate influence, actions and messaging, is one of
the biggest challenges USAID faces. USAID's approach is to put forward
a positive, affirmative vision for global development that is
fundamentally different from efforts to advance the centralized,
authoritarian model of development that Beijing advocates. That model
is at odds with our values, which are grounded in the interests of our
partners, and guided by the conviction that democratic principles form
the strongest foundation upon which to build open, transparent,
accountable, sustainable, prosperous, and sovereign societies.
We defer to the Department of State for additional policy context.
Question. Please describe in detail USAID's role and contributions
to strategic competition in the Middle East.
Answer. When it comes to economic ties that promote growth and job
creation, the United States is the better, more capable, and reliable
partner in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, despite the
People's Republic of China's (PRC) status as the region's largest
trading partner in recent years resulting from the drop in U.S.
dependence on Middle Eastern oil. We invest more, employ more, donate
more, train more, and educate more.
Across the Middle East, we are advancing these objectives. For
example, as the PRC invests billions in energy, transport, water and 5G
technology in Jordan, USAID's approach has been to prioritize technical
assistance to support Jordan's ability to assess foreign investment
risk and avoid bad deals, thereby mitigating PRC influence on water
infrastructure and financing decisions. These efforts strengthen
transparency and governance to avoid opaque foreign involvement and/or
investments.
We would be pleased to brief the Committee in further detail.
Question. While countries like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and
the United Arab Emirates do not receive assistance from USAID, how does
USAID engage with our gulf partners to ensure the United States remains
the partner of choice in the Middle East?
Answer. We engage in a broad range of bilateral, regional, and
multilateral fora to enhance our partnership and cooperation with Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and other
Gulf countries. Senior USAID officials attend events hosted by Gulf
partners throughout the region, meet with counterparts during their
U.S. visits, and maintain relationships with Gulf Ambassadors in the
U.S. to discuss assistance priorities and potential areas of
collaboration.
In addition, USAID has conducted outreach to Gulf donors on
humanitarian and development issues over decades, through sustained
staff-level engagements and high-level USG official meetings. As part
of the Fifth Strategic Dialogue in March 2023, the United States and
Qatar discussed the need for greater support for women and children in
vulnerable environments, rising global food insecurity levels, and the
importance of rapid responses to emerging humanitarian crises.
Similarly, the United States and the UAE continue to engage on women's
economic empowerment, food and water security, global health security,
and health cooperation--topics expected to be discussed during the next
Economic Policy Dialogue between both countries later this year.
In 2020, USAID signed separate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs)
with Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait to advance bilateral humanitarian and
development assistance cooperation. These agreements catalyzed deeper
bilateral engagement, including the signing of a funding agreement
between USAID and Qatar's foreign development assistance agency to
support Syrian Civil Defence (``White Helmets'') core operations in
Northwest Syria following the 2023 earthquake.
In 2022, the United States joined Israel, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, and
Morocco in establishing the Negev Forum to enhance regional prosperity
and stability. USAID serves as the U.S. Government lead for two of the
six Negev Forum Working Groups (Food Security and Water Technology and
Tourism), and also provides expertise to the Health, Clean Energy, and
Education and Coexistence Working Groups.
Question. West Bank and Gaza: Will you seek to prioritize violence
reduction and de-radicalization programs in the West Bank and Gaza to
ensure programs for accessibility, combatting gender-based violence,
and others are not undermined?
Answer. USAID funding supports U.S. foreign policy goals for equal
measures of security, prosperity, and freedom for both Israelis and
Palestinians and builds the foundation for a future Palestinian state.
In a time of increased insecurity, USAID programming targets some of
the daily inequities that lead to rising frustration and outbreaks of
violence while also addressing the drivers of violence directly.
USAID has a strong track record of delivering assistance even in
contexts of violence and instability, and we will leverage that
experience to ensure that vulnerable communities continue to benefit
from our programming even as we direct resources specifically to the
challenge of reducing violence and instability.
To address the current, acute increase of violence in the West
Bank, USAID launched a pilot rapid response program in 2023 to target
conflict-prone areas in the West Bank, such as Jenin and Nablus. USAID
is already working closely with the U.S. Security Coordinator to
identify opportunities to strategically mitigate the drivers of
violence. Pending Congressional approval, USAID would launch a larger
rapid response activity with FY22 funds.
Some of our work may have an indirect impact on violence levels.
For example, research shows that violence among youth is strongly
correlated with violence in the home. This makes programming to provide
psycho-social support and to prevent gender-based violence (GBV) an
important contributor to the overarching goal of broad-based violence
reduction within the region. USAID will therefore heighten its focus on
GBV programming as part of its overall approach to violence reduction.
Question. While I understand that funding levels to the West Bank
and Gaza are driven by appropriations law, assistance to the West Bank
and Gaza increased dramatically from $75 million in fiscal years 2020
and 2021 to $225 million in fiscal year 2022.
What steps is USAID taking to address absorption challenges with
the $219 million appropriated for the West Bank and Gaza?
Answer. The USAID/WBG Mission is fully confident it can absorb the
FY22 level.
During the pause in assistance in January of 2019, USAID slowed
Foreign Service Officer (FSO) assignments to the WBG Mission and
assigned many of its local staff to serve with other Missions and
offices within the USG on Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs). Since
the relaunch of assistance in January of 2021, USAID has returned all
of the local staff to work full time on the WBG portfolio, bringing the
total to 76. USAID is also increasing the number of FSOs, and the
mission will be fully staffed with 13 by summer's end. In addition,
there are a variety of trusted international and local partners who are
qualified and prepared to implement USAID programs.
Given rising instability in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) and
pressing development needs, the increased level of funding for fiscal
year 2022 will allow the USAID/WBG to support economic and development
assistance programs that improve the lives of millions of Palestinians
by providing immediate relief and advancing progress across sectors
such as health, economic growth, civil society, climate, and water. To
address the increased insecurity, especially in the West Bank, USAID
programming targets some of the daily inequities that lead to rising
frustration and outbreaks of violence while also addressing the drivers
of violence directly.
Question. Despite 2 years of Palestinian assistance under the Biden
administration, Israeli-Palestinian violence is at record levels, there
is no political horizon, and we have not seen substantial movement on
``pay-for-slay'' reforms.
How are you linking Palestinian assistance to strategic outcomes in
the West Bank and Gaza?
What are USAID's strategic outcomes linked to Palestinian
assistance?
What efforts is USAID undertaking, in conjunction with State, to
ensure that Palestinian assistance is synchronized with USCC security
operations, MEPPA, and State engagement on ``pay-for-slay'' reforms?
Answer. USAID is deeply integrated into the interagency process to
establish the Integrated Country Strategy, and USAID funding supports
the goals of the ICS to (1) advance peace and a two-state solution, (2)
strengthen non-PA Palestinian institutions at the local level, (3)
build a prosperous Palestinian economy, and (4) ensure regional
integration.
USAID programming supports each of these goals and advances the
overarching U.S. foreign policy goal of ensuring equal measures of
security, prosperity, and freedom for both Israelis and Palestinians.
USAID makes progress toward these strategic goals through a wide
range of programming that targets the most vulnerable in Palestinian
society, builds bridges of trust and peace with Israelis, and focuses
its assistance in order to prevent radicalization and extremism in
communities prone to violence.
USAID works closely with interagency partners, including the State
Department, the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), and the Development
Finance Corporation, to deliver the most responsible development
programs in service of these objectives.
USAID meets regularly with these interagency partners to discuss
shared strategic objectives; to outline planned interventions; and to
ensure that our messaging and programming, including USAID's bilateral
and MEPPA funds, are mutually reinforcing and fully in compliance with
all relevant legislation and regulations, including the Taylor Force
Act.
To address spiraling violence in the West Bank, USAID is deepening
its partnership with USSC to work on a pilot program targeting
conflict-prone areas such as Jenin and Nablus. Pending Congressional
approval, it would launch a broader rapid response program with FY22
funds to build on this collaboration.
USAID has been very clear on our position that the prisoner payment
system is abhorrent. USAID, in concert with other U.S. officials, has
repeatedly raised the issue directly with Palestinian leadership to
urge them to end it. The State Department is leading efforts to
pressure the PA into reform of the program, and we defer questions on
that progress to the State Department. In the meantime, USAID is fully
committed to maintaining compliance with the Taylor Force Act in all
our programming.
Question. Syria: The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act prohibits
``reconstruction'' in Syria.
How does USAID distinguish between early recovery, earthquake
relief, and reconstruction?
Answer. USAID humanitarian assistance support in the aftermath of
an earthquake focuses on rescuing victims and providing immediate
relief to survivors, and could include search and rescue, evacuation,
the distribution of tents/tarpaulins, ready-to-consume foods, water
bladders/jerrycans, kitchen sets, blankets and other items needed for
short-term survival until medium-term support from governments and
other actors can commence. This aid usually builds on what surviving
communities have already started doing themselves after an earthquake.
In response to the February 6 earthquakes in Syria, USAID partners were
able to draw on the existing major humanitarian infrastructure to
quickly mobilize to provide life- saving support including rubble
removal, shelter rehabilitation, emergency shelter kits, food
assistance, provision of water, distribution of hygiene kits,
distribution of non-food items, and mobile medical units.
Early recovery is a type of humanitarian assistance designed to
make vulnerable people more resilient and reduce the need for
humanitarian assistance. USAID-funded early recovery programs in Syria
are very limited in scale and conducted by independent and impartial
humanitarian agencies. Like all other humanitarian assistance, these
programs are channeled through UN and NGO partners, not governments. An
example of early recovery would be a humanitarian organization
rehabilitating a conflict-damaged water network to ensure continued
access to clean water.
USAID does not do reconstruction activities there. In other
contexts, reconstruction focuses on essential services delivered by the
state through its own capacity. Given the current operational context
and constraints, USAID does not do reconstruction in Syria.
Question. Please provide definitions, expenditure thresholds, or
other data that USAID relies on to ensure it is not in violation of the
Caesar Act.
Answer. USAID stabilization programs do not operate in Regime-held
parts of Syria. USAID stabilization awards elsewhere in Syria--like all
USAID stabilization awards--include explicit requirements to adhere to
all applicable laws, including the Caesar Civilian Protection Act.
During the kick-off post-award orientation with each partner for every
new award, USAID informs partners of the OFAC licenses and their
responsibilities to adhere to them. USAID also shares OFAC guidance
during each award's kickoff, including the U.S. Treasury Department
communique that includes Sanctions Compliance Guidance. Contracts
include the FAR clause 52.225-13 Restrictions on Certain Foreign
Purchases. Assistance awards include an applicable standard provision
entitled, ``Preventing Transactions With, or the Provision of Resources
or Support to, Sanctioned Groups and Individuals.''
Question. Tunisia: President Kais Saied has taken dramatic steps
that have dismantled Tunisia's democratic institutions, upset checks on
the power of the executive, and have failed to address the root causes
of Tunisia's economic woes.
What actions is USAID, in conjunction with the State Department,
taking to prevent democratic backsliding and restore the integrity of
Tunisia's democratic institutions?
Answer. The United States remains committed to the long-standing
partnership with the Tunisian people, and we have been clear about the
reversal of many of the Tunisian people's hard-won democratic gains
over the past 21 months. Since July 2021, the Secretary of State and
other senior U.S. officials have conveyed our deep concern over
Tunisia's negative democratic trajectory and urged President Saied to
take concrete steps to restore confidence in Tunisian democracy. The
United States has coordinated closely with our European and
international partners to deliver a united message, when possible.
We continue to support the Tunisian people's aspirations for a
democratic and accountable government that respects human rights and
fundamental freedoms. This includes using U.S. assistance strategically
and targeting our programs to support civil society and economic growth
while maintaining core security interests.
USAID's work focuses on building democratic resilience in Tunisia
through support to civil society, countering mis- and disinformation,
supporting credible elections and advancing inclusion of all Tunisians
into political processes. We also recognize that to counter democratic
backsliding and build Tunisian resilience to political shocks, we must
concurrently work to address the country's fragile economic state. Our
investment in the Tunisian private sector is also vital to mitigate the
severe impact of rising unemployment, inflation, and commodity
shortages, and prevent thousands of Tunisian businesses from failing.
Question. What challenges does USAID face when transitioning from
programming through a foreign government to programming through civil
society organizations?
Answer. USAID has partnered with civil society organizations in
Tunisia since 2011, and given our longstanding partnerships with civil
society, we did not experience major challenges in pivoting assistance.
The recalibration of U.S. assistance from the Government of Tunisia to
the Tunisian people enabled us to augment support to existing
partnerships with civil society and created opportunities to invest in
new organizations. Our existing programs work with civil society groups
across the country to promote the integrity of elections and other
democratic processes, empower youth, and combat mis- and disinformation
across all forms of media. Our long-term investment in civil society
allowed us to pivot in the face of growing threats to freedom of
expression and association, helping to advance information integrity
and support calls for inclusive reform.
Question. Why haven't USAID and State conditioned assistance to
Tunisia based on clearly articulated democratic benchmarks? Is there a
benefit or risk to this approach?
Answer. The United States continues to engage with the Tunisian
people, partner with civil society, and work with international
partners to communicate our concerns at the highest levels about the
negative trajectory for democracy and human rights in Tunisia.
Despite our concerns over the Government of Tunisia's anti-
democratic trends, we feel it is important to maintain direct support
to the Tunisian people as they grapple with the twin economic and
democratic crises. U.S. assistance empowers Tunisian civil society
pressing for government accountability, combats dis- and
misinformation, informs citizens about their rights and political
processes, and supports citizen oversight of political processes,
including elections. U.S. assistance also supports Tunisians as they
grapple with the declining economic conditions and food insecurity
exacerbated by Russia's aggression in Ukraine amidst domestic political
turmoil and closing civic space.
At this stage, we assess that messaging against the recent actions
of the Tunisian Government can be calibrated with our assistance which
is aimed at sustaining our long-term relationship with the Tunisian
people. As we continue to plan for the future of development assistance
in Tunisia, we will keep pushing for a return to a democratic path
while balancing our broader national security interests.
Question. What balance should the U.S. strike between forcing
democratic reforms and strategic competition with China?
Answer. USAID's democracy assistance in Tunisia is an extension of
our strategic competition with the People's Republic of China and other
competitors who prefer to advance or advocate for a centralized,
authoritarian model of development. USAID programming works to counter
the authoritarian narrative in Tunisia by promoting economic
opportunity and inclusive, democratic values and by building resilience
to autocracy with a particular focus on civil society and marginalized
communities.
Question. SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA: SIGAR John Sopko recently
testified that U.S. assistance to Afghanistan is subject to widespread
diversion and abuse by the Taliban.
Does USAID maintain a policy of ``no direct benefit'' to the
Taliban?
Answer. USAID assistance is not provided to the Taliban and does
not directly benefit the Taliban. All USAID humanitarian and
development assistance supports the work of UN agencies and
experienced, carefully chosen international NGOs with extensive
experience working in challenging environments. These partners have
robust risk mitigation procedures in place to ensure that our funded
assistance reaches its intended recipients.
Question. What specific mechanisms has USAID developed to prevent
direct benefit to the Taliban, to include associated mission orders?
Answer. USAID takes its duty as a steward of U.S. taxpayer funding
seriously and holds implementing partners to the highest standards to
ensure that taxpayer funds are used wisely, effectively, and for their
intended purposes. USAID assistance is not provided to the Taliban and
does not directly benefit the Taliban.
USAID implementers have extensive experience operating in high-risk
environments around the world. USAID requires them to have proper
safeguards and risk-mitigation systems in place to help ensure that
principled development and humanitarian aid reaches those who need it
most.
RAMPs: USAID employs risk analytic processes that include an
examination of the risks associated with the diversion of assistance to
the Taliban and Haqqani Network in Afghanistan. USAID requires that
partners submit Risk Assessment and Management Plans (RAMPs) as part of
their applications for funding. USAID utilizes these RAMPs, along with
our robust internal analysis, to examine how applicants for funding
will mitigate the risk of our assistance benefiting sanctioned
entities, among other risks.
OIG: Per USAID standard provisions in awards, partners are required
to report to USAID's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) all
incidents of fraud, waste and abuse, including diversion. USAID staff
continually coordinate with our partners to ensure both that our
assistance is reaching those for which it is intended and that our
partners have effective mitigation measures in place to help safeguard
against similar incidents occurring. USAID requires all cases of fraud,
waste, and abuse to be reported. These instances are all documented,
tracked, and reported to USAID's OIG.
PROGRAM REPORTING: USAID staff regularly meet with partners, as
well as review programmatic and financial reports corresponding with
their respective awards, to assess the progress of award implementation
and obtain key contextual and programmatic updates, including access to
beneficiary populations, safety and security, and attempted Taliban
interference. Partners are required to provide regular program updates
on the progress of their activities and report any diversions,
seizures, or losses. We monitor these reports to verify not only that
our assistance reaches those for whom it is intended, but also that our
partners have effective mitigation measures in place to help safeguard
against incidents occurring.
THIRD PARTY MONITORING: USAID programming is dynamic and adjusted
to meet the requirements of monitoring and evaluating our programs from
outside Afghanistan. USAID and our implementing partners monitor
programs through numerous methods, including by remote monitoring,
post-distribution monitoring, and third-party monitoring. USAID
utilizes a third-party monitoring (TPM) contractor to provide in-person
oversight of awards and promptly follows up with partners on reported
findings, including diversion or other program irregularities. USAID's
Afghanistan Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Activity TPM helps
ensure that USAID's development and humanitarian programs in
Afghanistan achieve their intended results. This is done through strong
evaluation of technical support services, learning and adaptive
management services, and program support services.
SANCTIONS RISK ANALYSIS: All USAID partners are required to comply
with USG legal authorizations restricting transactions with the
Taliban, including annual appropriations restrictions. However, USAID
and our partners also have authorization via various OFAC licenses to
engage in incidental transactions necessary to facilitate the provision
of assistance (i.e., fuel, electricity, etc.). This is not unique to
Afghanistan. USAID, and our partners, have authorization via various
OFAC licenses to engage in incidental transactions to facilitate the
provision of assistance across OFAC sanctions programs (including,
e.g., Yemen, Venezuela, and Horn of Africa countries) in non-permissive
environments. While USAID has legal authorizations in place to
safeguard against sanctions violations, we still require our
implementing partners to report any instances of diversion, fraud,
waste, and abuse, including incidents involving the Taliban and Haqqani
Network, and will suspend funding if necessary.
TERRORIST FINANCING RISK ASSESSMENT: USAID has a track record of
ensuring that our assistance does not benefit terrorists or other
blocked persons. In 2009, the Mission implemented a Terrorist Financing
Risk Assessment, a document that requires USAID staff to adhere to
policies that ensure USAID-financed projects and activities are
insulated against their benefits being provided, even inadvertently, to
terrorists.
VETTING: USAID's partner vetting policies are outlined in ADS
Chapter 319 (https://www.usaid.gov/about-us/agency-policy/series-300/
319), which includes requirements for pre-award vetting and an option
for post-award vetting for urgently needed humanitarian assistance (see
ADS 319.3.6.3). Special standard operating processes are further
described in the country specific partner vetting orders.
MISSION ORDER: USAID/Afghanistan's vetting Mission Order 201.06
outlines the vetting process in detail. Generally, USAID vets proposed
non-U.S. prime or sub-awardees when the proposed award amount exceeds
$25,000. Vetting is done by award, and is redone annually for multi-
year awards. U.S. citizens generally are not vetted; per M.O. 201.06;
however, USAID reserves the right to vet any entity, or any person, at
any time when there is a noted concern of being involved with a
prohibited party. The Mission Order (and other information on the
vetting process) is provided to implementing partners (IPs) as part of
the pre-award process and at other times, as requested. The Vetting
Support Unit provides virtual one-on-one briefings, instructions, and
vetting customer service support to all IPs and potential IPs prior to
and throughout the vetting process.
Question. The State Department transmitted to Congress on May 3,
2018, that assistance to the West Bank and Gaza is considered
``directly benefitting'' the Palestinian Authority according to the
following conditions: The intended primary beneficiary or end user of
the assistance; Whether the Palestinian Authority is the direct
recipient of the assistance; Whether the assistance involves the
payment of Palestinian Authority creditors; The extent of ownership or
control the Palestinian Authority exerts over an entity or individual
that is the primary beneficiary or end user of the assistance; Whether
the assistance or services provided directly replace assistance or
services provided by the Palestinian Authority.
What legal definition of ``direct benefit'' is USAID using to
govern assistance in Afghanistan?
Answer. Section 7044(a)(1) of the Department of State, Foreign
Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act (SFOAA), 2022
imposes a restriction on the use of any FY 2022 or prior year
assistance funds, including Economic Support Funds, ``for direct
assistance to the Taliban.'' The provision applies to any new
obligations and new sub-obligations under a bilateral agreement of FY
2022 or prior year assistance funds made available to the Department of
State and USAID.
``Direct assistance'' is not defined in the SFOAA and the term is
not otherwise a term of art, therefore USAID evaluates the scope of the
restriction on a case-by-case basis. Because the United States has not
yet made a decision as to whether to recognize any entity, including
the Taliban, as the Government of Afghanistan, the provision raises
difficult questions regarding its potential application to Afghan
Government entities, such as ministries, etc., which continue to exist
and operate regardless of any U.S. recognition decision. The Department
of State and USAID expect that the restriction would apply to any
assistance provided directly to the Taliban as a group and could also
apply to entities controlled by the Taliban, depending on the
circumstances. Because the term ``direct assistance'' is not defined,
USAID analyzes on a case-by-case basis whether particular programs or
activities are subject to this restriction.
Question. WESTERN HEMISPHERE: Colombia: The FY24 Budget request
would direct additional resources to ``address root causes of illegal
migration.'' However, in the last 2 years, the Administration has only
been able to report lower illegal immigration numbers as a result of
the legally dubious parole programs it began implementing late in 2022.
Please provide evidence that USAID programs in Central America are
directly related to lower illegal immigration numbers.
Answer. The budget request expands economic prosperity while
supporting human rights and citizen security--both clear drivers of
migration. Programs will respond to irregular hemispheric migration in
the region by addressing the root causes of migration from Central
America, while also providing legal pathways for migration, and
promoting the socio-economic integration of migrants in Latin America
and the Caribbean.
The Administration is committed to long-term development solutions
that address the root causes of migration and collaboratively manage
migration in the Western Hemisphere. We know that making progress
requires sustained political commitment and cooperation across a broad
range of stakeholders, combined with both private sector and foreign
assistance investments.
We fully understand the headwinds in the region, particularly
democratic backsliding in El Salvador and Guatemala, an uncertain
trajectory in Honduras. However, there are clear signs of progress amid
a challenging strategic environment. The Root Causes Strategy has
yielded some clear results.
Intentions to go to live or work in another country, as measured by
Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) surveys conducted in 2022,
fell by double digits in Guatemala and Honduras (with almost no change
in El Salvador), compared to 2021 survey results. Rates of GDP growth
per capita rebounded after steep drop-offs due to the COVID-19
pandemic, and national homicide rates in all three countries continued
their multi-year decline.
Question. The FY24 budget request asks for $43.3 million to support
implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord in Colombia. According to
Colombia's Attorney General, about 412 accused murderers of demobilized
FARC members, human rights defenders, and relatives of FARC demobilized
members remain at large because they are protected under the cease fire
decrees issued by President Petro in December 2022.
Please describe how the cease fire decrees may impact the
implementation of USAID programs related to the 2016 Peace Accord.
Answer. Thus far, Petro administration talks with armed groups have
not impacted USAID's programs related to the 2016 Peace Accord. The
Accord remains Colombia's best tool to consolidate peace, expand the
state's presence to violent rural areas, and promote the well-being of
Colombia's most vulnerable populations. USAID has been a steadfast ally
of Colombia for many years before, during, and after the signing of the
Accord. We are closely monitoring the Petro administration's talks with
armed groups and will continue to assess changes in the context. Should
the situation merit program adjustments we will do so in consultation
with Congress.
Question. USAID plays a significant role in Colombia's efforts to
substitute illicit coca crops. A 2020 review by the State Department's
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement found that social
leaders were more-than-twice likely to have been killed in areas where
there was no forced eradication and with levels of coca cultivation.
Please explain USAID's current understanding of how many
assassinations and attacks on human rights defenders and social leaders
take place in areas were eradication takes place?
Answer. Advancing human rights is a U.S. Government priority in
Colombia; one defender killed is one too many. In Colombia, USAID
focuses on prevention, protection, and response measures to address
human rights challenges. Despite steady advances in Colombia's human
rights over the past decade, attacks against human rights and
environmental defenders remain far too frequent, particularly along
lucrative narcotrafficking and illegal mining routes and in
environmentally protected areas.
The vacuum left in some areas of Colombia by inadequate state
presence is quickly filled by illegal armed groups. In those areas coca
cultivation can flourish, and with it levels of violence increase
significantly, including the killing of social leaders. U.S. assistance
supports the Colombian Government's efforts to not only reduce levels
of coca cultivation but also to increase state presence and by
extension, decrease violence. The United Nations' Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) Colombia's team collects and
disseminates data on the incidence and impact of violence (See, for
example: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2022-07/reporta-
Informe-Violencia-Territorial-en-Colombia-Recomendaciones-para-el-
Nuevo-Gobierno-Oficina-ONU-Derechos-Humanos.pdf). We partner with
UNOHCHR and support their work (more details below).
USAID's strategy focuses on protecting leaders, preventing violent
attacks against them, and reducing impunity for these crimes.
USAID quadrupled its funding in the past 2 years to the United
Nations' Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR)--
from about $1 million annually to $4.6 million--to monitor Colombia's
human rights situation, assist the Colombian Government in protecting
human rights, and help the Colombian Attorney General's Office secure
nearly 70 convictions in human rights defender homicide cases.
USAID also directly supports the Attorney General's Office to
dismantle complex criminal structures and target those responsible for
human rights defender crimes.
USAID partners with the Inspector General's Office (IGO) to
facilitate dialogue between social leaders and key government
authorities. USAID also elevates human rights defenders through the
Lidera la Vida campaign that seeks to raise public awareness, and spur
action around the need to protect social leaders and human rights
defenders. In addition, USAID supports IGO efforts to advance
disciplinary actions for public officials who fail to protect leaders
and implement Ombudsman Early Warning Alerts as required by law.
USAID has trained thousands of leaders and civil society
organizations in self-protection measures. Not one leader trained has
been killed. USAID has partnered with the National Protection Unit,
police, and other Government of Colombia institutions to scale these
efforts and focus on particularly threatened leaders, such as crop
substitution leaders.
Question. Please explain how failure to eradicate illicit coca
crops will impact the success of USAID efforts to support
implementation of the 2016 Peace Accord.
Answer. Despite continuing challenges of violence and coca
production, the Peace Accord has provided the most important forcing
mechanism to push the Colombian state to areas where coca is grown,
increasing public investments and state presence. Colombians living in
these regions detest living under the control of violent drug gangs and
are looking for a better life. A lack of sufficient eradication may
result in increased illicit cultivation which will impede both USAID
and Colombian Government efforts to implement programs and expand
services and licit economic opportunities in these regions.
At the March 2023 High Level Dialogue meetings in Washington, both
the U.S. and Colombia re-committed to a holistic approach to
counternarcotics and strengthening peace. USAID collaborates closely
with the Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (State/INL), Department of Defense, and Colombian
stakeholders on this holistic approach, supporting peace through
reducing illicit coca crops and helping communities to transition to
licit livelihoods. This approach also includes a strong focus on
environmental protection and combating environmental crimes as well as
broader metrics of success.
In terms of crop substitution, USAID supports various modalities,
including those focused on entering into agreements with communities to
transition out of coca and, in return, receive improved public goods
and services, land titles, economic opportunities, and payments for
environmental services. Our efforts support the entire community.
In the many places where USAID has built stronger licit options,
people's lives have been transformed through the production and sale of
licit crops like cacao, coffee, dairy, and rubber. Coca replanting
rates in communities where USAID is present are generally significantly
lower than in communities where USAID is not working.
Question. Honduras: In January, Taiwan joined a USAID-led effort to
provide education to about 300,000 children in Honduras. Has the Castro
Government's recognition of the People's Republic of China in March had
any impact on U.S. support for this program?
Answer. The Government of Honduras's diplomatic recognition of the
People's Republic of China led the Government of Taiwan to pull all
development support out of Honduras, including the $2 million Taiwan
had pledged in support of a USAID-led education alliance.
However, the alliance has been able to continue with U.S.
Government funding as well as private sector and community support. The
alliance continues to build and improve school infrastructure, promote
student enrollment and retention, develop alternative education options
for out-of-school youth, and work to prevent school-based violence.
Question. Haiti: Please explain whether and how the absence of a
U.S. Ambassador in Haiti has impacted the work of USAID in that
country.
Answer. As you have noted eloquently in the past, the U.S. is best
able to promote its national security interests abroad with a Senate-
confirmed ambassador at post. Accordingly, USAID supports the
confirmation of a U.S. Ambassador to Haiti.
In the meantime, USAID has full access to our government
counterparts and continues to provide development and life-saving
humanitarian assistance. USAID has a close working relationship with
the Deputy Chief of Mission and Charge d'Affaires, a.i. Ambassador Eric
Stromayer. USAID regularly briefs the Charge on humanitarian response
issues and the U.S. Government's humanitarian and development
assistance. Ambassador Stromayer regularly and effectively engages with
the Government of Haiti, UN and non-governmental organization (NGO)
partners, and other external stakeholders on humanitarian priorities.
He also represents the Mission at various external events in support of
Haiti and the Haitian people, including the upcoming 2023 National
Nutrition Survey (l'Enquete Nutritionnelle Nationale) hosted by H.E.
Prime Minister Dr. Ariel Henry, with the Ministry of Public Health and
Population (MSPP), and in collaboration with UNICEF.
USAID's development programs continue implementation to build a
stable and economically viable Haiti, focusing on improving health and
education outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving
the independence and accountability of government institutions. Our
development assistance provides economic opportunity through inclusive,
environmentally sustainable agriculture development and micro-, small-,
and medium-sized business development, and improves the economic and
environmental resilience of communities. USAID health programs work to
fight infectious disease and improve primary healthcare services and
increase access to water and sanitation services.
Question. EUROPE & EURASIA: War in Ukraine: Russia continues to
make clear its unhappiness with the Black Sea Grain Deal and seems
increasingly likely to withdraw from it when the Deal comes up for
renewal again.
If Russia does indeed abrogate its participation in the Black Sea
Grain Deal, what contingency plans does USAID have to help transport
Ukrainian grain to those nations that need it most?
Answer. Continuing to support the efforts of the Black Sea Grain
Initiative (BSGI) is a priority for USAID. Ukraine's ability to export
grain is particularly critical in light of the uncertainty surrounding
the BSGI renewal. Based on Russia's prior behavior in talks with UN
Secretary-General (SG) Guterres and active efforts to undermine the
Black Sea Grain deal, we have modest expectations of any extension of
the deal. Any interruption would be detrimental to food-insecure
populations worldwide, global food prices, and Ukraine's economy.
USAID will continue to utilize the generous support provided by
Congress to support Ukraine's agriculture needs. USAID's Agriculture
Resilience Initiative--Ukraine (AGRI) funding, which has increased from
$100 million to $350 million, will be key to support Ukraine's
agriculture sector at this critical time. Additionally, USAID is
advocating with other donors and the private sector to leverage
additional external funding to add to the $150 million USAID has helped
to raise since the launch of AGRI. Since the beginning of the war,
USAID has provided over 13,700 farmers with seeds, fertilizer, storage,
and other services to help them continue to produce despite the high
uncertainties. To support the spring sowing campaign in 2023, USAID's
initiatives are distributing fertilizer and seeds to farmers in 15
oblasts most affected by the war, and offering more opportunities to
farmers to access needed finance. Should Ukraine face a deficit in
storage due to shrinking export capacity, USAID will look to find ways
to support farmers with storage solutions and services, using the
network of local storage service providers that the Agency established
in 2022, which provided 1.5 million metric tons of storage capacity
last year. Additionally, USAID is co-investing with private sector
partners (Kernel, Grain Alliance, and Nibulon) to expand grain export
capacity and operations of alternative export routes, namely through
two Danube ports (Reni and Izmail) and Cierna nad Tisou in Slovakia.
Those combined $44 million investments are projected to increase
Ukraine's grain shipping capacity by more than 3.35 million tons
annually, bolstering Ukraine's economy and bringing much-needed grain
to the global market.
USAID is also considering different sources and modalities of food
assistance--including U.S. in-kind food commodities--to ensure that
there are no interruptions in lifesaving food assistance in the nations
where USAID is currently sending Ukrainian grain. These include grain
procurement in other countries such as Australia and India, where
production was very good this year. USAID partner the World Food
Program also plans to revert to shipping grain and oilseeds out via the
Danube and rail networks though this option would only meet about 40
percent of monthly export requirements.
Question. Does the U.S. Government believe that it may be necessary
to acquiesce to Russia's demands to open the ammonia pipeline across
Ukraine and permit more exports of Russian and Belarusian fertilizer in
order to keep grain flowing from Ukraine? If yes, please explain your
reasoning.
Answer. Russia's consistent actions to undermine the Black Sea
Grain Initiative (BSGI)--by imposing unilateral deadlines, threatening
to withdraw, and obstructing ship movements--are further evidence that
Russia is weaponizing food in its war against Ukraine, at the expense
of the world's hungry people. Russia's obstruction of the BSGI is a
violation of the commitments it made to the United Nations last summer.
The data we have suggests that Russia is exporting grain and fertilizer
at the same levels--if not higher--than it was before its full-scale
invasion of Ukraine. Whether to reopen the Togliatti-Pivdenny pipeline
for ammonia export is a matter for discussion between the parties.
Regardless, Ukraine's grain should flow unimpeded.
Question. Despite the growing and acute humanitarian needs in
Ukraine, your FY24 budget request maintains funding level for Ukraine
that are very similar to pre-war requests.
Does USAID believe that its funding needs in Ukraine will shortly
return to pre-war levels?
Answer. The FY24 budget request allocated for Ukraine reflects the
world's new multifaceted and intertwined challenges resulting from
Russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion in February 2022.
The FY24 budget request accounts for an increase in resource
requirements from the renewed base budget to meet substantial needs,
taking into account that Ukraine received no base funding in FY23
because all funding that year was included in supplemental
appropriations. This budget request reflects USAID's efforts to
appropriately respond to one of the greatest threats to democratic
freedom and sovereignty of our generation. Specifically, the FY24
request for USAID- and State-managed Assistance to Eastern Europe and
Central Asia (AEECA) funding is almost 80 percent higher than the level
requested in FY22 and appropriated in FY21, and there is a 100 percent
increase to the Global Health Programs-USAID (GHP-USAID) funds. This
increase reflects our effort to right-size and normalize funding levels
to appropriately and adequately respond to the monumental challenges
facing our work in Ukraine. Given the enormity of the challenges from
continued and elevated Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the
daunting task of reconstruction and rehabilitation that lies ahead, we
do not anticipate that funding needs will shortly return to pre-war
levels.
Question. Does the Administration expect to continue to rely on
supplemental requests to fund U.S. assistance to Ukraine?
Answer. We stand with Ukraine and greatly appreciate the
supplemental appropriations Congress has passed, which have been
indispensable in providing necessary support to the citizens and
Government of Ukraine while advancing U.S. Government (USG) objectives.
We will be forward-leaning in utilizing our available funding to
address the highest needs and in working with other donors to leverage
additional support to help meet Ukraine's budget gaps and assistance
needs.
Despite this historic support, Ukraine continues to face monumental
challenges in meeting the needs of its people and, ultimately,
recovering. Given the fluidity of the situation on the ground, we will
continue to assess requirements and available resources and request
funding from Congress, as needed. We are in close coordination with our
colleagues at the State Department, NSC and OMB about the ongoing
challenges and our ability to meet USG objectives in Ukraine.
Question. Compared to last year's budget request, $5 million less
has been requested for State Department OIG, while $5 million more has
been requested for USAID OIG.
Is this adjustment in funding correlated? If so, what is the
reasoning behind the $5 million shift to USAID OIG?
How will USAID prioritize funding for OIG oversight over assistance
to Ukraine?
How will USAID OIG coordinate with the State Department and Defense
Department OIGs on funding for joint oversight projects?
Answer. As Offices of Inspector General are independent of the
Agencies they oversee, USAID has no functional role in prioritizing
funding for USAID's Office of Inspector General. The increase in USAID
OIG funding is unrelated to the decrease in State Department OIG
funding. We would refer you directly to the USAID OIG for further
information.
Question. Central Europe: In 2022, USAID started a program in
Central Europe ``with the goal of strengthening democratic
institutions, civil society, and independent media.''
Although little time has elapsed since this program began, please
describe what you see as the successes of this program thus far.
Answer. In fiscal year 2021, USAID received an allocation of $8
million out of the $20 million in congressionally directed funding to
strengthen democracy and civil society in Central Europe. There is an
additional $7.5 million in FY 2022 appropriations allocated for USAID.
We anticipate our work in Central Europe to continue for 5 years. We
have formally launched the Central Europe program and briefed
leadership and staff from the Embassies of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia,
and Poland about the nature and scope of the program. The program
focuses on building the skills and ability of local media,
organizations, and actors to reach beyond the bubble of large cities to
encourage greater civic participation in the regions.
USAID has promoted collaboration and networking among leading local
European human rights organizations in a 2-year capacity- and alliance-
building program that helps human rights defenders and civic space
advocates from across the EU meet, learn, and strategize together.
Between October 2022 and May 2023, the Recharging Advocacy for Rights
in Europe Network had four convening events that promoted networking,
exchanging ideas, and learning. The participants also practiced new
skills in how to communicate effectively and deliver effective
messages, speak confidently, and write persuasive policy briefs.
In December 2022, the German Marshall Fund partnered with five
local organizations in Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria to bolster the
capacity of civil society and watchdog organizations to increase their
management, financial sustainability, constituency-building, and
communication skills through training, mentoring, networking, and
microgranting. The Power of Humanity Foundation in Hungary received 130
applications from local organizations (formal and informal) expressing
their interest in participating.
In January 2023, the Central Europe Media Program that aims to
strengthen the competitiveness, financial independence, and
sustainability of the independent media sector in Central Europe,
finalized the selection of 10 media outlets from Hungary, Poland,
Romania, and Slovenia. Following needs assessment, digital audit and
organizational capacity assessment, each individual media outlet will
receive a tailored package of support.
On May 2, as part of UNESCO's World Press Freedom Day events,
USAID, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP),
and the Cyrus R. Vance Center for International Justice announced the
launch of Reporters Shield. Reporters Shield is a membership program
that defends investigative reporting around the world from legal
threats, including libel, defamation, and strategic lawsuits against
public participation (or SLAPP suits), meant to silence critical
voices. The program is for media outlets and non-government
organizations that report in the public interest. Private donor
contributions fund the program to support U.S. media. Reporters Shield
is accepting applications worldwide and is reviewing applications in a
phased approach starting with Phase I, which includes organizations
based in most countries in South America, North America, Europe, and
Central Asia. USAID allocated $1 million in FY 2021 funds for Central
Europe to OCCRP for this effort.
Question. Georgia: The last two elections in Georgia were
grudgingly deemed free by international observers, but they highlighted
the role that state resources played in meaning that in many cases,
elections were not necessarily fair.
As the October 2024 elections approach, how is USAID working to
help ensure that these elections will be truly free and fair? Please be
specific.
Answer. USAID has a robust elections and political processes
portfolio that supports independent oversight of electoral processes to
ensure that elections are free and fair. Through awards with the
Consortium for Election and Political Processes (CEPPS) and local civil
society organizations, USAID will support the following activities to
safeguard the integrity of Georgia's 2024 parliamentary elections.
Pre-Election Assessment Missions: Through CEPPS, USAID will support
international non-profit organizations to conduct at least two high-
level pre-election missions, one in the year leading up to the
elections and at least one approximately 2-3 months before the
elections, emphasizing the international community's expectations to
all stakeholders about the responsibility to comply with international
standards for democratic elections.
Long-Term Observation: Through CEPPS, USAID will support leading
international non-profit organizations to deploy long-term observers
and analysts in the 6 months prior to Election Day, enabling both wide
geographic and in-depth thematic coverage of key electoral
developments. Long-term observers will provide geographic coverage of
all 10 Georgian regions and the broader Tbilisi metropolitan area, as
well as analyze key electoral themes. Key observers will remain in
Georgia following Election Day to monitor post-election events.
Short-Term Observation: Through CEPPS, USAID will support leading
international non-profit organizations to organize delegations of
observers on Election Day. In the week leading up to the polls, CEPPS
will deploy teams of international delegates and staff to assess
preparations for Election Day and the conduct of elections. CEPPS will
recruit high-profile delegates from the U.S. and Europe, including
former diplomats, elected officials, civil society leaders, academics,
and regional experts from its global network of election experts.
Reporting: In the months leading up to Election Day, USAID will
support, through CEPPS, leading international non-profit organizations
to conduct a series of Georgia Watcher updates, which serve as
situation reports and interactive conference calls for relevant U.S.
Government and European Union stakeholders to engage in Q&A and
analysis, followed by post-election reports.
Grants to Local Elections Monitoring Organizations: USAID supports
the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, the
Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Transparency International Georgia,
and Public Movement Multinational Georgia, to conduct parallel vote
tabulation and monitor campaign finance, use of state resources, and
electoral dispute resolution processes.
In addition, we will be coordinating with our colleagues at the
Department of State, Embassy Tbilisi, and the National Security
Council, and others to ensure that the United States has a fully
comprehensive set of interventions to try to ensure that the electoral
process is free, fair, and credible, and meets international and
European standards for elections.
Question. INDO-PACIFIC: What is USAID's anticipated role in the
mandatory spending packages to ``out-compete China,'' specifically the
infrastructure request ($2 billion over 5 years) and the Indo-Pacific
request ($2 billion over 5 years)? Please ensure your answer is
forward-looking, rather than only prior examples of USAID's work.
Answer. A mandatory funding stream will empower USAID to fill
strategic investment and programming gaps in sustainable infrastructure
investments, private sector-led financing, and long-term planning that
lays the foundations for thriving, open, transparent and just
societies. It will also send a clear message that the United States is
fully committed to joining with our allies, friends, and partners in
building a free and open Indo-Pacific for years to come.
This funding will support new and innovative ways--and scale
existing efforts--to support our allies and partners around the world
by providing a viable alternative to the PRC Government's predatory and
coercive practices and expansion and offer alternatives at a scale that
discretionary spending simply cannot meet.
To fortify host government systems against the ``People's Republic
of China (PRC) Government's corrupting influence, new, integrated anti-
corruption programming will focus on strategic corruption in key
sectors, specifically critical minerals, energy, technology,
telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure. USAID will bring
to scale the partnerships necessary to improve the transparency of
infrastructure, transportation, and trade initiatives that risk harming
people, the environment, and creating vulnerabilities to coercion.
USAID's tailored efforts will support partner priorities to deploy
renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies, transform and
modernize utilities, drive regional cooperation, and stimulate private-
sector participation and investments. Together, these efforts will help
diversify energy systems away from the PRC and Russia while also
reducing costs and fighting climate change. For example, in support of
the U.S.-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda Partnership and India's
national target of deploying 500 gigawatts of renewable energy by 2030,
additional mandatory funding will accelerate large-scale renewable
energy deployment, promote grid flexibility to integrate renewables,
advance energy efficiency, and support the large-scale rollout of
public electric vehicle charging infrastructure throughout South Asia.
USAID will mitigate the PRC's regulatory tactics and supply chain
monopolization of essential medical products, utilizing additional
mandatory funding to build local capacities of partner countries'
competitive manufacturing, procurement, regulatory systems, technology
development and investment, financing, and workforce development. These
efforts will increase supply chain diversification and reduce
dependence on products supplied by PRC in local, regional, global, and
U.S. pharmaceutical markets.
As the PRC seeks to shape digital development through its Digital
Silk Road initiative, Pacific Island countries require national and
regional digital transformation and cybersecurity strategies that are
aligned with international best practices. Mandatory funding will scale
USAID's successful partnership with the Taiwan International
Cooperation and Development Fund (TaiwanICDF) to build partners'
capacity to detect and mitigate cybersecurity risks and provide proper
incident response while showcasing the benefits to countries of
partnering with Taiwan.
Reliable access to Asia's critical water assets is more challenging
due to climate change and the PRC's leveraging of water to exploit
transnational tensions over shared waters. New USAID efforts will
directly illuminate the ill effects of PRC infrastructure projects on
water assets, empowering partners to pursue self-reliant growth, and
rebuff external pressures. The $2 billion mandatory infrastructure
request will be managed by the State Department through a global
infrastructure fund. USAID will endeavor to utilize the fund for
programs in the Pacific Islands, which require more concentrated grant
financing to meet their unique infrastructure needs, due to their
geographic remoteness, small economies, and dispersed populations. With
mandatory funding, USAID will blend grant funding with conventional
technical assistance models, allowing for more comprehensive,
strategic, and sustainable infrastructure investment in the Pacific.
More flexible financing will mobilize private finance and leverage
investment from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. Bringing these
critical resources to bear will strengthen U.S. leadership on key
Pacific priorities, improve U.S. competitiveness against the PRC's
approach of visible infrastructure projects, and ensure regional
initiatives such as the Partners in the Blue Pacific and the Quad
deliver on commitments.
Question. What kind of programming is USAID doing in agriculture in
the Philippines?
Answer. USAID is the largest grant donor to the Philippines'
Department of Agriculture and is working with the Department to help
harmonize regulatory requirements for food and agricultural
commodities. USAID is also supporting the improvement of crop
varieties, including the development of Golden Rice, a more nutrient-
dense rice variety, and the Feed the Future Insect-Resistant Eggplant
Partnership project, which advances the development of eggplant
varieties that are highly resistant to pests.
In partnership with the Philippine Department of Trade and Industry
and the private sector, USAID supported the development of warehouse
receipt systems and the adoption and scaling of cold storage
technology.
USAID is also connecting farmers with buyers through the use of
digital platforms to support livelihoods. As of last year, USAID's
DELIVER-E initiative has already moved 422 tons of fresh farm produce
valued at $700,000, enabling about 600 farmers to double incomes, and
small and medium enterprises to increase their profit margins by six-
fold.
At the local level, USAID is working with more than 10,000
cooperative members and small and medium agribusinesses across 80
cooperatives. Our assistance includes strengthening governance and
financial management and facilitating access to finance and
participating in domestic and global value chains. As a next step,
USAID intends to partner with public-private networks, such as the
Philippine Partnership for Sustainable Agriculture, to explore
expanding cooperative development support to the fisheries sector to
support a request from the Cooperative Development Authority.
Recognizing that fisheries are a major protein and food staple in
the Philippines, USAID helped protect 2.58 million hectares of oceans
in the country to support its long-term sustainability. This includes
efforts around rebuilding stocks of smaller fish species critical to
the food chain, particularly the use of the Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Index and Threat Assessment Tool in municipal
waters and in the fisheries management areas. This tool assesses the
status of IUU fishing in a given area, identifies other longer-lasting
and targeted solutions to reducing IUU fishing, and tracks the progress
towards preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU fishing in
Philippine waters across various levels of governance, from municipal
to fisheries management areas to the entire country. By using this
tool, USAID is improving the productivity of wild fisheries to achieve
food security by securing community tenure rights of fisheries
resources and promoting market-based approaches. Additionally, USAID
developed Fish Tiangge, a Facebook marketplace that enables buyers to
purchase fish directly from fishers during the COVID-19 pandemic to
support livelihoods and nutrition and connected 6,000 fishers with more
than 300,000 households. Through various post-harvest, fish processing
and financial management training with fishing communities and
fisherfolk organizations, USAID also ensures that fisherfolk have the
capacity to properly handle, consolidate and process fish, thus
enabling them to meet market requirements for responsibly sourced
seafood and reduce waste.
In addition, USAID's disaster risk reduction and preparedness
programs support the resilience of the most vulnerable farming
households. Examples of this support include supporting at-risk farming
communities to integrate preparedness frameworks and resilience
strategies, such as promoting climate smart agriculture practices,
establishing Climate Resilient Farmer Field Schools, and assessing and
supporting the development of preparedness and response plans for
farming households. These efforts help the most vulnerable populations
prepare for and recover from disasters by helping to mitigate the
impacts of disasters at the household level.
USAID, in partnership with Buktamaco, the economic arm of the
Bukidnon Tagoloanon tribe, is implementing the 2-year Mindanao Bamboo
Value Chain Development Project. Working with a diverse team of
indigenous population nurseries, planters and private sector actors
from Mindanao and the United States, the Project aims to stimulate a
bamboo value chain that will allow Mindanao planters to participate in
the multi-billion-dollar global bamboo economy. Additionally, bamboo
absorbs greenhouse gasses, and because of its rapid growth, is very
useful as a tool for carbon sequestration. Bamboo also helps avoid
fossil fuel use, and reduce deforestation, by offering an alternative,
highly renewable source of biomass energy.
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Benjamin L. Cardin
Question. Ukraine: Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022, Congress has enacted four supplemental appropriations
laws, providing a total of $113 billion in emergency funding for FY
2022 and FY 2023. This includes approximately $88 billion for foreign
assistance, including to Ukraine and to other countries impacted by the
war.
How have the four Ukraine supplemental aid packages enacted since
the February 2022 invasion enabled USAID to meet its goals to promote
humanitarian and development aid in Ukraine?
Answer. We stand with Ukraine and greatly appreciate the
supplemental aid packages Congress has provided to date, which have
been indispensable in providing the necessary support to the citizens
and Government of Ukraine while also advancing U.S. Government
objectives. As a complement to the security assistance, the direct
budget support provided through bipartisan congressional appropriations
has enabled the Government of Ukraine to continue to keep the
government functioning and to preserve key services for its citizens
like healthcare and education. This is an economic war as well as a
military war, and our support is essential to Ukraine on both fronts.
These aid packages have enabled indispensable development
programming on priorities ranging from supporting energy workers to
keep heat and power flowing to supporting critical energy
infrastructure repairs during winter; supporting human rights activists
to document and report on war crimes and human rights abuses; and
assisting farmers with critical inputs such as seeds and fertilizers
and finance support of more than $49 million in grants and loans. They
have also enabled more than $500 million in assistance across sectors
including local and national governance; anti-corruption initiatives to
ensure accountability of foreign assistance funding flowing into the
country; and funding to help advance reforms, civil society and media
support, trade and finance, and health sector programming among others.
In addition, these assistance packages have allowed USAID to
appropriately respond to the humanitarian impact of the Ukraine crisis
by providing life-saving humanitarian assistance in Ukraine as well as
to 44 countries around the world whose populations are increasingly
food insecure because of the impacts of Putin's war. Congress'
supplemental funding allowed USAID to provide the most vulnerable
Ukrainians with thermal blankets, medical supplies, emergency health
kits, safe drinking water, shelter materials, protection services, and
other lifesaving support.
Question. How would USAID operations in Ukraine be impacted if
Congress does not enact further supplemental aid packages in the next
fiscal year?
Answer. Despite the historic support Ukraine has received from the
United States and other countries, Ukraine continues to face monumental
challenges in funding its requirements to meet the needs of its people,
and ultimately, recovering from the conflict's devastation.
International Disaster Assistance funding appropriated through the
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations
Act allowed USAID to maintain robust levels of humanitarian assistance
in Ukraine this fiscal year. USAID is working to tighten the focus of
humanitarian assistance in Ukraine in FY24, and strengthen the
coordination between humanitarian and development assistance, as well
as increasingly engage the Government of Ukraine in responding to
needs. Further, USAID is monitoring the global effects of the war in
Ukraine on prices and availability of agricultural commodities and
inputs, particularly for vulnerable countries who relied on the Black
Sea food exports and who have large populations facing increased food
prices and insecurity. However, absent additional supplemental
appropriations, USAID projects a significant decrease to humanitarian
assistance inside Ukraine as well as to other major crises worldwide.
Question. Georgia: The FY 2024 request indicates that Georgia would
continue to be the second-highest aid recipient in Europe and Eurasia
after Ukraine. Georgia would receive $88 million in the budget,
compared to $107 million in FY 2022 funding. At the same time, Georgia
has seen dramatic democratic backsliding in recent years. Billionaire
businessman and former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili holds an
oligarchic-like grip on Georgia's government from behind the scenes.
Transparency International has reported on the rapidly deteriorating
state of anti-corruption enforcement and declining media and civil
society freedoms, which have jeopardized its European Union accession
hopes. Additionally, various high-ranking officials of the ruling
Georgian Dream Party also launched verbal attacks on U.S. Ambassador
Kelly Degnan last year after she spoke up for independent voices and
institutions.
Please explain why the Administration proposes to maintain a
relatively high level of assistance for Georgia in light of recent
concerns about the pace of Georgia's European integration efforts and
declining democratic trends more broadly?
Answer. USAID's work in Georgia is critically important to protect
Georgia's democracy, Euro-Atlantic integration, and sovereignty,
especially in light of Georgia's significant democratic backsliding,
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and Russia's ongoing occupation of 20
percent of Georgia's territory.
USAID programming in Georgia is designed to slow democratic
backsliding; provide critical support to civil society and independent
media partners actively working to counter anti-Western disinformation;
and ensure that the Georgian Government remains accountable to
citizens, the majority of which support Georgia joining the EU and
NATO, especially in the lead up to Georgia's critical 2024 and 2025
elections. Programs also build resilience in vulnerable communities,
including those along the Administrative Boundary Lines of Georgian
territories occupied by Russia; support Georgia's economic and energy
independence away from Russia; and promote greater regional
cooperation, stability, and peace in the South Caucasus.
Reducing assistance would only lessen the U.S. Government's ability
to push Georgia in the right direction; undermine our relationship with
Georgia's citizens, the vast majority of which aspire for Western
integration; and benefit malign actors that seek to keep Georgia from
the West, threatening U.S. Government interests in Georgia and the
Caucasus. This funding, which supports actors and initiatives who are
working to move Georgia in the right direction--towards Europe--is more
important than ever.
Question. Global Health Systems: In December 2022, USAID launched
Primary Impact (formerly known as Accelerating Primary Health Care
Collaborative (APHC-C)) to work with five partner countries in Africa
to develop comprehensive strategies to improve primary health care and
bridge silos to foster resilient health systems. At the same time, we
know that the health workforce is integral to support a country's
health system. I appreciate USAID's growing focus on frontline health
workers, including through the Global Health Worker Initiative.
Reducing the estimated 10 million global health worker shortage is
essential to delivering primary health care, responding to emerging
threats, and reducing inequities in health and survival. Health workers
depend on all of the building blocks of a health system working
together. For example, health workers are less likely to succeed and
remain on the job if they are not fairly compensated and paid in a
timely manner, do not have access to adequate resources such as
medications and equipment, or if they do not have access to reliable
patient data.
As USAID looks to develop more comprehensive approaches to support
health systems, how are you leveraging programs, such as the Global
Health Worker Initiative or the U.S. President's Malaria Initiative,
that focus on a specific area, to strengthen health systems more
broadly?
Answer. USAID funds both program area-specific and cross-cutting
health systems strengthening (HSS) programming. Foundational, cross-
cutting investments in HSS complement and amplify the effect of program
area-specific programs, prevent duplication and inefficiency, and are
critical to achieving lasting and sustainable progress in all USAID's
health program areas and investments. USAID's cross-cutting approach to
HSS activities--such as sustainable financing interventions, support
for better delivery and management of commodities, and improved use of
human resources data systems--positively benefit all health areas.
These comprehensive and cross-cutting HSS approaches are closely
aligned with and supportive of key initiatives including USAID's
Primary Impact and the USG's Global Health Worker Initiative (GHWI).
Program area-specific investments also play an essential role in
strengthening health systems. For example, the U.S. President's Malaria
Initiative (PMI) delivers malaria services in an integrated manner and
invests in platforms for providing prevention and treatment services
that strengthen the underlying health system. In many countries,
community health workers trained by PMI test and care for children with
malaria, as well as other deadly diseases, such as diarrhea and
pneumonia, and provide nutrition and maternal health services.
Investments in laboratories and platforms for malaria campaigns also
strengthen countries' diagnostic capacity and delivery of vaccines for
other diseases. Further leveraging these investments across global
health program areas will advance efforts to leave our partner country
primary health systems stronger.
Question. Democracy Support--Concentration in EPP Funding: A vital
component of USAID's broad range of assistance efforts worldwide is to
support those people in other countries who are seeking to strengthen
democracy and rights-respecting governance in the face of authoritarian
resurgence, and the Committee is strongly supportive of the Agency's
initiatives in this regard. Yet, as Administrator Power said in her
speech on a Global Revolution of Dignity on June 7, 2022, ``USAID and
other development agencies have supported elections for decades, but we
have not always kept up with these pernicious methods [of repressive
government].'' The Committee is also strongly supportive of the core
objective of USAID's recently released Acquisition and Assistance
Strategy's goal to achieve ``a more diverse set of partners engaged to
implement locally led development solutions.'' As the Strategy states,
``the A&A workforce should proactively seek diverse prospective
partners, consider the benefits of making awards to new and local
partners, and work to lower barriers through flexible A&A approaches.''
(A&A Strategy p.14)
``We understand that there are more than 20 well-regarded
nongovernmental organizations in the U.S.--and many scores more
around the world--that have developed capacity and skills and
networks to do good work in the field Elections and Political
Processes (EPP). Yet since 1995, USAID has awarded more than $2
billion in funding for Elections and Political Processes
programs to a single recipient, the Consortium for Elections
and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). Moreover, the
proportion of funding going to CEPPS has been trending up. In
FY 2021 alone CEPPS received 66 percent of USAID EPP funding
(labeled Political Competition and Consensus Building),
according to data from USAID's foreignassistance.gov website
(using a similar approach to USAID's own localization
indicators--i.e., excluding funding to foreign governments,
interagency agreements, personal services contracts, and
agreements with multilateral organizations). This seems like a
curiously high concentration of large amounts of resources in
very few hands.
``CEPPS has been the recipient, over a period now spanning more
than 25 years, of five successive global, single-award EPP
programs. This would appear to be inconsistent with the spirit
of the A&A strategy cited above, and its goal of making awards
to new and local partners.
``The most recent--the Democratic Elections and Political
Process (DEPP) Leader With Associates (LWA) agreement awarded
in 2021, with a ceiling of $835 million--seems to have been the
largest mechanism in Democracy, Rights, and Governance ever
made by USAID.
``Agency Risk in Political Party Programming: The USAID Office
of Inspector General concluded in November 2019 that, `USAID's
reliance on a single consortium to implement the majority of
political party assistance in Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle
East exposes the Agency to risks that can diminish its ability
to achieve political strengthening and democracy goals and
damage the Agency's reputation.'
``Directive for CEPPS in FY2021 Joint Explanatory Statement: In
directing spending by USAID on Elections and Political
Processes support around the world, the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the FY 2021 Omnibus Appropriations Act expressly
named one organization, the Consortium on Elections and
Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS). Specifically, the
Joint Explanatory Statement stated:
`Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening
(CEPPS)--The agreement includes funds at not less than the
prior fiscal year level for CEPPS. The USAID Administrator is
directed to ensure that the follow-on solicitation encourages
consortia applicants and that the award is made to an
organization or consortium that meets the following criteria:
(1) history of quality past performance; (2) demonstrated
institutional capabilities and expertise in democracy,
elections, and quick response to political crises; and (3)
worldwide geographic reach including in non-permissive
environments.' ''
Has USAID felt constrained by the language in the Joint Explanatory
Statement quoted above, specifically referencing the dominant
implementer in this field, from widening the circle of the Agency's
partners?
Answer. The solicitation USAID issued for its global Democratic
Elections and Political Processes (DEPP) Leader with Associate (LWA)
award followed the guidance and criteria of this Congressional language
referenced above and resulted in only one qualified application. The
successful applicant, CEPPS, however, is a consortium that includes
more than one implementer. In addition to the three prime holders--the
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the
International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Democratic
Institute (NDI)--it includes four senior technical partner
organizations: the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (ABA
ROLI), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE),
Democracy Arch (D-Arch), and Internews, all of which have an equal
opportunity to bid on associate awards and shape the technical approach
of work being carried out through the DEPP LWA.
Question. What could be done to enhance competition in this area--
such as encouraging individual missions worldwide to openly compete for
awards for Elections and Political Processes programs?
Answer. The Agency's preference is for competition, and USAID
Missions are already encouraged to openly compete elections and
political processes programs. Missions have numerous options for
supporting qualified international, United States-based, regional, and
local partners to carry out electoral assistance activities. While some
Missions have relied on the pre-competed global mechanism for elections
and political processes programming, others have used full and open
competition or restricted competition to local and regional
organizations, in line with Agency localization efforts. In a number of
cases, Missions have chosen to award one or more election and political
processes activities to a variety of partners to best meet their needs.
Question. Would you consider in future solicitations for worldwide
EPP mechanisms doing what the Agency did in 2021 for the Civil Society
and Media--Strengthened Together and Advancing in New Directions (CSM-
STAND) LWA, when two parallel awards were made? While those awards were
divided by regions, one could also envision two (or more) parallel
global awards--which could provide Missions with more opportunities to
diversify their partners.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Given USAID's emphasis on diversifying and localizing its
partner base, what is the Agency doing specifically in Elections and
Political Processes programs to ensure there are more opportunities for
new, local, and nontraditional partners to partner with USAID?
Answer. USAID is committed to channeling a larger portion of funds
directly to credible local partners through its localization agenda.
USAID has set an ambitious agency-wide goal for increasing funding
directly to local partners. Washington and Mission operating units are
being actively encouraged to consider funding for local partners where
appropriate, including in the elections and political processes
subsector. In addition, the Agency's procurement policies in ADS 303
were updated in 2023 to allow for restricted competition for local and
underutilized partners, thereby giving more flexibility to missions and
Washington operating units in their selection process, including for
elections and political processes programs. Agency staff are encouraged
to consider the full range of procurement options. Some examples
include:
Kenya: Through a locally-competed annual program statement
(APS), USAID dedicated $14 million to three Kenyan-led
consortiums to provide support to government bodies with
election-related responsibilities, conduct civic and voter
education and carry out peacebuilding and conflict mitigation
activities around Kenya's 2022 election process.
Paraguay: In 2022 USAID awarded, through a competitive APS
process limited to local organizations, a grant to a local
civil society organization to conduct surveys to assess the
general public's awareness of organized crime and corruption in
politics, and use the results to inform actions taken by civil
society to mitigate this problem.
Tanzania: USAID currently has a Strengthening Inclusive,
Democratic, Participatory, and Accountable Governance (SIDPAG)
Annual Program Statement for local organizations--up to
$15,000,000--that covers electoral assistance and support for
civic and political leadership of women and girls.
Uganda: USAID localized a significant portion of its
elections and political processes work by awarding a large,
multi-year activity--Supporting Citizen Engagement in Elections
(SCENE)--to a local implementing partner. As the CEPPS award
came to a close in 2022, USAID issued a 5-year extension to the
local SCENE activity, which has taken on much of the scope of
the now-ended CEPPS award.
Southern Africa: USAID issued a solicitation limited to
local groups for the Southern Africa Political Parties and
Dialogue Program (SAPPD) which works to strengthen the
democratic structures and institutions of political parties in
several countries in Southern Africa to better respond to and
represent the needs of their constituents, particularly in the
areas of water and energy resource management. The implementer
is a South African organization, Democracy Works Foundation.
Regional Leader with Associate Awards: USAID issued a
solicitation limited to local and regional partners, which
resulted in two Regional Elections and Political Transitions
Leader with Associates awards, one covering Africa and awarded
to South African organization Electoral Institute for
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and one covering Asia
and the Pacific and awarded to Indonesian organization
Perludem. USAID missions in Cote d'Ivoire, Madagascar and
Liberia have procured associate awards through the Africa
Regional LWA.
Question. How has the Agency responded to, or acted upon, the
observation quoted above from the November 2019 OIG report?
Answer. USAID fully responded to OIG Audit 8-000-20-001-P; found on
the OIG webpage: https://oig.usaid.gov/node/3616.
USAID agreed with all six recommendations of the OIG Audit to
improve USAID's policies and processes to further minimize the risk of
bias in the Agency's DRG programs.
As part of this response, USAID identified the follow-on to the
Global Elections and Political Transitions (GEPT) award as the best
opportunity to explore ways to work with a broader range of
implementers providing political party assistance. USAID committed that
it would use the design processes for the new follow on award to
explore opportunities to use innovative methods for co-creation to
increase the diversity of partnerships for the new award.
The DRG Center worked with USAID's Office of Acquisition and
Assistance (M/OAA) to issue a Request For Information (RFI) in December
of 2019. USAID received 15 submissions on January 30, 2020, from a
variety of interested parties. The DRG Center conducted a consultation
with USAID procurement reform team and M/OAA, an internal analysis of
the RFIs and a gap analysis of other potentially interested companies.
Based on that analysis, USAID invited 27 organizations to a half-day
facilitated pre-solicitation conference on February 26, 2020. USAID
conducted another internal review of all the feedback from the RFIs and
the pre-solicitation conference notes in early April. The Agency used
that as the basis of a Program Description for the solicitation and
incorporated directive language contained in the FY 2021 Appropriation
Law.
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Marco Rubio
Question. USAID regularly awards contracts and grants to United
Nations agencies, such as the World Food Program, UNAIDS, and UNDP.
This past March, UNAIDS supported the launch of a report by the
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) titled, ``The 8 March
Principles for a Human Rights-Based Approach to Criminal Law
Proscribing Conduct Associated with Sex, Reproduction, Drug Use, HIV,
Homelessness and Poverty.'' That report included a recommendation that
national laws regarding the minimum age of consent be re-evaluated
because it asserted that ``sexual conduct involving persons below the
domestically prescribed minimum age of consent to sex may be consensual
in fact, if not in law.''
This recommendation gives credence to claims made by sexual
predators that justify their crimes by claiming their underage victims
can provide consent and undermines efforts by the United States to
protect children from sexual exploitation. Do you agree with the
recommendations of the ICJ report?
Answer. No. USAID does not support and does not suggest that
children can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults,
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our
shared goals.
USAID requires that all cost-type agreements with the United
Nations, its specialized agencies, and related organizations contain a
provision which states that, the parties have a zero-tolerance-for-
inaction approach to tackling sexual exploitation and sexual abuse
(SEA) and sexual harassment (SH). Under this provision, when UNAIDS is
the recipient of a public international organization grant, it and its
implementing partners, will take all reasonable and adequate steps to
prevent SEA and SH of any person linked to the delivery of the
agreement by both its employees and any implementing partner and
respond appropriately when reports of SEA and SH arise. The provision
further requires the recipient to apply the InterAgency Standing
Committee (IASC) Six Core Principles relating to Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse when implementing USAID funded agreements. IASC core
principle no. 2 specifically prohibits sexual activity with children
(persons under the age of 18) regardless of the age of majority or age
of consent locally.
USAID's website has a publicly available toolkit on child
safeguarding standards, including our specific award requirements,
frequently asked questions, and best practices, along with policy and
implementation guidance to assist our implementing partners and staff.
These materials communicate our expectations and requirements to our
partners and reinforce that an individual under the age of 18 is a
child regardless of the legal age of majority or consent, that a child
cannot give informed consent to sexual activity, that any sexual
activity with a child is prohibited, that allegations of such behaviors
must be reported to USAID and the Office of Inspector General, and that
we will take action to address such allegations and hold perpetrators
accountable.
Question. What is the Administration's position on this ICJ report?
Answer. USAID does not support and does not suggest that children
can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults,
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our
shared goals.
Question. Did USAID award any funding to UNAIDS during the 5-year
period between 2018 and 2022 when UNAIDS worked with ICJ on compiling
the report?
Answer. The U.S. Government has partnered with and provided funding
to UNAIDS since its inception in 1994, and USAID continued to award
funding to UNAIDS during the period of 2018 to 2022. USAID followed
standard processes prior to awarding such funds, including
Congressional notification of the use of funds that included monies for
the U.S. Government's annual contributions, technical assistance to
support countries in achieving their national HIV targets, and PEPFAR
field support activities, such as for community-led monitoring.
Question. Can you commit to ensuring that USAID will not award any
future funding to UNAIDS until it retracts its endorsement of the ICJ
report?
Answer. USAID does not support and does not suggest that children
can consent to sexual conduct consensually with older adults,
especially in contradiction of criminal laws in foreign countries where
we work. USAID has always worked to protect and promote human rights
and will continue to engage UNAIDS and other donors to advance our
shared goals.
Question. The Biden administration has rightly recognized that the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the only international adversary with
``both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly,
the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.''
Historically, the CCP has avoided investing many resources overseas,
but this has changed under Xi Jinping and his newly announced Global
Development Initiative and Global Security Initiative. Since 2021,
Congress has appropriated millions of dollars for a ``Countering
People's Republic of China Malign Influence Fund.'' While this sounds
good on paper, I am not sure this is leading to an actual increase in
assistance that counters the PRC's rising influence across the
developing world. Many recipients of U.S. assistance complain that
``working with China means we get an airport, while working with the
United States means we get a lecture.'' Can you detail what types of
programming USAID defines as ``countering PRC Malign Influence''?
Answer. We are grateful for Congress appropriating resources for
the Countering PRC Influence Fund (CPIF), which allows the Agency to
strategically invest in key sectors to counter PRC influence.
USAID development practices elevate inclusion, transparency,
independence, partnership, sustainability, and respect for human rights
and democratic norms--and builds on our decades- long history of
supporting partners to achieve their own priorities and self-
determination.
This approach, starting with our values, allows us to address the
unique and broad impact of the PRC's detrimental development model, not
by forcing countries to choose but by offering a better, more
sustainable, and affirmative approach that advances accountable
governance, the rule of law, and human rights protections and
strengthens the foundations of open, just, transparent, prosperous, and
sovereign societies.
USAID has identified four lines of efforts where development
expertise, investments, and tools can be especially critical in
supporting sustainable development. These include:
Supporting partner countries to transparently conserve and
manage natural resources, address and adapt to the climate
crisis, and better protect the environment.
For example, the FY 2024 budget proposal will support the
countries of the Mekong to jointly and transparently
address transboundary challenges on water security, smart
hydropower, infrastructure planning, and sustainable
development.
Our Green and Prosperous: Responsible Mining for our
Future project is a FY 2021 CCIF-funded activity jointly
managed by DDI and ACTF in the green energy minerals sector
designed to advance transparent and accountable management
of critical minerals as well as supply chain security.
Empowering partner countries to develop open and secure
digital ecosystems--including robust cybersecurity--and
policies and regulations consistent with international
standards.
For example, through the South Asia Regional Digital
Initiative, USAID propels digital connectivity and economic
development in South Asia by strengthening the digital
capacity of micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs),
raising awareness around critical cybersecurity issues, and
fostering opportunities for MSMEs and governments to engage
on digital and ICT policy issues.
USAID is leading in the International Open RAN Initiative,
which is focused on increasing open radio access network
market opportunities and demonstrating the development
impact of opening up hardware and software markets. The
activity is the main U.S.-backed alternative to PRC-based
telecom companies and is part of a broader set of
programming designed to address PRC efforts to re-shape the
internet and telecommunications industry by demonstrating
the value of an open, inclusive, and secure internet that
respects human rights and reflects democratic values.
Implementers for these Open RAN projects include: DAI/
INVEST (research and planning), Indo-Pacific Opportunities
(the Asia ORAN Academy), USAID/Peru CR3CE Alliance, and the
Africa Trade and Investment contract.
Helping partner countries demonstrate that democratic
institutions, respect for human rights, and adherence to the
rule of law will deliver tangible results for societies and
individuals.
For example, in Timor-Leste, the FY 2024 budget proposal
will strengthen civil society and support the Timorese
Government's accountability and integrity public
administration reform program, which seeks better
management of state public resources and improved service
delivery.
At the global level, USAID is working through its Greater
Internet Freedom (GIF) project. GIF has two objectives: (1)
increase the digital security capacity of civil society
organizations, independent media, and human rights
defenders, and (2) increase civil society engagement in
digital rights policy advocacy in support of a free, open,
secure, and interoperable internet. The project advances a
model of internet freedom and digital rights that contrasts
with authoritarian and sovereign models of the internet.
GIF works with a network of international, regional, and
local actors in 38 countries throughout the world.
Ensuring that partner countries can enhance their own
resilience and independence so that they can more effectively
make their own sovereign decisions.
For example, in the Philippines, USAID will diversify
trade and supply chain linkages related to critical
minerals, boost domestic processing capacity, and improve
minimum governance standards in the mining sector, thus
increasing fair and transparent extraction and weaning the
Philippines off its export dependence.
Another example is from Africa, where USAID is supporting
the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF). ALSF is a public
international organization housed at the African
Development Bank providing legal and technical assistance
to African governments on structuring complex transactions
related to natural resources, energy, infrastructure, etc.
The organization also provides assistance on avoiding
unsustainable debt.
These lines of efforts are also represented in the FY22 State and
USAID guidance for applying for DA and ESF-CPIF resources, which
required that all proposals from Posts and Operating Units offer
programming solutions to address specific problematic PRC influence
efforts.
Question. Last April, Solomon Islands signed a security agreement
with the People's Republic of China, which potentially gives the
People's Liberation Army a naval presence in the Pacific that threatens
our allies. The week before that agreement was signed, the State
Department released a report criticizing the Solomon Islands' stance on
LGBT rights. What initiatives was USAID supporting in the Solomon
Islands when that agreement was signed?
Answer. USAID is committed to supporting Solomon Islands'
development goals. We have expanded our work in Solomon Islands from
climate and disaster assistance to additional programming in economic
development, sustainable fisheries, democracy and governance, health,
and the environment. Additionally, the recent reopening of the U.S.
Embassy in Honiara is an important milestone in strengthening our long-
term partnership.
USAID's largest bilateral initiative in Solomon Islands is the
Strengthening Competitiveness, Agriculture, Livelihoods and Environment
(SCALE) Program. Working closely with the Solomon Islands Government,
the project focuses on economic growth and trade, with specific
emphasis on the development of the agribusiness sector and improved
transparent management of the forestry sector. Through SCALE, more than
20 community groups and organizations have formally registered and
received funds to pursue locally identified activities that will expand
reforestation, livelihoods, and environmental protection efforts. SCALE
also launched a $1 million partnership agreement with the largest cocoa
exporter in Solomon Islands to enable local farmers to extend their
network into previously unserved areas and increase cocoa processing
for domestic consumption and export to New Zealand. SCALE further
partnered with public, private, and civil society organizations to
identify 11 agribusiness small scale infrastructure projects that USAID
will support.
USAID also has ongoing recovery, disaster risk reduction, and
resilience bilateral programming in Solomon Islands, with a current
total estimated investment of $2.3 million. Our activities focus on
building community-level capacity to understand natural hazards, risks,
and vulnerabilities, manage and mitigate disaster risks, and improve
knowledge on early warning systems.
Question. Similarly, Hungary is likely the most pro-CCP government
in Europe. Nowhere else in Europe is the need most dire for assistance
to counter the CCP's influence there. However, this January, you
traveled to Hungary to meet with leaders of their LGBT community and to
critique Hungarian Prime Minister Orban's stance on LGBT issues. How
does that counter CCP influence in Europe?
Answer. In October 2022, USAID relaunched work in several Central
European countries including Hungary, with a focus on strengthening
civil society, democratic institutions, and independent media. With
USAID undertaking this new programming, I subsequently traveled to
Hungary in February 2023 to underscore for the Hungarian people,
government, and our partners on the ground the strong commitment of the
U.S. on issues such as fighting corruption, promoting the rule of law,
and expanding civic engagement--priorities for USAID that also counter
the governance model advanced by the People's Republic of China. During
the trip, I engaged with various groups, including youth, governance
and transparency advocates, and members of Hungary's LGBTQI+ community.
In meeting with this community, I had the opportunity to hear about the
very difficult experiences of many LGBTQI+ people in Hungary, who often
face marginalization, discrimination, and fears about their safety and
livelihoods. I emphasized that the United States stands with LGBTQI+
people, and supports their right to live lives free of interference and
persecution. I believe that support for core tenets of democracy,
including equality, dignity and human rights, is a distinguishing
feature of U.S. foreign policy when compared to that of the People's
Republic of China. More broadly, U.S. investments in the people of
Hungary--like those launched by USAID--demonstrate the importance of
our long friendship and contribute to countering PRC influence in the
region. The trip also offered an opportunity to engage in candid
conversation with Hungarian leaders, including the Ministers of
Justice, Defense, and Chair of the Hungarian Parliament's Foreign
Affairs Committee, where I discussed key concerns and encouraged a
constructive approach to bolster our relationship at this critical
juncture.
Question. According to USAID's website, USAID still provides
development assistance to the People's Republic of China. While this
does not go to the Government of the PRC or to the CCP, some of this
funding goes to ``addressing key cross-border challenges of global
consequence'' including ``reducing greenhouse gas emissions,''
``preventing the spread of HIV/AIDS,'' and ``combating wildlife
trafficking.'' Can you confirm whether any of this development
assistance benefits the CCP or the government of the PRC, including
local level government bodies?
Does this assistance benefit Chinese companies, or non-government
organizations affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party?
Answer. USAID does not provide assistance to or through the
government of the People's Republic of China (PRC), nor does USAID
assistance directly benefit companies or non-governmental organizations
affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party. Besides activities
supporting ethnic Tibetans within the PRC, USAID's only activities in
the PRC are focused on countering wildlife trafficking, a transnational
crime with global economic and security impacts as well as public
health risks. These activities help reduce the availability of and
demand for illegal wildlife products in China. We are working on
updating USAID's website to reflect this.
Question. Is China a developing country?
Answer. No. The PRC should not receive preferential treatment or
assistance as a result of having the status of a developing country, as
defined by the World Bank given its per capita income.
Question. Does China lack the resources, financial or otherwise, or
the capability to handle these ``cross border challenges of global
consequence'' itself?
Answer. While the People's Republic of China has the resources and
capacity to handle ``cross border challenges of global consequences''
itself, it does not have the will or the inclination to be a
cooperative global partner on many issues that are of concern to the
region and the rest of the world. COVID-19 proved that there are many
areas where international cooperation or pressure are still vital to
solve transnational challenges that directly harm U.S. citizens like
pandemics, climate resilience, and the flow of illicit drugs and
wildlife.
Question. How does development assistance provided to entities in
the PRC help combat the CCP's malign influence?
Answer. USAID assistance does not directly benefit the PRC
Government or CCP entities. USAID's TRAPS Wildlife Trafficking activity
helps reduce the trade in illegal and/or high-risk wildlife and related
products in the PRC. This trade harms wildlife populations in Africa
and other regions outside of China, increases the risk of zoonotic
disease spillover, while also benefiting criminal networks and corrupt
individuals.
Separately, under an annual $10 million congressional directive,
USAID implements six awards in regions that have significant Tibetan
populations in the PRC. In the face of PRC pressure to assimilate, our
assistance helps ethnic Tibetan communities become more self-reliant
and resilient, as well as helping to preserve their cultural heritage.
USAID does not provide assistance to or through the government of the
PRC. There are currently six activities, the first four of which run
through 2024, while the last two run through 2027. For activities that
will end in 2024, new activities are in the design process. These
activities will build on current programs that aim to engage local
Tibetan communities in cultural preservation, develop market linkages
for established Tibetan businesses, identify community-led restoration
plans and best management practices of soil, grassland, forest, and
water resources with a focus on traditional Tibetan livelihoods, and
increase the availability of basic health services for Tibetans.
Question. If we're going to more effectively compete with China, we
have to start investing in trade and infrastructure and move away from
antiquated models of aid. In 2018, Congress established the
International Development Finance Corporation to directly compete with
the CCP's Belt and Road Initiative, but the DFC still remains fairly
isolated from other U.S. efforts to compete with China and often does
not focus on projects that would actually advance U.S. interests. How
does USAID plan to work more closely with the DFC to actually invest in
infrastructure to help countries build markets rather than perpetuate
dependence on foreign aid?
Answer. In establishing the DFC, Congress put forth a number of
institutional linkages between USAID and DFC, which we have been
working in close partnership to implement since the DFC launched.
USAID's transactional partnership with DFC is centered on mobilizing
much needed investment in the countries where we work. These
investments are crucial in supporting USAID's work to catalyze private
sector-led economic development in our partner countries and help build
markets while offering alternative financing to that of PRC.
Since DFC launched, it has completed 66 transactions and invested
more than $900 million towards USAID development objectives. These are
deals that USAID missions helped originate and support because of the
impact on local markets, including investing in micro, small and medium
and enterprises (MSMEs) that are vital parts of economic development in
our partner countries. One example, which was supported by funds made
available from the Countering China Influence Fund (CCIF), was a
partnership with DFC and the African Union Development Agency to
bolster financial inclusion and drive economic opportunity in low- and
lower-middle income countries and increase food security and bolster
food systems across sub-Saharan Africa.
DFC is best positioned to speak to its work to align with U.S.
efforts to compete with PRC and advance U.S. interests. However, as a
Board member of DFC, USAID has seen the advancement of a number of
geopolitically important projects over the past 2 years which the USAID
Administrator has voted to approve when presented to the Board. For
example, the Board recently voted to approve an equity investment to
TechMet, an investment platform focused on mine assets that produce
minerals and metal, to support a downstream investment to Brazilian
Nickel for operations and the expansion of its open pit nickel and
cobalt mine in Brazil. These types of investments help counter and
diversify away from PRC dominated supply chains.
Question. To what extent is USAID working with DFC to address
complex issues, like diversifying the supply chains of developing
countries away from China?
Answer. USAID and DFC work very closely to address complex
development issues globally. Over the past 2 years our teams have
partnered to advance 66 DFC investments and more than $900 million of
commitments towards USAID development objectives, including a host of
complex issues--whether supporting businesses through economic recovery
from the COVID-19 pandemic, combating food insecurity and global shocks
in agriculture supply chains, supporting Venezuelan migrant communities
in Colombia to help them grow their businesses and drive economic
growth, or ensuring that Ukrainian small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
have capital for much needed operational expenses.
USAID's Supply Chain Integrity and Freedom program is working with
DFC to identify opportunities where DFC might be able to support
investments in private companies to advance vital supply chains for
American prosperity & security of newly emerging supply chains to
include critical minerals, vital construction materials, agricultural
inputs, pharmaceutical precursors, and microchip manufacturing
equipment.
As a Board member, the USAID Administrator continues to support
DFC's ability to mobilize capital to advance U.S. development and
foreign policy interests.
In December 2021, the Board voted to approve a $500 million
loan to First Solar, an American solar manufacturing company,
to construct a solar PV module manufacturing facility in Tamil
Nadu, India--a critically important project to advance
alternative supply chains within the energy sector.
In September 2022, the Board voted to approve an equity
investment to TechMet, an investment platform focused on mine
assets that produce minerals and metal, to support a downstream
investment to Brazilian Nickel for operations and the expansion
of its open pit nickel and cobalt mine in Brazil. The Board
approved potential follow-on investments from TechMet in other
eligible markets. These types of investments help counter and
diversify away from PRC dominated supply chains.
We look forward to continuing to partner with and support DFC in
combating complex global development challenges.
Question. According to USAID's Scaling Up Renewable Energy (SURE)
website, the program aims to meet international climate commitments,
strengthen energy security via private investment and procurement of
clean electricity. However, many of the clean energy aid programs, such
as solar-powered aid projects and wind turbine projects, source these
products or components made in China. Besides USAID subsidizing China's
industry by using solar panels and wind turbines parts for aid
projects, the production of these items in China is anything but
``clean'' and simply provides the veneer that these USAID projects
somehow reduce Co2 emission. Further, there is ample concern that
components used in these projects are likely connected to forced labor
in China. How does USAID ensure that solar panels, wind turbines, or
other ``clean'' energy products/components are not made in China by
slave labor?
Answer. The vast majority of USAID energy sector assistance is
unrelated to the procurement of renewable energy generation technology,
such as solar panels, either directly or through its implementing
partners. Nonetheless, all USG contract and assistance awards include
an unambiguous prohibition on the use of forced labor in the
performance of the award. In addition, for certain awards (as
prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation), USAID requires
certification from both contractors and recipients that they have a
compliance plan in place to prevent this prohibited activity (See ADS
303mav (https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/303mav.pdf),
paragraph 5 and FAR 52.222-56 (https://www.acquisition.gov/far/52.222-
56)). USAID further advises all of its implementing partners, as well
as USAID staff overseeing awards, to make use of a number of U.S.
Government-provided resources that identify entities who have been
determined to engage in forced labor practices (such as DHS's UFLPA
Entities List (https://www.dhs.gov/uflpa-entity-list)). This
prohibition is enforced by USAID through its contract and grant
management processes, and violations may result in termination of the
award and referral to USAID's Suspending and Debarring Official.
However, in the rare instances in which items such as solar panels are
directly procured, they are deemed ``commercial products'' under
government-wide procurement regulations, and as such USAID is obligated
to rely on contractors' existing quality assurance systems as a
substitute for government inspection. This reliance does not alleviate
contractors of their legal obligation to refrain from using forced
labor in the performance of federal awards.
Question. Are implementing or third-party partners for these
``clean'' energy aid projects required to source from non-China
suppliers?
Answer. Consistent with statutory and regulatory requirements, all
commodities and services procured under a USAID contract or assistance
award generally must be sourced from the United States, the recipient
country, or a developing country. Notably, in this context, USAID
regulations define ``sourced'' to mean, in relevant part, ``the country
from which a commodity is shipped to the cooperating/recipient country
. . . irrespective of the place of manufacture or production.'' China
is not considered a developing country for this purpose, so
implementing partners cannot source from China unless a waiver has been
issued, in accordance with USAID's regulations and policies.
Question. Do current or future ``clean'' energy aid products,
funded by USAID, contain Chinese produced solar panels or wind
turbines?
Answer. USAID does not maintain a centralized database of the point
of origin for all equipment purchased by USAID through our programs to
be able to answer this question definitively. However, only a small
percentage of USAID Clean Energy funding is used for direct purchases
of equipment, and USAID does not purchase energy equipment directly
from China. However, given the prevalence of products across all supply
chains that were initially manufactured in the PRC and then integrated
into commodities sourced from the U.S. or developing countries, our
experts assess that some components produced in the PRC are likely to
be contained within globally sourced energy equipment at this time
until competitive alternative supply chains are available. USAID fully
embraces the need for alternative supply chains and supports
development of manufacturing capabilities in partner countries where
practical, such as facilitating domestic smart meter production in
Pakistan.
Question. With rising prices for gas, food, schools and housing,
working families across America remain rightly concerned that their
taxpayer dollars must be fairly and effectively spent. We owe it to
American taxpayers to provide them with information and certainty that
their money is not going to fund some Ukrainian oligarch's personal
slush fund. Repeated reports from USAID's Office of Inspector General
have found no evidence that assistance funds have been misused. While
this looks like good news, this seems too good to be true. I would find
it hard to believe that even a federal program in the United States
would mean absolutely zero incidents of misuse. Do you stand by the
findings of these OIG reports?
Answer. USAID's Office of Inspector General (OIG) has declared that
providing independent oversight of USAID's support of Ukraine and its
people is its top priority. Information concerning their efforts can be
found on OIG's website specifically dedicated to Ukraine oversight:
https://oig.usaid.gov/our-work/ukraine-oversight. We have no reason or
basis to question the findings of OIG's reports. While we defer to OIG
to answer specific questions about its work, we note the following
statement from USAID Acting Deputy (performing the duties of the
Inspector General) Nicole Angarella before the House Foreign Affairs
Committee on March 29, 2023:
``Our investigators have provided more than 20 fraud awareness
briefings to nearly 1,000 individuals employed by at least 9
organizations receiving USAID funds for programming in Ukraine.
In these briefings, our special agents train aid workers and
contractors to identify fraud indicators, potential misconduct,
and other program vulnerabilities at an early stage, and report
allegations directly to OIG. Our special agents and legal
counsel also explain the whistleblower protections available
under U.S. law to individuals from any country who elect to
come forward. Specifically, our work relies on the ability of
complainants to report information affecting USAID awards
without fear of reprisal, and we aggressively investigate
allegations of whistleblower retaliation. We also worked
closely with our colleagues at the State Department and DoD
OIGs to produce joint hotline materials in English and
Ukrainian. Since broadcasting our joint message to report fraud
to the OIGs, my office has received a substantial influx of
reports. Specifically, since the issuance of our hotline
materials, USAID OIG's hotline has received 178 reports related
to Ukraine. This represents a 556 percent increase in reports
from the previous 11-month period. To date, we have no serious
criminal findings associated with USAID assistance to Ukraine.
However, this increase in reporting shows that our outreach is
working, and individuals know how to report potential misuse of
USAID funds.''
USAID is confident in OIG, its oversight work in Ukraine, and its
current reporting. USAID is in regular communication with OIG regarding
direct budget support to Ukraine, and has provided OIG with relevant
information to help ensure they can effectively perform their
independent oversight role. OIG has alter-ego authority to access the
same documents or records that USAID has access to, in order to carry
out OIG's independent oversight responsibilities. As Acting Deputy IG
Angarella noted in her House Foreign Affairs Committee testimony:
``[OIG] recently issued three products related to USAID's
Direct Budget Support (DBS) to the Government of Ukraine. The
first report was an Information Brief that described the three
different World Bank trust funds that USAID's money has gone
through, and the oversight mechanisms associated with each
fund. The second and third DBS products detailed and assessed
the monitoring and safeguards in place to prevent corruption
and ensure accountability within USAID's DBS programming. In
these reports, we found that the oversight mechanisms aligned
with the U.S. Government Accountability Office's standards for
internal control. In a future report, we plan to assess the
effectiveness of these established mechanisms.''
Question. According to these reports, USAID primarily relies on
Deloitte's Ukraine branch to audit Ukrainian Government spending of
U.S. assistance funds and that all of these employees are Ukrainian
nationals. Do U.S. auditors play any part in verifying Ukrainian
Government spending of U.S. taxpayer dollars?
Answer. Under USAID's State-Owned Enterprise Reform Activity
(SOERA), Deloitte provides technical assistance to the Ministry of
Finance and other Ukrainian Government institutions on existing
processes and procedures to oversee and report on direct budget support
funding provided by USAID. This includes reporting on the use of funds,
results achieved, and metrics used to measure results. The USAID
Mission in Kyiv is working to procure an independent, third-party
auditor to audit DBS funding, which will not include Deloitte given its
role in providing technical assistance to the Government of Ukraine
under SOERA. Deloitte has 12 Ukrainian nationals and 21 Americans
engaged in DBS verification.
Question. How many direct hire USAID employees are physically
working in Ukraine?
Answer. As of April 26, 2023, USAID's Mission in Ukraine is staffed
with 110 people, of which 47 (40 Foreign Service Nationals and 7 U.S.
Direct Hires) are working inside Ukraine. Under an Embassy cap of 106
U.S. Direct Hire positions operating in Kyiv, 7 of those belong to
USAID (6 Mission U.S. Direct Hire and one Disaster Assistance Response
Team lead). USAID's Mission in Ukraine follows the U.S. Embassy
security guidelines and maintains a limited staffing footprint in
Ukraine.
Question. Has USAID used implementing partners or USAID direct hire
employees to verify oversight of USAID aid and programs in Ukraine?
Answer. USAID uses both direct hire employees and implementing
partners to verify oversight of USAID aid and programs in Ukraine. All
42 USAID programs in Ukraine continue to operate through the work of
nearly 1,400 implementing partner staff.
There are currently direct hire employees working for USAID's
Ukraine Mission in Ukraine and remotely who provide monitoring and
oversight of U.S. Government (USG) funding and programs. Mission staff
hold in-person or virtual meetings with implementing partners and
program beneficiaries and review reports, deliverables, photos, videos,
and work plans to ensure activities are on track. Despite the ongoing
war, USAID continues to implement oversight, monitoring, and
accountability procedures in line with Agency directives. Requirements
for monitoring, accountability, and oversight of USG funds and USG-
funded equipment are included in all contracts and grants. Our
implementing partner staff are also vital to these efforts--of nearly
1,400 implementing partner staff from USAID Ukraine Mission programs,
over 1,000 remain in Ukraine--in addition to 47 Ukraine Mission staff
still in-country (of 102 total). Activity-specific accountability
includes the role of the Contracting/Agreement Officer's Representative
to ensure compliance with monitoring and evaluation procedures and
policy. This is supplemented by the Mission's overarching monitoring
and evaluation team. Every activity has a Monitoring and Evaluation
Plan with specific indicators and quantifiable targets. Work plans,
regular reporting, and Risk Assessment and Management Plans are all
required. USAID engagement with Ukrainian Government counterparts and
civil society organizations increases visibility on assistance delivery
and impact. Almost all Mission activities undergo a third-party
evaluation.
In order to implement humanitarian assistance, the USAID Disaster
Assistance Response Team team, currently composed of humanitarian
experts based in Rzeszow, Poland, and in Kyiv, is augmented by a
Response Management Team in Washington and supported by additional
Monitoring and Evaluation and Risk Management specialists. USAID
utilizes direct monitoring, third-party monitoring, and implementing
partners' own monitoring and reporting, and continuously assesses and
mitigates risks related to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in
Ukraine. Despite a limited footprint in Kyiv, USAID conducts direct
oversight of humanitarian assistance award activities with the approval
of the U.S. Embassy's Ukraine Regional Security Officer. USAID also
uses third-party monitoring to mitigate access limitations and
independently monitor our humanitarian assistance partners' activities.
In addition, every partner is required to abide by an approved
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, which is reviewed by USAID prior to
implementation. Direct monitoring and third-party monitoring complement
the monitoring by implementing partners to provide greater oversight,
accountability, and visibility into the efficacy of USAID programming.
USAID currently delivers Direct Budget Support (DBS) to Ukraine
through the World Bank Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity
Endurance (PEACE) mechanism, which reimburses the Government of Ukraine
(GOU) for expenses incurred in pre-approved expenditure categories.
Funding is only disbursed to the GOU following verification of expenses
by the Ministry of Finance and World Bank, which minimizes risk of
diversion. USAID contracted an independent third-party monitor,
Deloitte, to review financial controls and procedures utilized by the
GOU to track and oversee U.S. funds being used for DBS. Deloitte's
experts are reviewing the Ukrainian Ministry of Finance's existing
monitoring, transparency, verification and reporting systems and
procedures, identifying and strengthening responses to gaps, and
supporting reporting on DBS tranches. Deloitte is conducting three
tiers of spot checks to trace payments from the U.S. Government through
the World Bank to the GOU's Single Treasury Account (Tier 1), then to
recipient governmental organizations and institutions (Tier 2), and
ultimately down to individual beneficiaries (Tier 3).
Question. Since the start of the invasion in February 2022, the
U.S. has provided billions of dollars in ``direct budgetary support''
to the Ukrainian Government to offset its shortfalls in tax collection.
This support is going to pay the salaries and pensions of Ukrainian
public officials, to ensure continuation of Ukrainian public services.
While this may have made sense at the beginning of the invasion when
there was an urgent need to help Ukraine handle a dramatic shock to its
public finances, Ukraine has now had the time to adjust. What
assistance is USAID providing to ensure Ukraine regains its ability to
be self-reliant in paying public sector salaries?
Answer. The U.S. Government, and USAID in particular, continues to
focus on helping Ukraine win the war and set the right conditions for a
speedy recovery, reconstruction, and ultimately self- reliance. USAID
is working to help Ukraine's economy--critical to help Ukraine regain
its fiscal strength--through activities such as implementing critical
infrastructure for export, investing in digitization, supporting
Ukrainian businesses, advancing economic reforms, and facilitating
private and foreign direct investment. We are helping Ukraine expand
trade throughout the country and build import and export relationships
with the European Union and the United States, with the goal of
restarting and expanding the production of goods and services in
Ukraine, increasing access to markets for Ukrainian products, creating
jobs, and restoring government tax revenues. We are also focused on
helping specific vulnerable groups, such as veterans, persons with
disabilities, female-headed households, and internally displaced
persons and returnees. This will enable Ukraine to more fully utilize
its labor potential and generate revenue needed for recovery.
Question. Has USAID approached the Ukrainian Government on the need
to consider other possibilities to remain solvent, such as reducing the
salaries of government workers, or re-examining the steep tax cuts
Ukraine announced at the start of the war?
Answer. USAID assesses that it is unlikely that the Government of
Ukraine (GOU) will be able to increase revenue while Russia continues
to wage its illegal war through its indiscriminate and destructive
bombing campaign. While USAID has not approached the GOU about further
reducing salaries for government employees or re-evaluating previous
tax cuts in order for the GOU to raise revenues, we note, however, that
the GOU has already instituted austerity measures, which includes
downsizing their government. All national ministries are downsizing by
30 percent, even as the country looks to cut unemployment and get at
least 1 million people back to work. The goal is to combine redundant
parts of ministries, streamline actions, and redefine what the
government should be doing. The result of these efforts has reduced
their fiscal budgetary needs from $5 billion per month to $3.5 billion
per month. USAID is also working with the GOU on reforms in critical
sectors of the economy and infrastructure, so that Ukraine has the
ability to raise revenues in the future through increased market
activity.
Question. How much are our European counterparts contributing to
ensuring that the Ukrainian Government remains solvent?
Answer. Since the start of Russia's war of aggression, the European
Union (EU), Member States, and the European Financial Institutions--in
a Team Europe approach--are making available up to =37.8 billion in
financial, humanitarian, and budget support to Ukraine as of April
2023. To ensure the Ukrainian Government remains solvent, the EU is
providing up to =25.2 billion in direct budget support through highly
concessional loans through 2023 in addition to =2.3 billion in EU
guarantees. Of the =18 billion allocated for 2023, the EU disbursed the
first =3 billion in January 2023 and has been distributing =1.5 billion
a month since March with a third installment of =1.5 billion made on
April 25. This package will support paying wages and pensions and
maintaining essential public services, such as hospitals, schools, and
housing for relocated people. It will also ensure macroeconomic
stability and help restore critical infrastructure that has been
destroyed.
The EU has provided approximately 4 million people from Ukraine
with temporary protection status since February 2022, granting
displaced people fleeing the war in Ukraine certain rights in the EU,
including a residence permit, access to the labor market and suitable
accommodation or housing, medical care, and access to education for
children. The EU has made up to =17 billion available to member states
to assist with refugees in the EU. Unofficially, the European
Commission estimates total EU member state spending on refugees at =20
billion in 2022, and =30 billion per year in 2023 and 2024.
Other donors are also stepping up. Norway, Canada, and Japan have
committed more than the United States when calculating funding as a
percentage of gross domestic product. On February 16, 2023, Norway
announced a $7.3 billion, 5-year support package to Ukraine--the
breakdown for all years has not been announced, but will likely include
approximately $3.7 billion in civilian assistance. On March 15, Denmark
announced the creation of a new $1 billion Ukraine Fund to include
military, civil, and commercial support. The fund will provide $770
million for military assistance; $170 million for civilian support,
including humanitarian efforts and long-term reconstruction; and $60
million for business subsidies to assist Danish businesses contributing
to the rebuilding of Ukraine.
The scope and scale of Putin's brutality requires a sustained,
shared response. The United States has rallied our partners to respond
swiftly and as a unified force. USAID continues to use every
opportunity to raise the importance of sustained financial support to
Ukraine with European and other like-minded donor counterparts.
Question. Next year, Venezuela is scheduled to hold general
elections. The democratic opposition faces an uphill battle to win
these elections, to say the least. As long as the Maduro regime
controls the central election commission, it is absolutely certain the
results will be rigged in their favor.
What assistance is USAID providing to the Venezuelan democracy
movement to give them the best chance possible to compete in next
year's elections?
Answer. The Maduro regime has yet to demonstrate willingness to
allow necessary conditions for free and fair elections in 2024.
However, the Venezuelan opposition has won important elected positions
under unfavorable conditions in the past. The October 22 primaries are
an opportunity for the opposition to regain momentum and expand their
appeal in Venezuela, while the Maduro regime itself is nearing an all
time low in popularity.
USAID is supporting the Venezuelan pro-democracy movement through
technical assistance, focusing on activities that promote the
democratic opposition's consensus and collective action, including a
primary. USAID supports activities to monitor and improve electoral
conditions, report irregularities, and ensure that news of
irregularities is shared widely. USAID supports independent
stakeholders and civil society to mobilize Venezuelans in the defense
of their political rights and advocate for a more competitive,
inclusive, and transparent electoral process. USAID does not support
specific candidates or political parties.
Question. Is USAID considering providing any other assistance to
help the opposition respond to the possibility that elections will end
up handing the Maduro regime a rigged victory?
Answer. USAID supports democratic civil society and independent
media organizations in holding the regime accountable for its actions.
Our assistance includes activities to monitor and improve electoral
conditions, report irregularities, and ensure news of irregularities is
shared widely.
USAID will continue our long-standing support for outreach and
communication efforts that describe standards and procedures for
electoral participation to the Venezuelan public. USAID will also
provide assistance to facilitate and mobilize Venezuelans to register
or update their voter registration and mobilize citizens to defend free
and fair elections should the regime subvert a competitive democratic
process in the run up to, the day of, and after election.
In the event that rigged elections hand the Maduro regime a tainted
victory, USAID will continue to support independent stakeholders and
civil society to mobilize Venezuelans in the defense of their political
rights and a more competitive, inclusive, and transparent electoral
process.
Question. Late last year, the Unitary Platform and the Maduro
regime agreed to establish a humanitarian fund, under the auspices of
the United Nations, to provide assistance to Venezuela. Given USAID's
long experience of providing humanitarian experience in Venezuela, what
is USAID's main role in this process?
Has USAID briefed Congress on the distribution of these funds? If
not, when is Congress expected to be briefed?
What are the chances that a UN administered fund will result in
money being directed towards the Maduro regime?
What participation, if any, is USAID considering providing in this
proposed humanitarian fund?
Answer. USAID is tracking closely that the Unitary Platform and
Maduro regime officials signed the Mesa Social humanitarian agreement
on November 26, 2022, committing both parties to pursue joint
initiatives to benefit the Venezuelan people and address humanitarian
needs using frozen Government of Venezuela funds for assistance in
Venezuela. USAID's role is strictly advisory, providing information on
the humanitarian response in Venezuela to the interagency and to the UN
as discussions proceed regarding the possibility of establishing a
trust fund. Thus far, USAID has shared experiences working with various
UN agencies and has reiterated the importance of maintaining
humanitarian principles.
USAID has not briefed Congress on the establishment of a trust fund
or distribution of funds. To the best of our knowledge, no funds have
been distributed to date, but we defer to our colleagues at the
Department of State and Department of Treasury, who are in the lead on
this initiative.
USAID is not currently planning to put any funding into the
proposed UN-managed trust fund, nor would USAID have a management role
to play.
Question. The Biden administration has spent far too much time
alienating allies and far too little time strengthening partnerships
with key countries, especially in our hemisphere. For example, the
Dominican Republic has been overwhelmed by the collapse of Haiti--yet
instead of working together to assist them, the Biden administration
accuses the Dominican Government of discrimination. How is USAID
assisting the Dominican Republic deal with the negative consequences
caused by the instability in Haiti?
Answer. USAID's budget in the Dominican Republic has risen
significantly, from $37.6 million in Fiscal Year 2019 to $64.4 million
in Fiscal Year 2022, helping us to more effectively address development
challenges in the Dominican Republic, including as a result of
instability in Haiti. Our efforts support the Government of the
Dominican Republic's priorities in areas such as: Citizen Security and
Anti-Corruption; Education; Climate Resilience; Energy; Biodiversity;
Food Security; Health; and Vulnerable Populations and Human Rights.
Our transboundary approach allows us to address conflict mitigation
and management, health disparities for those living with HIV, and
economic and environmental threats along the Dominican-Haitian border
and throughout the Dominican Republic. For instance, our health
programs provide migrants and people of Haitian descent with tailored
services, given their increased risks of HIV/AIDS infection and low
treatment coverage. USAID-supported community justice houses increase
access to justice for vulnerable populations, including migrants and
people of Haitian descent. Under the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, USAID addresses transnational crime threats by supporting
youth at risk of becoming involved in crime or violence and helping key
security institutions, including the Dominican National Police, to more
effectively and transparently address crime.
We have designated the Dominican Republic both under the Democracy
Delivers and Partnership for Democratic Development initiatives. As
such, we are directing additional resources to support the Government
of the Dominican Republic's commitment to democracy, including by
mitigating the effects of instability in Haiti. One way USAID is doing
this is by advancing economic development to support trade, investment,
and employment in the Dominican Republic's northwest region, which
borders Haiti.
Question. The political, economic, and humanitarian situation in
Haiti has deteriorated significantly in recent years. The situation is
so severe that more than 75 percent of Port-au-Prince and 60 percent of
the country are controlled by violent gangs that disrupt people's
access to food, fuel, education, and a normal life. The gangs have made
providing humanitarian aid to some parts of the country all but
impossible. How is USAID working across humanitarian, development, and
stabilization programs to address the extraordinary level of need in
Haiti?
Answer. USAID has been actively working to address the significant
challenges faced by Haiti, including political, economic, and
humanitarian issues. In response to the deteriorating situation, USAID
has implemented a comprehensive approach that encompasses humanitarian,
development, and stabilization programs in Haiti.
Humanitarian Assistance: Despite the highly insecure operating
environment that challenges humanitarian access, humanitarian
organizations, including USAID partners, continue to reach people in
need in Haiti. The United States is the single largest donor of
humanitarian assistance to Haiti. This funding is helping partners meet
the urgent humanitarian needs of people across Haiti. USAID's partners
provide emergency food and nutrition assistance; deliver protection
services, including gender-based violence prevention and response;
distribute medical supplies and medicines; and improve access to safe
water, including to respond to the ongoing cholera epidemic.
USAID remains deeply concerned by the adverse impacts of ongoing
violence and insecurity on civilians. To ensure the protection of
civilians in Haiti, we are working with our humanitarian partners to
overcome access constraints and effectively deliver needs-based
assistance to the most vulnerable while mitigating harm. USAID
continues to advocate for unhindered humanitarian access with relevant
parties to reach people in need with critical aid. Free and open roads
and access for aid workers are essential for the successful delivery of
life-saving assistance.
Since USAID deployed a Disaster Assistance Response Team to Haiti
in mid-October 2022, we have transported a total of more than 450 MT of
critical supplies including health, logistics, and water, sanitation,
and hygiene commodities to partners responding to needs from the
complex humanitarian emergency and cholera epidemic. In addition, the
UN announced a system-wide scale-up of humanitarian response activities
in Haiti on April 17, 2023. The scale-up will be in place for an
initial 3 months, from April through July 14, 2023. Along with the
scale-up, the humanitarian community is activating a number of
humanitarian clusters in order to address the high level of need in
Haiti. The UN also released the 2023 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP)
for Haiti on April 21, requesting $719.9 million--the largest appeal
since Haiti's 2010 earthquake to target 3.2 million people of the
estimated 5.2 million people in need across the country. The HRP
prioritizes food and nutrition; health, protection; and water,
sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) assistance.
Development Programs: USAID works to build a stable and
economically viable Haiti, focusing on improving health and education
outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving the
independence and accountability of government institutions. Our
development assistance provides economic opportunity through inclusive,
environmentally sustainable agriculture development and micro-, small-,
and medium-sized business development, and improves the economic and
environmental resilience of communities. USAID health programs work to
fight infectious disease and improve primary healthcare services, and
increase access to water and sanitation services. USAID also seeks to
strengthen the organizational capacity to respond to natural and
manmade emergencies, and to advance citizen-responsive government
institutions.
Stabilization Efforts: Given the security challenges posed by
violent gangs, USAID incorporates stabilization efforts into its
programs. USAID aims to create a secure environment that allows for the
provision of essential services and the reestablishment of normalcy in
affected areas. This includes community engagement, and violence
prevention initiatives. For example, USAID will soon launch a 5-year
citizen security program to reduce the level of violence in targeted
neighborhoods. This activity uses a three-pronged approach that
connects police and other Haitian Government entities, the communities
they serve, and social services providers in targeted neighborhoods of
greater Port-au-Prince.
Question. How is Haiti prioritized in the FY24 budget? Please list
specific proposals.
Answer. The Request prioritized $146.2 million in development and
global health assistance for Haiti will help build a more stable and
economically viable Haiti, focused on improving health and education
outcomes, advancing economic and food security, and improving the
independence and accountability of government institutions. Increased
resources will support violence prevention and reception and
reintegration activities for returned migrants. Specifically, USAID
programs will:
Promote citizen security, good governance, and capacity-
building for elections; increase multi-sector resilience; and
expand locally driven development and civil society. USAID will
help administer elections while strengthening the capacity of
the provisional electoral commission to administer credible
elections.
Strengthen the justice sector, including reducing pretrial
detention and providing justice for violence-affected
communities. Funds will strengthen Haiti's supreme audit
institution to oversee public spending and conduct performance
audits.
Support better planning, financing, and implementation to
mitigate threats to water security, improve water resource
management, strengthen the excreta management value chain, and
increase access to safe water and sanitation.
Strengthen decentralized water utilities, community service
providers, and relevant local authorities in Haiti. USAID will
provide technical assistance to ensure efficient and
financially-sound operation of water utilities.
Provide bilingual, phonics-based literacy instruction and
materials, and socio-emotional learning support for
marginalized and vulnerable children in elementary schools.
USAID will provide entrepreneurial and life skills training,
and psychosocial support to develop skills that lead to
successful participation in the workplace.
Support investment facilitation particularly for high-growth
small and medium enterprises to support job creation and
retention.
Expand income generating activities in at-risk communities.
Activities will strengthen the capacity of people in vulnerable
communities to access economic opportunities, jobs, and to
reduce economic instability and violence in select areas
through skills development and entrepreneurship, particularly
for at-risk youth and women.
Support smallholder farmers to increase yields, sales, and
investment in key crops and commodities, including livestock.
Conserve and restore key watersheds through agriculture,
reforestation, land management, and livelihood opportunities
for vulnerable households. Funds will mitigate and adapt to
climate change impacts, environmental degradation, and natural
disasters. USAID will support clean energy initiatives for
electric and solar grids and microgrids to increase economic
opportunities and private sector growth.
Confront challenges posed by irregular migration out of
Haiti and support reception services for returning migrants by
providing cash, medical and social services, and other tools
upon arrival in Haiti.
Given the continuing high levels of urgent humanitarian need,
USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance anticipates continuing to
provide significant funding to Haiti in FY24. In FY23, the United
States has been the single largest donor of humanitarian assistance to
Haiti. Our funding is helping partners meet urgent humanitarian needs
of people across Haiti by providing emergency food and nutrition
assistance; delivering protection services, including gender-based
violence prevention and response; distributing medical supplies and
medicines and improving access to safe water, including responding to
the ongoing cholera epidemic.
Question. What assistance is USAID providing to the newly announced
transition council intended to provide the framework for holding new
elections in Haiti by the end of this year?
Answer. In May, USAID started a new elections program that will
support the High Council of the Transition (HCT) to provide the
framework for holding elections in Haiti by the end of this year. The
program will provide assistance to the Provisional Electoral Commission
(CEP) to help it implement its institutional mandate, exercise
oversight functions, and foster greater responsiveness to citizens'
needs. Technical assistance will be provided to formulate a realistic
electoral framework and timeline in the current political environment.
The program will also assist with electoral and constitutional
reform as requested in areas that include synchronization of national
and subnational elections, rebalancing power between the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of government, and reform of
electoral law. USAID will facilitate dialogue and participation by a
broad spectrum of citizens, civil society, and political actors to
ensure citizen input.
To educate citizens on the transition process, we will also provide
strategic communications support to the CEP and HCT.
Question. As we know all too well in Florida, hurricanes and
natural disasters frequently impact the Caribbean. USAID has been a
critical provider of disaster relief for these countries. In 2021
alone, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance provided $8 billion
in humanitarian aid. While this spending is important to ensure that
natural disasters do not drive illegal immigration, this is a
significant amount of money. As even FEMA is projecting to fall short
on the Disaster Relief Fund, as soon as this summer, we need to find
more efficient ways to use foreign aid dollars. In many cases, a modest
investment in disaster resilience before a hurricane strikes can mean
much less spending after the fact. We saw this in 1998 with Hurricane
Mitch in Central America and in Haiti after the 2010 earthquake.
Stronger infrastructures in LAC region countries can be more cost-
effective and contribute to U.S. national security by helping stabilize
disaster-stricken countries, facilitating faster recovery and
reconstruction, and reducing pressures for affected populations to
emigrate. What is USAID doing to support pre-disaster efforts in the
Caribbean?
Answer. Populations in the Caribbean are vulnerable to a range of
natural disasters, including drought, earthquakes, hurricanes, floods,
landslides, and wildfires. These hazards compound existing
vulnerabilities faced by many communities in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC). In FY 2022, USAID's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance
(BHA) provided approximately $110 million to partner organizations
conducting early recovery, risk reduction, and resilience (ER4)
activities in 16 countries across LAC. BHA partners with local,
regional, and national disaster management agencies, non-government
organizations, civil society, the UN and others to advance countries
and populations' capacity for disaster preparedness, risk reduction,
and timely frontline disaster response.
In the Caribbean, USAID contributed to the establishment of what is
now known as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency
(CDEMA), a regional intergovernmental body for disaster coordination
and management in the Caribbean, and we've continued that enduring
partnership since 1991. BHA currently funds the UN World Food Program
(WFP) to strengthen the operational capacity of CDEMA. In FY22, with
USAID's support, WFP activities enhanced the capacities of CDEMA and
its 19 member states and territories to strengthen social protection
systems, emergency telecommunications, and end-to-end humanitarian
supply chain management.
USAID utilizes agreements with the U.S. Forest Service and U.S.
Geological Service to provide technical support to countries to enhance
their disaster preparedness in the face of wildfires and volcanic
eruptions. BHA also funds early warning systems such as the Volcanic
Disaster Assistance Program that monitors volcanic activity in the
region, enabling early evacuations and preparedness.
In addition, BHA is prepared to respond to the 2023 hurricane
season in the Atlantic basin with an experienced team of disaster
management professionals strategically located throughout LAC, pre-
positioned emergency relief supplies and communications equipment, and
agreements with partners and service providers to support the delivery
of humanitarian assistance. BHA has prepositioned USAID-branded relief
commodities in Miami and Barbados for quick distributions to the most
vulnerable after a disaster. BHA also maintains agreements with other
U.S. federal agencies regarding specialized assistance for disaster
response and ER4 activities, including the National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration, the U.S. Forest Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; the U.S.
Department of Agriculture; and the Department of Defense (DoD). BHA
maintains two humanitarian assistance advisors to the military at
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM, a Regional Civil Military Affairs Coordinator,
and two BHA staff in Washington, DC, who assist in coordinating USAID
and DoD humanitarian assistance in LAC.
Question. Is there an opportunity to pilot a solid partnership
between universities in the United States and governments willing to
learn from some of America's most successful disaster mitigation
researchers in Florida?
Answer. USAID works in partnership with host country and U.S.
higher education institutions (HEIs) to ensure higher education
institutions in our partner countries have the capacity to be central
actors in disaster risk reduction and development. Faculty and students
contribute to strengthening all sectors of the economy, including
agriculture, energy, business services, technology, health,
engineering, disaster risk reduction and more.
As part of USAID's partnerships, programs leverage university
research expertise to solve global development challenges and establish
global networks of universities to strengthen the capacity of
individuals and institutions to identify knowledge gaps, discover new
information, and translate that knowledge into actionable solutions.
HEIs can play an important role in supporting disaster mitigation.
USAID is currently partnering with Florida International University
(FIU) on the Disaster Resilience and Climate in the Americas Program.
The project works to advance disaster risk reduction (DRR) in Latin
America and the Caribbean by institutionalizing risk management through
higher education organizations and encouraging broader participation by
the academic and scientific communities in disaster preparedness, risk
reduction, response, recovery, and resilience-building actions. The
program also works to address the drivers of existing risks and their
consequences, as well as helping avoid the creation and accumulation of
new risk, and developing capabilities and mechanisms for building
resilience. The DRR project is located within the Extreme Events
Research department at FIU. The Department utilizes FIU's research and
applications leadership at the global level in extreme events,
reflecting an institutional interest in development and multi-hazard
disaster resilience, including disaster risk management, risk
reduction, preparedness, emergency response, resilience, and ``smart''
recovery.
Additional Examples of Partnerships with Universities in Florida:
USAID has strong partnerships with HEIs in Florida and welcomes all
organizations interested in working with USAID to explore publicly
listed partnership opportunities. Information on partnership
opportunities is provided on USAID's website (https://www.usaid.gov/
partner-with-us). Examples of current partnerships with HEIs in Florida
include:
Florida International University (FIU) signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) with USAID as part of USAID's Minority-
Serving Institution Partnership Initiative in March 2022 to
promote diversity, equity, and inclusion in the workforce for
the international development field. The MOU builds on USAID
and FIU's long-time collaboration on international development
initiatives, such as disaster risk resilience, and marks the
first MOU the agency has signed with a Hispanic-Serving
Institution (HSI) of higher education. USAID's Innovation,
Technology, and Research (ITR) Hub plans to meet with
leadership and faculty from FIU's Jack D. Gordon School of
Public Policy, on Tuesday May 16, to discuss potential
opportunities for engagement.
University of Florida hosts the U.S. Government's Feed the
Future Innovation Lab for Livestock Systems, which uses
research to support international agriculture and development
in low- and middle-income countries. The goal of the Lab is to
sustainably improve livestock production in order to improve
the nutrition, health, incomes and livelihoods in partner
countries. Through research projects, capacity building, and
education, the Lab seeks to reduce poverty, improve food
security, enhance nutrition and build resilience. Projects
integrate health, food systems, and environment-friendly
approaches to ensure sustainability.
Florida State University's Learning Systems Institute (LSI)
is leading a $15.6 million project sponsored by USAID to
improve teacher training in Malawi: the Strengthening Teacher
Education and Practice (STEP) project. LSI faculty are working
with 16 teacher training colleges across the country to improve
teacher education programs and develop new training materials
related to literacy and numeracy education. The project will
also provide support to the Ministry of Education to deliver
continuous professional development courses to teachers who are
already in classrooms. The STEP project is a landmark
investment by USAID to support local institutions of higher
education that provide pre-service teacher education.
University of South Florida (USF) received a $3.6 million
grant from USAID to support the Research Initiative for
Supporting Education in the Caribbean, also known as the RISE
Caribbean Initiative, a project that launched a new
interdisciplinary educational research center to support
education policy development and timely decision-making on
issues impacting schools in the sub-region. The initiative
brings together researchers from both USF and The University of
the West Indies (UWI) Cave Hill to collaborate on research and
activities to help solve ongoing challenges facing the region's
schools.
Question. The President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) purchases
millions of dollars' worth of commodities, such as medicine, medical
equipment, and bed nets, to drive malaria elimination in countries all
around the world. In order to ensure the supply chain resiliency of
these commodities, PMI has undertaken a market shaping effort to bring
a diversity of manufacturers into the malaria commodity market. In a
time where global supply chains can be disrupted by a war in Europe or
a pandemic sprung from a lab leak in China, it is important that these
lifesaving goods are sourced from reliable providers in the United
States. Over the last 5 years, can you provide the volume that PMI has
procured for malaria-related commodities that has been procured from
U.S. companies and from non-U.S. companies?
Answer. The U.S. President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) works to
promote a healthy market and operate a resilient supply chain that is
able to continue to deliver life-saving malaria commodities during both
global and local disruptions. A core component of this is developing a
diversified supply base both in terms of the number of qualified
suppliers from which PMI procures, and the geographic location of the
manufacturing sites. For example, in 2022, PMI procured malaria
pharmaceuticals from 12 suppliers with manufacturing sites in six
countries. This approach helped ensure that malaria commodities
continued to flow to PMI partner countries during the COVID-19
pandemic, even as the global supply chain experienced significant
disruptions.
Currently, there is limited manufacturing of malaria commodities in
the United States, including no manufacturing of insecticide-treated
nets (ITN) or antimalarial pharmaceuticals, our largest spending
categories. This is primarily because there is not a domestic market
for malaria commodities given that there are less than 2,000 malaria
cases in the United States annually. Historically, there was a U.S.-
based supplier of malaria rapid diagnostic tests (mRDT) that were
manufactured in New Jersey. However, the supplier received a notice of
concern due to quality issues in 2020, and therefore, was not eligible
for procurement until the issues were resolved. The supplier has since
shifted to manufacturing COVID-19 tests. PMI does, however, procure
laboratory supplies and personal protective equipment manufactured in
the United States.
Over the last 5 years, the value of malaria commodities
manufactured in the United States was $16 million (laboratory supplies,
mRDTs, PPE) and the value of malaria commodities manufactured outside
of the United States was $943 million (including ITNs, pharmaceuticals
and mRDTs).
______
Responses of Ms. Samantha Power to Questions
Submitted by Senator Bill Hagerty
Question. On USAID support natural gas programing: (In your
testimony on April 26, 2023, you stated that ``[USAID] support[s], for
example, natural gas programming in instances where it can create
energy access while not delaying plans [for?] clean energy.''
Please provide a list of all natural gas deals, including prime
awardees and subawardees, that have received any funding from USAID
beginning January 1, 2021, to the present day. The list should include
the names of the prime awardees and sub awardees receiving any U.S.
funding, the date and duration of the funding provided, the total
amount of funding that has been and will be provided, the
instrumentality of the United States Government that is providing the
funding, and the stated purpose of the funding.
Answer. USAID energy programs do not typically fund deals directly
through either prime awardees or subawardees. The majority of our
support focuses on the enabling environment for sound energy sector
development and private sector investment in the sector for long term
financial sustainability and provision of low cost, reliable energy
services.
A list of our assistance to the gas sector that has been vetted
through our internal vetting procedures is provided below.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
WSJ Article, ``Solar and Wind Force Poverty on Africa,''
Dated October 24, 2021, by President Museveni
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
Letter From USAID Providing Two Corrections for the Record for
Ms. Samantha Power, Dated April 28, 2023
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[all]